The entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on 30 May, after only three years of negotiations, is an economic, political and diplomatic milestone for the African Union (AU) and its member states, crucial for economic growth, job creation, and making Africa a meaningful player in international trade. But the continent will have to work together to ensure that the potential benefits are fully realized.

A necessary innovation

With its advances in maintaining peace and security, abundant natural resources, high growth rates, improved linkages to global supply chains and a youthful population, Africa is emerging as a new global centre of economic growth, increasingly sought after as a partner by the world’s biggest economies. Governments from across Africa have been taking a more assertive role in international markets, including through proactive diversification of trading partners, and the continent remains a strong advocate for the multilateral trading system.

However, this is not yet reflected in outcomes. The African Union does not have observer status at the World Trade Organization, despite diplomatic efforts in the past decade. Africa has less than a three per cent share of global trade, and the growing trend towards protectionism across the global economy may only increase the vulnerability of a disunited Africa. Its fractured internal market means that trade within Africa is lower than for any other region on the globe, with intra-African trade just 18 per cent of overall exports, as compared to 70 per cent in Europe.

The AfCFTA is the continent’s tool to address the disparity between Africa’s growing economic significance and its peripheral place in the global trade system, to build a bridge between present fragmentation and future prosperity. It is an ambitious, comprehensive agreement covering trade in goods, services, investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy. It has been signed by all of Africa’s states with the exception of Eritrea.

It is the AU's Agenda 2063 flagship project, brought about by the decisions taken at the January 2012 African Union Summit to boost intra-African trade and to fast track the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area. It builds upon ambitions enshrined in successive agreements including the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty. Access to new regional markets and reduced non-tariff barriers are intended to help companies scale up, driving job creation and poverty reduction, as well as attracting inward investment to even Africa’s smaller economies.

The signing in 2018 of the instruments governing the Single Air Transport Market and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment provided another step towards the gradual elimination of barriers to the movement of goods, services and people within the continent.

Tests to come

However, while progress is being made towards the ratification of the AfCFTA, much remains to be done before African countries can fully trade under its terms. The framework for implementation is still under development, and the creation of enabling infrastructure that is critical for connectivity will take time to develop and requires extensive investment.

So, the first test for the AfCFTA will be the level to which Africa’s leaders make it a domestic priority, and whether a consensus can be maintained across the AU’s member states as the costs of implementation become clear.

There is no guarantee that the gains of free trade will be evenly distributed. They will mainly depend on the extent to which countries embrace industrialization, liberalization of their markets and opening of their borders for free movement of goods and people – policies that some incumbent leaders may be reluctant to implement. Political will to maintain a unified negotiating position with diverse stakeholders, including the private sector, will come under increasing stress.  

A second challenge is how the AfCFTA relates to already existing trade arrangements, notably with the EU.  The AU has long preferred to pursue a continent-to-continent trading arrangement instead of the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements being sought by the EU under the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) framework to which, with the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa, all African states belong. The signing of the AfCFTA is one important step towards making this possible.

But there are currently negotiations under the ACP to replace the Cotonou Accord (the framework governing trade between ACP members and the EU, including Economic Partnership Agreements [EPAs], that is due to expire in 2020). Negotiations on the African pillar of the accord are due to take place after the AfCFTA has entered into force. So African states and the AU will face the challenge of balancing their commitment to the ACP bloc with pursuing their own interests.

And though the AfCFTA should supersede any other agreements, the EPAs or their successors, will continue to govern day-to-day trading, in parallel to the new pan-African market. It is not yet clear how these contradictions will be reconciled.

A new role for the AU?

The AU will need to play an active role as the main interlocutor with Africa´s international trading partners, with the AfCFTA secretariat being the arbiter of internal tensions and trade disputes. The AU´s engagement at continental level has to date revolved mainly around headline political diplomacy, security and peacekeeping. With the continental free market becoming a reality, an effective pivot to economic diplomacy will be critical for growth and development.

With the AfCFTA, the AU has endeavoured to address Africa’s unsustainable position in global trade, to stimulate growth, economic diversification and jobs for its growing population. Much will depend on the commitment of African leaders to maintaining a unified negotiating position to implement the agreement and the AU’s capacity to effectively move from political to economic diplomacy.

