Webinar: Gandhi's Vision for India 15 June 2020 — 12:00PM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 June 2020

In 1931, Mahatma Gandhi visited Chatham House as part of his campaign for Indian independence. Addressing an overflowing hall, he described the poverty and the religious conflict that plagued India at the time.

Today, India is the world’s fifth largest economy and more than 270 million people have been lifted out of poverty in just a decade. But poverty in India remains widespread and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is only expected to exacerbate the situation. Meanwhile, the communal violence that erupted in Delhi earlier this year reflects intensifying religious tensions under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

In this webinar, the speakers discuss Gandhi’s global legacy and to what extent we are seeing a re-awakening of his principles across modern India.

This event is part of a series, held in the context of the Chatham House Centenary in 2020, bringing together historians, practitioners and current policymakers to discuss contemporary problems of international relations.

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Peptidoglycan (PG) is an essential constituent of the bacterial cell wall. During cell division, the machinery responsible for PG synthesis localizes mid-cell, at the septum, under the control of a multiprotein complex called the divisome. In Escherichia coli, septal PG synthesis and cell constriction rely on the accumulation of FtsN at the division site. Interestingly, a short sequence of FtsN (Leu75–Gln93, known as EFtsN) was shown to be essential and sufficient for its functioning in vivo, but what exactly this sequence is doing remained unknown. Here, we show that EFtsN binds specifically to the major PG synthase PBP1b and is sufficient to stimulate its biosynthetic glycosyltransferase (GTase) activity. We also report the crystal structure of PBP1b in complex with EFtsN, which demonstrates that EFtsN binds at the junction between the GTase and UB2H domains of PBP1b. Interestingly, mutations to two residues (R141A/R397A) within the EFtsN-binding pocket reduced the activation of PBP1b by FtsN but not by the lipoprotein LpoB. This mutant was unable to rescue the ΔponB-ponAts strain, which lacks PBP1b and has a thermosensitive PBP1a, at nonpermissive temperature and induced a mild cell-chaining phenotype and cell lysis. Altogether, the results show that EFtsN interacts with PBP1b and that this interaction plays a role in the activation of its GTase activity by FtsN, which may contribute to the overall septal PG synthesis and regulation during cell division.

A new vision for African agency in sustainable development Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2022

Change is necessary not only in global economic structures and attitudes – but in African governance too.

The conventional notion that Africa is mostly a consumer of norms and practices designed by the Global North has been repeatedly challenged and is increasingly being debunked. Increased African agency in international affairs is today a well-established and documented reality. But Africa’s influence still does not match the scale of the challenges that it faces on its pathway to sustainable development. 

Pushing for African agency in sustainable development also warrants a critical assessment of how ‘sustainable development’ should be defined, and how it can be achieved in terms of actual poverty reduction and real improvement in the lives of local poor Africans. Sustainable development has been a political catchphrase for over 30 years – but a genuine transition towards sustainability has yet to begin.

African agency today

Historically, there have been structural limitations on the agency of African stakeholders to shape development pathways. Chief among them, donor-recipient power dynamics have persistently promoted dependency and sustained institutional corruption. Many African countries are also challenged by economic incentives and infrastructure that have favoured the market demands and supply chains of former colonial powers, which largely remain reliant on natural resource extraction, and are marked by limited investment in value-addition activities and technology development.

Today, however, African agency is being exerted in a more assertive fashion. The African Union (AU), individual African states, civil society, the private sector and eminent and ordinary persons are all displaying Africa’s agency in steering global sustainable development priorities, namely by proposing their own development agenda, The African Union Agenda 2063, adopted in 2013. This was followed by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030), which in many ways mirror Agenda 2063 – a clear demonstration of the influence of Africa in the global arena. 

Agenda 2063 is a strategic roadmap for Africa ‘to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and development goals representing a dynamic force in the international arena’. Prepared following a broad-based participatory consultation, it advocates for inclusion and empowerment and provides an excellent vision for African countries and African people. The SDGs address several of the key shortcomings of their predecessor – the MDGs – and incorporate a broader and more transformative agenda that more adequately reflects the complex challenges of the 21st century and the need for structural reforms in the global economy and governance norms.

In international forums on sustainable development, African countries are increasingly using their collective voice to change the discourse on how development can and should be done. For instance, by championing innovative solutions for carbon markets, African policy leaders are enabling access to climate finance for development while preserving Africa’s natural wealth.

In the post-COVID era, championing investments in and leadership of Africa’s global health architecture demonstrates a desire that in the next pandemic, Africa CDC, AMA and continental manufacturers will play leading roles in determining Africa’s public health strategy and implementation.

In trade, building on the groundwork led by the regional economic commissions, the AfCFTA will catalyse and scale regional integration, trade and cooperation, leading to promising new modes of supply chain and self-sufficiency.

