dn

Trans-Dniester profile

An overview of the breakaway region in eastern Moldova




dn

Cathy Yan’s rapid rise from journalist to ‘Birds of Prey’ director: ‘I didn’t think you could do this professionally’

Yan guided Margot Robbie's return to her character Harley Quinn, and is the first woman of Asian descent to direct a major Hollywood superhero movie.




dn

News24.com | Pirates kidnap 6 crewmen from 2 fishing boats off Gabon: source

Pirates have attacked two fishing vessels near the Gabonese capital Libreville, abducting six crewmen, a source close to the Gabonese government told AFP.




dn

The NCAA’s lousy new metric is going to make March Madness even crazier

The NCAA tournament could be more entertaining than usual, if only because seedings may be less accurate than in past years.




dn

Steve Harvey’s cartel jokes about Colombia at the Miss Universe pageant didn’t go over well

The host made news of his own with questionable jokes, an eye roll and whispers of another wrong winner.




dn

The deficit has gotten worse. This shouldn’t be a surprise.

President Trump’s policies haven’t helped his campaign promise.




dn

oscon: Only 48 hours left to get discounted tickets to #OSCON. Early registration prices end tomorrow at midnight http://t.co/E0JKpcj1Rp

oscon: Only 48 hours left to get discounted tickets to #OSCON. Early registration prices end tomorrow at midnight http://t.co/E0JKpcj1Rp




dn

oscon: Last chance - today is the last day for #OSCON early registration pricing. Register by midnight PT to save http://t.co/E0JKpcj1Rp

oscon: Last chance - today is the last day for #OSCON early registration pricing. Register by midnight PT to save http://t.co/E0JKpcj1Rp




dn

strataconf: Moving to the open healthcare graph http:// http://t.co/YYTUDN3Vzn Achieving the triple aim in healthcare: better, cheaper, safer #stratarx

strataconf: Moving to the open healthcare graph http:// http://t.co/YYTUDN3Vzn Achieving the triple aim in healthcare: better, cheaper, safer #stratarx




dn

AT#281 - Travel to Sydney, Australia

The Amateur Traveler talks to Alix (of Alix and Jace’s Amazing Adventure) about her hometown of Sydney Australia. Alix has many ideas about fun things to do in Sydney so you don’t just end up with the rest of the tourists on Darling Harbor. After you have climbed the Harbor Bridge and visited the Sydney Opera House she recommends a beach walk by word famous Bondi Beach, a chance to sleep with the animals of the Taronga Zoo and the out of the way Manly Beach. She tells us what’s the best day of the year to see Sydney (although also the most expensive). Alix also gives us a dizzying list of Sydney restaurants to try.




dn

AT#537 - Travel to Sydney, Australia

Hear about travel to Sydney, Australia as the Amateur Traveler talks to Roma Small from RoamingRequired.com about her hometown. 




dn

He Spent 45 Years in Prison for Crime He Didn’t Commit, Turned to Art as His Escape

In 1971, a man named Gregory Harris was murdered. Richard Phillips, an autoworker, was convicted of the crime and spent the next 45 years in prison. The problem? Phillips was innocent. Instead, it was the star witness during the trial who framed Phillips, and it took his alleged partner-in-crime, Richard Polombo, decades to admit that…

The post He Spent 45 Years in Prison for Crime He Didn’t Commit, Turned to Art as His Escape appeared first on The Western Journal.




dn

For Some Refugees, Safe Haven Now Depends on a DNA Test

Changes to a program designed to reunite refugees with family in the U.S. have slowed -- and in some cases outright denied -- legitimate entries into the country.




dn

Texas Gov Abbott Frees Salon Owner Shelley Luther: “Criminals shouldn’t be released to prevent COVID-19 just to put business owners in their place”

The following article, Texas Gov Abbott Frees Salon Owner Shelley Luther: “Criminals shouldn’t be released to prevent COVID-19 just to put business owners in their place”, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

Texas Governor Greg Abbott just changed the coronavirus order to free Salon A La Mode owner Shelley Luther from jail. Abbott tweeted out a comment about the poor treatment of the business owner: Throwing Texans in jail whose biz’s shut down through no fault of their own is wrong. I am eliminating jail for violating […]

Continue reading: Texas Gov Abbott Frees Salon Owner Shelley Luther: “Criminals shouldn’t be released to prevent COVID-19 just to put business owners in their place” ...




dn

Woman Shoots Three Teenage McDonald’s Workers For Telling Her She Couldn’t Eat In Dining Room Over COVID19 Restrictions

The following article, Woman Shoots Three Teenage McDonald’s Workers For Telling Her She Couldn’t Eat In Dining Room Over COVID19 Restrictions, was first published on 100PercentFedUp.com.

An angry Oklahoma woman shot at a group of teenagers working at a local McDonald’s after they explained to her that the dining room was closed due to coronavirus restrictions. 32-year-old Gloricia Woody was arrested by the Oklahoma City Police and charged with the shooting. From the Oklahoma City Police -Last night, officers were called […]

Continue reading: Woman Shoots Three Teenage McDonald’s Workers For Telling Her She Couldn’t Eat In Dining Room Over COVID19 Restrictions ...




dn

A comprehensive evaluation of a typical plant telomeric G-quadruplex (G4) DNA reveals the dynamics of G4 formation, rearrangement, and unfolding [Plant Biology]