Africa’s dinosaur leaders are members of an increasingly small and unstable club. Popular protests last year forced Algeria’s president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, out of office after almost 20 years in power, as well as Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, who ruled for 30 years. In 2017, Robert Mugabe was deposed in a military coup (although this was denied) after 40 years. 
And in 2011, mass protests led to the downfall of Tunisia’s president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, after he had been in power for 23 years.

Somewhat smoother are the political transitions in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). José Eduardo dos Santos, after almost 38 years in power, stepped down from office in 2017 as his term ended. So did his younger neighbour, Joseph Kabila, in January 2019, after 18 years in the presidency.

What the six former leaders had in common was that they wanted to remain heads of state and considered succession planning or stepping down only as a last resort. This year will be crucial for the six countries in political transition particularly as the reform-window period is short.

From A to Z 

Algeria: Tens of thousands of protesters have rallied in the capital Algiers and other cities against the December 2019 elections, rejecting what they see as sham transitional politics. A soft landing for Algeria in 2020 is unlikely, and what happens in the year has significant regional implications.

Angola: A transition is under way, led by President João Lourenço. This shift is smoother than many others, but 2020 will be the watershed year. The country has been in economic recession for four years but is predicted to see gross domestic product growth in 2020. Investment and job creation will determine the pace of change. The honeymoon period has ended and there are signs of increasing frustration among the urban youth and the middle class.

DRC: Despite his constitutionally mandated term expiring in December 2016, Joseph Kabila continued his presidency by continuously postponing elections until 30 December 2018. This election saw a three-way contest between the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDSP), the Engagement for Citizenship and Development party and the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD). Fèlix Tshisekedi of the UDSP was declared the winner by the Independent National Electoral Commission on January 10 last year with 38.6% votes. He was followed by Martin Fayulu of the Engagement for Citizenship and Development party, with 34.8%. He denounced the election results. In third place was Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, of the PPRD, a key ally of Kabila.

Although this was the first peaceful transition of power in DRC, there were widespread electoral inconsistencies and some observers believed that Fayulu was the legitimate winner. In 2020 it will become clearer whether a genuine transition from Kabila’s influence is taking place.

Sudan: More promising than the DRC or Algeria, a 39-month transitional administration led by a technocratic prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, has been established and enjoys domestic and international goodwill. This honeymoon is likely to be short, and the transitional administration needs to show results. The United States can help by removing Sudan from its terror list, thereby lifting the de facto ban on Sudan’s access to the dollar-based international financial system.

Tunisia: A low-profile, conservative law professor beat a charismatic media magnate released from prison in the presidential election runoff in October 2019. Kais Saied won 70% of the vote and his victory and the putting together of a new governing coalition is another step forward in an open-ended democratic transition that started in 2011 after Ben Ali fell.

Zimbabwe: This is a deeply troubled transition with an acute foreign exchange liquidity crisis, a deteriorating economy, hyperinflation and underperforming government. The state’s clinics and hospitals are closed or turn away patients as medical supplies run out and the doctors’ strike over decimated wages continues. There are power outages and almost half of the people face hunger and starvation as a result of drought and the economic crisis.

Zimbabwe’s 2020 looks bleak, a far cry from the euphoria of two years ago when a “military assisted transition” removed Mugabe and replaced him with Emmerson Mnangagwa.

More changes coming

So what do these political developments in 2019 tell us more broadly?

Long-standing leaders have been persistent in Africa, despite the end of single-party rule in favour of a multiparty system. About a fifth of all African heads of state since independence can be classed as long-standing leaders — in power for more than a decade — and only five countries have never experienced one. But the trend is in decline.

It remains most resilient in central Africa and in the Great Lakes regions. Cracks are appearing in their citadels in Malabo and Kampala, but in 2019 Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo celebrated 40 years in power and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni 33 years.

Will there be any more departures from the dinosaurs club in 2020?

One of the shortest serving members of this club, President Pierre Nkurunziza (14 years in power) has said he will not stand for the 2020 elections in Burundi, although this is uncertain given that a 2018 constitutional referendum could allow him to stay in power until 2034. Togo’s Faure Gnassingbé (14 years in power) will stand for re-election to the presidency again after Parliament in 2019 approved a constitutional change permitting him to potentially stay in office until 2030.

