Director’s Briefing: Assessing foreign policy challenges for the next US president 5 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 August 2024 Chatham House and Online

This briefing will explore what challenges might await the winner of 2024 US presidential election.

As the 2024 US Presidential election draws closer, the future direction of American foreign policy seems ever more uncertain. Kamala Harris, the Democratic presidential candidate, appears to be embracing many of Biden’s policies, but she brings a different background, and most likely a different team, so change is likely.  Donald Trump has more well-known views on foreign policy, but the context for a second Trump administration would be very different than the first.

The next U.S. President will be confronted a world in need of leadership with two major wars, a more assertive and capable China, a climate crisis, ungoverned technological change, emerging powers that demand a seat at the table, and debt distress across much of the developing world.

Please join us for this critical conversation covering:

• How will US-China strategic competition and the threat of conflict over Taiwan challenge US policy makers?
• What are the risks and challenges posed by Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
• How does war in the Middle East and the threat of regional escalation shape US foreign policy?

Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? 22 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 September 2024 Online

Join us and ask Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Natalie Sabanadze anything about the situation in the Caucasus. Submit your questions in advance.

Whilst Russia focuses on its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the situation at its southern border is evolving. Relations between the three states in the South Caucasus and Moscow have never been easy as Russia tried to maintain its dominance by leveraging vulnerabilities, playing one side against another to keep conflicts simmering and even engaging in open military aggression.  Although the violence seen in the 1990s and early 2000s has abated, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect impact on the region, bringing a change to the status quo.

Russia abandoned its long-standing support for Armenia, allowing for the collapse of Nagorny-Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the backing of Turkey. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as a dominant regional player with Baku recently declaring its interest to join BRICS.  Turkey’s influence has grown, while Armenia frustrated by Russia’s change of heart has been turning cautiously towards the EU and the US.

In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling party has been consolidating its grasp on power, rolling back democratic reforms and pivoting away from the West. Georgia’s long-awaited European integration process has been suspended, following the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents legislation.

Join us as our Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme answers your questions in this quick-fire session assessing the extent to which the Russian influence has changed since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and who is there to fill the vacuum; how geopolitical contestation in the region is going to impact aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and much more.

Submit your questions to Natalie Sabanadze in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

Fostering inclusive health systems amidst geopolitical instability 13 October 2024 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 11 September 2024 Sheraton Berlin Grand Hotel Esplanade

How can we build trust and inclusivity in the health sector in a fractured geopolitical environment?

Building trust in government, service provision and delivery are crucial considerations for policymakers who aim to make local, national and international health systems more inclusive. In the health space, trust can be a matter of life and death. Understanding and modulating policies that account for the trust factor, alongside the geopolitical determinants of health, can lead to more inclusive decision making and thus better health outcomes for larger proportions of a population.

International unity is key to addressing the challenges posed by geopolitical instability, which include disinformation campaigns, rising nationalism and growing divisions between states. If countries can find common ground through an inclusive approach to health, the effects could be transformative in achieving global health and equity targets.

This discussion, held in partnership with Haleon, will examine what it takes to foster trust and resilience in the health sector, achieve global inclusivity aims and chart a path for the public and private spheres to come together to navigate a fractured geopolitical environment.

• In what ways can localised health inclusivity data help policymakers to alleviate gaps in healthcare provision and why is this an essential element in instilling trust across the system?
• What role should multilateral organizations play in setting precedents for health inclusivity around the world?
• How do health inclusivity policies empower the service user and help reduce the burden placed on public healthcare systems?
• How can the health sector come together to ensure individuals are included within their own health decisions, are able to access services regardless of demographics and geography and trust their healthcare providers?

This event will be held at the Sheraton Hotel, Grand Esplanade, Berlin in the margins of the World Health Summit. You do not need a ticket for the World Health Summit to attend this event.

The 2024 US Election: Global Consequences 26 September 2024 — 5:30PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores what is at stake for US policy in key regions around the globe.

In the lead up to the 2024 US presidential election, Chatham House experts discuss:

• What is at stake for US policy towards China, Europe, and Latin America and what challenges will confront the next US president?

• Can the US lead when its partners and allies are continually dissatisfied by the new turn in its trade and economic policy?

• What are the core humanitarian challenges and how can they be addressed?

US domestic polarization and implications for the presidential election 30 September 2024 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores the rise of polarization amongst the US public and implications for the upcoming election.

Domestic polarization has been on the rise in the US in recent years, with Democrats and Republicans moving further away from the centre on key policy issues. As polarization increases, so too do concerns about the state of US democracy and prospects of political violence surrounding the upcoming presidential election. 

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• What are the driving forces of the growing political divide in the US?
• How far apart are voters on key election issues, from healthcare to immigration to national security?
• How is partisan polarisation altering the effectiveness of US foreign policy and influencing America’s role in the world?

Business Briefing: US election geopolitical and economic risk scenarios 10 October 2024 — 11:45AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 September 2024 Chatham House

Please join us for this critical discussion of the US Election related global business risks.

The outcome of the US presidential election will have significant, intersecting implications for global as well as American business. At stake will be the degree of continuity and stability on both the domestic and international fronts, with a Harris presidency pursuing policies building broadly on the Biden Administration and a second Trump Administration departing sharply from them—with both shaped and limited by control of Congress.

An already volatile geopolitical environment and global economy may become even more unpredictable in the face of potential American political instability and uncertain leadership in the international community.

Please join us for this critical session to discuss:

• How might trade policy differ between a Harris and Trump presidency? Will national security pressures, especially over China, lead to greater policy commonalities than expected?

• What might differing approaches to decarbonization and the energy transition mean for the future of policy toward EVs, critical mineral supply chains, and ‘green’ industrial subsidy?

• How might each Administration approach fiscal policy? Will either push for a tightening to the current loose policy—and what may be implications for US debt and the dollar?

• What economic effects can we expect in the case of a disputed election result or non-peaceful transfer of power—and will Corporate America be compelled to make public statements?

Looking ahead to the 2024 US Presidential Election 2 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

This panel explores the state of the US presidential election following the vice presidential debate.

With only weeks to go, this panel looks at the state of the 2024 US presidential election.

Harris and Trump are campaigning to drive up voter enthusiasm and bring undecided voters to their side.

What are the key issues shaping voter’s preferences and how may this impact voter turnout? What can we expect in the weeks ahead?

Celebrating Black History Month at Chatham House 24 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Chatham House

Join us for the ‘Beyond expectations: The impact and legacy of migration exhibition 2024’ exhibition and drinks reception.

About the Photographer  

Neil Kenlock, a photographer and media professional, has lived in London since arriving from Jamaica in 1963 to join his parents. He spent the early years of his career as a professional photographer, specialising in fashion, beauty, celebrities, and the cultural lifestyles of Black people in the UK. In the late 1960s and 1970s, he captured images of the UK Black Panther movement and documented demonstrations and anti-racism protests across the country.

“Neil Kenlock helps us to better understand the story of London’s Black communities and to appreciate the huge artistic and cultural impact they have had on all our lives. He is a significant photographer whose work documents a key chapter in London’s post-war history.” — Mike Seaborne, former curator of photographs at the Museum of London.

About the exhibition

This exhibition unveils a collection of photographs by Neil Kenlock, capturing Black British individuals who migrated from their homelands and settled in the UK. Curated by his daughter Emelia Kenlock, the series explores the theme of ‘expectations’ and its enduring legacy, featuring African and Caribbean subjects who brought their skills, passions, and dreams—contributions that have profoundly shaped British culture today.

Reflecting on the work, Kenlock stated: “Over 50 years since the concept of ‘black excellence’ first manifested, and more than 70 years since the Windrush, I truly hope this exhibition will add to the national cultural narrative and resonate with new audiences.” 

Numerous iron-sulfur (Fe-S) proteins with diverse functions are present in the matrix and respiratory chain complexes of mitochondria. Although [4Fe-4S] clusters are the most common type of Fe-S cluster in mitochondria, the molecular mechanism of [4Fe-4S] cluster assembly and insertion into target proteins by the mitochondrial iron-sulfur cluster (ISC) maturation system is not well-understood. Here we report a detailed characterization of two late-acting Fe-S cluster-carrier proteins from Arabidopsis thaliana, NFU4 and NFU5. Yeast two-hybrid and bimolecular fluorescence complementation studies demonstrated interaction of both the NFU4 and NFU5 proteins with the ISCA class of Fe-S carrier proteins. Recombinant NFU4 and NFU5 were purified as apo-proteins after expression in Escherichia coli. In vitro Fe-S cluster reconstitution led to the insertion of one [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster per homodimer as determined by UV-visible absorption/CD, resonance Raman and EPR spectroscopy, and analytical studies. Cluster transfer reactions, monitored by UV-visible absorption and CD spectroscopy, showed that a [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster-bound ISCA1a/2 heterodimer is effective in transferring [4Fe-4S]2+ clusters to both NFU4 and NFU5 with negligible back reaction. In addition, [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster-bound ISCA1a/2, NFU4, and NFU5 were all found to be effective [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster donors for maturation of the mitochondrial apo-aconitase 2 as assessed by enzyme activity measurements. The results demonstrate rapid, unidirectional, and quantitative [4Fe-4S]2+ cluster transfer from ISCA1a/2 to NFU4 or NFU5 that further delineates their respective positions in the plant ISC machinery and their contributions to the maturation of client [4Fe-4S] cluster-containing proteins.

The cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) is a plasma membrane anion channel that plays a key role in controlling transepithelial fluid movement. Excessive activation results in intestinal fluid loss during secretory diarrheas, whereas CFTR mutations underlie cystic fibrosis (CF). Anion permeability depends both on how well CFTR channels work (permeation/gating) and on how many are present at the membrane. Recently, treatments with two drug classes targeting CFTR—one boosting ion-channel function (potentiators) and the other increasing plasma membrane density (correctors)—have provided significant health benefits to CF patients. Here, we present an image-based fluorescence assay that can rapidly and simultaneously estimate both CFTR ion-channel function and the protein's proximity to the membrane. We monitor F508del-CFTR, the most common CF-causing variant, and confirm rescue by low temperature, CFTR-targeting drugs and second-site revertant mutation R1070W. In addition, we characterize a panel of 62 CF-causing mutations. Our measurements correlate well with published data (electrophysiology and biochemistry), further confirming validity of the assay. Finally, we profile effects of acute treatment with approved potentiator drug VX-770 on the rare-mutation panel. Mapping the potentiation profile on CFTR structures raises mechanistic hypotheses on drug action, suggesting that VX-770 might allow an open-channel conformation with an alternative arrangement of domain interfaces. The assay is a valuable tool for investigation of CFTR molecular mechanisms, allowing accurate inferences on gating/permeation. In addition, by providing a two-dimensional characterization of the CFTR protein, it could better inform development of single-drug and precision therapies addressing the root cause of CF disease.

The main protease (3CL Mpro) from SARS–CoV-2, the etiological agent of COVID-19, is an essential enzyme for viral replication. 3CL Mpro possesses an unusual catalytic dyad composed of Cys145 and His41 residues. A critical question in the field has been what the protonation states of the ionizable residues in the substrate-binding active-site cavity are; resolving this point would help understand the catalytic details of the enzyme and inform rational drug development against this pernicious virus. Here, we present the room-temperature neutron structure of 3CL Mpro, which allowed direct determination of hydrogen atom positions and, hence, protonation states in the protease. We observe that the catalytic site natively adopts a zwitterionic reactive form in which Cys145 is in the negatively charged thiolate state and His41 is doubly protonated and positively charged, instead of the neutral unreactive state usually envisaged. The neutron structure also identified the protonation states, and thus electrical charges, of all other amino acid residues and revealed intricate hydrogen-bonding networks in the active-site cavity and at the dimer interface. The fine atomic details present in this structure were made possible by the unique scattering properties of the neutron, which is an ideal probe for locating hydrogen positions and experimentally determining protonation states at near-physiological temperature. Our observations provide critical information for structure-assisted and computational drug design, allowing precise tailoring of inhibitors to the enzyme's electrostatic environment.

