Editor’s note: Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown is currently on the ground in Afghanistan and sent over a dispatch on what she’s seeing.

President Barack Obama is about to make crucial decisions about the number of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan in 2016 and possibly after. His decision will be a vital signal to other U.S. allies in Afghanistan and its neighbors. Recent events in Afghanistan, particularly the Taliban's capture of Kunduz, show how too large a reduction in US military and economic support can hollow out the state-building effort and strengthen the Taliban and many other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, including those labeling themselves daesh. In such a case, collapse of the government and indeed a collapse of the entire political order the United States has sought to build since 2001 are high. Maintaining support at something close to the current level of effort does not guarantee military or political success or that peace negotiations with the Taliban will eventually produce any satisfactory peace. But it buys us time. On the cusp of a dire situation, Afghan politicians equally need to put aside their self-interested hoarding, plotting, and back-stabbing, which are once again running high, and being put ahead of the national interest.

The Taliban’s recent victory in Kunduz is both highly impactful and different from the previous military efforts and victories of the Taliban over the past several years. For the first time since 2001, the Taliban managed to conquer an entire province and for several days hold its capital. The psychological effect in Afghanistan has been tremendous. For a few days, it looked like the entire provinces of Badakshan, Takhar, and Baghlan would also fall. Many Afghans in those provinces started getting ready to leave or began moving south. If all these northern provinces fell, the chances were high, with whispers and blatant loud talk of political coups intensifying for a number of days, that the Afghan government might fall, and perhaps the entire political system collapse., In short, the dangerous and deleterious political and psychological effects are far bigger than those from the Taliban's push in Musa Qala this year or last year. Particularly detrimental and disheartening was the fact that many Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units, led by weak or corrupt commanders, did not fight, and threw down their arms and ran away. Conversely, the boost of morale to the Taliban and the strengthening of its new leader Mullah Akbar Mansour were great. However, the Taliban also discredited itself with its brutality in Kunduz City.

The Taliban operation to take Kuduz was very well-planned and put together over a period of months, perhaps years. Foreign fighters from Central Asia, China, and Pakistan featured prominently among the mix of some 1,000 fighters, adding much heft to local militias that the Taliban mobilized against the militias of the dominant powerbrokers and the United States, as well as the government-sponsored Afghan Local Police. The support of Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence for the Taliban, which the country has not been able to sever despite a decade of pressure from the United States and more recent engagement from China, significantly augmented the Taliban's capacities.

Kunduz is vital strategic province, with major access roads to various other parts of Afghanistan's north. Those who control the roads—still now the Taliban—also get major revenue from taxing travelers, which is significant along these opium-smuggling routes. It will take time for the Afghan forces to reduce Taliban control and influence along the roads, and large rural areas will be left in the hands of the Taliban for a while. Both in the rural areas and in Kunduz City itself, the Taliban is anchored among local population groups alienated by years of pernicious exclusionary and rapacious politics, which has only intensified since March of this year. Equally, however, many of the local population groups hate the Taliban, have engaged in revenge killings and abuses this week, and are spoiling for more revenge.

Despite the intense drama of the past week, however, Afghanistan has not fallen off the cliff. Takhar and Baghlan have not fallen, nor has all of Badakhshan. The political atmosphere in Kabul is still poisonous, but the various anti-government plots and scheming are dissipating in their intensity and immediacy. On Wednesday, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reached out to some of those dissatisfied powerbrokers, who have been salivating for a change in political dispensation. The crisis is not over, neither on the battlefield in Kunduz and many other parts of Afghanistan, nor in the Afghan political system. But it is much easier to exhale on Thursday, October 8th.

United States air support was essential in retaking Kunduz and avoiding more of Badakhshan falling into the hands of the Taliban, precipitating a military domino effect in the north and inflaming the political crisis. Despite the terrible and tragic mistake of the U.S. bombing of the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital, maintaining and expanding U.S. air support for the Afghan forces, and allowing for U.S. support beyond in extremis, such as in preventing a similar Taliban offensive, is vital. It is equally important to augment intelligence- assets support. Significant reductions in U.S. assistance, whether that be troops, intelligence, or air support, will greatly increase the chances that another major Taliban success—like that of Kunduz, and perhaps possibly again in Kunduz—will happen again. It would also be accompanied by intensely dangerous political instability.

Equally imperative is that Afghan politicians put aside their self-interested scheming and rally behind the country to enable the government to function, or they will push Afghanistan over the brink into paralysis, intensified insurgency, and outright civil war. In addition to restraining their political and monetary ambitions and their many powerplays in Kabul, they need to recognize that years of abusive, discriminatory, exclusionary governance; extensive corruption; and individual and ethnic patronage and nepotism were the crucial roots of the crisis in Kunduz and elsewhere. These have corroded the Afghan Army and permeate the Afghan Police and anti-Taliban militias. Beyond blaming Pakistan, Afghan politicians and powerbrokers need to take a hard look at their behavior over the recent days and over many years and realize they have much to do to clean their own house to avoid disastrous outcomes for Afghanistan. To satisfy these politicians, many from the north of the country and prominent long-term powerbrokers, President Ghani decided over the past few days to include them more in consultations and power-sharing. Many Afghan people welcome such more inclusive politics, arguing that while the very survival of the country might be at stake, grand governance and anti-corruption ambitions need to be shelved. That may be a necessary bargain, but it is a Faustian one. Not all corruption or nepotism can or will disappear. But unless outright rapacious, exclusionary, and deeply predatory governance is mitigated, the root causes of the insurgency will remain unaddressed and the state-building project will have disappeared into fiefdoms and lasting conflict. At that point, even negotiations with the Taliban will not bring peace.

Over 30 years ago, the World Bank began to develop policies to safeguard the rights of those displaced by Bank-financed development projects. The safeguard policy on involuntary resettlement initiated in turn a series of follow up policies designed to safeguard other groups and sectors affected by Bank investments, including the environment and indigenous people. Since its adoption in 1980, the Bank’s operational policy on involuntary resettlement has been revised and strengthened in several stages, most recently in 2001. The regional development banks – African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, InterAmerican Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) – have all followed the World Bank’s lead and developed policies for involuntary resettlement cause by development projects financed by these multilateral banks.

While the policies are complex, the basic thrust of these safeguard policies on involuntary resettlement has been to affirm:

• Involuntary resettlement should be avoided where feasible.
• Where it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, the scale of displacement should be minimized and resettlement activities should be conceived and executed as full-fledged sustainable development programs on their own relying on commensurate financing l and informed participation with the populations to be displaced.
• Displaced persons should be assisted to improve, or at least restore their livelihoods and living standards to levels they enjoyed before the displacement.^[1]

Even with these safeguards policies, people displaced by development projects risk – and very large numbers have actually experienced – a sharp decline in their standards of living.^[2] Michael Cernea’s Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model identifies the most common and fundamental risks of such displacement and resettlement processes: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property, and social disintegration.^[3] If insufficiently addressed, these embedded risks convert into actual processes of massive impoverishment. And particular groups may be especially affected, as noted in the World Bank’s Operational Policy: “Bank experience has shown that resettlement of indigenous people with traditional land-based modes of production is particularly complex and may have significant adverse impacts on their identity and cultural survival.” (OP 4.12, para.9)

These safeguards policies are an important instrument to minimize and overcome the harm suffered by those displaced by development projects. It should be noted, however, that there have always been problems in the implementation of these policies due to the evasive implementation by borrowers or the incomplete application by World Bank staff. The Bank’s interest in researching the impacts of compulsory resettlement triggered by its projects has been sporadic. In particular, World Bank has not carried out and published a comprehensive evaluation of the displacements caused by its massive project portfolio for the last 20 years. The last full resettlement portfolio review was conducted two decades ago, in 1993-1994. In2010, with the approval of the Bank’s Board, the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) undertook a broad review on how not only the policy on involuntary resettlement, but all social safeguards policies have or have not been implemented. Reporting on its findings, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) publicly faulted World Bank management for not even keeping basic statistics of the number of people displaced and not making such statistics available for evaluation.^[4] Similar analytical syntheses are missing from other multilateral development agencies, such as, IADB and EBRD. There is a strong sense within the community of resettlement specialists that successful cases are the exception, not the norm. In sum, projects that are predicated on land expropriation and involuntary resettlement are not only forcibly uprooted large numbers of people, but leaving them impoverished, disenfranchised, disempowered, and in many other aspects worse off than before the Bank-financed project.

While the Bank’s safeguard policies were in need of review and many argued for a more explicit incorporation of human rights language into the policies, the Bank took a different approach. The Bank’s team tasked with “reviewing and updating” eliminated many robust and indispensable parts of the revised existing safeguards, watered down other parts, and failed to incorporate important lessons from the Bank’s own experiences as well as relevant and important new knowledge from social, economic, and environmental sciences.

At the end of July 2014, the Bank published a “draft” of the revised safeguards’ policies which were not based on consultation with civil society organizations (CSOs) as had been promised. Rather the newly proposed policies were held close and stamped “strictly confidential.” The numerous CSOs and NGOs involved for two years in what they thought was a consultative process learned only from a leak about plans by Bank management for proposals to the Bank’s Board and its Committee for Development Effectiveness (CODE). Because of this secrecy, the Bank’s Board and the CODE itself were not made aware of the civil society’s views about the Environmental and Social Safeguards draft policy, before CODE had to decide about endorsing and releasing it for a new round of “consultation.”

As is well known, the process shapes the product. These bizarre distortions in the way the World Bank conducted what should have been a transparent process of genuine consultation resulted in some deep flaws of the product as manifest in the current draft ESS.