Amending constitutions to change term limits so that incumbent leaders can run for office is a favoured tactic. Rwanda’s Paul Kagame (19 years in office) and the Republic of Congo’s Denis Sassou Nguesso (25 years in power) have done this. But Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki has never held an election during his 16 years in power.

Attempts at dynasties have been less successful, such as with Grace Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Gamal Mubarak in Egypt, but Obiang is grooming his playboy son Teodorin to succeed him and Gabon’s Ali Bongo and Togo’s Gnassingbé both succeeded their fathers.

The year is a reminder that more of these long-standing leaders will, in 2020 and beyond, step down or die. Most long-standing leaders in Africa are over the age of 70, with Paul Biya, aged 86, having served 37 years as Cameroon’s president.

Some former leaders capitulated under internal pressure: in Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. Only in Angola and the DRC was a transition process organized as part of an elite bargain.

What the political transitions have in common is that honeymoons are short and that, whether they are led by interim administrations or elected leaders, they need to deliver political and socioeconomic improvements to succeed, but have inherited shambolic economies. Their success depends on accountable political leadership and domestic and international support.

This article was originally published by the Mail & Guardian.

The entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on 30 May, after only three years of negotiations, is an economic, political and diplomatic milestone for the African Union (AU) and its member states, crucial for economic growth, job creation, and making Africa a meaningful player in international trade. But the continent will have to work together to ensure that the potential benefits are fully realized.

A necessary innovation

With its advances in maintaining peace and security, abundant natural resources, high growth rates, improved linkages to global supply chains and a youthful population, Africa is emerging as a new global centre of economic growth, increasingly sought after as a partner by the world’s biggest economies. Governments from across Africa have been taking a more assertive role in international markets, including through proactive diversification of trading partners, and the continent remains a strong advocate for the multilateral trading system.

However, this is not yet reflected in outcomes. The African Union does not have observer status at the World Trade Organization, despite diplomatic efforts in the past decade. Africa has less than a three per cent share of global trade, and the growing trend towards protectionism across the global economy may only increase the vulnerability of a disunited Africa. Its fractured internal market means that trade within Africa is lower than for any other region on the globe, with intra-African trade just 18 per cent of overall exports, as compared to 70 per cent in Europe.

The AfCFTA is the continent’s tool to address the disparity between Africa’s growing economic significance and its peripheral place in the global trade system, to build a bridge between present fragmentation and future prosperity. It is an ambitious, comprehensive agreement covering trade in goods, services, investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy. It has been signed by all of Africa’s states with the exception of Eritrea.

It is the AU's Agenda 2063 flagship project, brought about by the decisions taken at the January 2012 African Union Summit to boost intra-African trade and to fast track the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area. It builds upon ambitions enshrined in successive agreements including the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty. Access to new regional markets and reduced non-tariff barriers are intended to help companies scale up, driving job creation and poverty reduction, as well as attracting inward investment to even Africa’s smaller economies.

The signing in 2018 of the instruments governing the Single Air Transport Market and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment provided another step towards the gradual elimination of barriers to the movement of goods, services and people within the continent.

Tests to come

However, while progress is being made towards the ratification of the AfCFTA, much remains to be done before African countries can fully trade under its terms. The framework for implementation is still under development, and the creation of enabling infrastructure that is critical for connectivity will take time to develop and requires extensive investment.

So, the first test for the AfCFTA will be the level to which Africa’s leaders make it a domestic priority, and whether a consensus can be maintained across the AU’s member states as the costs of implementation become clear.

There is no guarantee that the gains of free trade will be evenly distributed. They will mainly depend on the extent to which countries embrace industrialization, liberalization of their markets and opening of their borders for free movement of goods and people – policies that some incumbent leaders may be reluctant to implement. Political will to maintain a unified negotiating position with diverse stakeholders, including the private sector, will come under increasing stress.  

A second challenge is how the AfCFTA relates to already existing trade arrangements, notably with the EU.  The AU has long preferred to pursue a continent-to-continent trading arrangement instead of the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements being sought by the EU under the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) framework to which, with the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa, all African states belong. The signing of the AfCFTA is one important step towards making this possible.

