Fifteen years ago it would be unthinkable for cyber security to top the list of priorities at the annual US-China Security and Economic Dialogue, as it did last week. But, in the intervening years, cyber technologies and the internet have become fundamental tools for everything from running critical infrastructure such as energy grids and satellite systems, to political, economic and social interactions. Given the pace of change, it should not surprise us that we have barely started to understand how to govern this new order and manage the global internet in ways that both empower and protect us.

In response, Chatham House and Routledge (part of the Taylor & Francis Group) are launching the Journal of Cyber Policy, addressing a rapidly changing situation and connecting creative, technical and policy experts.

Informing the growing security challenges of an interconnected digital world, this new peer-reviewed journal will provide a valuable resource to decision-makers in the public and private sectors grappling with the challenges of cyber security, online privacy, surveillance and internet access. The journal will offer informed and rigorous thinking, supported by the journal’s internationally renowned editorial board.

'The Journal of Cyber Policy will empower experts with new thinking and diverse ideas delivered in a way which is practically relevant as well as academically rigorous,' Dr Patricia Lewis, research director, International Security Department at Chatham House and co-editor of the journal, said. 'It will change the game for those working on cyber issues.' 

'As the preferred publisher for think tanks around the world, we are proud to be Chatham House’s partner on this new journal, which seeks to address issues that touch upon all our lives on a daily basis,' said Leon Heward-Mills, Global Publishing Director (Journals) at Taylor & Francis Group.

The Journal of Cyber Policy launches on the evening of 2 July at a reception at Chatham House.

During a decade-long commodities boom, new or emerging producers of oil, gas or mineral resources registered some of the fastest rates of economic growth in the world. Development banks, governments giving foreign aid, extractives companies and major consultancies broadly agreed that ‘extractives-led growth’ is a viable path to socio-economic development for poor countries. 
               
Following over a year of decline in global commodities prices and as efforts to tackle climate change mount, a new paper re-examines the 'curse of natural resources'. It finds that a policy of extractives-led growth entails serious risks. As governments of countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Mauritania, Somalia, Liberia and Cuba prepare to follow an extractives-led growth path, both the advice being handed to them and the growth model itself require a fundamental rethink.

The Resource Curse Revisited argues that:

• The steep decline in the oil price in the second half of 2014 demolished the main assumption of the extractives-led growth agenda. The assumption that prices of raw materials would continue to increase as global demand grew and well-established sources were exhausted has actually led several low- to middle-income producers such as Ghana into unmanageable debt. At the very least, the current price context  puts new producers at a serious disadvantage, as the focus on cost-cutting has made investors reluctant to accept the risks of developing projects in countries with little infrastructure or capacity to support them.

• Good governance initiatives are not the antidote to the resource curse. There has often been a mismatch in terms of policy advice given (for example on transparency and revenue management) and the capacity of a country to implement it. Furthermore, basing economic growth on the extraction of below-ground resources will create strong pressures towards poor governance. In the absence of strong institutions, this path leads to the enrichment of minority elite groups, whose interest in capturing rents is likely to become a barrier to improving governance.

• Both governments with extractives potential and those advising them give too little consideration to the size and nature of the resource base. If extractives-led growth is to be sustained, resource extraction must persist long enough for new economic sectors to emerge and generate revenues that can support government spending and import needs as income from extractives declines.

• The extractives-led growth model, in its current form, is at odds with green growth strategies. The advice from international agencies and initiatives to countries with extractive resources offers no suggestions on how governments should manage the risk of stranded assets or how they can reconcile extractives-led growth with national sustainable-development goals.

The report concludes that the extractives-led growth agenda has tended to reinforce domestic, government and investor pressures to ‘develop fast’. However, this can threaten long-term opportunities for robust economic diversification. In many cases, there is a strong case for slowing development of extractives projects to allow time to develop the capacity of the government and the private sector to maximize the linkages with the rest of the economy.

Avoiding the resource curse needs not only good governance but also an economic policy that provides for the transition of an economy over time in accordance with its competitive advantages. This report recommends that countries considering extractives development, and their would-be advisors, take into account a wider set of issues at the outset including the likely value of the asset to the economy over time, the options for slow or indeed no development of extractives, and how the rest of the economy would lessen reliance on support from the extractives sector over time.

