Why a more inward-looking China is bad news for the world economy Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2022

The increased role of geopolitics and ideology in Beijing’s economic decision-making is bad news not just for China but for the world.

This quote by President Xi clearly outlines the inward tilt of Chinese economic policymaking that is now becoming increasingly obvious to the rest of the world. But it actually has deep roots. Ever since the 2008 global financial crisis, when the West’s reliability as a trading partner was thrown into question, self-reliance has become a more decisive organizing principle for Chinese officials.

As a result, the export-dependent growth model on which China built its economic rise in recent decades has been fraying. Exports as a share of China’s GDP peaked at 35 per cent in 2007 but had fallen to around 20 per cent by last year, a level not seen since before China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. This shows that net exports no longer make any meaningful contribution to Chinese GDP growth.

Although China’s inward tilt may have started out as a response to purely economic phenomena – the post-crisis global recession, belt-tightening in the West, the eurozone crisis, and a general softening of global trade growth in the post-crisis years – geopolitical considerations are now dominant in shaping this shift toward self-reliance.

The role of geopolitics in pushing China towards a more inward-looking development path became clear in China’s response to the aggressive tariffs and export controls introduced by the Trump administration in the US. Because of these new constraints on China’s access to international markets and technology, Beijing sought to limit its dependence on the rest of the world.   

The most obvious result of this was the introduction of the ‘dual circulation’ strategy in May 2020, which sets out a rebalancing of China’s economy away from a reliance on external demand as a stimulus to growth (‘international circulation’) towards increased self-dependence (‘domestic circulation’). 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has provided another geopolitical impetus to China’s pursuit of self-reliance. Since it is not far-fetched to think that China, like Russia, might one day also face coordinated sanctions, Chinese authorities must be thinking hard about how to respond to such a risk. 

The only credible strategy that China can adopt is to reduce its economic dependence on the West by creating, in effect, a kind of economic fortress, as its dependence on imported technology, food, and fossil fuels in particular, has created a substantial strategic vulnerability.

Over the next few years, Chinese policymakers will likely attempt to build up the country’s ability to supply its own semi-conductors, food, and green energy sources.

This new approach to economic policymaking isn’t just about China’s relationship with the rest of the world. Within China itself, a new emphasis on the role of the state is increasingly apparent – and seemingly rooted in ideology. 

The previous National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in October 2017, made a push for ‘stronger, better, and bigger’ state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the past five years have indeed seen a measurable rise in the role that SOEs play in the Chinese economy. These firms now account for more fixed investment in the economy than private firms, for the first time since 2005.

Climate justice with Chinese characteristics? Expert comment NCapeling 7 November 2022

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), claims to be making sustainability a key feature of the programme.

Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has regularly unveiled a grand new strategic concept every four years or so.

Each has been deeply rooted in the Chinese political system and communicated via ambitious slogans, such as A Harmonious World, or New Types of Great Power Relations. And all have reliably generated both excitement and confusion abroad and within China.

China’s latest grand concept, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), is no exception. When Chinese president Xi Jinping introduced it at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2021, it made hardly any splash in the West, perhaps because China has already signalled its determination to shape international development in the post-COVID era.

But the GDI is more than just a new label for an ongoing project. One of its core political functions is to deflect some of the fierce criticism directed at its older sibling, the gigantic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has a tarnished reputation for being neither transparent nor sufficiently ‘green’.

Focus on grants and capacity-building

According to the Chinese government’s initial description of the GDI, sustainability is a key feature of the programme. Unlike the BRI, the GDI will focus less on physical infrastructure projects – such as roads, bridges, digital networks, and coal-fired power plants – and more on sustainable-development grants and capacity-building.

In his remarks about GDI in 2021, Xi placed special emphasis on advancing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helping developing countries manage the transition to a low-carbon economy.

On paper, then, the GDI appears a laudable initiative. While ongoing geopolitical tensions have deepened divisions between China and the US, derailing collaboration on combatting climate change, China at least is adjusting its diplomacy and aid programmes to position itself as a more attractive partner for those seeking climate security.

Since launching the GDI, it has already created the China-Pacific Island Countries Climate Action Cooperation Centre to help some of the world’s most vulnerable countries mitigate the damage from climate change.

But the GDI is still very much in line with China’s past grand initiatives. Its implementation is opaque and there is considerable flexibility in how it will deliver projects and offer grants. This approach is well understood and frequently practiced by Chinese political elites, following Deng Xiaoping’s famous reform ethos of ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’.

Xi has clearly adopted this approach in introducing the GDI. But whereas Deng was steering China’s domestic economy during a period of isolation after the Cultural Revolution, Xi needs to involve many other countries in his vision. That will not be easy now that Russia’s war in Ukraine and other recent developments have complicated many of China’s international relationships.

China’s leaders recognize the BRI was not warmly received in global development circles, owing partly to its role in increasing both climate and financial risks. In implementing the GDI, they need to rethink some basic assumptions. Although gigantic infrastructure investments drove China’s own economic miracle, the same approach is not necessarily applicable everywhere.

Nor should China’s development aid be relentlessly used to seek diplomatic endorsement from other countries. Instead, producing a clear, concrete action plan with specific regional and thematic points of focus would enhance the GDI’s clarity and credibility.

Consider Xi’s recent pledge to add $1 billion to the $3.1 billion South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund, which will be renamed the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund. If China is serious about the GDI’s green credentials, this money should go towards supporting the clean-energy transition in response to the current oil and gas price crunch.

But the GDI’s success ultimately depends on how China deploys not just financial but political capital. It needs to show it can cooperate constructively with countries in the ‘GDI Friends Group’ launched at the UN in January 2022.

For many group members, the pandemic showed that existing development assistance programs urgently need to be updated to account for their recipients’ specific interests and priorities. After years of hollow diplomatic rhetoric, there is a craving for more meaningful assistance to help countries build resilience against climate-driven natural disasters and other growing threats.

China could help meet this demand, but it also will need to manage expectations. Many in the Global South assume a grand-concept policy such as the GDI will be meticulously planned from within Xi’s cabinet and thus executed to deliver large-scale, rapid results. But the GDI will require broad coordination across a wide range of ministries, agencies, and state-owned banks.

One party but not one voice

China may be ruled by one party, but that doesn’t mean its central administration system can always speak with one voice in supporting sustainable development abroad.

Since launching the BRI in 2013, China has showered the Global South with hundreds of billions of dollars in physical infrastructure investment. With the global climate debate increasingly focusing on the need to mobilize international financing for climate mitigation and adaptation in low and middle-income countries, many will be looking to both China and the advanced economies to provide the necessary support.

Beijing briefing: China’s wish for 2023? An end to lockdown The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

Xi Jinping will try to beef up Global South relations in 2023, but weary Chinese and the business sector need pandemic restrictions to end, says Yu Jie.

This past year in Chinese politics was capped by a highly anticipated 20th Party Congress in Beijing in October which marked the beginning of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term. Xi stacked the all-powerful Politburo with male loyalists and left the rest of the world to sift through the implications of his leadership reshuffle.

Meanwhile, Xi made headlines at the G20 summit in Indonesia, maintaining a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and being caught on camera chiding Canada’s Justin Trudeau for leaks after their talks. So, what can we expect Xi to pull out of the hat in 2023, the Chinese Year of the Rabbit? 

In February and March, the conversations around Beijing dinner tables will focus on the composition of the new central government – the important seats within the Chinese State Council. This body must deliver Xi’s ‘security-oriented’ economic agenda as well as his much-promoted ‘Common Prosperity’ initiative.

Pundits will be paying particular attention to who is put in charge of economic planning, who the new foreign minister might be and who will govern the central bank. I will offer my reading of these tea leaves as the year unfolds.

In April and May, speculation may turn to whether China will finally open its borders to foreign visitors and those compatriots who want to be reunited with loved ones after enduring the pandemic lockdown. While some loosening of restrictions began in November 2022, China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of Covid and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to Europe.

Beijing’s controversial ‘Zero-Covid’ strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment and tested the patience of China’s middle class, which has led to unprecedented civil disobedience. Those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until Beijing reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

A pivot to the Global South

June and July will be prime season for Beijing’s diplomacy with the Global South. Xi recently announced that China would host the third Belt and Road Forum in 2023 – a meeting of heads of states from predominantly developing countries to discuss his flagship foreign affairs initiative. As seen in the Political Report of the 20th Party Congress, Xi has abandoned the ‘new type of great power relations’ language he previously used to describe relations with the US-led western world. 

In its place, Xi is stressing that China should develop its ties with the Global South through his Global Development and Global Security initiatives which were announced in 2021 and 2022 respectively. These aim to reshape the global governance agenda in multilateral forums and project Beijing’s influence on to the developing world.

Sport will dominate throughout August and September. While Beijing’s spending spree on football promotion might have failed to see the national side qualify for the World Cup, its table tennis team has proved invincible and continues to cheer up the nation. I will offer my own verdict on why there is such a stark contrast between the success of the two men’s teams and explain the meaning of sports in modern Chinese society.

In October and November, young graduates will begin their careers while new university students start to arrive on campus. Chinese students are constantly subjected to strenuous testing. And like their western peers, they face the inevitable pressures of finding a job, repaying the mortgage and other everyday facts of life.

The burnout of China’s Generation Z 

The term ‘involution’ – neijuan – has been adopted by China’s Generation Z to describe their feelings of burnout at the ever-increasing expectations associated with high performance. Equally, they have strong opinions about their own government as well as western liberal democracies. China’s leaders of the future will come from their ranks so it will be worthwhile spending some time trying to understand what makes them tick.

Whatever the Year of the Rabbit holds for China, billions of its people will want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their Covid health QR code. Only a green code shows a person is healthy and free to move around. The Covid threat has hovered over people for three years and as borders reopen, they may be holding their breath. 

A slowing economy dimming consumer confidence and a precarious international environment make it look even harder for President Xi to pursue the agenda outlined in October 2022. As the Year of the Rabbit dawns, China doesn’t need a Mad Hatter or a March Hare, instead it urgently needs a sound path to economic recovery and a plan to reopen its borders that works for everyone. 

China’s zero-COVID cannot continue, reopening is needed Expert comment NCapeling 1 December 2022

Unsure of how to loosen rules, local officials have doubled down on severe restrictions behind so much economic damage. Reopening will quell public anger.

When President Xi Jinping was seen unmasked at the G20 summit in Indonesia, he maintained a largely positive tone with President Joe Biden and other world leaders. This left an impression that China was on the verge of withdrawing its zero-COVID strategy.

A set of loosening policy measures introduced by Beijing seemed to further suggest that China was on track to reopen. As outlined in the 20th party congress, Xi wants to forge a pathway towards economic modernization and this means building economic resilience and a further increase in household incomes.

However, a series of displays of public defiance against the government’s zero-COVID policy has left the rest of the world perplexed. Some loosening of restrictions announced on 11 November by the central government, with the number of new cases still rising rapidly, left the provincial governments in confusion as to which direction to turn.

Absolute political loyalty

The persistent slogan of ‘zero-COVID’ was in stark contrast to the slackening of restrictions. Local officials decided to double down on stringent COVID measures as a way of displaying absolute political loyalty to the top, which inevitably caused daily agonies among large parts of the Chinese population.

This decision-making process sheds some light on the way the Chinese bureaucracy approaches crises at a time when the party leadership is tightening political control. Lower-level officials avoided making important decisions and instead decided to wait for instructions from the top. As the rules were unclear, they implemented policies according to past precedents, in this case zero-COVID, which had worked relatively well for China in 2020 and 2021.

For decades, local governments have been major political actors in China and have known what works best under local conditions. But with tighter regulation being exercised by lower-level bureaucrats and civil servants, there is less opportunity for the input of local knowledge, increasing the risk of ineffective policies being implemented.

Away from Beijing, those not employed by the state have been hit particularly hard by zero-COVID measures. The strategy has intensified economic pressures, exacerbated rising levels of youth unemployment, and tested the patience of the entire country.

Billions of Chinese people want to have their life return to normal without the fear of having the wrong colour – yellow or red – on their COVID health QR code or endless mandatory testing. Only a green code shows that a person is healthy and able to move around freely.

Economy is suffering

China is still balancing its twin aims of containing the spread of COVID and re-engineering its economy along similar lines to the rest of the world. It is difficult to see how China’s economy can crank up again until the country reduces its internal restrictions and reconnects with the world.