The backlash was inevitable, strong, and broad, coming from an extensive array of constituencies:’ from CSOs, NGOs, and various other groups representing populations adversely affected by Bank financed projects, professional communities , all the way to various organisms of the United Nations. More than 300 civil society organizations issued a statement opposing the Bank’s plans and at World Bank meetings in mid-October 2014, civil society organizations walked out of a World Bank ‘consultative meeting’ on the revised policies. The statement argued that the consultative process had been inadequate and that the safeguards were being undercut even at a time when the Bank is seeking to expand its lending to riskier infrastructure and mega-project schemes. While the Review and Update exercise was expected to strengthen the provisions of existing policies, instead the policies themselves were redrafted in a way that weakened them. The civil society statement notes that the revised draft “eliminates the fundamental development objective of the resettlement policy and the key measures essential to preventing impoverishment and protecting the rights of people uprooted from their homes, lands, productive activities and jobs to make way for Bank projects.”^[5] Not only did the revised policy not strengthen protections for displaced people, but each of its “standards” represents a backwards step in comparison to existing policies. According to the draft revised policies the Bank could now finance projects which would displace people without requiring a sound reconstruction plan and budget to “ensure adequate compensation, sound physical resettlement, economic recovery and improvement.” Moreover, the application of some safeguards policies would now become optional. Although the regional development banks have not – so far – begun to take actions to weaken their own safeguard policies, there is fear that they will follow the Bank’s lead.

Just as humanitarian response to internally displaced persons seems to be sliding backward, so too the actions of development agencies – or at least the World Bank – seem to be reversing gains made over the past three decades.

Executive Summary

Chicago rebounded from four decades of population loss in the 1990s, and Census 2000 provides a snapshot of that recovery.

Chicago's rebound derives in large part from significant immigration flows, which have made the city one of the nation's most racially and ethnically diverse. Immigrants from Mexico now account for nearly half the city's foreign-born population, for example, yet Chicago also remains one of the foremost U.S. gateways for workers and families from Eastern Europe. Such inflows have made Chicago more youthful, and they are responsible for the residential and commercial revitalization of many of the city's neighborhoods. However, most new foreign-born residents are settling in the suburbs rather than the city, as they are in a number of other U.S. metropolitan areas.

Chicago made progress on income and poverty during the last decade, and all racial/ethnic groups experienced gains in homeownership. Yet in many respects the city still exemplifies our nation's residential and economic separation by race. Blacks, Hispanics, and whites live in largely segregated neighborhoods. Annual household incomes for blacks trail those for whites by more than $20,000. And families with children face particular challenges—more than a third live below or near the poverty line, and more than one in five Chicago children live in a family with no adult workers. In the time since Census 2000 was conducted, moreover, unemployment in the city has risen, and economic differences by race and class are likely magnified today.

Along these lines and others, then, Chicago in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 concludes that:

• Chicago's population "rebounded" during the 1990s, but the region's outer suburbs are booming. Census 2000 reports the story: For the first decade since the 1950s, the City of Chicago saw its population increase, by 112,000 residents. Neighborhoods on the city's southwest and northwest sides grew rapidly with the addition of immigrant populations. At the same time, though, Chicago's suburbs added roughly seven residents for every net new resident in the city. Most of the growth was in the outer suburbs; wide areas of suburban Cook County and inner DuPage County lost population over the decade. As a result, the economic center of the region is shifting outward. Fewer than half of the region's workers commute to the city for their jobs, and a growing number of Chicago residents drive alone to work in the suburbs.

• The city owes much of its population growth and unrivaled diversity to new arrivals from abroad. While most Midwestern cities are home to a predominantly black/white population, Chicago boasts high racial and ethnic diversity. Whites, blacks, and Hispanics each make up at least a quarter of the city's population. This unique mix reflects Chicago's continued status as one of the nation's important immigrant gateways. The city added 160,000 new residents from abroad in the 1990s. Nearly half came from Mexico, and significant numbers also came from Eastern Europe and Asia. This diversity is not uniformly dispersed, however. Chicago's blacks and Hispanics, and blacks and whites, often live in very separate sections of the city.

• The city's residents are relatively young, but most have lived in Chicago for several years. Baby Boomers aged 35 to 54 are by far the nation's largest age cohorts, but people in their late 20s represent Chicago's largest age group. But Chicago is not a transient place. The city's youth belies the fact that nearly 85 percent of its residents have lived there for more than five years, one of the highest rates among the Living Cities. Despite a slight decline in the number of married couples with children living in the city during the 1990s, Chicago still has a higher share of these "nuclear" families than most other large cities. Whether these families remain in the city will influence Chicago's population trajectory in the current decade.

• Chicago's families made broad economic gains in the 1990s, though some residents—African Americans, in particular—still face hardships. Unlike many other U.S. cities in the 1990s, Chicago managed to retain its middle class, and the ranks of lower-income households declined modestly. Median household income in Chicago grew at a rate twice the national average. Poverty, especially for children, declined. Yet Chicago's black community faces continued economic challenges. Median household income for blacks was just $29,000 in 2000, versus $37,000 for Hispanics and $49,000 for whites. Chicago has the sixth highest black poverty rate among the 23 Living Cities. The ranks of the "working poor"—families with incomes below 150 percent of poverty—are significant. Behind these economic differences lies a racial education gap; only 13 percent of black adults in Chicago hold bachelor's degrees, compared to 42 percent of whites.

• Chicago maintains a unique mix of homeowners and renters. Forty-four percent of households in Chicago own their own homes, a rate lower than that for most large cities. Differences in homeownership between minorities and whites, however, are less stark here than in many other cities. Nearly 40 percent of racial and ethnic minority households are homeowners, and all groups—especially Hispanics—made significant gains in the 1990s. Rents rose during the decade, and median prices are similar to those in growing cities like Dallas, Phoenix, and Portland. But because Chicago's households tend to be larger, and more likely to rent, cost burdens remain a significant issue in Chicago. To be precise, roughly 225,000 households in Chicago devote at least 30 percent of their incomes to rent.

By presenting the indicators on the following pages, Chicago in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 seeks to give readers a better sense of where Chicago and its residents stand in relation to their peers, and how the 1990s shaped the city, its neighborhoods, and the entire Chicago region. Living Cities and the Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy hope that this information will prompt a fruitful dialogue among city and community leaders about the direction Chicago should take in the coming decade.

Chicago Data Book Series 1
Chicago Data Book Series 2

After decades of abuse under the old regime, how can the civilian government of President Mohamed Morsi turn Egypt’s security apparatus into one befitting a new democracy? What are the necessary steps in overcoming institutional barriers to reform and creating an Egyptian police force in the service of its citizens?

In a new "Project on Arab Transitions" paper from the Brookings Doha Center and Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), From Good Cop to Bad Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt, nonresident fellow Omar Ashour discusses the political dynamics of transforming Egypt’s security establishment.

Based on months of interviews with current and former officers and generals in the police, army, and intelligence services, Ashour lays out the workings of the Mubarak regime’s repressive security apparatus and assesses current reform initiatives, drawing on lessons from other transitions in the Arab world and beyond. He offers a set of policy proposals for establishing an accountable, civilian-led security sector, ranging from a presidential commission on reform to new oversight mechanisms. Ashour cites the brutality and abuse of Egypt’s police as a key catalyst of the January 25 Revolution; the success of that revolution, he says, will hinge on effective security sector reform.

Download » (English PDF)
Download » (Arabic PDF)

Downloads

• English PDF
• Arabic PDF

Economist Albert Hirschman’s marvelously perceptive little book with big ideas written in 1970 titled “Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States” provides a cornucopia of insights into understanding Brexit and the current state of global governance.  When it emerged American economist Kenneth Arrow marveled at its extraordinary richness, and political scientist Karl Deutsch, in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, called it an “outstanding contribution to political theory.”

Economists assume exit to mean dissatisfaction with an organization’s product or the service leading to decline in demand for it. The value of exit lies in the certainty it provides in terms of the relationship between the customer or member and the firm. Political scientists think of how a firm handles its response to customer dissatisfaction as the exercise of voice by stakeholders. The value of voice is that it can lead to reform that ultimately determines the firm’s revival, an idea also advanced by scholar Clayton Christiansen in his book “The Innovator’s Dilemma.” An understanding of the conditions under which exit and voice are exercised requires the incorporation of the concept of loyalty. Loyalty makes voice more probable and exit less likely. But loyalty does not by itself make the exercise of voice more effective. That depends on the extent to which customers or members are willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of improvement in the deteriorating product, and their ability to influence the organization.  

Applying these ideas to Brexit suggests that the option of a U.K. exit was made more likely because of the limited voice of the U.K. in achieving reforms, coupled with the fact that Britain’s loyalty to the European Union was mixed at best. Its self-perception as “special people” was accompanied by long-standing skepticism about foreigners, including other Europeans.

Some have attributed Brexit to misjudgment by Prime Minister David Cameron about holding a referendum, poor management of migration policy by the EU including procrastination and downright misjudgment on migration, and they have termed the historic vote as nothing short of the beginning of the end of the post-World War II institutional frameworks, including the Bretton Woods institutions. They fear that the longest and most prosperous period of sustained peace in modern human history, enabled by post-war global architecture, may have come to an end.

The Economist is one proponent of this view, describing Brexit as multiple calamities. The British economy and polity are wildly off the rails, the newspaper notes. The prime minister has resigned with no obvious successor. The leader of the opposition is struggling to survive a coup. The pound hit a 31-year low against the dollar and banks lost a third of their value before stabilizing. Meanwhile there is talk in Scotland and Northern Ireland of secession.