Telomeres are specific nucleoprotein structures that are located at the ends of linear eukaryotic chromosomes and play crucial roles in genomic stability. Telomere DNA consists of simple repeats of a short G-rich sequence: TTAGGG in mammals and TTTAGGG in most plants. In recent years, the mammalian telomeric G-rich repeats have been shown to form G-quadruplex (G4) structures, which are crucial for modulating telomere functions. Surprisingly, even though plant telomeres are essential for plant growth, development, and environmental adaptions, only few reports exist on plant telomeric G4 DNA (pTG4). Here, using bulk and single-molecule assays, including CD spectroscopy, and single-molecule FRET approaches, we comprehensively characterized the structure and dynamics of a typical plant telomeric sequence, d[GGG(TTTAGGG)3]. We found that this sequence can fold into mixed G4s in potassium, including parallel and antiparallel structures. We also directly detected intermediate dynamic transitions, including G-hairpin, parallel G-triplex, and antiparallel G-triplex structures. Moreover, we observed that pTG4 is unfolded by the AtRecQ2 helicase but not by AtRecQ3. The results of our work shed light on our understanding about the existence, topological structures, stability, intermediates, unwinding, and functions of pTG4.




dn

Legal Provision for Crisis Preparedness: Foresight not Hindsight

21 April 2020

Dr Patricia Lewis

Research Director, Conflict, Science & Transformation; Director, International Security Programme
COVID-19 is proving to be a grave threat to humanity. But this is not a one-off, there will be future crises, and we can be better prepared to mitigate them.

2020-04-21-Nurse-COVID-Test

Examining a patient while testing for COVID-19 at the Velocity Urgent Care in Woodbridge, Virginia. Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

Case Study of Preparedness: South Korea

By 2007, South Korea had established the Division of Public Health Crisis Response in Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) and, in 2016, the KCDC Center for Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response had established a round-the-clock Emergency Operations Center with rapid response teams.

KCDC is responsible for the distribution of antiviral stockpiles to 16 cities and provinces that are required by law to hold and manage antiviral stockpiles.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

Case Study of Preparedness: United States

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) established PERRC – the Preparedness for Emergency Response Research Centers - as a requirement of the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, which required research to ‘improve federal, state, local, and tribal public health preparedness and response systems’.

The 2006 Act has since been supplanted by the 2019 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act. This created the post of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS) and authorised the development and acquisitions of medical countermeasures and a quadrennial National Health Security Strategy.

The 2019 Act also set in place a number of measures including the requirement for the US government to re-evaluate several important metrics of the Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement and the Hospital Preparedness Program, and a requirement for a report on the states of preparedness and response in US healthcare facilities.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

  • The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
  • The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
  • How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
  • What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

  • Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
  • Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
  • All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
  • There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

  • The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
  • States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
  • Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

Case Study of Preparedness: The UK

The National Risk Register was first published in 2008 as part of the undertakings laid out in the National Security Strategy (the UK also published the Biological Security Strategy in July 2018). Now entitled the National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies it has been updated regularly to analyse the risks of major emergencies that could affect the UK in the next five years and provide resilience advice and guidance.

The latest edition - produced in 2017 when the UK had a Minister for Government Resilience and Efficiency - placed the risk of a pandemic influenza in the ‘highly likely and most severe’ category. It stood out from all the other identified risks, whereas an emerging disease (such as COVID-19) was identified as ‘highly likely but with moderate impact’.

However, much preparatory work for an influenza pandemic is the same as for COVID-19, particularly in prepositioning large stocks of PPE, readiness within large hospitals, and the creation of new hospitals and facilities.

One key issue is that the 2017 NHS Operating Framework for Managing the Response to Pandemic Influenza was dependent on pre-positioned ’just in case’ stockpiles of PPE. But as it became clear the PPE stocks were not adequate for the pandemic, it was reported that recommendations about the stockpile by NERVTAG (the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group which advises the government on the threat posed by new and emerging respiratory viruses) had been subjected to an ‘economic assessment’ and decisions reversed on, for example, eye protection.

The UK chief medical officer Dame Sally Davies, when speaking at the World Health Organization about Operation Cygnus – a 2016 three-day exercise on a flu pandemic in the UK – reportedly said the UK was not ready for a severe flu attack and ‘a lot of things need improving’.

Aware of the significance of the situation, the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy launched an inquiry in 2019 on ‘Biosecurity and human health: preparing for emerging infectious diseases and bioweapons’ which intended to coordinate a cross-government approach to biosecurity threats. But the inquiry had to postpone its oral hearings scheduled for late October 2019 and, because of the general election in December 2019, the committee was obliged to close the inquiry.




dn

The histone H4 basic patch regulates SAGA-mediated H2B deubiquitination and histone acetylation [DNA and Chromosomes]

Histone H2B monoubiquitylation (H2Bub1) has central functions in multiple DNA-templated processes, including gene transcription, DNA repair, and replication. H2Bub1 also is required for the trans-histone regulation of H3K4 and H3K79 methylation. Although previous studies have elucidated the basic mechanisms that establish and remove H2Bub1, we have only an incomplete understanding of how H2Bub1 is regulated. We report here that the histone H4 basic patch regulates H2Bub1. Yeast cells with arginine-to-alanine mutations in the H4 basic patch (H42RA) exhibited a significant loss of global H2Bub1. H42RA mutant yeast strains also displayed chemotoxin sensitivities similar to, but less severe than, strains containing a complete loss of H2Bub1. We found that the H4 basic patch regulates H2Bub1 levels independently of interactions with chromatin remodelers and separately from its regulation of H3K79 methylation. To measure H2B ubiquitylation and deubiquitination kinetics in vivo, we used a rapid and reversible optogenetic tool, the light-inducible nuclear exporter, to control the subcellular location of the H2Bub1 E3 ligase, Bre1. The ability of Bre1 to ubiquitylate H2B was unaffected in the H42RA mutant. In contrast, H2Bub1 deubiquitination by SAGA-associated Ubp8, but not by Ubp10, increased in the H42RA mutant. Consistent with a function for the H4 basic patch in regulating SAGA deubiquitinase activity, we also detected increased SAGA-mediated histone acetylation in H4 basic patch mutants. Our findings uncover that the H4 basic patch has a regulatory function in SAGA-mediated histone modifications.




dn

Impact of 1,N6-ethenoadenosine, a damaged ribonucleotide in DNA, on translesion synthesis and repair [Enzymology]

