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The Dire Consequences of Trump's Suleimani Decision

Americans would be wise to brace for war with Iran, writes Susan Rice.

"Full-scale conflict is not a certainty, but the probability is higher than at any point in decades. Despite President Trump’s oft-professed desire to avoid war with Iran and withdraw from military entanglements in the Middle East, his decision to order the killing of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, Iran’s second most important official, as well as Iraqi leaders of an Iranian-backed militia, now locks our two countries in a dangerous escalatory cycle that will likely lead to wider warfare."




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2020–2021 International Security Program Research Fellowships: Apply Now

The International Security Program (ISP) is still accepting applications for 2020–2021.  ISP is a multidisciplinary research group that develops and trains new talent in security studies by hosting pre- and postdoctoral research fellows. 




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The battle of 'resistance' vs 'revolution' in the Middle East

The events surrounding the US assassination of Iranian Quds Force leader Major General Qassem Soleimani brought to the surface the two main ideological forces that now battle each other across the Middle East - the anti-imperial "resistance" of Iran and its Arab allies, and the freedom "revolution" of domestic protesters in the same lands. 




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What Makes for a Moral Foreign Policy?

Joseph Nye's new book rates the efforts of presidents from FDR to Trump.




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Lebanon has formed a controversial new government in a polarised, charged atmosphere, and protesters are not going to be easily pacified by its promises, explains Rami Khoury.

The fourth consecutive month of Lebanon's unprecedented political and economic crisis kicked off this week with three dramatic developments that will interplay in the coming months to define the country's direction for years to come: Escalating protests on the streets, heightened security measures by an increasingly militarising state, and now, a new cabinet of controversial so-called "independent technocrats" led by Prime Minister-designate Hassan Diab.

Seeking to increase pressure on the political elite to act responsibly amid inaction vis-a-vis the slow collapse of the economy, the protesters had launched the fourth month of their protest movement, which had begun on 17 October last year, with a 'Week of Anger', stepping up their tactics and targeting banks and government institutions.




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Armed Rebel Groups Lobby in D.C., Just Like Governments. How Does That Influence U.S. Policy?

Armed rebel groups push for funding and recognition, and often get it.




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H-Diplo Review Essay 192 on Lawson. Anatomies of Revolution

Emily Whalen reviews Anatomies of Revolution by George Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).




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How Do Past Presidents Rank in Foreign Policy?

How do presidents incorporate morality into decisions involving the national interest? Moral considerations explain why Truman, who authorized the use of nuclear weapons in Japan during World War II, later refused General MacArthur's request to use them in China during the Korean War. What is contextual intelligence, and how does it explain why Bush 41 is ranked first in foreign policy, but Bush 43 is found wanting? Is it possible for a president to lie in the service of the public interest? In this episode, Professor Joseph S. Nye considers these questions as he explores the role of morality in presidential decision-making from FDR to Trump.




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The Future of the Transatlantic Defense Relationship: Views from Finland and the EU

February 7, 2020: With the advent of the digital age and the rise of Russia and China as global powers, the EU must do more to defend itself and its relationship with the United States, according to Janne Kuusela, Director General Janne Kuusela. In an event moderated by  Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, Executive Director of the Future of Diplomacy Project and the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship he explained why Finland could be a potential paradigm for the EU’s defense strategy. 

 




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What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence

Is indiscriminate loyalty what allies want? The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) case suggests that allies do not desire U.S. loyalty in all situations. Instead, they want the United States to be a reliable ally, posing no risk of abandonment or entrapment.




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There's No Such Thing as Good Liberal Hegemony

Stephen Walt argues that as democracies falter, it's worth considering whether the United States made the right call in attempting to create a liberal world order.




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An Abysmal Failure of Leadership

During times of crisis, the most effective leaders are those who can build solidarity by educating the public about its own interests. Sadly, in the case of COVID-19, the leaders of the world's two largest economies have gone in the opposite direction, all but ensuring that the crisis will deepen.