Russia and China in Antarctica: Implications for the Five Eyes 15 December 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 December 2022 Online

This event explores Russia’s and China’s postions on the Antarctic and offers a critical assessment of their actions in the region.

Ever since the 1959 Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), signed at the height of Cold War, Antarctica has remained a demilitarized continent.

Today, even though the ATS is not in immediate danger of collapse, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean are no longer insulated from wider geopolitical tension, with China and Russia posing challenges to regional governance. 
 
This event also discusses key recommendations for the Five Eyes regarding Russian and Chinese current and future efforts at undermining the ATS and Antarctic governance. 

The discussion is informed by Mathieu Boulègue’s paper ‘Russia and China in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean: Implications for the Five Eyes’ published by the Sea Power Centre of the Royal Australian Navy.

Director's briefing: Key challenges for China’s economy in 2023 6 February 2023 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 January 2023 Chatham House

This event examines the structural challenges facing the Chinese economy in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

This event examines the structural challenges facing the Chinese economy after the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022 and how President Xi Jinping is responding to short and long-term domestic pressures.

The panel, including Professor Huang Yiping, discuss how quickly the Chinese economy could rebound after the Chinese government abandoned its ‘Zero COVID-19’ policy in December 2022 and to what extent the Chinese economy is pivoting toward Xi Jinping’s stated goal of ‘self-reliance’. The panel also discuss the broader implications for the global economy.
 
Key questions to be explored:

• Which sectors will China prioritize in pursuit of greater economic self-reliance?

• If China is turning inward, how will it drive technological innovation in the coming years?

• Is China’s economy robust enough to withstand geopolitical turbulence and other external shocks?

This event is held under the Chatham House Rule.

Beijing briefing: China bets on warmer EU relations The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

With the Sino-US Xi relationship cooling, Xi Jinping is sending a new diplomatic team to Europe – but his ties to Putin may mean slow progress, writes Yu Jie.

It has been a momentous year for Beijing. Twelve months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its relations with the West have become more strained than ever. And after President Xi Jinping secured an unprecedented third term in office at the 20th Party Congress, the country has embarked on a chaotic exit from the Covid lockdown amid hopes the economy will rebound quickly.

Some are already asking if Beijing will set a course correction in its diplomatic priorities to spare itself some of the setbacks it incurred in 2022. But when it comes to foreign affairs, China’s priorities rarely change. 

The Chinese leadership seeks to create a stable external environment to allow its domestic economic development. This conservative maxim was adopted in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, and President Xi is likely to follow it as a time-honoured recipe for diplomatic reconciliation.

China’s awkward position

Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow and its failure to oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have put China in an awkward position. Xi and his colleagues have begun to realize that cooperation with Russia comes with substantial limits to avoid undermining China’s own political priorities and longer-term economic interests.

Interestingly, pundits interpreted the omission of ‘pursuing new types of great power relations’ in the 20th Party Congress report as an acceptance by the party leadership that its fraught relationship with advanced developed nations is likely to remain, with little prospect of improvement in the short term.

Chinese diplomatic literature has always presented Russia as a great power, but the abandonment of such terms signals that Beijing is keen to put clear daylight between itself and Vladimir Putin, although international commentators may argue this is not enough and nothing has changed.

There has been little sign of China using its influence to help resolve the Ukraine conflict. Facing, as it feels it now does, a ‘collective West’ and not the Americans alone, Beijing has concluded there are few reasons not to move closer to Russia.

But a reset would appear necessary if China is to tackle its domestic economic woes. So far, Beijing’s main political tactic has been to reassure European countries that it is willing to use its ties with Russia to restrain Putin from entertaining the deployment of nuclear weapons. That was the message conveyed during the visit of Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, and it will be said again when both President Emmanuel Macron of France and Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, each visit later this year.

Economically, China has traditionally relied on its relationships with the European Union and the United States to support innovation and growth. So, a perceived isolation from ‘a collective West’ is not an attractive option given Xi’s hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after dropping the country’s ‘zero-covid’ policy. A precarious bilateral tie with the US has already reduced Beijing’s choice of partners and consumers. Worsening Sino-US relations and a tightening of access to overseas markets for Chinese companies have prompted Beijing not only to reconsider the country’s sources of economic growth but to reconfigure its approach to foreign affairs.

China is making a renewed push to strengthen ties with the Global South, which does not see the war in Ukraine as black and white as the West does. Such a move is only possible because five decades of engagement with the ‘collective West’ has allowed China to emerge from poverty and become a global economic powerhouse.

A new diplomatic team

In an attempt to reset the tone of China’s relations with the EU, its largest trading partner, Xi has formed a new diplomatic team headed by Qin Gang, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is returning from his post in Washington as ambassador to the US and who has a background in European affairs. Achieving warmer relations will be easier said than done, however, as China has maintained its ‘neutrality’ at Russia’s aggression since February 2022.

Review: The Cultural Revolution still haunts China The World Today mhiggins.drupal 30 January 2023

Tania Branigan’s searching ‘Red Memory’ reveals the costs to Chinese society of not addressing that upheaval’s lingering injustices, writes Nathan Law.

Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China’s Cultural Revolution
Tania Branigan, Faber, £20

The Cultural Revolution, a decade-long socio-political upheaval initiated by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966, caused as many as two million deaths and reshaped China. Under the influence of Mao’s personality cult, an entire nation was mobilized to purge the ‘reactionary elements’ in society and the Chinese Communist Party through public denunciation and demolition of traditional heritages.

Children turned on their parents; pupils murdered their teachers, and those who survived the summary public trials were often banished – as a young Xi Jinping himself was, living in a cave for seven years, after his father fell from favour.

Impossible moral choices

In her engaging and sensitive narrative account of the revolution’s upheaval and its consequences, Tania Branigan, the Guardian’s China correspondent between 2008 and 2015, speaks to some of those who survived those terrible years, considers their impossible moral choices and explores the far-reaching legacy of the revolution in present-day China.

Mao urged the party to cleanse itself of its ‘class enemies’: ‘capitalists’ such as landowners and shopkeepers, but also artists, farmers and university professors. Often their family members were tainted by association and persecuted. Branigan captures the awful sense of intimate betrayal and tragedy nowhere more than in the testimony of Zhang Hongbing, a lawyer turned zealous Red Guard.

Zhang denounced his mother, a hospital worker, as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ because her father owned land. She was eventually executed but not before her son struck her twice during her arrest to show his party loyalty. ‘What I did to my mother was worse even than to an animal,’ the remorseful Zhang tells Branigan.

Zhang points out that his actions were far from uncommon: ‘The whole country was doing it.’ This unreconciled sense of betrayal and fear still blights China: ‘Our society is ethically hollow. If we trace these problems to their roots, we are likely to find them in the Cultural Revolution,’ one survivor is quoted as writing.

Branigan encapsulates the difficulties around reconciliation and remembering in the story of Song Binbin. As a schoolgirl in 1966, she and two classmates were the first to pin up a poster attacking teachers for urging students to focus on their work instead of the revolution. Song’s classmates then beat the school vice principal Bian Zhongyun to death in the playground. The case was never properly investigated, and the death was dismissed as an accident.

The pain of remembering

In 2014, Song apologized publicly for the poster and expressed a sense of guilt for not intervening on Bian’s behalf. But Bian’s widower rejected the apology. Song did not speak to Branigan herself, instead allowing her friends to speak in her defence. ‘They had spoken of truth and reconciliation, but not once of justice. Every remark brought them towards closure, not accountability,’ Branigan writes.

The inability to come to terms with the past pervades the book, most of whose interviewees express feelings of resentment, fear and shame about the Cultural Revolution. I sensed the same emotions when, as a boy, I talked to a neighbour in Hong Kong who was then in his 70s. He escaped from China in the late 1960s due to political and economic strains. He simply nodded and fell silent when I asked him to elaborate.

As Branigan writes: ‘Most Cultural Revolution survivors had learnt to bend with the will of the time; not only to do as they were told but to imply that doing so was their own idea. It was better – safer – to stay silent or lie.’

This collective trauma is exacerbated by official unwillingness to address the past. The Cultural Revolution warrants no more than a few paragraphs in official textbooks with no mention of the suffering it unleashed. Documents of the period that might tarnish the CCP remain unavailable; any attempts to interrogate the Cultural Revolution are condemned as ‘historical nihilism’ by the party.

China is attempting a precarious balancing act Expert comment NCapeling 9 March 2023

In its efforts to maintain ties with both Russia and Europe, China is having to wade through conflicting interests and rapidly changing sentiments.

Precisely how far China will go in supporting Russia has been one of the most important questions of the war in Ukraine.

On 20 February, US secretary of state Antony Blinken warned China may soon provide arms (‘lethal support’) to Moscow. But then, on 24 February – the anniversary of Russia’s invasion – China released a position paper calling for a political settlement to end the conflict, tellingly omitting any mention of its ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia.

China’s goal was to present itself as a neutral mediator. In fact, Beijing’s ties with Russia remain unchanged, even if this relationship has grown more exasperating for Chinese diplomats over the past year.

Their job is to continue striking a delicate balance, a task that is becoming increasingly difficult as Russian president Vladimir Putin doubles down on nuclear brinkmanship and reckless rhetoric.

Staying out of the Ukraine war

With Putin extolling the law of the jungle in its most brutal form, China must be careful not to involve itself too much in the conflict. After all, Russia is clearly losing, and China has high hopes of repairing ties with major European economies.

But Putin is of course keen to signal that China has his back. That is why he recently rolled out the red carpet for China’s top diplomat Wang Yi and then alluded to an (unconfirmed) upcoming visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping.

Such diplomatic developments allow him to present China’s ambivalent position as, in fact, an endorsement of the invasion. While the costs of aligning with Russia could easily outweigh the benefits for China, one must remember that China’s reasons for maintaining good relations with the Kremlin go beyond the war in Ukraine.

For starters, the two countries share a 2,672-mile (4,300-kilometer) border – roughly equivalent to the width of Europe – and the frontier’s exact location was not even finally settled until the beginning of this century, after generations of negotiations that included some 2,000 meetings.

Yet to this day, the spectre of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s and 1960s looms large on both sides and it is not likely to be exorcised anytime soon. With China focused on moves by the US and its allies in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific, it simply cannot afford sabre-rattling or unrest on its other borders.

Moreover, unlike the collective West, China’s foreign policy has always been shaped by interests rather than by values. Even with respect to Russia, the two countries’ bond is based mainly on shared resentment of US hegemony. By deepening their bilateral cooperation in recent years, they have been able to achieve a level of great-power status with which to counterbalance America.

But Putin’s misadventure in Ukraine has forced Xi and China’s newly minted Politburo to manage a new set of economic, financial, and political risks.

Russia’s war has left the West more firmly united than it has been in years. As China’s relations with the US have reached new lows, Chinese leaders want to avoid also alienating the European Union (EU), which is one of the country’s biggest trading partners.

This is why Xi and Chinese diplomats have been so careful not to accept the Kremlin’s talking points in full. Being isolated from the ‘collective West’ is not an attractive option for China, given its hopes of achieving a robust economic rebound after years of the zero-COVID policy.

Balancing Europe with the Global South

In seeking to keep diplomatic and trade channels open, China’s main tactic has been to reassure European countries that it will use its own ties with Russia to restrain Putin from deploying nuclear weapons.

At the same time, China is making a renewed push to strengthen its ties with the Global South where many countries do not see the war in Ukraine in the same stark moral terms as the West does.

The emphasis on energy and food security in China’s recent position paper may have struck a chord with developing countries that have been reeling from the war’s negative knock-on effects on their economies.

Beijing briefing: China aims for tech self-reliance The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Xi Jinping’s new appointments are tasked with a technology led recovery, but they face a daunting task to restore growth, writes Yu Jie.

The three-day state visit to Moscow by President Xi Jinping in March may have eclipsed the National People’s Congress in Beijing a fortnight earlier, but as Xi seeks to establish a new global order with China at its centre, the political events in the Great Hall of People provide an important insight into the country’s longer-term economic plans.

While a new cohort of cabinet members was appointed to sit on the State Council for the next five years, much of the attention remains on China’s economic stimulus plan to enable a rapid post-Covid recovery, as well as proposals to restructure central government.

Mountainous task

Three aspects of this year’s Congress deserve deeper scrutiny: Li Qiang’s confirmation as premier to succeed Li Keqiang’s decade-long subdued tenure under Xi; the extent to which Xi’s new cabinet sheds light on China’s economic and scientific self-reliance; and the unveiling of a major restructuring of central government administration in sectors such as finance and science.

