Lynn Neary: I'm Lynn Neary in Washington, sitting in for Neal Conan.

John Kerry may not have clinched the Democratic nomination for president in yesterday's primaries and caucuses, but his victories in five of the seven races certainly completed his rehabilitation from an also-ran to a front-runner. John Edwards and Wesley Clark also won last night, Edwards in South Carolina, Clark in a tight race in Oklahoma, where Edwards came in second. Joe Lieberman dropped out of the race altogether. Howard Dean vowed to fight on despite a dismal showing. So did Al Sharpton, who placed third in South Carolina. Dennis Kucinich barely registered with voters. All the candidates now have their eyes on the future with contests in delegate-heavy states now up for grabs.

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Lynn Neary:...With us to talk about money in politics is Anthony Corrado. He's a professor of government at Colby College in Waterville, Maine, and is spending this year as a visiting fellow at The Brookings Institution here in Washington.

Thanks for being with us.

Anthony Corrado: Well, thanks for inviting me, Lynn.

Lynn Neary: Do we know exactly how much money's been spent so far by the candidates?

Anthony Corrado: Well, so far the Democrats have raised about $170 million in private donations and public funding all together, and all of that money's now been spent. This very competitive contest has proved to be very expensive so that as we enter this crucial part of the nominating process, no candidate really has a large reservoir of cash that's available to be spent.

Lynn Neary: Yeah. Both Dean and Kerry used the same strategy, focusing on Iowa and New Hampshire, but came up with very different results, didn't they?

Anthony Corrado: Yes, they did, and it was particularly problematic for Howard Dean because what Dean decided to do was use the large store of cash that he had raised in 2003 to spend lots of money in the states that would be voting in February, as well as in Iowa and New Hampshire, and as a result spent over $3 1/3 million on television in states that were voting after New Hampshire. Whereas John Kerry basically took all of the money he had and put it into Iowa and New Hampshire and was able to get the victories he needed to spur additional fund-raising so that he right now is in the best position even though he ended up raising much less than Howard Dean prior to New Hampshire. He's now in the best position to raise and spend money in this next stage of the race.

Lynn Neary: Yeah. And what about Dean? Has he been able to--he was so well-known for his fund-raising. How has his fund-raising been since he has started losing?

Anthony Corrado: Well, his fund-raising has actually held up very well. He's raising about a million dollars a week. He's raised about $3 million since that now-infamous night in Iowa. But one of the problems that he has is that he built such a large organization that it's very expensive to maintain. And as a result he has not had money for television advertising this week. He's not doing any television advertising in the states this weekend. And he probably won't do any television advertising in Tennessee and Virginia. So he's basically gone off of the airwaves in terms of paid television, with the exception of looking towards Wisconsin, which isn't until February 17th.

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The debate surrounding net energy metering (NEM) and the appropriate way to reform this policy is under scrutiny in many U.S. states. This is highly warranted since NEM policies do indeed need reforming because NEM often results in subsidies to private (rooftop) solar owners and leasing companies. These subsidies are then “paid for” by non-NEM customers (customers without private rooftop solar installations). The fundamental source of the NEM subsidy is the failure of NEM customers (customers with private rooftop solar installations) to pay fully for the grid services that they use 24/7. These subsidies are well-documented and underpin much of the regulatory reform efforts underway across the United States.[1]

In a recent Brookings paper, “Rooftop solar: Net metering is a net benefit,” Mark Muro and Devashree Saha contend that net metering is a net benefit for non-NEM customers.[2] I fundamentally disagree with their findings, and argue that NEM is not a net benefit; it is, in fact, a tariff that much of the time results in a subsidy to NEM customers and a cost shift onto non-NEM customers. As Executive Director of the Institute for Electric Innovation, a non-lobbying organization focused on trends in the electric power industry, I have followed this debate and written about it for several years.

