Monitoring of trade deals needs a risk-based approach Expert comment NCapeling 24 May 2021

On human rights issues, trading partners must do more than trust to luck.

The recent row within the UK government about the treatment of agricultural products in a proposed new trade deal with Australia provides a reminder that changes to trading arrangements can have social and environmental costs, as well as benefits.

Although the UK government clearly feels political pressure to demonstrate its ‘Global Britain’ credentials with some speedily concluded new deals, rushing ahead without a full understanding of the social, environmental, and human rights implications risks storing up problems for later. In the meantime, calls for better evaluation and monitoring of trade agreements against sustainability-related commitments and goals – ideally with statutory backing – will only get stronger.

EU experiences with these kinds of processes are instructive. For more than 20 years the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission (DG Trade) has been commissioning sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) from independent consultants in support of trade negotiations, and since 2012 these assessments have explicitly encompassed human rights impacts as a core part of the analysis.

These processes have since been augmented with a programme of periodic ‘ex post’ evaluations of trade agreements to ‘analyse the observed economic, social, human rights, and environmental impacts’ of live trade deals and to make recommendations about any mitigation action which may be needed.

For credibility and objectivity, the Commission outsources much of its sustainability assessment and ex post evaluation activities to independent consultants, who are encouraged to innovate and tailor their approaches subject to broad methodological parameters laid down by the Commission. Over time, experiences with specific assessment and monitoring assignments have enabled external SIA practitioners – and the Commission itself – to progressively strengthen these processes and underlying methodologies.

Yet despite the improvements there remains legitimate questions about whether the human rights aspects of these SIA processes – and subsequent evaluations – are having real policy impact. The difficulty of predicting human rights impacts of trade agreements in advance – as the COVID-19 crisis amply demonstrates – suggests a need for realism about the extent to which a ‘one off’ process, often carried out at a time when there is only ‘agreement in principle’ as to future trading terms, can produce a robust roadmap for heading off future human rights-related risks.

Human rights impact assessments have a potentially valuable role to play in laying down the substantive and structural foundations for future human rights monitoring as part of a broader, iterative, human rights risk management strategy. But the fragmented manner in which many trade agreements approach human rights issues, and the fact that outcomes are the product of negotiation rather than necessarily design, make it difficult to turn this vision into reality.

Controversies surrounding the SIA process for the EU-Mercosur agreement illustrate why striving for more coherence in the identification and subsequent management of human rights-related risks is important. In June 2019, the Commission decided to wrap up negotiations with the South America Mercosur bloc, even though the SIA process for the proposed agreement was still incomplete and the interim and final SIA reports yet to be delivered. Frustrated NGOs made their feelings clear in the form of a formal complaint – and a slap on the wrist from the EU Ombudsman duly followed.

However, when it eventually appeared in December 2020, the final SIA report for the EU-Mercosur deal did include a number of interesting recommendations for responding to specific areas of human rights-related risk identified through the pre-signing assessment process – such as flanking measures designed to address issues pertaining to health, equality, and protection of indigenous peoples, and stressing the need for ‘continuous monitoring’.

Hopefully these recommendations will be proactively followed up, but there are reasons not to be overly optimistic about that. To the extent that these recommendations might have required, or benefitted from, some tweaks to the terms of the trade agreement itself, it was clearly too late. And while there may be opportunities for EU institutions to follow up the recommendations through unilateral ex post evaluation processes, current legal, policy, and institutional arrangements provide few guarantees this will take place.

The credibility of the EU SIA programme has clearly taken a knock because of the problems with the EU-Mercosur process, and stakeholders could be forgiven for questioning whether expending time and effort on engaging in these processes is actually worthwhile. As a first step towards rectifying this, the Commission should be transparent about how it plans to respond to the EU-Mercosur SIA recommendations regarding flanking measures and follow up – ideally consulting with stakeholders about the various human rights monitoring options available.

