po Swimming, aerobics, and racquet sports are linked to lowest risk of cardiovascular death By www.bmj.com Published On :: Wednesday, November 30, 2016 - 06:30 Full Article
po NICE recommends hybrid closed loop systems for poorly controlled type 1 diabetes By www.bmj.com Published On :: Wednesday, November 8, 2023 - 11:31 Full Article
po War on Ukraine: The state of the global response By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Mon, 03 Oct 2022 15:47:14 +0000 War on Ukraine: The state of the global response 17 October 2022 — 6:30PM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2022 Chatham House and Online Implications of the war for the future of multilateralism. Russia’s war on Ukraine has tested the capacity for a unified global response to grave violations of the UN Charter. The world is in unchartered territory as a nuclear member of the United Nations Security Council attacks a non-nuclear country. Multilateral institutions that were born out of an effort to prevent war are struggling to prove their relevance in the face of growing existential threats to humanity. The war is exacerbating divisions within the global community, disrupting food and energy supplies worldwide and contributing to a profound crisis of multilateralism. The longer these divisions last, the longer the war in the middle of Europe and the harder it will be to respond to the interconnected global crises that threaten everyone. This discussion offers a unique insight into the macro-geopolitical questions in relation to the war in Ukraine with members of the Elders and other experts: The panel considers: How can a more united global response to Russian aggression be built? What stands in the way of an effective multilateral response based on international norms? In what ways are divisions between UN member states influencing the trajectory of the war or prospects for peace? How is the conflict changing geopolitics and the ability of the multilateral system to address global challenges? As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. This event is organised in partnership between Chatham House and The Elders, the group of independent global leaders founded by Nelson Mandela who work for peace, justice and human rights. Read the transcript. Full Article
po Iran: Protests, politics and power By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 13:42:13 +0000 Iran: Protests, politics and power 16 November 2022 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2022 Online Join Robert Macaire, UK ambassador to Iran (2018-21), and others to discuss what the protests mean for Iran’s domestic, regional and global power. Protests in Iran, spurred after Masha Amini died in police custody, have drawn focus on how Iranians feel about state repression, a struggling economy and global isolation. Iran is facing the most adamant challenge to its power structure since the ‘green movement’ in 2009 with protests taking place in more than 50 cities and towns across the country. There is no sign that the government will back down but what will that decision mean for the power it can wield at home and abroad? This conversation examines how the protests impact Iran’s domestic power, its regional relationships and its relations with the US. What do the protests demonstrate about Iran’s power domestically and regionally? How do the protests influence the JCPOA? What will the government gain if they hold a hard line on protesters? How do the protests impact Iran’s regional activities? As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. Read the transcript. Full Article
po What’s next in UK monetary policy? By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 19 Oct 2022 11:32:14 +0000 What’s next in UK monetary policy? 4 November 2022 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 October 2022 Chatham House and Online A panel of leading experts discuss the future direction of UK monetary policy. The UK’s so-called ‘mini-budget’ on 23 September led to a severe market reaction and a wave of criticism at home and abroad that ultimately forced the sacking of UK chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng and contributed to the downfall of Liz Truss’s government. The new chancellor Jeremy Hunt is due to deliver what will essentially be an entirely new budget in mid-November, with a full assessment from the Office of Budget Responsibility. This will follow the meeting of the Bank of England’s interest rate setting Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) on Thursday 3 November. Given rising inflationary pressures worldwide, it seems highly likely that the MPC will increase interest rates once again, but by how much and how far there will have to be an additional premium linked to the government’s fiscal strategy is far from clear. Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance programme is pleased to partner with Fathom Consulting to host a special session of Fathom’s Monetary Policy Forum. A presentation of Fathom’s latest economic outlook, fully updated to take account of the previous day’s MPC decision, will be followed by a discussion among four of the MPC’s original former external members. Key questions will include: How far has the government been able to restore its fiscal credibility? Did the MPC make the right decision on 3 November? What is the likely pace and extent of monetary tightening in the UK going forward? What will be the long-term consequences for the UK economy of the past month’s policy experiment? What are the international implications? As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. This event is in partnership with Fathom Consulting. Full Article
po Middle East and great power competition By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 12:42:13 +0000 Middle East and great power competition 28 November 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 October 2022 Chatham House and Online Experts discuss how the Middle East is changing in a fast-moving geopolitical environment. The war in Ukraine and great power competition define not only global politics but also regional ones. The Middle East is a microcosm for observing how the great power rivalry informs regional affairs. OPEC+’s decision to reduce oil supply to international markets and many regional states’ balancing act between the West and Russia, for that matter China as well, are only a few recent policy choices that clearly illustrate how the global and regional levels interact with each other. Plus this is now a region in which the US has downsized its security commitments, whereas Russia has increased its footprint in regional security and China in economy. This event tries to unpack how the great power rivalry and the war in Ukraine affect regional politics and how the Middle East adjusts itself to this new phase in global politics. Full Article
po Nigeria's 2023 elections: Security, economic and foreign policy imperatives By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 23 Nov 2022 14:47:13 +0000 Nigeria's 2023 elections: Security, economic and foreign policy imperatives 5 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 November 2022 Chatham House and Online Bola Ahmed Tinubu, presidential candidate for the All-Progressives Congress, discusses his vision and recently-unveiled manifesto for ‘renewing hope’ in Nigeria. Nigeria is scheduled to hold presidential and national assembly elections on 25 February 2023 as well as governorship and other subnational elections on 11 March 2023. The elections will end President Muhammadu Buhari’s two terms in office since his election in 2015 and will mark the first time that he is not engaging in a presidential poll since Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999 – an important marker in Nigeria’s trajectory of democratic consolidation. Nigeria’s recently enacted Electoral Act has contributed to improved hope around the election process, reflected in the addition of 12.29 million new voters in Nigeria’s voter registration exercise across the federation’s 36 states and 1,491 constituencies. Yet Nigeria stands at a critical juncture, having suffered from two recessions in the past six years, unprecedented levels of food insecurity, persistent fuel scarcity and high levels of crude oil theft. Civic fatigue also remains an important challenge and President Muhammadu Buhari’s three main policy pillars of security, economy and corruption continue to be defining issues for citizens. At this event, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, presidential candidate for the All-Progressives Congress, discusses his vision and recently unveiled manifesto for ‘renewing hope’ in Nigeria including his policy proposals for economic reform and revival and how to deliver secure and inclusive job opportunities for Nigerian citizens. Download a transcript This event is a members and Africa programme event and is part of a series of events and outputs examining Nigeria’s 2023 elections and political developments. As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation. Full Article
po What is Labour’s foreign policy? By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Tue, 03 Jan 2023 15:02:14 +0000 What is Labour’s foreign policy? 24 January 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 January 2023 Chatham House and Online In conversation with David Lammy, the UK shadow foreign secretary. David Lammy MP, shadow secretary of state for foreign, commonwealth and development affairs, outlines Labour’s plan for UK foreign policy if elected to government. He addresses the UK’s strengths and opportunities in a world that has become more divided, more dangerous, and more unpredictable. He also offers a critique of the current UK government’s approach to foreign policy, particularly at strained relationships with allies and Britain’s economic woes. The shadow foreign secretary explores the following key questions: What would a future Labour government do to modernize Britain’s diplomacy and rebuild alliances to improve Britain’s global influence? In a new age of warfare in Europe, how would Labour pursue security cooperation with allies? How would Labour address high energy costs, energy security, and the climate crisis? As Britain’s economy falters, how can foreign policy drive prosperity at home? What is Labour’s plan for international development, following the UK government’s abandonment of the 0.7% commitment? As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. Read a transcript Full Article