Much of the talk about NEM focuses too often on the “value” of the energy that is sold back to the grid by a NEM customer. In reality, the amount of energy sold back to the grid is relatively small. The real issue is the failure of NEM customers to pay fully for the grid services that they use while connected to the grid 24/7, as shown in Figure 1.[3] Customers need to constantly use the grid to balance supply and demand throughout the day, and the cost of these grid services can be sizeable. In fact, for a typical residential customer in the United States with an average electricity bill of $110 per month, the actual cost of grid services can range from $45 to $70 per month–however, the customer doesn’t see that charge.[4] That means, in the extreme, if a customer’s energy use “nets” to zero in a given month because the customer’s private solar system produced exactly what the customer consumed, that customer would pay $0 even though that customer is connected to the local electric company’s distribution grid and is utilizing grid services on a continuous around-the-clock basis.[5]

Although exactly netting to zero energy in a month is highly unlikely, this example demonstrates the point that the customer would pay nothing, despite using grid services at a cost ranging from $45 to $70 per month. Over the course of one year, this customer could receive a subsidy resulting from NEM of between $540 and $840. Over the life of a private rooftop solar system, which ranges from 20 to 25 years, this is a significant subsidy resulting from NEM.

Granted, this is an extreme example, and most NEM customers will pay for some portion of grid services. However, the fundamental source of the NEM subsidy is the failure of NEM customers to pay fully for the grid services that they use 24/7, and the cost of these services can be quite substantial. When a NEM customer doesn’t pay for the grid, the cost is shifted onto non-NEM customers.[6] It is a zero-sum game; plain and simple. This is the elephant in the room.

This issue was directly addressed by Austin Energy when the company implemented a “buy-sell” arrangement for the private rooftop solar customers in its service territory. The rationale for the buy-sell approach is that the customer buys all of the energy that is consumed on-site through the electric company’s retail tariff and sells all of the energy produced by their private rooftop solar system at the electric company’s avoided cost. This addresses the “elephant in the room” because, by buying all energy consumed at the retail tariff, the customer does pay for grid services that are largely captured through the retail tariff. It is an unfortunate fact that under ratemaking practices today in the United States, the majority of fixed costs (i.e., grid and other costs) are captured through a volumetric charge.

Hence, I fundamentally disagree with the Muro/Saha paper–NEM does need to be reformed. NEM is not a net benefit; it is a tariff that the much of the time results in a cost shift onto non-NEM customers. One of the first studies to quantify the magnitude of the NEM subsidy was conducted by Energy+Environmental Economics (E3) for the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) in 2013. There was no mention of this analysis for the CPUC in the Muro/Saha paper. The E3 study estimated that NEM would result in a cost shift of $1.1 billion annually by 2020 from NEM to non-NEM customers if current NEM policies were not reformed in California.[7] A cost shift of this magnitude–paid for by non-NEM customers–was unacceptable to California regulators. As a result, California regulators set to work to reform rates in their state; many other states followed suit and conducted similar investigations of the magnitude of the NEM subsidy.

In reviewing NEM studies, Muro and Saha chose to focus on a handful of studies that show that net metering results in a benefit to all customers. In this small group of NEM studies, they included a study that E3 conducted for the Nevada Public Utilities Commission (PUC) in 2014–perhaps the most well-known and cited of the five studies included in the Muro/Saha paper. Very soon after the E3 Nevada study was published, the cost assumptions for the base-case scenario which showed a net benefit of $36 million to non-NEM customers (assuming $100 per MWh for utility-scale solar) were found to be incorrect, completely reversing the conclusion. The $36 million benefit associated with NEM for private rooftop solar turned into a $222 million cost to non-NEM customers when utility-scale solar was priced at $80 per MWh.[8] Today, based on the two most recent utility-scale contracts approved by the Nevada PUC, utility-scale solar has an average lifetime (i.e., levelized) cost of $50 per MWh, meaning that the NEM cost shift would be far greater today. In February 2016, the Nevada PUC stated that “the E3 study is already outdated and irrelevant to the discussion of costs and benefits of NEM in Nevada…”[9] Hence, because the E3 study for the Nevada PUC that the Muro/Saha paper included has been declared outdated and irrelevant to the discussion and because costs for utility-scale solar have declined significantly, that study does not show that NEM provides a net benefit.