The Chatham House Prize is presented annually to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

The CPJ has been recognized for its efforts in defending the right of journalists to report the news without fear of reprisal, at a time when the free press is under serious pressure in many parts of the world.

Highlights of the work of the CPJ during 2017 include the launch of the US Press Freedom Tracker documenting attacks on press freedom in the US and the launch of its Free the Press campaign to raise awareness of journalists imprisoned on anti-state charges around the world. In addition, last year its advocacy helped secure the early release from prison of at least 75 journalists worldwide and helped to win convictions in the murders of six reporters, including Marcos Hernández Bautista in Mexico and Syrian editor Naji Jerf, who was killed in Turkey.

In a climate where the term ‘fake news’ is used to discredit much reporting, the CPJ has robustly supported the fourth estate’s role in contributing to a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Events

The Chatham House Prize 2018 was awarded in a ceremony on Wednesday 28 November at Chatham House in London. The executive director of the committee, Joel Simon, accepted the award and spoke about the importance of safeguarding journalism and free speech, followed by a discussion about the challenges of reporting today with a panel of journalists who have faced these pressures in their work.

Nominees

The nominees for the Chatham House Prize 2018 were:

• The Committee to Protect Journalists
• Mario Draghi, President, European Central Bank
• Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Halima Ismail Ibrahim, Chair, National Independent Electoral Commission, Federal Republic of Somalia

About the Chatham House Prize

The Chatham House Prize is presented to the person, persons or organization deemed by members of Chatham House to have made the most significant contribution to the improvement of international relations in the previous year.

The selection process is independent, democratic and draws on the deep knowledge of Chatham House's research teams, making the Prize a distinctive and unique award in the field of international affairs.

A short-list of nominees is selected by the institute's three presidents from a longer list submitted by the research programmes and departments in their areas of expertise. The recipient is then determined by Chatham House's broad membership base on a one-member, one-vote basis. The award is presented on behalf of the institute's patron, Her Majesty the Queen, representing the non-partisan and authoritative character of the Prize.

The Chatham House Prize was launched in 2005. Previous recipients of the Prize include former Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos, former president of Ghana John Kufuor, Médecins Sans Frontières and Melinda Gates, co-founder of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

For more information, please contact:

Chatham House press office
Email: pressoffice@chathamhouse.org
Phone: +44 (0)207 957 5739

CPJ Communications Associate 
Beatrice Santa-Wood
Email: press@cpj.org
Phone: +1 212 300 9032

He brings substantial expertise on food systems and environmental change to the role and will focus on establishing new initiatives at the intersection of research and policymaking.

Tim was appointed as a distinguished visiting fellow of Chatham House in the Energy, Environment and Resources Department in 2016. He has since contributed to the institute in a number of ways, not least through leading the GCRF-AFRICAP project which aims to enhance policy making in Sub-Saharan Africa, through building climate-smart food systems.

Tim’s research focuses on food security and building food systems that are resilient and sustainable, working within the broader areas of ecology, natural resources and climate change impacts. He has published over 150 academic papers, most tackling the core themes of agriculture’s environmental impact and more generally how systems respond to environmental change. He is a lead author of the upcoming Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on climate change and land. He is also coordinating lead author on international risks for the UK’s Climate Change Risk Assessment, which draws on his broader interests in sustainable finance, trade and energy. He has advised other governments as well as global companies on related issues.

Tim joins Chatham House in his new capacity from the University of Leeds where he is dean of strategic research initiatives. Prior to this, from 2011 to 2016, Tim was the champion of the UK’s Global Food Security programme, a large multi-agency partnership of the UK’s public bodies involved in addressing challenges around food. He has also been research dean in the Faculty of Biological Sciences, and head of department, at Leeds.

Dr Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, said: 'Tim’s wealth of experience will be especially valuable as we build up our interdisciplinary Chatham House research theme of promoting sustainable growth. We look forward to welcoming Tim to his new role in early July.'

Tim Benton said: 'I am honoured to be joining Chatham House as Research Director for Energy, Environment and Resources. Chatham House has a global reputation in these areas, on which we can build. Informed analysis, combined with effective action to transition towards sustainable economies, is needed now, more than ever.'

About the Energy, Environment and Resources Department

The Energy, Environment and Resources department at Chatham House seeks to advance the international debate on energy, environment and development policy and to influence and enable decision-makers – governments, NGOs and business – to take well-informed decisions that contribute to achieving sustainable development. Independent of any actor or ideology, we do this by carrying out innovative research on major policy challenges, bringing together diverse perspectives and constituencies and injecting new ideas into the international arena.

