Saudi deputy crown prince and defense minister Mohammad bin Salman is just wrapping up a heavily hyped visit to Washington, aimed at reinforcing the kingdom’s partnership with the United States. Recent years have frayed what is traditionally the central strategic relationship for Riyadh, principally over the Obama administration’s nuclear diplomacy with Iran.

Since the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear deal last July, the perennial antagonism between Riyadh and Tehran has reached a dangerous pitch, fueling the violence that rages in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and the undercurrent of instability that saturates the region. And the fallout of their rivalry has left its mark well beyond the boundaries of the Gulf, exacerbating volatile energy markets and, by extension, the global economy. 

Within OPEC, Riyadh and Tehran are eyeing each other warily, and their continuing differences torpedoed a proposed ceiling on oil production at OPEC’s latest meeting. The outcome was not surprising; a similar effort to agree on a production freeze between the group and a handful of non-OPEC producers fizzled in April. In the meantime, any incentives for drastic measures to address soft oil prices have abated as oil prices creep back up to approximately $50 a barrel. 

Iran and Saudi Arabia have plenty of reasons to continue pumping for the foreseeable future. Since the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions in January, Iranian leaders have been determined to make up for lost time and lost revenues, already defying expectations by quickly raising production to levels that hadn’t been reached since November 2011 and aggressively cutting prices in hopes of winning back its pre-sanctions export market. 

The centrality of oil to the legitimacy and autonomy of both regimes means that these plans are little more than publicity stunts.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia appears prepared to continue pumping at record-high levels, part of a larger strategy aimed at maintaining market share and driving down non-OPEC production. The two states’ economic incentives are compounded by their fierce geostrategic and sectarian rivalry, which has intensified, as evidenced by the standoff over Iranian participation in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

But even as the two states duel over oil production and prices, both Saudi Arabia and Iran are conspicuously planning for a post-oil future. Leaders in both countries have decreed an end to the era of oil dependency, endorsing ambitious blueprints for restructuring their economies that—if implemented—would ultimately transform state, society, and the wider region. The centrality of oil to the legitimacy and autonomy of both regimes means that these plans are little more than publicity stunts. Still, just imagine for a moment what it would mean for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East if these grandiose agendas were adopted.

Competing and complementary visions

Tehran’s plan actually dates back more than a decade, with the 2005 release of its “20 Year Perspective” (sometimes called “Vision 2025”). The plan laid out extravagant expectations: rapid growth and job creation, diversification away from oil, a knowledge-based economy. Intervening developments—sanctions that targeted Iran’s oil exports and helped expand non-oil trade—have only bolstered the rhetorical commitment of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to a “resistance economy” in which oil exports constitute a minor part.

“One of our most serious losses is dependence on oil,” Khamenei bemoaned in a 2014 speech. “I am not saying that oil should not be used. Rather, I am saying that we should reduce our dependence on selling crude oil as much as we can.” 

Not to be outdone, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Salman announced Saudi “Vision 2030,” to address what he described as “an addiction to oil.” The plan, which has met with equal doses of fanfare and skepticism since its announcement last month, aims to create a “thriving economy” and end Saudi dependence on oil revenues by 2020. Vision 2030 includes provisions to sell off a small stake in the kingdom’s state oil company, Saudi Aramco, and create the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund to manage the country’s income, as well as goals of creating 450,000 new private sector jobs, cutting public sector wages, and tripling the country’s non-oil exports all within the same abbreviated time frame.

Jeopardizing domestic stability

There is one hitch, however: these aspirations, though laudable, are preposterously unmoored from current political and economic exigencies. The institutions of governance and the structure of power in resource-rich states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran are organized around the state’s role as purveyors of vital social and economic goods. Riyadh and Tehran distribute cash handouts, provide jobs in already-bloated state bureaucracies, and levy few taxes. Diversifying away from reliance on oil would essentially require Riyadh and Tehran to radically curtail this distributive role, inviting historic social and political changes that could ultimately compromise regime ideology and weaken state legitimacy. 

[T]hese aspirations, though laudable, are preposterously unmoored from current political and economic exigencies.

In Saudi Arabia, the supply of these benefits is central to the monarchy’s legitimacy. To diversify away from oil, which currently accounts for over 70 percent of government revenues, Riyadh would have to drastically cut spending, far more than it already has. Not only would this further slash subsidies and hike fees, it would also effectively force Saudi workers—two-thirds of whom are employed by the state—to take up private sector jobs, 80 percent of which are currently staffed by expatriates. To accomplish this transition would require fundamental changes to the incentive structure for the Saudi labor force: a much broader willingness to accept low-skill, low-wage jobs, as well as the requisite improvements in education and productivity to support larger numbers of Saudi nationals moving into private sector positions.

For the Saudi economy to be truly competitive, Riyadh would have to initiate dramatic changes to a central component of the Saudi social compact—women’s rights and freedoms. The Vision 2030 document boasts that over 50 percent of Saudi university graduates are women and pledges to “continue to develop their talents, invest in their productive capabilities and enable them to strengthen their future and contribute to the development of our society and economy.” 