China’s new premier initially faces the mountainous task of restoring growth and market confidence. During a press conference much shorter than his predecessor would hold, Li Qiang praised China’s private business sector and repeated the words ‘China remains open to foreign business’ to address the growing anxieties among foreigners and Chinese private entrepreneurs.

Beside the daunting task of economic recovery, Li Qiang faces another big challenge. Unlike his predecessors, he has never worked as a vice premier and overseen ministries under the State Council. The test for him will be to pursue a sound economic recovery plan while coordinating numerous central government agencies. He will also need to regulate relations among provincial heads who have a tendency to argue endlessly over the distribution of public finances.

Even though Xi is secure in his third term, his involvement in shaping and implementing macro-economic policies is keenly felt. Li Qiang made explicit the State Council under his leadership will be the chief implementor of all policies approved by the president. This is a less equal working partnership with Xi than his predecessors on the State Council enjoyed in the past.

Beijing published its official plan to restructure its central government administration announcing planned cuts of 5 per cent of its civil service. The newly established Central Commission on Finance intends to deal with systemic financial risks and to coordinate the financial regulatory bodies, central bank and Ministry of Finance. This is seen to reflect the Chinese leadership’s growing concern with the poor performance of local government loans and debt as well of the volatility of the property market, all of which threaten huge uncertainty for the economy.

As well as reorganizing the financial sector, Xi’s intention to pursue an integrated national strategy combining economic and scientific self-reliance has led to significant appointments following the Congress. As a starter, a new Central Commission for Science under the party leadership has been established. This commission will focus on providing a renewed impetus to accelerate China’s drive to achieve ‘scientific reliance’ and to ease the choke points in the economy, such as the supply chain for semiconductors.

It remains unclear who will head this new commission or who will be on it, however, as scant detail has been made public. It is seen as a direct response to the tough measures adopted by the United States designed to dent China’s ambitions of technology supremacy.

Departure from the past

New appointees to the Politburo come with substantial backgrounds in science as well as a solid track record of running state-owned enterprises. This is a departure from the past.

Instead of inserting financial specialists, Xi appointed two scientists, Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, as the vice premiers overseeing science, education and industrial policies. This signals that Xi intends to prioritize science and innovation during his third term. The appointment of technocrats to the State Council is seen as a move to strengthen innovation and prepare the Chinese economy, political system and society for potential external shocks.

India-China relations: Is the Quad the answer? Interview NCapeling 28 March 2023

The threat of China’s military aggression is being felt across the world, but this is a phenomenon India has been contending with for decades.

India’s border with China became the site of tense conflict in 2020, which led to India reinvesting in the Quad. Arzan Tarapore discusses key issues from his International Affairs article, such as how India is responding to increased aggression at the border and how a reinvigorated Quad may hold answers to balancing China in the Indo-Pacific.

What have India-China relations been like in the past?

Relations between India and China have varied over the decades. In the years following World War Two there was some hope they would find common cause in their international outlooks but that was quite quickly extinguished with their border war of 1962.

Since then, the two countries have oscillated between detente and tension. It took decades for them to normalize their relations and slowly build trust through several confidence-building agreements.

More recently it seemed the two countries were both willing to set aside their border dispute in order to profit from their burgeoning economic relationship – as, for both, there is no question development and economic growth is the primary national objective.

The question has been the extent to which their unresolved sovereignty and security issues undermine those goals as, at the same time, they both began paying more attention to the security of their territorial claims.

China in particular matched its explosive economic growth with startling military modernization and assertiveness. Its long-standing military doctrine and terrain advantages means it relies heavily on quality military infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau and it has accelerated the pace of those infrastructure upgrades and expansion.

In the 2010s, India belatedly began to improve its own transport infrastructure near the border, which threatened to reduce China’s military advantages. The earlier quiet on the border began to crack and China began launching border incursions with increasing frequency and scale.

This was a dynamic, iterative process, with incursions prompting India to accelerate its infrastructure development, which in turn probably prompted more incursions by China.

What happened around 2020 to change their relationship?

The cycle of competitive security policies on the border reached a tipping point in 2020 with Chinese incursions at multiple points simultaneously in Ladakh, apparently designed to establish a new status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian and Chinese-controlled territory.

The Indian political leadership played down the incursions but both Indian and Chinese militaries rushed to reinforce their positions near the border. They held multiple rounds of military talks which made halting progress.

On 15 June 2020, a skirmish resulted in the loss of 20 Indian troops, and an unknown number of Chinese troops. In the weeks that followed, both sides further reinforced their positions in a scramble to gain positional advantage.

How has India responded to China’s increasing military might?

The Indian government’s response to the Chinese landgrab was to threaten the entire bilateral relationship. In a reversal of decades of policy, it argued China had demolished the painstakingly constructed confidence-building measures on the border, and so the relationship could not continue as normal until the border crisis was resolved.

It imposed new restrictions on Chinese investment in India – even as overall trade continued to increase – and adopted a more assertive diplomatic posture.

Strategically, the 2020 border crisis had two major effects. First, it reinforced the Indian proclivity to see its northern borders as the primary threat to Indian national security.

India has heavily reinforced the border, reassigning some major formations and making numerous new investments in military capability to manage the threat. The significance of this however is that, in the context of budget scarcity, these military improvements come at the cost of potential increases in India’s capability in the Indian Ocean region – ultimately a more consequential zone of competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian government may yet change course and reallocate resources for power projection but, at this stage, I see no evidence of that.

The second major strategic effect of the crisis was to unleash Indian cooperation with its partners, especially the US and the reinvigorated Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

India has generally avoided formal international alliances, and the Quad was in hiatus for years – why has India invested in it now?

India had always been mindful not to embrace external partners too closely so as to maintain its freedom of action and to not provoke a Chinese reaction. But since the Ladakh crisis, New Delhi has a newfound willingness to work more closely with the US, Japan, and Australia – because it calculates correctly that these partnerships enhance its freedom to act, and that China has already adopted the aggressive posture India feared.

It is important to note however that the border crisis was not the only driver of India’s strategic adjustment. The crisis coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic which highlighted to India the ineffectiveness of existing international institutional arrangements.

For New Delhi, then, the twin crises of Ladakh and the pandemic stressed the need for new international arrangements, and the Quad offered the best combination of agility and capability to meet the most pressing challenges of the Indo-Pacific region.

What do the Quad partners hope to achieve in their renewed partnership?

Beginning in 2021, the Quad assumed far greater significance. The first national leader summits happened – which have since continued at regular intervals – and its members have all agreed to a continually expanding agenda of work.

It seeks to provide international public goods, and everything from climate action to telecommunications regulations. Critically, it has limited its security role to some niche and relatively unprovocative areas, such as humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness – issues which benefit the Indo-Pacific as a whole and do not intensify security competition. It has certainly eschewed military cooperation.

Interestingly, the four Quad countries have also separately accelerated their military cooperation, bilaterally, trilaterally, and even quadrilaterally. But that cooperation lies outside the formal mechanisms of the Quad.

What impact will these Quad actions have on Chinese aggression and the Indo-Pacific region?

This Quad approach, which I call ‘zone balancing’ in my article, is specifically designed to build the capacity and resilience of regional states, and to not inflame dyadic security competition.

The relatively uncompetitive character of these activities helps to deflate Chinese claims that the Quad is an antagonistic new bloc, and to ameliorate southeast Asian states’ concerns over the potential intensification of strategic competition.

But the Quad’s agenda is not fixed and not bounded. It has expanded year on year and may continue to extend into new areas. This gives it a degree of flexibility and coercive leverage as Beijing cannot be confident about the Quad’s future direction.

This slate of activities has a lot of utility in building the Quad’s regional legitimacy and habits of cooperation among its members. But it conspicuously does not address the region’s most pressing security challenges.

It is not, in its current form, equipped to manage the challenge of territorial disputes or aggression. So the Quad will not address India’s unresolved border dispute with China, potential crises over Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

I would argue, however, that the four members of the Quad have unparalleled advantages of capacity and geography. With further military cooperation, even outside the formal structures of the Quad, they have the potential to deter Chinese aggression, but that remains subject to their political preferences.

Will other countries in different parts of the world adopt similar balancing strategies?

Zone balancing could be an attractive strategy for other countries which want to either avoid the costs of hard military balancing, or to not provoke their rivals.

It has been used in the past – such as the Marshall Plan during the early Cold War – and I would not be surprised if other countries competing with China, or even China itself, use it.

Chinese supply chains could tip the balance in Ukraine Expert comment NCapeling 29 March 2023

Disrupting supply chains of critical minerals to those supporting Ukraine could give China a key advantage in its wider international trade competition.

Direct military intervention from China into the war on Ukraine, with Chinese troops and airmen appearing at the front line, would be highly escalatory and highly unlikely.

Equipping Russia with weapons and equipment is much more likely – if indeed it hasn’t already happened – and considering the West is supplying armaments to Ukraine, a joust with western technologies would be an interesting development to follow.

But if Chinese weapons underperform in the heat of battle, this may have implications for the current situation with Taiwan and the US, as a poor outcome on the Ukraine front could give the West more confidence over the tensions in the South China Sea. And the use of Chinese weapons in Ukraine would also be a feast for Western technical intelligence to capture.

Creating economic disruption

A much more likely development for China is to put in place export controls on critical minerals for Western powers supplying arms to Ukraine. This is a significant lever which China has used before during its fishing dispute with Japan in 2010 when hi-tech industrial production in Japan was affected by shortages of China-sourced critical minerals. Once normal supplies were resumed, Japan started to stockpile critical mineral reserves.

In October 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed a new statute enabling – when necessary – restriction of critical mineral supplies to third party nations intending to use them for defence and security applications, adding a ‘versatile weapon to Beijing’s arsenal’ in its trade competition with the US.

That legal control has been applied to Lockheed Martin production of Taiwan-bound F-35s and it applies not only to critical minerals mined on the Chinese mainland, but also to Chinese-controlled enterprises within international supply chains, of which there are many.

Responding to any such restrictions by opening up new mines and setting up new supply chains can take more than a decade, so the countries involved may need to start stockpiling critical materials as Japan has been doing since 2010.

Commodity markets also need to be ready for some interesting price wobbles – a persistent problem in critical minerals extractives investment as is overcoming environmental, social, and governance (ESG) challenges in this new game of global supplies.

In addition, those markets include the London Metal Exchange, now owned by Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing whose biggest shareholder is the Hong Kong government which is struggling to operate with complete independence from Beijing.

Splitting the West’s consensus

By extending the thinking on China’s potential to throttle global critical mineral supply chains and the ensuing latency of extraction from new mining resources, progress to the Paris Agreement 2050 goals on climate change will inevitably be affected.

Given there are no supply chain assurance mechanisms, such as distributed ledger technologies, in place within global mining supply chains, a key issue to overcome would be how the West assures China that critical mineral supplies are not destined for military applications.

But if China’s default position becomes a total refusal to supply client nations unless end-to-end assurances can be achieved to prove non-military use, the West’s aspirations regarding the Paris 2050 goals will certainly be put in jeopardy, or even made unachievable.

Celebrating Black History Month at Chatham House 24 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Chatham House

Join us for the ‘Beyond expectations: The impact and legacy of migration exhibition 2024’ exhibition and drinks reception.

About the Photographer  

Neil Kenlock, a photographer and media professional, has lived in London since arriving from Jamaica in 1963 to join his parents. He spent the early years of his career as a professional photographer, specialising in fashion, beauty, celebrities, and the cultural lifestyles of Black people in the UK. In the late 1960s and 1970s, he captured images of the UK Black Panther movement and documented demonstrations and anti-racism protests across the country.

“Neil Kenlock helps us to better understand the story of London’s Black communities and to appreciate the huge artistic and cultural impact they have had on all our lives. He is a significant photographer whose work documents a key chapter in London’s post-war history.” — Mike Seaborne, former curator of photographs at the Museum of London.

About the exhibition

This exhibition unveils a collection of photographs by Neil Kenlock, capturing Black British individuals who migrated from their homelands and settled in the UK. Curated by his daughter Emelia Kenlock, the series explores the theme of ‘expectations’ and its enduring legacy, featuring African and Caribbean subjects who brought their skills, passions, and dreams—contributions that have profoundly shaped British culture today.

