Titles and footnotes do not span the entire width of the page when you use the COLUMNS= option with a value that is greater than 1 with the TAGSETS.RTF_SAMPLE tagset. When a value that is greater than 1 is specified for th

When you log on to the SAS Risk Governance Framework and choose a solution, the web application might fail to load the solution content. When the problem occurs, you continue to see "Loading..." on the screen, an

Certain tables that are created in SAS Scalable Performance Data (SPD) Server might not be displayed correctly by SAS Federation Server Manager. Tables that have Latin5 characters in column names encounter this

Proprotein convertase subtilisin/kexin type 9 (PCSK9) regulates cholesterol metabolism by inducing the degradation of hepatic low-density lipoprotein receptor (LDLR). Plasma PCSK9 has two main molecular forms: a 62-kDa mature form (PCSK9_62) and a 55-kDa, furin-cleaved form (PCSK9_55). PCSK9_55 is considered less active than PCSK9_62 in degrading LDLR. We aimed to identify the site of PCSK9_55 formation (intra- vs. extracellular) and to further characterize the LDLR-degradative function of PCSK9_55 relative to PCSK9_62. Co-expressing PCSK9_62 with furin in cell culture induced formation of PCSK9_55, most of which was found in the extracellular space. Under the same conditions we found that: i) adding a cell-permeable furin inhibitor preferentially decreased the formation of PCSK9_55 extracellularly; ii) using pulse-chase, we observed the formation of PCSK9_55 exclusively extracellularly in a time-dependent manner. A recombinant form of PCSK9_55 was efficiently produced but displayed impaired secretion that resulted in its intracellular trapping. However, the non-secreted PCSK9_55 was able to induce degradation of LDLR, though with 50% lower efficiency compared with PCSK9_62. Collectively, our data show that PCSK9_55 is generated in the extracellular space, and that intracellular PCSK9_55 is not secreted but retains the ability to degrade the LDLR through an intracellular pathway.

Lipoprotein (a) [Lp(a)] is a risk factor for CVD and a target of therapy, but Lp(a) measurements are not globally standardized. Commercially available assays generally use polyclonal antibodies that detect multiple sites within the kringle (K)IV₂ repeat region of Lp(a) and may lead to inaccurate assessments of plasma levels. With increasing awareness of Lp(a) as a cardiovascular risk factor and the active clinical development of new potential therapeutic approaches, the broad availability of reagents capable of providing isoform independence of Lp(a) measurements is paramount. To address this issue, we generated a murine monoclonal antibody that binds to only one site on apo(a). A BALB/C mouse was immunized with a truncated version of apo(a) that contained eight total KIV repeats, including only one copy of KIV₂. We generated hybridomas, screened them, and successfully produced a KIV₂-independent monoclonal antibody, named LPA-KIV9. Using a variety of truncated apo(a) constructs to map its binding site, we found that LPA-KIV9 binds to KIV₉ without binding to plasminogen. Fine peptide mapping revealed that LPA-KIV9 bound to the sequence ⁴⁰⁷⁶LETPTVV⁴⁰⁸² on KIV₉. In conclusion, the generation of monoclonal antibody LPA-KIV9 may be a useful reagent in basic research studies and in the clinical application of Lp(a) measurements.

SLC19A2 and SLC19A3, also known as thiamine transporters (THTR) 1 and 2, respectively, transport the positively charged thiamine (vitamin B1) into cells to enable its efficient utilization. SLC19A2 and SLC19A3 are also known to transport structurally unrelated cationic drugs, such as metformin, but whether this charge selectivity extends to other molecules, such as pyridoxine (vitamin B6), is unknown. We tested this possibility using Madin-Darby canine kidney II (MDCKII) cells and human embryonic kidney 293 (HEK293) cells for transfection experiments, and also using Caco-2 cells as human intestinal epithelial model cells. The stable expression of SLC19A2 and SLC19A3 in MDCKII cells (as well as their transient expression in HEK293 cells) led to a significant induction in pyridoxine uptake at pH 5.5 compared with control cells. The induced uptake was pH-dependent, favoring acidic conditions over neutral to basic conditions, and protonophore-sensitive. It was saturable as a function of pyridoxine concentration, with an apparent Km of 37.8 and 18.5 μm, for SLC19A2 and SLC19A3, respectively, and inhibited by the pyridoxine analogs pyridoxal and pyridoxamine as well as thiamine. We also found that silencing the endogenous SLC19A3, but not SLC19A2, of Caco-2 cells with gene-specific siRNAs lead to a significant reduction in carrier-mediated pyridoxine uptake. These results show that SLC19A2 and SLC19A3 are capable of recognizing/transporting pyridoxine, favoring acidic conditions for operation, and suggest a possible role for these transporters in pyridoxine transport mainly in tissues with an acidic environment like the small intestine, which has an acidic surface microclimate.