But the domestic Saudi labor force is overwhelmingly male, and even the plan’s modest aspirations to raise female participation in the workforce from 22 to 30 percent are likely to run into logistical and social obstacles. Shortly after announcing Vision 2030, Deputy Crown Prince Salman said Saudi Arabia is not yet ready to let women drive. A diversified economy will not emerge in the kind of constricted social environment mandated by the Saudi interpretation of sharia (Islamic law). 

Iran’s Islamic Republic doesn’t have the same degree of gender segregation, but Iran’s official interpretation of Islam has still constrained female participation in the workforce. Iran employs an equally low percentage of women—according to a 2014 U.N. report around 16 percent—and women’s unemployment is more than double that of men (nearly 20 percent).

A Saudi man walks past the logo of Vision 2030 after a news conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia June 7, 2016. Photo credit: Reuters/Faisal Al Nasser.

The bigger challenge for Iran will be truly opening up its economy to foreign direct investment. This remains hotly contested among the leadership, even in the aftermath of the nuclear agreement and the lifting of related sanctions. While there is some consensus around the need for foreign capital and technology, hardliners including Khamenei are determined to insulate Iran from any accompanying cultural influence and dependency. As the supreme leader recently inveighed, the global economy is “a plan and system that has been devised mainly by Zionist capitalists and some non-Zionists with the purpose of usurping the economic resources of the whole world...If a country merges its economy with the global economy, this is not a source of pride, rather it is a loss and a defeat!”

This deeply-rooted paranoia has provided a convenient platform for the Islamic Republic to galvanize citizens’ loyalty to the state and hostility to outside interference. And it also inhibits the liberalization that makes foreign investment possible: measures to enhance transparency and security, develop more attractive legal and fiscal frameworks, shrink the role of the state, and undertake an array of other structural reforms. Without these measures, Tehran will struggle to capitalize on its extraordinary reengagement with the world. 

While Saudi Arabia has maintained a more consistent and mutually beneficial pattern of foreign investment, its leadership too will have to revamp its approach if it is to broaden its economic base. For Riyadh, the challenge is less one of attracting foreign capital than of developing a sustainable influx of technology and expertise to develop sectors other than energy. The kingdom will also have to overcome serious regulatory hurdles and a proclivity for mammoth (and often white elephant) projects.

Compromising regional clout

Riyadh and Tehran will need to balance their economic aspirations and their approach to the region, too. Historically, their role in global energy markets has largely shielded both states from the fallout of regional instability. The world’s need for reliable oil at reasonable prices has inculcated the commitment of outside powers to secure transportation of resources and considerable autonomy for Riyadh and Tehran from the implications of their own policies. 

As a result, Saudi Arabia and Iran can fund nefarious activity across the region, violate the civil and human rights of their citizens and other residents, and carry out belligerent foreign policies without severe repercussions for their oil revenues. Only in the past five years has Tehran seen the limits of the world’s reluctance to jeopardize its investment with a major oil exporter; and the recent reversal of the U.N. condemnation regarding the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen demonstrates that Riyadh remains insulated.

Saudi Arabia and Iran can fund nefarious activity across the region, violate the civil and human rights of their citizens and other residents, and carry out belligerent foreign policies without severe repercussions for their oil revenues.

Regional developments make the prospect of economic diversification even less likely, as sensitivity to such developments will only increase if either country successfully develops its non-oil sectors. At the same time, regional stability is a basic prerequisite for economic diversification. Robust growth and good governance throughout the Middle East would provide the optimal context for the economic transformation of Iran and Saudi Arabia, since the marketplace for their non-oil exports is concentrated in the immediate neighborhood. But such transformation would require both countries to put economic priorities that serve their general populations above the ideological and religious agendas—supported by oil rents—that propel their regional and international influence and that provide a large portion of their autonomy in foreign policymaking. 

Technocrats in both countries understand this intuitively. At a 2015 conference on Iran’s economy, President Hassan Rouhani wondered “How long can the economy pay subsidies to politics?” He added that the country’s economy “pays subsidies both to foreign policy and domestic policy. Let us try the other way round for a decade and pay subsidies from the domestic and foreign policy to the economy to see [what] the lives and incomes of people and the employment of the youth will be like.” The problem, of course, is political will: neither country is prepared to elevate the interests of its people over the demands of ideology.

Imagining an unlikely future

Can either Iran or Saudi Arabia really kick the oil habit? It seems exceptionally unlikely. Even as Khamenei extols the need for inward-focused development, Tehran is racing to expand crude output level to four million barrels per day by March 2017. 

Oil enabled the creation of the modern Middle Eastern state and fueled the rise of both countries to regional predominance. Oil is a vector for their regional rivalry, and it provides prestige and funds to be used in other arenas of competition. A genuine diversification of the two largest economies in the Middle East and North Africa would jeopardize their revenue streams and domestic legitimacy, as well as their efforts to assert their primacy across the Islamic world.

[N]either country is prepared to elevate the interests of its people over the demands of ideology.

“All success stories start with a vision,” Deputy Crown Prince Salman is quoted as saying on the Vision 2030 website. But vision is insufficient to bridge the gap between aspiration and reality; a serious agenda to implement either the Saudi or the Iranian vision would require painful compromises to regime ideology and a fundamental overhaul of the institutions and the structure of power in both countries. 