Tim Benton takes over the role from Rob Bailey who has joined Marsh & McLennan Insights as Director, Climate Resilience.

Summary

• The United States and the European Union are deeply integrated economically in terms of movement of goods, services and capital across the Atlantic, but this is not matched by the mobility of labour. Freer movement of high-skilled workers across the Atlantic has a potentially critical role to play in maintaining and strengthening the bilateral economic relationship.
• Both the US and EU seek to attract high-skilled labour through the use of temporary visa programmes. Various routes are available for highly skilled workers from the EU to temporarily work in the US (for instance, through the H-1B visa for foreign nationals in ‘specialty occupations’, as well as other visa categories for treaty traders and investors, intra-company transferees, and international students seeking work authorization in the US before or after graduation). The main ways for highly skilled workers from the US to temporarily work in EU member states are through EU-wide schemes that apply in 25 out of the 28 member states (for holders of EU Blue Cards or intra-company transferees); or via member states’ parallel national schemes.
• The experiences of US and EU employers and workers under the US H-1B programme and the EU’s Blue Card scheme differ greatly. The EU Blue Card scheme avoids many of the drawbacks of the H-1B visa. It does not have an annual cap on the number of visas issued. It also grants greater autonomy to the worker by not requiring the employer to sponsor long-term residence, by providing greater flexibility to switch employment, and by having a longer grace period for visa-holders to find new employment after dismissal.
• The US visa system hampers America’s economic growth. Restrictive policies such as an annual limit on the number of H-1B visas issued, and the associated uncertainty for employees and employers, hinder the ability of US companies to expand and innovate. The complex and costly visa application process is a particular burden for small and medium-sized enterprises. Problems around the timely availability of visas frustrate investors both from the US and from abroad (including from the EU). European firms face difficulties in acquiring visas for intra-company transferees, and not all EU member states have access to the treaty trader and treaty investor visa categories. At times, this impedes foreign direct investment and restricts US job creation. In addition, current policies hinder the economy’s retention of EU and other graduates of US universities. This is of particular concern given that skilled graduates have a critical role to play in addressing the US’s growing shortage of workers in the science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields.
• Given the comparability of US and EU wages and labour markets, US concerns about foreign workers ‘stealing’ their jobs or depressing wages generally do not apply to EU citizens. On the contrary, a more open immigration policy for high-skilled workers – in particular for EU citizens – would benefit the US economy.
• Efforts to reform visa systems for high-skilled labour are under way in both the US and EU. In order to facilitate the movement of highly skilled workers across the Atlantic, this research paper recommends (1) creating a special visa for highly skilled EU citizens to work temporarily in the US; (2) extending the availability of treaty trader and investor visas to all EU member states; and (3) increasing efforts to eliminate fraud and abuse in the H-1B system. These measures could potentially help to create more investment, jobs and economic growth in the US.

When the H1N1 influenza pandemic struck in 2009, some industrialized countries were well prepared. Many countries’ preparedness plans had focused on preparing for an influenza pandemic and based on earlier alerts over the H5N1 ‘bird flu’ virus, countries had made advanced purchase or ‘sleeping’ contracts for vaccine supplies that could be activated as soon as a pandemic was declared. Countries without contracts scrambled to get supplies after those that already had contracts received their vaccine.

Following the 2009 pandemic, the European Union (EU) developed plans for joint-purchase vaccine contracts that any member state could join, guaranteeing the same price per dose for everyone. In 2009, low-income countries were unable to get the vaccine until manufacturers agreed to let 10 per cent of their production go to the World Health Organization (WHO).

The situation for COVID-19 could be even worse. No country had a sleeping contract in place for a COVID-19 vaccine since nobody had anticipated that the next pandemic would be a coronavirus, not an influenza virus. With around 80 candidate vaccines reported to be in development, choosing the right one will be like playing roulette.

These candidates will be whittled down as some will fail at an early stage of development and others will not get to scale-up for manufacturing. All of the world’s major vaccine pharmaceutical companies have said that they will divert resources to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines and, as long as they choose the right candidate for production, they have the expertise and the capacity to produce in huge quantities.

