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20 Years On: Removal of the Ban on LGBTIQ+ Personnel Serving in the UK Armed Forces




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A comprehensive evaluation of a typical plant telomeric G-quadruplex (G4) DNA reveals the dynamics of G4 formation, rearrangement, and unfolding [Plant Biology]

Telomeres are specific nucleoprotein structures that are located at the ends of linear eukaryotic chromosomes and play crucial roles in genomic stability. Telomere DNA consists of simple repeats of a short G-rich sequence: TTAGGG in mammals and TTTAGGG in most plants. In recent years, the mammalian telomeric G-rich repeats have been shown to form G-quadruplex (G4) structures, which are crucial for modulating telomere functions. Surprisingly, even though plant telomeres are essential for plant growth, development, and environmental adaptions, only few reports exist on plant telomeric G4 DNA (pTG4). Here, using bulk and single-molecule assays, including CD spectroscopy, and single-molecule FRET approaches, we comprehensively characterized the structure and dynamics of a typical plant telomeric sequence, d[GGG(TTTAGGG)3]. We found that this sequence can fold into mixed G4s in potassium, including parallel and antiparallel structures. We also directly detected intermediate dynamic transitions, including G-hairpin, parallel G-triplex, and antiparallel G-triplex structures. Moreover, we observed that pTG4 is unfolded by the AtRecQ2 helicase but not by AtRecQ3. The results of our work shed light on our understanding about the existence, topological structures, stability, intermediates, unwinding, and functions of pTG4.




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Structural basis of specific inhibition of extracellular activation of pro- or latent myostatin by the monoclonal antibody SRK-015 [Molecular Biophysics]

Myostatin (or growth/differentiation factor 8 (GDF8)) is a member of the transforming growth factor β superfamily of growth factors and negatively regulates skeletal muscle growth. Its dysregulation is implicated in muscle wasting diseases. SRK-015 is a clinical-stage mAb that prevents extracellular proteolytic activation of pro- and latent myostatin. Here we used integrated structural and biochemical approaches to elucidate the molecular mechanism of antibody-mediated neutralization of pro-myostatin activation. The crystal structure of pro-myostatin in complex with 29H4-16 Fab, a high-affinity variant of SRK-015, at 2.79 Å resolution revealed that the antibody binds to a conformational epitope in the arm region of the prodomain distant from the proteolytic cleavage sites. This epitope is highly sequence-divergent, having only limited similarity to other closely related members of the transforming growth factor β superfamily. Hydrogen/deuterium exchange MS experiments indicated that antibody binding induces conformational changes in pro- and latent myostatin that span the arm region, the loops contiguous to the protease cleavage sites, and the latency-associated structural elements. Moreover, negative-stain EM with full-length antibodies disclosed a stable, ring-like antigen–antibody structure in which the two Fab arms of a single antibody occupy the two arm regions of the prodomain in the pro- and latent myostatin homodimers, suggesting a 1:1 (antibody:myostatin homodimer) binding stoichiometry. These results suggest that SRK-015 binding stabilizes the latent conformation and limits the accessibility of protease cleavage sites within the prodomain. These findings shed light on approaches that specifically block the extracellular activation of growth factors by targeting their precursor forms.




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Biochemical and structural insights into how amino acids regulate pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 [Enzymology]

Pyruvate kinase muscle isoform 2 (PKM2) is a key glycolytic enzyme involved in ATP generation and critical for cancer metabolism. PKM2 is expressed in many human cancers and is regulated by complex mechanisms that promote tumor growth and proliferation. Therefore, it is considered an attractive therapeutic target for modulating tumor metabolism. Various stimuli allosterically regulate PKM2 by cycling it between highly active and less active states. Several small molecules activate PKM2 by binding to its intersubunit interface. Serine and cysteine serve as an activator and inhibitor of PKM2, respectively, by binding to its amino acid (AA)-binding pocket, which therefore represents a potential druggable site. Despite binding similarly to PKM2, how cysteine and serine differentially regulate this enzyme remains elusive. Using kinetic analyses, fluorescence binding, X-ray crystallography, and gel filtration experiments with asparagine, aspartate, and valine as PKM2 ligands, we examined whether the differences in the side-chain polarity of these AAs trigger distinct allosteric responses in PKM2. We found that Asn (polar) and Asp (charged) activate PKM2 and that Val (hydrophobic) inhibits it. The results also indicate that both Asn and Asp can restore the activity of Val-inhibited PKM2. AA-bound crystal structures of PKM2 displayed distinctive interactions within the binding pocket, causing unique allosteric effects in the enzyme. These structure-function analyses of AA-mediated PKM2 regulation shed light on the chemical requirements in the development of mechanism-based small-molecule modulators targeting the AA-binding pocket of PKM2 and provide broader insights into the regulatory mechanisms of complex allosteric enzymes.




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X-ray structures of catalytic intermediates of cytochrome c oxidase provide insights into its O2 activation and unidirectional proton-pump mechanisms [Molecular Biophysics]

Cytochrome c oxidase (CcO) reduces O2 to water, coupled with a proton-pumping process. The structure of the O2-reduction site of CcO contains two reducing equivalents, Fea32+ and CuB1+, and suggests that a peroxide-bound state (Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+) rather than an O2-bound state (Fea32+–O2) is the initial catalytic intermediate. Unexpectedly, however, resonance Raman spectroscopy results have shown that the initial intermediate is Fea32+–O2, whereas Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+ is undetectable. Based on X-ray structures of static noncatalytic CcO forms and mutation analyses for bovine CcO, a proton-pumping mechanism has been proposed. It involves a proton-conducting pathway (the H-pathway) comprising a tandem hydrogen-bond network and a water channel located between the N- and P-side surfaces. However, a system for unidirectional proton-transport has not been experimentally identified. Here, an essentially identical X-ray structure for the two catalytic intermediates (P and F) of bovine CcO was determined at 1.8 Å resolution. A 1.70 Å Fe–O distance of the ferryl center could best be described as Fea34+ = O2−, not as Fea34+–OH−. The distance suggests an ∼800-cm−1 Raman stretching band. We found an interstitial water molecule that could trigger a rapid proton-coupled electron transfer from tyrosine-OH to the slowly forming Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+ state, preventing its detection, consistent with the unexpected Raman results. The H-pathway structures of both intermediates indicated that during proton-pumping from the hydrogen-bond network to the P-side, a transmembrane helix closes the water channel connecting the N-side with the hydrogen-bond network, facilitating unidirectional proton-pumping during the P-to-F transition.