But there are currently negotiations under the ACP to replace the Cotonou Accord (the framework governing trade between ACP members and the EU, including Economic Partnership Agreements [EPAs], that is due to expire in 2020). Negotiations on the African pillar of the accord are due to take place after the AfCFTA has entered into force. So African states and the AU will face the challenge of balancing their commitment to the ACP bloc with pursuing their own interests.

And though the AfCFTA should supersede any other agreements, the EPAs or their successors, will continue to govern day-to-day trading, in parallel to the new pan-African market. It is not yet clear how these contradictions will be reconciled.

A new role for the AU?

The AU will need to play an active role as the main interlocutor with Africa´s international trading partners, with the AfCFTA secretariat being the arbiter of internal tensions and trade disputes. The AU´s engagement at continental level has to date revolved mainly around headline political diplomacy, security and peacekeeping. With the continental free market becoming a reality, an effective pivot to economic diplomacy will be critical for growth and development.

With the AfCFTA, the AU has endeavoured to address Africa’s unsustainable position in global trade, to stimulate growth, economic diversification and jobs for its growing population. Much will depend on the commitment of African leaders to maintaining a unified negotiating position to implement the agreement and the AU’s capacity to effectively move from political to economic diplomacy.

Both Russia and China have mounted combined charm offensives and disinformation campaigns on the back of the pandemic. Shipments of ‘aid’ – reportedly of questionable utility and quality - have gone hand in hand with a concerted effort to deflect any blame from China for the early spread, and an ongoing drive by Russia to undermine states’ confidence and have sanctions lifted.

These concurrent operations have very different objectives, as Russia seeks to subvert international order while China is continuing its bid to demonstrate global leadership - but in both cases, they are seeking long-term gains by exploiting the inattention and distraction of their targets.

Both seek to present themselves as globally responsible stakeholders, but for divergent reasons – especially China which needs the rest of the world to recover and return to stability to ensure its own economic recovery. But despite this, the two campaigns appear superficially similar.

Fertile ground for disinformation

One reason lies in the unique nature of the current crisis. Unlike political issues that are local or regional in nature, COVID-19 affects everybody worldwide. The perceived lack of reliable information about the virus provides fertile ground for information and disinformation campaigns, especially feeding on fear, uncertainty and doubt. But Russia in particular would not be succeeding in its objectives without mis-steps and inattention by Western governments.

Confused reporting on Russia sending medical supplies to the United States showed Moscow taking advantage of a US administration in apparent disarray. Claims Russia was sending ’humanitarian aid’ were only belatedly countered by the US State Department pointing out it had been paid for. Meanwhile the earlier arrival of Russian military equipment in Italy also scored a propaganda victory for Russia, facilitated by curious passivity by the Italian government.

In both cases Russia also achieved secondary objectives. With the United States, Russia scored bonus points by shipping equipment produced by a subsidiary of a company under US sanctions. In the case of Italy, Russian state media made good use of misleading or heavily edited video clips to give the impression of widespread Italian acclaim for Russian aid, combined with disdain for the efforts of the EU.

Beijing’s external information campaigns have sought to deflect or defuse criticism of its early mishandling and misinformation on coronavirus and counter accusations of secrecy and falsifying data while also pursuing an opportunity to exercise soft power. For Moscow, current efforts boost a long-standing and intensive campaign to induce the lifting of sanctions, demonstrating if nothing else that sanctions are indeed an effective measure. Official and unofficial lobbying has intensified in numerous capital cities, and will inevitably find supporters.

But both the aid and the information campaigns are seriously flawed. While appropriate and useful aid for countries that are struggling should of course be welcomed, both Russian and Chinese equipment delivered to Europe has repeatedly been found to be inappropriate or defective. 

Russian photographs of cardboard boxes stacked loose and unsecured in a transport aircraft bound for the United States sparked alarm and disbelief among military and aviation experts - and there has still been no US statement on what exactly was purchased, and whether it was found to be fit for purpose when it arrived.

Reporting from Italy that the Russian equipment delivered there was ‘80% useless’ has not been contradicted by the Italian authorities. In fact, although the Italian sources criticizing Russia remain anonymous it is striking that - President Trump aside - no government has publicly endorsed materials and assistance received from Russia as actually being useful and helpful.