From roulette to a horse race

Our game now changes from roulette to a horse race, as the probability of winning is a matter of odds not a random chance. Countries are now able to try to make contracts alone or in purchasing consortia with other states, and with one of the major companies or with multiple companies. This would be like betting on one of the favourites.

For example, it has been reported that Oxford University has made an agreement with pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, with a possibility of 100 million doses being available by the end of 2020. If the vaccine works and those doses materialize, and are all available for the UK, then the UK population requirements will be met in full, and the challenge becomes vaccinating everyone as quickly as possible.

Even if half of the doses were reserved for the UK, all those in high-risk or occupational groups could be vaccinated rapidly. However, as each major manufacturer accepts more contracts, the quantity that each country will get diminishes and the time to vaccinate the at-risk population gets longer.

At this point, it is not known how manufacturers will respond to requests for vaccine and how they will apportion supplies between different markets. You could bet on an outsider. You study the field and select a biotech that has potential with a good production development programme and a tie-in with a smaller-scale production facility.

If other countries do not try to get contracts, you will get your vaccine as fast as manufacturing can be scaled up; but because it is a small manufacturer, your supplies may take a long time. And outsiders do not often win races. You can of course, depending on your resources, cover several runners and try to make multiple contracts. However, you take on the risk that some will fail, and you may have compromised your eventual supply.

On April 24, the WHO co-hosted a meeting with the president of France, the president of the European Commission and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It brought together heads of state and industry leaders who committed to ‘work towards equitable global access based on an unprecedented level of partnership’. They agreed ‘to create a strong unified voice, to build on past experience and to be accountable to the world, to communities and to one another’ for vaccines, testing materials and treatments.

They did not, however, say how this will be achieved and the absence of the United States was notable. The EU and its partners are hosting an international pledging conference on May 4 that aims to raise €7.5 billion in initial funding to kick-start global cooperation on vaccines. Co-hosts will be France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway and Saudi Arabia and the priorities will be ‘Test, Treat and Prevent’, with the latter dedicated to vaccines.

Despite these expressions of altruism, every government will face the tension between wanting to protect their own populations as quickly as possible and knowing that this will disadvantage poorer countries, where health services are even less able to cope. It will not be a vote winner to offer a share in available vaccine to less-privileged countries.

The factories for the biggest vaccine manufacturers are in Europe, the US and India. Will European manufacturers be obliged by the EU to restrict sales first to European countries? Will the US invoke its Defense Production Act and block vaccine exports until there are stocks enough for every American? And will vaccine only be available in India for those who can afford it?

The lessons on vaccine availability from the 2009 influenza pandemic are clear: vaccine was not shared on anything like an equitable basis. It remains to be seen if we will do any better in 2020.

Over the past couple of decades, cyberspace has evolved to become a truly global digital communication space. Managed by a multitude of state and non-state actors, it has enabled a huge range of positive innovations and developments. However, it has also become an arena of intense international competition and rivalry – a reflection of its increasing economic and political importance and broader geopolitical tensions. Despite a number of efforts and some progress in the United Nations and other forums, there are still disagreements on key issues between major powers on how to achieve responsible behaviour in cyberspace.

In light of this, the panel will explore how state and non-state actors can work together to encourage responsible behaviour in cyberspace. What challenges do various actors face in implementing agreed upon norms and principles? Is the existing global model for reaching an agreement a non-starter? What are the remaining challenges around attribution, accountability and enforcement? And what is the role for civil society, the private sector and NGOs in this debate?

This event is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more.

Over the past couple of decades, cyberspace has evolved to become a truly global digital communication space. Managed by a multitude of state and non-state actors, it has enabled a huge range of positive innovations and developments. However, it has also become an arena of intense international competition and rivalry – a reflection of its increasing economic and political importance and broader geopolitical tensions. Despite a number of efforts and some progress in the United Nations and other forums, there are still disagreements on key issues between major powers on how to achieve responsible behaviour in cyberspace.

In light of this, the panel will explore how state and non-state actors can work together to encourage responsible behaviour in cyberspace. What challenges do various actors face in implementing agreed upon norms and principles? Is the existing global model for reaching an agreement a non-starter? What are the remaining challenges around attribution, accountability and enforcement? And what is the role for civil society, the private sector and NGOs in this debate?

This event is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more.

Is the news our society’s religion today?