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China's ivory bans: enhancing soft power through wildlife conservation

6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6

Jonas Gamso

China has been a major market for elephant ivory for centuries. However, the Chinese government recently enacted bans on imports and exports of ivory (2015) and on the domestic ivory trade (2017). These bans appear to have come in response to intensive influence campaigns and public shaming from domestic and foreign activists, who cited declining elephant populations and highlighted China's role. However, this shaming-narrative is at odds with conventional wisdom regarding Chinese policy-making: China typically resists international pressures and its authoritarian government is thought to be largely insulated from domestic efforts by civil society groups. This article reconciles Beijing's ivory policy with these conventional beliefs about policy-making in China. I argue that the Chinese government saw unique benefits to banning the ivory trade, under growing international scrutiny, as doing so enhanced Chinese soft power while having very little impact on its sovereignty or development. Non-government organizations (NGOs) operating both inside and outside of China played a role as well: NGOs in China helped to shift Chinese public opinion towards favouring the bans, while those operating abroad led public relations efforts to publicize Chinese demand for ivory to foreign audiences. Efforts by the latter group of NGOs intensified pressure on the Chinese government to rein in the ivory market, while increasing the soft power benefits that banning ivory would bring to Beijing.




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Will a Devastating Bushfire Season Change Australia’s Climate Stance?

23 January 2020

Madeleine Forster

Richard and Susan Hayden Academy Fellow, International Law Programme

Professor Tim Benton

Research Director, Emerging Risks; Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
With Australians experiencing first-hand the risks of climate change, Madeleine Forster and Tim Benton examine the influencers, at home or abroad, that could push the government towards more action.

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Residents look on as flames burn through bush on 4 January 2020 in Lake Tabourie, NSW. Photo: Getty Images.

The 2019–20 fire season in Australia has been unprecedented. To date, an estimated 18 million hectares of fire has cut swathes through the bush – an area greater than that of the average European country and over five times the size of blazes in the Amazon.

This reflects previous predictions of Australian science. Since 2008 and as recently as 2018, scientific bodies have warned that climate change will exacerbate existing conditions for fires and other climatic disasters in Australia. What used to be once-in-a-generation fires now re-appear within 10–15 years with increased ferocity, over longer seasons.

In a country known for climate denial and division, debate has erupted around bushfire management and climate change. One of these is whether controlled burns are the answer to Australia’s climate-affected fire conditions.

There is no single risk reduction strategy. Controlled burning remains key, if adapted to the environment and climate

But when three out of four seasons in a year can support destructive bushfires, there are clear limits to what controlled burning and other fire management techniques can achieve. Other ‘adaptation’ measures are also likely to provoke intense debate – including bush clearance. As one Australian expert offered to highlight where Australia has got to, families should probably not go on holiday to bush and beach during the height of summer when temperatures and fire risk peaks. 

So, unless Australia is prepared to debate radical changes to where people live and how land is used, the limits to adaptation imply the need for mitigation. This means supporting ambitious global greenhouse emissions reductions targets. As research from Victoria, one fire-prone state in Australia, highlights, ‘the emissions pathway we follow is the largest determinant of change to many variables [such as temperature] beyond the next few decades.’

Can Australia become a more active global partner on emissions?

Australia accounts for just over one per cent of global emissions, so reducing domestic emissions – even though on a per capita basis they are the highest in the world – will not reduce Australia’s climate risk. Showing international leadership and supporting a powerful coalition of the willing to tackle climate change is the only way ahead. By showing a willingness to adopt climate ambition, Australia can help more constructive worldwide action, and thereby reduce its own risk exposure. 

Leading by example is a politically difficult issue for Australia. Prime Minister Scott Morrison was re-elected in May 2019 on an economic stability platform, and a promise not to imperil employment growth through climate action. Australia has contested UN estimates that it will not meet its existing modest goals for domestic emissions, by seeking to rely on carryover credits from action under the Kyoto Protocol as proof of progress.

It has also distanced itself from concerns over global supply and demand in fossil fuels. Australia remains a global supplier for fossil fuels, including coal – the nation’s coal exports accounted for $67 billion in revenues in 2019 in an expanding but changing Asian market, supplying ‘some of the cheapest electricity in the world’.

Possible influencers of change

With Australians experiencing first-hand the risks of climate change, there is already pressure to do more. Many are sceptical this will translate into domestic targets or export policies that give Australia the moral authority to ask for more action on the global stage.

Here, diverse groups who share a common interest in seeing Australia recover from the bushfires and address future climate risks could be key.

Importantly this includes rural and urban-fringe communities affected by the bushfires. They were part of Morrison’s traditional supporter-base but are angry at the government’s handling of the crisis and increasingly see how tiptoeing around emissions (including exports) has also ‘buried’ open discussion at home on climate-readiness.

Australian states could also find themselves taking a lead role. Virtually all jurisdictions have now committed to their own goals, most based on zero-carbon goals by 2050 (as has New Zealand). These can support modelling for Australia’s energy transition from coal, through gas, to market competitive renewables, while also help to ensure this reflects community expectations on jobs, electricity prices and other costs. 