Imagine, though, for a moment, that these far-fetched ambitions were quite serious, and that both the Saudi and Iranian leadership were determined to do what was necessary to truly wean their economies off oil dependence. Consider what it might mean for the region if these grandiose ambitions were not simply the illusions of overpriced consultants and embattled technocrats—if a leadership emerged in one or both of the Middle East’s most powerful actors prepared to invest political capital in a genuine transformation of priorities and policies. What might be possible if Tehran and Riyadh sought to compete for economic opportunities instead of fueling violence and sectarianism around the region? If instead of a vicious sectarian and geopolitical rivalry, these two old adversaries engaged in a race to the top?

What will it take to move these visions from wishful thinking to reality? More than rhetoric, to be sure. But even the articulation of improbable objectives will have its impact. As documented in a recent book, Iran’s post-revolutionary experience demonstrates that the regime’s reliance on promises of economic gains has generated public expectations for effective and accountable governance. Now Iranians and Saudis have been told by their leaders—who happen to be officially infallible—that the time has come to transcend oil. What might happen if they believe it?

Senior Fellows Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy discuss their book, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin in a five part podcast series.

In the book, Hill and Gaddy write that Russian President Vladmir Putin’s style of rule is influenced by his identities as a Statist, a Man of History, a Free Marketeer, a Survivalist, an Outsider, and a Case Officer; these are distinct personalities, they note, that interact and affect policy decisions. On February 6, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings hosted an event for the launch of Mr. Putin with a discussion featuring the authors.

Video

• Fiona Hill: Putin’s Statist Personality: Restoring the Greatness of Russia
• Clifford Gaddy: Putin the History Man and Survivalist
• Fiona Hill and Cliff Gaddy: The Outsider Influenced Putin’s “Free Market” Personality
• Fiona Hill: Putin’s History in KGB Leads to “Case Officer” Personality
• Fiona Hill: Putin’s Personalities Leveraged to Boost Russia

In his wide-ranging interview with The New York Times, Republican presidential nominee Donald J. Trump stressed the importance of fighting ISIS while declaring “we are going to take care of this country first before we worry about everybody else in the world.” For counterterrorism (and I would argue for security in general), such thinking is dangerously wrong-headed: Fighting ISIS and stopping other foreign terrorist threats to the U.S. homeland requires close alliances and deep engagement abroad.

Allies may also have better access to a terrorist stronghold due to geography or historic ties. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan are within easy bombing range of ISIS’ core: the U.S. homeland is not. Although military action against ISIS’ core in Iraq and Syria is vital, it is often quiet global intelligence cooperation that does much of the day-to-day counterterrorism lifting. Given the geographic span of ISIS operations, it is not realistic for the United States to have strong unilateral capabilities in every possible country where the terrorists might operate and use as a base for anti-U.S. operations. Foreign governments fill this gap, acting as a force multiplier for the United States. Shortly after 9/11, the United States was working with over 100 countries on counterterrorism; several years into the war on terror a senior CIA official testified that virtually every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq involved at least some help from a foreign intelligence service. 

Many allies have skilled intelligence services, and they also use their police and their domestic intelligence services to gather information. These services of course know local languages and are culturally aware. They can also take advantage of the law in their efforts to disrupt terrorism: Terrorism, after all, is a crime. Allies, particularly less savory ones, use a government’s coercive power as well. Although people automatically think torture, governments at times threaten to jail a relative of a suspected terrorist or withhold a business permit or the right to attend university. These seemingly mundane threats are something that the United States cannot do outside its own borders. 

Many of the most basic homeland security tasks do not begin or end with the homeland.

Given these advantages, the primary role of U.S. intelligence is to cajole and strengthen allies, not replace them. The United States might provide technical assistance, as many U.S. allies are far weaker in this area. In addition, U.S. intelligence often acts as a conductor of global liaison services. In 2010, al-Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula tried to bomb two cargo planes as they approached the United States. Efforts to disrupt the plot involved not only the United States and Yemen, but also the countries in transit, including Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Germany, and the United Kingdom. And Saudi Arabia provided a key intelligence tip. 

Many of the most basic homeland security tasks do not begin or end with the homeland. Foreign governments provide information on terrorist suspects, and there is considerable cooperation on those who might travel to the United States. Much of the screening to hinder terrorist travel and operations is done “over there,” not in the United States.

Our world is too small, and terrorists too global, to think of U.S. security narrowly. If we want to fight ISIS and other foes, we need allies. That doesn’t mean we should do whatever our allies want or support them unconditionally. But we must recognize that if we expect them to help America fight its enemies, we must stand by them as well.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fragile states present one of the greatest challenges to global development and poverty reduction. Despite much new learning that has emerged from within the development community in recent years, understanding of how to address fragility remains modest. There is growing recognition that donor engagement in fragile states must look beyond the confines of the traditional aid effectiveness agenda if it is to achieve its intended objectives, which include statebuilding, meeting the needs of citizens, and managing risk more effectively. Current approaches are constrained by relying heavily on small-scale interventions, are weakened by poor coordination and volatility, and struggle to promote an appropriate role for the recipient state.

Scaling up (i.e., the expansion, replication, adaption and sustaining of successful policies and programs in space and over time to reach a greater number of people) is highly relevant to fragile settings, both as an objective and as a strategic approach to development. As an objective, it reinforces the logic that the scale of the challenges in fragile states demands interventions that are commensurate in purpose and equal to the task. As a strategy, it encourages donors to identify and leverage successes, and to integrate institutional development more explicitly into projects and programs. In addition, scaling up can assist donors in addressing the priority areas of improved project design and implementation, sustainability and effective risk management.

