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From a bureaucratic backwater in the waning days of the Cold War, the fight against global poverty has become one of the hottest tickets on the global agenda. The cozy, all-of-a-kind club of rich country officials who for decades dominated the development agenda has given way to a profusion of mega philanthropists, new bilaterals such as China, "celanthropists" and super-charged advocacy networks vying to solve the world's toughest problems. While philanthropic foundations and celebrity goodwill ambassadors have been part of the charitable landscape for many years, the explosion in the givers' wealth, the messaging leverage associated with new media and social networking, and the new flows of assistance from developing country donors and diasporas together herald a new era of global action on poverty. The new scale and dynamism of these entrants offer hopeful prospects for this continuing fight, even as the new entrants confront some of the same conundrums that official aid donors have grappled with in the past.

On August 1-3, 2007, the Brookings Blum Roundtable gathered representatives reflective of this dynamic landscape to discuss these trends. Through robust discussion and continuing cross-sector partnerships, the conference hopes to foster lasting and widespread improvements in this new field of development.

2007 Brookings Blum Roundtable: Related Materials
	Read the roundtable report - Making Poverty History? How Activists, Philanthropists, and the Public Are Changing Global Development »  Download the participant list » (PDF)  Download the scene setter » (PDF)

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2007 Brookings Blum Roundtable Agenda:

1. Fighting Global Poverty: Who'll Be Relevant In 2020?
   • Matthew Bishop, The Economist, "Fighting Global Poverty: Who'll Be Relevant In 2020?"
   • Homi Kharas, The Brookings Institution, "The New Reality Of Aid"
   • Jane Nelson, Harvard University, "New Development Players And Models"
2. Angelina, Bono, And Me: New Vehicles To Engage The Public
   • Darrell M. West, Brown University, "Angelina, Mia, And Bono: Celebrities And International Development"
   • Joshua Busby, University of Texas, Austin, "Is There A Constituency For Global Poverty? Jubilee 2000 And The Future Of Development Advocacy"
   • Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, The Brookings Institution, "Nigeria's Fight For Debt Relief: Tracing The Path"
3. Leveraging Knowledge For Development
   • Ashok Khosla, Development Alternatives Group, "Leveraging Knowledge To End Poverty"
   • Eric Brewer, University of California, Berkeley, "Development And Engineering"
4. Social Enterprise And Private Enterprise
   Chaired by: Mary Robinson, Realizing Rights: The Ethical Globalization Initiative
   • J. Gregory Dees, Duke University, "Philanthropy And Enterprise: Harnessing The Power Of Business And Entrepreneurship For Social Change"
5. Africa's Economic Successes: What's Worked And What's Next
   Moderated by: Paul Martin, former Prime Minister of Canada
   Panelists
   • Donald Kaberuka, African Development Bank
   • Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, The Brookings Institution
6. Effecting Change Through Accountable Channels
   • Jane Nelson, Harvard University, "Effecting Change Through Accountable Channels"
   • Simon Zadek, AccountAbility, "Accountability Compacts: Collaborative Governance For The 21^stCentury"
7. Global Impact: Philanthropy Changing Development
   • Mark R. Kramer, FSG Social Impact Advisors, "Philanthropy, Aid, And Investment: Creating A Common Language"
   • Joseph O'Keefe, The Brookings Institution, "Aid - From Consensus To Competition?"
8. Keynote Address
   • Former Vice President Al Gore, Generation Investment Management

       

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In the midst of a global economic downturn, the world’s climate change negotiators will descend on Copenhagen in December to craft a post-2012 climate regime. But with the timing and impacts of climate change still uncertain—not to mention the ongoing transitions brought about by globalization and the increased cost of capital investment due to weak financial markets—tensions across countries are evident. Policy-makers must now think creatively to realize their goal of revitalizing the global economy through low carbon growth models.

2009 Brookings Blum Roundtable: Related Materials
	Read the roundtable report - Climate Crisis, Credit Crisis: The Quest for Green Growth »  Read the conference policy briefs »  Download the participant list » (PDF) Download the scene setter » (PDF) Download the full roundtable agenda » (PDF)

In its sixth annual gathering, led by Kemal Derviş and co-chaired by Strobe Talbott and Richard C. Blum, the Brookings Blum Roundtable convened leaders from the climate change and global development communities from July 30 through August 1, 2009 to discuss and debate policy options to stimulate green, pro-poor growth. By examining the challenges and opportunities policymakers face, the roundtable forged sustainable solutions to solve the climate crisis in a way that revitalizes the global economy and lifts the lives of the poor.

Lunch Briefing: 

“Towards a Global Climate Agreement: Key Insights from Project Catalyst”

Keynote Sessions:

“A Blueprint for Transatlantic Climate Cooperation”

“Compounding Crises: How Can and How Are the Poor Protecting Themselves?”

“Greening Business: Engaging the Private Sector in Climate Change Solutions”

Hal Harvey, ClimateWorks Foundation

Thomas Heller, Stanford Law School

Moderator: William Antholis, Brookings

John Podesta, Center for American Progress

Cem Özdemir, German Green Party

Moderator: Timothy Wirth, United Nations Foundation

Ernest Aryeetey, University of Ghana and Director, Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings

Helen Clark, United Nations Development Program

Raymond Offenheiser, Oxfam America

Moderator: Karen Kornbluh, Center for American Progress

Meg McDonald, Alcoa Foundation

Jane Nelson, Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Glenn Prickett, Conservation International

Mark Tercek, the Nature Conservancy

       

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From high-profile stabilization contexts like Afghanistan to global public health campaigns to a renewed focus on sustainable food security and the looming impacts of climate change, development effectiveness is a central and hotly debated issue. As traditional donors make progress in the international aid effectiveness dialogue, they must increasingly take into account the changing global development landscape and the slew of new actors, including emerging donors, multinational corporations, mega philanthropists, high-profile advocates, and a vocal and energized global public.

2010 Brookings Blum Roundtable: Related Materials
	Read the roundtable report - Aiding Development: Assistance Reform in the 21st Century »  Read the conference policy briefs »  Download the participant list » (PDF) Download the scene setter » (PDF) Download the full roundtable agenda » (PDF)

The seventh annual Brookings Blum Roundtable, led by Kemal Derviş and co-chaired by Richard C. Blum and Strobe Talbott, convened over 40 exceptional international thought leaders, entrepreneurs and practitioners to explore the relationship between efforts to promote aid effectiveness and the anticipated shape of the global development agenda over the next decade. The roundtable discussions provided an opportunity to look beyond questions of increased resources for anti-poverty services to the effectiveness of different approaches and to systemic issues associated with the delivery of development outcomes. The high-level group of participants explored opportunities for new commitment in engaging the private sector and multilateral actors, as well as the increasingly important role of climate assistance and operations in instable arenas. Over separate meal conversations, Dr. Donald Kaberuka, president of the African Development Bank, and Dr. Rajiv Shah, administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), reflected on the current and future roles of their organizations, and how they could each act on the suggestions put forward at the roundtable.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

The mobile economy in China and India has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade. Mobile technology has the potential to shrink the broadband gap, improve financial inclusion, and support humanitarian efforts. A recent report from the Boston Consulting Group adds another interesting perspective into the existing conversation about the impact of mobile technologies. India appears poised to eschew building up its fixed broadband infrastructure and jump directly to mobile. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in India appeared poised to take advantage of this amazing change.

Mobile innovation lower costs and improve performance

Source: Boston Consulting Group

Maximum download speeds have risen greatly when comparing second generation networks with current fourth generation technology. 2G networks were capable of reaching 20 kilobits per second and 4G technologies can reach 250 megabits per second, which is about 12,000 times faster. At the same time the actual cost of network infrastructure per megabyte is falling dramatically: a 95 percent decrease from 2G to 3G and 67 percent decrease from 3G to 4G. Subsequently, the consumer cost of data per megabyte decreased sharply. From 2005 to 2013, the average cost of a mobile subscription relative to the maximum data speed dropped about 40 percent each year or 99 percent in an 8 year period. Higher speeds and lower costs make mobile a viable development platform for SMEs. In America this had led to the growth of the app economy. In India this effect is even more pronounced.

Widespread use of mobile technologies fuels the leap

In 2013 India reached 900 million mobile connections and became the second largest market in terms of mobile connections and unique subscribers. Indians spend 45 percent of their incomes on mobile technologies and platforms whereas Americans only spend 11 percent.

Source: World Bank Indicators

For the average Indian, mobile is the only point-of-entry to the Internet. Mobile devices are much more common than computers. The PC penetration rate in India of 5 percent stands in stark contrast to the 75 percent rate for mobile devices. Rates of fixed broadband Internet usage increased at a snails pace in India and at the same time mobile cellular subscriptions soared. More and more people in India are choosing to access Internet solely through mobile devices. Currently about 34 percent of people in India access the Internet exclusively from mobile devices. Flipkart an Indian e-commerce company predicts that 75 to 80 percent of their customer’s traffic will come on mobile platforms. The proliferation of mobile technologies in India provides incentives for SMEs to focus on developing mobile oriented business models.

Existing mobile focused SMEs lead the leap

SMEs in India place a greater emphasis on mobile platforms compared to companies in other countries. About 25 to 35 percent of surveyed SMEs in India are identified as mobile leaders, firms that use mobile productivity tools, operational tools (real-time job tracking or mobile data analytics) and sales and marketing tools. In developed countries such as Germany, only 14 percent of the surveyed SMEs are mobile leaders. Further, mobile oriented SMEs are thriving in India in a variety of fields. India’s largest E-commerce marketplace Flipkart Sidesteps has seen its traffic grow twice as face on mobile when compared with PC. Anti-violence apps such as FightBack and mobile health initiatives such as Swasthya Samvedana Sena are also experiencing great success.