Other emerging voices include the insurance and banking sectors (the Reserve Bank of Australia warned of the long-term financial stability risks of climate change before the fires) and indigenous Australians (one group of Torres Strait Islanders have filed a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee which, if heard, will place Australia’s emissions record under the spotlight again). Their challenge now is finding a common language on what a cohesive approach to addressing climate change risk looks like. 

The international picture is mixed. The United States’ poor federal climate policy is a buffer for Australia. French President Emmanuel Macron has tried to raise the cost of inaction for Australia in current EU–Australia trade negotiations, but many large emitters in the Indo-Pacific region remain key Australian trading partners, investors and buyers of Australian coal. 

In the meantime, the United Kingdom is preparing for the meeting of parties to the Paris Agreement in Glasgow in November. A key global event following Brexit, the UK will no doubt be hoping to encourage a leadership circle with national commitments that meet global need to make the Glasgow meeting a success.

The UK public has expressed enormous sympathy for Australia in the bushfires and outrage over ‘climate denialism.’ Australia’s experience will be a cautionary tale of the effects of climate change at the meeting. Could the UK also support Australia to become a less reluctant partner in global climate action?




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The prospects of carbon dioxide removal in climate policymaking within the United States

Research Event

19 November 2019 - 9:00am to 5:00pm

School of Law, University of California, Davis

This meeting formed part of a programme of work which investigates the role of negative emissions technologies (NETs) in achieving the Paris Agreement climate targets. Previous meetings held in London and Brussels have looked at integrating negative emissions into EU policy-making, the implications and degree to which NETs, and in particular bioenergy with carbon capture storage (BECCS), can be an effective climate mitigation tool. This meeting focused on the possible deployment pathways of NETs and alternatives to BECCS for the US in particular, in the context of geographical constraints and socioenvironmental implications, the role of the private sector, and appropriate governance and finance mechanisms. 

Melissa MacEwen

Project Manager, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme




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To Advance Trade and Climate Goals, ‘Global Britain’ Must Link Them

19 March 2020

Carolyn Deere Birkbeck

Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme, and Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy

Dr Emily Jones

Associate Professor, Blavatnik School of Government

Dr Thomas Hale

Associate Professor, Blavatnik School of Government
COVID-19 is a sharp reminder of why trade policy matters. As the UK works to forge new trade deals, it must align its trade policy agenda with its climate ambition.

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Boris Johnson at the launch of the UK-hosted COP26 UN Climate Summit at the Science Museum, London on February 4, 2020. Photo by Jeremy Selwyn - WPA Pool/Getty Images.

COVID-19 is a sharp reminder of why trade and climate policy matters. How can governments maintain access to critical goods and services, and ensure global supply chains function in times of crisis?

The timing of many trade negotiations is now increasingly uncertain, as are the UK’s plans to host COP26 in November. Policy work continues, however, and the EU has released its draft negotiating text for the new UK-EU trade deal, which includes a sub-chapter specifically devoted to climate. 

This is a timely reminder both of the pressing need for the UK to integrate its trade and climate policymaking and to use the current crisis-induced breathing space in international negotiations - however limited - to catch up on both strategy and priorities on this critical policy intersection.

The UK government has moved fast to reset its external trade relations post-Brexit. In the past month it formally launched bilateral negotiations with the EU and took up a seat at the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an independent member. Until the COVID-19 crisis hit, negotiations were also poised to start with the US.

The UK is also in the climate spotlight as host of COP26, the most important international climate negotiation since Paris in 2015, which presents a vital opportunity for the government to show leadership by aligning its trade agenda with its climate and sustainability commitments in bold new ways.

Not just an empty aspiration

This would send a signal that ‘Global Britain’ is not just an empty aspiration, but a concrete commitment to lead.

Not only is concerted action on the climate crisis a central priority for UK citizens, a growing and increasingly vocal group of UK businesses committed to decarbonization are calling on the government to secure a more transparent and predictable international market place that supports climate action by business.

With COP26, the UK has a unique responsibility to push governments to ratchet up ambition in the national contributions to climate action – and to promote coherence between climate ambition and wider economic policymaking, including on trade. If Britain really wants to lead, here are some concrete actions it should take.

At the national level, the UK can pioneer new ways to put environmental sustainability – and climate action in particular - at the heart of its trade agenda. Achieving the government’s ambitious Clean Growth Strategy - which seeks to make the UK the global leader in a range of industries including electric cars and offshore wind – should be a central objective of UK trade policy.

The UK should re-orient trade policy frameworks to incentivize the shift toward a more circular and net zero global economy. And all elements of UK trade policy could be assessed against environmental objectives - for example, their contribution to phasing out fossil fuels, helping to reverse overexploitation of natural resources, and support for sustainable agriculture and biodiversity.

In its bilateral and regional trade negotiations, the UK can and should advance its environment, climate and trade goals in tandem, and implementation of the Paris Agreement must be a core objective of the UK trade strategy.

A core issue for the UK is how to ensure that efforts to decarbonise the economy are not undercut by imports from high-carbon producers. Here, a ‘border carbon adjustment (BCA)’ - effectively a tax on the climate pollution of imports - would support UK climate goals. The EU draft negotiating text released yesterday put the issue of BCAs front and centre, making crystal clear that the intersection of climate, environment and trade policy goals will be a central issue for UK-EU trade negotiations.

Even with the United States, a trade deal can and should still be seized as a way to incentivize the shift toward a net zero and more circular economy. At the multilateral level, as a new independent WTO member, the UK has an opportunity to help build a forward-looking climate and trade agenda.

The UK could help foster dialogue, research and action on a cluster of ‘climate and trade’ issues that warrant more focused attention at the WTO. These include the design of carbon pricing policies at the border that are transparent, fair and support a just transition; proposals for a climate waiver for WTO rules; and identification of ways multilateral trade cooperation could promote a zero carbon and more circular global economy.  