po The state of the union? US foreign policy and a new US Congress By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 11 Jan 2023 08:52:13 +0000 The state of the union? US foreign policy and a new US Congress 30 January 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 January 2023 Chatham House and Online As a new Congress takes shape, what is the impact for US foreign policy? The recent US 2022 midterm elections have led to a split with Republicans in command of the US House of Representatives and Democrats retaining a slim majority in the Senate. Following a gruelling selection process for the new Speaker of the House, the new Congress took its seats in January 2023, but President Joe Biden no longer enjoys single-party control of Congress. What will be the implications of this for US leadership and US foreign policy? How will domestic politics constrain foreign policy objectives? Can policymakers across government set aside political differences to tackle global challenges? This panel also unpacks insights into the following questions: What will this Congress view as foreign policy priorities? Will policies that are tough on China ramp up? Can the US continue its support for Ukraine with a split Congress? Will the next two years lead to any considerable foreign policy pivots with a general election on the horizon? As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. Read the transcript. Full Article
po Disruptive technologies by nation states and malign cyber actors – the US response By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 02 Feb 2023 12:32:13 +0000 Disruptive technologies by nation states and malign cyber actors – the US response 16 February 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 February 2023 Chatham House and Online Lisa Monaco, the US deputy attorney general, discusses how autocratic governments and malign cyber actors use disruptive technologies to project power and engage in illicit activity. Weaponizing data, ransomware attacks and other illicit cyber activity represent significant threats to national security. Governments and malicious cyber actors around the world exploit disruptive technology to engage in criminal activity, track citizens and coerce other countries thereby weakening the rules-based order and fundamental principles of democracy. Lisa Monaco discusses how the world is at an inflection point when it comes to meeting this challenge and describes how the US and partner nations are responding to protect their citizens and the broader international community. Key questions to discuss include: What steps does the US government need to take to properly address this threat? How are countries coordinating policies to confront the problem? To what extent does this challenge go beyond US-China competition? As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. Read the transcript. Full Article
po The role of think tanks amid political uncertainty By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 13 Apr 2023 09:37:13 +0000 The role of think tanks amid political uncertainty 9 May 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 April 2023 Chatham House and Online Think tank leaders discuss how persistent and new forms of political uncertainty impact on their work and what can they do to counter it. Think tanks play a crucial role in supporting better public policy to address the most pressing global and local challenges. However, the recent rise in political turbulence poses a significant challenge to this work. Not only must the work of think tanks help counter political uncertainty but that uncertainty often threatens their ability to work effectively, and in some cases, their survival. Polarized elections, regional instability, the rise of populism, shrinking civic space, eroding democracies, weakened institutions and public distrust are just some of the tricky contexts and issues raised by think tank leaders in the latest think tank state of the sector report. This event is being held in collaboration with On Think Tanks ahead of the On Think Tanks Conference. Join us for a thought-provoking discussion at Chatham House on the major sources and consequences of political uncertainty in the world today and the critical role of think tanks in responding to and countering it. Key questions to be addressed during this discussion include: How does political uncertainty look like today? What can think tanks do to operate within uncertain contexts? What are their roles: should they build the middle ground, support political parties, rally behind social demands? Will think tanks be able to maintain their reliability and credibility in an increasingly polarized political environment? What can think tanks do to contribute to greater political stability? As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation. A drinks reception will immediately follow this event. Full Article
po The future of Europe post-Brexit By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 16:36:41 +0000 The future of Europe post-Brexit 28 September 2021 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2021 Online In conversation with Michel Barnier, Chief Brexit Negotiator, European Union (2016-2019). Drawing on the diary he kept during the 1600 days of complex and acrimonious Brexit negotiations, Michel Barnier explores the political and practical implications for Europe post-Brexit. Britain’s departure from the European Union has been a long and difficult journey. Many questions remain about what future lies ahead for the UK and EU and the relations between them. To what extent were UK negotiating positions shaped by politics within the ruling Conservative government? How did domestic politics in EU member states shape EU positions? What were key turning points in the negotiations? What are the hopes and expectations for bilateral relations between the UK and EU states? What is the scope for UK – EU cooperation on transatlantic issues and relations with China This event forms part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on Effective Multilateralism. Read a transcript. As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation. Attending this event and watching the full event video is for Chatham House members only. Not a member? Find out more. Full Article
po Memory politics: the challenge of commemoration in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 15:39:42 +0000 Memory politics: the challenge of commemoration in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 5 October 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Online This event explores how to address memory and commemoration in the former Soviet states, considering their role in political processes and violent conflict. How the past is remembered and commemorated plays a large role – perhaps too large – in contemporary political debates and in how conflicts are negotiated. Perceptions of history influence people’s actions and are used to judge or dismiss the actions of others. Nowhere is this more so than in the political, territorial and social debates and disputes across the former Soviet Union. This event examines how to address the problems caused by entrenched memory debates – and proposes a framework for ‘ethical political commemoration’ for use across historical enquiry, political processes, and conflict transformation initiatives. The speakers explore the topic through the context of Turkey and the Armenian genocide, as well as more broadly through their own experiences in conflict transformation and peace processes. Full Article
po Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Mon, 04 Oct 2021 10:14:41 +0000 Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 14 October 2021 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2021 Chatham House Former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11. Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11. The dramatic events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates a profound shift in European security priorities since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of 9/11, former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses recent shifts in European foreign policy. How has the focus on counterterrorism changed over the last two decades particularly in light of new and evolving strategic challenges? Why were many long-term objectives in Afghanistan left unachieved? Has the threat of terrorism changed across Europe? How has cooperation between security and intelligence services across the world changed particularly across the Atlantic? And, 20 years on, is the ‘war on terror’ really over? This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org. Full Article
po Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Tue, 08 Feb 2022 16:36:23 +0000 Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022 Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership. Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals. Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack. The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv. The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe. The question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response. Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’. One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine. Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity. But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit. Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes. The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions. The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments. UK must do more to win trust But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia. When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge. In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest. Despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions. Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia. Full Article
po Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 13:20:31 +0000 Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022 As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders. One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries. Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla. The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection. The waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs. Solidarity with Ukrainians The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education. The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response. Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees. Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards. The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies. The unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders. A turning point for asylum in Europe? Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system. Full Article
po War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 06 Apr 2022 08:42:16 +0000 War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two. Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding. The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced. Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. The panel considers: What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now? How can aid agencies meet those needs? What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe? How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter? This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world. This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict. Read the transcript Full Article
po Culture notes: Populists of the world unite By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 25 May 2022 09:11:06 +0000 Culture notes: Populists of the world unite The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022 America’s hard-right has successfully played a long game at home, and now it’s schmoozing Europe. We should be worried, says Catherine Fieschi The politics of advanced democracies is a rather Janus-faced affair these days. No sooner have we breathed a sigh of relief at the results of the French presidential election than a leaked United States Supreme Court document on Roe v Wade signals American abortion rights are under threat. Yes, Europe seems to be maintaining political unity in its support of Ukraine, and the US is lavishing eye-watering sums on it both in military and humanitarian aid. Yet one cannot help but feel that these might be short-lived spells of relief in the face of mounting storm clouds on the political horizon. Both at the domestic and international level, populist politics looks to be gathering pace still. On the domestic front, we should be cautious in our relief. In the French elections Emmanuel Macron was indeed re-elected, and comfortably so, but there is no denying the space occupied by populist politicians on the left and the right. In the first round, Marine Le Pen gained 23 per cent of the vote, left populist candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon 22 per cent, and far-right candidate Éric Zemmour 7 per cent. Add to this a record low turnout, and the picture is one of a system in which mainstream politics has overall been rejected in favour of various populist options. The Hungarians weren’t so lucky, and Viktor Orbán’s capture of the media and quashing of the opposition over his years in power delivered solid victory. What should be cause for further concern is what is happening in the United States, as well as its potential impact on European politics. A quick flick through American politics today suggests dysfunctionalities of staggering magnitude and depth, and the full extent of the success of the right-wing Republican project, as confirmed by the intention to reverse Roe v Wade. Any reversal of Roe v Wade is a further step towards a drastic re-territorialization of American politics: into red states and blue states, into urban v rural, into places where taxes fund public education and public goods and where they won’t. It is also about a re-territorialization of institutional power away from the federal and into state institutions. The words of JD Vance, the Ohio Republican senatorial candidate – author of the rather good memoir Hillbilly Elegy – pander to an ‘American heartlands’ view of the United States’ role in the world. Asked about the fate of Ukraine, Vance simply replied that he ‘didn’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another’. On an even more basic level, we would do well to keep in mind that there were 440 anti-voter bills in 49 states at the end of 2021 and rising, calling into question citizens’ basic rights to vote. Republicans have pursued this agenda relentlessly. They have played a long game and invested in media, education and minor and not so minor projects – all of which have secured them a social and political base that is well-disposed towards the deep reversal of the American liberal global project and that of its allies across the world. The arrival of the Fox News-driven Conservative Political Action Conference in Hungary in May is deeply worrying And it is perhaps on this last point that we should be most alarmed. Between May 18-20, the Conservative Political Action Conference, an American conclave of the right, was held in Europe. Viktor Orbán gave the keynote speech, and other speakers included the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo, and the president of Spain’s far-right party Vox, Santiago Abascal, as well as some well-known American Trumpian voices, including Trump himself. Marine Le Pen, whose earlier appearance at the conference had met with rapturous applause, chose not to cosy-up too closely to Orbán in the run-up to the French parliamentary elections in June but she sent her deputy. The export of the Fox News-driven conference from across the Atlantic is deeply worrying. Up until now populists have failed in their attempts at international alliances. At the European Union level their nationalism has always been in the way of their working together, and their groups tend to be short-lived or ineffective as a result. As for American attempts in Europe, the one led by Steve Bannon, the former White House adviser, in 2020 that aimed to create an Academy for the Judeo-Christian West ended as a damp squib – possibly not helped by his dismissal from the White House amid charges of defrauding donors. But something may be changing: the conference’s embrace of Orbán and an international smattering of ‘strongmen’ hailing from the hard-right, aligned with Putin and sup-ported by Trump and a media empire, suggests that we are entering a Trumpian-infused second act that in its triumphal revanchism is seeking to create an international right-wing populist, or even authoritarian front. This is about politics, media, but also money – something European populist parties have been short of. As Marine Le Pen explained to French voters, her party is so poor it had to borrow money from a Russian bank. As some have pointed out, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has complicated matters when it comes to Russian funding of disinformation to the West. Many routes have been shut down. But a new route between the US and Hungary as a platform to floss Europe with dirty money is a good replacement to the old Russian route. Full Article
po Polish-British Belvedere Forum 2022 By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 10:27:13 +0000 Polish-British Belvedere Forum 2022 7 July 2022 TO 8 July 2022 — 12:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 June 2022 Chatham House and Online The Belvedere Forum is a leading annual British and Polish dialogue that seeks to strengthen the extensive social, economic and political partnership between the two countries. Please note this event has reached full in-person capacity. You are welcome to join virtually via the Zoom link: https://chathamhouse.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_QFwXsXb0RoSt-1ywkuPjfQ The video on this page is of the opening remarks from the Belvedere Forum, with addresses from Sir Robin Niblett KCMG, Dr Sławomir Dębski, Prof Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC, Ambassador Anna Clunes CMG OBE, Lord (Tariq) Ahmad of Wimbledon, Min Marcin Przydacz, and Ambassador Piotr Wilczek. This and other session videos are available to watch on the Belvedere Forum 2022 playlist on YouTube. Photos by Mateusz Jozwiak, Zuzanna Nowak/PISM. The Belvedere Forum is a leading annual British and Polish bilateral dialogue bringing together a diverse group of actors from civil society, politics, business, academia and NGOs. It seeks to strengthen and deepen the extensive partnership between the two countries by exploring political, economic, social and cultural issues through debate and discussion. The forum is an annual event alternating between the UK and Poland. Originally created in 2017 by the governments of the UK and Poland, the forum is now jointly organized by Chatham House and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in Warsaw. The forum brings together a diverse group of actors to debate and discuss not only current British-Polish relations, but also the British and Polish responses to key European and global challenges. Agenda - Polish-British Belvedere Forum 2022 (PDF) Full Article
po President Maia Sandu on democracy and politics in Moldova By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Mon, 04 Jul 2022 17:05:20 +0000 President Maia Sandu on democracy and politics in Moldova Video jon.wallace 4 July 2022 The president covers Moldova’s challenges as it seeks closer integration with the European Union. President Maia Sandu discusses challenges to Moldovan democracy and society during an interview at Chatham House’s 2022 London Conference. She covers issues including corruption, the presence of Russian troops in the Transnistria region, neutrality in Moldova’s constitution, popular support for EU membership and refugees from Russian aggression in Ukraine. Full Article
po Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Sat, 03 Sep 2022 09:45:59 +0000 Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022 The last major figure with a decisive Cold War role, Mikhail Gorbachev was not as bad as Putin’s Russia portrays him, but also not as heroic as the West thinks. Arguably the worst year of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis was 1983, with three major incidents which escalated East-West tensions – and any one of them could have led to a full-scale war. The first was the Korean Airline KAL007 being shot down by an SU15 fighter aircraft for straying into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 passengers and crew. Then came the identification of signals from Soviet satellites as being incoming US intercontinental ballistic missiles – Colonel Stanislav Petrov, going against all protocols, thankfully decided to report them as a false alarm before he could be sure. The third was perhaps the most dangerous, being the misinterpretation of a live-fire NATO exercise which was believed by some in both East Germany and Russia to be a front for an imminent attack. The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled All three incidents occurred in the few months following the infamous March 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech by US president Ronald Reagan, in which he talked about nuclear arms control and laid out the US case for a ballistic missile defence programme. At that time Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the youngest serving member of the USSR Politburo, known to be a favourite of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is highly likely he had been aware of these close calls and was part of discussions within Kremlin decision-making circles. A changemaker both inside and outside the USSR Following the deaths of Andropov in 1984 and his replacement Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary of the Communist Party saw him immediately begin to change the Soviet Union from within – and also change relationships with the major Western powers, especially the US, Germany, and the UK. His policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were primarily aimed at internal reforms but translated into a major reset of international relations and international security. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US. These included the 1986 Stockholm Accord which emanated from the Helsinki Process and allowed for the observation and inspection of large-scale military exercises, the 1985 resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which lead to START I, and the 1987 INF Treaty in which the USSR ‘out-yessed’ the US – the most open and transparent disarmament treaty in terms of notification and verification measures ever agreed. There was also a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests starting from 1985 – which laid the groundwork for the 1996 CTBT – the 1991 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The most dramatic moment of all was when Gorbachev and Reagan met at a summit in Reykjavik and came close to deciding to eliminate nuclear weapons – but the initiative failed to reach agreement, mainly because Reagan could not drop his commitment to ballistic missile defences and Gorbachev could not accept the offer of joint development. Nonetheless, all these nuclear arms control treaties led the way for their descendants which have kept nuclear weapons in check ever since and are still in place in the form of the New START agreement. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US But despite these outstanding achievements, Gorbachev had blind spots – such as enabling rather than destroying the USSR bioweapons programme, unlike the US which had dismantled its own bioweapons offensive capability by 1973. And it is now known that, despite negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia withheld information on new chemical weapons agents – Novichoks – which have since been used to lethal effect by Russia in Salisbury and against figures opposing the current regime. His misguided faith in a Soviet future Gorbachev was markedly different to his predecessors as secretary general. He was neither as decrepit nor as hardline, and he understood from the outset that the Soviet Union was, by the 1980s, finally dying. Using the intellectual abilities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, he forced through the reforms which simultaneously captured the imagination of the free world and liberated his countrymen and women. But although he built solid relationships – even friendships – with the world’s major heads of state and improved the USSR’s human rights, releasing dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but many – especially Ukrainian dissidents – continued to languish in camps. The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled. This shortcoming is especially uncomfortable as today’s Russia continues to insist it has a given right to control other former Soviet states, to the extent it is willing to destroy them if they do not concede. Full Article
po How Russia’s war affects politics in southeast Europe By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 11:42:13 +0000 How Russia’s war affects politics in southeast Europe 4 April 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 March 2023 Online This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe. This event will discuss how the war on Ukraine has affected southeastern Europe. How have the governments and publics responded to the war? The panel will discuss Russia’s goals and leverage in the region, including the impact of its disinformation campaigns. Are the governments reassessing their foreign policy options? The granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova has brought attention to the stalled accession process in the Western Balkans. What lessons from the Western Balkans can be applied in Ukraine and Moldova? Have new linkages emerged between the two regions? Full Article
po Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 15:46:39 +0000 Eurovision, war and the geopolitics of pop The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023 Europe’s great song competition may strive for continental harmony, but bitter conflicts and voting blocs often drag it off key, writes Saskia Postema. In May, the city that spawned the Beatles will add another notch to its cultural belt as Liverpool hosts the Eurovision Song Contest. The pop competition has been celebrating extravagance, dramatic acts and lots of glitter since 1956. It is expressly designed to be non-political, with performers barred from promoting political interests, yet it exists for a specific political purpose – to promote European unity. The organizer, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), has certainly succeeded in part with its mission. While Europe Day on May 9 comes and goes without much fanfare, Eurovision is an eagerly anticipated fixture on the cultural calendar. Cultural diplomacy While some may dismiss it as simply an extravagant party, there is more to it than that: it is a form of cultural diplomacy. Beyond artistry, acts are expected to bring their cultural identity to the stage as they bid for douze points, Eurovision’s highest score, from national juries. Like any popular forum, it reflects popular opinion. So, when war threatens the European harmony Eurovision is meant to exude, politics inevitably manifests itself. This was evident last year. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Eurovision’s organizers reiterated their apolitical stance stating both countries would be allowed to participate. But when various countries threatened to withdraw if Russia was allowed to compete, the EBU changed its tune and broke off ties with Russian broadcasting agencies indefinitely. As reluctant as it was to act in this capacity, the organization still inadvertently highlighted its role as a political gatekeeper and confirmed Eurovision does function as a political arena. The first ‘nul points’ awarded to the UK in 2003 was seen as a backlash against the Iraq war Unsurprisingly, all eyes were on the Ukrainian entry that year. Kalush Orchestra’s Stefania, presenting a blend of traditional Ukrainian folk music with hip hop beats, went on to win the contest resoundingly. And while the winning nation normally hosts next year’s competition, due to the war this honour passed to the runner-up, the United Kingdom. Britain, coincidentally, has been one of the most visible supporters of Kyiv’s war efforts. Boris Johnson, the former prime minister, was among the first leaders to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion. Last year’s second place ended a long spate of poor results for the UK in the competition. The first year it scored nul points was 2003 when the UK entry was Cry Baby by the duo Jemini. The result was seen widely as a backlash against Britain’s entry into the Iraq war earlier that year. In the intervening years it has been placed last twice and received nul points again in 2021 when the entry was Embers sung by James Newman. With last year’s second place for Sam Ryder’s Space Man, the UK redeemed itself and will get to host Eurovision in Liverpool, a city twinned with Odesa since 1957. It is not the first time that Russia’s geopolitical relations have led to Eurovision controversy. In 2008, following the Russo-Georgian war, Russia recognized the self-proclaimed independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia which had broken away from Georgia. Despite Russian objections, Ukraine’s 2016 entry about Stalin’s deportation of Crimean Tatars was permitted – and won As a result, Georgia initially refused to take part in the 2009 Eurovision as it was to be held in Moscow. It changed its mind, however, submitting a song by Stefane and 3G called We Don’t Wanna Put In. The submission was rejected by the EBU, which said it contained obvious references to the Russian leader, something Georgia denied. In 2015, Ukraine withdrew from Eurovision following the Russian annexation of Crimea. The following year the EBU was faced with a similar problem when Ukraine submitted a song, 1944,sung by Jamala, which told the story of her great-grandmother who lived through the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. This time the EBU allowed the entry, despite the Russian Duma calling for its rejection. The song went on to win. " class="video-embed-field-lazy"> — A year after Russia annexed Crimea, Ukraine’s triumphant 2016 Eurovision entry, ‘1944’ by Jamala, touched on the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Union. Country-level voting behaviour, in general, can reveal interesting trends, starting with neighbourly support. Geographical voting blocs are a reality – whether it is Belgium and the Netherlands awarding each other points, the former Soviet Bloc countries showing preference for one another, or the Nordic states exchanging highest scores. In 2004 hosts Turkey