India is in the midst of a mobile revolution that is categorically different than other parts of the world. Without existing complex legacy systems, businesses in India are now in the unique position to leapfrog terrestrial Internet technologies and reap the full benefits of a truly mobile economy.

Yikun Chi contributed to this post

Find more content about techpolicy on TechTank

      

During the height of the Ebola crisis in September 2014 there were 21 confirmed cases of the virus and 8 deaths in Nigeria. The African nation has the continent’s largest population, a high poverty rate, and the government spends relatively little on health care. At the time many were worried about a scenario where the virus spread throughout Nigeria. But, the Nigerian Minister of Health Onyebuchi Chukwu disagreed with that assessment. He commented to Forbes, “Nigeria will be as clean as any other country as far as Ebola virus disease is concerned.” His comments were proven to be accurate in the coming months. There were a variety of factors that contributed to Nigeria’s success at combating the disease. One important factor was the use of mobile electronic health records programs.

How mobile fights disease

1. Training Healthcare Workers

Training health care providers was a priority at the beginning of the Ebola outbreak. A survey found that 85 percent of health care workers in the country believed you could avoid Ebola by abstaining from handshakes or touching. Correcting these myths about the disease was a critical part of the response effort, especially for health care workers.

2. Rapid Deployment

One of the virtues of mHealth is its speed and flexibility. Mobile allows officials to quickly disseminate the latest information to front line health care workers. Increasing the speed of communication is a general boon to any large public health response.

3. Virtual Records

Ebola Treatment Units (ETU) greatly benefitted from using digital rather than paper records. Paper records cannot be removed from an ETU. Deborah Theobald co-founder of Vecna Technologies that created the mHealth platform in Nigeria has pointed out that, “If the patient is isolated, so is their paperwork”. Electronic records are easy to share and also lower the risk of infection for health care workers.

Mobile health policy challenges

Despite the potential benefits of mHealth, barriers in some countries prevent the full positive impact of these technologies from coming into effect. Many developing nations lack the electrical infrastructure that is necessary to power mobile devices. Health care regulations are often too overly bureaucratic and burdensome. This makes it difficult for innovators to develop and equip workers with mobile tools and applications. It often takes an emergency situation like the Ebola crisis to make substantive changes. Success in the long term is only possible if leaders create an environment that is more hospitable to mHealth.

Mobile interventions have also demonstrated potential to address important public health issues. Recently experts gathered at the Brookings Institution to discuss how mHealth can improve health outcomes. Apps like Mobile Midwife and Text4Baby can encourage healthy pregnancies by providing valuable tips to expecting mothers. Mobile health platforms are successful because they directly inform caregivers. The proliferation of mobile phones through the developing world presents a health opportunity to communicate with the people who need help.

      

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The last time policymakers substantially reviewed federal communications policy, it was the early 1990s. At that time, the Internet was only beginning to reveal itself to be the dynamic technology seen today. Mobile devices and services, such as 100 megabit broadband, smartphones, applications, social networks, tablets, and digital streaming, were barely imagined, let alone factored into policy discussions. As the recent debate around net neutrality highlights, policymakers today can be hamstrung in efforts to fit today's communications technologies and services into last century's communications law. Given that most major communications laws are out of step with today’s advanced mobile capabilities, what shape would smart, updated legislation and regulatory changes take? What are the major changes to U.S. communications law that most need to be addressed and implemented?

On March 24, the Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings hosted a conversation with Craig Silliman, general counsel and executive vice president for public policy at Verizon, to examine what 21st century communications polices might look like.

Video

• Updating communications law and regulations for the mobile era

Audio

• Updating communications law and regulations for the mobile era

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20150324_communications_law_transcript

      

Choosing a health plan on one of the new public or private exchanges is no easy task. That’s especially true for those with medical conditions who want to be very sure the plan they enroll in will provide the services they need.

This challenge is not unique to buying health plans, however. It’s always hard for consumers to buy complex and technical services or products when they have little or no expertise in the field. Health insurance can be especially daunting, with so many factors to consider, and even the terminology can be confusing.

Standardizing choices and terms can be helpful to a point. Grouping health plans according to premiums and out-of-pocket costs – bronze, silver, gold and platinum plans – has worked well in the public exchanges. But standardization will always be in tension with innovation, and the reality is that most exchanges will carry a larger inventory of plans than what the typical consumer wants to scroll through. So the question of “choice architecture” – how the plans are filtered or screened – will come to the fore. 

Consumers will have many questions.  What is the price? How do I assess the trade-off between lower premiums and higher cost sharing? Is my doctor in the plan’s network? Are the drugs I take in the formulary (whatever that is)? Things can get real complicated real fast, and it can feel like there are too many, not too few, choices. No wonder some call that “choice anxiety”.

But that view overlooks how technology is likely to reduce choice anxiety in health care, just as it has for other complicated searches.  It used to take a librarian to find an obscure article or a travel agent to plan a vacation. Today a few keystrokes on Google locates the article, and Travelocity makes vacation planning a cakewalk, with everything from on-time flight arrival data to pictures of hotel rooms and customer reviews arranged by star ratings.

Expect technology to have the same dramatic impact on buying health coverage in the near future. There are several reasons for this:

The presentation of consumer information will get better. When large new markets for products and services are created and the demand for buyers’ information rises sharply, the incentive for entrepreneurs – both for-profit and nonprofit – to provide customer-friendly information also rises. We’ve already seen this in parts of the health care market where there has been plenty of choice. Millions of federal employees have for many years been able choose among a wide range of plans with differing benefits.  Many have turned to the highly regarded Consumers’ Checkbook to help them understand and readily compare plans in the federal program.

Checkbook has launched a similar comparison tool for the  Illinois exchange and recently won the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s (RWJF) first "Plan Choice Challenge," a nationwide competition to design a technology application that helps people choose their best health plan options.

Navigation technology will make searches simple and quick.  Most consumers don’t want to spend a lot of time comparing plans; they want to find the best buy for their situation as quickly as possible.  That’s why brokers have traditionally encouraged employers to offer their employees a carefully limited set of shopping choices, but we expect plan navigation technology to constantly improve the shopping experience in ways that will help customers search a larger inventory and still make choices more easily.   Stride Health, a San Francisco startup and finalist in the RWJF Challenge, has developed a recommendation technology that searches massive data sets on networks and formularies in seconds to help consumers find a “match” that fits their budget and health care needs.  (Full disclosure – author Joel Ario is an investor).  

Stride is one of more than 40 “web brokers” that has met federal consumer protection and privacy standards enabling it to work with the federal exchange to enroll subsidy-eligible individuals in coverage.  Expect increasing collaboration between public exchanges and private vendors, with a surge of apps and gadgets to make navigation easier and easier in health exchanges.

Technology will allow choices to be tailored to medical history.  Advances in technology won’t just make it technically easier to pick and choose by price and reputation. These advances will also empower Americans to base their choices on their likely medical needs. Today, tailoring your coverage to your medical condition usually means trying to get a doctor– or several doctors– to help you figure out what you should look for in a plan. Even with that help, for the average person it’s still a hit-or-miss proposition. But new forms of choice technology are beginning to utilize questions about medical history to guide buyers towards the plans that are most suited to their condition.  

Checkbook and Stride already allow consumers to enter more detailed health histories and get more sophisticated assistance, and this will only improve as exchanges publish more data in machine readable formats.   Expect more and increasingly sophisticated customized navigators, especially as patients get more access to their electronic medical records.  Also expect sellers to respond with products than bundle services to meet the new demand.

Does this mean that an iPhone app will be all that’s needed to ensure that every consumer can find his or her perfect plan? Not quite.  Health insurance marketplaces will continue to present thorny regulatory challenges.  Insurance regulators will need to guard against unfair practices, such as insurers’ designing benefit plans to drive away applicants with certain health conditions; privacy concerns will be raised whenever apps ask for medical history; and new forms of provider integration will test antitrust doctrine.

But one thing is clear. Improving technology will soon make picking the right health plan a far more precise and simple process – easy enough for many of our children to do on their smart phones or whatever gadget comes next.

      

There is a lot of hope around the potential of Big Data—massive volumes of data (such as cell phone GPS signals, social media posts, online digital pictures and videos, and transaction records of online purchases) that are large and difficult to process with traditional database and software techniques—to help achieve the sustainable development goals. The United Nations even calls for using the ongoing Data Revolution –the explosion in quantity and diversity of Big Data—to make more and better data usable to inform development analysis, monitoring and policymaking: In fact, the United Nations believes that that “Data are the lifeblood of decision-making and the raw material for accountability. Without high-quality data providing the right information on the right things at the right time; designing, monitoring and evaluating effective policies becomes almost impossible.” The U.N. even held a “Data Innovation for Policy Makers” conference in Jakarta, Indonesia in November 2014 to promote use of Big Data in solving development challenges.

Big Data has already played a role in development: Early uses of it include the detection of influenza epidemics using search engine query data or the estimation of a country’s GDP by using satellite data on night lights. Work is also under way by the World Bank to use Big Data for transport planning in Brazil.