No doubt there is an intense debate underway about NEM for private rooftop solar, and much has changed in the past two years in terms of both NEM policies and the growth of private solar projects:

• First, several state regulatory commissions now recognize that the NEM cost shift is both real and sizeable and that all customers who use the grid, including NEM customers, need to pay for the cost of the grid. As a result, many electric companies have proposed and state regulatory commissions have approved increases in monthly fixed charges over the past few years; this partially addresses the issue of NEM customers paying for the cost of the grid services that they use.
• Second and related, getting the pricing right for distributed energy resources of all types is important because we expect those resources to grow significantly in the future. Work is underway in this area and it is one focus of the New York Reforming the Energy Vision proceeding; but there is still much to be done.

By focusing on a select group of studies that show that NEM benefits all customers (as stated by the authors); by excluding the E3 study for the CPUC which was fundamental to the NEM cost shift debate; and by not providing an update on the NEM debate today, I believe that the Muro/Saha paper is misleading.

In the second part of their paper, Muro and Saha suggest some helpful regulatory reforms such as moving toward rate designs that “can meet the needs of a distributed resource future” and moving “toward performance-based rate-making (PBR).” Some electric companies have already implemented PBR or some type of formula rate and PBR is under discussion in several states.[10] Lawrence Berkeley National Labs is looking closely at this and related issues in its Future Electric Utility Regulation series of reports currently underway.[11]

Mura and Saha also suggest decoupling as a way forward–I disagree. In my view, decoupling is a not solution for private rooftop solar. Revenue decoupling is currently used to true-up revenues that would otherwise be lost due to declining electricity sales resulting from electric company investments in energy efficiency (EE). Decoupling explicitly shifts costs from participating EE customers to non-participating EE customers causing the same cost-shifting problem that is created by NEM. However, a fundamental difference is that the magnitude of the cost shifting onto non-NEM customers is on a much larger scale than the cost shifting due to EE. A recent study revealed that decoupling rate adjustments for EE are quite small–about two to three percent of the retail rate.^[12] In contrast, as described earlier in this paper, a NEM customer could shift a significant cost onto non-NEM customers (and the NEM cost shifting is essentially invisible to customers, which is one reason that NEM customers do not believe they are subsidized).[13]

Finally, Muro and Saha suggest that electric companies should invest in a more digital and distributed power grid. In fact, electric companies across the United States are doing just that. In 2015, electric companies invested $20 billion in the distribution system alone and this is expected to continue. Over the past five to six years, electric companies invested in the deployment of nearly 65 million digital smart meters to about 50 percent of U.S. households. In addition, electric companies are investing in thousands of devices to make the power grid smarter and more state-aware. Today, in states such as California, Hawaii, and Arizona, electric companies are investing to enable and integrate the distributed energy resources that are growing exponentially. And, in some states–where regulation allows–electric companies are offering rooftop solar or solar subscriptions to their customers.

No doubt, the electric power industry is undergoing a period of profound transformation–our power generation resource mix is getting cleaner and more distributed; the energy grid is becoming more digital; and customers have different expectations.[14]

Collaboration, good public policy, and appropriate regulatory policies are critical to a successful transformation of the power sector. In the context of this paper, this means reforming NEM so that private rooftop solar customers who use the energy grid pay for the grid. One straightforward approach is to require NEM customers to pay a higher monthly fixed charge thereby reducing the cost shift.[15] Ultimately the challenge is to make the transition of the electric power industry–including the significant growth in private rooftop solar and other distributed energy resources–affordable to all customers.

Lisa Wood is a nonresident senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Initiative at Brookings. She is also the executive director of the Institute for Electric Innovation and vice president of The Edison Foundation whose members include electric companies and technology companies.

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently released more detailed ACO-level data for participants in first two years of the Pioneer ACO Model. The program, which is designed for health systems with more experience assuming financial risk for patient populations, has generated savings and improvements in quality measures, but has also struggled to retain participants. The program began with 32 provider organizations; following a series of recent announcements there are now 19 total participants.

Last month, CMS announced that the Pioneer Program was able to yield total program savings of $96 million in its second year and resulted in ACOs sharing in savings of $68 million. CMS also reported that the Pioneers were able to improve mean quality scores by 19 percent and increased performance on 28 of 33 measures between performance year one and performance year two.