Looking further ahead, the Commission should be urging SIA practitioners to deal more expansively with the options for follow up human rights monitoring in future SIA reports, setting out recommendations not just on the need for ongoing monitoring of human rights-related issues but on the detail of how this might be done, and how progress towards human rights-related goals could be tracked. And creativity should be encouraged because, as detailed in a newly-published Chatham House research paper, there may be more opportunities for human rights monitoring than first appear.

The SIA process could also provide a forum for exploring complementary measures needed to make future monitoring efforts as effective as possible – jointly and unilaterally; politically, structurally, and resources-wise; both within the framework of the trading relationship and extraneously. The credibility of the process – and hence stakeholder trust – would be further enhanced by commitments from the Commission to be more transparent in future about how different human rights monitoring recommendations laid out in SIAs have been taken into account in subsequent negotiations, in the supervisory arrangements developed for specific trading relationships, and in the implementation of EU trade policy more generally.

How can the investor community address the ‘S’ in ESG? – the role of social purpose values 16 November 2021 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2021 Online

This webinar highlights the crucial relationship between an open civic space and a profitable business environment.

2020 was a tipping point for investors to think and act more responsibly, galvanized by catalysts like the killing of George Floyd and the pandemic. There is increasing investor support for social and environmental causes. Younger investors are placing increasing emphasis on values and social issues in their investment decisions.

The ‘S’ in the Environment Social and Governance (ESG) agenda is clearly gaining traction, but how far does it extend to civil and political liberties i.e. the right of citizens, NGOs and journalists to speak freely, assemble and associate which are increasingly shrinking around the world?

While there is increasing focus on human rights issues such as modern slavery and supply chains, civil society space issues often fall between the cracks when investors consider ESG.

This webinar also explores opportunities and challenges that arise for the investor community in terms of factoring civic space issues into their political risk and ESG analysis.

• To what extent are civic space issues being factored into ESG social purpose values, especially by younger investors?
• What is the best methodology for assessing these issues in order to ensure a common and coherent set of global standards in this area?
• And how can investors mitigate the risks of their activities to civic space in practice?

Re-imagining trade for domestic and foreign policy Expert comment NCapeling 7 December 2021

Exploring future trade policy through issues such as the green transition, labour standards, human rights, the role of the WTO, and non-trade policy objectives.

Balancing trade and non-trade policy objectives

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

The supply chain disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic highlight trade cannot be taken for granted, and economic interdependencies have both benefits and costs. As international commerce rebounds and trade policy is increasingly seen through the prism of enhancing resilience, the moment is ripe to redefine and reimagine trade.

The goal of trade policy has never been to increase trade for trade’s sake, so a new narrative and framework for global trade requires striking a careful balance between pursuing trade and non-trade policy objectives.

Protecting the environment, strengthening labour standards, and upholding human rights have long been goals for which trade policy is used as a lever, and the interaction of trade and national security interests as well as the links between trade and competition policy are not new issues either.

All these non-trade policy aspects have come to the forefront as the geopolitical context has shifted and the transition to green and digital economies has gathered force – and, at times, these different non-trade policy goals clash.

The US and European Union (EU) are promoting solar energy to fight climate change but supply chains for solar panels are heavily reliant on forced labour from Xinjiang, and hence it is not yet certain whether environmental or human rights concerns will prevail. However, it is clear trade policy tools can be part of a comprehensive solution which manages inherent tensions while still advancing both objectives.

Trade policy is also not just a foreign policy instrument but links closely to domestic policy – the populist backlash against globalization in much of the developed world, especially the US and Europe, was in part driven by anti-trade sentiment.

While American attitudes towards trade improved after the 2016 election of Donald Trump, positive views towards trade dropped sharply in 2021. The Biden administration’s worker-centred trade policy aims to address distributional effects of international economic integration which is a long-standing challenge. Thus, tackling non-trade policy issues without losing sight of this unresolved core issue requires careful calibration.

Trade policy is being pulled in many different directions at the same time as the core institution governing global trade – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – is in crisis, and it is uncertain how much of the non-trade policy agenda the WTO can handle. If the linkage to non-trade policy becomes too strong, this could be the straw that breaks the WTO’s back, but if it is too weak, the WTO risks becoming irrelevant in efforts to tackle key global challenges.