During the Data for Development session at the recent NetMob conference at MIT, we presented a paper in which we jump on the Big Data bandwagon. In the paper, we use mobile phone data to assess how the opening of a new toll highway in Dakar, Senegal is changing how people commute to work (human mobility) in this metropolitan area. The new toll road is one of the largest investments by the government of Senegal and expectations for its developmental impact are high. In particular, the new infrastructure is expected to increase the flow of goods and people into and out of Dakar, spur urban and rural development outside congested areas, and boost land valuation outside Dakar. Our study is a first step in helping policymakers and other stakeholders benchmark the impact of the toll road against many of these objectives.

Assessing how the impact of the new toll highway differs by area and how it changes over time can help policymakers benchmark the performance of their investment and better plan the development of urban areas.

The Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway

The Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (in red in Figure 1), inaugurated on August 1, 2013 is the first section (32 km or 20 miles) of a broader project to connect the capital, Dakar, through a double three-lane highway to a new airport (Aeroport International Blaise Diagne, AIBD) and a special economic zone, the Dakar Integrated Special Economic Zone (DISEZ) and the rest of the country.

Note: The numbers indicate the incidence of increased inter cell mobility and were used to calculate the percentage increase in mobility.

The cost of this large project is estimated to be about $696 million (FCFA 380.2 billion or 22.7 percent of 2014 fiscal revenues, excluding grants) with the government of Senegal having already disbursed $353 million. The project is one of the first toll roads in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) structured as a public-private partnership (PPP) and includes multilateral partners such as the World Bank, the French Development Agency, and the African Development Bank.

In our study, we ask whether the new toll road led to an increase in human mobility and, if so, whether particular geographical areas experienced higher or lower mobility relative to others following its opening.

Did the Highway Increase Human Mobility?

Using mobile phone usage data (Big Data), we use statistical analysis in our paper to approximate where people live and where they work. We then estimate how the reduction in travel time following the opening of the toll road changes the way they commute to work.

As illustrated in the map of Figure 1, we find some interesting trends:

• Human mobility in the metropolitan Dakar area increased on average by 1.34 percent after the opening of the Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway. However, this increase masks important disparities across the different sub-areas of the Dakar metropolitan areas. Areas in blue in Figure 1 are those for which mobility increased after the opening of the new road toll while those in red experienced decreased mobility.
• In particular, the Parcelles Assainies suburban area benefited the most from the toll road with an increase in mobility of 26 percent. The Centre Ville (downtown) area experienced a decrease in mobility of about 20 percent.

These trends are important and would have been difficult to discover without Big Data. Now, though, researchers need to parse through the various reasons these trends might have occurred. For instance, the Parcelles Assainies area may have benefited the most because of its closer location to the toll road whereas the feeder roads in the downtown area may not have been able to absorb the increase in traffic from the toll road. Or people may have moved from the downtown area to less expensive areas in the suburbs now that the new toll road makes commuting faster.

The Success of Big Data

From these preliminary results (our study is work in progress, and we will be improving its methodology), we are encouraged by the fact that our method and use of Big Data has three areas of application for a project such as this:

Benchmarking: Our method can be used to track how the impact of the Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway changes over time and for different areas of the Dakar metropolitan areas. This process could be used to study other highways in the future and inform highway development overall.

Zooming in: Our analysis is a first step towards a more granular study of the different geographic areas within the Dakar suburban metropolitan area, and perhaps inspire similar studies around the continent. In particular, it would be useful to study the socio-economic context within each area to better appreciate the impact of new infrastructure on people’s lives. For instance, in order to move from estimates of human mobility (traffic) to measures of “accessibility,” it will be useful to complement the current analysis with an analysis of land use, a study of job accessibility, and other labor markets information for specific areas. Regarding accessibility, questions of interest include: Who lives in the areas most/least affected? What kind of jobs do they have access to? What type of infrastructure do they have access to? What is their income level? Answers to these questions can be obtained using satellite information for land prices, survey data (including through mobile phones) and data available from the authorities. Regarding urban planning, questions include: Is the toll diverting the traffic to other areas? What happens in those areas? Do they have the appropriate infrastructure to absorb the increase in traffic?

Zooming out: So far, our analysis is focused on the Dakar metropolitan area, and it would be useful to assess the impact of new infrastructure on mobility between the rest of the country and Dakar. For instance, the analysis can help assess whether the benefits of the toll road spill over to the rest of the country and even differentiate the impact of the toll road on the different regions of the country.

This experience tells us that there are major opportunities in converting Big Data into actionable information, but the impact of Big Data still remains limited. In our case, the use of mobile phone data helped generate timely and relatively inexpensive information on the impact of a large transport infrastructure on human mobility. On the other hand, it is clear that more analysis using socioeconomic data is needed to get to concrete and impactful policy actions. Thus, we think that making such information available to all stakeholders has the potential not only to guide policy action but also to spur it. 

References

Atkin, D. and D. Donaldson (2014). Who ’ s Getting Globalized ? The Size and Implications of Intranational Trade Costs . (February).

Clark, X., D. Dollar, and A. Micco (2004). Port efficiency, maritime transport costs, and bilateral trade. Journal of Development Economics 75(2), 417–450, December.

Donaldson, D. (2013). Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the Impact of Transportation Infrastructure. forthcoming, American Economic Review.

Fetzer Thiemo (2014) “Urban Road Construction and Human Commuting: Evidence from Dakar, Senegal.” Mimeo

Ji, Y. (2011). Understanding Human Mobility Patterns Through Mobile Phone Records : A cross-cultural Study.

Simini, F., M. C. Gonzalez, A. Maritan, and A.-L. Barab´asi (2012). A universal model for mobility and migration patterns. Nature 484(7392), 96–100, April.

Tinbergen, J. (1962). Shaping the World Economy; Suggestions for an International Economic Policy.

Yuan, Y. and M. Raubal (2013). Extracting dynamic urban mobility patterns from mobile phone data.

      

Mobile devices are making a big difference in the lives of billions of people around the world who use them every day. Internet-enabled smartphones and tablets provide access to information and a channel of communication for users. Building wireless networks to support mobile devices requires large capital investments from wireless carriers who must purchase wireless spectrum and infrastructure. To ensure that mobile services are reliable and affordable, national governments must allocate enough wireless spectrum to commercial carriers to satisfy demand. This is the subject of a new paper from Shamika Ravi and Darrell M. West titled “Spectrum Policy in India."

A scarce resource

Mobile devices typically operate on frequencies from 30 kHz to 300 GHz on the radio spectrum. Unless spectrum is allocated efficiently, the scarcity of available frequencies leads to poor quality and high costs for mobile broadband. The growing demand for mobile service in India currently exceeds the amount of spectrum available to wireless carriers. The scarcity of wireless spectrum limits reliable Internet access for mobile subscribers who have no alternative point of access. According to the Cellular Operators Association of India, nearly 60 percent of Internet users only have access through their mobile phones.

Mobile service in India is relatively expensive for many consumers because the Indian military reserves so much spectrum for their own use. Much of this spectrum goes underutilized, even as commercial carriers plead for more spectrum to be released. When the Indian government does release spectrum, it is typically through auctions with high starting bids. Setting high starting bids for blocks of spectrum can lead to high selling prices that force wireless carriers to take out large loans. Higher prices for spectrum raise costs for consumers and reduce private sector investment in wireless infrastructure. Rather than make spectrum artificially scarce, the Indian government should work with wireless carriers to lower the prices for consumers. 

Investing in India’s future

Reliable mobile service has the potential to greatly enhance economic growth in India. Analysis from the Boston Consulting Group found that the India’s mobile sector grew at 12.4 percent annually from 2009-2014; it now accounts for 2.2 percent of India’s gross domestic product. Potential growth comes from filling gaps in educational and health care spending in rural communities. Innovative mobile applications provide a low cost method of sending education and health care resources to underserved rural communities that lack physical infrastructure. In India’s rapidly growing cities, mobile services are seen as a way to improve the quality of government services and promote entrepreneurship. Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently designated 100 “smart cities” that would use technology to overcome the challenges of India’s rapid urbanization.

India could free up spectrum by adopting the “NATO Band” of spectrum for military uses and auctioning off the remaining spectrum.  The NATO band is used by the militaries of NATO member countries and several of their allies, and it already overlaps with much of the Indian military’s spectrum.  Furthermore, the Indian government must lower the minimum bids at spectrum auctions and lower taxes so that wireless carriers have enough profits to build their networks.  Mobile technologies are rapidly evolving, and each new generation has greater demands for spectrum. Regulators in India will not only have to maintain affordable prices for the current generation of mobile technology, but also anticipate upgrades that will deliver more data at faster speeds.

      

This post originally appeared in the opinion page of the Boston Globe on October 1, 2015.

As they ratchet up a campaign for backdoor access to information on iPhones and other devices with encryption, some law enforcement leaders paint a dark vision of technology. Manhattan DA Cyrus Vance suggests that passcodes on smartphones blocked identification of a murderer. British Prime Minister David Cameron sees a “safe haven” for terrorists “in dark places.” FBI Director James Comey alludes to phones buzzing devilish messages in the pockets of ISIS recruits and says widespread encryption “threatens to lead us to a very, very dark place.”

Sure, it’s the job of law enforcement officers to look on the dark side, and to focus on protecting people and catching criminals. But evil lies with terrorists and criminals — not the phones or apps they use. Cellphones are targets simply because they have become such rich new sources of evidence for law enforcement. Chief Justice John Roberts called them windows into our entire lives.