In the developed economies, the news now occupies a position of power at least equal to that formerly enjoyed by the faiths. Matins has been transubstantiated into the breakfast bulletin, vespers into the evening report. It also demands that we approach it with some of the same deferential expectations we would once have harboured for the faiths. Here, too, we hope to receive revelations, learn who is good and bad, fathom suffering and understand the unfolding logic of existence. And here too, if we refuse to take part in the rituals, there could be imputations of heresy.

What would you like the news to be?

It feels like there is always an infinite amount of news, so much is happening in the world every day. Yet after a while it becomes clear that the same kinds of event are recurring again and again. The details change, but all circle round the same archetypal story. Men in highly responsible positions are coming unstuck because their desires lead them to do things that, when made public, are shameful.

Identifying the underlying theme is more important in the long run than going through the details of every case. The news that matters is not so much that this MP or banker did what they did. What we need to address is why such things happen.

How do you keep the public interested in the news that does matter?

We cannot be collectively dragged into being more responsible through guilt. The Arctic ice is melting and this is going to have major, lasting implications for sea levels and weather around the world. A few people care a lot but, strangely, Taylor Swift’s legs are far more captivating. The starting point has to be indulgence towards the way our minds work. We are interested in Swift’s legs not because we are evil – but because we are wired in unhelpful ways. If we are going to be interested en masse in the defrosting poles, we need to take our fragilities on board and therefore get serious about trying to make important news not just ‘important’, but also beguiling. Then things stand a chance of changing.

You argue that we should set aside ‘neutral reporting’. Are you asking for more bias?

Many people imagine that what makes news organizations serious is their ability to provide us with information that is ‘unbiased’. But facts can only become meaningful and relevant to us when they slot into some picture of important or trivial, right or wrong. News organizations that vaunt their neutrality forget that neutrality is simply impossible. There is no risk-free, all-knowing sober set of answers to cling to. At heart, the word ‘bias’ simply alludes to the business of having a ‘take’ on existence. One may have a better or worse take, but one can’t make any sense of the flotsam of daily events in the news without having one. All of the figures we revere in history have been highly biased: each of them had a strong sense of what mattered and why, and their judgments were anything but perfectly balanced. They were just flavoured in the right way. We don’t need news stripped of bias, we need news presented to us with the best kinds of bias.

What is the purpose of foreign reporting?

Foreign reporting implicitly defers to the priorities of the state and of business, occupying itself almost exclusively with whom and where we should fight, trade or sympathize. But it should instead offer us a means by which to humanize the Other who instinctively repels, bores or frightens us and with whom we can’t, without help, imagine having anything in common.

Foreign countries also furnish a scale against which our own nation and ways of living can be assessed; they may help us to see our national oddities, blind spots and strengths. Stories from them may lead us to a fresh appreciation of the imperfect freedoms and comparative abundance of our homelands, which otherwise would be treated only as matters for grumbling or blame. Alternatively, problems with which we are all too familiar may be revealed to have been solved better elsewhere.

You mention the importance of historical perspective in reporting, so that we can respond to issues with context.

Contrary to what the news usually suggests, hardly anything is ever totally new, few things are truly amazing and very little is absolutely terrible. The economic indices are grim, but we have weathered comparable drops many times over the past century and even the worst scenarios only predict that we will return to a standard of living we had a few decades ago. A bad avian flu may disrupt international travel and defeat known drugs for a while, but research will eventually understand and contain it. The floods look dramatic, but in the end, they will affect merely a fraction of the population and recede soon.

How can photography change the way we report news?

There are now more images than ever before in the coverage we consume, but the problem lies in the lack of ambition behind their production and display. We might usefully divide news photographs into two genres. The first are images of corroboration, which do little other than confirm something we have learnt about a person or an event through an accompanying article. The second is a rarer kind of image, the photograph of revelation, whose ambition is not simply to back up what the text tells us but to advance our level of knowledge to a new point. It sets out to challenge cliché. We have lost any sense of photography’s potential as an information-bearing medium, as a force to properly introduce us to a planet that we keep conceitedly assuming that we know rather well already.

Do you feel oppressed by the news?

The pressure of not missing out makes one feel one has to care about a given topic, even when one doesn’t want to. Take Mandela’s funeral. One was supposed to care a lot, and yet, you don’t. You know the reasons why it is important, but they don’t grip you because you are focused elsewhere on subjects that, while tiny in the grand scheme of things, matter a lot within your context. It would be dangerous if hardly anyone paid attention to what the Government was doing, or what was happening to the environment. But it is not right to go from this to the demand that everyone should be interested in every item whenever the news machine calls. We badly need people whose attention is not caught up in the trends of the moment and who are not looking in the same direction as everyone else. We need people scanning the less familiar parts of the horizon.