refused to screen a map of the Republic of Cyprus Similarly, voting trends might be indicative of large diaspora communities living in a particular country. They can also provide insights into political trends. Amid rising tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2009, police reportedly questioned all 43 Azerbaijan judges who had voted for Armenia, resulting in a fine from the EBU. On the flipside, when Istanbul hosted the 2004 contest, it marked the first time that Turkey and Cyprus recognized each other through voting despite ongoing tensions, although Turkey still refused to screen a map of the Republic of Cyprus, which it does not recognize, when that country’s votes were announced as is custom. Participation means recognition Indeed, participation means recognition for countries. It shows kinship to the European continent, particularly attractive in the early 2000s during the initial waves of accession to the European Union by Eastern Bloc countries. Participation also offers individual recognition for the acts, whose mere involvement may promote diversity and inclusion. Having achieved a cult following from the LGBT community, Eurovision has become a platform for the promotion of human rights as well, exemplified by Austria’s 2014 winner Rise Like a Phoenix by Conchita Wurst, a moustachioed drag performer in a ball gown. " class="video-embed-field-lazy"> — The drag performer Conchita Wurst won Eurovision for Austria in 2014 with ‘Rise Like a Phoenix’. Eurovision acts as a gauge for cultural trends across the continent. As a result, it simply cannot be apolitical, not when countries such as Hungary withdraw from the competition calling Eurovision ‘too gay’. Interestingly, when China censored Ireland’s 2018 entry because it included two men dancing together, the EBU chose not to break ties. Full Article
po [68Ga]Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT-Positive Hepatic Inflammatory Pseudotumor: Possible PSMA-Avid Pitfall in Nuclear Imaging By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-01T04:08:08-07:00 Full Article
po The Emission of Internal Conversion Electrons Rather Than Auger Electrons Increased the Nucleus-Absorbed Dose for 161Tb Compared with 177Lu with a Higher Dose Response for [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 Than for [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-01T04:08:08-07:00 Preclinical data have shown that 161Tb-labeled peptides targeting the somatostatin receptor are therapeutically more effective for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy than are their 177Lu-labeled counterparts. To further substantiate this enhanced therapeutic effect, we performed cellular dosimetry to quantify the absorbed dose to the cell nucleus and compared dose–response curves to evaluate differences in relative biological effectiveness in vitro. Methods: CA20948 cell survival was assessed after treatment with [161Tb]Tb- and [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE (agonist) and with [161Tb]Tb- and [177Lu]Lu-DOTA-LM3 (antagonist) via a clonogenic assay. Cell binding, internalization, and dissociation assays were performed up to 7 d to acquire time-integrated activity coefficients. Separate S values for each type of particle emission (Auger/internal conversion [IC] electrons and β– particles) were computed via Monte Carlo simulations, while considering spheric cells. Once the absorbed dose to the cell nucleus was calculated, survival curves were fitted to the appropriate linear or linear-quadratic model and corresponding relative biological effectiveness was evaluated. Results: Although the radiopeptide uptake was independent of the radionuclide, [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 delivered a 3.6 and 3.8 times higher dose to the nucleus, respectively, than their 177Lu-labeled counterparts on saturated receptor binding. This increased nucleus-absorbed dose was mainly due to the additional emission of IC and not Auger electrons by 161Tb. When activity concentrations were considered, both [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 showed a lower survival fraction than did labeling with 177Lu. When the absorbed dose to the nucleus was considered, no significant difference could be observed between the dose–response curves for [161Tb]Tb- and [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE. [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 showed a linear-quadratic dose response, whereas [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE showed only a linear dose response within the observed dose range, suggesting additional cell membrane damage by Auger electrons. Conclusion: The IC, rather than Auger, electrons emitted by 161Tb resulted in a higher absorbed dose to the cell nucleus and lower clonogenic survival for [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 than for the 177Lu-labeled analogs. In contrast, [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE showed no higher dose response than [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE, whereas for [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 an additional quadratic response was observed. Because of this quadratic response, potentially caused by cell membrane damage, [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 is a more effective radiopeptide than [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE for labeling with 161Tb. Full Article
po Quantitative SPECT/CT Metrics in Early Prediction of [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE Treatment Response in Gastroenteropancreatic Neuroendocrine Tumor Patients By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-01T04:08:08-07:00 Our objective is to explore quantitative imaging markers for early prediction of treatment response in patients with gastroenteropancreatic neuroendocrine tumors (GEP-NETs) undergoing [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE therapy. By doing so, we aim to enable timely switching to more effective therapies in order to prevent time-resource waste and minimize toxicities. Methods: Patients diagnosed with unresectable or metastatic, progressive, well-differentiated, receptor-positive GEP-NETs who received 4 sessions of [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE were retrospectively selected. Using SPECT/CT images taken at the end of treatment sessions, we counted all visible tumors and measured their largest diameters to calculate the tumor burden score (TBS). Up to 4 target lesions were selected and semiautomatically segmented. Target lesion peak counts and spleen peak counts were measured, and normalized peak counts were calculated. Changes in TBS (TBS) and changes in normalized peak count (nPC) throughout treatment sessions in relation to the first treatment session were calculated. Treatment responses were evaluated using third-month CT and were binarized as progressive disease (PD) or non-PD. Results: Twenty-seven patients were included (7 PD, 20 non-PD). Significant differences were observed in TBSsecond-first, TBSthird-first, and TBSfourth-first (where second-first, third-first, and fourth-first denote scan number between the second and first, third and first, and fourth and first [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE treatment cycles), respectively) between the PD and non-PD groups (median, 0.043 vs. –0.049, 0.08 vs. –0.116, and 0.109 vs. –0.123 [P = 0.023, P = 0.002, and P < 0.001], respectively). nPCsecond-first showed significant group differences (mean, –0.107 vs. –0.282; P = 0.033); nPCthird-first and nPCfourth-first did not reach statistical significance (mean, –0.122 vs. –0.312 and –0.183 vs. –0.405 [P = 0.117 and 0.067], respectively). At the optimal threshold, TBSfourth-first exhibited an area under the curve (AUC) of 0.957, achieving 100% sensitivity and 80% specificity. TBSsecond-first and TBSthird-first reached AUCs of 0.793 and 0.893, sensitivities of 71.4%, and specificities of 85% and 95%, respectively. nPCsecond-first, nPCthird-first, and nPCfourth-first showed AUCs of 0.764, 0.693, and 0.679; sensitivities of 71.4%, 71.4%, and 100%; and specificities of 75%, 70%, and 35%, respectively. Conclusion: TBS and nPC can predict [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE response by the second treatment session. Full Article
po Composite Prediction Score to Interpret Bone Focal Uptake in Hormone-Sensitive Prostate Cancer Patients Imaged with [18F]PSMA-1007 PET/CT By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-01T04:08:08-07:00 Unspecific bone uptake (UBU) related to [18F]PSMA-1007 PET/CT imaging represents a clinical challenge. We aimed to assess whether a combination of clinical, biochemical, and imaging parameters could predict skeletal metastases in patients with [18F]PSMA-1007 bone focal uptake, aiding in result interpretation. Methods: We retrospectively analyzed [18F]PSMA-1007 PET/CT performed in hormone-sensitive prostate cancer (PCa) patients at 3 tertiary-level cancer centers. A fourth center was involved in performing an external validation. For each, a volume of interest was drawn using a threshold method to extract SUVmax, SUVmean, PSMA tumor volume, and total lesion PSMA. The same volume of interest was applied to CT images to calculate the mean Hounsfield units (HUmean) and maximum Hounsfield units. Clinical and laboratory data were collected from electronic medical records. A composite reference standard, including follow-up histopathology, biochemistry, and imaging data, was used to distinguish between PCa bone metastases and UBU. PET readers with less (n = 2) or more (n = 2) experience, masked to the reference standard, were asked to visually rate a subset of focal bone uptake (n = 178) as PCa metastases or not. Results: In total, 448 bone [18F]PSMA-1007 focal uptake specimens were identified in 267 PCa patients. Of the 448 uptake samples, 188 (41.9%) corresponded to PCa metastases. Ongoing androgen deprivation therapy at PET/CT (P < 0.001) with determination of SUVmax (P < 0.001) and HUmean (P < 0.001) independently predicted bone metastases. A composite prediction score, the bone uptake metastatic probability (BUMP) score, achieving an area under the receiver-operating-characteristic curve (AUC) of 0.87, was validated through a 10-fold internal and external validation (n = 89 bone uptake, 51% metastatic; AUC, 0.92). The BUMP score’s AUC was significantly higher than that of HUmean (AUC, 0.62) and remained high among lesions with HUmean in the first tertile (AUC, 0.80). A decision-curve analysis showed a higher net benefit with the score. Compared with the visual assessment, the BUMP score provided added value in terms of specificity in less-experienced PET readers (88% vs. 54%, P < 0.001). Conclusion: The BUMP score accurately distinguished UBU from bone metastases in PCa patients with [18F]PSMA-1007 focal bone uptake at PET imaging, offering additional value compared with the simple assessment of the osteoblastic CT correlate. Its use could help clinicians interpret imaging results, particularly those with less experience, potentially reducing the risk of patient overstaging. Full Article