In their comment (1) on our publication (2), the authors make two points: (i) they raise concerns about the possible effect of residual NONOate in our study, and (ii) they promote nitrosylcobalamin (NOCbl) supplied by their own company. Both points lack merit for the following reasons. The authors make the astonishing claim that the spectra of nitric oxide (NO•) and cobalamins overlap. Unlike NO•, cobalamin absorbs in the visible region, permitting unequivocal spectral assignment of NOCbl as reported (3). We demonstrated that whereas NOCbl is highly unstable in solution, it is stabilized by the B12 trafficking protein CblC. So even if present, residual NONOate (which is unstable at neutral pH and is removed during the work-up (3)) could not account for the observed difference.The authors then misrepresent our synthetic method, claiming that anaerobic conditions were used to generate nitrocobalamin (NO2Cbl), which results in the transient formation of NOCbl. We synthesized NO2Cbl aerobically using nitrite as described (4); NOCbl is not an intermediate in this ligand exchange reaction. The aerobic instability of NOCbl has been rigorously described by inorganic chemists (3, 5) and raises obvious questions about its purported biological effects as exemplified by the authors' own 2003 JBC publication, which was later withdrawn.As to promoting NOCbl from their company, the authors refer to a synthetic route from a mixture of NO• gas and aquocobalamin. The authors' method (6) has been described as “dubious” by chemists (5). Whereas DEAE NONOate used in our method is widely known as an NO• donor,...

After a thorough read of this paper (1), we wish to clarify that the authors' anaerobic method of synthesis for the production of nitrocobalamin results in the transient formation of nitrosylcobalamin, an unstable intermediate upon exposure to air. We concur that the authors' method results in the production of nitrocobalamin based on the UV-visible data as shown. The authors' adapted anaerobic method consists of mixing hydroxocobalamin hydrochloride with diethylamine NONOate diethylammonium salt in aqueous solution. Of concern, the UV spectrum of nitric oxide overlaps that of all cobalamin species under anaerobic conditions, making any assignments of the binding of nitric oxide to hydroxocobalamin suspect (2). Additionally, the use of acetone to precipitate the authors' product causes precipitation of diethylamine NONOate, resulting in an impure product. As a result, its utility for drawing experimental conclusions is faulty.The product from the authors' anaerobic synthetic method has not been assessed for purity, and the synthetic method itself has not been validated using a stability-indicating method as required by the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) (ICH Q2B, Validation of Analytical Procedures) methodology, which is a hallmark for analytical characterization. Our nitrosylcobalamin synthesis involves reacting nitric oxide gas with hydroxocobalamin acetate as a heterogeneous mixture in a non-electron-donating solvent followed by rotary evaporation. Our nitrosylcobalamin product is stable in air, releases nitric oxide gas in situ (3), and meets ICH stability guidelines (4). Additionally, our nitrosylcobalamin product demonstrates biological activity, which has not been observed for nitrocobalamin (3, 5).

The amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and frontotemporal dementia (FTD)–linked RNA-binding protein called FUS (fused in sarcoma) has been implicated in several aspects of RNA regulation, including mRNA translation. The mechanism by which FUS affects the translation of polyribosomes has not been established. Here we show that FUS can associate with stalled polyribosomes and that this association is sensitive to mTOR (mammalian target of rapamycin) kinase activity. Specifically, we show that FUS association with polyribosomes is increased by Torin1 treatment or when cells are cultured in nutrient-deficient media, but not when cells are treated with rapamycin, the allosteric inhibitor of mTORC1. Moreover, we report that FUS is necessary for efficient stalling of translation because deficient cells are refractory to the inhibition of mTOR-dependent signaling by Torin1. We also show that ALS-linked FUS mutants R521G and P525L associate abundantly with polyribosomes and decrease global protein synthesis. Importantly, the inhibitory effect on translation by FUS is impaired by mutations that reduce its RNA-binding affinity. These findings demonstrate that FUS is an important RNA-binding protein that mediates translational repression through mTOR-dependent signaling and that ALS-linked FUS mutants can cause a toxic gain of function in the cytoplasm by repressing the translation of mRNA at polyribosomes.

A Digital India Must Embrace the Circular Economy Expert comment sysadmin 15 January 2018

A growing amount of e-waste should draw attention to the broader sustainability of a digital society.

The latest Global E-Waste Monitor places India as one of the highest contributors to global e-waste, generating over 2 million metric tonnes in 2016. Posing serious health and environmental risks, growing e-waste represents the hidden cost of increasingly digital lives in an information society.

With just 33 per cent of the population owning a smart phone, India already has the second largest number of smart phone users in the world, nearly 4 times that of the United States. The amount of e-waste generated will exponentially increase in the coming decade as the cost of consumer electronics decline, middle-class incomes rise, and the frequency at which devices are discarded increases.

As governance instruments are increasingly digitized and industry re-repositions itself to leverage Industry 4.0 solutions, the generation of e-waste will become a byproduct of institutional choices rather than consumer consumption and behaviour alone.

India is already a leader in the management and recycling of e-waste. But over 90 per cent is managed in the unorganized sector by small businesses and individual entrepreneurs, typically from low-income marginalized communities, and often women. E-waste contains various toxic substances such as mercury and lead, prolonged exposure to which can lead to major health problems.

Almost 80 per cent of e-waste workers in India suffer from respiratory ailments due to improper standards and nearly 500,000 children are engaged in e-waste collection without adequate protection and safeguards. The bulk of the dirty and dangerous work supporting India’s march towards an increasingly digital society is done by those who have the least access to technology gains. Government regulations for the management of e-waste, on the other hand, are becoming more relaxed, presumably as a result of industry pressure. To streamline e-waste management, the government notified Electronic Waste Rules in 2011, based on the concept of extended producer responsibility (EPR).

EPR makes manufacturers of electronic products responsible for the end-of-life management of their products, including setting up collection centres. By shifting the burden to manufacturers, the EPR framework, in theory, creates incentives for more environmentally friendly design. But the impact of EPR rules on manufacturers has been minimal, at best. The recently released Draft Notification (2017) by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change further relaxes the EPR rule by reducing the e-waste collection targets for industries.

While the efficiency and productivity gains of Digital India are to be welcomed, growing e-waste should draw attention to the broader sustainability of a digital society. Data centres, for example, are one the largest contributors to global warming, contributing a similar amount to global greenhouse emissions as the aviation industry.

This amount is expected to triple in the next decade. In many ways, the sustainability challenge is a ‘wicked problem’ – where possible solutions create a new set of additional challenges and the choice between available alternatives is largely about competing values.

For example, data centres powered by renewable sources of energy such as solar provide a greener alternative, but will also create new forms of e-waste in the form of photovoltaic cells and panels. An unverified estimate suggests that India’s projected solar capacity of 100 gigawatts by 2022 will create 7.76 million tonnes of e-waste. Without adequate and preemptive consideration of how this waste should be disposed and recycled, renewable energy solutions can create new negative externalities.

For Digital India to be sustainable, we need to develop anticipatory knowledge for preemptive solutions. It is an opportune moment to think of the broader architecture of a digital society, one that avoids getting locked into unsustainable models of production and consumption, as is the case with many industrialized economies.

The argument that such considerations are premature for India, given high levels of poverty and unemployment, are misplaced. Enquiries into the sustainability of Digital India are no less urgent than the need for sustained job-creating economic growth. These issues should not be addressed in a sequential or linear manner, but in parallel, or else we will be only partially aware of available choices and their consequences, creating new forms of technological and economic lock-ins.

The value-based choice demanded by the ‘wicked problem’ at hand is one that embraces the idea of a circular economy — one that departs from the linear economic growth model predicated on ‘take, make, dispose’ to embrace a growth model based on creating closed loops of production, consumption and re-use. A circular economy model is built on the idea of designing out waste and pollution; keeping products and materials in use; and regenerating natural systems. In many ways, India is already a leader in the circular economy.

Alongside, the management of e-waste and other forms of recycling, high levels of repair and reuse are distinctly observable. A number of reports note that the informal waste management sector in India works better than systems in many industrialized economies.

A circular economy vision for Digital India would include organizing informal waste management systems, including safety and social protection initiatives for workers; revising and tightening existent e-waste rules for increased accountability by manufacturers both in terms of durable design and responsible disposal; green data centres; and building future smart cities with a view towards energy and water efficiency, among others.

A recent report by the Ellen McArthur Foundation and the World Economic Forum also estimates that a circular economy path to development could bring India annual benefits of $624 billion by 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions could also be 44 per cent lower in 2050, compared with current development path.

Unsurprisingly, Nordic countries are leading the way in promoting the idea of a circular economy. Sweden recently announced tax breaks for repair related activities and Finland hosted the first global conference on the circular economy earlier this year. The circular economy provides an opportunity for India to capitalize and leverage an already existing culture of circular activities, and promote it as a policy agenda that will create new forms of employment while facilitating sustainable environmental management.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

Arguments Over Innovation Capacity Miss How Much the US and China Are Intertwined Expert comment sysadmin 30 May 2018

Most discussions of current US–China trade tensions fundamentally misrepresent the globalized nature of innovation.

Among the many issues at play in the ongoing economic and trade tensions between the US and China are questions of technological capability and innovation.

Two of the main complaints in the US Section 301 report were that American companies have been forced to transfer technology to China and been the subject of cyber espionage. The presentation of the issues in this report has been disputed, but behind it lies concern in the US that Chinese innovative and technological capability is catching up with that in the US, thanks partly to the support of state policies set out in the Made in China 2025 initiative.

One important feature of the package of measures announced by the US last month is that it was designed to contain China’s technological development as much as to reduce the trade deficit, even though the latter has been the focus of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric.

(Some have cast doubt on this picture of Chinese innovation, suggesting that China is more of a ‘fat tech dragon’ whose massive inputs into research and development do not translate into real innovative capacity.)

The problem with the debate comparing Chinese and American technological capability is that it misunderstands or misrepresents the globalized nature of innovation in today’s world.

Contrary to the economic nationalist rhetoric emanating mainly from Washington, and to a lesser extent from Beijing, the US and China are not two separate economies competing for economic hegemony. As part of the globalization of manufacturing and production over the last 40 years and the more recent globalization of consumption, the shape and structure of innovation has also changed.

As we argue in a new paper, the key to understanding this is to think of innovation as being carried out through global or transnational networks linking economic actors, not within separated economies. What the recent phase of globalization has demonstrated is that innovation is achieved most effectively and efficiently when those engaged in innovation are connected not just within national borders but across them.

China has become integrated into these global innovation networks in ways which reflect its relative strengths and weaknesses in research and development. China’s extensive manufacturing ecosystem has enabled its companies to perform well in production-related and efficiency-driven innovation. Moreover the rapid growth in its large and dynamic consumer market provides fertile ground for consumer-related innovation by Chinese and foreign-invested enterprises alike. The rapidly increasing talent pool in China also provides additional human capital for innovation and technology.

Apart from the increased emphasis by Chinese enterprises on innovation, multinationals have also been stepping up their research and development (R&D) efforts in China. These now consitute a significant part of China’s R&D landscape, and are an increasingly important part of the global innovation by multinationals.

Things are of course changing. China’s overall innovation capacity is improving, and there are concerns in both in the US and Europe that Chinese policy is moving backwards towards the promotion of ‘indigenous innovation’ – or self-reliant innovation – and away from openness. In other words, we may be seeing a more ‘techno-nationalist’ China as well as a protectionist US.

China has also been criticized for inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, though the establishment of special courts for such disputes marks a commitment to improve – and the rights of Chinese companies increasingly need protection too.

As the benefits of globalization increasingly come under question, and with some degree of nationalist political pressure in both the West and China, it is not going to be possible – or politically desirable – to do away with national borders when it comes to innovation. But at the same time, the extent to which businesses and consumers have globalized means that fully ‘indigenous’ innovation is not possible, even if it were politically desirable.