Pathogenic mutations in the Leucine-rich repeat kinase 2 (LRRK2) are the predominant genetic cause of Parkinson's disease (PD). They increase its activity, resulting in augmented Rab10-Thr73 phosphorylation and conversely, LRRK2 inhibition decreases pRab10 levels. Currently, there is no assay to quantify pRab10 levels for drug target engagement or patient stratification. To meet this challenge, we developed an high accuracy and sensitivity targeted mass spectrometry (MS)-based assay for determining Rab10-Thr73 phosphorylation stoichiometry in human samples. It uses synthetic stable isotope-labeled (SIL) analogues for both phosphorylated and nonphosphorylated tryptic peptides surrounding Rab10-Thr73 to directly derive the percentage of Rab10 phosphorylation from attomole amounts of the endogenous phosphopeptide. The SIL and the endogenous phosphopeptides are separately admitted into an Orbitrap analyzer with the appropriate injection times. We test the reproducibility of our assay by determining Rab10-Thr73 phosphorylation stoichiometry in neutrophils of LRRK2 mutation carriers before and after LRRK2 inhibition. Compared with healthy controls, the PD predisposing mutation carriers LRRK2 G2019S and VPS35 D620N display 1.9-fold and 3.7-fold increased pRab10 levels, respectively. Our generic MS-based assay further establishes the relevance of pRab10 as a prognostic PD marker and is a powerful tool for determining LRRK2 inhibitor efficacy and for stratifying PD patients for LRRK2 inhibitor treatment.

Protein synthesis on the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) requires the dynamic coordination of numerous cellular components. Together, resident ER membrane proteins, cytoplasmic translation factors, and both integral membrane and cytosolic RNA-binding proteins operate in concert with membrane-associated ribosomes to facilitate ER-localized translation. Little is known, however, regarding the spatial organization of ER-localized translation. This question is of growing significance as it is now known that ER-bound ribosomes contribute to secretory, integral membrane, and cytosolic protein synthesis alike. To explore this question, we utilized quantitative proximity proteomics to identify neighboring protein networks for the candidate ribosome interactors SEC61β (subunit of the protein translocase), RPN1 (oligosaccharyltransferase subunit), SEC62 (translocation integral membrane protein), and LRRC59 (ribosome binding integral membrane protein). Biotin labeling time course studies of the four BioID reporters revealed distinct labeling patterns that intensified but only modestly diversified as a function of labeling time, suggesting that the ER membrane is organized into discrete protein interaction domains. Whereas SEC61β and RPN1 reporters identified translocon-associated networks, SEC62 and LRRC59 reporters revealed divergent protein interactomes. Notably, the SEC62 interactome is enriched in redox-linked proteins and ER luminal chaperones, with the latter likely representing proximity to an ER luminal chaperone reflux pathway. In contrast, the LRRC59 interactome is highly enriched in SRP pathway components, translation factors, and ER-localized RNA-binding proteins, uncovering a functional link between LRRC59 and mRNA translation regulation. Importantly, analysis of the LRRC59 interactome by native immunoprecipitation identified similar protein and functional enrichments. Moreover, [³⁵S]-methionine incorporation assays revealed that siRNA silencing of LRRC59 expression reduced steady state translation levels on the ER by ca. 50%, and also impacted steady state translation levels in the cytosol compartment. Collectively, these data reveal a functional domain organization for the ER and identify a key role for LRRC59 in the organization and regulation of local translation.

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a highly contagious infection and threating the human lives in the world. The elevation of cytokines in blood is crucial to induce cytokine storm and immunosuppression in the transition of severity in COVID-19 patients. However, the comprehensive changes of serum proteins in COVID-19 patients throughout the SARS-CoV-2 infection is unknown. In this work, we developed a high-density antibody microarray and performed an in-depth proteomics analysis of serum samples collected from early COVID-19 (n = 15) and influenza (n = 13) patients. We identified a large set of differentially expressed proteins (n = 132) that participate in a landscape of inflammation and immune signaling related to the SARS-CoV-2 infection. Furthermore, the significant correlations of neutrophil and lymphocyte with the CCL2 and CXCL10 mediated cytokine signaling pathways was identified. These information are valuable for the understanding of COVID-19 pathogenesis, identification of biomarkers and development of the optimal anti-inflammation therapy.

China's Regions in an Era of Globalization Book sysadmin 14 May 2018

The rise of China has been shaped and driven by its engagement with the global economy. This engagement cannot be understood at the level of national policymaking alone, but requires analysis of the differences in participation in the global economy across China’s regions.