But my own English friends, some of whom favored Brexit, talk about the high tax payments to the EU, oppressive overreach of the EU bureaucracy, and the fear of open borders leading to uncontrollable immigration from Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East. In short they see EU membership as all pain and no gain. On the surface Brexit has all the flavors ranging from nostalgia of self-rule to xenophobia.

There are already signs that exit is becoming the preferred option in various global governance organizations. Global loyalties are split, not just among great powers, but also between developed and developing countries. Voice and reform have not been effective.

Hirschman mentions leadership and timely action in sharing power with the next generation as a behavioral trait (often found in the animal kingdom) favoring voice. He contrasts that with exit, which he describes as a human behavior which assumes markets, including political markets, will solve problems.

Hirschman’s chapter “Exit and Voice in American Ideology and Practice” helps us to better understand the U.S. role in global governance. He notes that exit has been accorded “an extraordinarily privileged position in the American tradition” founded in its very creation as a land of immigrants, who, he reminds us, were opting for exit.  Indeed, like in Britain, “the neatness of exit over the messiness and heartbreak of voice” has persisted throughout U.S. history. In his last chapter, “Elusive Optimal Mix of Exit and Voice,” he does not come up with a recipe for some optimum mix of the two, nor does he recommend each institution has its own optimum mix, instead arguing conditions are seldom ripe for their optimum and stable mix—although it is possible to say there is deficiency of one or the other at a given point in time.

Today, it seems that the dominant mode of the post-World War II era, namely voice, is plainly revealing its inadequacy, so the other mode, exit, will eventually be injected once again.

Having had a leading role in founding the global architecture of the United Nation, Food and Agriculture Organization, and Bretton Woods institutions, the U.S. has had a strong voice in and loyalty to the Bretton Woods institutions as well as leadership roles commensurate with its historic roles. U.S. loyalty to the U.N. outside of the Security Council has varied among administrations, since voice in U.N. organizations is distributed more equally. The U.S. has opted for exit from specific U.N. organizations from time to time when it has disliked the dissenting views of other members. 

Others are also choosing to exit. China’s slightly increased shares in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank after the financial crisis are nowhere near its weight in the global economy, thanks to European reluctance to accept a reduced voice. China and other emerging countries have exercised a partial exit option by establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank to meet the investment needs of developing countries.The U.S. considered the establishment of the two as a threat to its leadership and to the Bretton Woods institutions, viewing the acts as verging on disloyalty, whereas most U.S. allies have embraced membership in both. And yet the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is following on the footsteps of the Bretton Woods institutions as regards norms and rules.

To strengthen global governance requires strengthening “voice” and weakening incentives for “exit” from the U.N. and Bretton Woods institutions and other forums of global governance. The U.S. needs to also lead the effort to increase the rewards and reduce the cost of exercising voice. This would be a timely reminder, when politics seems to thrive on divisions, that leadership means forging inclusive institutions that serve all members. 

Bringing together the five counties of Southeastern Pennsylvania, the nonprofit Metropolitan Caucus, a new regional consortium there, is promoting a joint regional application for ARRA’s competitive Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant dollars. Its four-part proposal, which will add and refine partners and programs over time, draws on the collaboration of multiple regional institutions to establish and operate a loan fund for green building and retrofits; support clean energy technology deployment; assist local governments with energy efficiency plans; and measure the energy performance of public facilities.

The newly created Metropolitan Caucus of southeastern Pennsylvania is leading the bold new regional energy efficiency strategy targeting for the competitive Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants (EECBG) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Unprecedented for the region, the Metropolitan Caucus has brought together five area counties—Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia—to make the most of the stimulus opportunity by coordinating their plans, goals, and assets to achieve maximum regional benefit. Their proposed joint EECBG competitive application for roughly $35 million calls for financing construction and retrofits, supporting clean energy companies, measuring building energy performance, and assisting local governments in implementing various sustainability solutions. To carry out each of these activities, the caucus intends to engage in broad cross-sector collaboration to leverage the strengths and unique assets of regional educational institutions, key nonprofits, and planning agencies.

Downloads

• Download Snapshot

Key messages and Policy Pointers

• Given the stalemate in U.N. climate negotiations, the best arena to strike a workable deal is among the members the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF).

• The 13 MEF members—including the EU-27 (but not double-counting the four EU countries that are also individual members of the MEF)—account for 81.3 percent of all global emissions.

• This proposal devises a fair compromise to break the impasse to develop a science-based approach for fairly sharing the carbon budget in order to have a 75 percent chance of avoiding dangerous climate change.

• To increase the likelihood of a future climate agreement, carbon accounting must shift from pro­duction-based inventories to consumption-based ones.

• The shares of a carbon budget to stay below 2 °C through 2050 are calculated by cumulative emis­sions since 1990, i.e. according to a short-horizon polluter pays principle, and national capability (income), and allocated to MEF members through emission rights. This proposed fair compromise addresses key concerns of major emitters.

• According to this accounting, no countries have negative carbon budgets, there is substantial time for greening major developing economies, and some developed countries need to institute very rapid reductions in emissions.

• To provide a ‘green ladder’ to developing countries and to ensure a fair global deal, it will be crucial to agree how to extend sufficient and predictable financial support and the rapid transfer of technology.

The most urgent and complicated ethical issue in addressing climate change is how human society will share the work of reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. Looking ahead to 2015 when a new international treaty on climate change should be agreed upon, we fear we are headed towards a train wreck.

Key developed countries have made it clear they will not accept any regime excluding emerging economies such as China and Brazil, and the U.S. and other ‘umbrella’ countries are calling for only voluntary, bottom-up com­mitments. Yet the major developing countries have made equity the sine qua non for any kind of agreement: they will not take on mandatory emission reduction targets with perceived implications for their economic growth and social development, unless the wealthier countries commit to deep emissions cuts and act first.

These entrenched positions between the different blocs have led to the current impasse, but as Nobel laureate economist and philosopher, Amaryta Sen pointed out, the perfect agreement that never happens is more unjust than an imperfect one that is obtainable.

What is a fair and feasible way to break the impasse, given that all efforts are faltering? The most difficult task is determining a country’s fair share of the required emissions reductions in a way that is politically feasible. After 20 years of negotiations and gridlock, it is clear that many conflicting principles of equity are brought to the table, so a solution will have to be based on some kind of ‘negotiated justice,’ or a ‘fair compromise,’ which will not be one preferred by just one group of countries.

A few basic requirements must be met. A feasible, fair and effective climate agreement must involve the largest emitters from both the developed and developing countries. Such an agreement must find a way to engage the latter without penalizing them or the former countries too much. In order to secure progress, above all it must be acceptable to the two world superpowers and top carbon emitters, China and the U.S.; with this leadership, in fact, other emitters will likely follow. This agreement could be forged in a ‘plurilateral’ setting where a limited number of countries come together first, and then be brought into the formal U.N. negotiations as the basis for a future deal, perhaps by 2015.

How can future negotiations on emissions reductions overcome such political inertia? We suggest that taking three manageable steps to a fair compromise will unlock progress.

First, negotiate a core agreement between the 13 members in the MEF (including the EU-27), which accounts for 81.3 percent of all global emissions. This makes the negotiations feasible, where deals can be struck that would be impossible in the vast U.N. forum.

Second, use consumption-based emissions accounting, which is much fairer than the cur­rent production/territorial-based accounting that all past agreements and negotiations have been based upon. These are relatively new numbers developed by the Norwegian research center CICERO, and have been vetted by the top scientific journals and increasingly utilized by policymakers.

Third, forge a fair compromise to allocate emissions rights. We propose a compromise based on a short-horizon ‘polluter pays principle’ and an indicator of national capability (income).

This third step in particular is a genuine compromise for both developed and developing countries, but it is re­quired to break the current gridlock. Each MEF member gives and takes something from this simple, workable framework and all gain a liveable planet in the future.

Throughout the paper we first explain why counting carbon emissions by consumption is far better and the im­plications of doing so, and we then introduce the MEF and why it is a promising arena for forging a bold compro­mise like the one so badly needed before 2015. We then calculate what the numbers actually mean for that group of countries and develop a proposal for a fair compromise that embodies a feasible but fair operationalization of the central equity principles of the U.N. climate treaty, i.e. action by countries according to their responsibility and capability. We conclude with a discussion of how a start in the MEF could lead to a new framework being brought into those broader negotiations.

Downloads

• Download the paper

The Central African Republic (CAR), a landlocked country roughly the size of Texas, has endured a nearly constant state of political crisis since its independence from France in 1960. In fact, in the post-colonial era, the CAR has experienced only 10 years of rule under a democratically elected leader, Ange-Félix Patassé, from 1993 to 2003. Four of the CAR’s past five presidents have been removed from power through unconstitutional means, and each of these transitions has been marred by political instability and violence. Fragile attempts to build democratic political institutions and establish the rule of law have been undermined by coups, mutinies, and further lawlessness, making cycles of violence tragically the norm in the CAR.

The country’s current crisis (2012–present) stems from political tensions and competition for power between the predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel coalition and the government of President Francois Bozizé, as well as unresolved grievances from the CAR’s last conflict (2006–2007). Since the Séléka’s overthrow of the government in March 2013 and concurrent occupation of large areas of the country, the conflict has evolved to encompass an ethno-religious dimension: So-called Christian defense militias named the anti-balaka emerged to counter the Séléka alliance, but in effect sought revenge against the CAR’s Muslim minority (about 15 percent of the population), including civilians. During a March 2014 trip to the Central African Republic, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay remarked that “the inter-communal hatred remains at a terrifying level,” as reports of atrocities and pre-genocidal indicators continued to surface. Even today, horrific crimes against civilians are still being committed at a frightening frequency in one of the poorest countries in the world: The CAR has a per capita GNI of $588 and a ranking of 185 out of 187 on 2013’s United Nations Human Development Index.