po Clinical Factors That Influence Repeat 68Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT Scan Positivity in Patients with Recurrent Prostate Cancer Under Observation After a Negative 68Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT Scan: A Single-Center Retrospective Study By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-01T04:08:08-07:00 This analysis aimed to identify clinical factors associated with positivity on repeat 68Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT after a negative scan in patients with recurrent prostate cancer (PCa) under observation. Methods: This single-center, retrospective analysis included patients who underwent at least 2 68Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT scans (PET1 and PET2) at UCLA between October 2016 and June 2021 for recurrent PCa with negative PET1 and no PCa-related treatments between the 2 scans. Using Prostate Cancer Molecular Imaging Standardized Evaluation criteria to define negative and positive scans, the final cohort was divided into PET2-negative (PET2-Neg) and PET2-positive (PET2-Pos). The same PET1 was used twice in the more than 2 PET cases with inclusion criteria fulfilled. Patient characteristics and clinical parameters were compared between the 2 cohorts using Mann–Whitney U test and Fisher exact test. Areas under the curve (AUCs) of the receiver operating characteristic and the Youden index were computed to determine the discrimination ability of statistically significant factors and specific cut points that maximized sensitivity and specificity, respectively. Results: The final analysis included 83 sets of 2 PET/CT scans from 70 patients. Thirty-nine of 83 (47%) sets were PET2-Neg, and 44 of 83 (53%) sets were PET2-Pos. Prostate-specific antigen (PSA) increased from PET1 to PET2 for all 83 (100%) sets of scans. Median PSA at PET1 was 0.4 ng/mL (interquartile range, 0.2–1.0) and at PET2 was 1.6 ng/mL (interquartile range, 0.9–3.8). We found higher serum PSA at PET2 (median, 1.8 vs. 1.1 ng/mL; P = 0.015), absolute PSA difference (median, 1.4 vs. 0.7 ng/mL; P = 0.006), percentage of PSA change (median, +270.4% vs. +150.0%: P = 0.031), and median PSA velocity (0.044 vs. 0.017 ng/mL/wk, P = 0.002) and shorter PSA doubling time (DT; median, 5.1 vs. 8.3 mo; P = 0.006) in the PET2-Pos cohort than in the PET2-Neg cohort. Receiver operating characteristic curves showed cutoffs for PSA at PET2 of 4.80 ng/mL (sensitivity, 34%; specificity, 92%; AUC, 0.66), absolute PSA difference of 0.95 ng/mL (sensitivity, 62%; specificity, 71%; AUC, 0.68), percentage of PSA change of a positive 289.50% (sensitivity, 48%; specificity, 82%; AUC, 0.64), PSA velocity of 0.033 ng/mL/wk (sensitivity, 57%; specificity, 80%; AUC, 0.70), and PSA DT of 7.91 mo (sensitivity, 71%; specificity, 62%; AUC, 0.67). Conclusion: Patients with recurrent PCa under observation after a negative 68Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT scan with markedly elevated serum PSA levels and shorter PSA DT are more likely to have positive findings on repeat 68Ga-PSMA-11 PET/CT. Full Article
po Predicting Pathologic Complete Response in Locally Advanced Rectal Cancer with [68Ga]Ga-FAPI-04 PET, [18F]FDG PET, and Contrast-Enhanced MRI: Lesion-to-Lesion Comparison with Pathology By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-01T04:08:08-07:00 Neoadjuvant therapy in patients with locally advanced rectal cancer (LARC) has achieved good pathologic complete response (pCR) rates, potentially eliminating the need for surgical intervention. This study investigated preoperative methods for predicting pCR after neoadjuvant short-course radiotherapy (SCRT) combined with immunochemotherapy. Methods: Treatment-naïve patients with histologically confirmed LARC were enrolled from February 2023 to July 2023. Before surgery, the patients received neoadjuvant SCRT followed by 2 cycles of capecitabine and oxaliplatin plus camrelizumab. 68Ga-labeled fibroblast activation protein inhibitor ([68Ga]Ga-FAPI-04) PET/MRI, [18F]FDG PET/CT, and contrast-enhanced MRI were performed before treatment initiation and before surgery in each patient. PET and MRI features and the size and number of lesions were also collected from each scan. Each parameter’s sensitivity, specificity, and diagnostic cutoff were derived via receiver-operating-characteristic curve analysis. Results: Twenty eligible patients (13 men, 7 women; mean age, 60.2 y) were enrolled and completed the entire trial, and all patients had proficient mismatch repair or microsatellite-stable LARC. A postoperative pCR was achieved in 9 patients (45.0%). In the visual evaluation, both [68Ga]Ga-FAPI-04 PET/MRI and [18F]FDG PET/CT were limited to forecasting pCR. Contrast-enhanced MRI had a low sensitivity of 55.56% to predict pCR. In the quantitative evaluation, [68Ga]Ga-FAPI-04 change in SULpeak percentage, where SULpeak is SUVpeak standardized by lean body mass, had the largest area under the curve (0.929) with high specificity (sensitivity, 77.78%; specificity, 100.0%; cutoff, 63.92%). Conclusion: [68Ga]Ga-FAPI-04 PET/MRI is a promising imaging modality for predicting pCR after SCRT combined with immunochemotherapy. The SULpeak decrease exceeding 63.92% may provide valuable guidance in selecting patients who can forgo surgery after neoadjuvant therapy. Full Article
po Whole-Body HER2 Heterogeneity Identified on HER2 PET in HER2-Negative, -Low, and -Positive Metastatic Breast Cancer By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-01T04:08:08-07:00 Understanding which patients with human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER2)–negative or –low metastatic breast cancer (MBC) benefit from HER2-targeted strategies is urgently needed. We assessed the whole-body heterogeneity of HER2 expression on 89Zr-trastuzumab PET (HER2 PET) and the diagnostic performance of HER2 PET in a large series of patients, including HER2-negative and -low MBC. Methods: In the IMPACT-MBC study, patients with newly diagnosed and nonrapidly progressive MBC of all subtypes were included. Metastasis HER2 status was determined by immunohistochemistry and in situ hybridization.89Zr-trastuzumab uptake was quantified as SUVmax and SUVmean. HER2 immunohistochemistry was related to the quantitative 89Zr-trastuzumab uptake of all metastases and corresponding biopsied metastasis, uptake heterogeneity, and qualitative scan evaluation. A prediction algorithm for HER2 immunohistochemistry positivity based on uptake was developed. Results: In 200 patients, 89Zr-trastuzumab uptake was quantified in 5,163 metastases, including 186 biopsied metastases. With increasing HER2 immunohistochemistry status, uptake was higher (geometric mean SUVmax of 7.0, 7.6, 7.3, and 17.4 for a HER2 immunohistochemistry score of 0, 1, 2, or 3+, respectively; P < 0.001). High uptake exceeding 14.6 (90th percentile) was observed in one third of patients with a HER2-negative or -low metastasis biopsy. The algorithm performed best when lesion site and size were incorporated (area under the curve, 0.86; 95% CI, 0.79–0.93). Conclusion: HER2 PET had good diagnostic performance in MBC, showing considerable whole-body HER2 heterogeneity and uptake above background in HER2-negative and -low MBC. This provides novel insights into HER2-negative and -low MBC compared with standard HER2 immunohistochemistry on a single biopsy. Full Article
po Development of 18F-Fluoromisonidazole Hypoxia PET/CT Diagnostic Interpretation Criteria and Validation of Interreader Reliability, Reproducibility, and Performance By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2024-10-01T04:08:08-07:00 Tumor hypoxia, an integral biomarker to guide radiotherapy, can be imaged with 18F-fluoromisonidazole (18F-FMISO) hypoxia PET. One major obstacle to its broader application is the lack of standardized interpretation criteria. We sought to develop and validate practical interpretation criteria and a dedicated training protocol for nuclear medicine physicians to interpret 18F-FMISO hypoxia PET. Methods: We randomly selected 123 patients with human papillomavirus–positive oropharyngeal cancer enrolled in a phase II trial who underwent 123 18F-FDG PET/CT and 134 18F-FMISO PET/CT scans. Four independent nuclear medicine physicians with no 18F-FMISO experience read the scans. Interpretation by a fifth nuclear medicine physician with over 2 decades of 18F-FMISO experience was the reference standard. Performance was evaluated after initial instruction and subsequent dedicated training. Scans were considered positive for hypoxia by visual assessment if 18F-FMISO uptake was greater than floor-of-mouth uptake. Additionally, SUVmax was determined to evaluate whether quantitative assessment using tumor-to-background ratios could be helpful to define hypoxia positivity. Results: Visual assessment produced a mean sensitivity and specificity of 77.3% and 80.9%, with fair interreader agreement ( = 0.34), after initial instruction. After dedicated training, mean sensitivity and specificity improved to 97.6% and 86.9%, with almost perfect agreement ( = 0.86). Quantitative assessment with an estimated best SUVmax ratio threshold of more than 1.2 to define hypoxia positivity produced a mean sensitivity and specificity of 56.8% and 95.9%, respectively, with substantial interreader agreement ( = 0.66), after initial instruction. After dedicated training, mean sensitivity improved to 89.6% whereas mean specificity remained high at 95.3%, with near-perfect interreader agreement ( = 0.86). Conclusion: Nuclear medicine physicians without 18F-FMISO hypoxia PET reading experience demonstrate much improved interreader agreement with dedicated training using specific interpretation criteria. Full Article