China is a continent-sized economy and society with substantial diversity across its different regions. This book traces the evolution of regional policy in China and its implications in a global context.

Detailed chapters examine the trajectory of what is now becoming known as the Greater Bay Area in southern China, the inland mega-city of Chongqing, and the role of China’s regions in the globally focused Belt and Road Initiative launched by the Chinese government in late 2013.

It will be of interest to practitioners and scholars engaging with contemporary China’s political economy and international relations.

This book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for China’s Regions in an Era of Globalization

About the author

Tim Summers works on the political economy and international relations of contemporary China. He is a Lecturer at the Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a (non-resident) Senior Consulting Fellow on the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House. He was British consul general in Chongqing from 2004 to 2007.

This book is published in collaboration with Routledge.

Purchase

• Worldwide (via Routledge)
• Students (via Browns Books)

Annual Review 2018-19 Other resource sysadmin 24 July 2019

Explore the institute’s output, activities and achievements from the past year examining how to make the world more stable in uncertain times, new thinking on how societies can promote prosperity, and how to contribute to a more just society.

Chair’s statement

I was delighted to be elected chair of Chatham House last year. It is an honour to lead such a remarkable institution and to have the opportunity to build on the legacy left by Stuart Popham, who stepped down last year as chair and whom I thank and pay tribute to.

My ambition is to ensure that the institute has an even better future than its illustrious past. We are living in unpredictable times, and I want us to be at the centre of the drive to guide the world to a healthier place both politically and economically.

Chatham House possesses world-leading convening power, which – when combined with our capacity to deliver leading, cross-cutting research – gives us a unique advantage in the field of international relations. I want us to harness these assets and better combine the strengths of our research teams so that we can address the big global challenges around economic growth; avoiding geopolitical tensions; and developing new governance systems (as outlined on page 7). This will enable us to improve our impact and effect more policy change.

I also want Chatham House to be an exciting place that attracts younger, more diverse, international audiences. We need to drive more engagement with the next generation of members and others to draw on their enthusiasm, energy and ideas. Our Common Futures Conversations project, for example, is engaging young people from 13 countries across Africa and Europe to identify their shared concerns, and is enabling them to work together to identify solutions via online communities.

This initiative, and indeed all of our activities, would not be possible without funding and support. As noted in more detail in the Honorary Treasurer’s report (page 32), 2018/19 was a challenging year financially, with income totalling £16,381,000, slightly below the level recorded in 2017/18.

Although total net assets at 31 March 2019 were 3 per cent down year on year, the balance sheet remain strong and there was an inflow of cash, with the level of forward income received and pledged increasing significantly.

In this context, I am delighted to note the award of the transformational £10 million grant to facilitate the creation of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Wing, which will help facilitate research, host our Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs and establish a new collaboration space – the ‘CoLab’ – for engaging our new audiences. All of Chatham House’s supporters, and not least our members, remain indispensable to our success. Without their engagement, enthusiasm and input, the institute could not fulfil its mission.

I am indebted to my colleagues on Council for their support, engagement and expertise. I can say with confidence that they are actively involved in their governance responsibilities at this time when the operational, as well as financial, pressures on all charitable institutions are more intense than ever.

I would like to pay tribute to Alistair Burnett, Martin Fraenkel and Barbara Ridpath, who step down from Council this year after a total of 15 years’ service. I would also like to thank and acknowledge Robin Niblett and his team for their dedication and hard work. Some of the outcomes of their labours are highlighted on the following pages.

Lord Jim O’Neill

The Phillies acquired All-Star catcher J.T. Realmuto from the Marlins on Thursday for catcher Jorge Alfaro, right-hander Sixto Sanchez, left-hander Will Stewart and $250,000 in international bonus slot money, the latest move in a busy and ambitious offseason for a team eager to return to the postseason.

MLB Network's countdown of baseball's best players at each position came to a conclusion with the final installment of the "Top 10 Right Now!" series, featuring the game's top relief pitchers and shortstops.

Phillies pitchers and catchers have their first workout Wednesday morning at Carpenter Complex. Almost anything can happen between Wednesday and Opening Day. That said, here is a very early prediction of the Phillies' Opening Day roster, knowing the Phillies remain in the hunt to sign Bryce Harper or Manny Machado.

The Phillies introduced J.T. Realmuto, their new All-Star catcher, in a news conference Tuesday at the team's Spring Training complex in Clearwater, Fla.

Aaron Nola established himself as one of the best pitchers in baseball in 2018. The Phillies ensured on Wednesday that he will be the ace in their rotation for possibly the next five seasons.