Even in Serbia, with its traditionally close ties with Russia, the only information forthcoming on the activities of the Russian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops and their equipment that arrived on April 3 was from Russian press releases.

Both countries’ strategic communications efforts are similarly fallible. China’s notoriously heavy-handed approach to its critics is of only limited use in the face of such a severe and immediate threat. One suggestion that the virus originated in the US – an early response to US criticism – has already been walked back by the Chinese diplomat who made it.

And Russia continues to be capable of spectacularly misjudging its targets. When investigative journalists looked more closely at the nature of the assistance to Italy, Russia’s official response was rage and personal threats, laying bare the real nature of the campaign and immediately alienating many of those whom Moscow had sought to win over.

Errors and deficiencies such as these provide opportunities to mitigate the worst side-effects of the campaigns. And actions by individuals can also mitigate much of the impact. The most effective disinformation plays on deeply emotional issues and triggers visceral rather than rational reactions.

Advocates of ’informational distancing’ as well as social distancing suggest a tactical pause to assess information calmly, instead of reacting or spreading it further unthinkingly. This approach would bolster not only calm dispassionate assessment of the real impact of Russian and Chinese actions, but also counter spreading of misinformation on the pandemic as a whole - especially when key sources of disinformation are national leaders seeking to politicize or profit from the crisis.

Limitations of Russian and Chinese altruism must be stated clearly and frankly to fill gaps in public understanding. Where help is genuine, it should of course be welcomed: but if it is the case that assistance received from Moscow or Beijing is not appropriate, not useful, or not fit for purpose, this should be acknowledged publicly.

Even without central direction or coordination with other Russian strategic communications efforts, the self-perpetuating Russian disinformation ecosystem continues to push narratives designed to undermine confidence in institutions and their ability to deal with the crisis. This too must continue to be monitored closely and countered where it matters.

In all cases, miscalculations by Russia or China that expose the true intent of their campaigns – no matter how different their objectives might be - should be watched for closely and highlighted where they occur.

Despite the enormity of the present emergency it is not a time for any government to relax its vigilance over longer-term threats. States must not lose sight of manoeuvres seeking to exploit weakness and distraction. If Russia and China emerge from the current crisis with enhanced authority and unjustifiably restored reputations, this will make it still harder to resist their respective challenges to the current rules-based international order in the future.

The world is currently witnessing how vulnerable existing production and consumption systems are, with the current global health crisis harshly exposing the magnitude of the risks associated with the global economy in its current form, grounded, as it is, in a linear system that uses a ‘take–make–throw away’ approach.

These ‘linear risks’ associated with the existing global supply chain system are extremely high for national economies overly dependent on natural resource extraction and exports of commodities like minerals and metals. Equally vulnerable are countries with large manufacturing sectors of ready-made garments and non-repairable consumer goods for western markets. Furthermore, workers and communities working in these sectors are vulnerable to these changes as a result of disruptive technologies and reduced demand.

In a recently published Chatham House research paper, ‘Promoting a Just Transition to an Inclusive Circular Economy’, we highlight why a circular economy approach presents the world with a solution to old and new global risks – from marine plastic pollution to climate change and resource scarcity.

Taking the long view

So far, action to transition to a circular economy has been slow compared to the current crisis which has mobilized rapid global action. For proponents of transitioning to a circular economy, this requires taking the long view. The pandemic has shown us that global emergencies can fast-forward processes that otherwise might take years, even decades, to play out or reverse achievements which have taken years to accomplish.

In this vein, there are three striking points of convergence between the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to transition to an inclusive circular economy.

Firstly, the current crisis is a stark reminder that the circular economy is not only necessary to ensure long-term resource security but also short-term supplies of important materials. In many cities across the US, the UK and Europe, councils have suspended recycling to focus on essential waste collection services. The UK Recycling Association, for example, has warned about carboard shortages due to disrupted recycling operations with possible shortages for food and medicine packaging on the horizon.

Similarly, in China, most recycling sites were shut during the country’s lockdown presenting implications for global recycling markets with additional concerns that there will be a fibre shortage across Europe and possibly around the world.

Furthermore, worldwide COVID-19 lockdowns are resulting in a resurgence in the use of single-use packaging creating a new wave of plastic waste especially from food deliveries – already seen in China – with illegal waste fly-tipping dramatically increasing in the UK since the lockdown.