Amid the escalating insecurity in 2013, African Union (AU), French, and European forces were deployed under the auspices of the African-led International Support Mission in Central Africa (MISCA) to disarm militant groups and protect civilians at a critical juncture in December, and their efforts contributed to the relative stabilization of the capital in early 2014. Meanwhile, in January 2014, Séléka leaders relinquished power to a transitional government led by former mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza, who was then tasked with preparing for national elections and establishing security throughout the country. In September 2014, the United Nations incorporated the MISCA forces into the larger Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and then in 2015 extended and reinforced its presence through 2016, in response to the ongoing violence. Despite the international military intervention and efforts of the transitional authorities to address the pervasive insecurity, reprisal killings continue and mobile armed groups still freely attack particularly remote, rural areas in the central and western regions of the country. The unguarded, porous borders have also allowed rebel forces and criminal elements to flee into distant areas of neighboring countries, including Chad and South Sudan, in order to prepare their attacks and return to the CAR.

This paper will explore the origins of the complex emergency affecting the CAR, with a particular focus on the economic causes and potential economic strategies for its resolution. It will begin by providing an overview of the core issues at stake and enumerating the driving and sustaining factors perpetuating the violence. Then it will discuss the consequences of the conflict on the humanitarian, security, political, and economic landscape of the CAR. Finally, it will highlight strategies for addressing the underlying issues and persisting tensions in the CAR to begin building a durable peace, arguing that the national authorities and international partners adopt a holistic approach to peace building that prioritizes inclusive economic recovery given the economic roots of the crisis.

Download the full paper »

Executive Summary

Census 2000 underscores the many social, demographic, and economic challenges facing the City of Cleveland and its residents.

Between 1980 and 2000, Cleveland lost fully one-sixth of its population. Like other older cities in the nation's "Rust Belt," Cleveland's metropolitan area also lost residents over this period, although it managed to grow modestly in the 1990s.

What little growth there was in the region occurred far from the core. The city's downtown area grew, but nearly every other neighborhood in the city and its close-in suburbs lost residents. To be sure, Cleveland actually gained modest numbers of black, Hispanic, and Asian residents in the last decade. But at the same time it lost almost three times as many white residents. As a result, the number of married couples living in Cleveland dwindled, while households not traditionally associated with the suburbs—single persons and single parents—proliferated there. A similar evacuation of jobs has occurred, and today fewer than one-third of the region's workers are employed in the City of Cleveland.

The demographic and economic impacts of decentralization in the Cleveland metro area are striking. Segregation levels between blacks and whites, and blacks and Hispanics, remain among the highest in the U.S. Cleveland ranks 96th out of the 100 largest cities in the share of adults who have a bachelor's degree, and the educational attainment of each racial/ethnic group in Cleveland significantly lags that in other cities. Not coincidentally, the city's unemployment rate is the second-highest among large U.S. cities, and median household income is the third-lowest. In the 1990s, income among Cleveland households did rise, but nearly half of all families with children still lived below or near the poverty line in 2000. With such low incomes, many of Cleveland's families fail to benefit from the city's relatively affordable rental and ownership opportunities. In many city neighborhoods today, a lack of market demand leaves senior citizens as the largest group of homeowners.

Along these lines and others, then, Cleveland in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 concludes that:

• The Cleveland metro area continued to decentralize in the 1990s amid slow growth region-wide. Between 1980 and 2000, the City of Cleveland lost 17 percent of its population, although the pace of decline slowed in the last decade. Meanwhile, the region's suburbs grew modestly, but the locus of that growth occurred far from the core. In the 1990s, a few neighborhoods in downtown Cleveland gained residents, but population loss was widespread throughout the remainder of the city and most inner suburbs. The city lost households of all types: The number of married couples living in the city dropped by 16,000, and for every additional single-person household the city gained, the suburbs added more than 40. Today, only one in five residents of the Cleveland region lives in the central city, and less than one-third of the region's workers are employed there.

• Cleveland remains highly segregated and profits from little international immigration. The number of whites living in Cleveland plummeted in the 1990s, and modest gains in black, Hispanic, and Asian populations were not enough to compensate for these losses. The city's foreign-born population grew by a mere 400 persons over the decade, signaling that while modest numbers of immigrants continued to arrive in Cleveland (9,300 in the 1990s), an equivalent number of earlier arrivals left the city for the suburbs or beyond. In addition, the metro area remains highly stratified along racial and ethnic lines, with blacks confined to the city's east side and eastern suburbs, Hispanics clustered on the west side, and whites located in the downtown and southern/western suburbs.

• Cleveland lacks a young, highly-educated population. During the 1990s, the number of 25-to-34 year-olds nationwide declined by 8 percent, due to the aging of the Baby Boom generation. In Cleveland, this age group shrank nearly three times as fast. Consequently, the share of adults with a college degree grew more slowly than elsewhere in the 1990s, and Cleveland now ranks 96th out of the 100 largest cities in college degree attainment. Efforts to retain students attending its own universities may help accelerate growth in educational attainment, but since Cleveland's college-student population is one of the smallest among the Living Cities, strategies to increase educational access for existing residents may be needed. Unlike in many other cities, low educational attainment is not confined to Cleveland's minority groups—whites, blacks, and Hispanics all have below-average rates of college completion.

• Incomes grew in Cleveland during the 1990s, although the city remains home to a primarily low-wage workforce. As in other Midwestern cities, median household income grew at an above-average rate in Cleveland during the 1990s. However, the city's median income still ranks 98th out of the 100 largest cities. Middle-income households declined over the decade, while the ranks of moderate-income "working poor" families grew. In fact, some 62 percent of the city's households made do with incomes below $34,000 in 2000. Families with children were especially likely to earn low wages; nearly half had incomes below or near the federal poverty line.

• Homeownership increased for some groups in Cleveland, but many families face difficulties paying for housing and moving toward homeownership. About half of Cleveland's households own their own homes. That share is typical among the 23 Living Cities, but it remains low for a city with such a large stock of single-family homes. Homeownership rose for the city's Hispanic households, 41 percent of whom now own. But black households in Cleveland did not share in these homeownership gains, and were likely impeded by their low incomes, which trail those for other racial/ethnic groups. Rents in Cleveland increased by almost 10 percent in the 1990s, but remain the lowest among the Living Cities—the median unit rents for only $465. Yet even so, 40,000 Cleveland renters still pay more than 30 percent of income on rent, suggesting that most earn too little to afford even a modestly-priced unit.

By presenting indicators like these on the following pages, Cleveland in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 seeks to give readers a better sense of where Cleveland and its residents stand in relation to their peers, and how the 1990s shaped the cities, their neighborhoods, and the entire Cleveland region. Living Cities and the Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy hope that this information will prompt a fruitful dialogue among city and community leaders about the direction Cleveland should take in the coming decade.

Cleveland Data Book Series 1
Cleveland Data Book Series 2

The biggest news at the end of the Brisbane G-20 on Sunday will be to confirm for the first time in an official G-20 communique that China will indeed chair the G-20 Summit in 2016. 

Coming on the heals of a momentous week of great power realignments and breakthroughs at the APEC Summit in Beijing and other one-on-one meetings of heads of state, the timing of China’s presidency of the G-20 Summit in 2016 could not be a better follow-up to this week’s accomplishments. It puts China in play as a global leader at a critical moment in geopolitical relations and in terms of several global agendas that will culminate in the next two years. It also provides an unusual opportunity for the U.S. and China to collaborate on a broader set of societal issues affecting everyone everywhere building on their agreements this week.

One of the reasons why the G-20 Summits have yet to realize their full potential is that the leaders-level summits have been captured by the finance ministers’ agendas and discourse. Leaders at G-20 Summits have individually and collectively failed to connect with their publics; ordinary citizens do not see their urgent issues being dealt with. Exchange rates, current account balances, reserve ratios for banks, and the role of the IMF do not resonate with public anxieties over their lives and livelihoods.

Three streams of global issues will culminate in 2015:  the forging of a “post-2015 agenda” on sustainable development with a new set of global goals to succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the agreement on  “financing for development” (FFD) arrangements and mechanisms to support the new post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be realized in 2030; and the achievement of a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by the end of 2015, which looks more promising now than it did a week ago.

What has been learned from previous global goal setting processes is that building on the momentum for the goal-setting process in 2015 and carrying it directly into the mobilization of national political commitment, resources and policies for implementation is vital. China as a member of the G-20 troika in 2015 through 2017 will be in crucial position of bridging the goal-setting and implementation phases of the new SDGs for 2030 to be adopted at the United Nations in September of next year.

China, as one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, will be in a pivotal position to create complementarities between the G-20 forum for the major economies and the U.N. as a forum for all countries for this critical period of setting the global sustainability agenda for the next fifteen years.  

The post-2015 agenda for social, economic and environmental sustainability is of high interest to the United States, and the new China-U.S. climate change agreement in Beijing this week augurs well for collaboration between the two countries on the broader agenda. White House Chief of Staff John Podesta was on the high-level panel for the post-2015 development agenda last year, which signals high U.S. policy involvement. The Shanghai Institute for International Studies has argued in a recent paper for the U.N. Development Program that “the G-20 and the U.N. could have certain complementary roles. The development issue could become the one linking the major work of both the U.N. and the G-20.”  

The world should welcome the unique role that China can now play in bringing the international community and the global system of international institutions together in charting a common path forward building on the progress made in the various summits this week. 