To help nudge multilateral discussion along, the UK could also ask to join a critical ‘path finder’ effort by six governments, led by New Zealand, to pursue an agreement on climate change, trade and sustainability (ACCTS). This group aims to find ways forward on three central trade and climate issues: removing fossil fuel subsidies, climate-related labelling, and promoting trade in climate-friendly goods and services.

At present, the complex challenges at the intersection of climate, trade and development policy are too often used to defer or side-step issues deemed ‘too hard’ or ‘too sensitive’ to tackle. The UK could help here by working to ensure multilateral climate and trade initiatives share adjustment burdens, recognise the historical responsibility of developed countries, and do not unfairly disadvantage developing countries - especially the least developed.

Many developing countries are keen to promote climate-friendly exports as part of wider export diversification strategies  and want to reap greater returns from greener global value chains. Further, small island states and least-developed countries – many of which are Commonwealth members – that are especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and natural disasters, need support to adapt in the face of trade shocks and to build climate-resilient, trade-related infrastructure and export sectors.

As an immediate next step, the UK should actively support the growing number of WTO members in favour of a WTO Ministerial Statement on environmental sustainability and trade. It should work with its key trading partners in the Commonwealth and beyond to ensure the agenda is inclusive, supports achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and helps developing countries benefit from a more environmentally sustainable global economy.

As the UK prepares to host COP26, negotiates deals with the EU and US, and prepares for its first WTO Ministerial meeting as an independent member, it must show it can lead the way nationally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. And to ensure the government acts, greater engagement from the UK’s business, civil society and research sectors is critical – we need all hands on deck to forge and promote concrete proposals for aligning UK trade policy with the climate ambition our world needs.




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Nina van der Mark

Research Analyst, Global Health Programme

Biography

Nina works on universal health coverage (UHC) and health system reforms. Her research is primarily focused on the political economy of UHC and accelerating health system reforms in low-and-middle income countries.

Previously, Nina worked as an international development professional, focused on health financing and advocacy in the fields of sexual and reproductive health and rights, youth participation and maternal and child health. Nina has experience working in Ethiopia and Nigeria. She has also worked for the private sector as a healthcare technology research consultant for Southeast Asia.

She has a broad-based interest in global health, including the influence of demographic changes on population health outcomes, innovative health financing mechanisms and improving research uptake into health policy.

She has a multidisciplinary background and holds a Msc in Population and Development at The London School of Economics (LSE) and a BA in Liberal Arts and Sciences, focused on international relations, international law and China studies at University College Utrecht. 




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The Hurdles to Developing a COVID-19 Vaccine: Why International Cooperation is Needed

23 April 2020

Professor David Salisbury CB

Associate Fellow, Global Health Programme

Dr Champa Patel

Director, Asia-Pacific Programme
While the world pins its hopes on vaccines to prevent COVID-19, there are scientific, regulatory and market hurdles to overcome. Furthermore, with geopolitical tensions and nationalistic approaches, there is a high risk that the most vulnerable will not get the life-saving interventions they need.

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A biologist works on the virus inactivation process in Belo Horizonte, Brazil on 24 March 2020. The Brazilian Ministry of Health convened The Technological Vaccine Center to conduct research on COVID-19 in order to diagnose, test and develop a vaccine. Photo: Getty Images.

On 10 January 2020, Chinese scientists released the sequence of the COVID-19 genome on the internet. This provided the starting gun for scientists around the world to start developing vaccines or therapies. With at least 80 different vaccines in development, many governments are pinning their hopes on a quick solution. However, there are many hurdles to overcome. 

Vaccine development

Firstly, vaccine development is normally a very long process to ensure vaccines are safe and effective before they are used. 

Safety is not a given: a recent dengue vaccine caused heightened disease in vaccinated children when they later were exposed to dengue, while Respiratory Syncytial Virus vaccine caused the same problem. Nor is effectiveness a given. Candidate vaccines that use novel techniques where minute fragments of the viruses’ genetic code are either injected directly into humans or incorporated into a vaccine (as is being pursued, or could be pursued for COVID-19) have higher risks of failure simply because they haven’t worked before. For some vaccines, we know what levels of immunity post-vaccination are likely to be protective. This is not the case for coronavirus. 

Clinical trials will have to be done for efficacy. This is not optional – regulators will need to know extensive testing has taken place before licencing any vaccine. Even if animal tests are done in parallel with early human tests, the remainder of the process is still lengthy. 

There is also great interest in the use of passive immunization, whereby antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 (collected from people who have recovered from infection or laboratory-created) are given to people who are currently ill. Antivirals may prove to be a quicker route than vaccine development, as the testing requirements would be shorter, manufacturing may be easier and only ill people would need to be treated, as opposed to all at-risk individuals being vaccinated.

Vaccine manufacturing

Developers, especially small biotechs, will have to make partnerships with large vaccine manufacturers in order to bring products to market. One notorious bottleneck in vaccine development is getting from proof-of-principle to commercial development: about 95 per cent of vaccines fail at this step. Another bottleneck is at the end of production. The final stages of vaccine production involve detailed testing to ensure that the vaccine meets the necessary criteria and there are always constraints on access to the technologies necessary to finalize the product. Only large vaccine manufacturers have these capacities. There is a graveyard of failed vaccine candidates that have not managed to pass through this development and manufacturing process.

Another consideration is adverse or unintended consequences. Highly specialized scientists may have to defer their work on other new vaccines to work on COVID-19 products and production of existing products may have to be set aside, raising the possibility of shortages of other essential vaccines. 

Cost is another challenge. Vaccines for industrialized markets can be very lucrative for pharmaceutical companies, but many countries have price caps on vaccines. Important lessons have been learned from the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic when industrialized countries took all the vaccines first. Supplies were made available to lower-income countries at a lower price but this was much later in the evolution of the pandemic. For the recent Ebola outbreaks, vaccines were made available at low or no cost. 