Reflecting on the work, Kenlock stated: “Over 50 years since the concept of ‘black excellence’ first manifested, and more than 70 years since the Windrush, I truly hope this exhibition will add to the national cultural narrative and resonate with new audiences.” 

The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) has emerged to a pandemic and caused global public health crisis. Human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2(ACE2) was identified as the entry receptor for SARS-CoV-2. As a carboxypeptidase, ACE2 cleaves many biological substrates besides angiotensin II to control vasodilatation and vascular permeability. Given the nanomolar high affinity between ACE2 and SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, we investigated how this interaction would affect the enzymatic activity of ACE2. Surprisingly, SARS-CoV-2 trimeric spike protein increased ACE2 proteolytic activity ∼3-10 fold against model peptide substrates, such as caspase-1 substrate and Bradykinin-analog. The enhancement in ACE2 enzymatic function was mediated by the binding of SARS-CoV-2 spike RBD domain. These results highlighted the potential for SARS-CoV-2 infection to enhance ACE2 activity, which may be relevant to the cardiovascular symptoms associated with COVID-19.

The amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and frontotemporal dementia (FTD)–linked RNA-binding protein called FUS (fused in sarcoma) has been implicated in several aspects of RNA regulation, including mRNA translation. The mechanism by which FUS affects the translation of polyribosomes has not been established. Here we show that FUS can associate with stalled polyribosomes and that this association is sensitive to mTOR (mammalian target of rapamycin) kinase activity. Specifically, we show that FUS association with polyribosomes is increased by Torin1 treatment or when cells are cultured in nutrient-deficient media, but not when cells are treated with rapamycin, the allosteric inhibitor of mTORC1. Moreover, we report that FUS is necessary for efficient stalling of translation because deficient cells are refractory to the inhibition of mTOR-dependent signaling by Torin1. We also show that ALS-linked FUS mutants R521G and P525L associate abundantly with polyribosomes and decrease global protein synthesis. Importantly, the inhibitory effect on translation by FUS is impaired by mutations that reduce its RNA-binding affinity. These findings demonstrate that FUS is an important RNA-binding protein that mediates translational repression through mTOR-dependent signaling and that ALS-linked FUS mutants can cause a toxic gain of function in the cytoplasm by repressing the translation of mRNA at polyribosomes.

The Critical Transition: China’s Priorities for 2021 Research paper sysadmin 31 January 2017

This paper sets out the core issues for the Xi leadership, and focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president.

In 2017 Xi Jinping will complete his first full five-year term as China’s leader. Towards the end of the year, in autumn, the country is due to hold its 19th Party Congress. This major meeting usually marks the moment when the Communist Party of China (CPC) assesses its performance over the previous five years, sets out political goals for the coming five-year period and makes new appointments.

Xi Jinping’s leadership has been characterized by a number of significant domestic and international policy strategies. China’s economic growth rate is slowing, and the country’s economy is undergoing major restructuring. Export-led manufacturing growth and capital investment in fixed assets are now being replaced by consumer-led and service-dominated expansion. Meanwhile, the role of the CPC has been rearticulated with a major anti-corruption struggle since 2013 that has sought to clear away a raft of different networks and senior officials and connected business people. Xi has proved a more communicative, more populist and more nationalistic leader than his predecessors. He is also crafting an image of himself as a more visionary leader.

Internationally, China is striving for a relevance and role that it has never had before. Its reach is felt in international organizations, regionally, and through its economic and resource needs. It has a role in global affairs that embraces places once considered on its periphery, such as Latin America, the Arctic and Antarctic Circles, and the Middle East. Its impact in Asia is particularly striking, marked by activity in the South China Sea, and a new kind of relationship with Russia, India and the US. The major Belt and Road Initiative, in particular, has started to outline a new expansiveness in China’s relations with the outside world, despite the largely abstract nature of its overall shape and form at the moment.

The themes and viewpoints in this collection of essays are particularly geared towards those with an interest in policy engagement with China. While setting out the core issues for the Xi leadership, it also focuses on what these might mean for the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit world and with the election of Donald Trump as US president. As the UK seeks a new kind of relationship with a rapidly changing China, this group of expert opinions maps out the key markers in the run up to 2021, when China is due to celebrate achieving the first of its centennial goals: the delivery of middle-income status and a moderately prosperous society.

Brexit: Implications for EU–China Relations Research paper sysadmin 10 May 2017

For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties – with China’s relative focus on Germany becoming even more significant.

Summary

• The extent of current UK relations with China means that Brexit will notably reduce the scale and diversity of overall EU–China economic and commercial interactions. But the impact will vary across different areas.
• In policy terms, liberal voices on economic policy towards China will be somewhat weaker among the post-Brexit EU27. Brexit will not be the most important factor determining the future level of strategic coherence in EU policy towards China.
• The impact on post-Brexit EU27 trade with China will be felt both in the volume of trade and its composition. Following Brexit the EU will no longer be China’s largest trading partner.
• There will be some relative shift in Chinese investment in Europe away from the UK, though over time the impact of Europe-wide policy approaches to Chinese investment will have more impact than Brexit per se.
• EU–China educational exchanges will be weakened after Brexit, but inbound Chinese tourism will be less affected by Brexit.
• By 2025, the EU will have compensated for Brexit’s impact in some areas, but much depends on the EU’s own trajectory over the next decade.
• For Beijing, the EU–China relationship will take priority over UK–China ties. Within the EU, China’s relative focus on Germany will be even more significant.

Arguments Over Innovation Capacity Miss How Much the US and China Are Intertwined Expert comment sysadmin 30 May 2018

Most discussions of current US–China trade tensions fundamentally misrepresent the globalized nature of innovation.

Among the many issues at play in the ongoing economic and trade tensions between the US and China are questions of technological capability and innovation.

Two of the main complaints in the US Section 301 report were that American companies have been forced to transfer technology to China and been the subject of cyber espionage. The presentation of the issues in this report has been disputed, but behind it lies concern in the US that Chinese innovative and technological capability is catching up with that in the US, thanks partly to the support of state policies set out in the Made in China 2025 initiative.

One important feature of the package of measures announced by the US last month is that it was designed to contain China’s technological development as much as to reduce the trade deficit, even though the latter has been the focus of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric.

(Some have cast doubt on this picture of Chinese innovation, suggesting that China is more of a ‘fat tech dragon’ whose massive inputs into research and development do not translate into real innovative capacity.)

The problem with the debate comparing Chinese and American technological capability is that it misunderstands or misrepresents the globalized nature of innovation in today’s world.

Contrary to the economic nationalist rhetoric emanating mainly from Washington, and to a lesser extent from Beijing, the US and China are not two separate economies competing for economic hegemony. As part of the globalization of manufacturing and production over the last 40 years and the more recent globalization of consumption, the shape and structure of innovation has also changed.

As we argue in a new paper, the key to understanding this is to think of innovation as being carried out through global or transnational networks linking economic actors, not within separated economies. What the recent phase of globalization has demonstrated is that innovation is achieved most effectively and efficiently when those engaged in innovation are connected not just within national borders but across them.

China has become integrated into these global innovation networks in ways which reflect its relative strengths and weaknesses in research and development. China’s extensive manufacturing ecosystem has enabled its companies to perform well in production-related and efficiency-driven innovation. Moreover the rapid growth in its large and dynamic consumer market provides fertile ground for consumer-related innovation by Chinese and foreign-invested enterprises alike. The rapidly increasing talent pool in China also provides additional human capital for innovation and technology.

Apart from the increased emphasis by Chinese enterprises on innovation, multinationals have also been stepping up their research and development (R&D) efforts in China. These now consitute a significant part of China’s R&D landscape, and are an increasingly important part of the global innovation by multinationals.

Things are of course changing. China’s overall innovation capacity is improving, and there are concerns in both in the US and Europe that Chinese policy is moving backwards towards the promotion of ‘indigenous innovation’ – or self-reliant innovation – and away from openness. In other words, we may be seeing a more ‘techno-nationalist’ China as well as a protectionist US.

China has also been criticized for inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, though the establishment of special courts for such disputes marks a commitment to improve – and the rights of Chinese companies increasingly need protection too.

As the benefits of globalization increasingly come under question, and with some degree of nationalist political pressure in both the West and China, it is not going to be possible – or politically desirable – to do away with national borders when it comes to innovation. But at the same time, the extent to which businesses and consumers have globalized means that fully ‘indigenous’ innovation is not possible, even if it were politically desirable.

EU-China innovation relations, as well as those between Washington and Beijing, therefore need careful management. But both Americans and Europeans should have more confidence in their innovation capability, given the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese innovation.

Americans and Europeans should acknowledge and promote the opportunities that come from globally networked innovation processes. Taking advantage of the comparative advantage of all the players in these networks means working with China as an innovation partner.

China: End of the Reform Era 20 July 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The speaker will argue that China’s reform era is ending, and that core factors which characterized it - including political stability, ideological openness and rapid economic growth - are unravelling.

Since the 1990s, Beijing’s leaders have firmly rejected any fundamental reform of their authoritarian one-party political system, even as a decades-long boom has reshaped China’s economy and society. On the surface, their efforts have been a success, but Carl Minzner says a closer look at China’s reform era reveals a different truth.

He outlines how over the past three decades, a frozen political system has fuelled both the rise of entrenched interests within the Communist Party and the systematic underdevelopment of institutions of governance among state and society at large. Economic gaps have widened, social unrest has worsened and ideological polarization has deepened.

The speaker will discuss how China’s leaders are attempting to address these looming challenges, including institutional reforms and a shift back towards single-man rule. The speaker will also consider the question of regime stability given that China’s era of ‘reform and opening up’ is ending and there is now a renewed uncertainty over Beijing’s future.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

China Needs to Make the Belt and Road Initiative More Transparent and Predictable Expert comment sysadmin 29 April 2019

The global infrastructure project must move beyond mish-mash of opaque bilateral deals

As China welcomes dozens of world leaders to Beijing for its second Belt and Road forum, it has one simple aim: relaunching President Xi Jinping’s controversial global infrastructure drive.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse.

Xi will stress sustainable financing and transparency this week, amid the usual talk of ‘win win’ cooperation. Yet BRI’s problems are structural, not presentational. For any pledges to be meaningful, China must move beyond its present mish-mash of opaque, bilateral deals.

After bad headlines last year, BRI has in fact enjoyed a good run in recent weeks. Malaysia announced it would resume a previously cancelled high-speed rail project, while Italy’s decision to join up last month marked a further European incursion. Indeed, if attendance is any guide to success, BRI looks in fine fettle. The first forum in 2017 attracted 29 world leaders. China says 37 will turn up this week. Phillip Hammond, UK chancellor, arrives hunting deals too, just a day after news that Chinese technology group Huawei will be allowed to help build 5G networks in Britain.

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of President Xi’s pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation.

The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China ‘traps’ its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka. These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances.

The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1 trillion; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

BRI’s third and most important challenge is its muddled organization. Despite BRI’s image as a centrally run mega-project, China has allowed many deals to be struck locally, via a mix of state-backed companies, public sector banks and freewheeling regional governments. And it is here that the problems began.

Infrastructure deals are notoriously complex, especially for transnational projects like high-speed rail. Renegotiations are common, even for experienced bodies like the World Bank. Yet BRI has repeatedly seen terms negotiated behind closed doors, in countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan, come unstuck in the face of public outcry.

Rather than seeking to trap others with debt, China’s central government more often has to step in to fix dubious projects agreed by underlings lower down the chain.

These negotiations go one of two ways. Either China’s partners complain and win terms, as was true in Malaysia and in Myanmar over a multibillion-dollar deep-sea port. Or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the renegotiations go in China’s favour, but at the cost of accusations of debt trickery. In both cases China looks bad.

Speaking last year, Xi responded to criticism of BRI by describing it as ‘an open platform for cooperation’. Yet, so far, he has proved resistant to the step that would deliver on that vision — namely turning BRI into an institution with open standards and international partners.

The reasons for his reluctance are obvious. Ending BRI’s reliance on loose bilateral deals would limit Beijing’s room for geopolitical manoeuvre. Yet what might be lost in political flexibility could easily be gained in economic credibility, while avoiding some of the painful renegotiations that have dogged many BRI projects.

At a time when China’s economy is slowing and its current account surplus is shrinking, formalising and institutionalising, BRI could also help avoid wasting scarce public resources on white elephant projects. China even has an easy template in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Beijing-based institution that has won plaudits for its project quality and openness since it started in 2016.

