Event Information

President Barack Obama took office in early 2009 with an ambitious foreign policy agenda for the Americas. In April of that year, his keynote remarks at the fifth Summit of the Americas emphasized the United States’ new course of seeking equal partnership and collaboration in the region.

On June 29, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings and the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) brought together experts from the region to discuss the significance of this renewed hemispheric partnership and featured a keynote address from Arturo Valenzuela, assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs. Panelists included: Craig Kelly, principal deputy assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State; Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue; Luis Enrique Berrizbeitia, executive vice-president of the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF); and Kevin Casas-Zamora, senior fellow at Brookings. They took a closer look at the idea of partnership in the region, reviewed the progress that has been made, explored opportunities that exist for the future and discussed the realities of developing collaborative policies in the region across a wide range of topics, including energy and climate change. The discussion also revisited the policy recommendations made by Brookings‘s Partnership for the Americas Commission.

Video

• A Confident and Strong Latin America
• Adaptable Latin America Policy
• Four Pillars of U.S. Strategy
• Need a Strong U.S. Relationship with Brazil

Audio

• Latin America and the Obama Administration: A New Partnership?

Transcript

• Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20100629_americas_partnership

Created within a year of each other, the World Bank and the United Nations were born out of a shared response to the Second World War. The war created a constituency willing to invest resources and ideals in a system of multilateral cooperation. In the words of one of their architects, these institutions were to create a “New Deal for a new world.”

Today we face another period of global disorder. The number of armed conflicts worldwide has tripled from four to 11 since 2007. 2014 was the most lethal year since the end of the Cold War, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. In the same year, the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 percent, to close to 37,000, the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace.

The fallout is clear. The number of people affected by humanitarian crises has almost doubled in the past decade, with 125 million people requiring humanitarian assistance. Displacement is at a post-World War II high with 60 million people around the world forced from their homes, often within their own countries. Roughly two-thirds of U.N. peacekeepers today and almost 90 percent of personnel in U.N. Special Political Missions are working in and on countries where there is little peace to keep.

Responding to this challenge, the U.N. and its member states led major reviews in 2015 of the tools and approaches used to respond to conflict. These reviews looked at peacekeeping operations, the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, and the U.N.’s peacebuilding architecture.

These reviews underscored that while humanitarian assistance can mitigate suffering, and peacekeepers can stabilize situations, they alone cannot create lasting peace, development, and prosperity. 

Responding to this challenge requires a new global partnership to prevent violent conflict, reduce humanitarian need, and sustain peace. This partnership must reaffirm our commitment to humanity and chart a course for change, as the secretary-general has called for in his recent report for the World Humanitarian Summit.

Taking place just before the World Humanitarian Summit, the ministerial meeting of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) in Stockholm is a key moment at which the principles of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, in particular the TRUST and FOCUS components, could be used to provide a foundation for this effort.

Peacebuilding and statebuilding, however, are political. Technical instruments must be aligned with and informed by a political strategy owned by national governments and developed in consultation with its people. This is as true at the global level as it is in each country.

The first step is normative. In 2015, through the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, member states committed to a future that aims to leave no one behind. The International Dialogue, the New Deal, and the g7+ were important foundations, asserting the links between development and peace captured in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). However, the SDGs are universal. Goal 16 on just, peaceful, and inclusive societies is an ambition of all countries, not only those identified internationally as conflict-affected, and other goals—for example SDG 1 on ending poverty and SDG 10 on reducing inequality—are critical to peace in conflict-affected states. A statement at Stockholm should be made clarifying the linkages between the specific focus of the New Deal and the universal goals of the SDGs (and their affiliated processes).

