algeria

AT#566 - Travel to Algeria

Hear about travel to Algeria as the Amateur Traveler talks to Ric Gazarian from GlobalGaz.com about travel to this "off the beaten path" destination.




algeria

Algeria’s Perfect Storm: COVID-19 and Its Fallout

6 May 2020

Adel Hamaizia

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Yahia H. Zoubir

Senior Professor of International Studies, KEDGE Business School; Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Coronavirus is a godsend for Algeria’s government to introduce restrictive measures beyond those needed to contain COVID-19. But its new leaders are missing a chance to gain legitimacy, which will offset the socio-economic fallout of the drop in oil prices.

2020-05-06-Algeria-Health-Covid

Algerian volunteers prepare personal protection equipment (PPE) to help combat the coronavirus epidemic in the capital Algiers. Photo by RYAD KRAMDI/AFP via Getty Images.

Although protests successfully ended Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 20-year sultanistic rule a little over one year ago, demands have been continuing to dismantle the system, get rid of the old personnel, and institute democracy.

The controversial election in December of Abdelmadjid Tebboune — who has inherited a disastrous situation — has not tempered the determination of the Hirak protest movement. As a former minister and prime minister under Bouteflika, the new president has won little legitimacy, and protests have continued.

Now COVID-19 is worsening already dire economic conditions, such as a sharp drop in oil prices. By the beginning of May, statistics showed 10% of confirmed cases have ended in fatality, the highest percentage in the region.

Maintaining an authoritarian style

Hirak had already called for the suspension of the marches — mobilising online instead — before the government’s measures, which include curfews and lockdowns, demonstrating a high sense of duty. But instead of appeasing Hirak’s demands, the government has maintained the authoritarian style of its predecessors.

Tebboune released more than 5,000 prisoners on March 31 but kept prisoners of conscience and leaders of the hirak imprisoned, then subsequently imprisoned journalists and activists. It even passed a controversial penal law, that also covers fake news, and may be used to justify actions against journalists.

The regime wishes to see an end to the Hirak, and rejects accusations of totalitarianism by insisting freedom and a democratic climate exist in Algeria.

Tebboune’s actions contradict his praise for the ‘blessed’ hirak and his promises of instituting the rule of law. In proclaiming the measures, the government has shown disappointing leadership, acting in an authoritarian fashion.

Tebboune also declared proudly that Algeria was fully prepared to fight the coronavirus epidemic, an optimistic claim given the country has only 400 intensive care unit (ICU) beds, or one per 100,000 people. Despite hundreds of billions of hydrocarbon dollars accumulating during the Bouteflika-era, Algeria’s health system ranks 173 out of 195 countries.

Algerians often refer to hospitals as ‘mouroirs’, meaning ‘places for the dying’. Not only has the state failed to build modern hospitals but basic hygienic conditions are lacking, and government officials prefer being treated overseas. A 2014 project to build five university hospitals was abandoned, leaving the health sector in deplorable shape.

Before Chinese assistance arrived, the glaring lack of equipment to protect caregivers and care for the sick was evident. Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad admitted the health system required a ‘total overhaul’. The president recently stated Algeria’s doctors are among the 'best in the world' but didn't address why almost 15,000 Algerian doctors practice in France.

Strict containment measures are in sync with most countries but implementation is challenging when most people live in overcrowded urban dwellings (the average household consists of 5.9 members).

Water shortages in many areas makes good hygiene and decontamination impossible, while schools and universities find online teaching difficult when many students do not possess laptops or internet connections. And only 20% of Algerians have debit cards in a cash-dominated economy because of low trust in the public-dominated banking sector, making online shopping capability low.

An already declining macroeconomic situation is worsening due to COVID-19. The IMF revised its 2020 estimates for Algeria, forecasting a catastrophic contraction of -5.2% in a country where hydrocarbons account for 93% of export revenues and 60% of its budget.

Foreign currency reserves are now an estimated $55 billion (expected to fall to $44billion by the end of 2020), down from $200 billion in 2014, and Algerian crude has recently traded close to production costs, with the fiscal breakeven oil price at $157.

In line with its historic aversion to external borrowing, Tebboune recently ruled out seeking financial support from the ‘IMF or other foreign banks’, as he argued such borrowing undermines sovereign foreign policy because - when indebted - ‘we cannot talk about either Palestine or Western Sahara’, two causes dear to Algeria. ‘Friendly countries’ - most likely a reference to China - are said to have offered to grant loans which have been declined for now.