EU-China innovation relations, as well as those between Washington and Beijing, therefore need careful management. But both Americans and Europeans should have more confidence in their innovation capability, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese innovation.

Americans and Europeans should acknowledge and promote the opportunities that come from globally networked innovation processes. Taking advantage of the comparative advantage of all the players in these networks means working with China as an innovation partner.

Nancy Pelosi in Taiwan: What lies ahead for China and the US? Expert comment GBhardwaj 3 August 2022

Chatham House experts examine the implications for Taiwan, China and the United States of Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island.

China’s fading ties with Washington?

Dr Yu Jie

US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s, visit to Taiwan has plunged China-US relations into a new low as the reservoir of trust forged between the two sides over the last 40 years appears to be almost exhausted.

However, her move will likely not result in the full-scale crisis across the Taiwan strait that some hawkish voices in both Beijing and Washington believe. Instead, Beijing will most likely offer a combination of military posturing toward the US navy and economic sanctions on Taiwanese agricultural and manufacturing products in order to send a clear bellwether to any future potential visits by high-level Western political figures.

Neither Beijing nor Washington has declared a willingness to change the current status quo as the present impasse benefits both governments – but for different reasons. For China, the best approach is to reach a military and economic capability that prevents US engagement with Taiwan without the use of force. For the US, the strategic ambiguity under the Taiwan Relations Act remains an effective card to counter China’s growing military influence in the Indo-Pacific and keep itself relevant within the region as a security guarantor. Yet, both sides have decided to kick the issue of Taiwan’s status down the road, believing that time is ultimately on their side.

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric, China will be careful not to stumble into an accidental conflict which risks colossal damage on all fronts. Chinese President, Xi Jinping, must weigh all of the options before him as Beijing cannot afford to be perceived as unilaterally seeking to change what it agreed with the US back in 1979 when ties were re-established. If that happens, it will provoke the US political establishment to reach a unanimous agreement to change its ‘One China Policy’ and, ahead of the 20th Communist Party Congress where Xi is expected to be crowned for a historic third term, the last thing he wants is an unnecessary conflict with Taiwan.

The road to escalation?

Dr Bill Hayton

Beijing has chosen to take issue over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in a way that it did not do for other recent US Congressional visits to the island. Several high-ranking US senators visited in April and May this year yet none of these visits triggered the prospect of a cross-strait crisis. So why has Beijing chosen to turn Pelosi’s visit into a stand-off?

Pelosi’s visit is part of a performance in which both actors – the US and China – are playing primarily for their domestic audiences. This comes at a time when ruling circles in Beijing are preparing for the five-yearly Communist Party Congress. Amid a slowing economy and successive COVID-19 variants, Xi Jinping cannot afford to look weak as he prepares the ground for his third term of office. Meanwhile, the US, represented either by President Joe Biden or House Speaker Pelosi, cannot back down at this point without looking weak itself.

Both sides have moved military assets into strategic positions near Taiwan to demonstrate their resolve. Neither side wants confrontation yet neither wishes to be humiliated. Currently, Pelosi’s visit, amid posturing by China, will make the US appear strong, but the consequences are likely to play out over a longer period. Xi Jinping will need to appear to have recaptured the initiative between now and the congress in the autumn when the risk of an incident will be at its greatest.

Taiwan controls several isolated islands that could be pressured by Chinese forces in the event of a future crisis. The Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos lie just a few miles off the coast of the mainland and have been at the centre of previous confrontations. There are also two other points of concern. Pratas Island – known as Dongsha – sits halfway between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Itu Aba – known as Taiping – is the largest of the Spratly Islands in the centre of the South China Sea. All would be vulnerable to an attack by the People’s Liberation Army, the principal military force of China, and the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.

A military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan, or further south in the South China Sea, would have major impacts on regional and global trade. An estimated $300 billion worth of trade passes through the area every month. Japan and South Korea depend heavily on flows of oil and gas through the sea. Exports from Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines would also be heavily affected by disruptions to shipping, increased insurance costs and interruptions in inflows of raw materials. The impact on a world economy already suffering major disruption because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the lingering effects of COVID-19 would indeed be stark.

Is a shift in US policy on the cards?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will undoubtedly be seen as a provocation by Beijing – even if it should not be. Pelosi’s trip to the Indo-Pacific, which also includes visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, comes at a time of growing tension between the US and China in the region.

It also comes at a time when the divide among Washington’s foreign policy elite is growing, with some arguing that it is time to abandon the country’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, where it refrains from stating how it would react were China to openly and deliberately attack Taiwan. Indeed, recent statements by President Joe Biden have raised questions about whether the US is set to make a policy change. But, since both its ‘One China Policy’ and policy of strategic ambiguity have been largely successful, it would be wise for the US to maintain them.

During her visit, Pelosi is likely to reaffirm the US’ high regard for Taiwan’s democracy and embrace the language of shared values. She has embraced Biden’s framing of international relations as a contest between democracies and autocracies. This alone will continue to exacerbate tensions. It would be a mistake, though, to signal a major policy change away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity on Taiwan’s status. Even if the US decides later to embrace a policy shift of this size, such a message should be carefully considered and communicated clearly, and not by chance.

Congress has an important role to play but President Joe Biden and his national security team should make the final decision on US policy towards Taiwan. Getting the signals right in international politics is a key part of deterrence and, especially in East Asia, deterring both China and Taiwan’s ambitions is essential. 

Increasing insecurity in the region?

Dr John Nilsson-Wright and Ben Bland

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has provoked mixed responses from US allies across Asia.

For Japanese policymakers, the Taiwan issue is connected to the wider issue of regional security. Fears that a military conflict over the island will inevitably draw Japanese self-defense forces into a shooting war with China – a development that is neither formally mandated under the terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty nor necessarily constitutionally sanctioned – explains the concerns in Tokyo.

While the Japanese government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is increasingly worried about China’s growing military presence in the East and South China Seas, Japan’s heavy trade dependence on China and the country’s economic and security vulnerabilities make it imperative to avoid any further escalation of tensions.

Given Tokyo’s non-recognition policy towards Taiwan, Japanese ties with Taipei are handled informally by politicians of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rather than at cabinet or foreign ministry level, and in recent weeks and months there has been an increase in visits by cross party delegations from Japan.

The death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as removed from public life a vocal advocate in support of enhanced ties between Tokyo and Taipei, but with public opinion in Japan increasingly tilting in an anti-Chinese direction, and with younger politicians favouring a more combative approach towards Beijing, there is a risk that the government will face pressure at home to toughen its language on Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence through increased military cooperation among allies, along with a graduated increase in defence spending, is the best way of limiting risk over Taiwan.

Nevertheless, privately, many officials in Tokyo are likely to have viewed the Pelosi visit as an unhelpful intervention and will be puzzled and perhaps frustrated by the apparent inability of the Biden administration to persuade the US Speaker of the House of Representatives to cancel her visit.

In South Korea, the government of President Yoon Suk-yeol, faces similar pressures to Japan, given the heavy dependence of the South Korean economy on China for trade and investment opportunities.

Pelosi’s visit to the region will strikingly not include meetings with either the president or Foreign Minister Park Jin. With Yoon on vacation and Park attending the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia, the absence of high profile engagements for Pelosi might seem to be a purely practical matter, but Seoul may also be seeking to avoid antagonizing Beijing at a time when the Chinese government is seeking to pressure South Korea not to enhance alliance coordination with the United States and Japan or to expand its commitment to the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system.

As in Japan, public opinion in South Korea is increasingly anti-Chinese, but the logic of regional economic and security uncertainty, requires the Yoon government to avoid getting trapped in a worsening stand-off with Beijing.

What are the lasting impacts of the AUKUS agreement? Interview LJefferson 15 August 2022

Drawing on their International Affairs article, Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda outline the effect of AUKUS on Australia-France relations and the liberal order.

Almost a year after the surprise announcement of the AUKUS treaty, its full diplomatic implications are still being understood. The security cooperation agreement between Australia, the US and the UK caused outrage in France and was a notable source of discord between states that see themselves as defenders of the liberal international order.

In this interview Jamal Barnes and Samuel Makinda discuss their recent article in International Affairs and assess the effect of the agreement on relationships between its signatories and France and the EU, the potential for reconciliation in the treaty’s aftermath, as well as the implications it has for trust in world politics.  

What was the AUKUS treaty and why did Australia sign it?

The AUKUS treaty is an agreement between Australia, the US and the UK. Signed in 2021, it facilitates cooperation on security issues in the Indo-Pacific between the three countries – specifically, it concerns the sharing of ‘military capabilities and critical technologies, such as cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and undersea domains’.

A key aspect is that Australia will purchase nuclear-fuelled submarines from either the US or UK. Australia decided to purchase nuclear-powered submarines – and reneged on its 2016 agreement to purchase French-built diesel-propelled submarines – because it believed that the French-made submarines were no longer fit for purpose.

However, the agreement is about more than submarines. Although Australia, the UK and US argue that AUKUS is designed to defend the rules-based international order and help ‘preserve security and stability in the Indo-Pacific’, AUKUS has been largely seen as a response to the rise of China and its military activities in the region. The AUKUS agreement reflects the increased attention that the US, UK and Australia are paying to the Indo-Pacific and their commitment to constraining China’s exercise of power in the region.

What were the effects of the AUKUS treaty on relations between Australia and France?

It led to a serious diplomatic rift. Australian officials, including former Prime Minister Morrison, had visited President Macron in France and told him nothing about AUKUS. Morrison had assured Macron in June 2021 while former Australian foreign and defence ministers had assured their French counterparts that Australia was fully committed to the purchase of French submarines just two weeks before the announcement of AUKUS.

When French officials found out about AUKUS on the day it was announced on 15 September 2021, they declared publicly that they had been betrayed and stabbed in the back. Not only had France built its relationship with Australia on trust, but its relationship was more than just about submarines. It was designed to be central to France’s 50-year engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific. However, France was not only left out of talks but was also betrayed by a country it considered a close ally.

France responded by temporarily recalling its ambassador and stated that it would ‘redefine’ its relationship with Australia. It did not say that it would not work with Australia, but rather downgraded its relationship to one where it would only do so on a case-by-case basis.

In your article you mention that the AUKUS treaty was seen as a betrayal of trust by France in particular. Why use the word ‘betrayal’?

The word betrayal is accurate because Australia’s actions went beyond simply cancelling a business contract. Australia breached France’s trust. Not all agreements involve trust. Some are driven by self-interest while others are simply legal contracts. When these agreements are broken, the usual response is feelings of disappointment and a belief that one party is unreliable and has not lived up to its end of the agreement.

However, when diplomatic partnerships involve trust, they often contain an emotional element. A key element of trust is that one party makes itself vulnerable to another in the expectation that neither party will take advantage. When that trust is breached, the response is different from a breach of contract.

It involves feelings of betrayal as deeper emotional factors are involved. This could be seen in President Macron’s anger, and his and other French officials’ willingness to publicly call Prime Minister Morrison a liar who had stabbed France in the back. If the previous France-Australia agreement was simply a legal contract, it would have been difficult to explain the emotional element of this diplomatic fallout.

How did the signing of the AUKUS treaty affect wider relations between members of AUKUS and EU member states?

The EU, like France, felt betrayed by the AUKUS announcement. Despite being a key ally of the US, Australia, and the UK, it was left out of AUKUS discussions, and was not aware of the agreement until it was announced in the media.

What made this worse was that the EU was in the process of announcing its Indo-Pacific strategy, which was characterized as ‘maybe one of the [EU’s] most important geopolitical documents’ by High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs, Josep Borrell. For the EU, this was the latest in a long line of recent policy betrayals that had left it uncertain if it could trust key allies on important issues. The result was greater calls from within the EU to more forcefully pursue ‘strategic autonomy’, meaning a more assertive and independent EU foreign policy.

Do betrayals of trust affect the health of the liberal international order?

Yes, they can. While it is common for leaders in liberal democracies to lie to their own people, lying to the leaders of other countries can have serious repercussions for the norms, rules and institutions of international society. A key aspect of international society is the ‘presumption of trust’ that facilitates legal compliance and diplomatic cooperation.