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Red Bull 'just quick everywhere' - Vettel

Sebastian Vettel played down suggestions Red Bull has opened a substantial gap on its rivals after securing its ninth pole position of the season




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Post-race driver reaction

Team and driver reaction after the British Grand Prix at Silverstone




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Webber remains angry with Red Bull decision

Mark Webber was clearly still far from happy with his team at the end of a weekend which will end with major concerns over the relationship between him and Sebastian Vettel




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Button relieved race worked out

Jenson Button said his fourth-place finish was as good as he could have hoped for after a challenging weekend at the British Grand Prix




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Red Bull keen to clear the air with Webber

Christian Horner has promised to have sit-down talks with Mark Webber and Sebastian Vettel after the relationship within the Red Bull team soured over the British Grand Prix weekend




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Barrichello hails 'great effort' from his team at Silverstone

Rubens Barrichello said it was a 'great effort' from his Williams team after the Brazilian claimed his second successive top-five finish




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Michael Schumacher bemoans Silverstone result

Michael Schumacher confessed himself unhappy with his British Grand Prix after he finished ninth while team-mate Nico Rosberg drove to the podium




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Alonso has no regrets over Kubica move

Fernando Alonso has no regrets about his decision not to let Robert Kubica back past after illegally overtaking him at the British Grand Prix




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Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy?

Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies.




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The U.S.-China Relationship is at a Crossroads

Joseph Nye writes that some decoupling of interdependence is likely, particularly in areas related to technology that directly affect national security. But will Washington and Beijing go too far?




re

What Makes for a Moral Foreign Policy?

Joseph Nye's new book rates the efforts of presidents from FDR to Trump.




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The Need for Creative and Effective Nuclear Security Vulnerability Assessment and Testing

Realistic, creative vulnerability assessment and testing are critical to finding and fixing nuclear security weaknesses and avoiding over-confidence. Both vulnerability assessment and realistic testing are needed to ensure that nuclear security systems are providing the level of protection required. Systems must be challenged by experts thinking like adversaries, trying to find ways to overcome them. Effective vulnerability assessment and realistic testing are more difficult in the case of insider threats, and special attention is needed. Organizations need to find ways to give people the mission and the incentives to find nuclear security weaknesses and suggest ways they might be fixed. With the right approaches and incentives in place, effective vulnerability assessment and testing can be a key part of achieving and sustaining high levels of nuclear security.




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The Risks and Rewards of Emerging Technology in Nuclear Security

Nuclear security is never finished. Nuclear security measures for protecting all nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and facilities whose sabotage could cause disastrous consequences should protect against the full range of plausible threats. It is an ongoing endeavor that requires constant assessment of physical protection operations and reevaluation of potential threats. One of the most challenging areas of nuclear security is how to account for the impact–positive and negative—of non-nuclear emerging technologies. The amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (amended CPPNM) states it should be reviewed in light of the prevailing situation, and a key part of the prevailing situation is technological evolution. Therefore, the upcoming review conference in 2021, as well as any future review conferences, should examine the security threats and benefits posed by emerging technologies.




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Assessing Progress on Nuclear Security Action Plans

Participants at the final Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 agreed on “action plans” for initiatives they would support by five international organizations and groups—the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, INTERPOL, the United Nations, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Destruction. These institutions were supposed to play key roles in bolstering ongoing nuclear security cooperation after the summit process ended. The action plans were modest documents, largely endorsing activities already underway, and there have been mixed results in implementing them. To date, these organizations have not filled any substantial part of the role once played by the nuclear security summits.




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Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




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How Do Past Presidents Rank in Foreign Policy?

How do presidents incorporate morality into decisions involving the national interest? Moral considerations explain why Truman, who authorized the use of nuclear weapons in Japan during World War II, later refused General MacArthur's request to use them in China during the Korean War. What is contextual intelligence, and how does it explain why Bush 41 is ranked first in foreign policy, but Bush 43 is found wanting? Is it possible for a president to lie in the service of the public interest? In this episode, Professor Joseph S. Nye considers these questions as he explores the role of morality in presidential decision-making from FDR to Trump.