The government is forecasted to face a 20% budget shortfall this year, but Algeria’s fiscal response to COVID-19 is actually the largest among the regional hydrocarbon exporters at an estimated 8% of GDP, compared to an average of 3.2%. However, the government revised downwards its 2020 public spending by 50% (a second cut in a month, from an initial 30% reduction), halting state projects and slashing its $41 billion import bill by 25% while expanding agricultural production. National oil company SONATRACH will also cut planned investment by half to $7 billion but plans have been revealed to develop other natural resources including gold, uranium and phosphates.

But recent growth rates are insufficient to create jobs for those entering the labour market. Despite government attempts to support a rather anaemic ‘formal’ private sector, estimates are 700,000 jobs could be lost due to potential bankruptcies from reduced activity and a loss of markets abroad.

Facing potential social unrest and the quasi-preservation of a tired social contract, the government has committed to upholding public sector wages - including for 50% of the civil servants told to stay home - protecting sacrosanct, unsustainable subsidies, and increasing health expenditure to strengthen the capacity to combat COVID-19.

A supplementary finance law will include various measures that support businesses and the economic fallout. However, while the government is to be commended for its efforts to aid businesses, supporting large swathes of the population is challenging as approximately 50% of the workforce operate in the informal economy.

Weak administrative capacity and insufficient data to implement cash transfers makes the planned ‘solidarity allowance’ of 10,000 dinars ($80) for Ramadan difficult to allocate to those who most need it (especially those in the informal sector). Families, communities, and religious organisations continue to be a social safety net.

So COVID-19 has not created new problems, it has merely magnified and exacerbated the numerous inequalities and failures of the Bouteflika regime to sufficiently invest in human security (economic, food, health environmental, personal, community, and political). Typically, whenever oil prices and related earnings dwindle, the political system promises to reform and diversify the economy. Tebboune is repeating this same old tune.

There are positive elements, such as the government’s realization it must initiate genuine reforms. And local enterprises have been successfully producing artificial respirators, surgical masks, and other materials. Algerians, including the Hirak, are showing great social solidarity.

But the government must capitalize on these positive actions by introducing real change. Because, if not, Hirak will certainly be back in force once the crisis is over, and operating in an environment of worsening socioeconomic problems. The medicine of the past will not work.




algeria

CBD News: Statement by Mr Ahmed Djoghlaf,Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, on the occasion of the 39th International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) World Farmers' Congress,21 May 2010,Algiers, Algeria.




algeria

CBD Communiqué: The President of Algeria donates to the Museum of Nature and Culture of the Convention on Biological Diversity




algeria

Algeria’s Perfect Storm: COVID-19 and Its Fallout

6 May 2020

Adel Hamaizia

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Yahia H. Zoubir

Senior Professor of International Studies, KEDGE Business School; Visiting Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
Coronavirus is a godsend for Algeria’s government to introduce restrictive measures beyond those needed to contain COVID-19. But its new leaders are missing a chance to gain legitimacy, which will offset the socio-economic fallout of the drop in oil prices.

2020-05-06-Algeria-Health-Covid

Algerian volunteers prepare personal protection equipment (PPE) to help combat the coronavirus epidemic in the capital Algiers. Photo by RYAD KRAMDI/AFP via Getty Images.

Although protests successfully ended Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 20-year sultanistic rule a little over one year ago, demands have been continuing to dismantle the system, get rid of the old personnel, and institute democracy.

The controversial election in December of Abdelmadjid Tebboune — who has inherited a disastrous situation — has not tempered the determination of the Hirak protest movement. As a former minister and prime minister under Bouteflika, the new president has won little legitimacy, and protests have continued.

Now COVID-19 is worsening already dire economic conditions, such as a sharp drop in oil prices. By the beginning of May, statistics showed 10% of confirmed cases have ended in fatality, the highest percentage in the region.

Maintaining an authoritarian style

Hirak had already called for the suspension of the marches — mobilising online instead — before the government’s measures, which include curfews and lockdowns, demonstrating a high sense of duty. But instead of appeasing Hirak’s demands, the government has maintained the authoritarian style of its predecessors.

Tebboune released more than 5,000 prisoners on March 31 but kept prisoners of conscience and leaders of the hirak imprisoned, then subsequently imprisoned journalists and activists. It even passed a controversial penal law, that also covers fake news, and may be used to justify actions against journalists.

The regime wishes to see an end to the Hirak, and rejects accusations of totalitarianism by insisting freedom and a democratic climate exist in Algeria.

Tebboune’s actions contradict his praise for the ‘blessed’ hirak and his promises of instituting the rule of law. In proclaiming the measures, the government has shown disappointing leadership, acting in an authoritarian fashion.

Tebboune also declared proudly that Algeria was fully prepared to fight the coronavirus epidemic, an optimistic claim given the country has only 400 intensive care unit (ICU) beds, or one per 100,000 people. Despite hundreds of billions of hydrocarbon dollars accumulating during the Bouteflika-era, Algeria’s health system ranks 173 out of 195 countries.