Encouraging signs, but persistent shortcomings

Encouraging signs that African agency is gaining momentum cannot disguise the fact that Africa has yet to move from rhetoric to implementation in the realm of sustainable development. Continental visions often fail to go beyond declarations of intent, and have only limited influence on governance systems or national structural transformation, and African states remain vulnerable to economic shocks emanating from the global system.

Change will require governance systems that are coordinated, transparent, efficient, and inclusive, as well as tools, processes, and means (material, technical, and human) for successful implementation. There is an urgent need for a new governance paradigm in Africa and internationally, dealing with long-term social change.

Notably, African agency should not be only seen as emanating from government, but also as being exerted by independent civil society organizations and committed ordinary individuals. Effective agency needs to be multi-faceted and multi-actor, and depends on the inclusiveness of African governments and their willingness to work with civil society in their strategic engagements with external partners.

Both Agenda 2063 and the SDGs hold the potential for transformation, but implementation will depend on continued advocacy to hold authorities to account and change the dominant discourse, logic and rules of engagement at global, regional, national, and local levels. There is a need for a dynamic new model of African ‘development’.

Time for a new vision

Africa’s economic landscape is changing rapidly, with new regional and local value chains, and integrated regional economic corridors to link countries, minimize the burden of high-cost production and logistics, and boost real incomes and international competitiveness. But Africa continues to face structural challenges, including the need for large investment projects – at a time when Africa remains a net exporter of capital.

Donors and development partners must reflect upon their prior modes of engagement and commit to genuine and equitable relationships with African states. Such partnerships must reflect mutual respect of ideas and accountability, and commit to making space in international forums and multi-lateral arrangements for African people and countries to realize their own visions for progress.

But African leaders and actors must also recognize that with the advent of resources and agency comes responsibility for results and outcomes, notably the need to improve governance. Gaps in accountability, widespread corruption, and lack of successful implementation and sustainability of projects must be addressed.

Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) encodes proteins and RNAs that support the functions of mitochondria and thereby numerous physiological processes. Mutations of mtDNA can cause mitochondrial diseases and are implicated in aging. The mtDNA within cells is organized into nucleoids within the mitochondrial matrix, but how mtDNA nucleoids are formed and regulated within cells remains incompletely resolved. Visualization of mtDNA within cells is a powerful means by which mechanistic insight can be gained. Manipulation of the amount and sequence of mtDNA within cells is important experimentally and for developing therapeutic interventions to treat mitochondrial disease. This review details recent developments and opportunities for improvements in the experimental tools and techniques that can be used to visualize, quantify, and manipulate the properties of mtDNA within cells.

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Driven by the energy of a photon, the visual pigments in rod and cone photoreceptor cells isomerize 11-cis-retinal to the all-trans configuration. This photochemical reaction initiates the signal transduction pathway that eventually leads to the transmission of a visual signal to the brain and leaves the opsins insensitive to further light stimulation. For the eye to restore light sensitivity, opsins require recharging with 11-cis-retinal. This trans–cis back conversion is achieved through a series of enzymatic reactions composing the retinoid (visual) cycle. Although it is evident that the classical retinoid cycle is critical for vision, the existence of an adjunct pathway for 11-cis-retinal regeneration has been debated for many years. Retinal pigment epithelium (RPE)–retinal G protein-coupled receptor (RGR) has been identified previously as a mammalian retinaldehyde photoisomerase homologous to retinochrome found in invertebrates. Using pharmacological, genetic, and biochemical approaches, researchers have now established the physiological relevance of the RGR in 11-cis-retinal regeneration. The photoisomerase activity of RGR in the RPE and Müller glia explains how the eye can remain responsive in daylight. In this review, we will focus on retinoid metabolism in the eye and visual chromophore regeneration mediated by RGR.  

Co-fractionation MS (CF-MS) is a technique with potential to characterize endogenous and unmanipulated protein complexes on an unprecedented scale. However this potential has been offset by a lack of guidelines for best-practice CF-MS data collection and analysis. To obtain such guidelines, this study thoroughly evaluates novel and published Saccharomyces cerevisiae CF-MS data sets using very high proteome coverage libraries of yeast gold standard complexes. A new method for identifying gold standard complexes in CF-MS data, Reference Complex Profiling, and the Extending 'Guilt-by-Association' by Degree (EGAD) R package are used for these evaluations, which are verified with concurrent analyses of published human data. By evaluating data collection designs, which involve fractionation of cell lysates, it is found that near-maximum recall of complexes can be achieved with fewer samples than published studies. Distributing sample collection across orthogonal fractionation methods, rather than a single high resolution data set, leads to particularly efficient recall. By evaluating 17 different similarity scoring metrics, which are central to CF-MS data analysis, it is found that two metrics rarely used in past CF-MS studies – Spearman and Kendall correlations – and the recently introduced Co-apex metric frequently maximize recall, whereas a popular metric—Euclidean distance—delivers poor recall. The common practice of integrating external genomic data into CF-MS data analysis is also evaluated, revealing that this practice may improve the precision and recall of known complexes but is generally unsuitable for predicting novel complexes in model organisms. If studying nonmodel organisms using orthologous genomic data, it is found that particular subsets of fractionation profiles (e.g. the lowest abundance quartile) should be excluded to minimize false discovery. These assessments are summarized in a series of universally applicable guidelines for precise, sensitive and efficient CF-MS studies of known complexes, and effective predictions of novel complexes for orthogonal experimental validation.