Without this presumption it is difficult for states to engage in long term partnerships or have confidence that diplomatic agreements will be upheld. In our article, we highlight how Australia’s violation of a particular norm, that agreements must be kept, has undermined this presumption of trust. This norm not only helps build trust between states, but also contributes to the maintenance of international order by helping to support the presumption of trust in international society.

US midterms: What to expect? Expert comment LJefferson 4 November 2022

The 2022 midterms have a heightened importance with long-term implications for the future of American democracy.

US voters will head to the polls on 8 November 2022 to cast their ballots for the midterm elections, which will see 35 of 100 Senate seats and all 435 seats in the House of Representatives up for re-election.

Midterm elections serve as a benchmark on voter’s approval of the sitting president’s party, but following a turbulent 2020 presidential election, with claims of a stolen election and voter fraud, the midterms have taken on a heightened importance with the processes and results having long-term implications for the future of democracy in the US.

When will we see results?

While many US voters expect to see results the night of an election, the complex voting process in the US often makes it difficult to ascertain the success of candidates in certain states after the polls close.

In Arizona, state laws allow 20 days for election officials to certify results while Nevada allows for additional time to count mail-in ballots following election day. Pennsylvania state laws prevent mail-in ballots from being counted before 7am on election day and the combined effect of counting in-person and mail-in ballots simultaneously, as well as the need to present votes to a state canvassing board could delay official results for weeks, and votes will not be officially certified by the state until 28 November.

In Georgia, the presence of a third-party candidate may lead to a run-off election if neither the Democrat or Republican contender receives over 50 per cent of the vote, which would take place on 6 December with results expected soon after.

Delays in determining election results may bolster claims made by Republican candidates that election results were fraudulent, especially if races are tight, as delays  counting mail-in ballots might cause results to differ over time. Early results favouring Republican candidates may also differ from the final tally as more mail-in ballots get counted, creating a ‘red mirage’, as the majority of Republican voters are expected to vote in-person, as seen in 2020.

In the vast majority of elections since World War II, the president’s party has often lost seats in the first midterm elections after taking office. While there have been exceptions and instances of the sitting party avoiding major losses during wartime, such as after the Gulf War and the 9/11 attacks, it’s unlikely Russia’s war in Ukraine will create the same rally around the flag effect.

Issues influencing voters

There are signs that US support for Ukraine on both sides of the aisle is starting to waver, as evidenced by the now recalled letter by the House Democratic Progressive Caucus pushing for a ceasefire and Republican House Leader, Kevin McCarthy’s recent comments about limiting US financial support for Ukraine.

US voters in general are more concerned with domestic issues rather than foreign policy, and both Democrats and Republicans have shaped their messaging around issues that will resonate with voters in key battleground states, with Democrats focusing heavily on abortion and reproductive rights and Republicans pushing the issues of crime and safety.

Democrats are hoping their focus on reproductive rights will motivate a higher turnout at the polls and have likely been encouraged by a recent referendum in Kansas where voters chose to protect abortion rights in the traditionally conservative state. In 2020, 52 per cent of the electorate in the swing state of Pennsylvania were female, and while not a huge majority, the difference could be enough to push the Democrats ahead.

Though the issue of abortion has gained more focus among Democratic voters, with 75 per cent of registered Democrats saying the issue was very important, 92 per cent of Republican voters rank the economy as their top issue.

The Senate race in Wisconsin, for example, was initially considered one of the Democrat’s most likely prospects for unseating an incumbent Republican senator, following US President Joe Biden’s win in the state in 2020.

Despite heavy fundraising from the Democratic party and a campaign visit by former US president Barack Obama, incumbent Senator Ron Johnson is now four points ahead of Democrat contender, Lieutenant Governor Mandela Barnes. A potential victory by Johnson, who has accused Barnes of being soft on crime and has shaped his messaging around growing the economy, may indicate whether  Democrats need to reshape their messaging ahead of the 2024 presidential election.

Threats of political violence

The risk of political violence in the US has increased in recent years, with many key officials under threat, as evidenced by the recent attack on US Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi’s, husband. A bulletin sent out by US agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, warned of attacks against not only political figures in the US, but also of attacks at locations like polling places, ballot box locations and voter registration sites.

The myth of a stolen election

Electoral integrity in 2022 has become especially significant, with over 300 candidates who believe the 2020 election was stolen up for election in various races across the United States.

The role of governors, secretaries of states and attorneys general (state officials charged with approving election results) has become a key issue in 2022. Proposals to give state legislatures the ability to certify election results, a role typically occupied by state officials, have already been made in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Arizona, all of which have Republican legislature majorities.

While these measures have not been successful thus far, a number of election deniers who would have the ability to influence how election results are certified are on the ballot for 2022. In Arizona, for example, Republican candidate for governor, Kari Lakes, and for attorney general, Abe Hamadeh have both been endorsed by Trump and have also supported his claims that the 2020 elections were fraudulent.

The Republican candidate for Arizona secretary of state, Mark Finchem publicly made calls to decertify Arizona’s electors, and was placed at receiving 49 per cent of votes in a poll conducted by CNN in early October. If Republicans are successful in both the state governor and secretary of state races, the role of the attorney general in certifying the election results in a state Biden closely won in 2020 becomes ever more crucial given their ability to govern how elections are run in the state, as well as their ability to challenge certification in court.

Next steps for EU-US cooperation on trade and technology 8 December 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 November 2022 Online

How can the EU and US increase cooperation on AI, semi-conductors and funding information communication technology services?

On trade and technology policy, the EU and the US are making meaningful progress towards cooperation while at the same time navigating tensions. As senior officials meet on 5 December for the third meeting of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), both sides have vowed to move towards concrete results. But can the US and EU increase cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and funding information communication technology services? 

This event draws on insights from a forthcoming Briefing Paper by Marianne Schneider-Petsinger that explores next steps for US-EU cooperation on trade and technology, which is part of a project supported by the Hanns Seidel Foundation. 

The near death and uncertain future of the US National Security Council 27 January 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2023 Chatham House

What role should the US National Security Council play in an era of great power competition?

Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00 GMT

Over the last three years, the US National Security Council (NSC) has gone from being neglected to necessary again, in Washington.

After former US President Donald Trump ignored and then tried to dismantle the NSC, current US President Joe Biden has restored the body but chosen not to reform it.

Born in the days before the Cold War and empowered during the War on Terror, what role should the NSC play in an era of great power competition?

Plus, how must it, and the rest of Washington, evolve to meet the challenges and opportunities that remain in the 21st century?

Digital politics threatens democracy and must change Expert comment NCapeling 13 January 2023

Violence in Brazil has again brought into focus the need for technology platforms to prioritize social responsibility to help prevent anti-democratic action.

Immediately following the violent storming of Brazil’s congressional building, supreme court, and presidential palace, comparisons to the infamous events of 6 January 2021 in the US came quickly and easily – and with good reason.

Both Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro built a fervent – albeit inchoate – political base of grievance which included Christian evangelicals, gun enthusiasts, and the disenfranchised. Both cynically spread doubts about the election victories of their successors without evidence. And it has been claimed both incited their supporters to overturn these results.

But this list of similarities extend beyond mere politics. The attack on democracy in Brazil was recorded, amplified, coordinated, and funded by exactly the same technologies used by the protesters in the US on 6 January.

In Brazil, the main engines of misinformation and insurrection planning were Telegram, Facebook, and WhatsApp, although some election-denying diehards also shifted to Twitter.

Tactical use of social media to mobilize and fundraise

When Bolsonaro was originally elected in 2018, these platforms were already a medium for promoting disinformation, conspiracy, and fear. But in the lead-up to the violence of 8 January, they became a means by which ‘Bolsonaristas’ raised funding for an attack and mobilized supporters to come to Brasilia – advertising the availability of buses and even free food for marchers – using the Festa da Selma hashtag.

To avoid detection by authorities, organizers used a simple switch of the letter ‘v’ to ‘m’ so that Selva, meaning ‘jungle’, became Selma – which means ‘party in the jungle’ to those in the know. But the authorities in the Brasilia state of Distrito Federal appeared to care little about preventing the attack anyway.

Civil society organizations have warned for decades that policies made in a Silicon Valley boardroom fit poorly to the realities of countries such as Brazil, Somalia, or Myanmar. Content moderation is a near-impossible task at the scale demanded by platforms as vast as those operated by big tech, and automated solutions are far from being a silver bullet as they create as many problems as they solve.

Extremism has found an unfettered enabler on mainstream platforms, and an increasingly sprawling network of alternative tech has made such voices resilient to challenge. Platforms such as Gettr, Gab, and Telegram have become go-to platforms for extremist networks when fringe voices find themselves blocked by mainstream platforms.

Telegram has come under significant scrutiny for the role it played in the storming of Congress in Brasilia but any number of tools and platforms – each with millions of users – could have achieved similar results.

The sordid events in Brasilia are just the latest chapter in digital extremism and conspiracy- mongering which often erupts into anti-democratic violence, and should serve as a reminder of the urgent risks of disinformation and the role digital technology plays in inciting, coordinating, fundraising, and amplifying such events.

But the checks on the power of private social media companies are still few and splintered. In Brazil, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, head of the elections tribunal, attempted to crack down on social media, banning users for spreading misinformation in a move which sparked complaints of censorship from Bolsonaro supporters.

Following the elections, Moraes has advocated for greater judicial authority to regulate social media – but the justice is only one person and his impartiality is already being challenged given his aggressive pursuit of Bolsonaro supporters posting inflammatory messages.

And one justice doing it alone only inflames an already volatile situation. Effective regulation of social media requires an independent body vested with multiparty support and operating under clearly-defined rules and authority.

A global movement to find solutions

Brazil is not alone in an increasingly frantic search for checks on digital power as dozens of regulatory regimes are springing up around the world. All are premised on platforms being responsible for their own fiefdoms, but few tackle the threat posed to democracy by unchecked corporate power over digital commons.

Well-intentioned regulation will fall short so long as it is narrowly focused on a never-ending game of ‘content whack-a-mole’ and is hamstrung by powerful voices who see any rules as an attack on freedoms of expression or corporate decision-making.

Democracies are traditionally cautious in managing speech, in separating good information from bad information, or in defining acceptable politics. The steady watering down of the UK’s Online Safety Bill, now so thin on disinformation as to be essentially homeopathic, shows that democratic regulation is willing to go only so far in tackling challenges posed by digital politics.

Directors Briefing: Constraints on US foreign policy 20 February 2023 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2023 Chatham House

In conversation with Dr Richard Haass.

The US is facing external threats from foreign actors including Russia, China and North Korea. Alongside geopolitical challenges, the US is also experiencing threats from within. Though the US has a long history of enshrining civic rights and democratic freedoms, the institutions of democracy are being weakened through polarization and disinformation. To combat this challenge, the idea of citizenship must be revised and expanded to allow for a functioning, and even a flourishing, democracy.

• What are the implications of a weakening democracy at home for US foreign policy?
• How can civic rights in the US be reimagined to reduce divisions within America and protect the future of democracy?

Divided US support shows time is not on Ukraine’s side Expert comment LJefferson 17 February 2023

Growing public opinion evidence and uncertainty about the future of the war suggests that continued American support for aiding Ukraine should not be assumed.

One year into Russia’s war on Ukraine, fears that American support for Kyiv would rapidly wane have proven demonstrably wrong. Western financial and military backing has been robust thanks to allied unity and an unexpectedly mild winter. But, as financial analysts constantly remind us, past performance is no guarantee of future results.

People like to back winners. If the anticipated Russian spring offensive looks successful or the counterpart Ukrainian offensive is uninspiring, expect louder US voices calling for a negotiated settlement. The warning signs are already here.

American officials privately express growing apprehension that there will be an early resolution of the conflict. As one White House official recently observed to me, by the end of the year the war could well be about where it is today. And a plurality of Americans intuitively grasp this: 46 per cent believe neither Russia nor Ukraine currently has the advantage in the conflict.