Phillies president Andy MacPhail opened a 28-minute press conference on Friday afternoon at Spectrum Field with facts and figures about investments the organization made the past few seasons as the team wallowed at the bottom of the National League. Then MacPhail talked a lot about Bryce Harper and Manny Machado as well as manager Gabe Kapler.

Who do the Phillies have in the pipeline? Get scouting reports, video, stats, projected ETAs and more for Philly's Top 30 Prospects on MLBPipeline.com's Prospect Watch.

The next five weeks will see lots of shuffling on Major League rosters. Here are the most intriguing positional battles on each of the 30 MLB clubs.

The Phillies have been the favorites in the Bryce Harper sweepstakes for months, and that speculation heated up over the weekend.

The Phillies list isn't quite as strong as it once was because of the Realmuto deal, but there's still some very good talent at the top and some exciting players on the rise.

Bryce Harper is the final superstar standing for the Phillies.

Spring Training is imminent, Opening Day is within sight and the big league season isn't complete for fans without a subscription to MLB.TV. The most comprehensive streaming service in professional sports is now available for the 2019 season.

MLB.com looked at each team's two highest-ranked position players in WAR, according to the Steamer projections. Here are the top 10, but keep in mind that things could change once Manny Machado and Bryce Harper find homes.

It's almost time for Spring Training yet again, as Angels pitchers and catchers report to their Spring Training complex in Tempe, Ariz. on Feb. 12.

Our weekly series previewing each of baseball's six divisions begins with the American League West. Let's take a team-by-team look at the biggest questions this season.

Since debuting in 2011, center fielder Mike Trout has been far and away the best player in the Majors, but the Angels have reached the postseason just once in his eight-year career.

Brad Ausmus held his first media session of the spring on the day pitchers and catchers officially reported on Tuesday, giving updates on rehabbing players such as Shohei Ohtani, Albert Pujols and Zack Cozart.

MLB Network's countdown of baseball's best players at each position continued with the third installment of the "Top 10 Right Now!" series, featuring the game's top left and center fielders.

Shohei Ohtani remains a must-watch player for Angels fans in 2019, and his recovery from Tommy John surgery will be worth monitoring throughout the season as he prepares to pitch again in '20.

The Angels head to Spring Training with most of their roster set, but there will be competition for a few spots. Here's a look at the projected roster for the Angels, as they begin their first campaign under manager Brad Ausmus.

Who do the Angels have in the pipeline? Get scouting reports, video, stats, projected ETAs and more for the Halos' Top 30 Prospects on MLB Pipeline's Prospect Watch.

The next five weeks will see lots of shuffling on Major League rosters. Here are the most intriguing positional battles on each of the 30 MLB clubs.

Mike Trout and owner Arte Moreno met separately with the media on Monday, but neither would confirm that extension talks have begun between the Angels and Trout's agent, Craig Landis.

The Angels have a new closer in Cody Allen and there isn't any manager in baseball who knows him better than Indians skipper Terry Francona.

VOLUME 289 (2014) PAGES 6604–6618In Fig. 4G, in the foxi1 panel, the images in Fig. 4G, i and l, corresponding to “smad1 MO” and “smad5 MO + samd1/9 mRNA” samples, respectively, were inadvertently reused during figure preparation. This error has now been corrected using images pertaining to each treatment and sample. This correction does not affect the results or conclusions of the work.jbc;295/52/18650/F4F1F4Figure 4G.

Rebuilding Zimbabwe's Economy: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Immediate Priorities Expert comment sysadmin 13 December 2017

Zimbabwe cannot expect to rebuild in the same economic model that brought previous prosperity.

Returning to Harare as Zimbabwe’s president-designate Emmerson Mnangagwa declared, ‘We want to grow our economy, we want peace, we want jobs, jobs, jobs.’

Robert Mugabe leaves a legacy of an independent Zimbabwe in a deep economic crisis. Much remains uncertain as to what a new government in Zimbabwe will look like, and there is sure to be continuity as well as considerable change.

What is clear is that a new administration under Mnangagwa will need to turn the economy around to garner support and legitimacy from the Zimbabwean people. Zimbabwe’s economic output halved over the period 1997–2008, and it has not recovered. With more than 80 per cent of Zimbabweans in the informal economy, and with social and economic resilience undermined by previous crises and decades of mismanagement, the stakes for the new leader are very high.

Reform will be difficult particularly because politically connected elites have acquired businesses through uncompetitive means. They will be reluctant to see significantly more competition. But they will also want an improved economic environment. And there is scope for the people of Zimbabwe to benefit from this.

An important change will be in the prioritization of economic stability. Mugabe demonstrated that he was willing to make political decisions irrespective of the economic consequences. Mnangagwa is thought to be less ideological and more of a pragmatist. For him, delivering economic recovery will be crucial to building political support.