But if its 164 members can generate trade-oriented solutions to non-trade issues, they can revive the organization and mobilize domestic support for global trade at the same time. This balancing act in managing the tensions between trade and non-trade policy objectives lies at the centre of future-proofing trade policy and global trade governance.

Developing countries must be part of green trade revolution

Carolyn Deere Birkbeck

The biggest challenge in taking environmental efforts forward within the multilateral context is to successfully combine environmental ambition with an approach which engages developing countries as partners, reflects their environment-related trade priorities, and addresses their sustainable development interests.

The importance of engaging developing countries must not be underestimated because it is vital a global green economy does not leave the poorest behind, or becomes two-tier where green trade happens only between certain countries and the essential task of incentivizing and supporting sustainable production and consumption patterns in all countries is neglected.

The new member-led initiatives at the WTO do signal that, while the rulemaking and negotiating functions remain central to the global trade body, governments recognize the need for enhanced, transparent, and inclusive policy dialogue as well as problem-solving on sectoral issues and specific trade-related challenges.

Given the well-documented challenges of achieving multilateral consensus at the WTO, governments are exploring new ways to work within multilateral frameworks and to redefine what progress and successful outcomes should look like.

Therefore, there is a need for best practices, voluntary action, pledges, and guidelines to both sustain the relevance of the multilateral trading system and support policy action at the national level for trade which underpins environmental and wider sustainable goals.

Making progress on an environmental agenda which reflects sustainable development concerns requires stronger leadership, engagement, and advocacy from business, civil society, and research communities in both developing and developed countries, as well as economies in transition.

Meaningful, inclusive dialogue and action at the WTO also requires deeper efforts to build policy coherence among environment, development, and trade policymaking at home, with environmental ministries having a key role to play in bringing expertise to bear and ensuring strong regulatory environments and institutions for the implementation of national, regional, and international environmental commitments.

But at the domestic level, many countries still have to overcome complex politics and diverse interests as they work to transform their economies toward greater sustainability and tackle the costs of transition.

Social preparation holds the key to trade transitions

Bernice Lee 

Trade being often depicted as the mother of all ills should not come as a surprise, as politicians are only too happy to put the blame on trade when all sorts of exogenous shocks, such as technological change, could actually be the trigger which fires the bullet into local industries or jobs.

Admittedly trade does have a way of breaking the seams in the social fabric but the fact politicians often ignore negative impacts of trade means its benefits can be likened to Schrodinger’s cat, both real and illusive. But trade being mainly depicted as a ‘zero-sum’ pursuit and trade deals as the result of swashbuckling duels belie the reality that the real business of trade is often boring, bureaucratic, but necessary.

This is particularly true when trade provides access to a much larger variety of necessary products, such as medicine, food, and minerals, which can be expensive to make domestically. Selling products and services abroad also brings in the hard currency needed to buy these goods or to spend on trips abroad.

This does not take away the fact trade is extremely disruptive but, as a result of all the theorizing and understandable rants about trade, large swathes of the international community have effectively foregone it as a force for good or as an instrument which – while not the answer to all problems – can help smooth the path to well-being through efficiency gains and income growth, as well as putting to work the theory of comparative advantage as promised by the textbooks.

Alas, what the textbooks do not clearly spell out – until recently – is that trade brings positive benefits only if a society is ready for trade, which often means having the cushion for social protection such as healthcare, unemployment benefits, and opportunities for training and reskilling.

The ‘China shock’ literature vividly depicts how workers rarely seamlessly move from one job or sector to another and so, without adequate social protection, trade not only magnifies existing fractures, it also exacerbates inequality. As the aftershock lingers for decades, the lesson learned is the importance of social readiness for trade, especially the role played by governments in providing support for workers as part of the adjustment to trade and globalization.

Authors of this China shock literature recently suggested the next shock will be the transition from fossil fuel production, but the good news is this so-called ‘just transition’ challenge is one which proponents of green energy are well aware of.