Momentum matters  

In public opinion, perception of momentum matters. Americans’ support for the Vietnam War waned as the conflict persisted, falling from six-in-ten Americans in 1965 to four-in-ten in 1973.

Similarly, backing for the Iraq war fell from more than seven-in-ten in 2003 to barely four-in-ten in 2008. And with Afghanistan, as the war dragged on, support for US involvement fell from more than nine-in-ten in 2002 to less than five-in-ten in 2021. Notably, once the American public turned on these wars, support never returned.

Of course, Americans were fighting and dying in those wars, which is not the case in the Ukraine conflict. But initially the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan war support was buoyed by the belief that continued US engagement was justified, otherwise American sons and daughters had died in vain. With no American lives at stake in Ukraine, only financial and military resources, there is a growing wariness of throwing good money after bad.

In the last year, the share of Americans who say the United States is doing too much for Ukraine has nearly quadrupled, from seven to 26 per cent. And the portion that believe Washington has not done enough has halved, from 49 per cent to 17 per cent.

Sentiment about Ukraine support has become increasingly partisan. In March 2022, nine per cent of Republicans and five per cent of Democrats said the US was doing too much for Ukraine. By January 2023, 40 per cent of Republicans but just 15 per cent of Democrats complained Washington was doing too much.

This erosion of Americans’ support for Ukraine does not bode well for the future. Less than half (48 per cent) of the public in November, compared to 58 per cent in July, believed Washington should support Ukraine for as long as it takes, even if it means American households have to pay higher gas and food prices as a consequence.

A similar share, 47 per cent – up from 38 per cent in July – said the United States should urge Ukraine to settle for peace as soon as possible so the costs aren’t so great for American households, even if that means Ukraine will lose some territory.

A partisan divide

The partisan divide over Ukraine is largely driven by Republican political rhetoric during and after the 2022 midterm elections. Current Republican Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy observed last October: ‘I think people are going to be sitting in a recession and they’re not going to write a blank cheque to Ukraine.’

More recently, in the wake of Ukrainian president Zelenskyy’s December speech to Congress, Florida Republican Representative Matt Gaetz, whose vote was pivotal in making McCarthy Speaker, tweeted: ‘Hemorrhaging billions in taxpayer dollars for Ukraine while our country is in crisis is the definition of America last.’

In January, newly-elected Ohio Republican Senator J.D. Vance told a Cleveland radio station that it was ‘ultimately not in our national security interest’ to send M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, despite the fact that they will be built by his constituents in Ohio.

In addition, ten Republican members of the House of Representatives have introduced legislation asserting ‘that the United States must end its military and financial aid to Ukraine, and urges all combatants to reach a peace agreement.’ 

And this month former President Donald Trump said: ‘That war has to stop, and it has to stop now, and it’s easy to do’ and it ‘can be negotiated within 24 hours’. Why worry about continued support for the war if it’s about to be over?

The road to 2024

With the 2024 US presidential election already revving up, Americans’ appetite for continued backing for Ukraine may hinge on how voters judge the Biden administration’s handling of the conflict.

Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans (61 per cent versus 27 per cent) to approve of the Biden administration’s response to the Russia invasion, suggesting Ukraine will be yet another partisan talking point as the campaign heats up. Notably, men are much more likely than women to approve of Biden’s efforts, as are older Americans compared with younger Americans.

US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?

Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.

The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?

Europe's response to the US Inflation Reduction Act 27 March 2023 — 2:00PM TO 3:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the implications of the US Inflation Reduction Act, how Europe can respond and what options the UK has.

While the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has led to an outcry in the EU, member states have different concerns and preferences for how to respond. The European Commission’s proposed ‘Green Deal Industrial Plan’ includes the relaxation of state aid rules to drive funding. But will this lead to a ‘subsidies race’ between the US and EU and is a ‘green trade war’ brewing?  
 
The UK’s response to the IRA has been much more muted than the EU’s. But caught between US subsidies and EU subsidies, can the UK compete and create an independent response to the IRA? And what steps can be taken to facilitate global cooperation and to make trade work for the green transition?

Dr Martin Porter, Executive Chair at the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, will kick off the discussion with short remarks followed by an interactive discussion among all participants

This discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our founding partner and supporting partners for their generous support of the forum.  

Steven A. Carr
Mar 1, 2014; 13:907-917
Technological Innovation and Resources

Qin Liu
Aug 1, 2007; 6:1299-1317
Research

Tamar Geiger
Mar 1, 2012; 11:M111.014050-M111.014050
Special Issue: Prospects in Space and Time

Jesper V. Olsen
Jun 1, 2004; 3:608-614
Technology

Ignat V. Shilov
Sep 1, 2007; 6:1638-1655
Technology

Martin R. Larsen
Jul 1, 2005; 4:873-886
Technology

Ulrich Rothbauer
Feb 1, 2008; 7:282-289
Research

Philip L. Ross
Dec 1, 2004; 3:1154-1169
Research

Staphylococcus aureus adhesion to the host's skin and mucosae enables asymptomatic colonization and the establishment of infection. This process is facilitated by cell wall-anchored adhesins that bind to host ligands. Therapeutics targeting this process could provide significant clinical benefits; however, the development of anti-adhesives requires an in-depth knowledge of adhesion-associated factors and an assay amenable to high-throughput applications. Here, we describe the development of a sensitive and robust whole cell assay to enable the large-scale profiling of S. aureus adhesion to host ligands. To validate the assay, and to gain insight into cellular factors contributing to adhesion, we profiled a sequence-defined S. aureus transposon mutant library, identifying mutants with attenuated adhesion to human-derived fibronectin, keratin, and fibrinogen. Our screening approach was validated by the identification of known adhesion-related proteins, such as the housekeeping sortase responsible for covalently linking adhesins to the cell wall. In addition, we also identified genetic loci that could represent undescribed anti-adhesive targets. To compare and contrast the genetic requirements of adhesion to each host ligand, we generated a S. aureus Genetic Adhesion Network, which identified a core gene set involved in adhesion to all three host ligands, and unique genetic signatures. In summary, this assay will enable high-throughput chemical screens to identify anti-adhesives and our findings provide insight into the target space of such an approach.

Leukocidin ED (LukED) is a pore-forming toxin produced by Staphylococcus aureus, which lyses host cells and promotes virulence of the bacteria. LukED enables S. aureus to acquire iron by lysing erythrocytes, which depends on targeting the host receptor Duffy antigen receptor for chemokines (DARC). The toxin also targets DARC on the endothelium, contributing to the lethality observed during bloodstream infection in mice. LukED is comprised of two monomers: LukE and LukD. LukE binds to DARC and facilitates hemolysis, but the closely related Panton–Valentine leukocidin S (LukS-PV) does not bind to DARC and is not hemolytic. The interaction of LukE with DARC and the role this plays in hemolysis are incompletely characterized. To determine the domain(s) of LukE that are critical for DARC binding, we studied the hemolytic function of LukE–LukS-PV chimeras, in which areas of sequence divergence (divergence regions, or DRs) were swapped between the toxins. We found that two regions of LukE's rim domain contribute to hemolysis, namely residues 57–75 (DR1) and residues 182–196 (DR4). Interestingly, LukE DR1 is sufficient to render LukS-PV capable of DARC binding and hemolysis. Further, LukE, by binding DARC through DR1, promotes the recruitment of LukD to erythrocytes, likely by facilitating LukED oligomer formation. Finally, we show that LukE targets murine Darc through DR1 in vivo to cause host lethality. These findings expand our biochemical understanding of the LukE–DARC interaction and the role that this toxin-receptor pair plays in S. aureus pathophysiology.

Time to accelerate the sustainability pivot Expert comment NCapeling 26 May 2021

Higher stakes make it more important than ever to safeguard the integrity of sustainability commitments, and ensure high quality in delivery and implementation.

Regular headlines reaffirm the rise of sustainability on the global stage. Political momentum behind climate action has not been derailed by COVID-19, sustainability is increasingly central to national political debates, and what once might have been confined to scientific pursuits and UN conferences has now percolated through to international financial affairs and the wider political summits.

Much is made of the scale of the challenge, from climate change, water stresses, and biodiversity loss to the looming spectre of environment-induced societal breakdown triggering unprecedented civilizational challenges on the back of decades of systemic neglect over the true cost of social and environmental imbalances and unencumbered consumption.

But the good news is that talk of sustainability solutions is picking up pace and growing in its reach into the mainstream. The Wall Street Journal recently charted the shift of sustainable finance from being a niche interest of socially conscious investors into a sustainable ‘gold rush’, further bolstering its financial credentials with trillions of dollars designated for the global energy transition.

Assets in investment funds with links to the environment came to almost $2 trillion globally in the first quarter of 2021, more than tripling in just three years, and investors are putting some $3 billion a day into these funds while bonds and loans worth $5 billion looking to bankroll green initiatives are issued every day.

Climate ambitions and power diplomacy

Should the number of zeros fail to persuade, other signs of a sustainability pivot abound. Climate ambition was the driving force in major power diplomacy as France, Germany, China, and the US jostled for leadership positions in a high octane theatre of ‘climate one upmanship’ in the run-up to the Climate Summit hosted by US president Joe Biden. The G7 has agreed to stop international financing of coal projects, and an International Energy Agency report says delivering net zero emissions by 2050 means no new coal, oil, or gas development from now on.

Governments are sending unmistakable policy signals which are redrawing multiple frontiers of the real economy, such as the banning of single use plastic in multiple jurisdictions from Europe, China, and more than 30 African states as well as New York and California. The sale of internal combustion engine vehicles is also set to end by 2035 or sooner in the EU, the UK, and California, and China is expected to follow suit with similar plans. France has proposed a ban on domestic flights when there are less carbon intensive alternatives on the ground.

But these signals did not spring out of a political vacuum. A global climate poll conducted by the United Nations (UN) in 50 countries showed two-thirds of the 1.2 million people polled thought there is a global climate emergency, and most indicated their support for stronger climate action even in countries with strong fossil energy interest.

Real economy responses to noticeable changes in risk calculus and political appetite will likely underpin further rapid shifts in market sentiment as investors begin to fully factor in the scale of the challenge and escalate their interrogation of company-level climate action plans.

Rapid pace of change still needed

But despite this ever-clearer direction of travel and growing availability of new technology and policy options, the need for speed remains. The rationale for moving fast in the next decade and a half to avoid the clear and present threats of environmental and breakdown is increasingly clear.

Getting up to scale is an ongoing and daunting challenge not least because exponential growth has brought growing pains. The recent spat over the definition and the usefulness of net zero targets for corporations and investors as seen in the shareholder votes over the climate plans put forward by Shell and other companies are all testimony to the challenge of mainstreaming.

While some have characterized these debates as political infighting, the reality is higher stakes simply mean it is more important than ever to safeguard the integrity of sustainability commitments as well as the quality of their delivery and implementation.

The move from ‘what’ to ‘how’ points to a clear demand for new, innovative collaborative efforts to help mitigate myriad political economy challenges associated with the upcoming great transition and ensure this sustainability pivot will deliver the promised outcomes. Launching the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator in support of these once-in-a-generation efforts is a proud moment for the institute, and a clear sign that this pivot to sustainability is here to stay.

Helen Clark elected president of Chatham House News release jon.wallace 23 July 2021

The former New Zealand prime minister and Head of UN Development Programme has been elected president of Chatham House.

Former New Zealand prime minister and Head of the United Nations Development Programme, Helen Clark, has been elected president of Chatham House.

Ms Clark will replace former United Kingdom Prime Minister, Sir John Major, who is retiring from the role. She will join Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller and Lord Darling as one of the institute’s three serving presidents.

Helen Clark was prime minister of New Zealand from 1999-2008. She then became the 8th and first female administrator of the UN Development Programme, completing two terms from 2009-2017.  

She is actively engaged in important international issues that are central to the institute’s priorities. She is currently chairing the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response with former president of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, which was convened by the World Health Organization last year and has just completed its main report. Her expertise extends to sustainable development, tackling climate change and developments in the Asia-Pacific.