Geopolitics may also play a role. Should countries that manufacture a vaccine share it widely with other countries or prioritize their own populations first? It has been reported that President Trump attempted to purchase CureVac, a German company with a candidate vaccine.  There are certainly precedents for countries prioritizing their own populations. With H1N1 flu in 2009, the Australian Government required a vaccine company to meet the needs of the Australian population first. 

Vaccine distribution

Global leadership and a coordinated and coherent response will be needed to ensure that any vaccine is distributed equitably. There have been recent calls for a G20 on health, but existing global bodies such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and GAVI are working on vaccines and worldwide access to them. Any new bodies should seek to boost funding for these entities so they can ensure products reach the most disadvantaged. 

While countries that cannot afford vaccines may be priced out of markets, access for poor, vulnerable or marginalized peoples, whether in developed or developing countries, is of concern. Developing countries are at particular risk from the impacts of COVID-19. People living in conflict-affected and fragile states – whether they are refugees or asylum seekers, internally displaced or stateless, or in detention facilities – are at especially high risk of devastating impacts. 

Mature economies will also face challenges. Equitable access to COVID-19 vaccine will be challenging where inequalities and unequal access to essential services have been compromised within some political systems. 

The need for global leadership 

There is an urgent need for international coordination on COVID-19 vaccines. While the WHO provides technical support and UNICEF acts as a procurement agency, responding to coronavirus needs clarity of global leadership that arches over national interests and is capable of mobilizing resources at a time when economies are facing painful recessions. We see vaccines as a salvation but remain ill-equipped to accelerate their development.

While everyone hopes for rapid availability of safe, effective and affordable vaccines that will be produced in sufficient quantities to meet everyone’s needs, realistically, we face huge hurdles. 




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Coronavirus Vaccine: Available For All, or When it's Your Turn?

4 May 2020

Professor David Salisbury CB

Associate Fellow, Global Health Programme
Despite high-level commitments and pledges to cooperate to ensure equitable global access to a coronavirus vaccine, prospects for fair distribution are uncertain.

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Researcher in Brazil working on virus replication in order to develop a vaccine against the coronavirus. Photo by DOUGLAS MAGNO/AFP via Getty Images.

When the H1N1 influenza pandemic struck in 2009, some industrialized countries were well prepared. Many countries’ preparedness plans had focused on preparing for an influenza pandemic and based on earlier alerts over the H5N1 ‘bird flu’ virus, countries had made advanced purchase or ‘sleeping’ contracts for vaccine supplies that could be activated as soon as a pandemic was declared. Countries without contracts scrambled to get supplies after those that already had contracts received their vaccine.

Following the 2009 pandemic, the European Union (EU) developed plans for joint-purchase vaccine contracts that any member state could join, guaranteeing the same price per dose for everyone. In 2009, low-income countries were unable to get the vaccine until manufacturers agreed to let 10 per cent of their production go to the World Health Organization (WHO).

The situation for COVID-19 could be even worse. No country had a sleeping contract in place for a COVID-19 vaccine since nobody had anticipated that the next pandemic would be a coronavirus, not an influenza virus. With around 80 candidate vaccines reported to be in development, choosing the right one will be like playing roulette.

These candidates will be whittled down as some will fail at an early stage of development and others will not get to scale-up for manufacturing. All of the world’s major vaccine pharmaceutical companies have said that they will divert resources to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines and, as long as they choose the right candidate for production, they have the expertise and the capacity to produce in huge quantities.

From roulette to a horse race

Our game now changes from roulette to a horse race, as the probability of winning is a matter of odds not a random chance. Countries are now able to try to make contracts alone or in purchasing consortia with other states, and with one of the major companies or with multiple companies. This would be like betting on one of the favourites.

For example, it has been reported that Oxford University has made an agreement with pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, with a possibility of 100 million doses being available by the end of 2020. If the vaccine works and those doses materialize, and are all available for the UK, then the UK population requirements will be met in full, and the challenge becomes vaccinating everyone as quickly as possible.

Even if half of the doses were reserved for the UK, all those in high-risk or occupational groups could be vaccinated rapidly. However, as each major manufacturer accepts more contracts, the quantity that each country will get diminishes and the time to vaccinate the at-risk population gets longer.

At this point, it is not known how manufacturers will respond to requests for vaccine and how they will apportion supplies between different markets. You could bet on an outsider. You study the field and select a biotech that has potential with a good production development programme and a tie-in with a smaller-scale production facility.

If other countries do not try to get contracts, you will get your vaccine as fast as manufacturing can be scaled up; but because it is a small manufacturer, your supplies may take a long time. And outsiders do not often win races. You can of course, depending on your resources, cover several runners and try to make multiple contracts. However, you take on the risk that some will fail, and you may have compromised your eventual supply.

On April 24, the WHO co-hosted a meeting with the president of France, the president of the European Commission and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It brought together heads of state and industry leaders who committed to ‘work towards equitable global access based on an unprecedented level of partnership’. They agreed ‘to create a strong unified voice, to build on past experience and to be accountable to the world, to communities and to one another’ for vaccines, testing materials and treatments.

They did not, however, say how this will be achieved and the absence of the United States was notable. The EU and its partners are hosting an international pledging conference on May 4 that aims to raise €7.5 billion in initial funding to kick-start global cooperation on vaccines. Co-hosts will be France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway and Saudi Arabia and the priorities will be ‘Test, Treat and Prevent’, with the latter dedicated to vaccines.

Despite these expressions of altruism, every government will face the tension between wanting to protect their own populations as quickly as possible and knowing that this will disadvantage poorer countries, where health services are even less able to cope. It will not be a vote winner to offer a share in available vaccine to less-privileged countries.

The factories for the biggest vaccine manufacturers are in Europe, the US and India. Will European manufacturers be obliged by the EU to restrict sales first to European countries? Will the US invoke its Defense Production Act and block vaccine exports until there are stocks enough for every American? And will vaccine only be available in India for those who can afford it?