Whichever model is chosen, a dose of Chinese-style central planning is called for, along with more openness. Without it, the oddly chaotic and decentralised model pioneered in BRI’s first five years is unlikely to help the project thrive over the next five.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

China's Evolving Economic Relations with North Africa: Before and After COVID-19 10 September 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 August 2020 Online

China’s economic presence across North Africa has grown in recent years. The global power has forged close economic relationships with Egypt and Algeria, while also continuing to develop ties with Morocco and Tunisia.

Beijing, which views the region as a geostrategic intersection between Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa, has primarily focused its efforts on developing bilateral relations, while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF).

All countries of the region have agreed to participate in China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), which has raised concerns among Western powers. As North African countries grapple with fiscal constraints as part of the fallout from COVID-19 (and the oil price drop for hydrocarbon exporters such as Algeria), it is yet to be seen whether China’s ambitions and relations within the region will continue to develop at the same pace going forward.

In this webinar, organized by Chatham House’s MENA and Asia-Pacific Programmes, experts will discuss the evolving economic relationship between China and North African states, and explore the impact of China’s pandemic diplomacy across the region.

How asymmetric are economic relations between China and North African states? Which sectors are most important, and what are the prospects for China to develop the region’s digital and healthcare infrastructure? Will China’s increasing economic interests necessitate an increasing political and security engagement? Should North African states be wary of Chinese loans? What is the public opinion of China’s economic presence in North Africa? Have Chinese ‘soft power’ efforts helped to bolster economic (and political) ties? What will be the likely fallout of COVID-19 on BRI and infrastructure projects in the region?

You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.

Policy for Recovery in Africa: Rethinking Energy Solutions for Universal Electricity Access 10 December 2020 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 November 2020 Online

Approximately three quarters of Africa’s population do not have access to clean cooking fuel and face costs to their health. Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge this gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

Speakers explore policy opportunities to bridge the energy access gap, the key barriers that remain and the transformative potential of energy transition in delivering sustainable access for all.

African countries face an uphill battle as they confront the shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, seeking recovery in the context of global socio-economic difficulty and fragmented geopolitics.

With deficits in terms of governance, public health systems, social protection, and basic service delivery presenting challenges even before the outbreak, careful analysis and creative evidence-based policy solutions, as well as emphasis on implementation, will be crucial if Africa is to progress towards the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

The Policy for Recovery in Africa series brings together expert speakers and decision makers to examine and exchange on key challenges, potential solutions, and approaches for implementation.

The energy access gap in Africa presents one of the most serious obstacles to the long-term pandemic recovery effort, with almost half of the continent’s population estimated to still lack access to electricity, creating a negative annual GDP impact estimated to be over 25 billion USD.

Nancy Pelosi in Taiwan: What lies ahead for China and the US? Expert comment GBhardwaj 3 August 2022

Chatham House experts examine the implications for Taiwan, China and the United States of Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island.

China’s fading ties with Washington?

Dr Yu Jie

US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s, visit to Taiwan has plunged China-US relations into a new low as the reservoir of trust forged between the two sides over the last 40 years appears to be almost exhausted.

However, her move will likely not result in the full-scale crisis across the Taiwan strait that some hawkish voices in both Beijing and Washington believe. Instead, Beijing will most likely offer a combination of military posturing toward the US navy and economic sanctions on Taiwanese agricultural and manufacturing products in order to send a clear bellwether to any future potential visits by high-level Western political figures.

Neither Beijing nor Washington has declared a willingness to change the current status quo as the present impasse benefits both governments – but for different reasons. For China, the best approach is to reach a military and economic capability that prevents US engagement with Taiwan without the use of force. For the US, the strategic ambiguity under the Taiwan Relations Act remains an effective card to counter China’s growing military influence in the Indo-Pacific and keep itself relevant within the region as a security guarantor. Yet, both sides have decided to kick the issue of Taiwan’s status down the road, believing that time is ultimately on their side.

Despite a chorus of nationalistic rhetoric, China will be careful not to stumble into an accidental conflict which risks colossal damage on all fronts. Chinese President, Xi Jinping, must weigh all of the options before him as Beijing cannot afford to be perceived as unilaterally seeking to change what it agreed with the US back in 1979 when ties were re-established. If that happens, it will provoke the US political establishment to reach a unanimous agreement to change its ‘One China Policy’ and, ahead of the 20th Communist Party Congress where Xi is expected to be crowned for a historic third term, the last thing he wants is an unnecessary conflict with Taiwan.

The road to escalation?

Dr Bill Hayton

Beijing has chosen to take issue over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in a way that it did not do for other recent US Congressional visits to the island. Several high-ranking US senators visited in April and May this year yet none of these visits triggered the prospect of a cross-strait crisis. So why has Beijing chosen to turn Pelosi’s visit into a stand-off?

Pelosi’s visit is part of a performance in which both actors – the US and China – are playing primarily for their domestic audiences. This comes at a time when ruling circles in Beijing are preparing for the five-yearly Communist Party Congress. Amid a slowing economy and successive COVID-19 variants, Xi Jinping cannot afford to look weak as he prepares the ground for his third term of office. Meanwhile, the US, represented either by President Joe Biden or House Speaker Pelosi, cannot back down at this point without looking weak itself.

Both sides have moved military assets into strategic positions near Taiwan to demonstrate their resolve. Neither side wants confrontation yet neither wishes to be humiliated. Currently, Pelosi’s visit, amid posturing by China, will make the US appear strong, but the consequences are likely to play out over a longer period. Xi Jinping will need to appear to have recaptured the initiative between now and the congress in the autumn when the risk of an incident will be at its greatest.

Taiwan controls several isolated islands that could be pressured by Chinese forces in the event of a future crisis. The Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos lie just a few miles off the coast of the mainland and have been at the centre of previous confrontations. There are also two other points of concern. Pratas Island – known as Dongsha – sits halfway between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Itu Aba – known as Taiping – is the largest of the Spratly Islands in the centre of the South China Sea. All would be vulnerable to an attack by the People’s Liberation Army, the principal military force of China, and the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.

A military confrontation between China and the US over Taiwan, or further south in the South China Sea, would have major impacts on regional and global trade. An estimated $300 billion worth of trade passes through the area every month. Japan and South Korea depend heavily on flows of oil and gas through the sea. Exports from Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines would also be heavily affected by disruptions to shipping, increased insurance costs and interruptions in inflows of raw materials. The impact on a world economy already suffering major disruption because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the lingering effects of COVID-19 would indeed be stark.

Is a shift in US policy on the cards?

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan will undoubtedly be seen as a provocation by Beijing – even if it should not be. Pelosi’s trip to the Indo-Pacific, which also includes visits to Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea and Japan, comes at a time of growing tension between the US and China in the region.

It also comes at a time when the divide among Washington’s foreign policy elite is growing, with some arguing that it is time to abandon the country’s policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’, where it refrains from stating how it would react were China to openly and deliberately attack Taiwan. Indeed, recent statements by President Joe Biden have raised questions about whether the US is set to make a policy change. But, since both its ‘One China Policy’ and policy of strategic ambiguity have been largely successful, it would be wise for the US to maintain them.

During her visit, Pelosi is likely to reaffirm the US’ high regard for Taiwan’s democracy and embrace the language of shared values. She has embraced Biden’s framing of international relations as a contest between democracies and autocracies. This alone will continue to exacerbate tensions. It would be a mistake, though, to signal a major policy change away from strategic ambiguity and towards strategic clarity on Taiwan’s status. Even if the US decides later to embrace a policy shift of this size, such a message should be carefully considered and communicated clearly, and not by chance.

Congress has an important role to play but President Joe Biden and his national security team should make the final decision on US policy towards Taiwan. Getting the signals right in international politics is a key part of deterrence and, especially in East Asia, deterring both China and Taiwan’s ambitions is essential. 

Increasing insecurity in the region?

Dr John Nilsson-Wright and Ben Bland

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan has provoked mixed responses from US allies across Asia.

For Japanese policymakers, the Taiwan issue is connected to the wider issue of regional security. Fears that a military conflict over the island will inevitably draw Japanese self-defense forces into a shooting war with China – a development that is neither formally mandated under the terms of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty nor necessarily constitutionally sanctioned – explains the concerns in Tokyo.

While the Japanese government of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is increasingly worried about China’s growing military presence in the East and South China Seas, Japan’s heavy trade dependence on China and the country’s economic and security vulnerabilities make it imperative to avoid any further escalation of tensions.

Given Tokyo’s non-recognition policy towards Taiwan, Japanese ties with Taipei are handled informally by politicians of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rather than at cabinet or foreign ministry level, and in recent weeks and months there has been an increase in visits by cross party delegations from Japan.

The death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as removed from public life a vocal advocate in support of enhanced ties between Tokyo and Taipei, but with public opinion in Japan increasingly tilting in an anti-Chinese direction, and with younger politicians favouring a more combative approach towards Beijing, there is a risk that the government will face pressure at home to toughen its language on Taiwan. Bolstering deterrence through increased military cooperation among allies, along with a graduated increase in defence spending, is the best way of limiting risk over Taiwan.

Nevertheless, privately, many officials in Tokyo are likely to have viewed the Pelosi visit as an unhelpful intervention and will be puzzled and perhaps frustrated by the apparent inability of the Biden administration to persuade the US Speaker of the House of Representatives to cancel her visit.

In South Korea, the government of President Yoon Suk-yeol, faces similar pressures to Japan, given the heavy dependence of the South Korean economy on China for trade and investment opportunities.

Pelosi’s visit to the region will strikingly not include meetings with either the president or Foreign Minister Park Jin. With Yoon on vacation and Park attending the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia, the absence of high profile engagements for Pelosi might seem to be a purely practical matter, but Seoul may also be seeking to avoid antagonizing Beijing at a time when the Chinese government is seeking to pressure South Korea not to enhance alliance coordination with the United States and Japan or to expand its commitment to the controversial Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system.

As in Japan, public opinion in South Korea is increasingly anti-Chinese, but the logic of regional economic and security uncertainty, requires the Yoon government to avoid getting trapped in a worsening stand-off with Beijing.

Japan’s G7 leadership: Defending the liberal order amid crisis 28 February 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Online

How G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

In May 2023 Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima, where leaders of the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany and Italy come to discuss the most urgent challenges facing the world.

This year’s summit takes place against a backdrop of continued global economic and political instability from the war in Ukraine to intensifying competition between China and the West.

The speakers discuss Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s priorities at the summit and consider how G7 countries should best respond to global economic and security challenges in order to defend the liberal international order.

This event is the third of a three-part series held in partnership with Japan House London.

Watch the first event which looked at Africa-Japan relations here, and the second event, on the UK and Japan’s engagement with Southeast Asia, here.

US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?

Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.

The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?

Ethics of dealing with authoritarians 28 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 March 2023 Chatham House

How can democracies simultaneously defend human rights and promote open societies while still engaging with leaders from non-democratic states as strategic allies?

In 2022, the Biden administration called upon the world’s democracies to unite against a rising tide of autocracy. Through its messaging, conferences, and op-eds, the US and its allies presented the public with a binary choice: democracy or autocracy.

But in today’s world, and in the practice of international relations, the choice is rarely this simple.  

Joel Rosenthal, president of Carnegie Council, joins Chatham House to discuss how democracies and multilateral institutions can leverage ethics as a tool to assess concerns and trade-offs when engaging with illiberal actors.

Can democracies afford to be adversarial with certain countries or overly selective in cooperation when facing global-scale challenges such as climate change and the emergence of AI?

How can democracies simultaneously defend human rights and promote open societies while still engaging with leaders from non-democratic states as strategic allies?

China’s renewed influence in the Gulf Interview LJefferson 14 April 2023

By disseminating narratives of its own supremacy, China deepened relations with the Gulf during the COVID-19 pandemic.

China has used the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to rebrand its international role as a ‘responsible’ and ‘great’ power by voicing narratives of its own supremacy to regions like the Gulf.

In this interview, Julia Gurol-Haller draws on her International Affairs article to trace how the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran have responded to China’s narratives, with key implications for Sino-US competition and regional autonomy for the Gulf. This illustrates how words and narratives help bolster authoritarian power.

What have the China-Gulf relations looked like in context of the COVID-19 pandemic?

Bilateral relations between China and the Gulf countries have grown in importance over the past decade, particularly since 2013 with the Belt and Road Initiative. The Gulf plays a crucial role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its westward expansion, owing to its favourable geographic position and proximity to the Red Sea. 