In this vein, concerns over the current global health crisis is reversing previous positive trends where many cities had established recycling schemes and companies and consumers had switched to reusable alternatives.

Secondly, the need to improve the working conditions of the people working in the informal circular economy, such as waste pickers and recyclers, is imperative. Many waste materials and recyclables that are being handled and collected may be contaminated as a result of being mixed with medical waste.

Now, more than ever, key workers in waste management, collection and recycling require personal protective equipment and social protection to ensure their safety as well as the continuation of essential waste collection so as not to increase the potential for new risks associated with additional infectious diseases.

In India, almost 450 million workers including construction workers, street vendors and landless agricultural labourers, work in the informal sector. In the current climate, the poorest who are unable to work pose a great risk to the Indian economy which could find itself having to shut down.

Moreover, many informal workers live in make-shift settlements areas such as Asia’s largest slum, Dharavi in Mumbai, where health authorities are now facing serious challenges to contain the spread of the disease. Lack of access to handwashing and sanitation facilities, however, further increase these risks but circular, decentralized solutions could make important contributions to sustainable sanitation, health and improved community resilience.

Thirdly, it is anticipated that in the long term several global supply chains will be radically changed as a result of transformed demand patterns and the increase in circular practices such as urban mining for the recovery and recycling of metals or the reuse and recycling of textile fibres and localized additive manufacturing (e.g. 3D printing).

Many of these supply chains and trade flows have now been already severely disrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the global garment industry has been particularly hard-hit due to the closure of outlets amid falling demand for apparel.

It is important to note, workers at the bottom of these garment supply chains are among the most vulnerable and most affected by the crisis as global fashion brands, for example, have been cancelling orders – in the order of $6 billion in the case of Bangladesh alone. Only after intense negotiations are some brands assuming financial responsibility in the form of compensation wage funds to help suppliers in Myanmar, Cambodia and Bangladesh to pay workers during the ongoing crisis.

In addition, the current pandemic is damaging demand for raw materials thereby affecting mining countries. Demand for Africa’s commodities in China, for example, has declined significantly, with the impact on African economies expected to be serious, with 15 per cent of the world’s copper and 20 per cent of the world’s zinc mines currently going offline. 

A further threat is expected to come from falling commodity prices as a result of the curtailment of manufacturing activity in China particularly for crude oil, copper, iron ore and other industrial commodities which, in these cases, will have direct impacts on the Australian and Canadian mining sectors.

This is all being compounded by an associated decline in consumer demand worldwide. For example, many South African mining companies – leading producers of metals and minerals – have started closing their mining operations following the government’s announcement of a lockdown in order to prevent the transmission of the virus among miners who often work in confined spaces and in close proximity with one another. As workers are laid off due to COVID-19, there are indications that the mining industry will see fast-tracking towards automated mining operations. 

All of these linear risks that have been exposed through the COVID-19 pandemic reinforce the need for a just transition to a circular economy. But while the reduction in the consumption of resources is necessary to achieve sustainability, the social impacts on low- and middle- income countries and their workers requires international support mechanisms.

In addition, the current situation also highlights the need to find a new approach to globalized retail chains and a balance between local and global trade based on international cooperation across global value chains rather than implementation of trade protectionist measures.

In this vein, all of the recovery plans from the global COVID-19 pandemic need to be aligned with the principles of an inclusive circular economy in order to ensure both short-term and long-term resilience and preparedness for future challenges and disruptions.  

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

In 2016, the then-German foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, suggested a way around the impasse in east Ukraine.

He proposed that elections in the areas held by Russian-backed insurgents – the ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DNR) and the ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LNR) –   could be held under Ukrainian legislation, with Kyiv adopting a temporary law on ‘special status’, the main disagreement between Russia and Ukraine in the Minsk Agreements. This law would become permanent once the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had declared that elections correspond with OSCE standards.

The reaction in Ukraine was strongly negative. The so-called Steinmeier Formula contradicted Kyiv’s position that elections in the occupied Donbas should only go ahead in a secure environment – requiring the prior withdrawal of Russian forces and the return of the eastern border to Ukraine’s control. It also did not address the differing views of ‘special status’; Russia demands a much greater devolution of constitutional powers to the DNR and LNR regimes than Ukraine will grant.