Do you think we get the news we deserve?

Much of what we now take for granted as news has its origins in the information needed by those people taking major decisions or who are at the centre of national affairs. Ease of communication and a generous democratic impulse means that selections from the knowledge base, originally designed for decision-makers, now gets routinely sent via the media to very large numbers of people. It is as if a dossier which might properly arrive upon the desk of a Minister has accidentally been delivered to the wrong address and ends up on the breakfast table of an electrician in Pitlochry. Every day the news gives us stuff that is both interesting for some people and irrelevant to you. No wonder we’re sometimes a bit bored. It’s not our fault.

The UK Independence Party (UKIP) turns 21 years old this month and has cause to celebrate. The insurgent party won a national election in May and last week enjoyed the most significant coup in its history when Conservative MP Douglas Carswell defected to UKIP and announced a forthcoming by-election. Given that his coastal seat of Clacton is UKIP’s most demographically favourable seat in the country, Carswell has almost certainly handed the party its first elected member of parliament.

The events in Clacton will be seen by many as validating one of the oldest myths about UKIP; that it is nothing more than a second home for disgruntled Conservatives. Carswell’s defection will be especially welcomed on the left, where many argue UKIP is dividing the right and clearing the path for Labour’s return to power in 2015. This is dangerously misguided.

To understand why, we can start with Clacton. The seat has the largest concentration of the 'left behind' demographic; older, white, blue-collar voters who lack qualifications, felt excluded from Britain’s economic transformation long before the crisis, are cut adrift from politics, and are intensely anxious over the cultural as well as economic effects of migration.

But as a Conservative-held seat, Clacton is also an outlier. For our book, Revolt on the Right, Robert Ford and I ranked all seats according to their demographic receptiveness to UKIP. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, most are in Labour territory where MPs are battling with the same cocktail as Carswell: economic stagnation, unease over migration, an entrenched anti-politics consensus and anxieties over rapid social change. Of the 20 seats most demographically receptive to UKIP, 18 have Labour incumbents. Of the top 50, Labour holds 42. Of course, demography alone is not necessarily destiny. Aside from a receptive local population, UKIP also needs a favourable political context. Unlike Conservative-held seats that are at genuine risk from UKIP, Labour’s heartland seats are currently protected by large majorities.

But a cursory glance at the recent European parliament results reveals the direction of travel. UKIP comfortably won the popular vote in a swath of Labour territory, and talks ambitiously of becoming the main rival to Labour in northern England. It appears to be succeeding. Across 39 local authorities in the northwest, UKIP won more votes than Labour in 13 and finished as its main rival in 23. It is similarly bleak in the northeast; across 12 authorities UKIP won the popular vote in five and finished second to Labour in seven.

Since 2010, UKIP has grown fastest among the groups in which Labour is struggling most: the over-65s, the working-class and those who left education early. UKIP is tearing off this section of the electorate, creating a fundamental divide in British politics between those with the skills, education and resources to adapt, and those who have little and feel intensely angry. This is why some Ukippers talk of a '2020 strategy' and plot further advances under an Ed Miliband-led post-2015 government.

Those who compare the party to earlier attempts to redraw the political map, such as the Social Democratic Party in the 1980s, or populist crusaders like the French Poujadists in the 1950s, miss a crucial point. UKIP is anchored in modern Britain’s most socially distinctive support base; it is the most working-class movement since Michael Foot’s Labour Party. Labelling UKIP as 'populist' implies that it appeals across society. It does not. Its strength is concentrated in the 'left behind', who cluster in specific geographical areas. Crucially, this is essential for success under first-past-the-post.

Labour should be under no illusion. UKIP is attracting the Carswells of this world but it is also emerging as the main opposition in many northern heartlands, where it benefits from the toxicity of the Tories, moribund Labour machines that have not had to compete for decades, and the short-sightedness of some close to Ed Miliband who think only of the impact UKIP might have in 2015, and not beyond. Should UKIP’s insurgency continue, not only will it cause a rupture on the centre right, but also bring back into play Labour constituencies that have not been competitive for generations.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

When the H1N1 influenza pandemic struck in 2009, some industrialized countries were well prepared. Many countries’ preparedness plans had focused on preparing for an influenza pandemic and based on earlier alerts over the H5N1 ‘bird flu’ virus, countries had made advanced purchase or ‘sleeping’ contracts for vaccine supplies that could be activated as soon as a pandemic was declared. Countries without contracts scrambled to get supplies after those that already had contracts received their vaccine.