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Secrecy, Public Relations and the British Nuclear Debate

The opening of the British archives has seen historians uncover the secrets of the UK's nuclear weapons programme since the 1990s. While a growing number have sought to expose these former secrets, there has been less effort to consider government secrecy itself. What was kept a secret, when and why? And how and why, notably from the 1980s, did the British government decide to officially disclose greater information about the British nuclear weapons programme to Members of Parliament, journalists, defence academics and the tax-paying general public. 




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Budapest Memorandum at 25: Between Past and Future

On December 5, 1994, leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation met in Budapest, Hungary, to pledge security assurances to Ukraine in connection with its accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapons state. The signature of the so-called Budapest Memorandum concluded arduous negotiations that resulted in Ukraine’s agreement to relinquish the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, which the country inherited from the collapsed Soviet Union, and transfer all nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement. The signatories of the memorandum pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders, and to refrain from the use or threat of military force. Russia breached these commitments with its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and aggression in eastern Ukraine, bringing the meaning and value of security assurance pledged in the Memorandum under renewed scrutiny.

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the memorandum’s signature, the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, with the support of the Center for U.S.-Ukrainian Relations and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, hosted a conference to revisit the history of the Budapest Memorandum, consider the repercussions of its violation for international security and the broader nonproliferation regime, and draw lessons for the future. The conference brought together academics, practitioners, and experts who have contributed to developing U.S. policy toward post-Soviet nuclear disarmament, participated in the negotiations of the Budapest Memorandum, and dealt with the repercussions of its breach in 2014. The conference highlighted five key lessons learned from the experience of Ukraine’s disarmament, highlighted at the conference.




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Public Testimony on Trump Administration Funding for Nuclear Theft Preventing Programs

A nuclear explosion detonated anywhere by a terrorist group would be a global humanitarian, economic, and political catastrophe. The current COVID-19 pandemic reminds us not to ignore prevention of and preparation for low-probability, high-consequence disasters. For nuclear terrorism, while preparation is important, prevention must be the top priority. The most effective strategy for keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists is to ensure that nuclear materials and facilities around the world have strong and sustainable security. Every president for more than two decades has made strengthening nuclear security around the globe a priority. This includes the Trump administration, whose 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states: “[n]uclear terrorism remains among the most significant threats to the security of the United States, allies, and partners.”




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So Do Morals Matter in U.S. Foreign Policy? I Asked the Expert.

In his new book, Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Joseph S. Nye developed a scorecard to determine how U.S. presidents since 1945 factored questions of ethics and morality into their foreign policy. In an interview, Henry Farrell asked him a few questions to get to the heart of his findings.




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Button considered 2016 Olympics entry

Jenson Button says he considered trying to compete for Great Britain at the 2016 Olympic Games in the triathlon




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Button: 'I haven't driven a McLaren like this before'

Jenson Button believes the McLaren MP4-30 has the basis to be the best McLaren he has driven since joining the team in 2010 but admits it will not get close to its full potential at this weekend's Australian Grand Prix




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McLaren needs a 'bucket load' of pace - Button

Jenson Button says McLaren needs a "bucket load" of both pace and reliability to get anywhere close to being competitive at the Australian Grand Prix this weekend




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Button: Back of the grid is no surprise for McLaren

Jenson Button says McLaren was braced for a spot on the back of the grid in Australia and does not think the race will be much easier




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McLaren-Honda working 'relentlessly' - Button

Jenson Button says McLaren and Honda are working flat-out to develop its package but are still bracing themselves for another difficult weekend in Malaysia




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Button: Nothing wrong with McLaren steering

Jenson Button is convinced there is nothing wrong with the McLaren MP4-30, despite team-mate Fernando Alonso's latest suggestion that a steering problem caused him to crash in pre-season testing




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McLaren getting more from Honda PU - Button

Jenson Button was in an optimistic mood following Friday practice in Malaysia after seeing McLaren make a step forward from its dismal Australian Grand Prix pace




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MP4-30 has more downforce than cars in front - Button

Jenson Button is confident his McLaren-Honda has more downforce than the cars in front of him on the grid in Malaysia and is hoping to exploit it at future races when the Honda power unit is closer to its full potential




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Button: We're catching midfield teams

Jenson Button says McLaren should be encouraged by its race pace compared to the midfield despite a double DNF in Malaysia




re

Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy?