The second is ownership. Peace and development are first and foremost a national responsibility. The New Deal provides a framework that brings together multilateral and bilateral partners of conflict-affected countries. However, it has functioned primarily as a tool for the targeting of aid, not its management. To achieve the SDGs in 2030 we need to equip national partners with the tools to address the drivers of conflict. That is where a revitalized New Deal can play an important role. While the SDGs are now the overarching framework, making more significant progress on the TRUST and FOCUS components of the New Deal will be essential contributions to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Commitments to ownership, the use of country systems, and mobilization of national resources should be restated and given life in Stockholm.

The last is resources. Resolving conflict requires multi-year financing addressing the drivers of conflict rather than short-term responses.  While official development assistance (ODA) to conflict-affected countries has increased over the last dozen years or so, in 2013, peacebuilding support to legitimate politics, security, and justice systems represented only 16 percent (or $6.8 billion) of the $42 billion in gross development assistance for 31 conflict-affected countries (see Figure 1). At a very moment of global crisis, as of January 1, 2016 and for the first time in its history, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund will not reach its $100 million annual allocation target endorsed by the secretary-general and donors. Stockholm needs to demonstrate a commitment to peacebuilding and statebuilding that goes beyond words, and commit to more resources devoted to conflict-affected countries and more resources targeting the drivers of conflict.

The U.N. has been a supporter of the New Deal from the beginning, recognizing it as a model for partnership between conflict-affected states and their development partners. A political, prioritized strategy for peacebuilding and statebuilding is necessary to support full implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in conflict-affected states. The New Deal provides inspiration for such a strategy. The question for Stockholm is whether inspiration alone will be sufficient.

Note: Special thanks goes to Jago Salmon for his contributions. This blog reflects the views of the author only and does not reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative. Similarly, the views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

In the past decade, a remarkable shift has occurred in the development landscape. Specifically, acknowledgment of the central role of the private sector in contributing to, even driving, economic growth and global development has grown rapidly. The data on financial flows are dramatic, indicating reversal of the relative roles of official development assistance and private financial flows. This shift is also reflected in the way development is framed and discussed, never more starkly than in the Addis Abba Action Agenda and the new set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which the SDGs follow, focused on official development assistance. In contrast, while the new set of global goals does not ignore the role of official development assistance, they reorient attention to the role of the business sector (and mobilizing host country resources).

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been in the vanguard of donors in recognizing the important role of the private sector to development, most notably via the agency’s launch in 2001 of a program targeted on public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the estimated 1,600 USAID PPPs initiated since then. This paper provides a quantitative and qualitative presentation of USAID’s public-private partnerships and business sector participation in those PPPs. The analysis offered here is based on USAID’s PPP data set covering 2001-2014 and interviews with executives of 17 U.S. corporations that have engaged in PPPs with USAID.

The genesis of this paper is the considerable discussion by USAID and the international development community about USAID’s PPPs, but the dearth of information on what these partnerships entail. USAID’s 2014 release (updated in 2015) of a data set describing nearly 1,500 USAID PPPs since 2001 offers an opportunity to analyze the nature of those PPPs.

On a conceptual level, public-private partnerships are a win-win, even a win-win-win, as they often involve three types of organizations: a public agency, a for-profit business, and a nonprofit entity. PPPs use public resources to leverage private resources and expertise to advance a public purpose. In turn, non-public sectors—both businesses and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—use their funds and expertise to leverage government resources, clout, and experience to advance their own objectives, consistent with a PPP’s overall public purpose. The data from the USAID data set confirm this conceptual mutual reinforcement of public and private goals.

The goal is to utilize USAID’s recently released data set to draw conclusions on the nature of PPPs, the level of business sector engagement, and, utilizing interviews, to describe corporate perspectives on partnership with USAID.

The arguments regarding “why” PPPs are an important instrument of development are well established. This paper presents data on the “what”: what kinds of PPPs have been implemented and in what countries, sectors, and income contexts. There are other research and publications on the “how” of partnership construction and implementation. What remains missing are hard data and analysis, beyond the anecdotal, as to whether PPPs make a difference—in short, is the trouble of forming these sometimes complex alliances worth the impact that results from them?