po Taking Stock of Turkey's Trade Policy By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 15:50:01 +0000 Taking Stock of Turkey's Trade Policy 11 September 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 August 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE As the only large economy outside of the EU with a customs union agreement, Turkey has a unique trade policy. Amid domestic economic challenges, Turkey’s trade minister, Ruhsar Pekcan, will discuss prospects for upgrading the EU-Turkey customs union. She will also discuss relations between the UK and Turkey and outline strategies for post-Brexit trade.Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Full Article
po Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:50:01 +0000 Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East 14 May 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Turkey is cooperating closely with Russia to secure its border with Syria and to encourage a long-term political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Its efforts have staved off a humanitarian catastrophe in the northern Syrian province of Idlib and initiated the trilateral ‘Astana Process’ with Russia and Iran as the primary framework to settle the future of Syria.By contrast, Turkey and the US disagree on a range of important issues including Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air missile defence systems and American support for the PKK-affiliated Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.In this session, the speaker will outline Turkey’s foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and share his country’s perspectives on the US and Russian policies in that region.Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Full Article
po Turkey in 2020 and Beyond: What Lies Ahead for Turkish Politics? By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 11:10:01 +0000 Turkey in 2020 and Beyond: What Lies Ahead for Turkish Politics? 25 November 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Turkey witnessed some major developments over the last year. In August 2018, the dramatic Lira devaluation caused the Turkish economy to go into recession. In the 2019 local elections, which took place during the economic downturn, the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) mayoral candidates took control of Ankara and Istanbul after 25 years of dominance by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).The election results might lead to a rethink of the AKP leadership and consequences on Turkish politics will depend on Erdoğan’s interpretation of this reversal of his political fortune.Will this affect the long-standing alliance between AKP and MHP that has characterised Turkish foreign policy for the past few years? What impact will this have on both the domestic and international level? Finally, will Turkey’s recent incursion into Syria have lasting effect on the country’s alliances with other powers and its standing?In this context, the speaker will analyse the significance of these changes and the future trajectory of Turkish politics, economics and foreign policy. Full Article
po Webinar: Turkey’s Challenging Post-COVID 19 Outlook By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Fri, 17 Apr 2020 13:05:01 +0000 Webinar: Turkey’s Challenging Post-COVID 19 Outlook 7 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 April 2020 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has so far refused to impose a nation-wide lockdown to suppress the spread of coronavirus in the country. In late March, Turkish health officials announced that they expect the virus to peak in three weeks’ time and for Turkey to overcome it quickly. At the same time, Turkey has ruled out turning to the IMF for help in dealing with the crisis despite growing pressures on the Lira and the wider economy. The country’s relations with its traditional allies, the US and Europe, remain thorny. This event will focus on the likely impact of the epidemic on Turkey’s economy and politics. What are the reasons behind Erdogan’s reluctance to implement a comprehensive lockdown to break the chain of virus transmission? Why is Turkey resolutely opposed to agreeing a funding package with the IMF? What is the macro outlook for 2020 and beyond for the country’s economy? And how may the government’s long-term popularity be affected? Full Article
po Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Perspective of the Main Opposition Party By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 14:59:46 +0000 Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Perspective of the Main Opposition Party 5 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2020 Online The Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main Turkish opposition party, is becoming a serious contender for a leading role in the country’s politics. This is an online only event. CHP’s mayoral candidates defeated the Justice and Development Party (AKP) incumbents in the 2019 local elections in Ankara and Istanbul, which held both cities for a quarter of a century. Its ascendency in Turkish politics is improving prospects for a CHP-led government after the next general election in 2023. In this webinar, the speaker will share CHP’s stance on the country’s foreign policy towards key regional allies in Europe, as well as its take on relations with Russia, the US and Turkey’s position and role in the Middle East. Finally, the speaker will share how CHP’s external policy might differ from the ruling AKP. Full Article
po Turkey's foreign policy: The perspective of the İYİ Parti By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Thu, 14 Jan 2021 13:19:18 +0000 Turkey's foreign policy: The perspective of the İYİ Parti 25 January 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 January 2021 Online The centre-right İYİ Parti, the second largest opposition party in Turkey, is attracting voters from the governing alliance between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the pro-Turkish National Movement Party (MHP). Please complete your registration on Zoom: The İYİ Parti, which was set up in 2017, formed the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı) with the left-of-centre Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the pro-Islam Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) in the 2018 parliamentary elections winning 43 seats in the Grand National Assembly. In the 2019 municipal elections, the İYİ Parti’s alliance alliance with the CHP played an important role in enabling the latter’s candidates to become the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara after a quarter-century dominance by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Its popularity has been rising steadily, according to recent polls. In this webinar, the speaker will outline the party’s viewpoint on the country’s foreign policy towards the European Union, as well as its perspectives on relations with Russia, the US, Iran and the Arab world. Finally, he will share the ways in which the İYİ Parti’s approach to external policy might differ from the ruling AKP. Full Article
po Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy: A story of mutual creation? By www.chathamhouse.org Published On :: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 10:32:14 +0000 Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy: A story of mutual creation? 1 November 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 October 2022 Online Panellists discuss the link between Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies under President Erdoğan. From Turkey’s ongoing rapprochement with its erstwhile Middle Eastern antagonists to its Syria policy and earlier approach towards the West, there has been extensive discussion on the domestic drivers behind Ankara’s foreign policy. Less discussed but no less important is how Turkish foreign affairs have shaped its internal politics. Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s foreign and domestic policies have mutually reshaped each other. In this webinar, launching Gönül Tol’s new book Erdoğan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria, panellists will take stock of how Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies under the leadership of President Erdoğan have influenced and shaped each other. Speakers will also discuss the internal drivers behind Turkey’s current reset in relations with the Middle East, and examine how Ankara’s foreign affairs play into the country’s political and identity fault lines. The event will be held on the record and will be live-streamed on the MENA Programme’s Facebook page. Full Article
po Federal Reserve to announce potential rate cut decision Thursday By www.upi.com Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2024 15:33:50 -0500 Prognosticators anticipate the Federal Reserve on Thursday will announce a second rate cut after lowering the federal lending rate by 0.5% in September. Full Article
po FDA says commonly used decongestant 'not effective,' proposes removal By www.upi.com Published On :: Thu, 07 Nov 2024 14:52:29 -0500 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has determined commonly used oral phenylephrine is "not effective" and has proposed its removal from over-the-counter nasal decongestants. Full Article
po Tesla regains $1 trillion in market capitalization in post-election surge By www.upi.com Published On :: Fri, 08 Nov 2024 12:37:28 -0500 Tesla Friday reached a $1 trillion market capitalization value for the first time since 2022 in a post-election stock rally. Full Article
po Mattel apologizes for misprint on 'Wicked' doll packaging that links to porn website By www.upi.com Published On :: Mon, 11 Nov 2024 04:20:43 -0500 Mattel has apologized after inadvertently directing customers of its new line of Wicked dolls to a pornographic website, stating it is taking action to remove the misprinted toys' packaging. Full Article
po Report: SpaceX signs battery deal with South Korea-based LG Energy Solution to power Starship By www.upi.com Published On :: Mon, 11 Nov 2024 17:29:20 -0500 SpaceX has reportedly struck a deal with LG Energy Solution Ltd. to supply cylindrical lithium-ion batteries for Elon Musk's Starship rocket, expected to launch early next year, according to industry sources. Full Article