In the beginning, transregional relations were mainly economic partnerships since China has a growing appetite for oil and gas and the Gulf monarchies fulfil these needs. China is one of the most important markets for Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to export these goods.

Over time, we’ve seen the Sino-Gulf relations expand beyond just economic ties and towards policy fields like security and cultural relations. While these processes were already in place, they were boosted during the COVID-19 pandemic, not only in material terms but also in respect of Chinese attempts to advance its soft power, leverage, and influence in the Gulf region.

When COVID-19 began to ravage the globe, China took that window of opportunity to rebrand its international role. Through efforts such as mask diplomacy, vaccine diplomacy and the strategic diffusion of narratives, China tried to project its image as a ‘global saviour’ and a responsible and great power.

The Gulf monarchies and Iran were among the main target audiences for this public diplomacy campaign. So, the COVID-19 pandemic has been a catalysing factor for deepening relations between China and the Gulf region.

What exactly are narratives and why are they important in China’s approach to the Gulf states during the COVID-19 pandemic?

Through diplomatic statements, news outlets and social media, China has engaged in, what I call, a ‘narrative power-play’. To understand what that is, we need to understand the political importance of narratives.

Narratives are deliberately constructed by (political) actors to influence a certain target audience. In authoritarian contexts, narratives are a useful resource for political actors to bind audiences to their rule and to appeal to people’s emotions by strategically projecting certain images. 

Ultimately, this creates linkages via attraction or persuasion that enhance the actors’ legitimacy and consolidate their power. So, in the narrative power-play, authoritarian leaders function as ‘storytellers-in-chief’, shaping reality in their favour.

What kinds of narratives has China disseminated to the Gulf region in backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic?

There are two sets of narratives that China disseminated to the Gulf: narratives of supremacy and narratives of a new world order.

China disseminates narratives of systemic supremacy which include praising the overall efficiency of its governance structures. For instance, the Chinese political system is presented as highly efficient and centralized. It has high amounts of ‘state capacity’ for mobilization and the ability to ‘quickly adapt’ to changing situations.

Narratives of performative supremacy refer to the tangible performance of the Chinese Communist Party or China as a whole, such as economic performance, performance in governance, provision of public goods or pandemic response. The performance narratives also highlight the ‘incredible logistical efficacy’, the highly professionalized medical sector and the innovative scientific sector. 

Narratives of normative supremacy are often informed by nationalist notions such as the reclaiming of China’s rightful position in the world and negative feelings towards Western imperial powers who are depicted as having inflicted great pains on China during the ‘century of humiliation’. Overall, these narratives serve to depict China as a responsible, caring and loyal world power that helps other states. The whole idea of mask diplomacy was also carved into that notion of China’s normative supremacy.

Together, China has used these narratives to construct the idea of a new world order in which China is believed to play a much bigger role. The world order narratives are closely linked to stories about the failure of the Western system and show the intertwinement of practices of othering and self-glorification that can also be observed in Chinese official media narratives in other contexts such as diplomatic stand-offs with the United States.

What do these narratives tell us about how China understands the world order?

The narratives China disseminated to the Gulf region show that in the Chinese understanding of politics, the world order is in flux and undergoing major power reconfigurations. For China, this implies a window of opportunity to position itself as a responsible and great power and move from the side-lines to the centre stage of international politics.

This is a trend that has been long in the making in Chinese foreign policy. For instance, the launch of the Chinese Global Security Initiative or the recent brokering of the Iran-Saudi rapprochement agreement show clearly that China is becoming much more than an economic powerhouse and is adopting a more proactive foreign policy.

During the recent state visit of Xi Jinping to Moscow, he said at one point that China stands ready to ‘safeguard (…) the international order underpinned by international law ’. These examples are quite telling regarding the role China ascribes itself on the international stage.

How have the Gulf countries responded to China’s power narratives during the COVID-19 pandemic?

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Iran all picked up the narrative of China’s superior performance during the global crisis. That was a unified response, but they did that to different degrees and by highlighting different aspects.

The strongest reproduction of Chinese narratives can be found in the Emirati media. They buy into the story of the COVID-19 pandemic as evoking a global power shift, which includes a decline of US hegemony and a corresponding rise of China. The explicit wording of Chinese narratives such as ‘community of shared future of humankind’ has been picked up word-for-word by some Emirati media outlets.

Iranian newspapers have also reproduced Chinese narratives. However, the difference is that they also praise China’s unconditional solidarity during the COVID-19 pandemic, which is believed to be superior and more ‘responsible’ than the ostensible individualism of the West. This tells us a lot about Iran’s relationship with the West and how China is believed to be a lifeline or anchor for stability.

Saudi Arabia has been more cautious in reproducing the Chinese narratives. While it does not contest China’s role in containing the COVID-19 pandemic, Saudi Arabia has adopted a more inward-looking perspective, stressing its own role as a responsible regional player during the pandemic.

This might be explained by the kingdom’s own regional leadership claims and the attempt to use the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen this role. The most pressing questions seem to be whether the post-COVID world will be a multipolar order, and what Saudi Arabia’s own position within it might be. 

Yue Chen
May 1, 2007; 6:812-819
Research

Ilka Wittig
Jul 1, 2007; 6:1215-1225
Research

Ivan Matic
Jan 1, 2008; 7:132-144
Research

Amelia C. Peterson
Nov 1, 2012; 11:1475-1488
Technological Innovation and Resources

Yu Xue
Sep 1, 2008; 7:1598-1608
Research

Martin R. Larsen
Jul 1, 2005; 4:873-886
Technology

N. Leigh Anderson
Nov 1, 2002; 1:845-867
Reviews/Perspectives

Staphylococcus aureus adhesion to the host's skin and mucosae enables asymptomatic colonization and the establishment of infection. This process is facilitated by cell wall-anchored adhesins that bind to host ligands. Therapeutics targeting this process could provide significant clinical benefits; however, the development of anti-adhesives requires an in-depth knowledge of adhesion-associated factors and an assay amenable to high-throughput applications. Here, we describe the development of a sensitive and robust whole cell assay to enable the large-scale profiling of S. aureus adhesion to host ligands. To validate the assay, and to gain insight into cellular factors contributing to adhesion, we profiled a sequence-defined S. aureus transposon mutant library, identifying mutants with attenuated adhesion to human-derived fibronectin, keratin, and fibrinogen. Our screening approach was validated by the identification of known adhesion-related proteins, such as the housekeeping sortase responsible for covalently linking adhesins to the cell wall. In addition, we also identified genetic loci that could represent undescribed anti-adhesive targets. To compare and contrast the genetic requirements of adhesion to each host ligand, we generated a S. aureus Genetic Adhesion Network, which identified a core gene set involved in adhesion to all three host ligands, and unique genetic signatures. In summary, this assay will enable high-throughput chemical screens to identify anti-adhesives and our findings provide insight into the target space of such an approach.

Despite its major importance in human health, the metabolic potential of the human gut microbiota is still poorly understood. We have recently shown that biosynthesis of Ruminococcin C (RumC), a novel ribosomally synthesized and posttranslationally modified peptide (RiPP) produced by the commensal bacterium Ruminococcus gnavus, requires two radical SAM enzymes (RumMC1 and RumMC2) catalyzing the formation of four Cα-thioether bridges. These bridges, which are essential for RumC's antibiotic properties against human pathogens such as Clostridium perfringens, define two hairpin domains giving this sactipeptide (sulfur-to-α-carbon thioether–containing peptide) an unusual architecture among natural products. We report here the biochemical and spectroscopic characterizations of RumMC2. EPR spectroscopy and mutagenesis data support that RumMC2 is a member of the large family of SPASM domain radical SAM enzymes characterized by the presence of three [4Fe-4S] clusters. We also demonstrate that this enzyme initiates its reaction by Cα H-atom abstraction and is able to catalyze the formation of nonnatural thioether bonds in engineered peptide substrates. Unexpectedly, our data support the formation of a ketoimine rather than an α,β-dehydro-amino acid intermediate during Cα-thioether bridge LC–MS/MS fragmentation. Finally, we explored the roles of the leader peptide and of the RiPP precursor peptide recognition element, present in myriad RiPP-modifying enzymes. Collectively, our data support a more complex role for the peptide recognition element and the core peptide for the installation of posttranslational modifications in RiPPs than previously anticipated and suggest a possible reaction intermediate for thioether bond formation.

Lys234 is one of the residues present in class A β-lactamases that is under selective pressure due to antibiotic use. Located adjacent to proton shuttle residue Ser130, it is suggested to play a role in proton transfer during catalysis of the antibiotics. The mechanism underpinning how substitutions in this position modulate inhibitor efficiency and substrate specificity leading to drug resistance is unclear. The K234R substitution identified in several inhibitor-resistant β-lactamase variants is associated with decreased potency of the inhibitor clavulanic acid, which is used in combination with amoxicillin to overcome β-lactamase–mediated antibiotic resistance. Here we show that for CTX-M-14 β-lactamase, whereas Lys234 is required for hydrolysis of cephalosporins such as cefotaxime, either lysine or arginine is sufficient for hydrolysis of ampicillin. Further, by determining the acylation and deacylation rates for cefotaxime hydrolysis, we show that both rates are fast, and neither is rate-limiting. The K234R substitution causes a 1500-fold decrease in the cefotaxime acylation rate but a 5-fold increase in kcat for ampicillin, suggesting that the K234R enzyme is a good penicillinase but a poor cephalosporinase due to slow acylation. Structural results suggest that the slow acylation by the K234R enzyme is due to a conformational change in Ser130, and this change also leads to decreased inhibition potency of clavulanic acid. Because other inhibitor resistance mutations also act through changes at Ser130 and such changes drastically reduce cephalosporin but not penicillin hydrolysis, we suggest that clavulanic acid paired with an oxyimino-cephalosporin rather than penicillin would impede the evolution of resistance.

G20's lack of progress highlights challenge for COP26 Expert comment NCapeling 1 November 2021

A positive outcome from the G20 summit was committing to end international financing for coal projects but, on other issues, the communique was ultimately weak.

Success at Glasgow depends on bridging fault lines

Renata Dwan

The G20 summit’s lack of progress on climate highlights the scale of the challenge – and the stakes – for COP26.  The countries responsible for 80 per cent of global emissions recognized but failed to agree concrete action to limit global warming to 1.5C.

The leaders’ gathering reveals multilateralism’s fault lines. One is the tension between domestic politics and international priorities, reflected in the lack of ambition to reduce coal dependency.  The second is the tension between industrialized and developing states over responsibility for delivering global goods.

The G20 failed to endorse the G7’s pledge to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 or to accelerate the mobilization of previously agreed climate financing. Success at Glasgow – and beyond – will depend on the extent to which these fault lines can be bridged.

Communique’s language was weak

Professor Tim Benton

A positive outcome on climate from the G20 summit was the commitment to end international financing for coal projects by the end of 2021. This is a win for the climate and for the G20-host, Italy.

The references to 1.5 degrees and the commitment to taking further action this decade were also important, and help lay the groundwork for COP26. On the downside, the communique’s language on phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and coal domestically was very weak.

The G20 summit should be regarded as the next step – it is crucial world leaders accelerate their efforts at COP26 in Glasgow to avert climate catastrophe and keep 1.5 degrees alive.

Platitudes and vague plans on pandemic preparedness

Robert Yates

As G20 leaders head to Glasgow to tackle the evolving climate crisis, they leave Rome having failed, yet again, to take serious action to end the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.

Despite the obvious urgency to achieve universal vaccine coverage, their communique contains little more than platitudes and vague plans to prepare better for future pandemics. It is not as if they had not been briefed. 

In the run up to the G20, the leaders of the WHO, WTO, IMF, World Bank, former world leaders, Nobel laureates and the Pope, all highlighted the costs of ongoing vaccine inequity: five million deaths next year and $5.3 trillion dollars in lost economic output by 2026.

The ask was also straightforward: launch a massive airlift of unneeded vaccines from rich countries through COVAX, ramp up financing of the multilateral response and accelerate technology transfers to developing countries.

But on all these issues the wording of the communique is weak, with no numbers on vaccines or funding, no hard timescales and no urgency. This does not augur well for the COP-26 summit.