The goal of this paper is not to provide commentary on impact since those data are not currently available on a broad scale. Similarly, this paper does not recommend replicable models or case studies (which can be found elsewhere), though these are important and can help new entrants to join and grow the field. Rather, the goal is to utilize USAID’s recently released data set to draw conclusions on the nature of PPPs, the level of business sector engagement, and, utilizing interviews, to describe corporate perspectives on partnership with USAID.

The decision to target this research on business sector partners’ engagement in PPPs—rather than on the civil society, foundation, or public partners—is based on several factors. First, USAID’s references to its PPPs tend to focus on the business sector partners, sometimes to the exclusion of other types of partners; we want to understand the role of the partners that USAID identifies as so important to PPP composition. Second, in recent years much has been written and discussed about corporate shared value, and we want to assess the extent to which shared value plays a role in USAID’s PPPs in practice.

The paper is divided into five sections. Section I is a consolidation of the principal data and findings of the research. Section II provides an in-depth “data picture” of USAID PPPs drawn from quantitative analysis of the USAID PPP data set and is primarily descriptive of PPPs to date. Section III moves beyond description and provides analysis of PPPs and business sector alignment. It contains the results of coding certain relevant fields in the data set to mine for information on the presence of business partners, commercial interests (i.e., shared value), and business sector partner expertise in PPPs. Section IV summarizes findings from a series of interviews of corporate executives on partnering with USAID. Section V presents recommendations for USAID’s partnership-making.

Downloads

• WP94PPPReport2016Web

Brookings today releases a report USAID’s Public-Private Partnerships: A Data Picture and Review of Business Engagement, which will be the subject of a public discussion on March 8 featuring a panel of Jane Nelson (Harvard University), Ann Mei Chang (U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)), Johanna Nesseth Tuttle (Chevron Corp.), and Sarah Thorn (Wal-Mart Stores Inc.).

The report is based on USAID’s database of 1,481 public-private partnerships (PPPs) from 2001 to 2014 and a series of corporate interviews.

The value of those partnerships totals $16.5 billion, two-thirds from non-U.S. government sources – private companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, and non-U.S. public institutions. Over 4000 organizations have served as resource partners in these PPPs.  Fifty-three percent are business entities, 32 percent are from the non-profit world, and 25 percent are public institutions. Eighty-five organizations have participated in five or more PPPs, led by Microsoft (62), Coca Cola (36), and Chevron (33).

The partnerships are relatively evenly distributed among three major regions—Africa, Latin American/Caribbean, and Asia—but 36 percent of the value of all PPPs is from partnerships that are global in reach.

In analyzing the data, the researchers found that 77 percent of PPPs included one or more business partner, and that 83 percent of these partnerships are connected to a business partner’s commercial interest (either shared value or more indirect strategic interest). In almost 80 percent of those PPPs, the business partner contributes some form of corporate expertise to the partnership.

The purpose of the March 8 panel discussion is to examine the report but also to go beyond by addressing outstanding questions like: how should the impact of public-private partnerships be identified, measured, and evaluated? Is shared value the Holy Grail linking corporate interest to public goods and achieving sustainable results? Where do public-private partnerships fit in USAID’s strategy for engaging the private sector in development, particularly in light of the emphasis on the role of business in advancing the new set of Sustainable Development Goals?

We hope you can join us for what should prove to be an engaging discussion.

Event Information

The United States alliance with Saudi Arabia dates back to 1943, making the U.S. relationship with the Kingdom one of America's longest-standing in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a key counterterrorism and diplomatic partner within the region, yet the alliance has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, especially in the period following the 9/11 attacks, when questions about Saudi support for extremist causes emerged. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution of the war in Yemen has added to the criticism, with many observers blaming the Kingdom for the unfolding humanitarian crisis within the Arab world's poorest state. In recent comments, President Barack Obama has been critical of Saudi policies, despite U.S. logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia’s war effort in Yemen.