Financial Results

The latest financial results provide more participant-level data and allow for a new level of analysis of performance across all these ACOs. In year one of the program, financial performance for individual Pioneers ranged from a gross loss of $9.31 million to a gross savings of $23.34 million. Thirteen Pioneers reduced costs enough to qualify for shared savings, with an average of $5.85 million returned to the ACOs, ranging from $1.00 million to $14.00 million. One ACO owed shared losses of $2.55 million. The remaining eighteen ACOs were within the minimum savings or loss rate and did not earn shared savings or owe money to Medicare due to losses.

Following year one, nine Pioneer ACOs either left the Medicare ACO program entirely, or moved to the lower risk Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Eight of the nine Pioneers that left the program failed to reduce spending in their first year. Out of the remaining 23 participants in the second performance year, three of these ACOs opted to defer reconciliation until the end of Performance Year 3. The 20 Pioneers with final Performance Year 2 data had financial performance ranging from a gross savings of $24.59 million to gross losses of $6.26 million. Fourteen ACOs reduced spending in Performance Year 2, eleven of which reduced enough to qualify for shared savings. The average shared savings for these ACOs was $6.55 million, ranging from $1.22 million to $13.41 million. Three Pioneers shared losses, averaging $2.33 million back to the Medicare program.

The table below shows the breakdown of ACOs according to whether they reduced spending, increased spending, shared in savings, or owed money back to Medicare due to losses. More than half of the Pioneers were able to reduce spending in year one (18/32) and year two (14/23), with more than one-third of total ACOs earning shared savings in each year as well.

The data also suggest that those ACOs that were most successful in reducing spending in the first year were also more likely to reduce spending in their second year. As the chart below shows, three ACOs that earned shared savings in year one owed money back to Medicare due to losses in year two, while no ACO that had shared losses in year one was able to attain shared savings in year two.  

Quality Results

CMS also released ACO-level performance on all 33 measures for Pioneer participants in year one and year two. The 23 ACOs that remain in the Pioneer Program showed overall improvement in average quality scores from the first to second performance year. The ACOs also improved overall on 28 of 33 measures, as the chart below shows.

The quality domain with the greatest improvement in year two was Domain 4 (At Risk-Populations) which saw an overall improvement from 67.5% to 83%. The marked improvement in this domain suggests that ACOs are making progress at better coordinating and delivery care for high-risk patients, many of whom have multiple chronic conditions. Chronic care management for conditions such as diabetes, coronary artery disease, and hypertension is critical for the continued success of accountable care efforts. All other domains saw average quality improvement as well, summarized below.

Likewise, almost all of the individual Pioneer ACOs improved their performance on quality measures from year one to year two. Of the ACOs that remained in the program for year two, all but one ACO was able to improve its overall quality score in its second year.

Additionally, the percentage of Pioneer ACOs performing in the 80^th or 90^th percentile in quality scores also increased from year one to year two, as shown in the chart below.

Putting Together Financial and Quality Results

In year one of the Pioneer Program there appeared to be no direct correlation between average quality scores and gross savings or losses for individual ACOs. This may not be unexpected, especially since Pioneer ACOs in their first year are eligible for shared savings simply by reporting their quality. In subsequent years, however, the ACO’s quality score impacts the level of shared savings that the Pioneers are eligible to receive, so we might expect a bit more alignment between quality and financial performance. Average quality scores and level of savings or losses for each of the 32 first year Pioneer ACOs is below.

After year two, there still does not appear to be a direct relationship between higher quality scores and level of savings or losses in the Pioneer Program. Further examination of results begs additional questions about why certain ACOs clustered in different parts of the grid relative to others.

Of those ACOs in the red circle above— higher total savings and relatively average quality scores—two of the ACOs are from the Boston area and the remaining ones from other large metropolitan areas (New York City; Orange County, CA; Phoenix, AZ; and Detroit, MI). The average per capita Medicare spending for the counties corresponding to these ACOs is $11,544, compared to an average of $10,384 for counties corresponding to all 23 of the Pioneer participants.