Algerians often refer to hospitals as ‘mouroirs’, meaning ‘places for the dying’. Not only has the state failed to build modern hospitals but basic hygienic conditions are lacking, and government officials prefer being treated overseas. A 2014 project to build five university hospitals was abandoned, leaving the health sector in deplorable shape.

Before Chinese assistance arrived, the glaring lack of equipment to protect caregivers and care for the sick was evident. Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad admitted the health system required a ‘total overhaul’. The president recently stated Algeria’s doctors are among the 'best in the world' but didn't address why almost 15,000 Algerian doctors practice in France.

Strict containment measures are in sync with most countries but implementation is challenging when most people live in overcrowded urban dwellings (the average household consists of 5.9 members).

Water shortages in many areas makes good hygiene and decontamination impossible, while schools and universities find online teaching difficult when many students do not possess laptops or internet connections. And only 20% of Algerians have debit cards in a cash-dominated economy because of low trust in the public-dominated banking sector, making online shopping capability low.

An already declining macroeconomic situation is worsening due to COVID-19. The IMF revised its 2020 estimates for Algeria, forecasting a catastrophic contraction of -5.2% in a country where hydrocarbons account for 93% of export revenues and 60% of its budget.

Foreign currency reserves are now an estimated $55 billion (expected to fall to $44billion by the end of 2020), down from $200 billion in 2014, and Algerian crude has recently traded close to production costs, with the fiscal breakeven oil price at $157.

In line with its historic aversion to external borrowing, Tebboune recently ruled out seeking financial support from the ‘IMF or other foreign banks’, as he argued such borrowing undermines sovereign foreign policy because - when indebted - ‘we cannot talk about either Palestine or Western Sahara’, two causes dear to Algeria. ‘Friendly countries’ - most likely a reference to China - are said to have offered to grant loans which have been declined for now.

The government is forecasted to face a 20% budget shortfall this year, but Algeria’s fiscal response to COVID-19 is actually the largest among the regional hydrocarbon exporters at an estimated 8% of GDP, compared to an average of 3.2%. However, the government revised downwards its 2020 public spending by 50% (a second cut in a month, from an initial 30% reduction), halting state projects and slashing its $41 billion import bill by 25% while expanding agricultural production. National oil company SONATRACH will also cut planned investment by half to $7 billion but plans have been revealed to develop other natural resources including gold, uranium and phosphates.

But recent growth rates are insufficient to create jobs for those entering the labour market. Despite government attempts to support a rather anaemic ‘formal’ private sector, estimates are 700,000 jobs could be lost due to potential bankruptcies from reduced activity and a loss of markets abroad.

Facing potential social unrest and the quasi-preservation of a tired social contract, the government has committed to upholding public sector wages - including for 50% of the civil servants told to stay home - protecting sacrosanct, unsustainable subsidies, and increasing health expenditure to strengthen the capacity to combat COVID-19.

A supplementary finance law will include various measures that support businesses and the economic fallout. However, while the government is to be commended for its efforts to aid businesses, supporting large swathes of the population is challenging as approximately 50% of the workforce operate in the informal economy.

Weak administrative capacity and insufficient data to implement cash transfers makes the planned ‘solidarity allowance’ of 10,000 dinars ($80) for Ramadan difficult to allocate to those who most need it (especially those in the informal sector). Families, communities, and religious organisations continue to be a social safety net.

So COVID-19 has not created new problems, it has merely magnified and exacerbated the numerous inequalities and failures of the Bouteflika regime to sufficiently invest in human security (economic, food, health environmental, personal, community, and political). Typically, whenever oil prices and related earnings dwindle, the political system promises to reform and diversify the economy. Tebboune is repeating this same old tune.

There are positive elements, such as the government’s realization it must initiate genuine reforms. And local enterprises have been successfully producing artificial respirators, surgical masks, and other materials. Algerians, including the Hirak, are showing great social solidarity.

But the government must capitalize on these positive actions by introducing real change. Because, if not, Hirak will certainly be back in force once the crisis is over, and operating in an environment of worsening socioeconomic problems. The medicine of the past will not work.




algeria

Algeria: Tired of Waiting

1 January 2008 , Number 10

At the beginning of December, media reports put the violence which had plagued Algeria since the 1990s at an all time low. Only six people had been killed in November and four of those were armed Islamist militants. Then on December 11, two car bombs exploded in the capital Algiers, killing some 67 people, including at least eleven United Nations officials in the largely destroyed offices of the UN’s High Commission for Refugees. What lies beneath this return to high-level, targeted attacks?