Chatham House Director Robin Niblett welcomed the appointment:

‘We are excited to have found someone with the high-level political experience and who shares the strong reputation for integrity that Sir John enjoys. Helen Clark is highly regarded around the world for her past and current endeavours. Her election also underscores the institute’s global outlook and priorities, which she is so well qualified to help guide.’

Ms Clark was elected at the Annual General Meeting of Chatham House on 20 July which also marked the last official engagement for Lord O’Neill, who has now handed over to Sir Nigel Sheinwald as Chair of the institute.

Chatham House is delighted that Sir John Major will remain affiliated with the institute as president emeritus, and that Lord O’Neill will become a member of the institute’s panel of senior advisers.

The Chatham House Centenary Award winners announced News release jon.wallace 29 July 2021

Black Lives Matter, Greta Thunberg and Sir David Attenborough have been recognized for their achievements tackling racial inequality, climate change and biodiversity loss.

As Chatham House wraps up its centenary activities, the institute has made three Centenary Awards recognizing outstanding contributions to confronting the critical challenges facing the world today.

The awards are unique as they were voted on by the institute’s staff and pay tribute to the individual or organization they believe has played a significant role in progressing the Chatham House mission: to help governments and societies build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Greta Thunberg has been awarded the Chatham House Centenary Changemakers Award in recognition of her vanguard role in mobilizing young people to take up climate activism.

Greta’s message has cut through where politicians and scientists have failed time and time again. She has commanded the attention of world leaders, addressed intergovernmental organizations and inspired millions of people to join the global climate strike. She has demonstrated the electrifying power of young voices speaking truth to power and focused the world’s attention on environmental injustices.

Sir David Attenborough has been named as the Chatham House Centenary Lifetime Award winner for his tireless commitment to conservation and raising public and political awareness of the growing climate crisis.

Together with the BBC, he has pioneered the way in which we experience and understand life on this planet, bringing the wonders of the natural world into our homes. Over the last 60 years, from black-and-white to 4K TV, his pioneering documentaries have been broadcast around the world and have sounded the alarm on the devastating impact humanity has had on the environment.

He has become one of the most compelling voices on important issues such as biodiversity loss, climate change and the destruction of natural habitats. Sir David was previously awarded the Chatham House Prize in 2019 for his work on Blue Planet II and tackling ocean plastic pollution.

Melina Abdullah, one of the co-founders of the Los Angeles chapter of the Black Lives Matter movement and co-director of Black Lives Matter Grassroots, has accepted the Chatham House Centenary Diversity Champion Award on behalf of the movement.

This award is in recognition of the momentous work Black Lives Matter has done towards empowering black people and promoting a more inclusive approach to race in policy-making. The movement has brought global attention to systemic injustice against black lives and is helping to build a better world that draws on more diverse voices and inclusive approaches.

Dr Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House said:

‘We are delighted to recognise three special centenary awards today in recognition of the individuals who our staff believe are redefining the ways in which each of us can drive positive global change.

‘The vision and achievements of each of the winners echo Chatham House’s own goals for its second century and demonstrate a shared commitment to building a more sustainable and inclusive world.

‘We are inspired by the ways the award winners are leading global efforts to combat climate change, protect biodiversity and bring about more equal and inclusive societies.’

For more information, please contact: pressoffice@chathamhouse.org

AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context Expert comment NCapeling 17 September 2021

The new AUKUS partnership as well as the furore in Paris surrounding its announcement says a lot about the new geopolitical landscape.

The growing diplomatic drama surrounding the announcement of the new Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) risks concealing rather than highlighting what the deal reveals about profound changes in the global strategic context. Several elements stand out.

First, Australia’s decision to break off the $66 billion contract it signed with France in 2016 to purchase a new fleet of diesel electric submarines underscores the heightened level of concern in Canberra about China’s growing naval capabilities.

Despite all the industrial, legal, and diplomatic disruption, the Australian government has decided only the stealthy nuclear-powered submarines developed by Britain with US support can provide the genuine naval capability it needs long-term.

Next, in helping Australia resolve this conundrum, the British government has revealed the versatility of its new foreign policy. Part of the reason UK prime minister Boris Johnson eschewed the concept of a formal foreign policy and security treaty in the post-Brexit deal with the European Union (EU) was to pursue freely new ventures such as the recent ‘G7-plus’ summit in Cornwall, and enhanced cooperation among the Five Eyes allies. AUKUS reveals that this approach can produce real results.

Europe or the Indo-Pacific

During this week’s Polish-British Belvedere Forum in Warsaw, one of the main Polish concerns was that this ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific could overstretch Britain’s scarce resources when it should be focusing on Europe, where they are most needed.

But AUKUS does not over-extend Britain. There is no military commitment involved in the agreement. The UK also remains outside the Quad – made up of the US, India, Japan, and Australia. And the ongoing stately voyage of its new aircraft carrier from the Mediterranean into the South China Sea provides better insight into the substance of the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt.

Much derided for not carrying enough of its own aircraft – and for depending on US and Dutch escort vessels – the UK has in fact managed to coalesce a flexible group of allies around the Queen Elizabeth while enabling it to fly the British flag in Asian waters and strengthening interoperability with its allies for future joint operations.

Despite the hype, Britain’s main defence investments and deployments remain firmly focused in Europe, as laid out by the recent Integrated Review. And the decision to draft a new NATO Strategic Concept – midwifed by Britain at the 70th anniversary NATO summit hosted in London in December 2019 and confirmed during Joe Biden’s visit to NATO headquarters in June – will give Britain’s role in European security a new purpose and focus in the coming years.

Alone on the strategic landscape

For France, of course, the cancellation of its submarine deal is a painful humiliation, and a severe blow to thousands of workers in its hi-tech defence industry. It also comes at a sensitive moment politically, with Emmanuel Macron keen to demonstrate his international standing ahead of the 2022 presidential election. Instead, France now looks rather lonely on the strategic landscape alongside the more homogeneous and collectively powerful AUKUS trio.

But, rather than take the high road, a furious French reaction has compared Biden to Donald Trump and argued that this defence industrial failure for France should drive an acceleration towards European – for which, read EU – strategic autonomy.

This implies France sees European strategic autonomy as protecting and extending its own sovereign power and industrial interests rather than as a process for EU members to achieve more together in security and foreign policy than they can alone – thereby undermining rather than enhancing its case.

The gap between European strategic rhetoric and practical action was further highlighted by the AUKUS partnership being announced the evening before the EU launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy, and on the same day as China refused to allow a German frigate its first planned port visit to Shanghai.

America is still back

There is still a long way to go before the new submarine deal becomes reality. Australia needs to extricate itself from the French deal, decide how to secure the highly enriched uranium to power its new nuclear submarines, decide with the US and UK the division of labour and technology transfer of production, and assuage the International Atomic Energy Agency’s concerns about the precedent this deal sets. The fruits of this dramatic announcement will, therefore, be a long time in coming.

But, however the details play out, 15 September 2021 was a consequential day. The AUKUS announcement showed that China’s growing hard power is now eliciting a genuinely tough and structural political-military reaction.

Across the Atlantic, it also allowed President Biden – flanked ‘virtually’ by the British and Australian prime ministers – to send the global message that America is indeed back, just three weeks after the ignominious retreat from Afghanistan and chaotic exit from Kabul. And it offered him the opportunity to remind the world that the Indo-Pacific is where the US will be putting its main effort in the future.

For many in China, AUKUS now confirms their belief that the US and its principal allies are determined to contain China’s rise in its own ‘backyard’, where it believes it has the right to flex its muscles. For others, it will confirm Xi Jinping has overreached and China is now paying the price of his more assertive strategy. Either way, the Chinese are on notice that the ambivalent nature of the Obama pivot to Asia has given way to a more determined pivot under Biden.

While the US is stepping up, the UK has shown it is in the mix, leveraging opportunities as they arise. For example, the goodwill the UK has generated in Tokyo with this new partnership with Australia could help its case as it pursues membership of the Transpacific Partnership trade area in 2022.

The EU looks like a bystander in comparison and ill-equipped for the geopolitical competition inherent in this new strategic context. It is essential, therefore, once the dust has settled from these fraught few days, that the US and UK reach out to find ways to involve France and its EU partners in a meaningful, shared transatlantic approach to the Indo-Pacific.

G20 must live up to its crisis-solving legacy Expert comment NCapeling 29 October 2021

The relevance of G20 is in question amid waning internal cohesion, but emerging economies could inject the group with inclusive ideas and greater legitimacy.

‘If we didn’t have it, we would have to invent it’ might well be the catchphrase for the Group of 20 (G20) as the international community rethinks global institutional architecture in the face of shifting power dynamics and geopolitical strife.

To be fair, the same is often said of other venerable institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), or even the United Nations (UN), often as a line of defence when questions are raised over their relevance or effectiveness.

According to former Goldman Sachs Asset Management chairman and UK treasury minister Jim O’Neill, size also matters because the G20 is both too big and too small to be on the ball consistently. While he might be right, numbers alone suggest the G20 should be the room where it happens when it comes to fixing global challenges such as post-pandemic economic recovery, tackling climate change, or getting the world vaccines.

Of all the international groupings, it boasts the most diverse and compelling mix of nations. It has 80 per cent of global income, three-quarters of global exports, 60 per cent of the global population and 80 per cent of global emissions.

Coming of age

The G20 was a forum of central bankers and finance ministers created when the 1997 Asian financial crisis laid bare the insufficiency of the G7. It came of age in 2008 when elevated to a leaders’ level summit two months after the Lehman Brothers collapse that precipitated the global financial crisis.

Perhaps distance did make the heart grow fonder, or at least hindsight rosier. While the G20’s response to the 2008 global financial meltdown is often lauded as an exemplary economic crisis response, the reality is less straightforward.

Barely two days after solemn promises were made in the 2008 communique, Russia broke rank and raised tariffs on imported cars. India followed by applying import duties on several iron and steel products.

Even though the 2008 summit did not immediately result in a coordinated fiscal boost, the common threat of a global financial meltdown helped conjure a display of global unity and rally much-needed market confidence. It also resulted in a set of practical action plans unheard of to that point and specific tasks for several international organisations as a follow-up to summitry.

The seeming parallel to 2008 this year, as the world faces the common threat of the COVID-19 pandemic amid a series of extreme weather and supply crunches, explains why expectations are running high for Rome and for G20 president Mario Draghi, the Italian prime minister.

There is pressure to solve myriad global challenges, whether scaling climate action before the UN climate change conference in Glasgow or delivering vaccines and debt relief for developing countries, to name a few.

Effective crisis response is how the G20 has cut its teeth, and the world is handling several emergencies right now. Draghi himself was chair of the Financial Stability Forum back in 2008.

Inflated expectations also abound because the Rome gathering is a G20 summit without the long shadow of Jamal Khashoggi’s death over the Saudi G20 presidency. It also lacks former US president Donald Trump, who tried his best to put many international organisations and the spirit of global cooperation in deep freeze since 2016.

If defrosting multilateralism was also a shared goal, in addition to economic recovery, general rustiness in the business of international cooperation – an understandable hangover from the Trump years – has also gummed up the works.

Hence, the G20 will have to do much in the coming days to prove that, unlike the G7 in 2008, it has yet to outlive its usefulness, even when some have decried it as being missing in action over the COVID-19 crisis. Amid rising US-China tensions and at a critical juncture for the global economy, countries are wondering if the G20 will survive such a tense geopolitical atmosphere and whether the agenda will be overloaded with challenging foreign policy issues such as the plight of Afghanistan.

Customary language aside, the G20’s problem-solving reputation can be oversold. Not surprisingly, it has worked best when members already agree on the next steps. Looking to the future, more hostile power plays are likely to further weaken the cohesiveness and effectiveness of institutions such as the G20.

Reviewing its track record would also suggest the institution’s prowess in crisis response tends to wane with the distance from the realm of monetary policy coordination. Not all areas of macroeconomics are created equal, in part because of the professional camaraderie and insularity of the central banking technocracy.