Comey acknowledges the benefits of strong encryption may outweigh the costs, but says “part of my job is make sure the debate is informed by a reasonable understanding of the costs.” Part of my job at the Commerce Department a few years ago was to make sure government debate on security and law enforcement issues was informed by a reasonable understanding of costs to security and privacy, innovation, economic growth, and democratic values in the world.

With backdoors, these costs are real. Leading cryptologists have detailed how backdoors would create “grave security risks.” Comey has suggested to Congress that tech companies can solve this problem if only they spend enough time on it. Yet no amount of magical thinking can undo the contradiction between promoting strong encryption as a defense against the barrage of identity theft, espionage, and other cybercrimes while opening up new vulnerabilities.

There is an acute need to strengthen data security everywhere, and no realistic way to leave a door open for good guys and democracies that have rigorous checks and balances but not for cybercriminals or authoritarian states.

Backdoors undermine not only security, but also the competitive position of US companies that are trying to strengthen global trust in their brands and correct perceptions of “direct access” for US intelligence and law enforcement left by the Snowden leaks.

If backdoors are adopted for US products, people intent on keeping information secure, whether for benign or nefarious reasons, will turn to alternatives like cheap burner phones, devices sold in other countries, and encryption applications.

The United States would face a choice of whether to join the ranks of countries that try to block devices and services. That dilemma shows another important cost of backdoors — they undermine America’s position in the world.

The United States has promoted technologies that help democratic activists avoid surveillance by repressive governments, objected to measures in India and China that imply backdoors or block imports of encrypted devices like Blackberries, and taken unprecedented steps to provide transparency and limits on foreign intelligence collection. If the United States adopts backdoor requirements, though, no matter how constrained by checks and balances, it will face cries of hypocrisy.

In the backdrop of President Obama’s discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping about cybersecurity are concerns about Chinese measures that require “secure and controllable” information technology and assert “Internet sovereignty.” It is hard to picture our president making headway on such concerns if his own government is contemplating backdoors.

In the end, the president himself likely will have to decide where his administration comes out on backdoors. When he does, he will have to pick sides.

The choices are less stark than the law enforcement meme “going dark” implies. Even so, it may be, as Chief Justice Roberts has written, that “Cellphones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises” but “Privacy comes at a cost.” So do security and trust.

The time has come for the president to shut the door on backdoors and send a clear message to the world that American technology is a trusted instrument of freedom.

       

Last month, we experienced yet another breakthrough in the epic battle of man against machine. Google’s AlphaGo won against the reigning Go champion Lee Sedol. This success, however, was different than that of IBM’s Deep Blue against Gary Kasparov in 1987. While Deep Blue still applied “brute force” to calculate all possible options ahead, AlphaGo was learning as the game progressed. And through this computing breakthrough that we can learn how to better leverage the data revolution.

In the game of Go, brute-force strategies don’t help because the total number of possible combinations exceeds the number of atoms in the universe. Some games, including some we played since childhood, were immune to computing “firepower” for a long time. For example, Connect Four wasn’t solved until 1995 with the conclusion being the first player can force a win. And checkers wasn’t until 2007, when Jonathan Schaeffer determined that in a perfect game, both sides could force a draw. For chess, a safe strategy has yet to be developed, meaning that we don’t know yet if white could force a win or, like in checkers, black could manage to hold on to a draw.

But most real-life situations are more complicated than chess, precisely because the universe of options is unlimited and solving them requires learning. If computers are to help, beyond their use as glorified calculators, they need to be able to learn. This is the starting point of the artificial intelligence movement.  In a world where perfection is impossible, you need well-informed intuition in order to advance. The first breakthrough in this space occurred when IBM’s Watson beat America’s Jeopardy! champions in 2011. These new intelligent machines operate in probabilities, not in certainty.

That being said, perfection remains important, especially when it comes to matters of life and death such as flying airplanes, constructing houses, or conducting heart surgery, as these areas require as much attention to detail as possible. At the same time, in many realms of life and policymaking we fall into a perfection trap. We often generate obsolete knowledge by attempting to explain things perfectly, when effective problem solving would have been better served by real-time estimates. We strive for exactitude when rough results, more often than not, are good enough.

By contrast, some of today’s breakthroughs are based on approximation. Think of Google Translate and Google’s search engine itself. The results are typically quite bad, but compared to the alternative of not having them at all, or spending hours leafing through an encyclopedia, they are wonderful. Moreover, once these imperfect breakthroughs are available, one can improve them iteratively. Only once the first IBM and Apple PCs were put on the market in the 1980s did the cycle of upgrading start, which still continues today.

In the realm of social and economic data, we have yet to reach this stage of “managed imperfection” and continuous upgrading. We are producing social and economic forecasts with solid 20th century methods. With extreme care we conduct poverty assessments and maps, usually taking at least a year to produce as they involve hundreds of enumerators, lengthy interviews and laborious data entry. Through these methods we are able to perfectly explain past events, but we fail to estimate current trends—even imperfectly.

The paradox of today’s big data era is that most of that data is poor and messy, even though the possibilities for improving it are unlimited. Almost every report from development institutions starts with a disclaimer highlighting “severe data limitations.” This is because only 0.5 percent of all the available data is actually being curated to be made usable. If data is the oil of the 21st century, we need data refineries to convert the raw product into something that can be consumed by the average person.

Thanks to the prevalence of mobile device and rapid advances in satellite technology, it is possible to produce more data faster, better, and cheaper. High-frequency data also makes it possible to make big data personal, which also increases the likelihood that people act on it. Ultimately, the breakthroughs in big data for development will be driven by managerial cultures, as has been the case with other successful ventures. Risk averse cultures pay great attention to perfection. They nurture the fear of mistakes and losing. Modern management accepts failure, encourages trial and error, and reaches progress through interaction and continuous upgrading.

       

La monnaie électronique a émergé dans les pays de l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, à la faveur de l'adoption, en 2006, d'une Instruction de la Banque Centrale, instaurant un cadre réglementaire souple et incitatif pour l’exercice de cette activité. L'implication des opérateurs de télécommunications dans l'offre de services financiers basés sur la téléphonie mobile a donné,  dès 2009, une nouvelle dimension à cette activité par l'accroissement du nombre des utilisateurs et des volumes de transactions.

Une activité en expansion

A fin septembre 2015, 22 millions de personnes, soit près d'un quart de la population de l'Union, ont souscrit à des services financiers via la téléphonie mobile. Environ 30% de ces abonnés réalisent au moins une opération sur une période de 90 jours.

Près de 500 millions de transactions ont été aussi réalisées au cours des neuf premiers mois de l'année 2015. La valeur cumulée des transactions atteint 5000 milliards de FCFA (8,5 milliards USD) à fin septembre 2015. De septembre 2013 à septembre 2014, cette valeur est passée de 1000 milliards à 2068 milliards de F CFA, soit une hausse de 107%.

Le réseau de distribution des services financiers via la téléphonie mobile suit également cette tendance haussière, en passant de 93 621 points de services en 2014 à plus de 132 658 points de services à fin septembre 2015.

Source: BCEAO

Le contexte socioéconomique de l'Union explique pour une large part, le succès des services de paiement via la téléphonie mobile. En effet, ce mode de prestation des services de transfert ou de paiement se révèle particulièrement adapté pour les personnes n'ayant pas accès au système bancaire classique, tout en offrant l'opportunité à des institutions non bancaires, en contrepartie de dépôt d'espèces, de mettre à la disposition des usagers une monnaie autre que fiduciaire, dont l'encours leur permet d'effectuer des transactions financières diverses.

L'implication croissante des opérateurs de télécommunications

Les partenariats entre les banques et les opérateurs de télécommunications occupent une place dominante sur le marché. En fin 2015, sur les 33 émetteurs de monnaie électronique sous licence, 25 appartenaient aux dits partenariats.

Au titre du modèle non bancaire, sept acteurs non bancaires ont été agréés pour émettre la monnaie électronique en qualité d'Etablissement de Monnaie Electronique (EME).[1]

Source: BCEAO

Un cadre réglementaire rénové

A la faveur de l'expansion des services financiers via la téléphonie mobile et de l'implication croissante des opérateurs de télécommunication, la Banque Centrale a rénové son cadre réglementaire afin de renforcer la sécurité et la qualité des services de paiement adossés à la monnaie électronique. Les principaux axes d'amélioration portent sur:

• une responsabilisation accrue des émetteurs en clarifiant leurs rôles dans les partenariats avec des prestataires techniques. Ainsi, les activités de prestataire technique sont limitées, sous la responsabilité de l'émetteur, au traitement technique de la monnaie électronique ou à sa distribution. De même, les émetteurs demeurent responsables, de l’intégrité, de la fiabilité, de la sécurité, de la confidentialité et de la traçabilité des transactions réalisées par chacun de leurs distributeurs;


• une stimulation de la concurrence par la transparence de la tarification avec l'obligation faite aux émetteurs de publier leurs tarifs;


• la formulation d'exigences spécifiques en matière de gouvernance et de contrôles interne et externe pour les établissements de monnaie électronique, en exigeant l'honorabilité des dirigeants, le respect du secret professionnel et des audits réguliers des infrastructures;


• une protection accrue des détenteurs de monnaie électronique avec d'une part, le cantonnement des fonds dans  des comptes dédiés, et l'exigence d'une équivalence continue entre l'encours de monnaie électronique et les soldes des comptes de cantonnement et d'autre part, l'obligation de la mise en place d'un mécanisme de recueil et de traitement des réclamations des porteurs de monnaie électronique;


• le renforcement du dispositif de supervision, par la réduction des délais de reporting des activités des émetteurs à la Banque Centrale, et l'adoption de sanctions pour les infractions aux dispositions réglementaires.