The most pressing fiscal priority is the public wage bill. Employment costs account for over 80 per cent of government expenditure, crowding out spending on social programmes, health and education. But the fragility of the economy means that reform cannot be fast-tracked. The public wage bill accounts for over 20 per cent of GDP and is an essential driver of demand. Public sector workers are also politically influential. Another further priority is the reform of state-owned enterprises that are pressuring the fiscus.

A new administration will need to rebuild confidence. Policymakers have been operating in a low-confidence environment for a long time, but for any meaningful change to take root there has to be trust between the government, businesses and the people of Zimbabwe. Businesses and citizens will want to see a plan of action for remonetizing the economy. Zimbabwe faces an acute liquidity crisis. A shortage of US dollars and a lack of confidence in government-issued bond notes are testing resilience.

The financial system has recovered from a crisis of nonperforming loans – triggered by high debt amassed during the post-dollarization boom, and weak corporate governance. But the system remains highly fragile and swamped with government debt. Hard cash US dollar deposits fell from 49 per cent ($582 million) in 2009 to just six per cent ($269 million) in 2016. In 2015, industrial utilization stood at just 34.3 per cent of installed capacity, and it was estimated that just five per cent of the country’s businesses were viable.

The crux of the Zimbabwean economy is the linkage between agriculture and manufacturing. Commercial agriculture contributes approximately 12 per cent of the country’s GDP, and more than 60 per cent of inputs into the manufacturing sector. Tobacco in particular is a vital earner of much needed foreign exchange. Policies to support mid-scale farmers will have multiplier effects. They drive agricultural growth and generate jobs throughout the supply chain.

Zimbabwe also has world-class natural resource endowments including ferrochrome, gold, copper, iron ore, lithium, diamonds and platinum group metals. But longer investment-gestation periods and industry risk adversity will mean that payoffs from fresh investments in this sector will take longer to materialize.

Domestic finance will need to be mobilized to generate recovery, and this will need to be supported by international investment. But international investors entering the country must be cognizant of Zimbabwean’s expectations and also historical perceptions – especially around the scepticism of neoliberal economics as a result of failed structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s.

Zimbabweans have high social expectations for international investors. Educated, tech-savvy, internationally connected youth are at the core of the consumer class that investors will be targeting, to both sell products to but also to staff offices in country. But this cohort also has a greater expectation of international companies to adhere to the norms and standards that they abide by at home and not take advantage of weak governance or poor regulation to exploit citizens.

Investors in Zimbabwe must also recognize that behind the controversial Mugabe policies of land reform and indigenization – the empowerment of local citizens through shared ownership – was a popular desire for postcolonial economic transformation. This sentiment remains. Working in partnership with local entities and communicating the economic contribution made to society will be necessary to build a long-term presence in Zimbabwe, and reap the dividend of what many hope to be a new start for the country.

Fresh thinking is required from domestic policymakers and international partners. A skilled population and estimated 3-5 million-strong diaspora will bring international experience and make a considerable contribution to this process. Some of this thinking has been done. The Lima process of re-engagement with international financial institutions that was agreed at the end of 2015 has laid some of the groundwork, especially around international expectations regarding both economic and governance reform – the substance of which was analysed in a 2016 Chatham House paper. The implementation of recommendations of the well-regarded auditor-general’s report on SOE reform will also be a key prerequisite for long-term reform.

Zimbabweans are not alone in processing what has happened and how to react. Investors have long been poised to capitalize on what is perceived to be one of the continent’s best long-term prospects. A lot will remain unchanged following the transition. But significantly, for the first time in decades, there is a real opportunity to effect positive change and improve the livelihoods of millions of Zimbabweans.

This article was originally published at the Huffington Post.

South Africa's Land Reform Quandary: Scenarios and Policy 10 July 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 13 June 2018 Chatham House, London

Slow delivery on expectations of land redistribution in South Africa has once again put the issue at the forefront of political debate in the country. A parliamentary public consultation process will consider whether constitutional change is required to accelerate expropriation without compensation. Policymakers face dual - often opposing - pressures due to investors’ fears of negative economic impacts as well as citizens’ frustrations over persistent inequality and hardship. State land and tribal trust land remain contentious issues for rural economic development, but with two thirds of the population now living in urban areas policy responses must be as cognizant of the country’s future as it is of its past.

At this meeting, Terence Corrigan, project manager at the South African Institute of Race Relations, will discuss the current debates on expropriation and present the institute’s latest research on future scenarios of land reform in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Zimbabwe's Elections Were Meant to Start a New Era Expert comment sysadmin 14 August 2018

Emmerson Mnangagwa has been declared president of Zimbabwe amid protests and violence but Zimbabweans are now in a post-political, economy-first mood, writes Knox Chitiyo.