But on 1 October, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the new Ukrainian president, announced that he was signing up to the Steinmeier Formula. He also announced a conditional withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from two frontline areas in the east.

Quick reversal

During the 2019 presidential election campaign, Zelenskyy repeatedly promised that, if elected, he would re-energize efforts to end the war. This appealed to many Ukrainians, who understandably want the conflict over, although Zelenskyy’s eventual electoral victory was largely won on domestic issues.

But his initiative quickly ran into two problems.

First, following a major prisoner swap in September, Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to judge that Zelenskyy was in a hurry to deliver his election promises and was acting without consulting France and Germany. Russia had earlier demanded that Ukraine formally agree to elections in the Donbas as the precondition for a summit of the ‘Normandy’ powers (the diplomatic format comprising leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France, which has not met since 2016).

Moreover, the US, which is not part of the ‘Normandy’ group, has seemed disengaged because of domestic controversies. Concluding that Zelenskyy was vulnerable, the Kremlin welcomed his announcement about the Steinmeier Formula but declined to assent to a summit, hoping to extract further concessions.

Second, Zelenskyy’s action triggered protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Critics feared that he intended to make unilateral concessions over ‘special status’. Though he tried to assure Ukrainians that ‘there won't be any elections there if the [Russian] troops are still there’, concerns were fuelled by what many saw as his lack of openness about what the Steinmeier Formula really meant. Ukrainian public opinion wants an end to the war, but apparently not at any price.

Zelenskyy duly rowed back. During a marathon 14-hour press conference on 10 October, he emphasized that he would not surrender Ukraine’s vital interests. He also acknowledged that he had been insufficiently open with the Ukrainian public. For the time being at least, he seems to have been given pause.

A situation resistant to compromise

Instead, Zelenskyy may now attempt to ‘freeze’ the conflict by ending active operations. This is not Ukraine’s favoured outcome but could be the most realistic one in current conditions.  

Russia still calculates that time is on its side. It believes that Western support for Ukraine is lukewarm and that Kyiv will eventually have to give it what it wants. Russia clearly felt no pressure to respond positively to Zelenskyy’s overture, which it probably read as a weakness to be exploited.    

For these reasons, Zelenskyy now appears less optimistic that rapid progress to end the war is possible. A new summit of the ‘Normandy’ powers may happen but looks unlikely in the near future. This may act as an incentive for further bilateral negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, such as those which delivered the prisoner swap. However, a diplomatic process managed by Zelenskyy and Putin alone risks reducing Ukraine’s leverage. 

Finally, the main obstacles to implementation of the Minsk Agreements – radically different views of elections in, and ‘special status’ for, the DNR and LNR – remain. The Kremlin’s versions of both would gravely limit Ukraine’s sovereignty; Kyiv’s would facilitate the re-establishment of its control over the east. It is hard to see how this gap can be bridged.

Tellingly, the Steinmeier Formula offers no answer to this conundrum. Some conflicts, it seems, are resistant to diplomatic compromises that aim to satisfy everyone equally.

Both Russia and China have mounted combined charm offensives and disinformation campaigns on the back of the pandemic. Shipments of ‘aid’ – reportedly of questionable utility and quality - have gone hand in hand with a concerted effort to deflect any blame from China for the early spread, and an ongoing drive by Russia to undermine states’ confidence and have sanctions lifted.

These concurrent operations have very different objectives, as Russia seeks to subvert international order while China is continuing its bid to demonstrate global leadership - but in both cases, they are seeking long-term gains by exploiting the inattention and distraction of their targets.

Both seek to present themselves as globally responsible stakeholders, but for divergent reasons – especially China which needs the rest of the world to recover and return to stability to ensure its own economic recovery. But despite this, the two campaigns appear superficially similar.

Fertile ground for disinformation

One reason lies in the unique nature of the current crisis. Unlike political issues that are local or regional in nature, COVID-19 affects everybody worldwide. The perceived lack of reliable information about the virus provides fertile ground for information and disinformation campaigns, especially feeding on fear, uncertainty and doubt. But Russia in particular would not be succeeding in its objectives without mis-steps and inattention by Western governments.