The lessons on vaccine availability from the 2009 influenza pandemic are clear: vaccine was not shared on anything like an equitable basis. It remains to be seen if we will do any better in 2020.




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Hematopoiesis is regulated by cholesterol efflux pathways and lipid rafts: connections with cardiovascular diseases [Thematic Reviews]

Lipid rafts are highly ordered regions of the plasma membrane that are enriched in cholesterol and sphingolipids and play important roles in many cells. In hematopoietic stem and progenitor cells (HSPCs), lipid rafts house receptors critical for normal hematopoiesis. Lipid rafts also can bind and sequester kinases that induce negative feedback pathways to limit proliferative cytokine receptor cycling back to the cell membrane. Modulation of lipid rafts occurs through an array of mechanisms, with optimal cholesterol efflux one of the major regulators. As such, cholesterol homeostasis also regulates hematopoiesis. Increased lipid raft content, which occurs in response to changes in cholesterol efflux in the membrane, can result in prolonged receptor occupancy in the cell membrane and enhanced signaling. In addition, certain diseases, like diabetes, may contribute to lipid raft formation and affect cholesterol retention in rafts. In this review, we explore the role of lipid raft-related mechanisms in hematopoiesis and CVD (specifically, atherosclerosis) and discuss how defective cholesterol efflux pathways in HSPCs contribute to expansion of lipid rafts, thereby promoting myelopoiesis and thrombopoiesis. We also discuss the utility of cholesterol acceptors in contributing to lipid raft regulation and disruption, and highlight the potential to manipulate these pathways for therapeutic gain in CVD as well as other disorders with aberrant hematopoiesis.




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Lipid rafts as signaling hubs in cancer cell survival/death and invasion: implications in tumor progression and therapy [Thematic Reviews]

Cholesterol/sphingolipid-rich membrane domains, known as lipid rafts or membrane rafts, play a critical role in the compartmentalization of signaling pathways. Physical segregation of proteins in lipid rafts may modulate the accessibility of proteins to regulatory or effector molecules. Thus, lipid rafts serve as sorting platforms and hubs for signal transduction proteins. Cancer cells contain higher levels of intracellular cholesterol and lipid rafts than their normal non-tumorigenic counterparts. Many signal transduction processes involved in cancer development (insulin-like growth factor system and phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase-AKT) and metastasis [cluster of differentiation (CD)44] are dependent on or modulated by lipid rafts. Additional proteins playing an important role in several malignant cancers (e.g., transmembrane glycoprotein mucin 1) are also being detected in association with lipid rafts, suggesting a major role of lipid rafts in tumor progression. Conversely, lipid rafts also serve as scaffolds for the recruitment and clustering of Fas/CD95 death receptors and downstream signaling molecules leading to cell death-promoting raft platforms. The partition of death receptors and downstream signaling molecules in aggregated lipid rafts has led to the formation of the so-called cluster of apoptotic signaling molecule-enriched rafts, or CASMER, which leads to apoptosis amplification and can be pharmacologically modulated. These death-promoting rafts can be viewed as a linchpin from which apoptotic signals are launched. In this review, we discuss the involvement of lipid rafts in major signaling processes in cancer cells, including cell survival, cell death, and metastasis, and we consider the potential of lipid raft modulation as a promising target in cancer therapy.





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X-ray structures of catalytic intermediates of cytochrome c oxidase provide insights into its O2 activation and unidirectional proton-pump mechanisms [Molecular Biophysics]

Cytochrome c oxidase (CcO) reduces O2 to water, coupled with a proton-pumping process. The structure of the O2-reduction site of CcO contains two reducing equivalents, Fea32+ and CuB1+, and suggests that a peroxide-bound state (Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+) rather than an O2-bound state (Fea32+–O2) is the initial catalytic intermediate. Unexpectedly, however, resonance Raman spectroscopy results have shown that the initial intermediate is Fea32+–O2, whereas Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+ is undetectable. Based on X-ray structures of static noncatalytic CcO forms and mutation analyses for bovine CcO, a proton-pumping mechanism has been proposed. It involves a proton-conducting pathway (the H-pathway) comprising a tandem hydrogen-bond network and a water channel located between the N- and P-side surfaces. However, a system for unidirectional proton-transport has not been experimentally identified. Here, an essentially identical X-ray structure for the two catalytic intermediates (P and F) of bovine CcO was determined at 1.8 Å resolution. A 1.70 Å Fe–O distance of the ferryl center could best be described as Fea34+ = O2−, not as Fea34+–OH−. The distance suggests an ∼800-cm−1 Raman stretching band. We found an interstitial water molecule that could trigger a rapid proton-coupled electron transfer from tyrosine-OH to the slowly forming Fea33+–O−–O−–CuB2+ state, preventing its detection, consistent with the unexpected Raman results. The H-pathway structures of both intermediates indicated that during proton-pumping from the hydrogen-bond network to the P-side, a transmembrane helix closes the water channel connecting the N-side with the hydrogen-bond network, facilitating unidirectional proton-pumping during the P-to-F transition.




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The short variant of optic atrophy 1 (OPA1) improves cell survival under oxidative stress [Bioenergetics]