Before Zimbabwe’s general election on 30 July, there was a lot of talk about there being ‘landmark change’ and ‘credibility.’ But in many ways it was déjà vu. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ruling ZANU-PF party won the parliamentary vote, taking a majority 144 seats out of 210. The opposition MDC Alliance, a seven-party coalition led by Nelson Chamisa, won 64 seats—an improvement on their 2013 showing of 44 seats, but still falling far short of expectations.

The presidential results were much closer. After clashes on Wednesday, the incumbent Mnangagwa was declared winner early Friday morning, taking 50.8 per cent of the vote against Chamisa’s 44.3 per cent. The 21 other independent presidential candidates polled less than 5 per cent between them.

The polls didn’t quite live up to the hype. There was much that was positive: the prelude and election day were peaceful, with a minimal military presence. Opposition candidates were able to hold nationwide rallies (including in ZANU-PF’s rural heartland) without interference—an electoral first. ZANU-PF leaders and the military called for a peaceful process. Four women candidates contested the presidential vote, another first. More than 5 million Zimbabweans registered out of an eligible voting population of 7.2 million, and there was a near record 75 per cent turnout on voting day. Zimbabwe invited official observers from 46 countries and 15 international organizations, and, for the first time since 2002, observers from the EU, the Commonwealth and the US were present.

But shortcomings included late public access to the imperfect biometric voters roll and controversies about the ballot papers. There were also misogynistic social media attacks and threats against female candidates and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) chair Justice Priscilla Chigumba.

The three-day wait for presidential results saw a further decline in public trust in the ZEC, and the opposition’s premature announcement of a Chamisa victory only fanned the political flames.

On Wednesday, six unarmed civilians were shot dead by soldiers in Harare, with dozens more assaulted. A Joint International Observer Mission statement promptly condemned the violence and called for restraint.

The election process was a boon for democracy, but ironically the result has entrenched the two-party parliamentary system and marginalized alternative voices. Mnangagwa has been conciliatory in his post-election statements, saying that Nelson Chamisa has a ‘crucial role to play’ and calling for unity to ‘build a new Zimbabwe for all.’

But Chamisa’s MDC Alliance has refused to accept the results, calling them ‘fake’ and a ‘scandal.’ The MDC has raised genuine transparency concerns and will likely challenge the results in court, but much of this may be cosmetic—with little chance of a 2017 Kenya-style presidential re-run. There is no critical mass of opposition parties to sustain a challenge, nor is there a popular appetite for a protracted political feud.

Zimbabwe’s democracy agenda may be heading into the slow lane, and Chamisa may be pressured by his coalition partners to make a political accommodation with Mnangagwa. Nevertheless, despite setbacks, Zimbabwe’s opposition and civil society has a long history of resilience under pressure and the struggle for democracy will continue.

Mnangagwa has a full in-tray. He has to unite a fractious ZANU-PF and manage internal civil-military and generational faultlines. Beyond that, he may need a public reconciliation with Chamisa—similar to how in Kenya and Mozambique, similar incumbent-opposition quarrels were mended by public rapprochements.

But Zimbabweans are now in a post-political, economy-first mood. Resolving the cash crisis is crucial. Few Zimbabweans can withdraw more than $50 a day from banks or ATMs—and much of this is paid out in unpopular ‘bond coins.’ The formal sector has contracted to only 20 per cent of the economy, and the informal sector lacks the capacity to push an economic renewal.

Zimbabwe’s new internationalism is premised upon the 2015 Lima process economic reform pathway for debt arrears clearance. (The country has a $10 billion foreign debt.) There has been a modest increase in foreign and diaspora investment, but the big-money Chinese, Russian and other pledges are long-horizon projects. What Zimbabwe needs is a short-term economic stimulus—to support small and medium-sized businesses.

For this to happen, Mnangagwa has to stay the course on economic reform, ease of doing business and the anti-corruption agenda. The pivot from reform to transformation in Zimbabwe will require all hands on deck, including civil society, the opposition, Zimbabwe diaspora and foreign investors, in a partnership for development.

A positive global verdict on the elections could supercharge investment, but time will tell whether these polls have been a deal-maker or a deal-breaker.

Zimbabwe’s elections often split the global south and the global north, and this could be the case again. The EU will have to decide whether to continue their incremental rapprochement with Zimbabwe, or accelerate to the reciprocity-based, ‘Re-Engagement 2.0’ approach currently favoured by the UK although the US is unlikely to lift statutory sanctions anytime soon.

Zimbabwe’s possible return to the Commonwealth could also be divisive, given the broader global context of the perceived existential clash between beleaguered liberal democracy and the rise of populist—and popular—autocracies across the globe.