Confused reporting on Russia sending medical supplies to the United States showed Moscow taking advantage of a US administration in apparent disarray. Claims Russia was sending ’humanitarian aid’ were only belatedly countered by the US State Department pointing out it had been paid for. Meanwhile the earlier arrival of Russian military equipment in Italy also scored a propaganda victory for Russia, facilitated by curious passivity by the Italian government.

In both cases Russia also achieved secondary objectives. With the United States, Russia scored bonus points by shipping equipment produced by a subsidiary of a company under US sanctions. In the case of Italy, Russian state media made good use of misleading or heavily edited video clips to give the impression of widespread Italian acclaim for Russian aid, combined with disdain for the efforts of the EU.

Beijing’s external information campaigns have sought to deflect or defuse criticism of its early mishandling and misinformation on coronavirus and counter accusations of secrecy and falsifying data while also pursuing an opportunity to exercise soft power. For Moscow, current efforts boost a long-standing and intensive campaign to induce the lifting of sanctions, demonstrating if nothing else that sanctions are indeed an effective measure. Official and unofficial lobbying has intensified in numerous capital cities, and will inevitably find supporters.

But both the aid and the information campaigns are seriously flawed. While appropriate and useful aid for countries that are struggling should of course be welcomed, both Russian and Chinese equipment delivered to Europe has repeatedly been found to be inappropriate or defective. 

Russian photographs of cardboard boxes stacked loose and unsecured in a transport aircraft bound for the United States sparked alarm and disbelief among military and aviation experts - and there has still been no US statement on what exactly was purchased, and whether it was found to be fit for purpose when it arrived.

Reporting from Italy that the Russian equipment delivered there was ‘80% useless’ has not been contradicted by the Italian authorities. In fact, although the Italian sources criticizing Russia remain anonymous it is striking that - President Trump aside - no government has publicly endorsed materials and assistance received from Russia as actually being useful and helpful.

Even in Serbia, with its traditionally close ties with Russia, the only information forthcoming on the activities of the Russian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops and their equipment that arrived on April 3 was from Russian press releases.

Both countries’ strategic communications efforts are similarly fallible. China’s notoriously heavy-handed approach to its critics is of only limited use in the face of such a severe and immediate threat. One suggestion that the virus originated in the US – an early response to US criticism – has already been walked back by the Chinese diplomat who made it.

And Russia continues to be capable of spectacularly misjudging its targets. When investigative journalists looked more closely at the nature of the assistance to Italy, Russia’s official response was rage and personal threats, laying bare the real nature of the campaign and immediately alienating many of those whom Moscow had sought to win over.

Errors and deficiencies such as these provide opportunities to mitigate the worst side-effects of the campaigns. And actions by individuals can also mitigate much of the impact. The most effective disinformation plays on deeply emotional issues and triggers visceral rather than rational reactions.

Advocates of ’informational distancing’ as well as social distancing suggest a tactical pause to assess information calmly, instead of reacting or spreading it further unthinkingly. This approach would bolster not only calm dispassionate assessment of the real impact of Russian and Chinese actions, but also counter spreading of misinformation on the pandemic as a whole - especially when key sources of disinformation are national leaders seeking to politicize or profit from the crisis.

Limitations of Russian and Chinese altruism must be stated clearly and frankly to fill gaps in public understanding. Where help is genuine, it should of course be welcomed: but if it is the case that assistance received from Moscow or Beijing is not appropriate, not useful, or not fit for purpose, this should be acknowledged publicly.

Even without central direction or coordination with other Russian strategic communications efforts, the self-perpetuating Russian disinformation ecosystem continues to push narratives designed to undermine confidence in institutions and their ability to deal with the crisis. This too must continue to be monitored closely and countered where it matters.

In all cases, miscalculations by Russia or China that expose the true intent of their campaigns – no matter how different their objectives might be - should be watched for closely and highlighted where they occur.

Despite the enormity of the present emergency it is not a time for any government to relax its vigilance over longer-term threats. States must not lose sight of manoeuvres seeking to exploit weakness and distraction. If Russia and China emerge from the current crisis with enhanced authority and unjustifiably restored reputations, this will make it still harder to resist their respective challenges to the current rules-based international order in the future.