Successful scaling up in fragile states almost certainly occurs less often than is possible and does not always involve a systematic approach. Donors should therefore look to more systematically pursue scaling up in fragile states and evaluate their performance with specific reference to this objective. This can be done by incorporating relevant elements of a scaling up framework into operational policies, from strategy development through to program design and monitoring.

Contrary to expectations, there are compelling examples of successful scaling up in fragile states. While the conditions prevailing in fragile states create serious obstacles in terms of “drivers” (the forces that push the scaling up process forward) and “spaces” (the opportunities that need to be created, or potential obstacles that need to be removed for interventions to grow), and in terms of the operational modalities of donors, these can be overcome through the careful design and delivery of programs with a clear focus on creating scaling up pathways, and through close partnership and sustained engagement of governments, communities and foreign partners.

Case study evidence suggests that the pathways taken to reach scale in fragile states demand different approaches by donors. Donors need to adopt greater selectivity in determining which areas or sectors for scaling up are justified—a strategy that has also assisted some donors in managing risk. More investment and time are required in upfront analysis and building the evidence for successful scaling up pathways. In some cases, donors require longer time horizons to achieve scale, although demand from government or beneficiaries has sometimes forced donors to move immediately to scale, allowing little or no time for piloting. Regardless of the pace of scaling up, donors that were most successful were engaged early and then remained engaged, often far beyond the replication phase of scaling up, to increase the likelihood of interventions being sustained. Other common characteristics of successful scaling up were simple project design and a focus on the institutional aspects of the scaling up pathway.

Case studies also point to the crucial role of drivers in moving the scaling up process forward in fragile states. Proven ideas and practical models have often been picked up in fragile states, contrary to the expectation that actors may be less responsive to recognizing and acting on the utility of promising results. Leaders undoubtedly have a role to play in supporting scaling up, although there are clear dangers that must be avoided, including avoiding the perception that donors are picking (political) winners by nominating leaders, and tying the survival of projects too closely to the fortunes of a leader’s political career. Incentives were found to be one of the most important drivers in fragile states, and there is a good case to be made for donors introducing new inducements, greater transparency or similar reforms to strengthen the role incentives play. Finally, and in contrast to the standard scaling up framework, community demand was found to be an important driver in many fragile states, both in demanding the expansion of small-scale projects and by facilitating the community’s own resources to support the scaling up process.

The greatest challenge to scaling up in fragile states is the limited spaces these environments provide. This is especially the case in respect to those spaces which concern aspects of governance: political, institutional and policy spaces. When working in fragile states, donors must recognize that spaces for scaling up are almost always more constrained, but look for ways to expand upon them. Some of the most successful examples of scaling up used creative approaches to build space quickly or used existing capacity to the fullest possible extent. Also relevant are the lessons of robust analysis, greater realism and cost control. The case studies confirm the importance of two additional spaces in fragile states. For example, security space often imposed horizontal obstacles to scaling up which could not realistically be overcome while ownership space served as a good indication of the perceived legitimacy of the scaling up process and the likelihood that interventions would be sustained longer term.

Case studies also affirm the importance of emphasizing robust project design and implementation, and the close linkages between the scaling up agenda and the role of risk management and sustainability in fragile states. While sustainability presented a significant problem for many of the projects and programs reviewed, a more focused approach around scaling up may assist donors in addressing sustainability concerns. This would entail adopting a longer-term perspective beyond the immediate confines of any individual project, looking for available drivers and supportive spaces, and focusing on effective implementation and consistent monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Any intervention introduced on a small scale that scores well in sustainability serves as a possible candidate for scaling up.

Similarly, many of the methods used by donors for managing risk—an emphasis on analysis, scenario planning, realism and making use of specialized aid instruments—are equally relevant for supporting scaling up in fragile countries. A persuasive argument can be made that the adoption of a more explicit scaling up approach by donors can form part of a risk management strategy in fragile states. Scaling up can enable donors to more ambitiously tackle development risks without allowing institutional and project risks to grow unchecked. Ultimately, a donor approach that combines good risk management and scaling up requires strong leadership and well-aligned incentives.

Downloads

• Download the full paper

The Roosevelt House Public Policy Institute hosted a forum with Ted Piccone and Ambassadors Hardeep Singh Puri and Antonio de Aguiar Patriota as they discussed his new book, Five Rising Democracies and the Fate of the International Liberal Order.

While the spread of democracy over the last three decades has inspired hope for an international liberal order, recent shifting power balances and democratic backsliding are shaking this foundation. In his new book, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Ted Piccone discusses how five pivotal countries—India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia—could play a critical role as examples and supporters of liberal ideas and practices. 

Mr. Piccone, Hardeep Singh Puri, former Ambassador of India to the U.N. and Secretary General of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism, and Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Ambassador of Brazil to the U.N. and former Minister of External Relations, discuss the ways in which these countries stand out for their embrace of globalization and liberal norms on their own terms—and how, in a multipolar world, they may impact our shared future.