South Africa Needs a Strategic Vision for Its Continent Expert comment sysadmin 24 November 2017

South Africa has the potential to catalyse growth across its sub-region and the continent, but the government must develop a comprehensive strategy that aligns political, ideological and commercial interests.

South Africa’s status as the ‘gateway to Africa’ is under serious threat. Its companies continue to flourish, but complex relationships at home and abroad constrain government capacity to match its economic dominance with political reach and influence.

South Africa’s policies towards the rest of the continent are often accused of being inconsistent and incoherent. It has been a development partner to the region and to international donors; a moral leader, championing human rights and exporting its own model of transition; and an advocate and representative for the continent in international forums. However, it has simultaneously been accused of exploiting its economic dominance at the expense of its neighbours; handicapped by the political debts owed by the ANC to other liberation movements for their assistance in the struggle; and criticized for its arrogance in seeking to position itself as the ‘legitimate’ voice of Africa.

At the same time, reputational risks, a weakened policy environment and poor growth have taken the shine off South Africa’s ‘Gateway to Africa’ rhetoric. South Africa faces considerable domestic economic issues. Growth forecasts have fallen from 1.3 to 0.7 per cent, State owned enterprises are a huge burden on the treasury, and the forecast budget deficit is R50.8 billion (£2.7 billion), at a time when the cost of borrowing is increasing following downgrades of the country’s credit ratings.

Political risk is high, lowering investor confidence. Corruption, poor service delivery and the government’s under-delivery on citizen’s expectations are exacerbating social tensions in a country with expanded unemployment at 36.4 per cent, and one of the highest rates of inequality in the world. McKinsey, KPMG and HSBC have all become entangled in scandal relating to their dealings with government entities that have become ‘captured’ by private interests.

Despite these concerns, South Africa nonetheless remains the backbone of the regional economy, and its firms are key players across the continent. Johannesburg hosts the deepest and most sophisticated capital market on the continent, and Pretoria has one of the highest numbers of diplomatic missions in the world. ESKOM provides around 75 per cent of the electricity contribution to the Southern Africa SADC Power pool – comprising 12 countries, including those as far north as DRC and Tanzania – and South African ports facilitate over half of sub-Saharan Africa’s non-commodity trade with the rest of the world.

Post-apartheid expansion across the continent by South African companies was initially met with resistance, but these relationships have improved significantly – and South African firms retain significant advantages. South African retailers have the scale to incorporate regional producers into continental supply chains, purchasing fresh produce at a competitive price from regional agri-businesses, then re-selling further afield. For example, Zambeef supplies meat from Zambia to Shoprite stores in west Africa.

African companies in turn rely on South Africa as a significant consumer of goods, services and primary commodities. A South African government agreement with the DRC to import about half of the electricity that will be produced by a new grand-scale hydro-power project guaranteed its bankability. Mozambique is looking to maximize the potential of its world-class natural gas reserves by building a pipeline into South Africa, thus benefitting from the purchasing power of South African parastatal electricity utility firm ESKOM.

But South Africa’s status as an economic hegemon is not mirrored in its political relationships. South Africa’s GDP is five times higher than the six countries with which it shares a border, combined. But successive ANC governments have been unable to fully flex this economic muscle. Partly this is a legacy of history. It is not forgotten that the regional economic body, the Southern African Development Community, originated as the organization of Front Line States coordinating efforts to end apartheid, and ZANU-PF officials in Zimbabwe lecture their ANC counterparts on liberation.

The pan-African vision of former president Thabo Mbeki, and promotion of South Africa’s transition as a model for the continent, reflected the values that have driven ANC policy since the end of apartheid. But the coherence of South Africa’s foreign policy has been undermined by conflict and contradiction within the government. Appetite for engagement in Africa is dwindling. The country’s ability to project military influence across the continent is in critical decline. Jacob Zuma’s use of regional political bodies as a means of removing political rivals from domestic politics has corroded goodwill.