On April 21, the Intelligence Project and Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted U.S. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut to discuss the U.S.-Saudi alliance with Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Cofman Wittes. Senator Murphy has urged a more rigorous approach to cooperation with Riyadh that balances U.S. counterterrorism interests, strategic imperatives, and human rights concerns, and has led efforts on Capitol Hill to debate the war in Yemen. Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. 

 Join the conversation on Twitter at #USSaudi.

Video

• Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership

Audio

• Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160421_us_saudi_transcript

Event Information

On July 20 and 21, defense ministers from several nations will gather in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. The meeting will bring together representatives from countries working to confront and defeat the Islamic State (or ISIL). French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will be among those at the summit discussing how to accelerate long-term efforts to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The close relationship between France and the United States has provided a solid base for security cooperation for decades, and in recent years, France has become one of America’s strongest allies in fighting terrorism and a prominent member of the international coalition to defeat ISIL.

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted Minister Le Drian for a discussion on French and U.S. cooperation as the two countries face multiple transnational security threats. Since becoming France’s defense minister in 2012, Le Drian has had to address numerous new security crises emerging from Africa, the Middle East, and within Europe itself. France faced horrific terrorist attacks on its own soil in January and November 2015 and remains under a state of emergency with its armed forces playing an active role in maintaining security both at home and abroad. Le Drian recently authored “Qui est l’ennemi?” (“Who is the enemy?”, Editions du Cerf, May 2016), defining a comprehensive strategy to address numerous current threats.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USFrance

Video

• Introduction and featured speaker
• Discussion
• Introduction et conférencier invité
• Débat

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160720_france_defense_transcript

I write this as I learn of the beating death of an Azerbaijani journalist Rasim Aliyev. His “crime” was to post a Facebook item about football. What follows seems insignificant compared to his murder.

Two articles have appeared in prominent Western outlets in the past month addressing developments in the South Caucasus and the need for adjustments in U.S. (and Western) policy toward the region. The first was an excellent, in-depth Brookings report titled "Retracing the Caucasian Circle—Considerations and Constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucasus"; the second was a shorter essay that Bill Courtney, Denis Corboy, and I penned for Newsweek on the need to reboot policy toward Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Both reflected the difficulty of writing about the “South Caucasus” as if the three countries had common interests and objectives. Increasingly these interests and objectives are diverging, except for a growing unhappiness with the United States and the West for not paying attention to—or doing enough to support—the region. In the case of Azerbaijan, the frustration stems from U.S. leaders paying too much attention to the appalling human rights situation in the country.

What’s making the Azerbaijanis so upset with the West?

The authors of the Brookings report point to elite cynicism over Western disinterest and policy failures in the region as sources of Azerbaijani leaders’ unhappiness. This, in their view, is causing Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—for different reasons and in different ways—to tack toward Russia.

We have a different take in our Newsweek piece. We argue that the unhappiness results from governing elites recognizing that U.S. and Western policy regarding human rights, democracy building, corruption, and conflict resolution (especially the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) threaten regime stability. Therefore, the tacking toward Russia is a conscious choice to avoid pressure and the transparency that closer association with the United States and Europe would involve.

The new orientation of these countries requires serious adjustment in Western policies. There are four new drivers prompting change (beyond the role of Russia): the regional consequences of the Iran nuclear agreement; the growing economic crisis, which is affecting the South Caucasian states in different ways; the threat of renewed military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan; and the internal security implications of suppression of human rights. While each country responds to these drivers in different ways, they are the source of a new dynamic in the South Caucasus that requires a fresh Western policy approach.

Three wild cards will shape these drivers and the Western approach to them: First, how hard will Russian President Vladimir Putin push his objective of rolling back the degree of Western influence achieved since the fall of the Soviet Union? Second, how well will Iran play the nuclear agreement card, especially regarding its reentry into global energy markets? Third, how distracting will Turkey’s military response to the Islamic State and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) be for Turkey’s interests in the South Caucasus and its objective of becoming a regional energy hub?