Incorporation of ribonucleotides into DNA can severely diminish genome integrity. However, how ribonucleotides instigate DNA damage is poorly understood. In DNA, they can promote replication stress and genomic instability and have been implicated in several diseases. We report here the impact of the ribonucleotide rATP and of its naturally occurring damaged analog 1,N6-ethenoadenosine (1,N6-ϵrA) on translesion synthesis (TLS), mediated by human DNA polymerase η (hpol η), and on RNase H2–mediated incision. Mass spectral analysis revealed that 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA generates extensive frameshifts during TLS, which can lead to genomic instability. Moreover, steady-state kinetic analysis of the TLS process indicated that deoxypurines (i.e. dATP and dGTP) are inserted predominantly opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also show that hpol η acts as a reverse transcriptase in the presence of damaged ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA but has poor RNA primer extension activities. Steady-state kinetic analysis of reverse transcription and RNA primer extension showed that hpol η favors the addition of dATP and dGTP opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also found that RNase H2 recognizes 1,N6-ϵrA but has limited incision activity across from this lesion, which can lead to the persistence of this detrimental DNA adduct. We conclude that the damaged and unrepaired ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA exhibits mutagenic potential and can also alter the reading frame in an mRNA transcript because 1,N6-ϵrA is incompletely incised by RNase H2.




dn

Legal Provision for Crisis Preparedness: Foresight not Hindsight

21 April 2020

Dr Patricia Lewis

Research Director, Conflict, Science & Transformation; Director, International Security Programme
COVID-19 is proving to be a grave threat to humanity. But this is not a one-off, there will be future crises, and we can be better prepared to mitigate them.

2020-04-21-Nurse-COVID-Test

Examining a patient while testing for COVID-19 at the Velocity Urgent Care in Woodbridge, Virginia. Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

Case Study of Preparedness: South Korea

By 2007, South Korea had established the Division of Public Health Crisis Response in Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) and, in 2016, the KCDC Center for Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response had established a round-the-clock Emergency Operations Center with rapid response teams.

KCDC is responsible for the distribution of antiviral stockpiles to 16 cities and provinces that are required by law to hold and manage antiviral stockpiles.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

Case Study of Preparedness: United States

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) established PERRC – the Preparedness for Emergency Response Research Centers - as a requirement of the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, which required research to ‘improve federal, state, local, and tribal public health preparedness and response systems’.

The 2006 Act has since been supplanted by the 2019 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act. This created the post of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS) and authorised the development and acquisitions of medical countermeasures and a quadrennial National Health Security Strategy.

The 2019 Act also set in place a number of measures including the requirement for the US government to re-evaluate several important metrics of the Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement and the Hospital Preparedness Program, and a requirement for a report on the states of preparedness and response in US healthcare facilities.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

  • The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
  • The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
  • How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
  • What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

  • Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
  • Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
  • All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
  • There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

  • The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
  • States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
  • Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

Case Study of Preparedness: The UK

The National Risk Register was first published in 2008 as part of the undertakings laid out in the National Security Strategy (the UK also published the Biological Security Strategy in July 2018). Now entitled the National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies it has been updated regularly to analyse the risks of major emergencies that could affect the UK in the next five years and provide resilience advice and guidance.

The latest edition - produced in 2017 when the UK had a Minister for Government Resilience and Efficiency - placed the risk of a pandemic influenza in the ‘highly likely and most severe’ category. It stood out from all the other identified risks, whereas an emerging disease (such as COVID-19) was identified as ‘highly likely but with moderate impact’.

However, much preparatory work for an influenza pandemic is the same as for COVID-19, particularly in prepositioning large stocks of PPE, readiness within large hospitals, and the creation of new hospitals and facilities.

One key issue is that the 2017 NHS Operating Framework for Managing the Response to Pandemic Influenza was dependent on pre-positioned ’just in case’ stockpiles of PPE. But as it became clear the PPE stocks were not adequate for the pandemic, it was reported that recommendations about the stockpile by NERVTAG (the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group which advises the government on the threat posed by new and emerging respiratory viruses) had been subjected to an ‘economic assessment’ and decisions reversed on, for example, eye protection.

The UK chief medical officer Dame Sally Davies, when speaking at the World Health Organization about Operation Cygnus – a 2016 three-day exercise on a flu pandemic in the UK – reportedly said the UK was not ready for a severe flu attack and ‘a lot of things need improving’.

Aware of the significance of the situation, the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy launched an inquiry in 2019 on ‘Biosecurity and human health: preparing for emerging infectious diseases and bioweapons’ which intended to coordinate a cross-government approach to biosecurity threats. But the inquiry had to postpone its oral hearings scheduled for late October 2019 and, because of the general election in December 2019, the committee was obliged to close the inquiry.




dn

Undercurrents: Summer Special - Allison Gardner on Artificial Intelligence




dn

A comprehensive evaluation of a typical plant telomeric G-quadruplex (G4) DNA reveals the dynamics of G4 formation, rearrangement, and unfolding [Plant Biology]

Telomeres are specific nucleoprotein structures that are located at the ends of linear eukaryotic chromosomes and play crucial roles in genomic stability. Telomere DNA consists of simple repeats of a short G-rich sequence: TTAGGG in mammals and TTTAGGG in most plants. In recent years, the mammalian telomeric G-rich repeats have been shown to form G-quadruplex (G4) structures, which are crucial for modulating telomere functions. Surprisingly, even though plant telomeres are essential for plant growth, development, and environmental adaptions, only few reports exist on plant telomeric G4 DNA (pTG4). Here, using bulk and single-molecule assays, including CD spectroscopy, and single-molecule FRET approaches, we comprehensively characterized the structure and dynamics of a typical plant telomeric sequence, d[GGG(TTTAGGG)3]. We found that this sequence can fold into mixed G4s in potassium, including parallel and antiparallel structures. We also directly detected intermediate dynamic transitions, including G-hairpin, parallel G-triplex, and antiparallel G-triplex structures. Moreover, we observed that pTG4 is unfolded by the AtRecQ2 helicase but not by AtRecQ3. The results of our work shed light on our understanding about the existence, topological structures, stability, intermediates, unwinding, and functions of pTG4.