Stephen Walt writes that the United States' unusual historical experience, geographic isolation, large domestic market, and general ignorance have weakened its ability to make viable foreign-policy strategies.




re

The U.S.-China Relationship is at a Crossroads

Joseph Nye writes that some decoupling of interdependence is likely, particularly in areas related to technology that directly affect national security. But will Washington and Beijing go too far?




re

What Makes for a Moral Foreign Policy?

Joseph Nye's new book rates the efforts of presidents from FDR to Trump.




re

The Need for Creative and Effective Nuclear Security Vulnerability Assessment and Testing

Realistic, creative vulnerability assessment and testing are critical to finding and fixing nuclear security weaknesses and avoiding over-confidence. Both vulnerability assessment and realistic testing are needed to ensure that nuclear security systems are providing the level of protection required. Systems must be challenged by experts thinking like adversaries, trying to find ways to overcome them. Effective vulnerability assessment and realistic testing are more difficult in the case of insider threats, and special attention is needed. Organizations need to find ways to give people the mission and the incentives to find nuclear security weaknesses and suggest ways they might be fixed. With the right approaches and incentives in place, effective vulnerability assessment and testing can be a key part of achieving and sustaining high levels of nuclear security.




re

The Risks and Rewards of Emerging Technology in Nuclear Security

Nuclear security is never finished. Nuclear security measures for protecting all nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and facilities whose sabotage could cause disastrous consequences should protect against the full range of plausible threats. It is an ongoing endeavor that requires constant assessment of physical protection operations and reevaluation of potential threats. One of the most challenging areas of nuclear security is how to account for the impact–positive and negative—of non-nuclear emerging technologies. The amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (amended CPPNM) states it should be reviewed in light of the prevailing situation, and a key part of the prevailing situation is technological evolution. Therefore, the upcoming review conference in 2021, as well as any future review conferences, should examine the security threats and benefits posed by emerging technologies.




re

Assessing Progress on Nuclear Security Action Plans

Participants at the final Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 agreed on “action plans” for initiatives they would support by five international organizations and groups—the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, INTERPOL, the United Nations, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Destruction. These institutions were supposed to play key roles in bolstering ongoing nuclear security cooperation after the summit process ended. The action plans were modest documents, largely endorsing activities already underway, and there have been mixed results in implementing them. To date, these organizations have not filled any substantial part of the role once played by the nuclear security summits.




re

Arms Control Agreement With Russia Should Cover More Than Nuclear Weapons

With the Russia investigation and impeachment behind him, President Trump finally may feel empowered to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin and pursue an arms control deal.  




re

How Do Past Presidents Rank in Foreign Policy?

How do presidents incorporate morality into decisions involving the national interest? Moral considerations explain why Truman, who authorized the use of nuclear weapons in Japan during World War II, later refused General MacArthur's request to use them in China during the Korean War. What is contextual intelligence, and how does it explain why Bush 41 is ranked first in foreign policy, but Bush 43 is found wanting? Is it possible for a president to lie in the service of the public interest? In this episode, Professor Joseph S. Nye considers these questions as he explores the role of morality in presidential decision-making from FDR to Trump.




re

Secrecy, Public Relations and the British Nuclear Debate

The opening of the British archives has seen historians uncover the secrets of the UK's nuclear weapons programme since the 1990s. While a growing number have sought to expose these former secrets, there has been less effort to consider government secrecy itself. What was kept a secret, when and why? And how and why, notably from the 1980s, did the British government decide to officially disclose greater information about the British nuclear weapons programme to Members of Parliament, journalists, defence academics and the tax-paying general public.