A new Africa Programme research paper argues that a fresh approach to South African engagement on the continent is both possible and necessary. South Africa can use its relative economic weight to play a stronger developmental role, leveraging the strengths of its business sector and its financial agencies. But it must match this with stronger and more cooperative political engagement, particularly through cultivating relationships with pivotal states such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and Angola.

In December, the ANC will elect a new leader to take the party into elections in 2019. Both leading candidates have international experience – Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was the chair of the African Union, and Cyril Ramaphosa has led regional responses to crises in South Sudan, Lesotho and Burundi. South Africa still has considerable foreign policy resources at its disposal. A new strategic vision for Africa that unites the interests of government and business, both domestically and in partner states, can deliver prosperity for both South Africa and the region – and need not contradict the values that have shaped South Africa’s aspirations for the continent in the post-apartheid era.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: A Vision for Inclusive Long-Term Economic Recovery 10 October 2019 — 10:00AM TO 12:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

In its Vision 2030, the government of Zimbabwe committed itself to facilitating an open market and stable economy through strategies such as the Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP) and new industrialization policy. The private sector is pivotal to these objectives and creating an environment conducive to inclusive and job-creating economic growth. Economic growth can only be achieved with a conducive policy environment and government support to underpin markets with provision of public goods, entrepreneurial incentives and protect contract enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms.

This event will launch a new Chatham House Africa Programme publication on Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030. The paper is the culmination of an inclusive research process that has drawn on senior private sector expertise, civil society, academics, technocratic elements of government and other experts to develop policy recommendations that will support inclusive economic growth in Zimbabwe.

This event is held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). It is supported by KAS and the Dulverton Trust.

Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Europe’s great song competition may strive for continental harmony, but bitter conflicts and voting blocs often drag it off key, writes Saskia Postema.

In May, the city that spawned the Beatles will add another notch to its cultural belt as Liverpool hosts the Eurovision Song Contest.

The pop competition has been celebrating extravagance, dramatic acts and lots of glitter since 1956. It is expressly designed to be non-political, with performers barred from promoting political interests, yet it exists for a specific political purpose – to promote European unity.

The organizer, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), has certainly succeeded in part with its mission. While Europe Day on May 9 comes and goes without much fanfare, Eurovision is an eagerly anticipated fixture on the cultural calendar.

Cultural diplomacy

While some may dismiss it as simply an extravagant party, there is more to it than that: it is a form of cultural diplomacy. Beyond artistry, acts are expected to bring their cultural identity to the stage as they bid for douze points, Eurovision’s highest score, from national juries.

Like any popular forum, it reflects popular opinion. So, when war threatens the European harmony Eurovision is meant to exude, politics inevitably manifests itself.

This was evident last year. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Eurovision’s organizers reiterated their apolitical stance stating both countries would be allowed to participate. But when various countries threatened to withdraw if Russia was allowed to compete, the EBU changed its tune and broke off ties with Russian broadcasting agencies indefinitely. As reluctant as it was to act in this capacity, the organization still inadvertently highlighted its role as a political gatekeeper and confirmed Eurovision does function as a political arena.

Unsurprisingly, all eyes were on the Ukrainian entry that year. Kalush Orchestra’s Stefania, presenting a blend of traditional Ukrainian folk music with hip hop beats, went on to win the contest resoundingly.

And while the winning nation normally hosts next year’s competition, due to the war this honour passed to the runner-up, the United Kingdom. Britain, coincidentally, has been one of the most visible supporters of Kyiv’s war efforts. Boris Johnson, the former prime minister, was among the first leaders to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion.

Last year’s second place ended a long spate of poor results for the UK in the competition. The first year it scored nul points was 2003 when the UK entry was Cry Baby by the duo Jemini. The result was seen widely as a backlash against Britain’s entry into the Iraq war earlier that year.

In the intervening years it has been placed last twice and received nul points again in 2021 when the entry was Embers sung by James Newman. With last year’s second place for Sam Ryder’s Space Man, the UK redeemed itself and will get to host Eurovision in Liverpool, a city twinned with Odesa since 1957.

It is not the first time that Russia’s geopolitical relations have led to Eurovision controversy. In 2008, following the Russo-Georgian war, Russia recognized the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia which had broken away from Georgia.

As a result, Georgia initially refused to take part in the 2009 Eurovision as it was to be held in Moscow. It changed its mind, however, submitting a song by Stefane and 3G called We Don’t Wanna Put In. The submission was rejected by the EBU, which said it contained obvious references to the Russian leader, something Georgia denied.

In 2015, Ukraine withdrew from Eurovision following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The following year the EBU was faced with a similar problem when Ukraine submitted a song, 1944,sung by Jamala, which told the story of her great-grandmother who lived through the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. This time the EBU allowed the entry, despite the Russian Duma calling for its rejection. The song went on to win.