Optic atrophy 1 (OPA1) is a dynamin protein that mediates mitochondrial fusion at the inner membrane. OPA1 is also necessary for maintaining the cristae and thus essential for supporting cellular energetics. OPA1 exists as membrane-anchored long form (L-OPA1) and short form (S-OPA1) that lacks the transmembrane region and is generated by cleavage of L-OPA1. Mitochondrial dysfunction and cellular stresses activate the inner membrane–associated zinc metallopeptidase OMA1 that cleaves L-OPA1, causing S-OPA1 accumulation. The prevailing notion has been that L-OPA1 is the functional form, whereas S-OPA1 is an inactive cleavage product in mammals, and that stress-induced OPA1 cleavage causes mitochondrial fragmentation and sensitizes cells to death. However, S-OPA1 contains all functional domains of dynamin proteins, suggesting that it has a physiological role. Indeed, we recently demonstrated that S-OPA1 can maintain cristae and energetics through its GTPase activity, despite lacking fusion activity. Here, applying oxidant insult that induces OPA1 cleavage, we show that cells unable to generate S-OPA1 are more sensitive to this stress under obligatory respiratory conditions, leading to necrotic death. These findings indicate that L-OPA1 and S-OPA1 differ in maintaining mitochondrial function. Mechanistically, we found that cells that exclusively express L-OPA1 generate more superoxide and are more sensitive to Ca2+-induced mitochondrial permeability transition, suggesting that S-OPA1, and not L-OPA1, protects against cellular stress. Importantly, silencing of OMA1 expression increased oxidant-induced cell death, indicating that stress-induced OPA1 cleavage supports cell survival. Our findings suggest that S-OPA1 generation by OPA1 cleavage is a survival mechanism in stressed cells.




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Control with point observation for a parabolic problem with convection

I. V. Astashova, D. A. Lashin and A. V. Filinovskii
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 80 (2020), 221-234.
Abstract, references and article information




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The finiteness of the spectrum of boundary value problems defined on a geometric graph

V. A. Sadovnichii, Ya. T. Sultanaev and A. M. Akhtyamov
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 80 (2020), 123-131.
Abstract, references and article information




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On the solvability of a class of nonlinear integral equations in the problem of a spread of an epidemic

A. G. Sergeev and Kh. A. Khachatryan
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 80 (2020), 95-111.
Abstract, references and article information





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Finite-dimensional approximations to the Poincaré–Steklov operator for general elliptic boundary value problems in domains with cylindrical and periodic exits to infinity

S. A. Nazarov
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 80 (2020), 1-51.
Abstract, references and article information





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Unha encravada: Como evitar e desencravar

Unha encravada: quem teve jamais quer repetir a experiência. Os que nunca passaram pela situação, tremem com a ideia de sentir aquela dor de que só ouvem sobre nos relatos.

The post Unha encravada: Como evitar e desencravar appeared first on Saúde Próspera.



  • Dicas de Saúde


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How can a company rely on the COVID-19 exception to shareholder approval requirements?

Publication Date: May 4 2020 On May 1, 2020, Nasdaq adopted Rule 5636T, operative through, and including, June 30, 2020, to provide listed companies with a temporary exception from certain shareholder approval requirements. A Company must submit an application to Nasdaq’s Listing Qualifications Department demonstrating that the transaction satisfies the requirements in Rule 5636T and must provide the Notification Form: Listing of Additional Shares (“LAS Form”) required by...





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Evasive balancing: India's unviable Indo-Pacific strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Rajesh Rajagopalan

India has adopted the Indo-Pacific concept with uncharacteristic speed. This article examines India's Indo-Pacific strategy, which evolved out of its earlier ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’ policies but is much more focused on strategic concerns than on trade or connectivity. As such, the strategy is subset of its China policy, and includes contradictory elements of balancing China by building partnerships with the United States as well as with regional powers, while simultaneously pursuing a reassurance strategy to convince Beijing that India is not really balancing China. The combination of these contradictory elements is characterized as evasive balancing, which is a more useful concept than either pure balancing or hedging for understanding the policies of India and of many other countries in the region that are trying to manage China's rise. However, reassurance strategies rarely work and the combination of balancing and reassurance is even less likely to be viable.




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Will a Devastating Bushfire Season Change Australia’s Climate Stance?

23 January 2020

Madeleine Forster

Richard and Susan Hayden Academy Fellow, International Law Programme

Professor Tim Benton

Research Director, Emerging Risks; Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
With Australians experiencing first-hand the risks of climate change, Madeleine Forster and Tim Benton examine the influencers, at home or abroad, that could push the government towards more action.

2020-01-23-FireNSW.jpg

Residents look on as flames burn through bush on 4 January 2020 in Lake Tabourie, NSW. Photo: Getty Images.

The 2019–20 fire season in Australia has been unprecedented. To date, an estimated 18 million hectares of fire has cut swathes through the bush – an area greater than that of the average European country and over five times the size of blazes in the Amazon.

This reflects previous predictions of Australian science. Since 2008 and as recently as 2018, scientific bodies have warned that climate change will exacerbate existing conditions for fires and other climatic disasters in Australia. What used to be once-in-a-generation fires now re-appear within 10–15 years with increased ferocity, over longer seasons.

In a country known for climate denial and division, debate has erupted around bushfire management and climate change. One of these is whether controlled burns are the answer to Australia’s climate-affected fire conditions.

There is no single risk reduction strategy. Controlled burning remains key, if adapted to the environment and climate

But when three out of four seasons in a year can support destructive bushfires, there are clear limits to what controlled burning and other fire management techniques can achieve. Other ‘adaptation’ measures are also likely to provoke intense debate – including bush clearance. As one Australian expert offered to highlight where Australia has got to, families should probably not go on holiday to bush and beach during the height of summer when temperatures and fire risk peaks. 

So, unless Australia is prepared to debate radical changes to where people live and how land is used, the limits to adaptation imply the need for mitigation. This means supporting ambitious global greenhouse emissions reductions targets. As research from Victoria, one fire-prone state in Australia, highlights, ‘the emissions pathway we follow is the largest determinant of change to many variables [such as temperature] beyond the next few decades.’

Can Australia become a more active global partner on emissions?

Australia accounts for just over one per cent of global emissions, so reducing domestic emissions – even though on a per capita basis they are the highest in the world – will not reduce Australia’s climate risk. Showing international leadership and supporting a powerful coalition of the willing to tackle climate change is the only way ahead. By showing a willingness to adopt climate ambition, Australia can help more constructive worldwide action, and thereby reduce its own risk exposure. 