Following the 2009 pandemic, the European Union (EU) developed plans for joint-purchase vaccine contracts that any member state could join, guaranteeing the same price per dose for everyone. In 2009, low-income countries were unable to get the vaccine until manufacturers agreed to let 10 per cent of their production go to the World Health Organization (WHO).

The situation for COVID-19 could be even worse. No country had a sleeping contract in place for a COVID-19 vaccine since nobody had anticipated that the next pandemic would be a coronavirus, not an influenza virus. With around 80 candidate vaccines reported to be in development, choosing the right one will be like playing roulette.

These candidates will be whittled down as some will fail at an early stage of development and others will not get to scale-up for manufacturing. All of the world’s major vaccine pharmaceutical companies have said that they will divert resources to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines and, as long as they choose the right candidate for production, they have the expertise and the capacity to produce in huge quantities.

From roulette to a horse race

Our game now changes from roulette to a horse race, as the probability of winning is a matter of odds not a random chance. Countries are now able to try to make contracts alone or in purchasing consortia with other states, and with one of the major companies or with multiple companies. This would be like betting on one of the favourites.

For example, it has been reported that Oxford University has made an agreement with pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, with a possibility of 100 million doses being available by the end of 2020. If the vaccine works and those doses materialize, and are all available for the UK, then the UK population requirements will be met in full, and the challenge becomes vaccinating everyone as quickly as possible.

Even if half of the doses were reserved for the UK, all those in high-risk or occupational groups could be vaccinated rapidly. However, as each major manufacturer accepts more contracts, the quantity that each country will get diminishes and the time to vaccinate the at-risk population gets longer.

At this point, it is not known how manufacturers will respond to requests for vaccine and how they will apportion supplies between different markets. You could bet on an outsider. You study the field and select a biotech that has potential with a good production development programme and a tie-in with a smaller-scale production facility.

If other countries do not try to get contracts, you will get your vaccine as fast as manufacturing can be scaled up; but because it is a small manufacturer, your supplies may take a long time. And outsiders do not often win races. You can of course, depending on your resources, cover several runners and try to make multiple contracts. However, you take on the risk that some will fail, and you may have compromised your eventual supply.

On April 24, the WHO co-hosted a meeting with the president of France, the president of the European Commission and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It brought together heads of state and industry leaders who committed to ‘work towards equitable global access based on an unprecedented level of partnership’. They agreed ‘to create a strong unified voice, to build on past experience and to be accountable to the world, to communities and to one another’ for vaccines, testing materials and treatments.

They did not, however, say how this will be achieved and the absence of the United States was notable. The EU and its partners are hosting an international pledging conference on May 4 that aims to raise €7.5 billion in initial funding to kick-start global cooperation on vaccines. Co-hosts will be France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway and Saudi Arabia and the priorities will be ‘Test, Treat and Prevent’, with the latter dedicated to vaccines.

Despite these expressions of altruism, every government will face the tension between wanting to protect their own populations as quickly as possible and knowing that this will disadvantage poorer countries, where health services are even less able to cope. It will not be a vote winner to offer a share in available vaccine to less-privileged countries.

The factories for the biggest vaccine manufacturers are in Europe, the US and India. Will European manufacturers be obliged by the EU to restrict sales first to European countries? Will the US invoke its Defense Production Act and block vaccine exports until there are stocks enough for every American? And will vaccine only be available in India for those who can afford it?

The lessons on vaccine availability from the 2009 influenza pandemic are clear: vaccine was not shared on anything like an equitable basis. It remains to be seen if we will do any better in 2020.

Over the past couple of decades, cyberspace has evolved to become a truly global digital communication space. Managed by a multitude of state and non-state actors, it has enabled a huge range of positive innovations and developments. However, it has also become an arena of intense international competition and rivalry – a reflection of its increasing economic and political importance and broader geopolitical tensions. Despite a number of efforts and some progress in the United Nations and other forums, there are still disagreements on key issues between major powers on how to achieve responsible behaviour in cyberspace.