But ultimately the China shock could be the dry run for the advent of machine intelligence, meaning better preparation is needed with solid social policies, investment in institutional readiness, and social preparedness to ensure the machines only take on monotonous and unsafe work – not our livelihoods and communities.

Trading partners must move to creating human rights impact

Dr Jennifer Zerk

The question of whether, and how, trade policy should be used as a way of addressing human rights concerns remains controversial and attempts to link the two still attract accusations of ‘protectionism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’.

Momentum appears to be behind those arguing for greater alignment between trade policy and human rights objectives – a trend which is most noticeable in the increasing willingness of trade partners to reference human rights standards in their trade agreements and in the growth of complementary activities such as human rights impact assessment and monitoring.

Evidence that these are having an impact ‘on the ground’ remains elusive. Nevertheless, efforts to enhance scrutiny of trade agreements from a human rights perspective, and to signal the importance of respect for human rights to a trading relationship, can still have value.

Even if causal relationships between trading arrangements and human rights impacts are difficult to establish conclusively, human rights impact assessment and subsequent monitoring activities provide valuable opportunities for stakeholders to weigh in on aspects of trade policy which are of concern.

Such processes not only help governments to realize rights of public participation, they also contribute to good governance by making it more likely that potential human rights problems will be recognized and addressed.

Turning to the agreements themselves, various ideas have been put forward on how to make these more responsive to human rights concerns.

Options mooted by EU institutions in recent years include an enhanced monitoring and enforcement role for consultative bodies established under specialized ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters, and better mainstreaming of human rights commitments in sector-specific chapters.

However, given the political and resource-related difficulties in developing credible monitoring systems for human rights-related issues, and the unlikelihood of actual enforcement, many view this as little more than window-dressing.

For governments wanting to see real impact, ‘supply chain due diligence’ regimes pioneered by the EU in relation to timber and conflict minerals present a promising regulatory model.

These regimes seek to curb trade in products derived from, or which aggravate, human rights abuses as well as aiming to promote more responsible sourcing of products by EU importers. They create powerful incentives within partner countries to crack down on harmful practices by producers, which are bolstered further by regulations that demand more proactive human rights risk management by EU operators throughout their supply chains. Capacity-building and aid packages have been deployed to help speed up the necessary reforms.

New regulatory measures imposing mandatory human rights due diligence obligations on companies operating in a much broader range of sectors are now under consideration by the European Commission. While the role of trade-related measures in the enforcement of this new regime is still unclear, trading partners should be sure to preserve the regulatory space for sector-level and company-level initiatives such as these in future agreements.

Understanding the impact of NTPOs on investment

Professor Michael Gasiorek

Increasingly, trade policy is not just all about achieving trade-related outcomes as international trade, by definition, involves interaction with partner countries and therefore trade policy with regard to those partner countries can be used as a means to achieve ‘non-trade policy objectives’ (NTPOs).

In turn this means trade policy is also no longer just about the domestic economy but also about policies and economies in other countries – such as poorer countries achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), concerns about practices in other countries in areas such as governance or corruption, or a desire to address broader challenges such as climate change.

But the inclusion of NTPOs in trade policy arrangements between countries also creates possible impacts on investment flows between countries. Stronger NTPO commitments could have a negative impact both on foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment because the commitments increase costs for the companies involved which makes the investment less attractive.

However, NTPOs bringing progress on governance, or strengthening institutions, or giving more clarity on environmental regulations could signal a more stable and safe business environment, with production standards which create increased market access for exports – all of which may lead to increased incentives to invest.

A third possibility is that NTPOs do not have much effect either way because, although trade agreement increasingly include provisions on economic and social rights, or civil and political rights, or environmental protection – these are typically ‘best endeavour’ clauses which are frequently not binding or subject to dispute settlement, making them less likely to be implemented.