Leading by example is a politically difficult issue for Australia. Prime Minister Scott Morrison was re-elected in May 2019 on an economic stability platform, and a promise not to imperil employment growth through climate action. Australia has contested UN estimates that it will not meet its existing modest goals for domestic emissions, by seeking to rely on carryover credits from action under the Kyoto Protocol as proof of progress.

It has also distanced itself from concerns over global supply and demand in fossil fuels. Australia remains a global supplier for fossil fuels, including coal – the nation’s coal exports accounted for $67 billion in revenues in 2019 in an expanding but changing Asian market, supplying ‘some of the cheapest electricity in the world’.

Possible influencers of change

With Australians experiencing first-hand the risks of climate change, there is already pressure to do more. Many are sceptical this will translate into domestic targets or export policies that give Australia the moral authority to ask for more action on the global stage.

Here, diverse groups who share a common interest in seeing Australia recover from the bushfires and address future climate risks could be key.

Importantly this includes rural and urban-fringe communities affected by the bushfires. They were part of Morrison’s traditional supporter-base but are angry at the government’s handling of the crisis and increasingly see how tiptoeing around emissions (including exports) has also ‘buried’ open discussion at home on climate-readiness.

Australian states could also find themselves taking a lead role. Virtually all jurisdictions have now committed to their own goals, most based on zero-carbon goals by 2050 (as has New Zealand). These can support modelling for Australia’s energy transition from coal, through gas, to market competitive renewables, while also help to ensure this reflects community expectations on jobs, electricity prices and other costs. 

Other emerging voices include the insurance and banking sectors (the Reserve Bank of Australia warned of the long-term financial stability risks of climate change before the fires) and indigenous Australians (one group of Torres Strait Islanders have filed a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee which, if heard, will place Australia’s emissions record under the spotlight again). Their challenge now is finding a common language on what a cohesive approach to addressing climate change risk looks like. 

The international picture is mixed. The United States’ poor federal climate policy is a buffer for Australia. French President Emmanuel Macron has tried to raise the cost of inaction for Australia in current EU–Australia trade negotiations, but many large emitters in the Indo-Pacific region remain key Australian trading partners, investors and buyers of Australian coal. 

In the meantime, the United Kingdom is preparing for the meeting of parties to the Paris Agreement in Glasgow in November. A key global event following Brexit, the UK will no doubt be hoping to encourage a leadership circle with national commitments that meet global need to make the Glasgow meeting a success.

The UK public has expressed enormous sympathy for Australia in the bushfires and outrage over ‘climate denialism.’ Australia’s experience will be a cautionary tale of the effects of climate change at the meeting. Could the UK also support Australia to become a less reluctant partner in global climate action?




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Virtual Roundtable: Evaluating Outcomes in Fragile Contexts: Adapting Research Methods in the Time of COVID-19

Invitation Only Research Event

5 May 2020 - 12:00pm to 1:00pm

Event participants

Rebecca Wolfe, Lecturer, Harris School for Public Policy and Associate, Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts, University of Chicago
Tom Gillhespy, Principal Consultant, Itad
Shodmon Hojibekov, Chief Executive Officer, Aga Khan Agency for Habitat (Afghanistan)
Chair: Champa Patel, Director, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House

This virtual roundtable has been co-convened by Chatham House and the Aga Khan Foundation.  

While conducting research in fragile and conflict-affected contexts has always presented challenges, the outbreak of COVID-19 creates additional challenges including travel restrictions, ethical challenges, and disruptions to usual modes of working. This virtual roundtable will explore how organizations can adapt their research and monitoring and evaluation models in response to the coronavirus pandemic. This event aims to discuss the research methods being used to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis; the important role of technology; and ways to engage policy and decision-makers during this time.

 

Event attributes

Chatham House Rule

Lucy Ridout

Programme Administrator, Asia-Pacific Programme
+44 (0) 207 314 2761




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Hydel blow away rivals to keep Champs title

Hydel, despite trailing their rivals for two straight days, easily retained their title




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Study helps arboreta, botanical gardens meet genetic diversity conservation goals

In a ground breaking study, an international team of 21 scientists led by Sean Hoban, Ph.D., Conservation Biologist at The Morton Arboretum in Lisle, Illinois, evaluated five genera spanning the plant tree of life (Hibiscus, Magnolia, Pseudophoenix, Quercus and Zamia) to understand how much genetic diversity currently exists in collections in botanical gardens and arboreta worldwide.




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Content as low as 85 cents/100w! - US Writers - Money Back Guarantee - 700+ Samples available




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Terms and conditions, privacy policy




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Report of the fifth meeting of the Compliance Committee now available.




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Report of the sixth meeting of the Compliance Committee now available.




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Tool for the analysis of Second National Reports on the Implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety now available on the BCH




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The Electronic Version of the Publication "The Convention on Biological Diversity Year in Review 2011" Is Now Available.




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Report of the workshop on capacity-building and exchange of experiences as related to the implantation of paragraph 2 of article 18 of the biosafety protocol now available.




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The Information Note for Participants for COP-MOP 6 is now available.




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Media accreditation form, with instructions and FAQs, is now available.




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The calendar for the fair on national experiences with the national implementation of the Biosafety Protocol during MOP 6 is now available.




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The live webcast is now available




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10th Issue of the Biosafety Protocol News is now available entitled: The role of media in promoting biosafety awareness




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The photo gallery for the COP-MOP 6 is now available




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57th, 58th and 59th edition of the Quarterly Report on the Administration of the Convention on Biological Diversity (April to June 2012) (July to December 2012) is now available.




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The Youth Guide to Biodiversity (1st edition), including a biosafety and agriculture part, is now available (page 122-123)




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The Report of the Compliance Committee under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on the Work of Its Tenth Meeting is now available.




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Report of the Asia-Pacific regional training workshop on public awareness, education and participation concerning the safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs is now available.




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Round table on access to information, public participation and access to justice regarding LMOs/GMOs, 16-17 October 2013, Geneva, Switzerland.