As was evident even in 2008, the G20 was less effective where there were more actors and domestic political dynamics at play, such as in the arena of trade. The recent deal struck on corporate tax is an encouraging but notable exception.

Gap between words and deeds

As The Economist said in 2011: ‘the G20 … is a big improvement over the G7 because it takes emerging economies seriously. But do the emerging economies themselves take the G20 seriously?’ Any scorecards would point to severe gaps between words and deeds, most notably but not limited to the emerging economy members.

If the G20 was born out of the need to increase the number of seats at the table, the next three years – with the G20 helmed by Indonesia in 2022 followed by India then Brazil – might prove to be the coming-out party for emerging economies.

Russia's end games and Putin's dilemmas Expert comment NCapeling 14 February 2022

As warnings from Washington and London intensify, the period of maximum danger in the Ukraine standoff has begun. Even if conflict is avoided, the status quo has gone.

There are several reasons to believe conflict over the Ukraine is imminent. The military build-up is complete. Russia has added tactical support elements, including medical units, to its already large and comprehensive array of troops and equipment deployed to the east, north, and south of Ukraine.

Additional naval units have entered the Black Sea, military exercises with Belarusian forces have begun and, along with those on Russian territory, these can all provide cover for an intervention of some sort.

Far from being comforting, comments by Vladimir Putin and his entourage that it will not be Russia provoking a conflict are ominous. Russian media has ramped up domestic programming about the ‘imminent Ukrainian fascist threat’ to the motherland. And a recent US intelligence briefing alleges sophisticated preparations by Russian intelligence include releasing a video of a staged attack on Russian-speaking civilians in northern Ukraine.

Should Russia attack, its ‘fortress economy’ could weather a new round of sanctions for several years, not least given the growth in Russia’s hard currency reserves to $630 billion, under 20 per cent of which are now held in US dollars, and the high demand for – and global price of – oil and gas.

What does Putin really want?

Diplomacy is in high gear but, as Putin and other senior Russian figures have made clear, the US and European offers of new security confidence-building measures do not address Russia’s two core, stated demands – namely to withdraw US and NATO forces close to its borders in former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states, and to end NATO’s ‘open door’ policy to future enlargement.

For the Kremlin, enlargement to Ukraine would remove a critical buffer between Russia and the NATO alliance. If Putin’s objective, therefore, was simply to put down an unambiguous marker that Ukrainian membership of NATO is a red line, he has made progress.

He has reminded the world and Ukraine’s leadership of that country’s strategic vulnerability. US president Joe Biden and his European counterparts have stated NATO will not commit forces to defend Ukraine if it is attacked. And although they remain resolute on the ‘open door’ policy, there have been reminders NATO does not accept new members who risk importing a pre-existing conflict into the alliance.

If another Putin objective was to refocus US and, to a lesser extent, European attention away from China and back onto Russia and its security interests, he has succeeded. NATO has offered some new confidence-building measures around the conduct of military exercises and deployment of forces, while the US may be willing to enter negotiations for a new treaty with Russia to limit nuclear missiles deployed in Europe.

This would mean setting aside the growing threat posed by Chinese missiles that had partly motivated the Donald Trump administration to withdraw unilaterally from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

But there is another scenario to consider – that although these two issues are both important, neither are Putin’s core objective, which instead is to right once and for all the historical ‘wrong’ of Ukraine’s separation from Russia in 1991.

As Putin made clear in a lengthy essay in July 2021, he sees an independent, sovereign Ukraine as a historical aberration, and he blames the US for the deepening discord and animosity between ‘brotherly’ Ukraine and Russia.

Not stated in the essay is that the emergence of a more democratic and functional Ukraine poses an existential threat to Putin’s own control over Russia. In contrast, reincorporating Ukraine into a ‘greater Russia’ would underpin his now constitutionally-mandated opportunity to reign until 2036, as well as being his biggest legacy.

The problem is it seems impossible to bring Ukraine permanently back into Russia’s sphere of influence without some form of new military intervention.

Putin’s options

Putin’s strategy to date has been limited to ensuring the breakaway Ukrainian portions of Donetsk and Lugansk gain a legal right to block any future efforts by the central Ukrainian government to join either the European Union (EU) or NATO.

The Kremlin sees expansive interpretation and implementation of the 2014-15 Minsk protocols allowing self-governance for these areas currently under Russian military control as a potential route to this outcome. But for Volodomyr Zelensky or any future Ukrainian president to accept this would be political suicide, and Kyiv has already resisted French and German pressure to make this concession under the Normandy Format of meetings they share with Russia.

If Putin has now decided to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty more explicitly, he can order a limited military intervention further into these occupied territories – and perhaps areas adjacent to them and Crimea – under the pretext of ‘protecting’ Russian-speaking communities there.

This would be relatively easy to achieve and, combined with a blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, could successfully destabilize the government in Kyiv. But such steps would trigger international economic sanctions and drive Ukraine even further towards the West.

A 21st century ‘blitzkrieg’ to take Ukrainian territory as far as the Dnipro River including Kyiv and all points east, would come closer to achieving Putin’s territorial and historic legacy. And this is now a feasible option given Russia’s military superiority. But how easily Russia could then hold the territory and consolidate its political control would be doubtful, and these moves also bring high-risk, long-term economic and diplomatic costs to Russia and to him personally.

No return to the status quo

On balance, Russian military intervention in the coming days or weeks is still less rather than more likely. Putin may yet accept a new, visible, bilateral accommodation with the US on the future of European security.

Chatham House appoints new director and chief executive News release jon.wallace 5 April 2022

Bronwen Maddox will take up the role at the end of August, succeeding Dr Robin Niblett CMG.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) is delighted to announce that its new director and chief executive will be Bronwen Maddox, who joins from the Institute for Government.

Bronwen Maddox has been the director of the Institute for Government, an independent think tank based in London promoting better government, since September 2016. 

She joined the institute from the current affairs magazine Prospect, where she spent six years as editor and CEO.

Bronwen was previously foreign editor, chief foreign commentator and US editor at The Times, and before that, she ran award-winning investigations and wrote economics editorials for the Financial Times, after a career as an investment analyst in the City. She writes frequent op-ed columns for the Financial Times and broadcasts widely.

She is also visiting professor in the Policy Institute at King’s College London, a non-executive board member of the Law Commission, and has just been appointed a council member of Research England, one of the research councils of UK Research & Innovation.

Ms Maddox succeeds Dr Robin Niblett CMG who is standing down in the summer after 15 years in the role. She will take up the role at the end of August.

Chair of Chatham House, Sir Nigel Sheinwald said:

‘This is an exciting appointment for the future of Chatham House and for London as a global hub. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedented response of the rest of the world reminds us that organizations like Chatham House, with its outstanding record of independent analysis and new ideas on how to build a secure and prosperous world, are needed more than ever.

‘Bronwen Maddox has an international reputation as a compelling commentator and analyst on world affairs, with a proven ability to spot emerging issues and frame them in ways which will provoke intelligent debate and fresh thinking. She has provided successful and innovative leadership at the IFG, Prospect and The Times, and is committed to continuing to broaden Chatham House’s diverse appeal and impact. She is the ideal person to lead the institute into the next stage of its development at this crucial time for the future of international relations.’

Bronwen Maddox said:

‘I am honoured and delighted to become Chatham House’s next director. It’s a momentous period in international affairs and Chatham House, with its reputation for rigour, independence and expert analysis, has a unique role to play in assessing these changes and prompting solutions to confront them – as it shows every day. I look forward to the privilege of working with its teams, and the many others who have come together to advance its work.’

Sir Nigel also paid tribute to Dr Niblett:

‘Robin Niblett has transformed Chatham House in his fifteen years as its head. The institute’s research, activities and impact have grown considerably in that time thanks to Robin’s own high-quality commentary, his productive relationships with our stakeholders, partners, supporters and members and his commitment to the institute’s staff. He leaves an institute which has a much wider and fresher appeal and has strengthened London’s standing as a great centre for international affairs.’

Dr Niblett said:

‘This appointment is excellent news for Chatham House. Bronwen Maddox is ideally placed to ensure the institute continues to play its part in helping governments, business and civil society tackle the serious challenges we face, not just from the return of geopolitical competition and interstate conflict, but also from climate change, unsustainable economic activity and growing inequality, priorities for the institute that have been underlined by the COVID-19 pandemic.’

Mark Carney to chair Chatham House senior advisers News release NCapeling 17 May 2022

Former Bank of England Governor Mark Carney will succeed Sir John Major as chair of Chatham House’s Panel of Senior Advisers.

Chatham House is pleased to announce Mark Carney will succeed Sir John Major as chair of the institute’s Panel of Senior Advisers.

Chatham House senior advisers bring deep, first-hand experience of the policy and business worlds and use their experience, knowledge and networks to advise the institute’s research agenda and disseminate its policy ideas.

Mark Carney is currently United Nations (UN) Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance, UK prime minister Boris Johnson’s special finance adviser on COP26, as well as vice chairman and head of transition investing at Brookfield Asset Management.

He served as Governor of the Bank of England between 2013 and 2020 and as Governor of the Bank of Canada between 2008 and 2013.

Robin Niblett, director and chief executive of Chatham House says: ‘We are delighted to benefit from Mark Carney’s wealth of experience at the highest levels of decision-making on international financial policy, crisis management, and sustainability.

‘His personal commitment to leveraging economic and finance policies to combat climate change aligns with a central plank of the institute’s mission to help governments and societies build a sustainable future.

‘I also want to thank Sir John Major for his invaluable advice and support through such a pivotal time in the institute’s history; we are delighted that he will retain an affiliation as a President Emeritus of Chatham House.’

Sir Nigel Sheinwald, chair of Chatham House, says: ‘Mark Carney is perfectly placed to lead the institute’s Panel of Senior Advisers and help ensure our research is focused on improving international relations in practical ways.

‘His experience and expertise will be of great value as the institute undertakes a leadership transition and welcomes Bronwen Maddox as its new director in the autumn.

‘The Chatham House council greatly appreciates Mark Carney’s engagement in our future success, as we do Sir John’s commitment to the institute these past thirteen years.’

Mark Carney says: ‘I have long respected Chatham House as one of the world’s leading independent institutes on international policy and am honoured to take up the reins from Sir John Major of chairing its eminent Panel of Senior Advisers. Alongside other members of the panel, I look forward to contributing to the relevance and impact of Chatham House’s important work.’

In addition to having been Governor of the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada, Mark Carney also chaired the Financial Stability Board from 2011 to 2018 and, in 2015, established the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures.

In 2021, he launched the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, to unite net-zero financial sector-specific alliances from across the world into one industry-wide strategic alliance.

Chatham House established the Panel of Senior Advisers in 2009, under Sir John’s Major’s chairmanship, to support the institute in achieving its mission to build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.

Individually and collectively, members of the panel support the institute in achieving its mission by advising on new topics for debate, offering input to the institute’s research, contributing to its private and public meetings, and disseminating the institute’s ideas across their networks.

The panel does not have governance responsibilities, which reside fully with the Chatham House council.

Europe should become the top priority for Liz Truss Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

Liz Truss has the chance to be a better prime minister than Boris Johnson was, not least in the UK’s foreign policy.

For all the smoke-and-mirrors talk now commonplace about Brexit opportunities, there is real potential that Liz Truss could extract from the aftermath of that upheaval as well as from the turmoil in the world.

But the approach and priorities she revealed during her one year as a better UK foreign secretary than Boris Johnson was – although he did set a low bar – as well as the past three months campaigning for the leadership of her party contain a warning.

She has shown a willingness to aggravate relationships with allies in pursuit of the support of her party faithful, and of a vision of British independence as well as a tendency to dismiss economic analysis when it inconveniently questions her assertions about favoured policies.

At the heart of her political identity is a notion which is both a strength and a potentially calamitous weakness – a love of the notion of being a disrupter which injects a deliberate unpredictability into her approach towards a world in extreme flux.