President Mnangagwa—along with South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, Mozambique’s Filipe Nyusi and others—belong to a pragmatic new wave of regional economic reformers nudging liberationism away from ideology. He now has an electoral mandate to lead a divided country. For sisters Chipo and Tendai, both businesswomen based in Harare who voted for Mnangagwa and Chamisa respectively, the future needs to come now. ‘There is too much talk,’ they said, ‘we live every day between hope and despair. We need cash and jobs. We are tired of being tired.’

This was originally published in TIME.

South Africa’s 2019 Election: Polling Data and Party Prospects 13 March 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 March 2019 Chatham House, London

On 8 May 2019, South Africans will vote in their sixth national election. Incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa is leading his ANC party campaign, which promises inclusive economic growth and social transformation, including through a sustainable land reform programme. However, public frustrations with the party’s record of service delivery and government corruption after 25 years in power could threaten the ANC’s electoral dominance especially in urban areas.

At this meeting, Professor David Everatt, head of the Wits School of Governance and political pollster, will present polling data and discuss the prospects and strategies of the main parties and their leaders ahead of the May election.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms 21 January 2020 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

COVID-19 in South Africa: Leadership, Resilience and Inequality Expert comment sysadmin 7 May 2020

In a world looking for leadership, South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa has been remarkable. One year after he carried the time-worn ANC through a national election, South Africans are crying out for more.

In the COVID-19 crisis so far, Cyril Ramaphosa has been widely praised for displaying the decisive leadership so many hoped for when they cast their ballot for him in May 2019. Buttressed by others such as health minister Dr Zweli Mkhize, and on a simple objective to prevent transmission, South Africa has been a lesson to the world. Act fast. Act hard.

Former president Thabo Mbeki’s disastrous response to the HIV crisis cast a long shadow over his legacy, and Ramaphosa has taken note. South Africa has had one of the tightest lockdowns in the world. No exercise. No cigarettes. No alcohol.

The lockdown was imposed when the country had only around 1,000 recorded cases and just two deaths. As a result, transmission from returning travellers has not yet led to an exponential infection rate within the community. The government’s swift reaction has bought much needed time with the peak now seemingly delayed to September or October.

Continental and national leadership

Ramaphosa has also emerged as a key focal point for Africa-wide responses. As current chair of the African Union (AU) he leads the continental engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO), and the various international finance institutions, while South African officials are working with the AU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on a push for African debt restructuring.

He has also been active in trouble shooting to unlock external assistance to the continent, including from China and Russia. Appointing special envoys is typical of his boardroom-honed leadership style.

International and regional partnerships are vital for resilience and the arrival of 217 Cuban doctors to South Africa is strongly reminiscent of the liberationist solidarity of the Cold War era. And regional economies remain dependent on South Africa to protect their own vulnerable citizens. Following the 2008 financial crisis, it was South Africa’s regional trading relationships that remained robust, while trade with its main global partners in China and the US dropped.

Despite the plaudits, Ramaphosa remains vulnerable to challenge at home, notably around his failure to stimulate South Africa’s moribund economy. On the eve of lockdown, Moody’s joined its peers Standard and Poor’s and Fitch in giving South Africa a below investment grade credit rating. The move was a long time coming. Long mooted economic reforms were slow to materialise, and South Africa had fallen into recession.

Ramaphosa depends on a small core of close advisors and allies, initially united in apparent opposition to the kleptocratic rule of President Jacob Zuma and the deep patronage networks he created within both the party and the state. But this allegiance is being tested by economic reality. Support within the party was already drifting prior to the crisis.

Disagreements are not just technocratic – there are big ideological questions in play around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. Energy minister and former union stalwart Gwede Mantashe is wary of job losses, and minister of public enterprises Pravin Gordhan protective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before coronavirus hit, Ramaphosa seemed content to allow these policy disputes to play themselves out with little decisive intervention.

Slow progress on reform, against worsening economic performance, left Ramaphosa and his allies exposed. In January the president missed the UK’s African Investment Summit in order to assert control over a party meeting at which it was expected his detractors would seek to remove Gordhan.

COVID-19 has sharpened thinking

As the independently assertive - and eminently quotable - pro-market reformist finance minister Tito Mboweni stated, ‘you can’t eat ideology’. Accelerated reform and restructuring is required if the government turns to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance.

For the first time, Gordhan has been forced to deny a bailout to beleaguered state airline South African Airways (SAA), and the government’s lockdown bailout of R500 billion has been applauded by business. Much like the fiscal stimulus and recovery plan of 2018, it relies on smart spending, targeting sectors with high multiplier effects. It also includes significant reserve bank loans.