Editor's Note: The paper is part of a book entitled, “The G8-G20 Relationship in Global Governance.”

Future global growth faces many challenges. The first is securing economic recovery from the global financial crisis and reviving strong growth. The euro area has experienced a double-dip recession. Growth remains subdued in other advanced economies. Emerging economies (including the BRICS countries of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, as well as other major emerging economies) had been the driver of global growth, accounting for almost two thirds of global growth since 2008, but in 2013 they too were experiencing slowing growth. The second challenge is sustaining growth. Many countries have large and rising public debt, and face unsustainable debt dynamics (International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2012). Environmental stresses put the longer-term sustainability of growth at risk. The third challenge is promoting balanced growth. Large external imbalances between countries — China's surplus and the U.S. deficit being the most notable — put global economic stability at risk and give rise to protectionist pressures. Unemployment has reached high levels in many countries, and there are concerns about a jobless recovery. And economic inequality within countries has been rising. More than two thirds of the world's people live in countries where income inequality has risen in the past few decades.

Thus, promoting strong, sustainable, and balanced growth is central objective of the Group of 20 (G20). A core component of the G20 is the Working Group on the Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth. Yet G20 policy actions since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 have focused mainly on short-term crisis response. Economic stabilization is necessary and risks to stability in the global economy, especially those in the euro area, call for firm actions to restore confidence. However, short-term stabilization only buys time and will not produce robust growth unless accompanied by structural reforms and investments that boost productivity and open new sources of growth. To be sure, several G20 members have announced or are implementing structural reforms. But the approach to strengthening the foundations for growth, meeting the jobs challenge, and assuring the longer-term sustainability of growth remains partial and piecemeal. Some elements of an approach are present, but the unrealized potential for a coherent and coordinated strategy and effort is significant. The G20 needs to move beyond a predominately short-term crisis management role to focus more on the longer-term agenda for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. 

Download the paper »

Downloads

• Download the paper (PDF)

The tragic and deadly attacks in Paris, the day before leaders were set to arrive in Antalya, Turkey, for the G-20 summit, underlined the divisions that Syria, its fleeing population, and the terrorists of ISIS have created, as fear and short-term political calculations seem to shove aside policies aimed at sustainable solutions to the unprecedented refugee challenge.

It had started on a more hopeful note. Turkey, which chairs the G-20 this year, had placed the refugee issue on the agenda, hoping for a substantive global dialogue while looking for broad-based solutions to the crisis in Syria and the terrorism challenge. No doubt the 2 million refugees in Turkey played a big role, as President Erdogan and other officials tried to rally support for this unusual situation in a variety of G-20 and other venues.

Turkey was supported by another full member of the G-20, the EU, the only non-nation state member of the group, which shrugged off its complacency when hundreds of thousands turned up on its shores in 2015. European Council President Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, European Commission president, echoed the Turkish President in calling for a global response: “Meeting in Turkey in the midst of a refugee crisis in Syria and elsewhere, the G-20 must rise to the challenge and lead a coordinated and innovative response… recognizing its global nature and economic consequences and promote greater international solidarity in protecting refugees.”

The G-20 is an imposing group, consisting of the world’s 20 largest economies, accounting for 85 percent of its GDP, 76 percent of its trade, and two-thirds of its population. Established in 1999 and growing in reach since the 2008 financial crisis, it should be a body that carries weight beyond the economic, with effective mechanisms to have impact on the global agenda. Yet, while Syria and the refugee crisis was the first time the G-20 stepped outside its usual narrower economic mandate, the agenda was quickly overtaken.     

The tragedy in Paris highlighted deep divisions over the refugees. Poland’s new government was the first to announce that it would stop participating in the EU resettlement plan whereby it would have accepted 5,000 refugees. Politicians from Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia as well as those with a nativist message from the Nordic countries, France, Germany, and others saw an opening for tighter border controls and a much less welcoming approach to the more than 800,000 refugees that have already made their way into Europe, not to mention the many more on the way. Such views linking refugees to terrorism are not restricted to Europe but can be seen on the other side of the Atlantic, as U.S. presidential candidates and some 27 State Governors declared that Syrian refugees were not welcome.

At this early date, except for a single Syria passport “holder”—a document easily acquired these days, and found near one of the suicide bombing sites in Paris—all those who died or are being sought as suspects are citizens of either France or Belgium. Clearly, there could be some who get into Europe by using the refugees as a cover but with literally thousands of Europeans fighting in Syria, the real threat emanates from the small number of home-grown extremists in Europe who have easy access to the West and a cultural and linguistic familiarity that will elude newcomers for years. This was the same scenario one saw in the Madrid, London, Copenhagen, and the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris earlier this year. 

Fear is winning out over policy

The EU also appears in disarray on aiding the 4 million refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. This is significant since it is reduced funding and aid that is leading to the worsening of conditions in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and driving many to Europe. Turkey too is reaching its limits and may potentially face a million or more new refugees if Aleppo falls. Yet funds pledged to these countries remain largely unfulfilled—of the 2.3 billion euros pledged by EU governments, only 486 million are firm government offers. The discussions between the EU and Turkey for additional aid to refugees of 3 billion euros also remain less-than-certain since such aid requires that EU countries agree to receiving and distributing asylum-seekers from Turkey. It also underlines the lack of funding for Jordan and Lebanon.    

In the end, the G-20 yielded little by way of concrete actions on refugees, though additional border controls, enhanced airport security, and intelligence sharing were promised. There was a call for broader burden sharing and greater funding of humanitarian efforts, as well as a search for political solutions. The G-20 also added little to the broad outlines of a potential settlement on Syria discussed in Vienna, Austria, on November 14, 2015, a day before the start of the G-20 summit.

Unfortunately, these are the very things that separate G-20 members among and within themselves. The growing danger is that fear and political opportunism rather than well-thought-out polices will guide the global response to the greatest human displacement tragedy since World War II. It is precisely this fearful and exclusive reaction that ISIS seeks. Indeed, that legacy may live long after ISIS is gone.                           

Event Information

The context for aid is changing. Globalization has spurred economic convergence, upending the twentieth century economic balance and creating a smaller world where both problems and solutions spill across national borders more readily. This has given rise to a legion of new development actors, including emerging economies, NGOs, private businesses, and coordinating networks, who have brought fresh energy and resources to the field while rendering the prospect of genuine donor coordination ever more difficult. Global integration and competition for resources has raised the prominence of global public goods, whose equitable and sustainable provision requires international collective action. Meanwhile, poor countries are demanding a new form of partnership with the international community, built upon the principles of country ownership and mutual accountability.

From G-20 meetings and the upcoming High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Korea to unfolding events in the Middle East and North Africa, leadership from the United States is crucial, placing pressure on the Obama administration to deliver on its promise of far-reaching reforms to U.S. global development efforts. And amidst this shifting global landscape is the issue of effectively communicating the importance of global development cooperation to both a national and global public, at a time when budget pressures are being felt across many of the world’s major economies

At the eighth annual Brookings Blum Roundtable, co-chaired by Kemal Derviş and Richard C. Blum, 50 thought-leaders in international development came together to discuss a new role for global development cooperation, one that employs inclusive and innovative approaches for tackling contemporary development problems and that leverages the resources of a large field of actors.

Roundtable Agenda

Wednesday, August 3, 2011

Welcome: 8:40 a.m. – 9:00 a.m.
Open Remarks
• Richard C. Blum, Blum Capital Partners, LP and Founder of the Blum Center for 
Developing Economies at Berkeley
• Mark Suzman, Global Development Program, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation
• Kemal Derviş, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

Statement of Purpose, Scene Setter, Comments on the Agenda
• Homi Kharas, Brookings

Session I: 9:00AM - 10:30AM
Reframing Development Cooperation
In almost any discussion of international development, foreign aid takes center stage. But while 
aid can certainly be a catalyst for development, it does not work in isolation. Participants will 
discuss the key objectives of development cooperation, consider what measures of development 
cooperation are most valuable for recipients, and explore an effective balance of roles and 
responsibilities - including both public and private players - in today’s evolving development 
landscape.

Moderator
• Walter Isaacson, Aspen Institute

Introductory Remarks
• Owen Barder, Center for Global Development
• Donald Kaberuka, African Development Bank Group
• Ananya Roy, University of California, Berkeley
• Elizabeth Littlefield, Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Session II: 10:50AM - 12:20PM
The G-20's Development Agenda
Last year’s G-20 meeting in Seoul marked the first time the group formally took up the issue of development. There they announced the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth and the Multi-Year Action Plan for Development: two far-reaching policies which are expected to guide the G20’s future agenda. What is the G-20’s comparative advantage vis-à-vis development, and how can the group’s development efforts be strengthened and supported?

Moderator
• Mark Suzman, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Introductory Remarks
• Alan Hirsch, The Presidency, South Africa
• Suman Bery, International Growth Centre
• Homi Kharas, Brookings

Dinner Program: 6:00PM - 9:00PM
A Conversation with Al Gore and Mary Robinson
Topic: "Energy Security and Climate Justice"

Moderator
• Kemal Derviş, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

Thursday, August 4, 2012 

Session III: 9:00AM - 10:30AM 
The Road to Buscan
In November, participants from over 150 countries, including ministers of developing and developed countries, heads of bilateral and multilateral development institutions, and civil society representatives, will take part in the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea. The forum is intended to take account of the development community’s progress in achieving greater impact through aid and to redefine the aid effectiveness agenda to adjust to a changing global landscape. What would constitute success or failure at Busan?