L'offre de services financiers via la téléphonie mobile

L'offre de services financiers via la téléphonie mobile comprend trois catégories de services. Il s'agit des services qui impliquent l'usage des espèces (monnaie fiduciaire), de ceux qui sont effectués en monnaie électronique et des services dits de « deuxième génération ».

Le premier type de services concerne essentiellement les dépôts d'espèces ou rechargements de porte-monnaies électroniques, ainsi que les retraits. Ils représentent 24% des transactions effectuées par les utilisateurs. Les dépôts d'espèces sont prédominants et permettent aux clients d'approvisionner leurs comptes de monnaie électronique.

La monnaie électronique rechargée est utilisée à hauteur de 76%, prioritairement pour les achats de crédit téléphonique, les paiements de factures, l'exécution de transferts de personne à personne, de personne à entreprise et aux Administrations publiques. Les principaux services de paiement dans l'UEMOA sont liés au règlement des factures relatives à la consommation d'eau, d'électricité, l'abonnement à des chaînes de télévision satellitaires, l'achat de marchandises dans les grandes surfaces ou de carburant dans les stations-service.

Des paiements d'impôts et taxes auprès des Administrations publiques et le remboursement des échéances de microcrédit sont également effectués, mais de façon très marginale.

Dans l'UEMOA les services dits de « deuxième génération », à savoir la micro-assurance, la micro-épargne et le micro-crédit, font leur apparition. Leur développement pourrait constituer une opportunité de bancarisation des utilisateurs de ces services.

Enfin, un début d'interopérabilité est mis en œuvre sur la base de conventions bilatérales entre les acteurs, notamment en vue d’offrir des services de paiement transfrontaliers entre les Etats membres de l'Union.

Les défis à relever

L'examen de l’évolution des services financiers via la téléphonie mobile dans l'UEMOA fait ressortir quelques obstacles à un développement plus rapide de ces services financiers au sein de l'UEMOA. Il s'agit de:

• la faiblesse du taux d'utilisateurs actifs, en raison du coût élevé des services;
• la méconnaissance des services, du fait d'une éducation financière insuffisante;
• la faible digitalisation des circuits de paiement des Administrations publiques;
• l'insuffisance des partenariats entre les émetteurs bancaires et non-bancaires pour le développement d'une offre de services plus inclusifs, dits de « seconde génération »

En collaboration avec toutes les parties prenantes, la Banque Centrale a développé une stratégie d’inclusion financière visant à améliorer l’accès et l’utilisation de divers services financiers personnalisés et aux prix abordables. La mise en place de ces actions, comme décrite dans la stratégie d’inclusion financière conçue par la BCEAO, devrait résoudre les défis mentionnés ci-dessus.

Lire en anglais »

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[1] EME: toute personne morale, autre que les banques, les établissements financiers de paiement, les systèmes financiers décentralisés, habilitée à émettre des moyens de paiement sous forme de monnaie électronique et dont les activités se limitent à l'émission et la distribution de monnaie électronique.

       

Electronic money, or e-money, emerged in the countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) following the adoption, in 2006, of a Central Bank Instruction establishing a flexible regulatory framework aimed at encouraging e-money business. The activity expanded in 2009 with the involvement of telecommunications operators in the provision of mobile telephone-based financial services, which increased the number of users and the volume of transactions.

A growing business

At the end of September 2015, 22 million people, or nearly a quarter of the people in the union, subscribed to financial services via mobile phone. Approximately 30 percent of those subscribers carried out at least one transaction per 90-day period.

Some 500 million transactions took place over the first nine months of 2015. The cumulative value of the transactions was 5 trillion CFA francs ($8.5 billion) by the end of September 2015, a growth of 142 percent from September 2014. Between September 2013 and September 2014, this value grew from CFA 1 trillion to CFA 2.068 trillion, an increase of 107 percent.

The mobile phone financial services distribution network followed a similar upward trend, rising from 93,621 points of services in 2014 to more than 132,658 at the end of September 2015.

Figure 1. Trends in the value of transactions

The socioeconomic environment in the union goes a long way to explaining the success of mobile telephone payment services. Indeed, this method of providing money transfer or payment services is particularly well suited to people who lack access to the mainstream banking system, and also affords non-bank institutions the opportunity to offer users non-cash money against cash deposits, which can then be used for a variety of financial transactions.

The growing involvement of telecommunications operators

The market is increasingly dominated by partnerships between banks and telecommunications operators, which represented 25 of the 33 licensed or authorized e-money issuers at the end of December 2015. In the framework of this model, known as the bank model, the bank has responsibility for issuing the e-money.

The other seven non-bank institutions, under the non-bank model, are authorized to issue electronic money as “Electronic Money Institutions” (EMIs) [1].

In WAEMU, e-money issuers are supported by a regulatory framework that was revised in 2015 to ensure increased security and quality of payment services backed by electronic money.

Figure 2. E-money issuers in WAEMU

Note: DFS denotes microfinance institutions.

A revised regulatory framework

With the expansion of mobile phone financial services and the growing involvement of telecommunications operators, the Central Bank has revised its regulatory framework with the aim of enhancing the security and quality of payment services backed by electronic money. The most salient improvements must focus on:

• Increasing issuer accountability by clarifying users’ roles in partnerships with technical service providers. With this goal in mind, the activities of technical service providers have been restricted to technical processing or the distribution of e-money under the responsibility of the issuer. In addition, issuers are responsible for the integrity, reliability, security, confidentiality, and traceability of all transactions carried out by all of their distributors; Stimulating competition through transparent pricing with an obligation for issuers to publish their rates;


• Specific requirements in terms of governance and internal and external audits for electronic money institutions, standards of integrity on the part of the management, professional secrecy and regular infrastructure audits;


• Increased protection for bearers of electronic money, including keeping funds in dedicated accounts, requiring a constant equivalence between the amount of e-money and the balances in the dedicated accounts, and mandatory creation of a mechanism to take in and deal with complaints by bearers of electronic money;


• Reinforcement of the supervisory mechanism by reducing deadlines for reporting on issuers’ activities to the Central Bank and adopting sanctions for violations of regulatory provisions.

Provision of mobile-phone-based financial services

Mobile-phone-based financial services provided in WAEMU include three categories of services, namely services involving the use of cash (banknotes and coins), e-money services, and so-called “second generation” services.

The first type of service essentially involves deposits of cash or refilling of electronic wallets, as well as withdrawals. This type of service represents 24 percent of user transactions. Cash deposits predominate; they allow customers to provision their electronic money accounts.

Seventy-six percent of the funds deposited into e-money accounts are used, above all, for purchases of telephone credit, payment of bills, person-to-person money transfers, and money transfers from individuals to businesses and from individuals to government agencies. The main payment services found in WAEMU pertain to payment of water or electricity bills, payment of satellite television subscriptions, and purchases of goods in supermarkets or fuel at service stations.

Payments of taxes or income taxes to government agencies and payments of micro-loan installments are also made through mobile phone financial services, but are much less common.

So-called “second generation” services, namely micro-insurance, micro-savings, and micro-credit, are currently emerging in WAEMU. Their development could be an opportunity to provide access to the banking system for the users of the services.

Finally, interoperability is just beginning to be implemented based on bilateral agreements between stakeholders, particularly with a view to offering cross-border payment services between member states of the union.

Challenges

A review of the development of mobile phone financial services in WAEMU reveals some obstacles to the rapid development of this type of financial service within WAEMU. They include:

• a low number of active users, due to the high cost of the services;
• the fact that the services are not well known due to inadequate financial education;
• the low rate of digitization of government agencies’ payment systems; and
• insufficient partnerships between bank and non-bank issuers with a view to developing a more inclusive range of “second-generation” services.

In collaboration with all stakeholders, the Central Bank has developed a financial inclusion strategy to continuously improve, access to and use of diverse, tailored and affordable financial services. The implementation of these actions as described in the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) financial inclusion strategy should support the challenges mentioned above.

Read in French »

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[1] EMI: any legal entity, other than a bank, financial payment institution, or decentralized financial system, that is authorized to issue payment instruments in the form of electronic money and whose business activities are restricted to electronic money issuing and distribution.

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

       

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The government and opposition in Georgia remain locked in political stalemate. The opposition continues to hold rallies and to call for President Saakashvili to step down, and the opposition and government thus far have found no common basis for moving forward. All this plays out against a backdrop of lingering tensions in relations between Georgia and Russia in the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict.

On June 17, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted Irakli Alasania, former Georgian permanent representative to the United Nations and currently the head of the Alliance for Georgia opposition group, for a discussion on the political crisis in Georgia and the prospects for resolution. After a decade of important positions in the Georgian government, Ambassador Alasania resigned from his position at the United Nations in December 2008 and has since been actively involved in the Georgian opposition. Brookings senior fellow Carlos Pascual introduced Ambassador Alasania and moderated the discussion.

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• The Political Crisis in Georgia: Prospects for Resolution

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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Introduction

Guaranteeing the right to vote and to participate in public and political affairs for all citizens is an important responsibility. Given the precarious position that IDPs can find themselves in and considering the extent to which they may need to rely on national authorities for assistance, IDPs have a legitimate and a heightened interest in influencing the decisions that affect their lives by participating in elections.   