G20 communique is a launching pad

Dr Leslie Vinjamuri

The G20 might seem disappointing to some, but a lot will depend on expectations. If your starting point is a pandemic that has so far taken five million lives and driven a global economic crisis, and that both these crises are marked by deep inequality, then the measures adopted are bound to look insufficient. But if your starting point is 16 years of democracy in decline, rampant disinformation on issues of climate and public health, four years of failed international leadership during the Donald Trump presidency and, especially today, heightened tensions between the US and China, the world’s two greatest powers, then the fact that the G20 communique achieved as much as it has is remarkable.

Any written document that requires agreement between the US, UK, China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and the EU is necessarily going to be watered down.

But the principles are in the document, and mostly everyone turned up – if some by video. That is a good outcome for this kind of multilateralism in 2021. The G20 communique is a floor not a ceiling, and it’s a launching pad for activism and mobilisation by individual states, but also by corporates, civil society, and subnational actors. 

Now we need to hope that those on the right side of progress, whether on climate, health, or development, will use this language to drive forward concrete actions towards net zero, climate finance, vaccine distribution, and debt relief.

Specifics are for the most part missing

Creon Butler

This year’s G20 leaders’ summit marks a stark contrast with the past four years when much of the group’s energy was exhausted simply trying to maintain a consensus – in the face of opposition by a President Trump-led United States – on such issues as the importance of tackling climate change, the benefits of the rules-based multilateral trade system and the centrality of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the global financial safety net. 

By contrast, today’s G20 Rome Leaders’ declaration early on underlines ‘the crucial role of multilateralism in finding shared, effective solutions’. In two critical areas for the world economy – the global boost to liquidity from the general allocation of $650bn in Special Drawing Rights and the global tax deal focused on addressing challenges arising from digitalisation – this outlook has been translated into very substantial and concrete achievements announced earlier in the year.

Chatham House appoints new director and chief executive News release jon.wallace 5 April 2022

Bronwen Maddox will take up the role at the end of August, succeeding Dr Robin Niblett CMG.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) is delighted to announce that its new director and chief executive will be Bronwen Maddox, who joins from the Institute for Government.

Bronwen Maddox has been the director of the Institute for Government, an independent think tank based in London promoting better government, since September 2016. 

She joined the institute from the current affairs magazine Prospect, where she spent six years as editor and CEO.

Bronwen was previously foreign editor, chief foreign commentator and US editor at The Times, and before that, she ran award-winning investigations and wrote economics editorials for the Financial Times, after a career as an investment analyst in the City. She writes frequent op-ed columns for the Financial Times and broadcasts widely.

She is also visiting professor in the Policy Institute at King’s College London, a non-executive board member of the Law Commission, and has just been appointed a council member of Research England, one of the research councils of UK Research & Innovation.

Ms Maddox succeeds Dr Robin Niblett CMG who is standing down in the summer after 15 years in the role. She will take up the role at the end of August.

Chair of Chatham House, Sir Nigel Sheinwald said:

‘This is an exciting appointment for the future of Chatham House and for London as a global hub. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedented response of the rest of the world reminds us that organizations like Chatham House, with its outstanding record of independent analysis and new ideas on how to build a secure and prosperous world, are needed more than ever.

‘Bronwen Maddox has an international reputation as a compelling commentator and analyst on world affairs, with a proven ability to spot emerging issues and frame them in ways which will provoke intelligent debate and fresh thinking. She has provided successful and innovative leadership at the IFG, Prospect and The Times, and is committed to continuing to broaden Chatham House’s diverse appeal and impact. She is the ideal person to lead the institute into the next stage of its development at this crucial time for the future of international relations.’

Bronwen Maddox said:

‘I am honoured and delighted to become Chatham House’s next director. It’s a momentous period in international affairs and Chatham House, with its reputation for rigour, independence and expert analysis, has a unique role to play in assessing these changes and prompting solutions to confront them – as it shows every day. I look forward to the privilege of working with its teams, and the many others who have come together to advance its work.’

Sir Nigel also paid tribute to Dr Niblett:

‘Robin Niblett has transformed Chatham House in his fifteen years as its head. The institute’s research, activities and impact have grown considerably in that time thanks to Robin’s own high-quality commentary, his productive relationships with our stakeholders, partners, supporters and members and his commitment to the institute’s staff. He leaves an institute which has a much wider and fresher appeal and has strengthened London’s standing as a great centre for international affairs.’

Dr Niblett said:

‘This appointment is excellent news for Chatham House. Bronwen Maddox is ideally placed to ensure the institute continues to play its part in helping governments, business and civil society tackle the serious challenges we face, not just from the return of geopolitical competition and interstate conflict, but also from climate change, unsustainable economic activity and growing inequality, priorities for the institute that have been underlined by the COVID-19 pandemic.’

The UK must avoid conflict with Europe and China Expert comment NCapeling 10 October 2022

Liz Truss says she wants to take a tough line but any freedom to forge her own foreign policy is a casualty of the economic turmoil following her first budget.

The tax-cutting budget from new UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng was clearly not inhibited by any apparent concern for the markets’ response. But the interest rate rise it contributed to and the scepticism raining down on the Truss government should force a recognition that economic vulnerability now constrains what the UK tries to do abroad.

That would mean taking a more cautious approach than the new UK prime minister seems to want to adopt. The Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) may sit next to each other in Whitehall’s parade of 18th century buildings, but a huge gulf lies between them.

When talking to officials, it is striking how those in one building make decisions without reference to the other. Foreign policy is made with no consideration of the UK’s need to borrow money in the markets, and budgets are written with little calculation of the effect of decisions next door – although the Cabinet Office does at least try to reconcile these.

But that approach is a luxury which the budget response and the sharp rise in national debt it will bring makes no longer affordable.

Repairing EU trade relations is priority

The first lesson is that any worsening of trade relations with the European Union (EU) is not now something the UK can afford to contemplate. The markets would take an even dimmer view of national finances if the UK were to become embroiled in an even more fractious trade dispute with its closest and largest trading partner.

When campaigning for the Conservative party leadership, Liz Truss talked tough on the Northern Ireland protocol and her unwillingness to compromise much with the EU. Since she became prime minister, sounds from both the UK and EU have been much more conciliatory, with suggestions that a deal could be just a few details away.

And yet the Truss government is still pressing ahead with the controversial legislation which would enable the UK unilaterally to walk away from parts of the treaty it signed – the House of Lords will debate the bill and its most contentious measures, such as the extensive new powers it gives ministers, on 11 October.

But there are suggestions from officials that, although Truss would lose too much face by withdrawing the legislation, the government may choose not to contest any Lords amendments vigorously.

That would be wise. The prime minister should know the financial path she has chosen with her chancellor makes carrying out the threats of walking away from a deal too costly to afford. As it is, the markets are hardly looking with equanimity on the prospect of the UK borrowing £100 billion to shield consumers from rising gas prices.

A £43 billion package of proposed tax cuts with no explanation – yet – of how the government will pay for them would be even less comfortable were the UK to take such a hard line on the Northern Ireland protocol that it provokes a trade war with the EU. Brussels can also make those calculations and, for all the recent talk of concessions, is expected to hold fast to its new position.

For the same reasons, the UK cannot afford to talk about taking a tougher line on China – as the prime minister has already done – without clearly knowing what the economic impact would be and being sure voters are prepared to pay this price. Years of courting commercial links with China mean they now weave their way through the UK economy.

The dependence of universities on Chinese students and the income they bring is already well-known and heavily debated – but the exposure of the UK economy to digital technology and components from China is even greater, and China is now the largest source of imports for the UK with £63.6 billion or 13.3 per cent of all goods imports according to the Office for National Statistics.

Much of that was laptops, computers, telecoms and phones as well as toys and clothes; there are few households or offices that will not have these products. China is also the sixth largest destination for UK exports, with £18.8 billion or 5.8 per cent of goods exports, much of it machinery and cars.

Scottish Liberal Democrat peer Lord Purvis expressed concern at these figures because of the implication that the UK’s ability to take a tough line with China on human rights was now enormously circumscribed. And defence and intelligence chiefs are also warning of the UK’s vulnerability.

Taking a hard line needs context

There are signs the government is concerned enough to begin to map out this economic vulnerability but no signs that it yet has a full picture. Without knowing the economic hit of a frostier relationship, and confidence the House of Commons accepts it, Liz Truss would be brave to label China ‘a threat to national security’ – as her supporters indicated during the leadership campaign – when she updates the integrated review of defence and security in the coming months.

Of course, foreign policy should not be inspired by commercial concerns alone. There are wider reasons to develop a clearer China strategy to help lay out a more consistent future path. On his recent trip to East Asia, UK foreign secretary James Cleverly heard from UK partners that they were disconcerted by the lurch from George Osborne’s ‘golden years’ to the Truss charge of a China ‘threat’.

When Liz Truss was UK foreign secretary, some forecast she would pursue mercantilism given her focus on forging post-Brexit trade deals but, as it turned out, that was not the spirit of her tenure.

Independent Thinking: War in Ukraine, Congress in China Audio NCapeling 21 October 2022

The inaugural episode of our new podcast examines the latest developments surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Xi Jinping’s political report from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests examine latest developments surrounding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, as well as Xi Jinping’s political report from the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.  

Bronwen is joined by Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times, Orysia Lutsevych, head of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House, and Dr Yu Jie, senior research fellow in Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific programme.

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Rishi Sunak and the UK, John Kerry on COP27 Audio NCapeling 28 October 2022

The second episode of our new podcast examines the changes in the UK government as Rishi Sunak become prime minister and looks ahead to COP27 with John Kerry.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests discuss the arrival in Number 10 of Rishi Sunak, the UK’s youngest prime minister of modern times as well as its third of 2022, alongside analysing the Chatham House event with US Special Presidential Envoy on Climate John Kerry. 

Bronwen’s guests from Chatham House are John Kampfner, executive director of the UK in the World Initiative, Hans Kundani, associate fellow with the Europe programme, and Anna Åberg, research associate with the Environment and Society programme.

They are joined by Sir Simon Fraser, formerly of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Chatham House’s deputy chairman. 

Independent Thinking is a regular podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts to provide insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Lula wins in Brazil, US midterms Audio NCapeling 4 November 2022

The third episode of our new podcast analyses the results from the Brazil presidential election, and looks ahead to the crucial midterm elections in the US next week.

Bronwen Maddox and her guests examine the tight election result from Brazil and its impact on both the country and the region, and preview the US midterm elections being held on 8 November and the start of COP27.

In Brazil, former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva beat incumbent Jair Bolsonaro by the narrowest of margins. Meanwhile in the US, the Democrats are fighting to retain the House and Senate from a resurgent Republican Party still enamoured with Donald Trump.

Joining Bronwen Maddox this week are Leslie Vinjamuri, director of Chatham House’s US and Americas programme, Christopher Sabatini, senior fellow on Latin America in the same programme, and Ana Yang, executive director of Chatham House’s Sustainability Accelerator.

Independent Thinking: US midterms surprise, COP27 begins Audio NCapeling 11 November 2022

The fourth episode of our new podcast analyses early results from the US midterm elections and brings the latest insights from a crucial COP27.

The US midterm elections threw up some surprising results with the anticipated Republican ‘red wave’ failing to materialize. Meanwhile at COP27 in Egypt, world leaders met in the first week of the summit. What did their presence achieve?

To find out, returning to the podcast this week with Bronwen Maddox are Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the Chatham House US and Americas programme who was in Atlanta Georgia for the midterms, and Anna Aberg, research associate in the Environment and Society programme who is on the ground at COP27.

Joining them are Peter Trubowitz, professor of international relations and director of the Phelan US Centre at the London School of Economics and Antony Froggart, deputy director and senior research fellow in the Environment and Society programme.

Independent Thinking: Iran protests, Iraq's invasion legacy Audio NCapeling 17 November 2022

Episode five of our new weekly podcast has a Middle East focus with insights into what is driving the ongoing protests in Iran, and the progress of Iraq in the years since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Since September, Iran has been swept by thousands of women-led protests, demanding an end to the morality police and the even calling for the fall of the Islamic Republic.

Meanwhile at Chatham House this week saw our Iraq Initiative conference 2022, which delved heavily into the multiple challenges facing Iraq two decades on from the invasion which toppled Saddam Hussein.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week are the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa programme deputy director Dr Sanam Vakil and senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour, who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative. They are joined by Sanya Burgess, digital investigations journalist with Sky News.