dn

Single-molecule level structural dynamics of DNA unwinding by human mitochondrial Twinkle helicase [Molecular Biophysics]

Knowledge of the molecular events in mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) replication is crucial to understanding the origins of human disorders arising from mitochondrial dysfunction. Twinkle helicase is an essential component of mtDNA replication. Here, we employed atomic force microscopy imaging in air and liquids to visualize ring assembly, DNA binding, and unwinding activity of individual Twinkle hexamers at the single-molecule level. We observed that the Twinkle subunits self-assemble into hexamers and higher-order complexes that can switch between open and closed-ring configurations in the absence of DNA. Our analyses helped visualize Twinkle loading onto and unloading from DNA in an open-ringed configuration. They also revealed that closed-ring conformers bind and unwind several hundred base pairs of duplex DNA at an average rate of ∼240 bp/min. We found that the addition of mitochondrial single-stranded (ss) DNA–binding protein both influences the ways Twinkle loads onto defined DNA substrates and stabilizes the unwound ssDNA product, resulting in a ∼5-fold stimulation of the apparent DNA-unwinding rate. Mitochondrial ssDNA-binding protein also increased the estimated translocation processivity from 1750 to >9000 bp before helicase disassociation, suggesting that more than half of the mitochondrial genome could be unwound by Twinkle during a single DNA-binding event. The strategies used in this work provide a new platform to examine Twinkle disease variants and the core mtDNA replication machinery. They also offer an enhanced framework to investigate molecular mechanisms underlying deletion and depletion of the mitochondrial genome as observed in mitochondrial diseases.




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Atomic force microscopy-based characterization of the interaction of PriA helicase with stalled DNA replication forks [DNA and Chromosomes]

In bacteria, the restart of stalled DNA replication forks requires the DNA helicase PriA. PriA can recognize and remodel abandoned DNA replication forks, unwind DNA in the 3'-to-5' direction, and facilitate the loading of the helicase DnaB onto the DNA to restart replication. Single-stranded DNA–binding protein (SSB) is typically present at the abandoned forks, but it is unclear how SSB and PriA interact, although it has been shown that the two proteins interact both physically and functionally. Here, we used atomic force microscopy to visualize the interaction of PriA with DNA substrates with or without SSB. These experiments were done in the absence of ATP to delineate the substrate recognition pattern of PriA before its ATP-catalyzed DNA-unwinding reaction. These analyses revealed that in the absence of SSB, PriA binds preferentially to a fork substrate with a gap in the leading strand. Such a preference has not been observed for 5'- and 3'-tailed duplexes, suggesting that it is the fork structure that plays an essential role in PriA's selection of DNA substrates. Furthermore, we found that in the absence of SSB, PriA binds exclusively to the fork regions of the DNA substrates. In contrast, fork-bound SSB loads PriA onto the duplex DNA arms of forks, suggesting a remodeling of PriA by SSB. We also demonstrate that the remodeling of PriA requires a functional C-terminal domain of SSB. In summary, our atomic force microscopy analyses reveal key details in the interactions between PriA and stalled DNA replication forks with or without SSB.




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Strengthening National Accountability and Preparedness for Global Health Security (SNAP-GHS)

The project aims to identify the enablers and barriers to enhance data use by National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs), producing outputs that will facilitate strengthening of the role of NPHIs in monitoring potential public health threats, and in shaping and informing domestic policies on health security and preparedness.

Global health security is underpinned by the actions taken at a national level to ensure capacities exist to sufficiently prepare for and respond to acute threats and crises. In many contexts, National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) were first established because of, and in response to, specific public health challenges typically related to infectious diseases.

The Strengthening National Accountability and Preparedness for Global Health Security (SNAP-GHS) project evolved from a series of roundtables and discussions hosted by the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House, in collaboration with the Graduate Institute of Geneva.

The outcome of the project is a SNAP-GHS Toolkit to support NPHIs in better diagnosing and understanding the challenges to data use within their own institutes, as well as in relation to external stakeholders and agencies. The toolkit is intended to be used for further circulation and dissemination by the International Association of National Public Health Institutes (IANPHI).

The project is led by the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House in collaboration with the Ethiopian Public Health Institute, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, and the National Institute for Health in Pakistan.




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Chemical roadblocking of DNA transcription for nascent RNA display [RNA]

Site-specific arrest of RNA polymerases (RNAPs) is fundamental to several technologies that assess RNA structure and function. Current in vitro transcription “roadblocking” approaches inhibit transcription elongation by blocking RNAP with a protein bound to the DNA template. One limitation of protein-mediated transcription roadblocking is that it requires inclusion of a protein factor extrinsic to the minimal in vitro transcription reaction. In this work, we developed a chemical approach for halting transcription by Escherichia coli RNAP. We first established a sequence-independent method for site-specific incorporation of chemical lesions into dsDNA templates by sequential PCR and translesion synthesis. We then show that interrupting the transcribed DNA strand with an internal desthiobiotin-triethylene glycol modification or 1,N6-etheno-2'-deoxyadenosine base efficiently and stably halts Escherichia coli RNAP transcription. By encoding an intrinsic stall site within the template DNA, our chemical transcription roadblocking approach enables display of nascent RNA molecules from RNAP in a minimal in vitro transcription reaction.