With over 16 million people and nearly 8.6 million jobs, America's older industrial cities remain a vital-if undervalued-part of the economy, particularly in states where they are heavily concentrated, such as Ohio and Pennsylvania. They also have a range of other physical, economic, and cultural assets that, if fully leveraged, can serve as a platform for their renewal.

Read the Executive Summary  »

Across the country, cities today are becoming more attractive to certain segments of society. Meanwhile, economic trends-globalization, the demand for educated workers, the increasing role of universities-are providing cities with an unprecedented chance to capitalize upon their economic advantages and regain their competitive edge.

Many cities have exploited these assets to their advantage; the moment is ripe for older industrial cities to follow suit. But to do so, these cities need thoughtful and broad-based approaches to foster prosperity.

"Restoring Prosperity" aims to mobilize governors and legislative leaders, as well as local constituencies, behind an asset-oriented agenda for reinvigorating the market in the nation's older industrial cities. The report begins with identifications and descriptions of these cities-and the economic, demographic, and policy "drivers" behind their current condition-then makes a case for why the moment is ripe for advancing urban reform, and offers a five-part agenda and organizing plan to achieve it.

Publications & Presentations
Connecticut State Profile
Connecticut State Presentation 

Michigan State Profile
Michigan State Presentation 

New Jersey State Profile
New Jersey State Presentation 

New York State Profile
New York State Presentation 

Ohio State Profile
Ohio State Presentation
Ohio Revitalization Speech

Pennsylvania State Profile 

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• Download

Ohio, like most other states in the country and particularly its neighbors in the Great Lakes region, is still reeling from the “Great Recession.” This economic crisis, the worst in a half century, has devastated economies across the globe.

While economists have declared that the recession has abated, it will be a long time before the businesses, households, and government treasuries across the country, and specifically in the state of Ohio, shake off the effects. And when the recession’s grip finally breaks, what will Ohio’s economy and landscape look like?

The choices that Ohio’s people and its leaders make—starting now and continuing over the next few years—will determine that answer. Ohioans can decide whether to shy away from manufacturing after the loss of so many jobs, or to transform the state’s old manufacturing strengths, derived from its role in the auto supply chain, into new products, markets, and opportunities. They can decide to opt out of the national shift to a lower-carbon economy, or to be at the forefront of developing clean coal and renewable energy industries and jobs.

They can choose a workforce system that is aligned to the true metropolitan scale of the economy and oriented to the needs of workers and employers. They can choose transformative transportation networks over more roads; smaller, greener, stronger cities; collaboration and regional cooperation to save money, reduce duplication, and bolster regional competitiveness. And instead of trying to go it alone in the 21st century global marketplace, they can maximize the federal resources on offer to support Ohio’s economic transformation and choose to compete effectively for new federal investments.

This report, Restoring Prosperity: Transforming Ohio’s Communities for the Next Economy, lays out some of the specific policy options that will help Ohioans restore the prosperity that the state enjoyed for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, but that it has been struggling to regain for at least a decade, if not longer.

Full Report »

Downloads

• Full Report
• Executive Summary
• Bruce Katz's Speech in Ohio

For over 100 years, the driving force of Ohio’s economy has been the state’s so-called Big Eight cities—Columbus, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Toledo, Akron, Dayton, Canton, and Youngstown. Today, though, the driving reality of these cities is sustained, long-term population loss. The central issue confronting these cities—and the state and surrounding metropolitan area—is not whether these cities will have different physical footprints and more green space than they do now, but how it will happen.

The state must adopt a different way of thinking and a different vision of its cities’ future—and so must the myriad local, civic, philanthropic, and business leaders who will also play a role in reshaping Ohio’s cities. The following seven basic premises should inform any vision for a smaller, stronger future and subsequent strategies for change in these places:

• These cities contain significant assets for future rebuilding
  
• These cities will not regain their peak population
  
• These cities have a surplus of housing
  
• These cities have far more vacant land than can be absorbed by redevelopment
  
• Impoverishment threatens the viability of these cities more than population loss as such
  
• Local resources are severely limited
  
• The fate of cities and their metropolitan areas are inextricably inter-connected
  

These premises have significant implications for the strategies that state and local governments should pursue to address the issues of shrinking cities.

Full Paper on Ohio's Cities » (PDF)
Paper on Shrinking Cities Across the United States »

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• Full Paper

The U.S. nominee for the World Bank presidency, South Korean-born physician Jim Yong Kim, is one of three candidates for the post, along with Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and former Colombian finance minister Jose Antonio Ocampo. According to Colin Bradford, the presence of several viable candidates—from different parts of the world—for the World Bank presidency means that the entire international community could have a say in selecting the next World Bank president, rather than the U.S. nominee being automatically confirmed. This change in the nominating process, says Bradford, is good for the Bank because it reflects growing demands for representation from emerging economies.
 

Video

• Change World Bank Nominating Process

Event Information

During the past decade, an abundance of wealth in minerals and hydrocarbons in Latin America and the Caribbean has translated into substantial revenues and macroeconomic growth. However, operations in the extractive sector have also led to significant challenges, such as corruption, negative social outcomes and environmental impacts.

On November 4, the Latin America Initiative and Energy Security Initiative at Brookings, with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), hosted a discussion on governance and institutional capacity in the extractive sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, drawing on findings from the publication Transparent Governance in an Age of Abundance: Experiences from the Extractive Industries in Latin America and the Caribbean, published by the IDB. Edited by Malaika Masson and Juan Cruz Vieyra, the book presents transparency as a central element to bolster governance quality and state legitimacy in the context of an increasingly demanding citizenry.