po Costco recalls nearly 80,000 pounds of butter due to possible mislabeling By www.upi.com Published On :: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 16:31:56 -0500 Costco voluntarily recalled 79,200 pounds of two types of its store-brand butter over the past month because their labels may not have said the products contain milk. Full Article
po Canada orders striking dock workers back to ports By www.upi.com Published On :: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 00:15:32 -0500 Canada ordered striking dock workers back to the ports of Vancouver, Prince Rupert and Montreal on Tuesday to clear out more than a week of container congestion bound for the United States and Canada. Full Article
po 2025 Luis J. Alvarez and Admiral Grace M. Hopper Postdoc Fellowship in Computing Sciences By careers.hpcwire.com Published On :: Fri, 20 Sep 2024 02:15:13 EST 2025 Luis J. Alvarez and Admiral Grace M. Hopper Postdoc Fellowship in Computing Sciences - 102564 Division: AC-Computing Luis J. Alvarez Postdoctoral Fellowship and Admiral Grace M. Hopper Postdoctoral Fellowship in Computing Sciences The Computing Sciences Area (https://cs.lbl.gov/) at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (https://www.lbl.gov) is now accepting applications for two distinguished postdoctoral fellowships in Computing Sciences: ⢠Luis W. Alvarez Postdoctoral Fellowship, and â¢Â Admiral Grace M. Hopper Postdoctoral Fellowship. Researchers in computer science, mathematics, data science, or any computational science discipline who have received their Ph.D. no earlier than January 1, 2022 but no later than September 30, 2025 are encouraged to apply. Only one (1) application is needed and it will be considered for both postdoctoral fellowships. The successful candidates will participate in research activities in computer science, mathematics, data science, or any computational science discipline of interest to the Computing Sciences Area and Berkeley Lab. Alvarez Fellows apply advances in computer science, mathematics, computational science, data science, machine learning or AI to computational modeling, simulations, and advanced data analytics for scientific discovery in materials science, biology, astronomy, environmental science, energy, particle physics, genomics, and other scientific domains. Hopper Fellows concentrate on the development and optimization of scientific and engineering applications leveraging high-speed network capability provided by the Energy Sciences Network or run on next-generation high performance computing and data systems hosted by the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center at Berkeley Lab. Since its founding in 2002, Berkeley Labâs Luis W. Alvarez Postdoctoral Fellowship (go.lbl.gov/alvarez) has cultivated exceptional early career scientists who have gone on to make outstanding contributions to computer science, mathematics, data science, and computational sciences. The Admiral Grace Hopper Postdoctoral Fellowship (go.lbl.gov/hopper) was first awarded in 2015 with the goal of enabling early career scientists to make outstanding contributions in computer science and high performance computing (HPC) research. About Computing Sciences at Berkeley Lab: Whether running extreme-scale simulations on a supercomputer or applying machine-learning or data analysis to massive datasets, scientists today rely on advances in and integration across applied mathematics, computer science, and computational science, as well as large-scale computing and networking facilities, to increase our understanding of ourselves, our planet, and our universe. Berkeley Labs Computing Sciences Area researches, develops, and deploys new tools and technologies to meet these needs and to advance research in our core capabilities of applied mathematics, computer science, data science, and computational science. In addition to fundamental advances in our core capabilities, we impact such areas as astrophysics and cosmology, accelerator physics, chemical science and materials science, combustion, fusion energy, nuclear physics, biology, climate change, and HPC systems and network technology. Research areas in Computing Sciences include but are not limited to: â¢Â Developing scientific applications and software technologies for extreme-scale and energy-efficient â¢Â Developing mathematical modeling for complex scientific problems â¢Â Designing algorithms to improve the performance of scientific applications â¢Â Researching digital and post-digital computer architectures for science â¢Â Developing and advancing extreme-scale scientific data management, analysis, and visualization â¢Â Developing and advancing next-generation machine learning, AI, and data science approaches for science â¢Â Advancing quantum computing and networking technologies, software, algorithms and applications â¢Â Evaluating or developing new and promising HPC systems and networking technologies â¢Â Researching methods to control and manage next-generation networks â¢Â Managing scientific data and workflows in distributed environments Qualifications: â¢Â Requires a Ph.D. in computer science, mathematics, computational science, or related discipline. â¢Â Candidates must have no more than 3 years of Postdoctoral Researcher or similar experience. â¢Â Expertise with advanced algorithms, software techniques, HPC systems and/or networking in a related research field. â¢Â Demonstrated creativity and the ability to perform independent research. â¢Â Demonstrated excellence in a related research field. â¢Â Ability to develop new cross-disciplinary partnerships that use advanced computational and/or mathematical techniques to produce unique lab capabilities. â¢Â Excellent communication skills with the ability to facilitate communications and collaborations with internal and external stakeholders. Additional Desired Qualifications: â¢Â Knowledge of advanced computing and high-performance computing. Application Process: 1. As part of your application process, you must upload and submit the following materials with your online application. 1. Cover letter 2. CV, with publication list included 3. Research Statement (no more than five (5) pages in length when printed using standard letter-size (8.5 inch x 11 inch) paper with 1-inch margins (top, bottom, left, and right) and a font size not smaller than 11 point; figures and references cited, if included, must fit within the five-page limit) 4. Contact information (name, affiliation, and email address) of at least three (3) individuals who will be able to provide letters of reference. 2. Application deadline: October 31, 2024. * It is highly advisable that you have all the required application materials and information ready and available prior to completing and submitting your application. Your application will not be considered complete if any of the above information is missing. Tentative Application Timeline: The Computing Sciences Fellowship Selection Committee is made up of a diverse representation of scientists and engineers across Berkeley Labâs Computing Sciences Area who will conduct a thorough review of all applications received. ⢠Application deadline: October 31, 2024 â¢Â Review and Selection: October 2024 - December 2024 ⢠Decisions made: January/February 2025 Want to learn more about working at Berkeley Lab? Please visit: careers.lbl.gov How To Apply Apply directly online at http://50.73.55.13/counter.php?id=290341 and follow the on-line instructions to complete the application process. Berkeley Lab is committed to inclusion, diversity, equity and accessibility and strives to continue building community with these shared values and commitments. Berkeley Lab is an Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Employer. We heartily welcome applications from women, minorities, veterans, and all who would contribute to the Labs mission of leading scientific discovery, inclusion, and professionalism. In support of our diverse global community, all qualified applicants will be considered for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, disability, age, or protected veteran status. Equal Opportunity and IDEA Information Links: Know your rights, click here (http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/posters/ofccpost.htm) for the supplement: Equal Employment Opportunity is the Law and the Pay Transparency Nondiscrimination Provision (https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ofccp/pdf/pay-transp_%20English_formattedESQA508c.pdf) under 41 CFR 60-1.4. Full Article
po Supermicro Introduces JBOF Storage Platform Powered by NVIDIA BlueField-3 for Scalable AI and HPC By www.hpcwire.com Published On :: Wed, 16 Oct 2024 15:04:21 +0000 SAN JOSE, Calif., Oct. 16, 2024 — Supermicro, Inc. is launching a new optimized storage system for high performance AI training, inference and HPC workloads. This JBOF (Just a Bunch […] The post Supermicro Introduces JBOF Storage Platform Powered by NVIDIA BlueField-3 for Scalable AI and HPC appeared first on HPCwire. Full Article
po Microchip Expands 64-Bit Portfolio with High-Performance PIC64HX Microprocessors for Edge Computing By www.hpcwire.com Published On :: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 12:07:23 +0000 CHANDLER, Ariz., Oct. 23, 2024 — The global edge computing market is expected to grow by more than 30 percent in the next five years, serving mission-critical applications in the […] The post Microchip Expands 64-Bit Portfolio with High-Performance PIC64HX Microprocessors for Edge Computing appeared first on HPCwire. Full Article
po Ciena Powers SC24’s SCinet with High-Speed Connectivity and Advanced Optical Solutions By www.hpcwire.com Published On :: Tue, 05 Nov 2024 14:47:50 +0000 HANOVER, Md., Nov. 5, 2024 — Ciena has announced that its optical and routing and switching innovations will once again support the SCinet network at SC24, taking place November 17–22 […] The post Ciena Powers SC24’s SCinet with High-Speed Connectivity and Advanced Optical Solutions appeared first on HPCwire. Full Article
po ‘Loopholes’ let warring parties use incendiary weapons in Ukraine, Middle East: HRW By www.upi.com Published On :: Sun, 10 Nov 2024 11:43:33 -0500 Loopholes in international laws governing the use of incendiary weapons in warfare are allowing warring parties in Ukraine and the Middle East to exploit the use of such weapons without adequately protecting civilians. Full Article