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Matching Vital Needs - Increasing the number of live-donor kidney transplants

A person needing a kidney transplant may have a friend or relative who volunteers to be a living donor, but whose kidney is incompatible, forcing the person to wait for a transplant from a deceased donor. In the U.S. alone, thousands of people die each year without ever finding a suitable kidney. A new technique applies graph theory to groups of incompatible patient-donor pairs to create the largest possible number of paired-donation exchanges. These exchanges, in which a donor paired with Patient A gives a kidney to Patient B while a donor paired with Patient B gives to Patient A, will dramatically increase transplants from living donors. Since transplantation is less expensive than dialysis, this mathematical algorithm, in addition to saving lives, will also save hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Naturally there can be more transplants if matches along longer patient-donor cycles are considered (e.g., A.s donor to B, B.s donor to C, and C.s donor to A). The problem is that the possible number of longer cycles grows so fast hundreds of millions of A >B>C>A matches in just 5000 donor-patient pairs that to search through all the possibilities is impossible. An ingenious use of random walks and integer programming now makes searching through all three-way matches feasible, even in a database large enough to include all incompatible patient-donor pairs. For More Information: Matchmaking for Kidneys, Dana Mackenzie, SIAM News, December 2008. Image of suboptimal two-way matching (in purple) and an optimal matching (in green), courtesy of Sommer Gentry.




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Why founders shouldn't worry about founder-market fit

As the venture capital world gets a hot new buzz phrase in 'founder-market fit', serial founder Alex Depledge counters with her view that industry experience doesn't help founders crack a market




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CBD News: It is with deep regret and profound sadness that we announce the passing away of a valued staff member of the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Marie Aminata Khan, on 12 December 2011. Since joining the CBD, Marie has great




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CBD News: Statement by Mr. Braulio F. de Souza Dias, CBD Executive Secretary, to the 44th Meeting of the Council of the Global Environment Facility, Washington DC, United States of America, Wednesday, 19 June 2013




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CBD News: With immense sadness, we announce the death of our dear colleague Olivier de Munck. He was a supremely dedicated colleague who joined the Secretariat in 1999.




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CBD News: It is with great regret and deepest sadness that we convey news of the untimely death of Dr Bradnee Chambers, Executive Secretary of the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS). Among his numerous achievements is the strengthened collaboration amo




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CBD News: Statement by Ms. Elizabeth Maruma Mrema, Acting Executive Secretary, Convention on Biological Diversity, at the fifty-seventh meeting of the Council of the Global Environment Facility, Wednesday, 18 December 2019, Washington D.C., United States




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Goodness-of-fit test in the Cox proportional hazards model with measurement errors

A. G. Kukush and O. O. Chernova
Theor. Probability and Math. Statist. 99 (2020), 125-135.
Abstract, references and article information




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Secondary Hyperparathyroidism and Chronic Kidney Disease

Sarah Tomasello
Jan 1, 2008; 21:19-25
Articles




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A comprehensive evaluation of a typical plant telomeric G-quadruplex (G4) DNA reveals the dynamics of G4 formation, rearrangement, and unfolding [Plant Biology]

Telomeres are specific nucleoprotein structures that are located at the ends of linear eukaryotic chromosomes and play crucial roles in genomic stability. Telomere DNA consists of simple repeats of a short G-rich sequence: TTAGGG in mammals and TTTAGGG in most plants. In recent years, the mammalian telomeric G-rich repeats have been shown to form G-quadruplex (G4) structures, which are crucial for modulating telomere functions. Surprisingly, even though plant telomeres are essential for plant growth, development, and environmental adaptions, only few reports exist on plant telomeric G4 DNA (pTG4). Here, using bulk and single-molecule assays, including CD spectroscopy, and single-molecule FRET approaches, we comprehensively characterized the structure and dynamics of a typical plant telomeric sequence, d[GGG(TTTAGGG)3]. We found that this sequence can fold into mixed G4s in potassium, including parallel and antiparallel structures. We also directly detected intermediate dynamic transitions, including G-hairpin, parallel G-triplex, and antiparallel G-triplex structures. Moreover, we observed that pTG4 is unfolded by the AtRecQ2 helicase but not by AtRecQ3. The results of our work shed light on our understanding about the existence, topological structures, stability, intermediates, unwinding, and functions of pTG4.




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Proline-rich 11 (PRR11) drives F-actin assembly by recruiting the actin-related protein 2/3 complex in human non-small cell lung carcinoma [DNA and Chromosomes]

The actin cytoskeleton is extremely dynamic and supports diverse cellular functions in many physiological and pathological processes, including tumorigenesis. However, the mechanisms that regulate the actin-related protein 2/3 (ARP2/3) complex and thereby promote actin polymerization and organization in cancer cells are not well-understood. We previously implicated the proline-rich 11 (PRR11) protein in lung cancer development. In this study, using immunofluorescence staining, actin polymerization assays, and siRNA-mediated gene silencing, we uncovered that cytoplasmic PRR11 is involved in F-actin polymerization and organization. We found that dysregulation of PRR11 expression results in F-actin rearrangement and nuclear instability in non-small cell lung cancer cells. Results from molecular mechanistic experiments indicated that PRR11 associates with and recruits the ARP2/3 complex, facilitates F-actin polymerization, and thereby disrupts the F-actin cytoskeleton, leading to abnormal nuclear lamina assembly and chromatin reorganization. Inhibition of the ARP2/3 complex activity abolished irregular F-actin polymerization, lamina assembly, and chromatin reorganization due to PRR11 overexpression. Notably, experiments with truncated PRR11 variants revealed that PRR11 regulates F-actin through different regions. We found that deletion of either the N or C terminus of PRR11 abrogates its effects on F-actin polymerization and nuclear instability and that deletion of amino acid residues 100–184 or 100–200 strongly induces an F-actin structure called the actin comet tail, not observed with WT PRR11. Our findings indicate that cytoplasmic PRR11 plays an essential role in regulating F-actin assembly and nuclear stability by recruiting the ARP2/3 complex in human non-small cell lung carcinoma cells.