 Join the conversation on Twitter using #LatAmResources

Audio

• Transparent Governance in Latin America’s Extractive Industries

In the months leading up to the 2015 United Nations climate change conference in Paris starting November 30, global businesses have pledged to do their part for proactive climate action. To "capture and catalyze" these commitments, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in conjunction with the government of Peru, launched the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Change (NAZCA). NAZCA is an online portal that showcases commitment to action by companies, investors, cities and subnational regions to address climate change. To date, more than 2,000 companies—from Baosteel Group Corporation to Exxon Mobil Corporation to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—have made voluntary commitments to reduce emissions, increase energy use efficiencies and invest in renewable energy sources.

IT sector stands out 

Proactive action by businesses to combat global climate change is not new. Over the past decade, businesses have increasingly engaged in voluntary climate action to share best practices, network, promote market mechanisms, and set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. Despite this, not all businesses are eager participants. My recent paper on the role of the Global 500 companies in transnational climate governance shows that, after controlling for political economic and institutional factors at the country level, global businesses operating in the information technology (IT) sector are twice as likely as other firms to engage in proactive climate action. Next to the consumer staples sector, the IT sector has the highest share of global companies engaging in proactive climate action compared to the energy, health care, industrials, materials and utilities sectors.

Among the notable IT companies worldwide that have taken proactive climate action, including public disclosures of their carbon emissions, are Apple Inc., Google Inc., Hitachi, Ltd., LG Innotek, Microsoft Corp., Ericsson and Telefonica.

There are several reasons why IT companies are in a better position than other corporations to play a proactive role in climate change mitigation. First, IT companies, as a sector, tend to be wealthier, not only in terms of asset holdings but also profitability. They also employ a larger number of workers than other companies. Large and well-endowed corporations are better able to afford the costly investments necessary for deploying renewable energy and for undertaking carbon emissions management. According to my findings, wealthy corporations that employ a large number of workers have two to four time higher odds of proactive climate action than companies with smaller asset holdings and employee base.

Complementary capabilities

Second, my research also shows that, more often than not, when a company demonstrates a commitment to sustainability through complementary capabilities and competencies, namely investments in environmental R&D and/or certification with the ISO 14001 environmental management standard, the odds are higher that the company also engages in voluntary climate action and carbon disclosure. For example, a larger share of companies in the IT sector (75 percent) are certified with the ISO 14001 environmental management standard than Global 500 companies excluding IT (54 percent). A similar pattern, albeit less pronounced, is also true of investments in environmental R&D by IT companies compared to other global companies (56 percent versus 48 percent).

Wealth endowment and complementary capabilities aside, IT companies are more likely than other Global 500 companies to have an in-house managerial- or executive-level sustainability officer. Close to half of all IT companies have formally created a position of a vice president of sustainability or a chief sustainability officer compared to about 40 percent of other global businesses. These in-house champions of sustainability policies and initiatives play a critical role in helping to align corporate vision and allocate the necessary resources toward sustainability efforts.

Among the world’s largest companies by revenue, Apple Inc. (rank 15^th) is a leader in proactive climate action: Apple has pledged to "maintain 100% renewable energy in datacenters… [and] maintain carbon neutrality of purchased electricity for U.S. corporate facilities achieved in 2014 through renewable energy purchases and onsite generation and procurement." In 2014, Apple hired Lisa Jackson, a former administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as its vice president of environmental, policy, and social initiatives, reporting directly to CEO Tim Cook. Along with Jacky Haynes, Apple’s senior director of social and environmental responsibility who specializes in supplier responsibility, Jackson has brokered a relationship with the Beijing-based Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs to train Apple facilities workers as part of Apple’s new Environmental, Health, and Safety Academy and to proactively publish emissions data of Apple’s supplier facilities in China. By committing to voluntary climate action, Apple and other corporations signal to consumers that they are socially responsible companies, not only to preempt public scrutiny but to gain an advantage in the "market for virtues."

Apple and Microsoft Corp. are the only two private sector entities that earned the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s Green Power Partner of the Year award in 2015, which recognizes leadership in green power use and overall strategy and impact on the green power market.

Other IT companies, such as Autodesk, BT, Infosys, Salesforce and SAP have recently joined forces with Aviva, IKEA, Starbucks, Walmart, Marks and Spencer, Johnson & Johnson, among others, as part of RE100, a collaborative initiative of businesses, to set long-term target on powering their operations entirely with renewable energy.

Living up to promises

The fact that so many companies are recognizing the dangers of climate change and setting ambitious climate action goals is laudable. The biggest challenge will be seeing that they live up to their promises, especially given the voluntary nature of initiatives such as NAZCA. To thwart greenwashing, national governments and global governance organizations have an important role to play to keep the IT sector and other businesses accountable. The first step that NAZCA has taken is to invite "partnerships with others who would…make assessments of this type." A significant next step would be to publish guidelines and best practices for third-party monitoring and verification in order to strengthen the link between pledges for proactive action and ultimate follow-through by corporations. IT companies, as leaders in proactive climate action, should be at the forefront of working to establish best practices for adherence to voluntary commitments for mitigating global climate change.