In light of this, the panel will explore how state and non-state actors can work together to encourage responsible behaviour in cyberspace. What challenges do various actors face in implementing agreed upon norms and principles? Is the existing global model for reaching an agreement a non-starter? What are the remaining challenges around attribution, accountability and enforcement? And what is the role for civil society, the private sector and NGOs in this debate?

This event is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more.

When the H1N1 influenza pandemic struck in 2009, some industrialized countries were well prepared. Many countries’ preparedness plans had focused on preparing for an influenza pandemic and based on earlier alerts over the H5N1 ‘bird flu’ virus, countries had made advanced purchase or ‘sleeping’ contracts for vaccine supplies that could be activated as soon as a pandemic was declared. Countries without contracts scrambled to get supplies after those that already had contracts received their vaccine.

Following the 2009 pandemic, the European Union (EU) developed plans for joint-purchase vaccine contracts that any member state could join, guaranteeing the same price per dose for everyone. In 2009, low-income countries were unable to get the vaccine until manufacturers agreed to let 10 per cent of their production go to the World Health Organization (WHO).

The situation for COVID-19 could be even worse. No country had a sleeping contract in place for a COVID-19 vaccine since nobody had anticipated that the next pandemic would be a coronavirus, not an influenza virus. With around 80 candidate vaccines reported to be in development, choosing the right one will be like playing roulette.

These candidates will be whittled down as some will fail at an early stage of development and others will not get to scale-up for manufacturing. All of the world’s major vaccine pharmaceutical companies have said that they will divert resources to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines and, as long as they choose the right candidate for production, they have the expertise and the capacity to produce in huge quantities.

From roulette to a horse race

Our game now changes from roulette to a horse race, as the probability of winning is a matter of odds not a random chance. Countries are now able to try to make contracts alone or in purchasing consortia with other states, and with one of the major companies or with multiple companies. This would be like betting on one of the favourites.

For example, it has been reported that Oxford University has made an agreement with pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, with a possibility of 100 million doses being available by the end of 2020. If the vaccine works and those doses materialize, and are all available for the UK, then the UK population requirements will be met in full, and the challenge becomes vaccinating everyone as quickly as possible.

Even if half of the doses were reserved for the UK, all those in high-risk or occupational groups could be vaccinated rapidly. However, as each major manufacturer accepts more contracts, the quantity that each country will get diminishes and the time to vaccinate the at-risk population gets longer.

At this point, it is not known how manufacturers will respond to requests for vaccine and how they will apportion supplies between different markets. You could bet on an outsider. You study the field and select a biotech that has potential with a good production development programme and a tie-in with a smaller-scale production facility.

If other countries do not try to get contracts, you will get your vaccine as fast as manufacturing can be scaled up; but because it is a small manufacturer, your supplies may take a long time. And outsiders do not often win races. You can of course, depending on your resources, cover several runners and try to make multiple contracts. However, you take on the risk that some will fail, and you may have compromised your eventual supply.

On April 24, the WHO co-hosted a meeting with the president of France, the president of the European Commission and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It brought together heads of state and industry leaders who committed to ‘work towards equitable global access based on an unprecedented level of partnership’. They agreed ‘to create a strong unified voice, to build on past experience and to be accountable to the world, to communities and to one another’ for vaccines, testing materials and treatments.

They did not, however, say how this will be achieved and the absence of the United States was notable. The EU and its partners are hosting an international pledging conference on May 4 that aims to raise €7.5 billion in initial funding to kick-start global cooperation on vaccines. Co-hosts will be France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway and Saudi Arabia and the priorities will be ‘Test, Treat and Prevent’, with the latter dedicated to vaccines.

Despite these expressions of altruism, every government will face the tension between wanting to protect their own populations as quickly as possible and knowing that this will disadvantage poorer countries, where health services are even less able to cope. It will not be a vote winner to offer a share in available vaccine to less-privileged countries.

The factories for the biggest vaccine manufacturers are in Europe, the US and India. Will European manufacturers be obliged by the EU to restrict sales first to European countries? Will the US invoke its Defense Production Act and block vaccine exports until there are stocks enough for every American? And will vaccine only be available in India for those who can afford it?

The lessons on vaccine availability from the 2009 influenza pandemic are clear: vaccine was not shared on anything like an equitable basis. It remains to be seen if we will do any better in 2020.