Moderator
• Raymond Offenheiser, Oxfam America

Introductory Remarks
• J. Brian Atwood, Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Development Assistance Committee 
• Wonhyuk Lim, Korean Development Institute
• Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, World Bank 
• Steven Radelet, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Session IV: 10:50AM - 12:20PM 
Lessons from the Middle East on Governance and Aid
Popular protests across the Middle East against authoritarian regimes have prompted reflection 
on the role of aid to non-democratic and poorly governed countries. Some critics believe that aid 
should only be given to relatively well-governed countries where it is more likely to be effective, 
but for others, this amounts to collective punishment for the people who suffer under such 
governments. Do aid allocation models need to change and what role can the development 
community now play in supporting peaceful, democratic reform in the Middle East?

Moderator
• Madeleine K. Albright, Albright Stonebridge Group

Introductory Remarks
• Ragui Assaad, University of Minnesota
• Sheila Herrling, Millennium Challenge Corporation
• Tarik Yousef, Silatech

Lunch Program: 12:30PM - 2:00PM
A Conversation with Thomas R. Nides, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources

Moderator
• Richard C. Blum, Blum Capital Partners, LP and Founder of the Blum Center for Developing Economies at Berkeley

Session V: 9:00AM - 10:30AM
Implementing U.S. Development Reforms 
The end of 2010 saw the completion of two major policy reviews in Washington concerned with 
international development: the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development and the 
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Progress on implementation has been 
significant in many respects and meager in others. Additionally, despite directives to deliver on 
many valuable priorities for improvement, essential components of fundamental reform are still 
in need of address. Casting a shadow across the exercise, or alternatively serving as a spur to 
focus, the budget environment has soured.

Moderator
• Jim Kolbe, German Marshall Fund of the United States

Introductory Remarks
• Rajiv Shah, U.S. Agency for International Development
• Samina Ahmed, International Crisis Group
• Robert Mosbacher, Jr., Mosbacher Energy Company

Session VI: 10:50AM - 12:20PM
Communicating Development Cooperation
Public interest in and support for aid matter. Yet in many aid giving countries, there is 
widespread cynicism as to what end aid programs serve and ignorance as to what activities they 
actually involve. What are the best examples of development efforts which have been 
communicated successfully and what can we learn from this to shore up support for 
development cooperation now and in the future?

Moderator 
• Liz Schrayer, U.S. Global Leadership Coalition

Introductory Remarks 
• Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes
• Joshua Bolten, ONE
• S. Shankar Sastry, University of California, Berkeley
• Jack Leslie, Weber Shandwick

Closing Remarks: 12:20PM- 12:30PM
• Richard C. Blum, Blum Capital Partners, LP and Founder of the Blum Center for 
Developing Economies at Berkeley
• Kemal Derviş, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

Public Event: 4:00PM - 5:30PM
Brookings and the Aspen Institute present “Development as National Security?”: A Conversation with Rajiv Shah, U.S. Agency for International Development; Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Richard J. Danzig, Center for a New American Security; and Susan C. Schwab, University of Maryland.

Moderator
• Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Welcome and Introductions
• Kemal Derviş, Brookings

Hosts
• Richard C. Blum and Senator Dianne Feinstein

The mobile economy in China and India has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade. Mobile technology has the potential to shrink the broadband gap, improve financial inclusion, and support humanitarian efforts. A recent report from the Boston Consulting Group adds another interesting perspective into the existing conversation about the impact of mobile technologies. India appears poised to eschew building up its fixed broadband infrastructure and jump directly to mobile. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in India appeared poised to take advantage of this amazing change.

Mobile innovation lower costs and improve performance

Source: Boston Consulting Group

Maximum download speeds have risen greatly when comparing second generation networks with current fourth generation technology. 2G networks were capable of reaching 20 kilobits per second and 4G technologies can reach 250 megabits per second, which is about 12,000 times faster. At the same time the actual cost of network infrastructure per megabyte is falling dramatically: a 95 percent decrease from 2G to 3G and 67 percent decrease from 3G to 4G. Subsequently, the consumer cost of data per megabyte decreased sharply. From 2005 to 2013, the average cost of a mobile subscription relative to the maximum data speed dropped about 40 percent each year or 99 percent in an 8 year period. Higher speeds and lower costs make mobile a viable development platform for SMEs. In America this had led to the growth of the app economy. In India this effect is even more pronounced.

Widespread use of mobile technologies fuels the leap

In 2013 India reached 900 million mobile connections and became the second largest market in terms of mobile connections and unique subscribers. Indians spend 45 percent of their incomes on mobile technologies and platforms whereas Americans only spend 11 percent.

Source: World Bank Indicators

For the average Indian, mobile is the only point-of-entry to the Internet. Mobile devices are much more common than computers. The PC penetration rate in India of 5 percent stands in stark contrast to the 75 percent rate for mobile devices. Rates of fixed broadband Internet usage increased at a snails pace in India and at the same time mobile cellular subscriptions soared. More and more people in India are choosing to access Internet solely through mobile devices. Currently about 34 percent of people in India access the Internet exclusively from mobile devices. Flipkart an Indian e-commerce company predicts that 75 to 80 percent of their customer’s traffic will come on mobile platforms. The proliferation of mobile technologies in India provides incentives for SMEs to focus on developing mobile oriented business models.

Existing mobile focused SMEs lead the leap

SMEs in India place a greater emphasis on mobile platforms compared to companies in other countries. About 25 to 35 percent of surveyed SMEs in India are identified as mobile leaders, firms that use mobile productivity tools, operational tools (real-time job tracking or mobile data analytics) and sales and marketing tools. In developed countries such as Germany, only 14 percent of the surveyed SMEs are mobile leaders. Further, mobile oriented SMEs are thriving in India in a variety of fields. India’s largest E-commerce marketplace Flipkart Sidesteps has seen its traffic grow twice as face on mobile when compared with PC. Anti-violence apps such as FightBack and mobile health initiatives such as Swasthya Samvedana Sena are also experiencing great success.

India is in the midst of a mobile revolution that is categorically different than other parts of the world. Without existing complex legacy systems, businesses in India are now in the unique position to leapfrog terrestrial Internet technologies and reap the full benefits of a truly mobile economy.

Yikun Chi contributed to this post

Find more content about techpolicy on TechTank

There is a lot of hope around the potential of Big Data—massive volumes of data (such as cell phone GPS signals, social media posts, online digital pictures and videos, and transaction records of online purchases) that are large and difficult to process with traditional database and software techniques—to help achieve the sustainable development goals. The United Nations even calls for using the ongoing Data Revolution –the explosion in quantity and diversity of Big Data—to make more and better data usable to inform development analysis, monitoring and policymaking: In fact, the United Nations believes that that “Data are the lifeblood of decision-making and the raw material for accountability. Without high-quality data providing the right information on the right things at the right time; designing, monitoring and evaluating effective policies becomes almost impossible.” The U.N. even held a “Data Innovation for Policy Makers” conference in Jakarta, Indonesia in November 2014 to promote use of Big Data in solving development challenges.

Big Data has already played a role in development: Early uses of it include the detection of influenza epidemics using search engine query data or the estimation of a country’s GDP by using satellite data on night lights. Work is also under way by the World Bank to use Big Data for transport planning in Brazil.

During the Data for Development session at the recent NetMob conference at MIT, we presented a paper in which we jump on the Big Data bandwagon. In the paper, we use mobile phone data to assess how the opening of a new toll highway in Dakar, Senegal is changing how people commute to work (human mobility) in this metropolitan area. The new toll road is one of the largest investments by the government of Senegal and expectations for its developmental impact are high. In particular, the new infrastructure is expected to increase the flow of goods and people into and out of Dakar, spur urban and rural development outside congested areas, and boost land valuation outside Dakar. Our study is a first step in helping policymakers and other stakeholders benchmark the impact of the toll road against many of these objectives.

Assessing how the impact of the new toll highway differs by area and how it changes over time can help policymakers benchmark the performance of their investment and better plan the development of urban areas.

The Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (in red in Figure 1), inaugurated on August 1, 2013 is the first section (32 km or 20 miles) of a broader project to connect the capital, Dakar, through a double three-lane highway to a new airport (Aeroport International Blaise Diagne, AIBD) and a special economic zone, the Dakar Integrated Special Economic Zone (DISEZ) and the rest of the country.

Note: The numbers indicate the incidence of increased inter cell mobility and were used to calculate the percentage increase in mobility.

The cost of this large project is estimated to be about $696 million (FCFA 380.2 billion or 22.7 percent of 2014 fiscal revenues, excluding grants) with the government of Senegal having already disbursed $353 million. The project is one of the first toll roads in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) structured as a public-private partnership (PPP) and includes multilateral partners such as the World Bank, the French Development Agency, and the African Development Bank.

In our study, we ask whether the new toll road led to an increase in human mobility and, if so, whether particular geographical areas experienced higher or lower mobility relative to others following its opening.

Using mobile phone usage data (Big Data), we use statistical analysis in our paper to approximate where people live and where they work. We then estimate how the reduction in travel time following the opening of the toll road changes the way they commute to work.

As illustrated in the map of Figure 1, we find some interesting trends:

• Human mobility in the metropolitan Dakar area increased on average by 1.34 percent after the opening of the Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway. However, this increase masks important disparities across the different sub-areas of the Dakar metropolitan areas. Areas in blue in Figure 1 are those for which mobility increased after the opening of the new road toll while those in red experienced decreased mobility.
• In particular, the Parcelles Assainies suburban area benefited the most from the toll road with an increase in mobility of 26 percent. The Centre Ville (downtown) area experienced a decrease in mobility of about 20 percent.