The shortcomings of soft regionalism

What is to be done? Faced with such a challenging situation, the default policy response is to provide more assistance (economic and military), dispatch senior officials from Western capitals to visit the region, and indulge (rather than criticize) democracy and human rights abuses, all in the name of developing a strategic partnership. In other words: Show more love.

That business-as-usual approach is inappropriate for these challenging times. In the case of Azerbaijan, it is an inappropriate response to the continued violations by the Baku regime of basic human rights and freedom of expression.

The Brookings paper suggests a multilateral approach (involving the United States, EU, and Turkey) based on soft regionalism. I do not believe that soft regionalism will work. The best we can hope for is parallel bilateral engagement on the basis of common interests (e.g. conflict prevention) and shared values (e.g. democratic evolution, observance of human rights). We need to treat the energy issue in the region as a commercial rather than geopolitical one. Changes in the global energy market have undermined the geopolitical significance of Caspian energy resources compared to two decades ago. With low energy prices likely the norm for the near future, energy no longer plays a strategic role for the region. Among other weaknesses, the soft regionalism prescription implies coordinated interests with Turkey—this will be difficult absent an opening in Turkish-Armenian relations.

Who needs who more?

The burden of choice in this relationship with the West must shift from the outside parties to the South Caucasian states themselves. The outsiders should stop talking about “strategic” partnerships, trans-Caspian pipelines and Silk Roads because this perpetuates a “you-need-us-more-than-we-need-you” starting point. Rather, the time has come for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to decide on their own where their interests coincide with those of the West. That’s where we and they can begin to develop meaningful relationships, rather than trying to invent a veneer to cover differences—as in the case of Azerbaijan’s record on human rights.

Another recent article in Newsweek, by Theodore Gerber and Jane Zavisca, raised questions about promoting democracy and human rights where populations and elites are skeptical of U.S. motivations in promoting these issues. Fairly, the article questions the effectiveness of the traditional instruments of promoting opposition political parties and local NGOs as a way of winning “hearts and minds” in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, these traditional instruments tend to emphasize the attractiveness of the “American way of life” through student and scientific exchanges. This offers a variant on the soft regionalism theme advanced in the Brookings paper. Both require a receptivity to change that both elites and populations increasingly find threatening. Developing a values-based relationship is difficult when values diverge.

To the extent our interests do not coincide, then the Western policy focus must be transactional and rest exclusively on conflict prevention and/or amelioration. It also should not shy away from pressing all three South Caucasian states on their obligations to observe international standards regarding human rights, democracy, and freedom of expression.

For the last several years, the US government has been negotiating a free-trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 other countries across the Asia-Pacific and Latin American regions, which could have major impact on the pharmaceutical market.  When finalized it will be the largest free-trade agreement in history, impacting up to one-third of world trade and roughly 40 percent of the global gross domestic product. The deal has attracted a fair share of criticism from a wide range of groups, including concerns over proposed regulations for biologic drugs in participating countries. Specifically, critics are concerned about the length of data exclusivity granted to the companies that hold the patents on these drugs. Below is a primer on biologics and how they are being addressed in the TPP.

Biologic drugs include any therapy derived from a biological source; a group which includes vaccines, anti-toxins, proteins, and monoclonal antibodies. Because they are typically much larger and more structurally complex than traditional ‘small-molecule’ drugs, they are also more difficult—and much more costly—to develop and manufacture. Biologics are also among the most expensive drugs on the market, costing an average of 22 times more than nonbiologic drugs. Avastin, a cancer drug, can cost more than $50,000 a year, while the rheumatoid arthritis drug Remicade can cost up to $2,500 per injection.