If she indulges this without good judgment, she could do real damage to Britain’s prospects and standing in the world.

Ukraine and the energy crisis

In foreign policy, Europe should be her starting point and the opportunity here for the UK is clear. The war in Ukraine and crisis in the cost of energy gives it a role – despite having left the European Union (EU) – in talking to EU governments about the future of the continent on many fronts.

Johnson’s emphatic support of President Zelensky gave the UK a position of moral and strategic clarity which Truss can build on through what will be an exceptionally difficult winter for Europe’s governments.

She is in a position to persuade European leaders to remain united in Ukraine’s support while planning better how they are going to source energy. She could expand on that to help the EU find a way through its many other problems, such as upholding democratic values throughout the bloc or finding a response to migration.

There is also a chance for the UK to shape Europe’s thinking on the development and regulation of digital technology and medicine, energy, and the environment.

Truss’s declaration that the UK should now spend three per cent of its GDP on defence could help her in taking that kind of role. However this campaign declaration is not yet credible, given the pressures on the national finances and her silence so far on support for households on energy costs.

But that is the opportunity in theory and the signs are this is not her approach to Europe. Her provocative and opportunistic comment that the ‘jury’s out’ on whether President Macron (and France) was a friend or foe shocked both Britain’s allies and opponents.

For those keen to see divisions among democracies, it gave unexpected, heady encouragement, and to those within those countries, it injected a doubt about shared values which was deeply damaging. The chilly poise of Macron’s response – that the UK and France would always be allies – showed how far she had departed from normal protocol.

The episode encapsulated one of the sources of unease about the Truss style – improvisation under the banner of ‘disruption’ without thought of consequences.

However, she has shown consistency over the Northern Ireland Protocol with little sign of compromise, and that alone could cause much unnecessary damage to UK interests. It also puts her on a collision course with the EU and the UK House of Lords, due to consider controversial legislation again in early October after the Conservative party conference.

There is huge opposition in the Lords to two aspects of the legislation. The first target is the intention of the Johnson government – likely to be repeated by a Truss government – to use the bill to jettison aspects of the protocol, which many argue breaks international law. The second is the delegated power the bill would give ministers.

The cost of a new, serious clash – or worse, a full trade war – with the EU is high. There is the loss of trade, the increase in friction for business, which is consistently underestimated by the UK government, and the loss of scientific and research partnerships.

More than that, though, there is the weakening of ties to a set of allies with common values sharing an increasingly troubled neighbourhood.

US, China, and others remain important

And to say Europe should come first is not to dismiss other claims on the UK’s foreign policy. Her instinctive liking for the US will help Truss in relations with Washington at a difficult time, and her apparent intention to designate China as ‘a threat’ will support that relationship too.

The UK must avoid conflict with Europe and China Expert comment NCapeling 10 October 2022

Liz Truss says she wants to take a tough line but any freedom to forge her own foreign policy is a casualty of the economic turmoil following her first budget.

The tax-cutting budget from new UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng was clearly not inhibited by any apparent concern for the markets’ response. But the interest rate rise it contributed to and the scepticism raining down on the Truss government should force a recognition that economic vulnerability now constrains what the UK tries to do abroad.

That would mean taking a more cautious approach than the new UK prime minister seems to want to adopt. The Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) may sit next to each other in Whitehall’s parade of 18th century buildings, but a huge gulf lies between them.

When talking to officials, it is striking how those in one building make decisions without reference to the other. Foreign policy is made with no consideration of the UK’s need to borrow money in the markets, and budgets are written with little calculation of the effect of decisions next door – although the Cabinet Office does at least try to reconcile these.

But that approach is a luxury which the budget response and the sharp rise in national debt it will bring makes no longer affordable.

Repairing EU trade relations is priority

The first lesson is that any worsening of trade relations with the European Union (EU) is not now something the UK can afford to contemplate. The markets would take an even dimmer view of national finances if the UK were to become embroiled in an even more fractious trade dispute with its closest and largest trading partner.

When campaigning for the Conservative party leadership, Liz Truss talked tough on the Northern Ireland protocol and her unwillingness to compromise much with the EU. Since she became prime minister, sounds from both the UK and EU have been much more conciliatory, with suggestions that a deal could be just a few details away.

And yet the Truss government is still pressing ahead with the controversial legislation which would enable the UK unilaterally to walk away from parts of the treaty it signed – the House of Lords will debate the bill and its most contentious measures, such as the extensive new powers it gives ministers, on 11 October.

But there are suggestions from officials that, although Truss would lose too much face by withdrawing the legislation, the government may choose not to contest any Lords amendments vigorously.

That would be wise. The prime minister should know the financial path she has chosen with her chancellor makes carrying out the threats of walking away from a deal too costly to afford. As it is, the markets are hardly looking with equanimity on the prospect of the UK borrowing £100 billion to shield consumers from rising gas prices.

A £43 billion package of proposed tax cuts with no explanation – yet – of how the government will pay for them would be even less comfortable were the UK to take such a hard line on the Northern Ireland protocol that it provokes a trade war with the EU. Brussels can also make those calculations and, for all the recent talk of concessions, is expected to hold fast to its new position.

For the same reasons, the UK cannot afford to talk about taking a tougher line on China – as the prime minister has already done – without clearly knowing what the economic impact would be and being sure voters are prepared to pay this price. Years of courting commercial links with China mean they now weave their way through the UK economy.

The dependence of universities on Chinese students and the income they bring is already well-known and heavily debated – but the exposure of the UK economy to digital technology and components from China is even greater, and China is now the largest source of imports for the UK with £63.6 billion or 13.3 per cent of all goods imports according to the Office for National Statistics.

Much of that was laptops, computers, telecoms and phones as well as toys and clothes; there are few households or offices that will not have these products. China is also the sixth largest destination for UK exports, with £18.8 billion or 5.8 per cent of goods exports, much of it machinery and cars.

Scottish Liberal Democrat peer Lord Purvis expressed concern at these figures because of the implication that the UK’s ability to take a tough line with China on human rights was now enormously circumscribed. And defence and intelligence chiefs are also warning of the UK’s vulnerability.

Taking a hard line needs context

There are signs the government is concerned enough to begin to map out this economic vulnerability but no signs that it yet has a full picture. Without knowing the economic hit of a frostier relationship, and confidence the House of Commons accepts it, Liz Truss would be brave to label China ‘a threat to national security’ – as her supporters indicated during the leadership campaign – when she updates the integrated review of defence and security in the coming months.

Of course, foreign policy should not be inspired by commercial concerns alone. There are wider reasons to develop a clearer China strategy to help lay out a more consistent future path. On his recent trip to East Asia, UK foreign secretary James Cleverly heard from UK partners that they were disconcerted by the lurch from George Osborne’s ‘golden years’ to the Truss charge of a China ‘threat’.

When Liz Truss was UK foreign secretary, some forecast she would pursue mercantilism given her focus on forging post-Brexit trade deals but, as it turned out, that was not the spirit of her tenure.

After Truss, the UK can still rebuild its global reputation Expert comment NCapeling 20 October 2022

Following a chaotic few weeks as UK prime minister, Liz Truss has stepped down. And that is the best outcome for her party and for the country.

Liz Truss could not command support for her calamitous – and misnamed – mini-budget. And once her new Chancellor Jeremy Hunt had overturned its provisions, she had no mission or credibility left.

The budget pushed interest rates higher and they did not fall much on the scrapping of it, leaving her open to the charge she pushed up mortgage and interest costs for every person and business in the country. Her apology for ‘mistakes made’ was not going to reverse that, so her MPs were right to tell her to go.

Her departure does mark a victory for at least some of the UK’s institutions, even if it might not seem that way to observers around the world.

The position of the UK parliament has been reaffirmed, and so has that of the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) – it will be a long time before a government tries to dispense with the comments of the independent watchdog of national finances.

This also reinforces the principle that governments must explain how they will pay for their programmes. The Bank of England remains unencumbered – despite Truss’s apparent intentions of giving it a pro-growth addition to its mandate – to pursue its aim of tackling inflation.

New leader needs legitimacy quickly

The Conservative party has a chance – perhaps – to produce another prime minister without being forced into a general election, as that is the constitutional principle in the UK’s parliamentary system.

But the clamour that the new leader, as the third prime minister in one year, lacks legitimacy may prove impossible to resist for long.

In attempting to select a leader with a chance of uniting the party, the Conservatives are right to be considering options for restricting this leadership election to MPs should there be only one candidate with enough support.

But no such candidate may emerge and the pressure within the Commons – and the country – for an early election will not let up.

There is no question the UK’s standing in the world has been severely battered by this episode and by the revolving door of prime ministers. For the UK to regain respect – and an image of reliability – it needs to move fast and find someone capable of putting policies into action.

Those policies need to be based on economic stability but must also include a resolution of the relationship with Europe as much of the current upheaval represents the bitter aftermath of Brexit.

Concluding a deal with Brussels over the Northern Ireland protocol – avoiding ripping up the treaty the UK signed – and continuing to smooth the considerable friction that the exit from the EU has brought for exporters is essential work for the next prime minister.

Pursuing a deal for scientists to take part in the European Union (EU) Horizon research should be a priority. UK universities and researchers are already reluctantly preparing for a future where that does not come, with signs of the feared drain of talent already clear.

UK’s international reputation now at risk

Beyond that, there is much about UK policy which needs clarifying if the country is to regain its international standing. Just weeks from the start of COP27 and less than one year since the Glasgow climate change summit it hosted, the UK position on climate change commitments appears in flux.

The UK government pledge to help Ukraine is clear and has won it gratitude there and respect within Europe, but its intentions for defence spending are less clear.

Independent Thinking: Lula wins in Brazil, US midterms Audio NCapeling 4 November 2022

The third episode of our new podcast analyses the results from the Brazil presidential election, and looks ahead to the crucial midterm elections in the US next week.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests examine the tight election result from Brazil and its impact on both the country and the region, and preview the US midterm elections being held on 8 November and the start of COP27.

In Brazil, former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva beat incumbent Jair Bolsonaro by the narrowest of margins. Meanwhile in the US, the Democrats are fighting to retain the House and Senate from a resurgent Republican Party still enamoured with Donald Trump.

Joining Bronwen Maddox this week are Leslie Vinjamuri, director of Chatham House’s US and Americas programme, Christopher Sabatini, senior fellow on Latin America in the same programme, and Ana Yang, executive director of Chatham House’s Sustainability Accelerator.

Independent Thinking: US midterms surprise, COP27 begins Audio NCapeling 11 November 2022

The fourth episode of our new podcast analyses early results from the US midterm elections and brings the latest insights from a crucial COP27.

The US midterm elections threw up some surprising results with the anticipated Republican ‘red wave’ failing to materialize. Meanwhile at COP27 in Egypt, world leaders met in the first week of the summit. What did their presence achieve?

To find out, returning to the podcast this week with Bronwen Maddox are Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the Chatham House US and Americas programme who was in Atlanta Georgia for the midterms, and Anna Aberg, research associate in the Environment and Society programme who is on the ground at COP27.

Joining them are Peter Trubowitz, professor of international relations and director of the Phelan US Centre at the London School of Economics and Antony Froggart, deputy director and senior research fellow in the Environment and Society programme.

Independent Thinking: Insurrections and elections in Brazil and the US Audio NCapeling 20 January 2023

Episode 11 examines disinformation in the US and Brazil, the role played by social media platforms, and how conspiracy theories percolate online.

The storming in Brasilia of government institutions by supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro echoed the events seen at the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021. This week’s guests discuss the impact on Brazil.

The panel also examines the state of politics in the US going into 2023. How are things shaping up for Joe Biden’s presidency after the mid-terms now that a new Congress has been sworn in? And what are the challenges being faced more broadly by the American body politic two years on from the insurrection at Capitol Hill.

Joining guest host Leslie Vinjamuri this week from Chatham House is Christopher Sabatini, senior research fellow for Latin America, Serusha Govender, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation academy fellow, and Alex Krasodomski, senior research associate at the Digital Society Initiative.