COP27: What was achieved, and what needs to happen now Expert comment NCapeling 20 November 2022

Chatham House environment experts give their initial reaction to the end of COP27, examining how much progress was achieved, and the key issues still to be worked on.

Loss and Damage fund is a historic moment

Anna Aberg

COP27 will go down in history as the UN climate change conference where the Loss and Damage fund was agreed. After decades of pushing, this is a momentous victory for climate-vulnerable developing countries.

The shift in the conversation – and in the positions of developed countries – since COP26 is remarkable. It is critical parties continue to build on the positive momentum created in Sharm as challenging discussions on how the new loss and damage fund will work – and who will contribute to it financially – ensue.

Tim Benton

Overall COP27 was a hectic, sometimes chaotic, event. The COP advanced some matters but on others failed to drive ambition towards the sort of climate action required to keep alive the possibility of restricting climate change within the envelope of the Paris agreement.

Loss and Damage progressed but, especially in week two, the risk was of going backwards in this COP relative to COP26 in Glasgow. The final cover declaration managed to avoid the worst, but also avoided the best.

Notably disappointing was that, although food systems were much in debate unlike in previous COPs, there was still significant political resistance to fully adopting a systems approach. Globally, food systems emit about one-third of all greenhouse gasses, while poor diets – in rich and poor countries alike – are arguably the single biggest factor in ill-health and early death.

COP27 maintained a firm focus on supply-side solutions to tackle food insecurity, avoiding the politically more contentious demand-side issues of ensuring nutritious and sustainable diets for all.

Start of implementation phase demands renewed urgency

Bernice Lee

It has often been said climate action is moving from target-setting into the implementation phase. What COP27 shows is that, as the implementation phase begins, integrity and accountability will be ever more critical, as the voices of the vulnerable economies and the youth remind the world time and time again.

This compromised outcome is also a reminder that the delivery of climate action begins at home, as does the bread-and-butter politics of money and influence. It is significant the link between fossil energy and climate impacts has now been openly made in the international arena, regardless of whether it appeared in the final cover agreement.

As the dust settles, there will be many questions and reflection over tactics chosen by different parties and actors, and much to be learned that can help those pushing for more breakthrough moments at COP28.

Antony Froggatt

There was insufficient progress on the energy transition both in and around COP27. Few countries followed through on their promises to increase the ambition of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), although Australia and the European Union (EU) were rare exceptions among the developed countries.

Higher fossil fuel prices, due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can and should have resulted in an accelerated energy transition. Yet the language in the final decision around carbon reductions and energy at best repeats the language of COP26 and does not reflect the renewed urgency of the situation, stemming from accelerating climate impacts and the weaponization of fossil fuels in Russia’s conflict.

At COP28, parties to the UNFCCC will finalize a Global Stock Take which will include a review of national progress in meeting carbon abatement targets. This will be a key moment and unfortunately is likely to highlight once again how much faster the world needs to reduce its dependency on fossil fuels.

Fossil fuel discussions show failure of imagination

Glada Lahn

Overshadowed by the pain of developing country fuel importers and European attempts to replace Russian gas, discussion of fossil fuels was fraught. The text, which called for accelerating the ‘phasedown of unabated coal’ use for the first time only last year, failed to expand to include oil and gas, despite calls to do so from India, the US, EU, and UK. Gas use also appeared to gain a pass via the inclusion of ‘low emission’ energy alongside renewables.

Given that extracting and burning oil and gas accounts for 40 per cent of all annual greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and leaders agree on the need for ‘deep, rapid and sustained’ emission cuts, that language is beyond logical argument. However, current dependencies, fears of stranded investments, and a failure of imagination won out.

Stronger than usual oil and gas industry presence led to a higher number of meetings focused on decarbonization of the sector. Major producer countries such as Canada and Saudi Arabia were keen to emphasize technologies to ‘clean up’ rather than phase down their fuels as the future.

Not all developing country governments with hydrocarbon reserves see the ‘phase down’ text as conflicting with their economic interests. Large oil and gas exporter Colombia supported the inclusion of ‘all fossil fuels’ and Kenya, a country which had been pursuing oil and coal prospects, became a friend of the high ambition Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance which seeks a ‘managed phase out of oil and gas supply’.

A vocal contingent of African civil society meanwhile railed against health and ecology-damaging oil and gas projects and investments that would lock them into a high emissions future.

With stronger resolve to reorient finance towards net zero both in Sharm el-Sheikh and at the concurrent G20 summit in Bali, the practicalities of economic adaptation to the shift out of fossil fuels – including just transition for workers – rose up the agenda. These issues will overtake the wrangle over wording in the run up to COP28.

Adaptation must now move to the forefront

Ruth Townend

There are three pillars of climate action: mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. This year progress was made on mitigation and loss and damage but, to avoid wild spiralling of the latter, adaptation must have its day in the sun in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at COP28 next year.

Adaptation lacks a concrete goal, akin to the 1.5 degree limit, and few countries have set out plans to adapt to climate change. Momentum will come when the promised ‘global goal on adaptation’ (GGA) is finally defined, to help mobilize finance and spur implementation.

The Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh (GLASS) work programme to achieve this has so far lacked focus. At COP27, parties decided to define a framework to measure the goal’s achievement and enable reviews of progress over the next year.

Some concrete progress on adaptation was seen at the COP: UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for worldwide extreme weather early warning systems within the next five years, while the Adaptation Fund received more than $230 million for the most climate-vulnerable in 2022.

The call from Glasgow to double adaptation finance was repeated, but overall, progress was muted, when parties really needed to come together for implementation of this crucial element of climate action.

Not enough done for agriculture and food security

Richard King

It is welcome that the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture – adopted in 2017 as the first and only formal UNFCCC agenda item focusing on agriculture and food security – has concluded in a decision to implement a new four-year work programme focused on implementing solutions.

While this has an objective of promoting holistic approaches to addressing climate impacts both on and from agriculture and food security, it disappointingly falls short of taking a food systems lens that includes all activities and actors from farm to fork.

There is now a small window of opportunity until March 2023 for governments and civil society to shape and broaden this agenda for the next four years. If not in the negotiating halls, then certainly in the myriad side events and discussions focusing on the issue, this year’s COP has clearly demonstrated a growing appreciation of the imperative of tackling food systems in their entirety.

An overarching and integrated approach to sustainable food production, distribution, and retail; nutrition and dietary shifts; and addressing food loss and waste will be vital to making comprehensive headway in addressing climate change and other planetary and social challenges.

It is important the parties at COP28 in the UAE seize this rising momentum to become the first climate negotiations to make tangible progress on transforming food systems towards sustainability, equitability, and resilience.

Rainforest leadership challenges traditional aid

Thiago Kanashiro Uehara

COP27 served well as a business fair for entrepreneurs wishing to benefit from new carbon markets. But forests, peatlands, and nature-based solutions did not receive the attention they deserve in guaranteeing climate security.

The good news is the COP26 pledges on forest finance, for the Congo basin, and for indigenous peoples (IP) and local communities’ (LC) forest tenure are pretty much alive, with disbursement rates at decent levels, albeit rarely directly to IP and LC-led organizations. The bad news is the financialization of forest governance and voluntary sustainability standards in global supply chains are solution ‘myths’ and were exposed by scientists as such at the conference.

On the second day of COP27, there was a last-minute launch led by the Global North, with Rishi Sunak and Emmanuel Macron announcing the ‘forests and climate leaders’ partnership’. One week later, at the G20 Bali summit, ministers from Indonesia, DR Congo, and Brazil announced a South-South rainforest leadership alliance – referred by some as the ‘OPEC of forests’ – challenging traditional forms of top-down international aid.

The climate crisis is one symptom of the inequality crisis engulfing our world at present. The African COP represented a step forward in addressing climate justice, an improvement over COP26 in Glasgow, where the issue was virtually denied.

The time has come for Global North constituents to work together with self-fashioned ‘solution countries’, such as the DRC now and Brazil after 2023. An ‘implementation COP’ will be successful only after establishing a new framework of co-leadership in climate action based on principles of justice and strong sustainability.

Outcomes of an African COP

Christopher Vandome

Africa’s contribution to the global energy transition cannot be at the expense of its own industrialization.

While pledges of increased financing for adaptation and the landmark establishment of a fund for loss and damage are important steps, the reality of under-disbursement and delivery of promised funds is causing many African leaders to rethink their engagement with multilateral climate initiatives.

African leaders are intent on advancing their own strategies for energy generation and adaptation that deliver on national priorities of job creation, sustainable growth, and environmental protection.

Many countries strategies involve exploiting gas reserves. But with mounting global pressures against further hydrocarbon extraction, African leaders need to demonstrate to international partners that these operations are part of a long-term transition away from other fossil fuels and contribute towards poverty alleviation.

Leaders need to be coordinated in their demands to international partners on how to phase out over time as well as de-risk potential stranded assets. President Ramaphosa’s unveiling of the investment plan for the South African Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) was a significant mark of progress to unlocking the $8.5 billion pledge for lowering the economy’s reliance on coal.

While progress has at times faltered over the past year, it has been critical that South Africa articulate its own needs and desired energy mix, rather than this be internationally prescribed. It has also demonstrated to other African nations that bilateral not multilateral initiatives may offer a fast-track route to green finance.

Independent Thinking: China protests, North Korea missile tests Audio NCapeling 1 December 2022

Episode seven of our new weekly podcast examines the civil unrest in China and the ongoing development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme.

Anti-lockdown protests are sweeping the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. What does the unrest say about China’s response to COVID-19? How serious a challenge is it to Xi Jinping’s legitimacy so soon after the Party Congress?

Meanwhile, 2022 has been a record year for Pyongyang’s ballistic missile launches. How far has North Korea’s nuclear programme and its missile systems developed, and what does it mean for the country’s neighbours?

Joining Bronwen Maddox in the studio this week from the Chatham House Asia-Pacific programme are its director Ben Bland and senior research fellow Dr Yu Jie. Joining the panel is special guest Ankit Panda, the Stanton senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and editor-at-large for The Diplomat magazine.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Independent Thinking: Reporting Putin’s wars Audio NCapeling 8 December 2022

Episode eight of our new weekly podcast reflects on almost one year of war in Ukraine, and 12 years of war in Syria.

In the studio with Bronwen Maddox is special guest Oz Katerji, a war correspondent and freelance journalist who in the early stages of the Syrian uprising reported on the brutality of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its impact on neighbouring Lebanon and Turkey.

Having written extensively on Syria and the Middle East, in January 2022 he journeyed to Ukraine and was in Kyiv on 24 February as Russia began its invasion. He has reported extensively on the battle for Ukraine’s capital, and later the Donbas, in Foreign Policy magazine, the New Statesman and Rolling Stone.

Joining Bronwen and Oz to discuss the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria from Chatham House are James Nixey, director of the Russia and Eurasia programme, and Lina Khatib, director of the Middle East and North Africa programme.

Independent Thinking: The UK tilts to the Indo-Pacific Audio NCapeling 14 December 2022

Episode nine discusses the UK’s foreign policy ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific and whether its desire to be a strategic player in the region is sustainable.

The past 18 months has seen the deployment of a Royal Navy carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific, the emergence of the AUKUS partnership, talk of closer diplomatic ties with India and ASEAN and, in the context of Brexit, the UK potentially joining the CPTPP pan-Pacific trade deal.

But just how sustainable is a UK presence in the Indo-Pacific? And what are the UK’s strategic objectives in the region?

Joining Bronwen Maddox to discuss the UK’s high ambitions in the Indo-Pacific are Shashank Joshi, defence editor at The Economist, and Veerle Nouwens, senior research fellow at RUSI and the co-author of a recent Chatham House report on transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Independent Thinking: Insurrections and elections in Brazil and the US Audio NCapeling 20 January 2023

Episode 11 examines disinformation in the US and Brazil, the role played by social media platforms, and how conspiracy theories percolate online.

The storming in Brasilia of government institutions by supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro echoed the events seen at the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021. This week’s guests discuss the impact on Brazil.

The panel also examines the state of politics in the US going into 2023. How are things shaping up for Joe Biden’s presidency after the mid-terms now that a new Congress has been sworn in? And what are the challenges being faced more broadly by the American body politic two years on from the insurrection at Capitol Hill.

Joining guest host Leslie Vinjamuri this week from Chatham House is Christopher Sabatini, senior research fellow for Latin America, Serusha Govender, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation academy fellow, and Alex Krasodomski, senior research associate at the Digital Society Initiative.