Meanwhile those ACOs within the yellow circle had the highest quality scores, but also experience financial losses or slight savings. Many of these ACOs are from less densely populated areas, such as Maine, Wisconsin, and Illinois. There are a number of factors that could be contributing to their quality success, but little financial savings—healthier patient populations, a smaller or more engaged patient population, financial baselines impacted by lower per capita spending in these areas, or other factors driven by their region. Further analysis of these ACOs and the other public and private ACO programs, including both their characteristics and regional market characteristics, will provide needed further insights on the factors most likely to drive success.

Next Steps

These ACO-level data reflect the range of experiences across Pioneer participants. Some ACOs have sustained positive performance to date, while others have seen diminishing rates of return. Those organizations more committed to clinical transformation, patient outreach, and organizational change may be more likely to do better, but further analysis of differences in performance could enable the Pioneer Program and ACOs to achieve bigger impacts over time.

It is hard to know what the third performance year of the Pioneer program will show, but as noted earlier, the Pioneer Program has already lost over a third of its original 32 participants. Despite the decline in participation and mixed results so far, CMS remains optimistic and committed to the program, and the overall number of Medicare, Medicaid, and privately-insured individuals in ACO arrangements continues to rise. We can anticipate a proposed rule impacting the MSSP, likely later this Fall, which will impact elements of the Pioneer ACO program. Regulatory changes that may help increase the ability of the Medicare ACO programs to support better care while ensuring sustainability include: adjustments to attribution methods, benchmark calculations, collection and sharing of data with ACOs, updating performance measures, linking to other ongoing payment and delivery reforms, and creating more financial sustainability for program participants. The current Pioneer program can be a key step toward effective payment reform, but further steps are needed to assure long-term success.

Editor’s Note: This blog post is one in a series of posts in which guest bloggers respond to the Brookings paper, “The potential and limitations of impact bonds: Lessons from the first five years of experience worldwide."

In 2014, clause 5 (1) of the County Early Childhood Education Bill 2014 declared free and compulsory early childhood education a right for all children in Kenya. Early childhood education (ECE) in Kenya has historically been located outside of the realm of government and placed under the purview of the community, religious institutions, and the private sector. The disparate and unstructured nature of ECE in the country has led to a proliferation of unregistered informal schools particularly in underprivileged communities. Most of these schools still charge relatively high fees and ancillary costs yet largely offer poor quality of education. Children from these preschools have poor cognitive development and inadequate school readiness upon entry into primary school.

The Kenyan constitution places the responsibility and mandate of providing free, compulsory, and quality ECE on the county governments. It is an onerous challenge for these sub-national governments in taking on a large-scale critical function that has until now principally existed outside of government.

In Nairobi City County, out of over 250,000 ECE eligible children, only about 12,000 attend public preschools. Except for one or two notable public preschools, most have a poor reputation with parents. Due to limited access and demand for quality, the majority of Nairobi’s preschool eligible children are enrolled in private and informal schools. A recent study of the Mukuru slum of Nairobi shows that over 80 percent of 4- and 5-year-olds in this large slum area are enrolled in preschool, with 94 percent of them attending informal private schools.

In early 2015, the Governor of Nairobi City County, Dr. Evans Kidero, commissioned a taskforce to look into factors affecting access, equity, and quality of education in the county. The taskforce identified significant constraints including human capital and capacity gaps, material and infrastructure deficiencies, management and systemic inefficiencies that have led to a steady deterioration of education in the city to a point where the county consistently underperforms relative to other less resourced counties. 

Nairobi City County now faces the challenge of designing and implementing a scalable model that will ensure access to quality early childhood education for all eligible children in the city by 2030. The sub-national government’s resources and implementation capacity are woefully inadequate to attain universal access in the near term, nor by the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) deadline of 2030. However, there are potential opportunities to leverage emerging mechanisms for development financing to provide requisite resource additionality, private sector rigor, and performance management that will enable Nairobi to significantly advance the objective of ensuring ECE is available to all children in the county.