Given these high costs, there is substantial interest in encouraging the development of biosimilars, a term used to describe follow-on versions of an original biologic. Estimates of the potential cost savings vary substantially, but some have predicted that competition from biosimilars could reduce US spending on biologics by $44 to $66 billion over the next ten years.  In the European Union, biosimilars have been on the market since 2006, and a 2013 analysis found that, for the 14 biosimilars on the market, the average price discount was about 25 percent. By 2020, the overall cost savings are projected to total $16-$43 billion.

After the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed in 2010, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) developed an accelerated approval pathway for biosimilars, modeled after the pathway used for the approval of small-molecule generics. In order to meet the criteria for biosimilarity, the drug must share the same mechanism of action for the approved condition of use, and there must be no clinically significant differences between the two drugs in terms of purity, safety, or potency. FDA recently approved its first biosimilar, Zarxio, which is a copy of the oncology drug Neupogen.

Under current FDA regulations, biologic drugs are granted 12 years of data exclusivity following approval. During this period of exclusivity, the FDA may not approve a biosimilar application that relies on the data submitted as part of the original biologic application. This form of temporary monopoly is distinct from patent protection, which is granted well before approval and is not related to clinical data.  Data exclusivity does not prevent another company from generating the data independently, but drug companies are unlikely to go to the considerable (and costly) effort of replicating a full course of clinical trials for a drug that is already on the market. (Though biosimilars may need to undergo some additional clinical testing under current FDA regulations, the amount of data required to support approval would certainly be less than what is required for an original biologic approval.)

The 12-year exclusivity period for biologics was established in the ACA following intense debate, and has continued to attract criticism. (By contrast, the period of data exclusivity is just five years for small-molecule drugs.) Supporters argue that given the greater cost and difficulty of bringing a biologic to market a longer period of exclusivity is necessary to incentivize innovation. Others argue that the resulting restrictions on competition keep drug prices unnecessarily high, inevitably putting a strain on the health system and keeping potentially life-saving drugs out of reach for many patients.

For the 11 countries besides the U.S. that are involved in the TPP, current data exclusivity protections range from zero (Brunei) to eight years (Japan). Under the Obama Administration’s current proposal, participating countries would increase those periods to match the US standard of 12 years. Curiously, this proposal directly contradicts the administration’s ongoing domestic efforts to lower the period of data exclusivity. Since the ACA passed, the Obama administration has repeatedly proposed reducing it to seven, arguing that this would save Medicare $4.4 billion over the next decade. Some have noted that, once the 12-year period is enshrined in the TPP, it will become significantly more difficult to change it through the US legislative process. Furthermore, imposing US standards on the 11 member countries would inevitably restrict competition at the global level, and many patient advocacy and international humanitarian organizations have argued that doing so would undermine the efforts of US global health initiatives like the Vaccine Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which rely on price competition to manage program costs.

It is unclear whether the US will be successful in its efforts. There have been reports that the issue of data exclusivity has become a significant point of contention, and the US delegation may seek to compromise on its demands. It may, for example, negotiate exceptions for the poorer countries involved in the negotiation, as the Washington Post notes. However, the details of the negotiations are largely confidential, which makes it challenging to assess the possibilities, their relative advantages, or how the US Trade Representative (which is leading the US negotiations) is balancing the need to ensure adequate incentives for innovation with the need to control drug costs and facilitate patient access to potentially life-saving therapies.

Editor's note: Elizabeth Richardson, a research associate in the Center for Health Policy, contributed to the research and writing of this post. 

Event Information

On July 20 and 21, defense ministers from several nations will gather in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. The meeting will bring together representatives from countries working to confront and defeat the Islamic State (or ISIL). French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will be among those at the summit discussing how to accelerate long-term efforts to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The close relationship between France and the United States has provided a solid base for security cooperation for decades, and in recent years, France has become one of America’s strongest allies in fighting terrorism and a prominent member of the international coalition to defeat ISIL.