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Single-molecule level structural dynamics of DNA unwinding by human mitochondrial Twinkle helicase [Molecular Biophysics]

Knowledge of the molecular events in mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) replication is crucial to understanding the origins of human disorders arising from mitochondrial dysfunction. Twinkle helicase is an essential component of mtDNA replication. Here, we employed atomic force microscopy imaging in air and liquids to visualize ring assembly, DNA binding, and unwinding activity of individual Twinkle hexamers at the single-molecule level. We observed that the Twinkle subunits self-assemble into hexamers and higher-order complexes that can switch between open and closed-ring configurations in the absence of DNA. Our analyses helped visualize Twinkle loading onto and unloading from DNA in an open-ringed configuration. They also revealed that closed-ring conformers bind and unwind several hundred base pairs of duplex DNA at an average rate of ∼240 bp/min. We found that the addition of mitochondrial single-stranded (ss) DNA–binding protein both influences the ways Twinkle loads onto defined DNA substrates and stabilizes the unwound ssDNA product, resulting in a ∼5-fold stimulation of the apparent DNA-unwinding rate. Mitochondrial ssDNA-binding protein also increased the estimated translocation processivity from 1750 to >9000 bp before helicase disassociation, suggesting that more than half of the mitochondrial genome could be unwound by Twinkle during a single DNA-binding event. The strategies used in this work provide a new platform to examine Twinkle disease variants and the core mtDNA replication machinery. They also offer an enhanced framework to investigate molecular mechanisms underlying deletion and depletion of the mitochondrial genome as observed in mitochondrial diseases.




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CRISPR-Cas12a has widespread off-target and dsDNA-nicking effects [DNA and Chromosomes]

Cas12a (Cpf1) is an RNA-guided endonuclease in the bacterial type V-A CRISPR-Cas anti-phage immune system that can be repurposed for genome editing. Cas12a can bind and cut dsDNA targets with high specificity in vivo, making it an ideal candidate for expanding the arsenal of enzymes used in precise genome editing. However, this reported high specificity contradicts Cas12a's natural role as an immune effector against rapidly evolving phages. Here, we employed high-throughput in vitro cleavage assays to determine and compare the native cleavage specificities and activities of three different natural Cas12a orthologs (FnCas12a, LbCas12a, and AsCas12a). Surprisingly, we observed pervasive sequence-specific nicking of randomized target libraries, with strong nicking of DNA sequences containing up to four mismatches in the Cas12a-targeted DNA-RNA hybrid sequences. We also found that these nicking and cleavage activities depend on mismatch type and position and vary with Cas12a ortholog and CRISPR RNA sequence. Our analysis further revealed robust nonspecific nicking of dsDNA when Cas12a is activated by binding to a target DNA. Together, our findings reveal that Cas12a has multiple nicking activities against dsDNA substrates and that these activities vary among different Cas12a orthologs.




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Withdrawal: miR-21-mediated radioresistance occurs via promoting repair of DNA double strand breaks. [Withdrawals/Retractions]

VOLUME 292 (2017) PAGES 3531–3540This article has been withdrawn by Shuofeng Hu, Xiaomin Ying, Xiangming Zhang, and Ya Wang. Baocheng Hu, Xiang Wang, Ping Wang, Jian Wang, and Hongyan Wang could not be reached. In Fig. 1C, the DAPI and merged images for the no IR control were switched. The DNA-PKcs and actin immunoblots on the left appear to have been spliced. In Fig. 4C, the DNA-PKcs immunoblot appears to have been spliced. In Fig. 4D, lanes 1 and 5; lanes 2, 6, and 8; and lanes 3 and 7 of the DNA-PKcs immunoblot are the same. In the p-DNA-PKcs immunoblot, lanes 1 and 8, lanes 2 and 6, and lanes 3 and 7 are the same. In the CRY2 immunoblot, lanes 5 and 7 are the same. In the CDC25A immunoblot, lanes 3 and 8 are the same. In the GSK3B immunoblot, lanes 1 and 5 and lanes 3 and 7 are the same. Also in the GSK3B immunoblot, the upper GSK3B bands in lanes 6 and 8 are the same. Lanes 4 and 8 of the cyclin D1 immunoblot are the same. In Fig. 5A, the CDC25A immunoblot appears to have been spliced. Also in Fig. 5A, lanes 2–4 and lanes 6–8 of the CDC25A immunoblot are the same. Lanes 4–6 and 7–9 of the actin immunoblot are the same. In Fig. 5C, lane 1 of the CDC25A immunoblot was reused in lane 5, and lanes 3 and 4 were reused in lanes 7 and 8. In the...




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Withdrawal: Distinct roles of Ape1 protein, an enzyme involved in DNA repair, in high or low linear energy transfer ionizing radiation-induced cell killing. [Withdrawals/Retractions]

VOLUME 289 (2014) PAGES 30635–30644This article has been withdrawn by Guangnan Chen, Dongkyoo Park, Francis A. Cucinotta, David S. Yu, Xingming Deng, William S. Dynan, Paul W. Doetsch, and Ya Wang. Hongyan Wang, Xiang Wang, Xiangming Zhang, and Xiaobing Tang could not be reached. The last two lanes of the actin immunoblot in Fig. 1A were reused in the last two lanes of the actin immunoblot in Fig. 1C. In Fig. 2A, the γ-H2AX and the merge with DAPI images for no IR treatment do not match. In Fig. 3A, lanes 3 and 4 of the γ-H2AX immunoblot were reused in lanes 7 and 8, and lanes 5 and 6 of the H2A immunoblot were reused in lanes 7 and 8. In Fig. 3B, lanes 5 and 6 of the H2A immunoblot were reused in lanes 7 and 8. In Fig. 3C, lanes 5 and 6 of the γ-H2AX immunoblot were reused in lanes 7 and 8. Additionally, lanes 1 and 2 of the H2A immunoblot were reused in lanes 3 and 4. In Fig. 3D, lanes 1 and 2 of the Mre11 immunoblot from lysates were reused in lanes 4 and 5. In the γ-H2AX immunoblot, lane 3 was reused in lane 7, and lane 4 was reused in lanes 6 and 8. Also in the H2A immunoblot, lanes 1 and 2 were reused in lanes 3 and 4. In Fig. 4B, lanes 2 and 6 of the Mre11 immunoblot from Ogg1−/− cells are the same. In the Ape1...