But it has been criticised for not doing enough to help the most vulnerable. There is considerable fear of what could happen when the virus takes hold in South Africa’s townships and informal settlements where social distancing is almost impossible, basic toilet facilities are shared, and HIV and TB rates high.

There are mounting concerns of the humanitarian cost of a prolonged lockdown, and the government has been faster than others in implementing a tiered lockdown system, trying to get people back to work and keep the economy afloat.

South Africa has been criticized by the UN for the use of lethal force by security forces in enforcing lockdown and, in a society plagued by corruption, there are fears legislation to stop the spread of false information could be used to restrict legitimate reporting on the virus response or other issues.

COVID-19 shines a spotlight on societies’ fault-lines worldwide. South Africa is often touted as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the world but, in a globalized economy, these divisions are international as much as they are local.

Resilience comes from within, but also depends on regional and global trading and financial systems. South Africans and international partners have long recognised Ramaphosa’s leadership qualities as an impressive voice for the global south.

But he must also be an advocate for South Africa’s poor. This crisis could accelerate implementation of his landmark pro-poor National Health Insurance and Universal Health Care programmes. Or the hit of COVID-19 on top of South Africa’s existing economic woes could see them derailed entirely. Ramaphosa must push through economic reforms at the same time as managing COVID-19 and rebuilding trust in his government.

Webinar: South Africa's Economic Recovery Beyond COVID-19 27 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2020

South Africa's Economic Outlook 20 August 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 August 2020 Online

South Africa’s long mooted economic reforms have been slow to materialize. The economy had fallen into recession even before the COVID-19 pandemic, and had been stripped of its international investment grade rating. The reserve bank is now forecasting a contraction in GDP of over seven percent for 2020.

There are significant questions around the role of the state in the economy, the level of intervention, and its affordability, with key government figures sceptical of rapid market reforms. The mandate and independence of the South African Reserve Bank has also been a subject of public debate. The IMF has approved a US$4.3 billion emergency financial assistance package to help mitigate the health and economic shock to the country. But it has also made clear that there is a pressing need to ensure debt sustainability and implement structural reforms to support recovery and achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this event, Lesetja Kganyago, the governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), gives his assessment of the expected trajectory of the South African economy in the short and medium term. He discusses the IMF package and the implications for economic reform, and the role of the reserve bank in delivering sustainable and inclusive growth.

Zimbabwe's Economy During the Coronavirus Pandemic and Beyond 8 September 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020

COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy. Important foreign currency earning industries have virtually stopped, and across the country livelihoods are at risk and an increasing number of people are reliant on government grants.

Businesses are having to become more flexible but are constrained by a weak policy environment and lack of confidence in the economy. Since 2017, the government has been pursuing an economic reform agenda and Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP), which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. The deepening challenges highlight the need to accelerate economic reform and build confidence in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this webinar, speakers discuss the measures that government, businesses, and individuals are adopting in response to the COVID-19 economic challenge, and the policies required for recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

South Africa's Economic Reform and Employment in the Context of the Coronavirus Pandemic 3 September 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020 Online

President of COSATU, Zingiswa Losi, discusses the organization’s priorities for protecting jobs and workers, and working with other stakeholders to build a sustainable post-pandemic economy.

Employment in South Africa fell by an estimated 18 per cent between February and April 2020. The measures imposed to control the spread of COVID-19 suffocated an already weak economy and unemployment has hit a new high.

The stated aims of the government’s economic reform plans include the support of job creation in labour intensive industries, but the reform of the state and rebalancing of the economy and fiscus could lead to further job losses in state agencies and enterprises.

Protecting jobs while ensuring the health and safety of workers are dual priorities, and require the joint commitment and ‘social compact’ of labour, business and government.

Angola forum 2022: Prospects for Angola's social and economic future 15 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 November 2022 Online

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future, and what to expect from 2023.

At this virtual Angola Forum, speakers will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023.

Angola experienced positive economic momentum in 2022 allowing it to exit its six-year recession, with the economy taking centre stage in the August national multiparty elections. Increased oil prices and high levels of production have driven Angola’s economic growth and improved macroeconomic conditions, as well as helping the country to reduce its public debt to 56.5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (down from 79.7 per cent in 2021).

However, a global economic downturn in 2023, with increased inflation, means Angola’s re-elected MPLA government will need to focus on job creation, greater economic inclusivity and diversifying away from an oil-led economy. It will also require Angola to navigate its international partnerships more effectively in this era of heightened geopolitical rivalries.  

At this online Angola forum, experts will discuss Angola’s social and economic future and what to expect from 2023. Speakers will reflect on the social and economic trends seen in 2021-22 and explore election trends, human rights and international relations.

This Angola Forum is supported by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.