Mammalian circadian clocks are driven by transcription/translation feedback loops composed of positive transcriptional activators (BMAL1 and CLOCK) and negative repressors (CRYPTOCHROMEs (CRYs) and PERIODs (PERs)). CRYs, in complex with PERs, bind to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex and repress E-box–driven transcription of clock-associated genes. There are two individual CRYs, with CRY1 exhibiting higher affinity to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex than CRY2. It is known that this differential binding is regulated by a dynamic serine-rich loop adjacent to the secondary pocket of both CRYs, but the underlying features controlling loop dynamics are not known. Here we report that allosteric regulation of the serine-rich loop is mediated by Arg-293 of CRY1, identified as a rare CRY1 SNP in the Ensembl and 1000 Genomes databases. The p.Arg293His CRY1 variant caused a shortened circadian period in a Cry1−/−Cry2−/− double knockout mouse embryonic fibroblast cell line. Moreover, the variant displayed reduced repressor activity on BMAL1/CLOCK driven transcription, which is explained by reduced affinity to BMAL1/CLOCK in the absence of PER2 compared with CRY1. Molecular dynamics simulations revealed that the p.Arg293His CRY1 variant altered a communication pathway between Arg-293 and the serine loop by reducing its dynamicity. Collectively, this study provides direct evidence that allosterism in CRY1 is critical for the regulation of circadian rhythm.

Stop codon read-through (SCR) is a process of continuation of translation beyond a stop codon. This phenomenon, which occurs only in certain mRNAs under specific conditions, leads to a longer isoform with properties different from that of the canonical isoform. MTCH2, which encodes a mitochondrial protein that regulates mitochondrial metabolism, was selected as a potential read-through candidate based on evolutionary conservation observed in the proximal region of its 3' UTR. Here, we demonstrate translational read-through across two evolutionarily conserved, in-frame stop codons of MTCH2 using luminescence- and fluorescence-based assays, and by analyzing ribosome-profiling and mass spectrometry (MS) data. This phenomenon generates two isoforms, MTCH2x and MTCH2xx (single- and double-SCR products, respectively), in addition to the canonical isoform MTCH2, from the same mRNA. Our experiments revealed that a cis-acting 12-nucleotide sequence in the proximal 3' UTR of MTCH2 is the necessary signal for SCR. Functional characterization showed that MTCH2 and MTCH2x were localized to mitochondria with a long t1/2 (>36 h). However, MTCH2xx was found predominantly in the cytoplasm. This mislocalization and its unique C terminus led to increased degradation, as shown by greatly reduced t1/2 (<1 h). MTCH2 read-through–deficient cells, generated using CRISPR-Cas9, showed increased MTCH2 expression and, consistent with this, decreased mitochondrial membrane potential. Thus, double-SCR of MTCH2 regulates its own expression levels contributing toward the maintenance of normal mitochondrial membrane potential.

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Histone recognition by “reader” modules serves as a fundamental mechanism in epigenetic regulation. Previous studies have shown that Spindlin1 is a reader of histone H3K4me3 as well as “K4me3-R8me2a” and promotes transcription of rDNA or Wnt/TCF4 target genes. Here we show that Spindlin1 also acts as a potent reader of histone H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent methylation pattern. Calorimetric titration revealed a binding affinity of 16 nm between Spindlin1 and H3 “K4me3-K9me3” peptide, which is one to three orders of magnitude stronger than most other histone readout events at peptide level. Structural studies revealed concurrent recognition of H3K4me3 and H3K9me3/2 by aromatic pockets 2 and 1 of Spindlin1, respectively. Epigenomic profiling studies showed that Spindlin1 colocalizes with both H3K4me3 and H3K9me3 peaks in a subset of genes enriched in biological processes of transcription and its regulation. Moreover, the distribution of Spindlin1 peaks is primarily associated with H3K4me3 but not H3K9me3, which suggests that Spindlin1 is a downstream effector of H3K4me3 generated in heterochromatic regions. Collectively, our work calls attention to an intriguing function of Spindlin1 as a potent H3 “K4me3-K9me3/2” bivalent mark reader, thereby balancing gene expression and silencing in H3K9me3/2-enriched regions.