Internally displaced persons often exist on the margins of society and are subject to a number of vulnerabilities because of their displacement. For instance, IDPs face an immediate need for protection and assistance in finding adequate shelter, food, and health care. Over time, they can suffer discrimination in accessing public services and finding employment on account of being an IDP from another region or town. IDPs also face an especially high risk of losing ownership of their housing, property, and land, something which can lead to loss of livelihoods and economic security as well as physical security. Women and children, who often make up the majority of IDP populations, face an acute risk of sexual exploitation and abuse.  

In addition to influencing public policy, elections can also be about reconciliation and addressing divisions and inequities that exist within society. For these reasons and others, IDPs should be afforded an opportunity to fully participate in elections as voters and as candidates.   

As noted in a press release of the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons following an official mission to Georgia in December 2005, 

“[IDP] participation in public life, including elections, needs promotion and support. Supporting internally displaced persons in their pursuit of a normal life does not exclude, but actually reinforces, the option of eventual return. … Well integrated people are more likely to be productive and contribute to society, which in turn gives them the strength to return once the time is right."[1]

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[1] United Nations Press Release - U.N. Expert Voices Concern for Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia, 27 December 2005, available at http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/RSG-Press-Releases/20051227_georgiapr.aspx.

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Since the Rose Revolution in November 2003, Georgia has grappled with the many challenges of building a modern, Western-oriented state, including implementing political and economic reforms, fighting corruption, and throwing off the vestiges of the Soviet legacy. On the path toward a functioning and reliable democracy, Georgia has pursued these domestic changes in an often difficult international environment, as evidenced by the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008.

On March 17, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) hosted President Mikheil Saakashvili to discuss Georgia’s approach to these challenges. A leader of Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia in January 2004 and reelected for a second term in January 2008.

Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, provided introductory remarks and Senior Fellow and CUSE Director Fiona Hill moderated the discussion. After the program, President Saakashvili took audience questions.

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• Georgia Is a Transformed Country
• Georgia Is a Valuable Asset to Europe
• The Key to Effective Change Is Youth

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• From Popular Revolutions to Effective Reforms: The Georgian Experience

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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Editor's Note: Launched at a December 5, 2011 event at Brookings, this study is based on a publication developed in 2005 by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement: Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is a central tenet of international law that states bear the primary duty and responsibility to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons within their borders, including the internally displaced. While internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain entitled to the full protection of rights and freedoms available to the population in general, they face vulnerabilities that nondisplaced persons do not face. Therefore, in order to ensure that IDPs are not deprived of their human rights and are treated equally with respect to nondisplaced citizens, states are obligated to provide special measures of protection and assistance to IDPs that correspond to their particular vulnerabilities. Reflecting these key notions of international law, the rights of IDPs and obligations of states are set forth in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (hereafter, “the Guiding Principles”).

Using the Guiding Principles as a departure for analysis, this study examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen. The analysis seeks to shed light on how and to what extent, if any, governments are fulfilling their responsibility toward IDPs, with a view to providing guidance to governments in such efforts. In so doing, this study also seeks to contribute to research and understanding regarding realization of the emerging norm of the “Responsibility to Protect.” To frame the analysis, the introduction to this volume examines the connections among the concepts of national responsibility, “sovereignty as responsibility” and the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

The comparative analysis across the fifteen countries, presented in chapter 1, is based on a systematic application of the document Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility (hereafter, “Framework for National Responsibility,” “the Framework”). Seeking to distill the Guiding Principles, the Framework outlines twelve practical steps (“benchmarks”) that states can take to directly contribute to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of internal displacement:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decision making.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

      

Event Information

On December 5, 2011, the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement held a private launch event for its report, From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement, which examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations. The analysis presented in the report is based on the first ever systematic use as an assessment tool of the document, Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility, developed by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement in 2005 to provide guidance to governments in their response to internal displacement.

Roberta Cohen (nonresident senior fellow at Brookings and former co-director of the Project) moderated the event, which featured remarks from the co-authors of the report, Elizabeth Ferris (senior fellow at Brookings and co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement), Erin Mooney (senior IDP and protection adviser at the United Nations and former deputy director of the Project) and Chareen Stark (senior research assistant, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement). In attendance were representatives from the US Department of State and international NGOs, as well as researchers from think tanks and universities.

Cohen opened the event by discussing the background and significance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. From the very beginning of discussions about internal displacement, there was an emphasis on the fundamental responsibility of national governments to protect and assist those displaced within their territory. And yet over the years there has been an awareness that international actors also have a role to play. She noted the positive strides that have occurred over the past twenty years in regards to government response to internal displacement. Country visits by the UN experts on IDPs—the Representatives of the Secretary-General on IDPs—have been instrumental to improving government response, in some instances leading governments to address internal displacement for the first time. Today, most governments understand their obligations and responsibilities to protect and assist IDPs; the challenge is often translating that understanding into concrete actions.

Elizabeth Ferris gave an overview of the Framework for National Responsibility, which was used to assess government response in each of the fifteen countries in the report (Afghanistan, The Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen). The Framework outlines twelve minimum steps—or benchmarks—that governments can take to address the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced persons within their territory, from preventing displacement to appointing a focal point on IDP issues, to facilitating the work of the international community. She explained the methodology used in the study and described the challenges the authors faced in conducting the research. For example, basic data on various aspects of government response was lacking in many instances and it was often difficult to determine the impact of a particular government policy in addressing internal displacement. In addition to analyzing the response of the fifteen governments on each of the twelve benchmarks, the study included four extended case studies commissioned for this report: Afghanistan, Georgia, Kenya and Sri Lanka.  Ferris discussed some of the overall findings of the study, noted that the Framework had proven to be a useful assessment tool for examining national responses to displacement, and suggested a number of areas where further research is needed. 

Erin Mooney briefed the audience on benchmark seven—designating an institutional focal point on IDPs—and benchmark ten—supporting durable solutions for IDPs. Mooney noted that designating a governmental focal point for addressing internal displacement is important for clarifying institutional responsibilities and, therefore, for increasing governmental accountability.  Of the 15 countries assessed, all but one had designated a national institutional focal point for addressing internal displacement. She discussed some of the challenges institutional focal points often face, including a lack of funding and a lack of political clout which often challenge their ability to coordinate across government agencies. Benchmark ten, the achievement of durable solutions, was one of the most complex and politicized areas of government action, and is  arguably the one in which government commitment to addressing displacement becomes most apparent. Governments tend to emphasize return as the primary solution to displacement, but, in situations where return has occurred, there is usually little information about whether IDPs have in fact achieved a durable solution. Mooney discussed some of the challenges the fifteen governments faced in finding durable solutions, noting that in none of the countries have durable solutions to displacement been fully achieved.

Chareen Stark discussed the report’s findings on benchmark one—the prevention of arbitrary displacement—and the study’s overall recommendations. Given that the study assessed governments already experiencing large-scale displacement and, in most instances, multiple waves of displacement, Stark said it was obvious that all fifteen governments had failed to prevent displacement. There were three major limitations to governments’ ability to prevent displacement: many of the governments are themselves parties to conflict; many of the governments assessed do not exercise effective sovereignty over all of their territory, due to the presence of nonstate armed actors and/or foreign militaries; and all of the assessed countries face financial and human capacity limitations. She explained that the study found that nearly half of the countries assessed had developed some sort of preventive measures (at least on paper), including several governments that had taken measures to prevent displacement from natural disasters but not conflict. Stark discussed some of these laws, policies and institutional mechanisms as well as the challenges to their effective implementation. She also outlined the report’s recommendations to governments of countries with IDP populations, such as developing and implementing laws and policies in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and devoting adequate resources at the national and local levels.

Concluding the discussion, the panel responded to questions from the audience on issues such as incentives for governments to address internal displacement using the Framework for National Responsibility and challenges in data reporting and analysis.  Specific questions were also raised on benchmarks five (laws on internal displacement), six (policies on internal displacement), three (designating an institutional focal point for IDPs) and twelve (working with the international community).

Event Materials

• From Responsibility to Response Nov 2011doc

      

Editor's Note: This is the first part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The second part is available here.

The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement recently released a study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement." The study examined 15 out of the 20 countries with the highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations—Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen.

According to estimates, these 15 countries represent over 70 percent of the world’s 27.5 million conflict-induced IDPs. Wherever possible, we also tried to include government efforts to address internal displacement by natural disasters. But in this and the subsequent blog post, we will focus on our main general conclusions as well as particular issues around housing, land and property (HLP) rights that emerged from our analysis (see Part II of this posting).

The study looks at how governments have fared in terms of implementing 12 practical steps (“benchmarks”) to prevent and address internal displacement, as outlined in the 2005 Brookings publication entitled "Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility." The 12 benchmarks are as follows:

1. Prevent displacement and minimize its adverse effects.
2. Raise national awareness of the problem.
3. Collect data on the number and conditions of IDPs.
4. Support training on the rights of IDPs.
5. Create a legal framework for upholding the rights of IDPs.
6. Develop a national policy on internal displacement.
7. Designate an institutional focal point on IDPs.
8. Support national human rights institutions to integrate internal displacement into their work.
9. Ensure the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking.
10. Support durable solutions.
11. Allocate adequate resources to the problem.
12. Cooperate with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

Stepping back from HLP issues (to be addressed in a subsequent set of comments in Part II of this guest posting), we drew several key observations on our overall findings.