These trends are important and would have been difficult to discover without Big Data. Now, though, researchers need to parse through the various reasons these trends might have occurred. For instance, the Parcelles Assainies area may have benefited the most because of its closer location to the toll road whereas the feeder roads in the downtown area may not have been able to absorb the increase in traffic from the toll road. Or people may have moved from the downtown area to less expensive areas in the suburbs now that the new toll road makes commuting faster.

From these preliminary results (our study is work in progress, and we will be improving its methodology), we are encouraged by the fact that our method and use of Big Data has three areas of application for a project such as this:

Benchmarking: Our method can be used to track how the impact of the Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway changes over time and for different areas of the Dakar metropolitan areas. This process could be used to study other highways in the future and inform highway development overall.

Zooming in: Our analysis is a first step towards a more granular study of the different geographic areas within the Dakar suburban metropolitan area, and perhaps inspire similar studies around the continent. In particular, it would be useful to study the socio-economic context within each area to better appreciate the impact of new infrastructure on people’s lives. For instance, in order to move from estimates of human mobility (traffic) to measures of “accessibility,” it will be useful to complement the current analysis with an analysis of land use, a study of job accessibility, and other labor markets information for specific areas. Regarding accessibility, questions of interest include: Who lives in the areas most/least affected? What kind of jobs do they have access to? What type of infrastructure do they have access to? What is their income level? Answers to these questions can be obtained using satellite information for land prices, survey data (including through mobile phones) and data available from the authorities. Regarding urban planning, questions include: Is the toll diverting the traffic to other areas? What happens in those areas? Do they have the appropriate infrastructure to absorb the increase in traffic?

Zooming out: So far, our analysis is focused on the Dakar metropolitan area, and it would be useful to assess the impact of new infrastructure on mobility between the rest of the country and Dakar. For instance, the analysis can help assess whether the benefits of the toll road spill over to the rest of the country and even differentiate the impact of the toll road on the different regions of the country.

This experience tells us that there are major opportunities in converting Big Data into actionable information, but the impact of Big Data still remains limited. In our case, the use of mobile phone data helped generate timely and relatively inexpensive information on the impact of a large transport infrastructure on human mobility. On the other hand, it is clear that more analysis using socioeconomic data is needed to get to concrete and impactful policy actions. Thus, we think that making such information available to all stakeholders has the potential not only to guide policy action but also to spur it. 

References

Atkin, D. and D. Donaldson (2014). Who ’ s Getting Globalized ? The Size and Implications of Intranational Trade Costs . (February).

Clark, X., D. Dollar, and A. Micco (2004). Port efficiency, maritime transport costs, and bilateral trade. Journal of Development Economics 75(2), 417–450, December.

Donaldson, D. (2013). Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the Impact of Transportation Infrastructure. forthcoming, American Economic Review.

Fetzer Thiemo (2014) “Urban Road Construction and Human Commuting: Evidence from Dakar, Senegal.” Mimeo

Ji, Y. (2011). Understanding Human Mobility Patterns Through Mobile Phone Records : A cross-cultural Study.

Simini, F., M. C. Gonzalez, A. Maritan, and A.-L. Barab´asi (2012). A universal model for mobility and migration patterns. Nature 484(7392), 96–100, April.

Tinbergen, J. (1962). Shaping the World Economy; Suggestions for an International Economic Policy.

Yuan, Y. and M. Raubal (2013). Extracting dynamic urban mobility patterns from mobile phone data.

Event Information

Since the Rose Revolution in November 2003, Georgia has grappled with the many challenges of building a modern, Western-oriented state, including implementing political and economic reforms, fighting corruption, and throwing off the vestiges of the Soviet legacy. On the path toward a functioning and reliable democracy, Georgia has pursued these domestic changes in an often difficult international environment, as evidenced by the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008.

On March 17, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted President Mikheil Saakashvili to discuss Georgia’s approach to these challenges. A leader of Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia in January 2004 and reelected for a second term in January 2008.

Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks and Senior Fellow and CUSE Director Fiona Hill moderated the discussion. After the program, President Saakashvili took audience questions.

Video

• Georgia Is a Transformed Country
• Georgia Is a Valuable Asset to Europe
• The Key to Effective Change Is Youth

Audio

• From Popular Revolutions to Effective Reforms: The Georgian Experience

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20110317_saakashvili_transcript

Editor's Note: Launched at a December 5, 2011 event at Brookings, this study is based on a publication developed in 2005 by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement: Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is a central tenet of international law that states bear the primary duty and responsibility to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons within their borders, including the internally displaced. While internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain entitled to the full protection of rights and freedoms available to the population in general, they face vulnerabilities that nondisplaced persons do not face. Therefore, in order to ensure that IDPs are not deprived of their human rights and are treated equally with respect to nondisplaced citizens, states are obligated to provide special measures of protection and assistance to IDPs that correspond to their particular vulnerabilities. Reflecting these key notions of international law, the rights of IDPs and obligations of states are set forth in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (hereafter, “the Guiding Principles”).

Using the Guiding Principles as a departure for analysis, this study examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen. The analysis seeks to shed light on how and to what extent, if any, governments are fulfilling their responsibility toward IDPs, with a view to providing guidance to governments in such efforts. In so doing, this study also seeks to contribute to research and understanding regarding realization of the emerging norm of the “Responsibility to Protect.” To frame the analysis, the introduction to this volume examines the connections among the concepts of national responsibility, “sovereignty as responsibility” and the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

The comparative analysis across the fifteen countries, presented in chapter 1, is based on a systematic application of the document Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility (hereafter, “Framework for National Responsibility,” “the Framework”). Seeking to distill the Guiding Principles, the Framework outlines twelve practical steps (“benchmarks”) that states can take to directly contribute to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of internal displacement:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decision making.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

Event Information

On December 5, 2011, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement held a private launch event for its report, From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement, which examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations. The analysis presented in the report is based on the first ever systematic use as an assessment tool of the document, Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility, developed by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in 2005 to provide guidance to governments in their response to internal displacement.

Roberta Cohen (nonresident senior fellow at Brookings and former co-director of the Project) moderated the event, which featured remarks from the co-authors of the report, Elizabeth Ferris (senior fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement), Erin Mooney (senior IDP and protection adviser at the United Nations and former deputy director of the Project) and Chareen Stark (senior research assistant, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement). In attendance were representatives from the US Department of State and international NGOs, as well as researchers from think tanks and universities.

Cohen opened the event by discussing the background and significance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. From the very beginning of discussions about internal displacement, there was an emphasis on the fundamental responsibility of national governments to protect and assist those displaced within their territory. And yet over the years there has been an awareness that international actors also have a role to play. She noted the positive strides that have occurred over the past twenty years in regards to government response to internal displacement. Country visits by the UN experts on IDPs—the Representatives of the Secretary-General on IDPs—have been instrumental to improving government response, in some instances leading governments to address internal displacement for the first time. Today, most governments understand their obligations and responsibilities to protect and assist IDPs; the challenge is often translating that understanding into concrete actions.

Elizabeth Ferris gave an overview of the Framework for National Responsibility, which was used to assess government response in each of the fifteen countries in the report (Afghanistan, The Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen). The Framework outlines twelve minimum steps—or benchmarks—that governments can take to address the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced persons within their territory, from preventing displacement to appointing a focal point on IDP issues, to facilitating the work of the international community. She explained the methodology used in the study and described the challenges the authors faced in conducting the research. For example, basic data on various aspects of government response was lacking in many instances and it was often difficult to determine the impact of a particular government policy in addressing internal displacement. In addition to analyzing the response of the fifteen governments on each of the twelve benchmarks, the study included four extended case studies commissioned for this report: Afghanistan, Georgia, Kenya and Sri Lanka.  Ferris discussed some of the overall findings of the study, noted that the Framework had proven to be a useful assessment tool for examining national responses to displacement, and suggested a number of areas where further research is needed. 

Erin Mooney briefed the audience on benchmark seven—designating an institutional focal point on IDPs—and benchmark ten—supporting durable solutions for IDPs. Mooney noted that designating a governmental focal point for addressing internal displacement is important for clarifying institutional responsibilities and, therefore, for increasing governmental accountability.  Of the 15 countries assessed, all but one had designated a national institutional focal point for addressing internal displacement. She discussed some of the challenges institutional focal points often face, including a lack of funding and a lack of political clout which often challenge their ability to coordinate across government agencies. Benchmark ten, the achievement of durable solutions, was one of the most complex and politicized areas of government action, and is  arguably the one in which government commitment to addressing displacement becomes most apparent. Governments tend to emphasize return as the primary solution to displacement, but, in situations where return has occurred, there is usually little information about whether IDPs have in fact achieved a durable solution. Mooney discussed some of the challenges the fifteen governments faced in finding durable solutions, noting that in none of the countries have durable solutions to displacement been fully achieved.

Chareen Stark discussed the report’s findings on benchmark one—the prevention of arbitrary displacement—and the study’s overall recommendations. Given that the study assessed governments already experiencing large-scale displacement and, in most instances, multiple waves of displacement, Stark said it was obvious that all fifteen governments had failed to prevent displacement. There were three major limitations to governments’ ability to prevent displacement: many of the governments are themselves parties to conflict; many of the governments assessed do not exercise effective sovereignty over all of their territory, due to the presence of nonstate armed actors and/or foreign militaries; and all of the assessed countries face financial and human capacity limitations. She explained that the study found that nearly half of the countries assessed had developed some sort of preventive measures (at least on paper), including several governments that had taken measures to prevent displacement from natural disasters but not conflict. Stark discussed some of these laws, policies and institutional mechanisms as well as the challenges to their effective implementation. She also outlined the report’s recommendations to governments of countries with IDP populations, such as developing and implementing laws and policies in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and devoting adequate resources at the national and local levels.