RecQ family helicases are highly conserved from bacteria to humans and have essential roles in maintaining genome stability. Mutations in three human RecQ helicases cause severe diseases with the main features of premature aging and cancer predisposition. Most RecQ helicases shared a conserved domain arrangement which comprises a helicase core, an RecQ C-terminal domain, and an auxiliary element helicase and RNaseD C-terminal (HRDC) domain, the functions of which are poorly understood. In this study, we systematically characterized the roles of the HRDC domain in E. coli RecQ in various DNA transactions by single-molecule FRET. We found that RecQ repetitively unwinds the 3'-partial duplex and fork DNA with a moderate processivity and periodically patrols on the ssDNA in the 5'-partial duplex by translocation. The HRDC domain significantly suppresses RecQ activities in the above transactions. In sharp contrast, the HRDC domain is essential for the deep and long-time unfolding of the G4 DNA structure by RecQ. Based on the observations that the HRDC domain dynamically switches between RecA core- and ssDNA-binding modes after RecQ association with DNA, we proposed a model to explain the modulation mechanism of the HRDC domain. Our findings not only provide new insights into the activities of RecQ on different substrates but also highlight the novel functions of the HRDC domain in DNA metabolisms.

E. A. Rakhmanov and S. P. Suetin
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 269-290.
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A. G. Sergeev, A. Kh. Khachatryan and Kh. A. Khachatryan
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 55-65.
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A. P. Starovoitov and N. V. Ryabchenko
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 15-31.
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Visualizing the Data: The Evolution of Trade Tensions in Metals and Minerals Markets 18 January 2018 — 4:30PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 December 2017 Chatham House, London

Over the past decade, producer countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Indonesia, the DRC and, most recently, Tanzania have restricted exports of unprocessed precious metals, copper, nickel, cobalt and other minerals in an attempt to support, or create, downstream processing industries and jobs or increase revenues. These moves have invariably created tensions with trading partners. Research suggests that export restrictions are not the best way to achieve such policy objectives and can instead harm the producer country’s economy and undermine the functioning of international metals and minerals.

Drawing on OECD and Chatham House research on resource trade, the speaker will present analysis and data visualizations exploring the drivers of past export restrictions and their political and economic impacts. They will also consider how the drivers of ‘resource nationalist measures’ are changing, whether and where export restrictions might present strategic and economic risks in the current context, and the extent to which producer and consumer governments and international governance mechanisms are prepared to address them.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

From local to global: A roadmap for US climate action 14 April 2021 — 6:30PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 March 2021 Online

Ahead of Biden’s Earth Day Summit, panellists discuss a range of climate issues, from city-level climate management to the international security implications of climate deals.

On their first day in office, the Biden-Harris administration sent a strong message to Americans and allies by rejoining the Paris Agreement. Experienced climate and environmental leaders were appointed to senior leadership roles as part of a ‘whole of government approach’ to climate action.

Although decisive action is welcomed by many Americans and international partners, the divided domestic perspectives on climate and a changed international landscape pose significant challenges.

Ahead of the Earth Day Summit on April 22, an event hosted by Joe Biden to mark America’s formal return to global climate talks, panellists discuss a range of climate issues, from city-level climate management to the international security implications of climate deals.

• How will post-COVID domestic priorities and policy influence the international approach of the US to climate action?
• How will US policy, both foreign and domestic, need to respond to the security and geopolitical elements posed by climate change?
• What actions are needed during the upcoming Earth Day Summit for the US to establish credibility as a climate leader?
• What shape are key debates taking on US-China climate relations ahead of COP 26, and how might climate issues be approached in relation to wider geopolitical tensions?

Cities as climate leaders: Progress and ambition 1 December 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 November 2021 Online

This panel discusses the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally.

Cities are critical to tackling the pressing environmental challenges of our time. While they now account for an estimated 75 per cent of global CO2 emissions, cities also offer a unique opportunity for devolved leadership on climate action. At the recent COP26, some significant progress was made in elevating cities’ position on climate action with a flurry of announcements and commitments.

For example, more than 1,000 cities are now committed to the Cities Race to Zero and C40’s Clean Construction Declaration saw multiple cities committing to at least halving emissions from initial construction of buildings by 2030. A raft of financing commitments were also made to improve urban resilience in the face of climate change.