Event Information

Longevity annuities—a financial innovation that provides protection against outliving your money late in life—have the potential to reshape the retirement security landscape. Typically bought at retirement, a longevity annuity offers a guaranteed stream of income beginning in ten or 20 years at a markedly lower cost than a conventional annuity that begins paying out immediately. Sales have grown rapidly and it will be even easier to purchase the annuities in the future given new Treasury regulations. While economists have touted the attractiveness of longevity annuities as a way to ensure the ability to maintain one’s living standards late in life, significant barriers to a robust market remain—including lack of consumer awareness, questions about product value, and employer concerns with taking on fiduciary responsibility by offering these products to their employees.

Can longevity annuities overcome these barriers to find widespread popularity among Americans retirees? On November 6, the Retirement Security Project hosted a panel of experts to discuss the potential for these products to contribute to the economic security of older Americans, in addition to policy reforms that could lead to greater take-up by retirement plan sponsors and consumers alike. Following a presentation by Katharine Abraham that laid out the issues, two panels of prominent experts added their insights on the promise and challenges of this burgeoning market.

Video

• Better Financial Security in Old-Age? The Promise of Longevity Annuities
• Understanding Longevity Annuities
• Eliminating Barriers to Market Development
• Longevity Annuities Are Not Necessarily Niche Products
• The Adverse Selection Issue

Audio

• Better Financial Security in Old-Age? The Promise of Longevity Annuities

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 06_retirement_longevity_annuities_abraham_harris
• longevity_annuities_presentation_abraham
• 20141106_longevity_annuities_transcript

Event Information

China’s outbound investment is expected to increase by leaps and bounds in the next decade. Chinese companies are poised to become a major economic force in the global economy. Outbound direct investment by Chinese companies presents unprecedented opportunities for both Chinese companies and their global partners.

The relatively brief history of Chinese companies’ outbound investment indicates, however, that Chinese outbound FDI faces many hurdles both at home and in the destination countries. How can we assess the regulatory, financial, labor, environmental and political risks faced by Chinese multinational companies? What remedies can mitigate such risks for the Chinese firms, for the host countries of Chinese investment and for the Chinese government and people?

The Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy co-hosted with the 21st Century China Program at UC San Diego, and in collaboration with the Enterprise Research Institute and Tsinghua’s School of Public Policy and Management, a two-day conference at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China, on September 23 and 24, 2013. The conference gathered leading experts, policy makers and corporate leaders to examine the latest research on trends and patterns of Chinese outbound direct investments; the regulatory framework and policy environment in China and destination countries (particularly, but not only in the U.S.); and the implications of Chinese outbound direct investment for China’s economic growth and the global economy. Keynote speakers of each day were Jin Liqun, chairman of China International Capital Corporation, and Gary Locke, U.S. ambassador to China. Mr. Jin suggested that China’s foreign direct investment companies should cooperate with local firms and be willing to talk to the local governments about their problems. Ambassador Locke, on the other hand, introduced the advantages of the U.S. as an investment destination country. He also agreed that investors were supposed to get local help to achieve success.

The audiences included major Chinese companies, service providers in the area of overseas direct investment, policy makers and scholars.

Read more about the speakers and the conference agenda »

Video

• Overview of China's Overseas Investments: Trends, Patterns and Comparison
• Chinese ODI: Motivation and Policy Environment
• Risk Management in Chinese ODI
• China's Outbound Direct Investment - Gary Locke Keynote Address
• Regulatory Environments in Destination Countries (Non-U.S.)
• Regulatory Environments in Destination Countries (Focusing on the U.S.)
• Labor, Environment, and Community Relations in Destination Countries

Transcript

• Keynote speech of U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke (.pdf)

Event Materials

• Remarks of Ambassador Locke
• Brian Beglin slides
• Daniel Levine slides
• Jiang Heng slides
• LIU Qian
• Matt Ferchen slides
• Steve Olson slides
• Tang Xiaoyang slides
• Thilo Hanemann slides
• Weiyi Shi slides
• Kang Rongping slides
• Duan Zhirong slides

Introduction

Reaching education goals in the coming years will require sharp increases in funding and better delivery. Despite a global focus on improving access to education, nearly 60 million children in developing countries remain out of primary school and increased investments have not translated to better education quality or improved learning outcomes (UNESCO 2015a). Even with an increase in domestic public expenditure, UNESCO estimates that the financing gap for delivering good quality universal education from pre-school through junior secondary levels by 2030 in low-income countries will be $10.6 billion, on average, between 2015 and 2030—over four times the level currently provided by official donors ($2.3 billion) (UNESCO 2015b).

Closing acute financing and delivery gaps that prevent access to quality education will be a major challenge, requiring all hands on deck. Domestic governments and foreign donors will need to step up their game substantially, but fiscal and capacity constraints are likely to prevent them remedying resource deficits on their own in the short term. Non-state actors—mainly religious and charitable organizations, private (“foundation”) schools, and a small number of for-profit schools—are already partially filling the gaps, although the precise extent of their services and their impact is unknown.