Concluding the discussion, the panel responded to questions from the audience on issues such as incentives for governments to address internal displacement using the Framework for National Responsibility and challenges in data reporting and analysis.  Specific questions were also raised on benchmarks five (laws on internal displacement), six (policies on internal displacement), three (designating an institutional focal point for IDPs) and twelve (working with the international community).

Event Materials

• From Responsibility to Response Nov 2011doc

Editor's Note: This is the first part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The second part is available here.

The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement recently released a study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement." The study examined 15 out of the 20 countries with the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations—Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen.

According to estimates, these 15 countries represent over 70 percent of the world’s 27.5 million conflict-induced IDPs. Wherever possible, we also tried to include government efforts to address internal displacement by natural disasters. But in this and the subsequent blog post, we will focus on our main general conclusions as well as particular issues around housing, land and property (HLP) rights that emerged from our analysis (see Part II of this posting).

The study looks at how governments have fared in terms of implementing 12 practical steps (“benchmarks”) to prevent and address internal displacement, as outlined in the 2005 Brookings publication entitled "Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility." The 12 benchmarks are as follows:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

Stepping back from HLP issues (to be addressed in a subsequent set of comments in Part II of this guest posting), we drew several key observations on our overall findings.

The study found that political will was the main determining factor of response to internal displacement. Governments cannot always control the factors that cause displacement, or may themselves be responsible for displacement, but they can take measures to improve the lives and uphold the rights and freedoms of IDPs. Internal displacement due to con­flict derives from political issues, and all aspects of a government’s response to it therefore are affected by political considerations, including, for example, acknowledgment of displacement, registration and collection of data on IDPs, ensuring the participation of IDPs in decision-making, assistance and protection offered to different (temporal) caseloads of IDPs, support for durable solutions, which durable solutions are supported, and the facilitation of efforts by international organizations to provide protec­tion and assistance to IDPs.

While none of the governments surveyed was fully protecting and assisting IDPs, four stand out in particular—Colombia, Georgia, Kenya and Uganda—for implementing their responsibility toward IDPs while three others—Central African Republic, Myanmar and Yemen—had particular difficulties in fulfilling their responsibilities toward IDPs. In Myanmar, the obstacles were primarily political while in Yemen and the Central African Republic, as in many of the countries surveyed, the limitations appear to arise primarily from inadequate government capacity.

The other eight countries were somewhere in between. For example, some, such as Nepal, have demonstrated a significant commitment at one particular point in time but have failed to follow through. Others, such as Sri Lanka, have at times demonstrated blatant disregard for their responsibility and have moved swiftly to try to bring an end to displacement. Sudan, Pakistan, and to a certain extent, Turkey, have very problematic records with respect to preventing displacement in one part of the country yet have supported efforts to bring an end to displacement in others. In some cases, such as Afghanistan and Yemen, the continuing conflict and the role of nonstate actors (and in Afghanistan, the presence of foreign militaries as well) have made it difficult for the government to respond effectively to internal displacement.

Prevention of internal displacement is paramount, but is probably the most difficult measure to take and the least likely to be taken in the countries as­sessed, which all had large IDP populations. Given the scale of displacement in the fifteen countries surveyed, it was to be expected that these governments would not have been suc­cessful in preventing displacement. Nearly half of the fifteen countries assessed had adopted some preventive measures on paper, but all fifteen have fallen short of actually prevent­ing displacement in practice.

Moreover, many national authorities themselves have been or are perpetrators of violence or human rights abuses that have led to displacement, and many states foster a culture of impunity for alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. Further, the presence of foreign military forces and/or non-state armed actors limits the abil­ity of many states to exercise full sovereignty over their territory and therefore to prevent the conditions that drive people into displacement. Some countries have taken steps to prevent dis­placement due to natural disasters or develop­ment but not due to conflict, indicating that the former is perhaps less politically taboo and/or practically less difficult to implement than the latter.

Sustained political attention by the highest authorities is a necessary, though not suffi­cient, condition for taking responsibility for IDPs. Nearly all of the governments surveyed, at least at some point, have exercised their responsibility to IDPs by acknowledging the existence of internal displacement and their responsibility to address it as a national prior­ity, for example, by drawing attention to IDPs’ plight. However, government efforts to raise awareness of internal displacement through public statements was not always a useful indicator of a government’s commitment to upholding the fundamental human rights and freedoms of IDPs.

Among the five countries with laws on or related to internal displacement, there were notable limitations to the scope of the laws and gaps in implementing them. Legislation was quite comprehensive in scope in at least two cases and was narrow in others, address­ing specific rights of IDPs or a phase of dis­placement. Other countries lacked a national legislative framework on IDPs but had generic legislation relevant to IDPs. Still others had laws that violated or could violate the rights of IDPs. Laws on internal displacement must be viewed in the context of other legislation and administrative acts applicable to the general population (e.g., those related to documenta­tion, residency, housing, land and property, and personal status), which this study reviews to the extent possible, particularly in the case studies on Georgia, Kenya, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In Africa, the region with the most IDPs, states have recognized in legally binding instruments the importance of addressing internal displace­ment by incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into domestic legisla­tion and policy.

Many of the governments surveyed have adopted policies or action plans to respond to the needs of IDPs, but adequate implementa­tion and dissemination were largely lacking. Nine of the countries surveyed had developed a specific policy, strategy or plan on internal displacement, implemented to varying degrees; those in six of these countries were still active at the time of writing. In addition, at least two countries had national policies in draft form, and one country that does not recognize conflict-induced displacement had a plan for mitigating displacement by cyclones and a plan on disaster risk reduction, although it did not discuss displacement. While in some cases positive steps had been taken, by and large im­plementation of policies on internal displace­ment remains a challenge and has, in some cases, stalled. Available information indicates that efforts to raise awareness of IDP issues and policies have largely been inadequate.

It is difficult to assess governments’ com­mitment of financial resources to address internal displacement, but some trends were identified. Addressing internal displacement, especially over time, is a costly venture. While it was difficult to obtain a full picture of a coun­try’s expenditure on IDPs, several countries allocated funds to assist IDPs, including a few that had no national laws or policies on IDPs. In at least two countries, funds for assisting IDPs seemed to diminish in recent years. In many countries, difficulties arise at the district or municipal levels, where local authorities bear significant responsibility for addressing internal displacement but face many obstacles, including insufficient funds, to doing so. Allegations of corruption and misallocation of funds intended to benefit IDPs at certain points has been observed in some of the countries as­sessed. Some countries seem to rely on inter­national assistance to IDPs rather than national funds.

National human rights institutions (NHRIs) contribute invaluably to improving national responses to internal displacement in a number of countries. In recent years, an increasing number of NHRIs around the world have begun to integrate attention to internal displacement into their work. NHRIs have played an impor­tant role in raising awareness of internal dis­placement, monitoring displacement situations and returns, investigating individual complaints, advocating for and advising the government on the drafting of national policies to address inter­nal displacement, and monitoring and reporting on the implementation of national policies and legislation. In particular, the NHRIs of six of the countries surveyed stand out for their efforts to promote the rights of IDPs in their countries. Interestingly, almost all of their work with IDPs is funded by international sources, raising the question of whether national governments themselves should not be doing more to increase their funding of NHRIs in order to support their engagement with IDP issues.

International actors are valuable resources for efforts aiming to improve government response to IDPs. In many cases, the past Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (RSGs) mandated to study the issue of internal displacement (Francis Deng and his successor Walter Kälin) and the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (Chaloka Beyani) had exercised significant influence on governments in encouraging and supporting action on behalf of IDPs. Along with these actors, UNHCR and the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement have provided technical assis­tance to support governments’ efforts to de­velop national legal frameworks to ensure IDPs’ access to their rights.

Durable solutions: Return was the durable solution most often supported by the govern­ments assessed. The Framework for National Responsibility identifies three durable solu­tions—return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in the country. However, the fifteen countries surveyed herein reflect a global ten­dency to emphasize return, often excluding the other durable solutions. Yet for solutions to be voluntary, IDPs must be able to choose among them, and local integration or settlement else­where in the country may in fact be some IDPs’ preferred solution. Especially in situations of protracted displacement, those may be the only feasible solutions, at least in the near future.

The most difficult benchmarks to analyze were those whose underlying concepts are very broad and those for which data was seemingly not publicly available. Chief among these were the benchmarks on preventing internal displacement (Benchmark 1), raising national awareness (Benchmark 2), promoting the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking (Benchmark 9), and allocating adequate resources (Benchmark 11). Analysis on all other benchmarks also faced data constraints as in many cases data were outdated or incomplete or simply were not available. Nonetheless, we found that the twelve benchmarks all directed attention to important issues in governments’ responses to internal displacement.

We also found that while protection is central to the Framework, the issue is of such importance that there should be a benchmark explicitly focused on it—and specifically on protection as physical security, provided to IDPs during all phases of displacement. This benchmark would also underscore the responsibility of governments to protect the security of humanitarian workers engaged with IDPs.

Overall, the study found that the Framework for National Responsibility is a valuable tool for analyzing government efforts to prevent dis­placement, to respond to IDPs’ needs for protection and assistance and to support durable solutions. But this study also reveals certain limitations to using the Framework as an assessment tool, particularly in terms of accounting for the responsibility of nonstate actors; accounting for national responsibility for protection, particularly during displacement; and accounting for causes of displacement other than conflict, violence and human rights violations.