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Impact of 1,N6-ethenoadenosine, a damaged ribonucleotide in DNA, on translesion synthesis and repair [Enzymology]

Incorporation of ribonucleotides into DNA can severely diminish genome integrity. However, how ribonucleotides instigate DNA damage is poorly understood. In DNA, they can promote replication stress and genomic instability and have been implicated in several diseases. We report here the impact of the ribonucleotide rATP and of its naturally occurring damaged analog 1,N6-ethenoadenosine (1,N6-ϵrA) on translesion synthesis (TLS), mediated by human DNA polymerase η (hpol η), and on RNase H2–mediated incision. Mass spectral analysis revealed that 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA generates extensive frameshifts during TLS, which can lead to genomic instability. Moreover, steady-state kinetic analysis of the TLS process indicated that deoxypurines (i.e. dATP and dGTP) are inserted predominantly opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also show that hpol η acts as a reverse transcriptase in the presence of damaged ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA but has poor RNA primer extension activities. Steady-state kinetic analysis of reverse transcription and RNA primer extension showed that hpol η favors the addition of dATP and dGTP opposite 1,N6-ϵrA. We also found that RNase H2 recognizes 1,N6-ϵrA but has limited incision activity across from this lesion, which can lead to the persistence of this detrimental DNA adduct. We conclude that the damaged and unrepaired ribonucleotide 1,N6-ϵrA in DNA exhibits mutagenic potential and can also alter the reading frame in an mRNA transcript because 1,N6-ϵrA is incompletely incised by RNase H2.




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Atomic force microscopy-based characterization of the interaction of PriA helicase with stalled DNA replication forks [DNA and Chromosomes]

In bacteria, the restart of stalled DNA replication forks requires the DNA helicase PriA. PriA can recognize and remodel abandoned DNA replication forks, unwind DNA in the 3'-to-5' direction, and facilitate the loading of the helicase DnaB onto the DNA to restart replication. Single-stranded DNA–binding protein (SSB) is typically present at the abandoned forks, but it is unclear how SSB and PriA interact, although it has been shown that the two proteins interact both physically and functionally. Here, we used atomic force microscopy to visualize the interaction of PriA with DNA substrates with or without SSB. These experiments were done in the absence of ATP to delineate the substrate recognition pattern of PriA before its ATP-catalyzed DNA-unwinding reaction. These analyses revealed that in the absence of SSB, PriA binds preferentially to a fork substrate with a gap in the leading strand. Such a preference has not been observed for 5'- and 3'-tailed duplexes, suggesting that it is the fork structure that plays an essential role in PriA's selection of DNA substrates. Furthermore, we found that in the absence of SSB, PriA binds exclusively to the fork regions of the DNA substrates. In contrast, fork-bound SSB loads PriA onto the duplex DNA arms of forks, suggesting a remodeling of PriA by SSB. We also demonstrate that the remodeling of PriA requires a functional C-terminal domain of SSB. In summary, our atomic force microscopy analyses reveal key details in the interactions between PriA and stalled DNA replication forks with or without SSB.




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Genetic evidence for reconfiguration of DNA polymerase {theta} active site for error-free translesion synthesis in human cells [DNA and Chromosomes]

The action mechanisms revealed by the biochemical and structural analyses of replicative and translesion synthesis (TLS) DNA polymerases (Pols) are retained in their cellular roles. In this regard, DNA polymerase θ differs from other Pols in that whereas purified Polθ misincorporates an A opposite 1,N6-ethenodeoxyadenosine (ϵdA) using an abasic-like mode, Polθ performs predominantly error-free TLS in human cells. To test the hypothesis that Polθ adopts a different mechanism for replicating through ϵdA in human cells than in the purified Pol, here we analyze the effects of mutations in the two highly conserved tyrosine residues, Tyr-2387 and Tyr-2391, in the Polθ active site. Our findings that these residues are indispensable for TLS by the purified Pol but are not required in human cells, as well as other findings, provide strong evidence that the Polθ active site is reconfigured in human cells to stabilize ϵdA in the syn conformation for Hoogsteen base pairing with the correct nucleotide. The evidence that a DNA polymerase can configure its active site entirely differently in human cells than in the purified Pol establishes a new paradigm for DNA polymerase function.




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Icelandic DNA jigsaw-puzzle brings new knowledge about Neanderthals

(Aarhus University) An international team of researchers has put together a new image of Neanderthals based on the genes Neanderthals left in the DNA of modern humans when they had children with them about 50,000 years ago. The researchers found the new information by trawling the genomes of more than 27,000 Icelanders. Among other things, they discovered that Neanderthal children had older mothers and younger fathers than the Homo-Sapien children in Africa did at the time.




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New technique delivers complete DNA sequences of chromosomes inherited from mother and father

(University of Adelaide) An international team of scientists led by the University of Adelaide's Davies Research Centre has shown that it is possible to disentangle the DNA sequences of the chromosomes inherited from the mother and the father, to create true diploid genomes from a single individual.




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The DNA sensor cGAS is decorated by acetylation and phosphorylation modifications in the context of immune signaling

Bokai Song
Apr 28, 2020; 0:RA120.001981v1-mcp.RA120.001981
Research




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Strengthening Urban Preparedness and Resilience Against Biological Threats in Accra

Invitation Only Research Event

1 March 2019 - 10:30am to 2 March 2019 - 3:00pm

Chatham House, London

Capacity to contain and respond to biological threats varies considerably across the world. Yet such preparedness is vital for prevention, impact-reduction and resilience in the face of biological events, whether they be natural or deliberate outbreaks.