This builds on existing momentum before COP26. Over 50 world cities are now on track to meet Paris Agreement and the Marrakech Partnership is further enabling collaboration between governments and cities within the UNFCCC processes.

Therefore, how we design, build, govern and use our urban places will be a key factor for decarbonization and climate change adaptation.

On the back of COP26, this panel brings together leaders from across urban development sectors to discuss the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally. 

Climate finance and conflict dynamics on the road to COP27 21 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2022 Online

Stakeholders discuss the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity in climate finance and action.

With climate change, fragility and conflict challenges worsening, the role of international climate finance is more urgent than ever.

From the implementation of climate finance and who it reaches to the rush for renewable energy, the inclusion of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity principles often remain absent from climate finance discussions and planning.

With COP27 around the corner and for the occasion of International Peace Day, stakeholders ranging from government representatives to climate activists discuss their perspectives on the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity as part of climate finance and action.

This event was organized in partnership with International Alert.

Climate Change and the Pacific: Impacts and Adaptation 27 November 2018 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 14 November 2018 Royal Academy of Arts

Bangladesh: The Trade-Off Between Economic Prosperity and Human Rights 11 March 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Bangladesh’s recent gains in economic and social indices, set against its record of corruption and poor civil rights, has at times been termed the ‘Bangladesh Paradox’. Yet this label is overly simplistic; the current situation proves that these trends can coexist.

The Awami League government, in power since 2009, has increased political stability, delivered unprecedented economic and social advances, and adopted a counter-terrorism strategy to stamp out extremist groups. At the same time, it is criticized for curbing civil rights and failing to hold credible elections. However, as the two previous regimes have demonstrated, the rights situation is unlikely to improve even if the Awami League were replaced.

How did worsening rights become a feature of the state irrespective of its political dispensation? An unresolved contest between political and non-political state actors may hold the key to that puzzle. The perils of the current dispensation have recently manifested in weakening economic indicators, which jeopardize the very stability and social progress for which the country has garnered much praise.

Zhaonan Wang and Yingpu Deng
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2921-2942.
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Martin Ehler and Karlheinz Gröchenig
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2885-2919.
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Ran Gu and Bing Gao
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2837-2860.
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Thomas O. Gallouët, Andrea Natale and Gabriele Todeschi
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2769-2810.
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Zhaohui Fu, Tao Tang and Jiang Yang
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2745-2767.
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Ming-Lun Hsieh and Shunsuke Yamana
Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 377 (), 5617-5672.
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Time: 9:00 AM, Location: E2.010

bradders1999 posted a photo:

The MATRIX-Style colour grading version.

Minifigures made, photographed and edited by me.

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

Tangled Bank posted a photo:

WendyHarris1955 posted a photo:

unbranded
plywood (basswood)
175 pieces
280 x 350 mm

TED: "I fink this lickle cat an' tiger pussle's cute. It's got pussycat wimsys an' it's shaped, so it's gonna be a keeper. The wobbly edj wuz a bit fiddly an' I 'ad to check the pikchur to make shure I 'ad it rite, but uvverwise it's a good'un.
That peece of cake I'm abowt to eat is Mum's 'ome-made froot cake spredd wiv butter - s'nice cuz she puts whisky in it. That's the cake, not the butter!"

Anne-Miek Bibbe posted a photo:

JOEPIE: I'm almost there! I wish Uncle Jeroen was here, I'm a little, really just a little bit afraid of the dark.
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JOEPIE: Ik ben bijna bij Peter! Ik wou dat oom Jeroen hier was, ik ben een beetje, echt maar een héél klein beetje bang in het donker.

Xiaoshang Jin
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5327-5337.
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Yongqiang Liu, Laurentiu Maxim and Botong Wang
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 5279-5288.
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Anton Freund, Fedor Pakhomov and Giovanni Soldà
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 152 (), 4993-5005.
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PROMOTED RACING, CHAPELTON MAROONS RENEW RIVALRY IN JPL - A16 FUNCAANDUN SET FOR FIFTH STRAIGHT WIN - A21

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