Claire Spencer

Head, Middle East Programme, Chatham House

algeria 2008.jpg

Algerian policemen and bomb experts in front of the destroyed building of the Supreme Court, Algiers. One explosion targeted the offices of the UN refugee agency in Algiers, while the other bomb was triggered near the Algerian Supreme Court building.




algeria

Algerian singer Idir, a Berber icon, has died in Paris

Born in Ait Lahcene, near the Kabylie capital of Tizi Ouzou, then part of French Algeria, he studied to be a geologist, but his life took a turn in 1973 when he was called up as a last-minute replacement on the radio to sing the Berber lullaby 'A Vava Inouva.'




algeria

Seychellois Rupee(SCR)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Seychellois Rupee = 7.4753 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Trinidad and Tobago Dollar(TTD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Trinidad and Tobago Dollar = 18.9914 Algerian Dinar



  • Trinidad and Tobago Dollar

algeria

Swedish Krona(SEK)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Swedish Krona = 13.1332 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Slovak Koruna(SKK)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Slovak Koruna = 5.7793 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Serbian Dinar(RSD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Serbian Dinar = 1.1833 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Polish Zloty(PLN)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Polish Zloty = 30.5217 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Qatari Rial(QAR)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Qatari Rial = 35.2471 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Indian Rupee(INR)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Indian Rupee = 1.6997 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Pakistani Rupee(PKR)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Pakistani Rupee = 0.8039 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Sierra Leonean Leone(SLL)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Sierra Leonean Leone = 0.013 Algerian Dinar



  • Sierra Leonean Leone

algeria

New Taiwan Dollar(TWD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 New Taiwan Dollar = 4.2984 Algerian Dinar



  • New Taiwan Dollar

algeria

Thai Baht(THB)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Thai Baht = 4.0079 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Turkish Lira(TRY)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Turkish Lira = 18.1033 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Singapore Dollar(SGD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Singapore Dollar = 90.8445 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Mauritian Rupee(MUR)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Mauritian Rupee = 3.2318 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Nepalese Rupee(NPR)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Nepalese Rupee = 1.0612 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Bangladeshi Taka(BDT)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Bangladeshi Taka = 1.5099 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Moldovan Leu(MDL)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Moldovan Leu = 7.1973 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Colombian Peso(COP)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Colombian Peso = 0.0329 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Uruguayan Peso(UYU)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Uruguayan Peso = 2.9749 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Uzbekistan Som(UZS)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Uzbekistan Som = 0.0127 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Russian Ruble(RUB)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Russian Ruble = 1.7484 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Iraqi Dinar(IQD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Iraqi Dinar = 0.1078 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Cayman Islands Dollar(KYD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Cayman Islands Dollar = 153.9621 Algerian Dinar



  • Cayman Islands Dollar

algeria

Swiss Franc(CHF)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Swiss Franc = 132.1713 Algerian Dinar




algeria

CFA Franc BCEAO(XOF)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 CFA Franc BCEAO = 0.2121 Algerian Dinar



  • CFA Franc BCEAO

algeria

Vietnamese Dong(VND)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Vietnamese Dong = 0.0055 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Macedonian Denar(MKD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Macedonian Denar = 2.2584 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Zambian Kwacha(ZMK)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Zambian Kwacha = 0.0247 Algerian Dinar




algeria

South Korean Won(KRW)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 South Korean Won = 0.1052 Algerian Dinar



  • South Korean Won

algeria

Jordanian Dinar(JOD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Jordanian Dinar = 180.8813 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Lebanese Pound(LBP)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Lebanese Pound = 0.0848 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Bahraini Dinar(BHD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Bahraini Dinar = 339.3525 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Chilean Peso(CLP)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Chilean Peso = 0.1554 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Maldivian Rufiyaa(MVR)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Maldivian Rufiyaa = 8.2778 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Malaysian Ringgit(MYR)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Malaysian Ringgit = 29.6112 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Nicaraguan Cordoba Oro(NIO)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Nicaraguan Cordoba Oro = 3.7303 Algerian Dinar



  • Nicaraguan Cordoba Oro

algeria

Netherlands Antillean Guilder(ANG)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Netherlands Antillean Guilder = 71.4884 Algerian Dinar



  • Netherlands Antillean Guilder

algeria

Estonian Kroon(EEK)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Estonian Kroon = 8.9982 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Danish Krone(DKK)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Danish Krone = 18.651 Algerian Dinar




algeria

Fiji Dollar(FJD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Fiji Dollar = 56.9613 Algerian Dinar




algeria

New Zealand Dollar(NZD)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 New Zealand Dollar = 78.7724 Algerian Dinar



  • New Zealand Dollar

algeria

Croatian Kuna(HRK)/Algerian Dinar(DZD)

1 Croatian Kuna = 18.496 Algerian Dinar