Social impact bonds (SIBs) are one form of innovative financing mechanism that have been used in developed countries to tap external resources to facilitate early childhood initiatives. This mechanism seeks to harness private finance to enable and support the implementation of social services. Government repays the investor contingent on the attainment of targeted outcomes. Where a donor agency is the outcomes funder instead of government, the mechanism is referred to as a development impact bond (DIB).

The recent Brookings study highlights some of the potential and limitations of impact bonds by researching in-depth the 38 impact bonds that had been contracted globally as of March, 2015. On the upside, the study shows that impact bonds have been successful in achieving a shift of government and service providers to outcomes. In addition, impact bonds have been able to foster collaboration among stakeholders including across levels of government, government agencies, and between the public and private sector. Another strength of impact bonds is their ability to build systems of monitoring and evaluation and establish processes of adaptive learning, both critical to achieving desirable ECD outcomes. On the downside, the report highlights some particular challenges and limitations of the impact bonds to date. These include the cost and complexity of putting the deals together, the need for appropriate legal and political environments and impact bonds’ inability thus far to demonstrate a large dent in the ever present challenge of achieving scale.

In the Kenyan context, especially at the sub-national level, there are two key challenges in implementing impact bonds.

To begin with, in the Kenyan context, the use of a SIB would invoke public-private partnership legislation, which prescribes highly stringent measures and extensive pre-qualification processes that are administered by the National Treasury and not at the county level. The complexity arises from the fact that SIBs constitute an inherent contingent liability to government as they expose it to fiscal risk resulting from a potential future public payment obligation to the private party in the project.

Another key challenge in a SIB is the fact that Government must pay for outcomes achieved and for often significant transaction costs, yet the SIB does not explicitly encompass financial additionality. Since government pays for outcomes in the end, the transaction costs and obligation to pay for outcomes could reduce interest from key decision-makers in government.

The above challenges notwithstanding, a combined approach of results-based financing and impact investing has high potential to mobilize both requisite resources and efficient capacity to deliver quality ECE in Nairobi City County. To establish an enabling foundation for the future inclusion of impact investing whilst beginning to address the immediate ECE challenge, Nairobi City County has designed and is in the process of rolling out a modified DIB. In this model, a pool of donor funds for education will be leveraged through the new Nairobi City County Education Trust (NCCET).

The model seeks to apply the basic principles of results-based financing, but in a structure adjusted to address aforementioned constraints. Whereas in the classical SIB and DIB mechanisms investors provide upfront capital and government and donors respectively repay the investment with a return for attained outcomes, the modified structure will incorporate only grant funding with no possibility for return of principal. Private service providers will be engaged to operate ECE centers, financed by the donor-funded NCCET. The operators will receive pre-set funding from the NCCET, but the county government will progressively absorb their costs as they achieve targeted outcomes, including salaries for top-performing teachers. As a result, high-performing providers will be able to make a small profit. The system is designed to incentivize teachers and progressively provide greater income for effective school operators, while enabling an ordered handover of funding responsibilities to government, thus providing for program sustainability.

Nairobi City County plans to build 97 new ECE centers, all of which are to be located in the slum areas. NCCET will complement this undertaking by structuring and implementing the new funding model to operationalize the schools. The structure aims to coordinate the actors involved in the program—donors, service providers, evaluators—whilst sensitizing and preparing government to engage the private sector in the provision of social services and the payment of outcomes thereof.

Event Information

On July 5, the Center for Universal Education at Brookings and the partners of the world’s first development impact bond for education held an online a discussion of the first year’s enrollment and learning results. The impact bond provides financing for Educate Girls, a non-profit that aims to increase enrollment for out-of-school girls and improve learning outcomes for girls and boys in Rajasthan, India. The UBS Optimus Foundation has provided upfront risk capital to Educate Girls and, contingent on program targets being met, will be paid back their principal plus a return by the Children's Investment Fund Foundation. Instiglio, a non-profit organization specializing in results-based financing mechanisms, serves as the program intermediary.

The webinar explored the experiences so far, the factors affecting the initial results, the key learnings, and ways these will inform the development of the programs it moves forward. The partners shared both positive and negative learnings to start a transparent discussion of the model and where, and how, it can be most effective.