The study found that political will was the main determining factor of response to internal displacement. Governments cannot always control the factors that cause displacement, or may themselves be responsible for displacement, but they can take measures to improve the lives and uphold the rights and freedoms of IDPs. Internal displacement due to con­flict derives from political issues, and all aspects of a government’s response to it therefore are affected by political considerations, including, for example, acknowledgment of displacement, registration and collection of data on IDPs, ensuring the participation of IDPs in decision-making, assistance and protection offered to different (temporal) caseloads of IDPs, support for durable solutions, which durable solutions are supported, and the facilitation of efforts by international organizations to provide protec­tion and assistance to IDPs.

While none of the governments surveyed was fully protecting and assisting IDPs, four stand out in particular—Colombia, Georgia, Kenya and Uganda—for implementing their responsibility toward IDPs while three others—Central African Republic, Myanmar and Yemen—had particular difficulties in fulfilling their responsibilities toward IDPs. In Myanmar, the obstacles were primarily political while in Yemen and the Central African Republic, as in many of the countries surveyed, the limitations appear to arise primarily from inadequate government capacity.

The other eight countries were somewhere in between. For example, some, such as Nepal, have demonstrated a significant commitment at one particular point in time but have failed to follow through. Others, such as Sri Lanka, have at times demonstrated blatant disregard for their responsibility and have moved swiftly to try to bring an end to displacement. Sudan, Pakistan, and to a certain extent, Turkey, have very problematic records with respect to preventing displacement in one part of the country yet have supported efforts to bring an end to displacement in others. In some cases, such as Afghanistan and Yemen, the continuing conflict and the role of nonstate actors (and in Afghanistan, the presence of foreign militaries as well) have made it difficult for the government to respond effectively to internal displacement.

Prevention of internal displacement is paramount, but is probably the most difficult measure to take and the least likely to be taken in the countries as­sessed, which all had large IDP populations. Given the scale of displacement in the fifteen countries surveyed, it was to be expected that these governments would not have been suc­cessful in preventing displacement. Nearly half of the fifteen countries assessed had adopted some preventive measures on paper, but all fifteen have fallen short of actually prevent­ing displacement in practice.

Moreover, many national authorities themselves have been or are perpetrators of violence or human rights abuses that have led to displacement, and many states foster a culture of impunity for alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. Further, the presence of foreign military forces and/or non-state armed actors limits the abil­ity of many states to exercise full sovereignty over their territory and therefore to prevent the conditions that drive people into displacement. Some countries have taken steps to prevent dis­placement due to natural disasters or develop­ment but not due to conflict, indicating that the former is perhaps less politically taboo and/or practically less difficult to implement than the latter.

Sustained political attention by the highest authorities is a necessary, though not suffi­cient, condition for taking responsibility for IDPs. Nearly all of the governments surveyed, at least at some point, have exercised their responsibility to IDPs by acknowledging the existence of internal displacement and their responsibility to address it as a national prior­ity, for example, by drawing attention to IDPs’ plight. However, government efforts to raise awareness of internal displacement through public statements was not always a useful indicator of a government’s commitment to upholding the fundamental human rights and freedoms of IDPs.

Among the five countries with laws on or related to internal displacement, there were notable limitations to the scope of the laws and gaps in implementing them. Legislation was quite comprehensive in scope in at least two cases and was narrow in others, address­ing specific rights of IDPs or a phase of dis­placement. Other countries lacked a national legislative framework on IDPs but had generic legislation relevant to IDPs. Still others had laws that violated or could violate the rights of IDPs. Laws on internal displacement must be viewed in the context of other legislation and administrative acts applicable to the general population (e.g., those related to documenta­tion, residency, housing, land and property, and personal status), which this study reviews to the extent possible, particularly in the case studies on Georgia, Kenya, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In Africa, the region with the most IDPs, states have recognized in legally binding instruments the importance of addressing internal displace­ment by incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into domestic legisla­tion and policy.

Many of the governments surveyed have adopted policies or action plans to respond to the needs of IDPs, but adequate implementa­tion and dissemination were largely lacking. Nine of the countries surveyed had developed a specific policy, strategy or plan on internal displacement, implemented to varying degrees; those in six of these countries were still active at the time of writing. In addition, at least two countries had national policies in draft form, and one country that does not recognize conflict-induced displacement had a plan for mitigating displacement by cyclones and a plan on disaster risk reduction, although it did not discuss displacement. While in some cases positive steps had been taken, by and large im­plementation of policies on internal displace­ment remains a challenge and has, in some cases, stalled. Available information indicates that efforts to raise awareness of IDP issues and policies have largely been inadequate.

It is difficult to assess governments’ com­mitment of financial resources to address internal displacement, but some trends were identified. Addressing internal displacement, especially over time, is a costly venture. While it was difficult to obtain a full picture of a coun­try’s expenditure on IDPs, several countries allocated funds to assist IDPs, including a few that had no national laws or policies on IDPs. In at least two countries, funds for assisting IDPs seemed to diminish in recent years. In many countries, difficulties arise at the district or municipal levels, where local authorities bear significant responsibility for addressing internal displacement but face many obstacles, including insufficient funds, to doing so. Allegations of corruption and misallocation of funds intended to benefit IDPs at certain points has been observed in some of the countries as­sessed. Some countries seem to rely on inter­national assistance to IDPs rather than national funds.

National human rights institutions (NHRIs) contribute invaluably to improving national responses to internal displacement in a number of countries. In recent years, an increasing number of NHRIs around the world have begun to integrate attention to internal displacement into their work. NHRIs have played an impor­tant role in raising awareness of internal dis­placement, monitoring displacement situations and returns, investigating individual complaints, advocating for and advising the government on the drafting of national policies to address inter­nal displacement, and monitoring and reporting on the implementation of national policies and legislation. In particular, the NHRIs of six of the countries surveyed stand out for their efforts to promote the rights of IDPs in their countries. Interestingly, almost all of their work with IDPs is funded by international sources, raising the question of whether national governments themselves should not be doing more to increase their funding of NHRIs in order to support their engagement with IDP issues.

International actors are valuable resources for efforts aiming to improve government response to IDPs. In many cases, the past Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (RSGs) mandated to study the issue of internal displacement (Francis Deng and his successor Walter Kälin) and the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons (Chaloka Beyani) had exercised significant influence on governments in encouraging and supporting action on behalf of IDPs. Along with these actors, UNHCR and the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement have provided technical assis­tance to support governments’ efforts to de­velop national legal frameworks to ensure IDPs’ access to their rights.

Durable solutions: Return was the durable solution most often supported by the govern­ments assessed. The Framework for National Responsibility identifies three durable solu­tions—return, local integration and settlement elsewhere in the country. However, the fifteen countries surveyed herein reflect a global ten­dency to emphasize return, often excluding the other durable solutions. Yet for solutions to be voluntary, IDPs must be able to choose among them, and local integration or settlement else­where in the country may in fact be some IDPs’ preferred solution. Especially in situations of protracted displacement, those may be the only feasible solutions, at least in the near future.

The most difficult benchmarks to analyze were those whose underlying concepts are very broad and those for which data was seemingly not publicly available. Chief among these were the benchmarks on preventing internal displacement (Benchmark 1), raising national awareness (Benchmark 2), promoting the participation of IDPs in decisionmaking (Benchmark 9), and allocating adequate resources (Benchmark 11). Analysis on all other benchmarks also faced data constraints as in many cases data were outdated or incomplete or simply were not available. Nonetheless, we found that the twelve benchmarks all directed attention to important issues in governments’ responses to internal displacement.

We also found that while protection is central to the Framework, the issue is of such importance that there should be a benchmark explicitly focused on it—and specifically on protection as physical security, provided to IDPs during all phases of displacement. This benchmark would also underscore the responsibility of governments to protect the security of humanitarian workers engaged with IDPs.

Overall, the study found that the Framework for National Responsibility is a valuable tool for analyzing government efforts to prevent dis­placement, to respond to IDPs’ needs for protection and assistance and to support durable solutions. But this study also reveals certain limitations to using the Framework as an assessment tool, particularly in terms of accounting for the responsibility of nonstate actors; accounting for national responsibility for protection, particularly during displacement; and accounting for causes of displacement other than conflict, violence and human rights violations.

       

Editor's Note: This is the second part of a two piece series on internal displacement that originally appeared online in TerraNullius. The first part is available here.
 
This post continues our discussion of the study entitled "From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Response to Internal Displacement" recently released by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement.

Addressing housing, land, and property (HLP) issues is a key component of national responsibility. Principle 29 of the non-binding but widely accepted Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement emphasizes that competent authorities have a duty to assist IDPs to recover their property and possessions or, when recovery is not possible, to obtain appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation.

The 2005 Framework for National Responsibility – which set the benchmarks we applied in our current study – reaffirms this responsibility (in Benchmark 10, “support durable solutions”) and flags a number of the challenges that often arise, such as IDPs’ lack of formal title or other documentary evidence of land and property ownership; the destruction of any such records due to conflict or natural disaster; and discrimination against women in laws and customs regulating property ownership and inheritance. The Framework for National Responsibility stresses that, “Government authorities should anticipate these problems and address them in line with international human rights standards and in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner.”

The extent to which a government has safeguarded HLP rights, including by assisting IDPs to recover their housing, land, and property thus was among the indicators by which we evaluated the efforts of each of the 15 governments examined in our study. Our findings emphasized the importance of both an adequate legal and policy framework for addressing displacement related HLP issues and the role that bodies charged with adjudication and monitoring can play in ensuring implementation.