Chatham House is conducting a series of meetings to strengthen urban preparedness for, and resilience against, biological threats in African countries. This meeting will examine the preparedness and prevention mechanisms in Accra, reviewing the comprehensiveness of city-level preparedness.  

This meeting will focus on the formation and implementation of city-level action plans in the context of preparedness for managing biological threats. It will also explore how local authorities are contributing to this effort with their knowledge and expertise.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Nilza Amaral

Project Manager, International Security Programme




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Legal Provision for Crisis Preparedness: Foresight not Hindsight

21 April 2020

Dr Patricia Lewis

Research Director, Conflict, Science & Transformation; Director, International Security Programme
COVID-19 is proving to be a grave threat to humanity. But this is not a one-off, there will be future crises, and we can be better prepared to mitigate them.

2020-04-21-Nurse-COVID-Test

Examining a patient while testing for COVID-19 at the Velocity Urgent Care in Woodbridge, Virginia. Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

Case Study of Preparedness: South Korea

By 2007, South Korea had established the Division of Public Health Crisis Response in Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) and, in 2016, the KCDC Center for Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response had established a round-the-clock Emergency Operations Center with rapid response teams.

KCDC is responsible for the distribution of antiviral stockpiles to 16 cities and provinces that are required by law to hold and manage antiviral stockpiles.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

Case Study of Preparedness: United States

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Center for Disease Control (CDC) established PERRC – the Preparedness for Emergency Response Research Centers - as a requirement of the 2006 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, which required research to ‘improve federal, state, local, and tribal public health preparedness and response systems’.

The 2006 Act has since been supplanted by the 2019 Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act. This created the post of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the Department for Health and Human Services (HHS) and authorised the development and acquisitions of medical countermeasures and a quadrennial National Health Security Strategy.

The 2019 Act also set in place a number of measures including the requirement for the US government to re-evaluate several important metrics of the Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement and the Hospital Preparedness Program, and a requirement for a report on the states of preparedness and response in US healthcare facilities.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

  • The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
  • The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
  • How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
  • What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

  • Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
  • Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
  • All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
  • There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

  • The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
  • States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
  • Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

Case Study of Preparedness: The UK

The National Risk Register was first published in 2008 as part of the undertakings laid out in the National Security Strategy (the UK also published the Biological Security Strategy in July 2018). Now entitled the National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies it has been updated regularly to analyse the risks of major emergencies that could affect the UK in the next five years and provide resilience advice and guidance.

The latest edition - produced in 2017 when the UK had a Minister for Government Resilience and Efficiency - placed the risk of a pandemic influenza in the ‘highly likely and most severe’ category. It stood out from all the other identified risks, whereas an emerging disease (such as COVID-19) was identified as ‘highly likely but with moderate impact’.

However, much preparatory work for an influenza pandemic is the same as for COVID-19, particularly in prepositioning large stocks of PPE, readiness within large hospitals, and the creation of new hospitals and facilities.

One key issue is that the 2017 NHS Operating Framework for Managing the Response to Pandemic Influenza was dependent on pre-positioned ’just in case’ stockpiles of PPE. But as it became clear the PPE stocks were not adequate for the pandemic, it was reported that recommendations about the stockpile by NERVTAG (the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group which advises the government on the threat posed by new and emerging respiratory viruses) had been subjected to an ‘economic assessment’ and decisions reversed on, for example, eye protection.

The UK chief medical officer Dame Sally Davies, when speaking at the World Health Organization about Operation Cygnus – a 2016 three-day exercise on a flu pandemic in the UK – reportedly said the UK was not ready for a severe flu attack and ‘a lot of things need improving’.

Aware of the significance of the situation, the UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy launched an inquiry in 2019 on ‘Biosecurity and human health: preparing for emerging infectious diseases and bioweapons’ which intended to coordinate a cross-government approach to biosecurity threats. But the inquiry had to postpone its oral hearings scheduled for late October 2019 and, because of the general election in December 2019, the committee was obliged to close the inquiry.




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Early Detection in a Mouse Model of Pancreatic Cancer by Imaging DNA Damage Response Signalling

Rationale: Despite its widespread use in oncology, the PET radiotracer 18F-FDG is ineffective for improving early detection of pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma (PDAC). An alternative strategy for early detection of pancreatic cancer involves visualisation of high-grade pancreatic intraepithelial neoplasias (PanIN-3), generally regarded as the non-invasive precursors of PDAC. The DNA damage response is known to be hyper-activated in late-stage PanINs. Therefore, we investigated whether the SPECT imaging agent, 111In-anti-H2AX-TAT, allows visualisation of the DNA damage repair marker H2AX in PanIN-3s in an engineered mouse model of PDAC, to facilitate early detection of PDAC. Methods: Genetically engineered KPC mice (KRasLSL.G12D/+; p53LSL.R172H/+; PdxCre) were imaged with 18F-FDG and 111In-anti-H2AX-TAT. PanIN/PDAC presence visualised by histology was compared with autoradiography and immunofluorescence. Separately, the survival of KPC mice imaged with 111In-anti-H2AX-TAT was evaluated. Results: In KPC mouse pancreata, H2AX expression was increased in high-grade PanINs, but not in PDAC, corroborating earlier results obtained from human pancreas sections. Uptake of 111In-anti-H2AX-TAT, but not 111In-IgG-TAT or 18F-FDG, within the pancreas was positively correlated with the age of KPC mice, which was correlated with the number of high-grade PanINs. 111In-anti-H2AX-TAT localises preferentially in high-grade PanIN lesions, but not in established PDAC. Younger, non-tumour-bearing KPC mice that show uptake of 111In-anti-H2AX-TAT in the pancreas survive significantly shorter than mice with physiological 111In-anti-H2AX-TAT uptake. Conclusion: 111In-anti-H2AX-TAT imaging allows non-invasive detection of DNA damage repair signalling upregulation in pre-invasive PanIN lesions and is a promising new tool to aid in the early detection and staging of pancreatic cancer.