Chaired by Emily Gustafsson-Wright, a fellow at the Center for Universal Education, the discussion featured Safeena Husain of Educate Girls, Phyllis Costanza of UBS Optimus Foundation, and Avnish Gungadurdoss of Instiglio. For further background on impact bonds as a financing mechanism for education and early childhood development in low- and middle-income countries, please see the Center for Universal Education’s report.

Further information on the outcome metrics and evaluation design in the Educate Girls Development Impact Bond » (PDF)

Watch a recording of the webinar via WebEx »

This weekend’s election results in Turkey were a surprise to the vast majority of Turkish pollsters and pundits, myself included. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) won nearly 50 percent of the popular vote. The party can now form a single-party government, even if it doesn’t have the supermajority necessary to remake the Turkish constitution. What happened?

As with much in life, the result does make sense in hindsight. Prior to the June 7 election, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP leadership had supported a Kurdish peace process, in part in the hope of gaining Kurdish votes. In that election, however, not only did the AKP fail to win new Kurdish votes, but support for the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)—a far-right Turkish nationalist party—swelled, apparently out of frustration among nationalist Turks with the AKP-led peace process with the Kurds. In other words, the AKP had the worst of both worlds.

Erdoğan and the AKP leadership, recognizing the political problem this posed for them, allowed the peace process to collapse amid mounting instability driven by the Syrian civil war. This, combined with disillusionment with the MHP leadership due to their perceived unwillingness to form a coalition government, drove about two million MHP voters to the AKP this weekend. The exodus shows, in a sense, what close substitutes the two parties can be among a more nationalist voting bloc.

The controlled chaos that resulted from the collapse of the peace process—combined with the escalating refugee crisis, the fear of ISIS attacks, and the struggling economy—helped the government politically. Voters evidently recalled that it had been the AKP that brought the country out of the very tough times of the 1990s.  

In contrast, the opposition parties seem to lack leadership and appear to promise only internal squabbles and indecisiveness. Craving security and stability, voters have now turned to the one party that appears to have the strength to provide it. In that sense, Erdoğan’s nationalist gambit—which was actually a well-conceived series of political maneuvers—worked. Even some one million conservative Kurdish voters returned to the AKP.

These voters perhaps did not notice the irony that the government had also engineered the instability they feared. In part, this success derives from government’s control over the media. These elections may have been free, in the sense that Turkish voters can cast a ballot for the candidates they want. But they were not fair. The state maintained tight control over traditional and social media alike. Freedom House and the Committee to Protect Journalists, among others, have cast doubt on Turkey’s press freedom credentials. Real opposition voices are difficult for media publish or voters to see on television. Thus, for example, Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and the most charismatic opposition politician in Turkey, had essentially no air time during the campaign.

There are some important upsides to the election results. For one, HDP again passed the 10 percent threshold to remain in parliament. That will help mitigate—though hardly erase—the polarization that grips the country, and will hopefully make government reconsider its abandonment of the Kurdish peace process.

More significantly, the AKP does not have what it needs to convert Turkey’s government structure into a presidential system, which would be a bad move for the country. The election results will undoubtedly revitalize Erdoğan’s push for a presidential regime in Turkey. But that requires changing the constitution, and the AKP did not achieve the supermajority that it would need to do that on its own.

Critically, changing to a presidential system will require some support from the opposition and even more importantly popular support via a referendum. As political strategists around the world have learned, people tend not to vote on the actual referendum item, per se, but based on more general opinions of their leadership. So to win a referendum on the presidential system, Erdoğan and his AKP colleagues would need to show improvements in the economy, in the security situation, on the Kurdish issue, on Syrian refugees, and on national stability more generally. Instability in Turkey, particularly the renewal of violence in the Kurdish region, will deter investment and deepen the economic slump throughout the country.

With its new majority, AKP leaders are now in a position of strength to negotiate with the HDP over Kurdish issues. The refugee crisis also means the government also has more leverage with the EU. If it chooses to use its strength to reach positive agreements on those fronts, the outcomes could be very good for the Turkish people.

To actually win a referendum on the presidential system, Erdoğan would have to work to depolarize his country. While the presidential system itself would not be good for Turkey, the process of getting there might be.