HLP Law and Policy Frameworks

One of the most encouraging signs of governments taking seriously their responsibility to address internal displacement has been the development, adoption and implementation in all regions of the world of specific laws and policies that respect the rights of IDPs. Some of the countries surveyed have developed laws, decrees, orders, and policies that protect IDPs’ HLP rights, but these measures are also not without their limits and challenges. A few examples are presented below.

In Colombia, while Law 387 on Internal Displacement (1997) stipulates the right of IDPs to compensation and restitution (Article 10), the government has been hard-pressed to establish measures enabling them to realize that right (see further, below). In Colombia, the constitutional complaint process – the acción de tutela petition procedure – has made the government accountable to IDPs and has influenced government policy toward IDPs, including the policy of allocation of government assistance such as housing subsidies.

In Georgia, the legal framework for IDP protection includes a property restitution law for IDPs from South Ossetia, adopted in 2007, which provided for the establishment of a Commission on Restitution and Compensation; however, this body never became operational and the status of the law is unclear following the August 2008 conflict. The State Strategy on IDPs, also adopted in 2007, protects IDPs against “arbitrary/illegitimate eviction” and sets out a large-scale program for improving the living conditions of IDPs in their place of displacement, all the while reaffirming their right to property restitution.[1]

Displaced families whose homes were destroyed or damaged during the August 2008 received $15,000 from the government to rebuild their homes, although many IDPs have held off reconstruction efforts due to concerns about insecurity. The RSG on IDPs recommended in 2009 the established of a comprehensive mechanism for resolving HLP claims for both the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts. In addition, in 2010, Georgia adopted procedures for vacating and reallocating IDP housing, which, among other things, addresses those cases in which removal of IDPs from a collective center is ordered by the government and may require an eviction, and spells out safeguards for guaranteeing the right of IDPs.[2]

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution protects Iraqis against forced displacement (Article 44(2)). Through its Property Claims Commission, formerly the Commission on the Resolution of Real Property Disputes established by Order No. 2 (2006), Iraq has sought to recover property seized between 1968 and 2003, although significant gaps and challenges remain. For those internally displaced between 2006 and 2008, Prime Ministerial Order 101 (2008) sets out a framework for providing property restitution for registered IDPs with a view to encouraging and facilitating their return to Baghdad governorate, the origin of the majority of post-2006 IDPs and the location of the majority of post-2006 returnees. However, there have been few claims; many IDPs lack the necessary documentation, do not trust government institutions, fear retribution or cannot afford the requisite costs.[3]

In Afghanistan, where national authorities have not yet defined “internally displaced persons,” property and land rights of IDPs are either specifically addressed or generally implicated in substantive and procedural provisions found in a series of executive acts that have been issued since 2001, including the most IDP-specific of them, Presidential Decree No. 104 on Land Distribution for Settlement to Eligible Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (2005). This decree sets forth a basic framework for distributing government land to both IDPs and returnees as a means of addressing their housing needs. However, IDPs seeking access to land are required to provide their national identity cards (tazkera) and documentation proving their internal displacement status—documentation which they may have lost. Moreover, the decree does not recognize other fundamental rights or needs of the internally displaced; it is valid only in areas of origin; and its implementation has been marred by inefficiency and corruption within the very weak ministry that is tasked with its implementation.

Although the 2006 peace agreement in Nepal  included a commitment to return occupied land and property and to allow for the return of displaced persons, four years after the peace agreement (and three years after the adoption of a national policy), between 50,000 and 70,000 people remained displaced.  Nearly half of the returnees interviewed by the Nepal IDP Working Group reported serious land, housing and property problems.  Of the more than 10,000 claims for compensation for property filed in 2007 only 2,000 families had received support to reconstruct or repair their houses by 2009.  It is widely reported that IDPs with non-Maoist political affiliations have been the least likely to recover land and property.

In Turkey, the government has yet to take full responsibility for displacement caused by its security forces against a largely Kurdish population. In its Law 5233 on Compensation of Damages That Occurred Due to Terror and the Fight against Terror (27 July 2004) and its Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program, displacement is defined in terms of “terrorism” or the “fight” against it. This law does not specifically focus on internal displacement, but it does benefit IDPs among other affected populations. Law 5233 and its related amendments and regulations compensate for “material damages suffered by persons due to terrorist acts or activities undertaken during the fight against terror” between 1987 and 2004. Compensation is provided for three types of damage: loss of property; physical injuries, disabilities, medical treatment, death and funerals; and inability to access property due to measures taken during “the fight against terrorism.”

According to the law, compensation is to be determined by damage assessment commissions (DACs) at the provincial level, with funding provided by the Ministry of the Interior. From 2004 to August 2009, the commissions received just over 360,000 applications. Of those, over 190,000 claims were decided: 120,000 were approved and the claimants awarded compensation; the remaining 70,000 were denied. Around $1.4 billion in compensation was awarded, of which close to $1.1 billion has been paid.[4] The existing legal and policy framework do not adequately address the obstacles to return, including the village guard system, insecurity and the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

In Kenya, the government’s promotion of return included a National Humanitarian Emergency Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement of Victims of 2007 Post-Election Violence which was to meet the full costs of resettlement of IDPs, including reconstruction of basic housing, replacement of household effects and rehabilitation of infrastructure. But in practice, the government has been criticized for promoting return before conditions were safe. The government has also tended to focus on IDPs who own land and to attach durable solutions to land; there is no clear strategy for dealing with landless IDPs, such as squatters and non-farmers.

Awareness among IDPs as to their housing, land, and property rights under existing law – where there is law addressing those rights – is inadequate in many instances. For example, in Turkey, about half of IDPs surveyed in 2006 were not aware of their entitlements under the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Program or the Law on Compensation. [5]

National Human Rights Institutions and Constitutional Courts

In some cases, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and constitutional courts have a critically important role to play in supporting as well as in holding governments accountable to guarantee the rights of IDPs. In a number of the countries our study examined, the work of NHRIs on internal displacement has included a focus on HLP issues.

In Georgia, for example, the Public Defender has been actively monitoring and reporting on the country-wide housing program begun in 2009 and has raised concerns about evictions of IDPs and the quality of housing in relocation sites. The Public Defender’s office also has undertaken a study on the conditions of the hidden majority of IDPs living in private accommodation rather than in collective centers.

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has reported on and raised concerns about the large number of IDPs living in urban slums and informal settlements and about the fact that many IDPs were unable to return to their homes due to disputes over land and property.

Constitutional courts have in some instances played a role in strengthening the national legal framework for protecting the property rights of IDPs. Notably, Colombia’s activist Constitutional Court, in its Decision T-821 in October 2007, ordered the government to ensure respect for IDPs’ right to reparation and property restitution. In January 2009, the Constitutional Court ordered the government to comprehensively address land rights issues and to establish mechanisms to prevent future violations.

Subsequently, the government has sought to ensure these rights by adopting in 2011 the historic and ambitious Law 1448, known as the Victims and Land Restitution Law. In this law, government acknowledges for the first time ever the existence of an internal armed conflict in Colombia, and recognizes as “victims” those individuals or communities whose rights were violated under international humanitarian law or international human rights law. The law regulates reparations for all victims of the armed conflict since 1985 – numbering over 5 million – including through land restitution or compensation for IDPs which is to occur over the next decade.

However, restitution of land does not guarantee returnees’ security and may even endanger people given that land disputes and seizures remain a driving force of displacement. Aiming to prevent further victimization of returnees as a result of insecurity and violence, the government established a new security body, the Integrated Center of Intelligence for Land Restitution (Centro Integrado de Inteligencia para la Restitución de Tierras, also known as CI2-RT) within the Ministry of Defense. Additional participants include the Office of the Vice President, the Ministry of Justice and Interior, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS), Social Action (Acción Social), Incoder, and organizations representing victims of violence. Time will tell how successful the implementation of this ambitious law will be.

In Georgia, the Constitutional Court has also played an important role by recognizing the rights of IDPs to purchase property without losing their IDP status or in any way jeopardizing their right to return.

Conclusion

Securing HLP rights for IDPs is, of course, a key component of finding durable solutions to displacement. The study found that land and property disputes are almost always sources or manifestations of lingering conflict and often an obstacle to IDPs’ free exercise of their right to return.  While some governments have made efforts to provide mechanisms for property restitution or compensation, those mechanisms have rarely been adequate to deal—at least in a timely manner—with the scale and complexity of the problem. National human rights institutions and constitutional courts can play a key role in holding governments accountable for HLP and other rights and freedoms of IDPs.

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[1] Government of Georgia, State Strategy for Internally Displaced Persons–Persecuted Persons, Chapter V.

[2] The Standard Operating Procedures for Vacation and Reallocation of IDPs for Durable Housing Solutions (2010) (www.mra.gov.ge)

[3] IDMC, Iraq: Little New Displacement but around 2.8 Million Iraqis Remain Internally Displaced: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 4 March, 2010, p. 240 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[4] IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 12, citing correspondence with the government of Turkey, 17 September 2009 (www.internal-displacement.org)

[5] Hacettepe University, Institute of Population Studies, "Findings of the Turkey Migration and Internally Displaced Population Survey," press release, 6 December 2006, cited in IDMC, Turkey: Need for Continued Improvement in Response to Protracted Displacement: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, 26 October 2009, p. 11 (www.internal-displacement.org)