Determining the appropriate role of non-state actors in education is a contentious topic among specialists. Disagreements have revolved around serious normative issues, including such basic questions as whether non-state provision is consistent with the principle of education as a human right, and serious empirical questions relating to quality and equity implications. This discussion has been blurred by definitional issues (i.e., what is non-state and private education?); lack of clarity over distinctions between ownership, delivery, and financing; a lack of accurate data on current and potential provision rates; and an insufficient base of evidence from which to draw clear conclusions on the effectiveness of non-state engagement in education. These problems have made it difficult to generate comparisons across empirical studies, leading to significant variation in the interpretation of evidence. For some observers, evidence has fueled concern that non-state education is violating human rights principles (e.g., the report by the United Nations Rapporteur on Education),1 while for others it has provided encouragement that non-state engagement can help address financing and delivery challenges (e.g., Tooley 2009).

Our goal is to provide a neutral background to this debate and identify areas of common ground. Beginning with some big picture facts, this paper develops a detailed language around non-state actors in education. We then outline current issues and poles of debate around engagement of non-state actors in education and provide an assessment of the depth of available data and evidence. To close, we establish a typology and propose a framework for discussions around the role of non-state actors in basic education and how these actors can best contribute to the achievement of Education for All and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Our paper refers largely to basic education, including pre-primary, primary, and lower-secondary, as this is the main focus of much recent discussion around the role of non-state actors in education and an area of strong growth in developing countries.

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The confluence of the agreement on 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, or Global Goals) in 2015, and the increased attention being paid to the role of non-traditional actors in contributing to shared prosperity, provide a unique opportunity to focus attention on attempts to identify promising new solutions to the barriers that impede the full development of the world’s youngest citizens. Current estimates indicate that 200 million children globally under the age of 5 are at risk of not reaching their development potential. With these goals, the global community has a tremendous opportunity to change the course of history. There is evidence that certain early childhood development (ECD) interventions—spanning the nutrition, health, water and sanitation, education, social protection, and governance sectors from conception to age 5—have high potential to help to achieve the SDGs related to child development. Furthermore, early childhood interventions have been found to improve adult health and education levels, reduce crime, and raise employment rates, which will be paramount to achieving global economic, climate, and physical security.

Impact bonds have the potential to address some of the main financing and delivery constraints faced in ECD. By providing upfront private capital, impact bonds could help to address service provider liquidity constraints and leverage public capital by allowing the government to connect preventive programs with future benefits to individuals, society, and the economy. Impact bonds also have the potential to drive performance management, support monitoring and evaluation, and create accountability, which all help to address quality and capacity constraints. By fostering innovation, experimentation and adaptive learning in service delivery, cost-effective solutions could be identified through impact bonds. By producing evidence of outcome achievement, impact bonds could shift the focus toward effective ECD programs. Finally, collaboration across stakeholders—a necessary component of impact bonds—has the potential to allow for alignment of interests and a win-win situation for investors, outcome funders, and program beneficiaries alike.

The high participation of non-state actors and potentially significant returns in ECD make it a promising sector for impact bonds. Unlike other services that may have entrenched interests, the multitude of agencies and non-state entities financing and providing ECD services potentially allows for more experimentation. The preventive nature of ECD programs also fits well with the core feature of SIBs, which is that preventive investments will result in valuable short- and potentially long-term outcomes. There is evidence that ECD interventions can have immense effects on later-life outcomes. For example, a longitudinal study of a program in Jamaica, in which participants received weekly visits from community health workers over a 2-year period, was found to increase the earnings of participants by 25 percent, 20 years later.

There may, however, be some particular challenges associated with applying impact bonds in the ECD sector. Impact bonds (and other Payment by Results mechanisms tied to outcomes) require meaningful outcomes that are measureable within a timeframe that is reasonable to the outcome funder (and investors in the case of an impact bond). Meaningful outcomes are outcomes that are intrinsically or extrinsically valuable. Intrinsically valuable outcomes that are measureable within a reasonable timeframe could be extrinsically valuable if they are proxies for long-term benefits to individuals, society, or the economy. The delay between ECD interventions and later-life results may prove an impediment in some cases. By identifying appropriate interim measures such as language development, socioemotional development, and schooling outcomes that may proxy for desirable longer-term outcomes, the issue of delay could be mitigated. For example, there is evidence that early stimulation and health programs can have statistically significant effects on schooling outcomes in the short-run. An increase in focus on the intrinsic value of short-term outcomes that result from ECD interventions, such as child survival, is also important.

As the global community moves beyond the Millennium Development Goals to a set of Global Goals and associated targets linked to measurable outcomes, there is an opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to invest in future generations. Leveraging upfront funding, focusing on outcomes through adaptive learning and testing new ways to deliver early childhood interventions more effectively are all means of achieving the ECD-related goals. Despite the hype around all of the new financing mechanisms, the keys to creating high-quality, locally appropriate programs remains simple—real-time collection of outcome data, the freedom to fail, and the flexibility to course-adjust. In some circumstances social service provision based on outcomes and adaptive learning may require mechanisms like impact bonds or other Payment by Results mechanisms. In other circumstances it may not. As this very nascent field continues to grow, more research will be needed to capture lessons learned, contextualize them within the larger landscape of ECD financing and service provision, and apply them to real-world social challenges with the world’s youngest and most disadvantaged populations at the forefront of the conversation. 

Read the previous report on the landscape of impact bonds across sectors and geography »

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• Download the policy brief