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted Minister Le Drian for a discussion on French and U.S. cooperation as the two countries face multiple transnational security threats. Since becoming France’s defense minister in 2012, Le Drian has had to address numerous new security crises emerging from Africa, the Middle East, and within Europe itself. France faced horrific terrorist attacks on its own soil in January and November 2015 and remains under a state of emergency with its armed forces playing an active role in maintaining security both at home and abroad. Le Drian recently authored “Qui est l’ennemi?” (“Who is the enemy?”, Editions du Cerf, May 2016), defining a comprehensive strategy to address numerous current threats.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USFrance

Video

• Introduction and featured speaker
• Discussion
• Introduction et conférencier invité
• Débat

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160720_france_defense_transcript

Event Information

Israeli society is diverse, dynamic, vibrant, and challenged. Israel’s long-held social solidarity faces new pressure from growing internal fissures and from the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians.

In bold and candid remarks earlier this year, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin identified four “tribes” in Israeli society, representing different worldviews, and called for a new effort to find common ground among secular, national-religious and ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis, and Arab citizens of Israel. How might Israel’s diverse society coalesce in the coming years? How will the future of Israeli society affect its democracy, its relations with its neighbors and with the United States?

On December 10, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted President Reuven Rivlin to discuss his vision for the future of Israeli society and the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Bruce Jones, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, gave welcoming remarks, and Tamara Cofman Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, introduced President Rivlin.

Following President Rivlin’s remarks, Natan Sachs, fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, engaged the president in conversation.

Join the conversation on Twitter at #IsraelsFuture.

Video

• The new Israeli society: From melting pot to partnership

Audio

• The new Israeli society: From melting pot to partnership

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20151210_israel_rivlin_transcript

Event Information

The United States alliance with Saudi Arabia dates back to 1943, making the U.S. relationship with the Kingdom one of America's longest-standing in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is a key counterterrorism and diplomatic partner within the region, yet the alliance has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, especially in the period following the 9/11 attacks, when questions about Saudi support for extremist causes emerged. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution of the war in Yemen has added to the criticism, with many observers blaming the Kingdom for the unfolding humanitarian crisis within the Arab world's poorest state. In recent comments, President Barack Obama has been critical of Saudi policies, despite U.S. logistical and intelligence support to Saudi Arabia’s war effort in Yemen.

On April 21, the Intelligence Project and Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted U.S. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut to discuss the U.S.-Saudi alliance with Senior Fellows Bruce Riedel and Tamara Cofman Wittes. Senator Murphy has urged a more rigorous approach to cooperation with Riyadh that balances U.S. counterterrorism interests, strategic imperatives, and human rights concerns, and has led efforts on Capitol Hill to debate the war in Yemen. Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the discussion. 

 Join the conversation on Twitter at #USSaudi.

Video

• Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership

Audio

• Reassessing the U.S.-Saudi partnership

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160421_us_saudi_transcript

Event Information

On July 20 and 21, defense ministers from several nations will gather in Washington, D.C. at the invitation of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. The meeting will bring together representatives from countries working to confront and defeat the Islamic State (or ISIL). French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian will be among those at the summit discussing how to accelerate long-term efforts to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The close relationship between France and the United States has provided a solid base for security cooperation for decades, and in recent years, France has become one of America’s strongest allies in fighting terrorism and a prominent member of the international coalition to defeat ISIL.

On July 20, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings hosted Minister Le Drian for a discussion on French and U.S. cooperation as the two countries face multiple transnational security threats. Since becoming France’s defense minister in 2012, Le Drian has had to address numerous new security crises emerging from Africa, the Middle East, and within Europe itself. France faced horrific terrorist attacks on its own soil in January and November 2015 and remains under a state of emergency with its armed forces playing an active role in maintaining security both at home and abroad. Le Drian recently authored “Qui est l’ennemi?” (“Who is the enemy?”, Editions du Cerf, May 2016), defining a comprehensive strategy to address numerous current threats.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #USFrance

Video

• Introduction and featured speaker
• Discussion
• Introduction et conférencier invité
• Débat

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20160720_france_defense_transcript