Crisis seems to be the byword for Brazil today: political crisis, economic crisis, corruption crisis. Even the 2016 Rio Olympics seem to teeter on the edge of failure, according to the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Yet despite the steady drum beat of grim news, Brazil is more than likely to resume its upward trajectory within a few years. Its present economic and political troubles mask a number of positives: the strength of its democracy and a new found willingness to fight corruption at all costs. With the correct policies in place, its economy will recover in due course. The impeachment process against Dilma Rousseff will soon be over, one way or the other. The present troubles are merely a temporary detour on Brazil’s long quest to achieve major power status and a consequential role in the international system. In a world in turmoil, where geopolitical tensions are on the rise and the fabric of international politics is stressed by events such as Brexit, we should not lose sight of Brazil’s history of and potential for contributing to sustaining the liberal international order.

Brazil’s aspirations for greatness

Brazil has long aspired to grandeza (greatness) both at home and abroad. As its first ambassador to Washington, Joaquim Nabuco (1905-1910) once said, “Brazil has always been conscious of its size, and it has been governed by a prophetic sense with regard to its future.” As we document in our new book, Brazil has reached for major power status at least four times in the past 100 years: participating as a co-belligerent with the Allies in World War One and seeking a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations thereafter; joining the Allies in World War II and aspiring to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1945; mastering nuclear technology beginning in the 1970s, including launching a covert military program (now terminated) to build a nuclear explosive device; and most recently, beginning with the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), seeking to become a leader in multilateral institutions, including actively campaigning for a permanent seat on the UNSC.

A decade ago, many Brazilians believed that this time their country was poised to secure its position as a major power. As the seventh largest economy in the world with the 10th largest defense budget and significant soft power, Brazilian leaders such as Lula saw their country as being “in the mix” of major powers who, while not able to make the international order alone, could very well shape its evolution through uncertain times together with other major powers. Certainly, they no longer saw Brazil as one of the middle or small powers, the “order takers” in the international system.

Brazil saw a new opportunity to emerge as a major power in the advent of a relatively stable and peaceful post-Cold War geopolitical order, the decade-long commodity boom that supercharged its economy after 2002, and the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Between 2002 and 2013, Brazil’s virtuous trifecta—democratic consolidation, rapid economic growth, and reduced inequality—was a boon to its soft power. This combination was highly attractive to many in the developing world, contributing to Brazil’s claim to leadership on the international stage as a bridge between the global South and the great powers. International peace and stability particularly favored Brazil’s predilection for deploying soft power rather than hard power. And in the BRICS, Brazil saw an opportunity to work together with other emerging powers critical of the present international order to advance its agenda for reformed global institutions.

Rethinking Brazil’s approach to global influence

Brazil’s bridge-building strategy was effective in advancing its national interests in multilateral forums, most recently on global internet governance and global climate change. But the BRICS dimension of Brazil’s strategy detracted from its ability to influence the world’s great democracies. The BRICS identity associated Brazil with authoritarian powers—China and Russia—that were viewed by the United States and its allies, at best, as unhelpful critics and, at worst, as deliberate saboteurs of the present order. This undermined Brazil’s credibility with Washington and other leading democracies, and hindered its ability to advance its preferred policies on everything from nonproliferation to the reform of global economic institutions to the debate on humanitarian intervention. In retrospect, working more closely with other emerging democracies that seek reform of the international order, such as through the India-Brazil-South Africa association known as IBSA, would have more clearly signaled Brazil’s constructive intentions while still preserving its critical posture.

Today, the opportunities that powered Brazil’s most recent rise—post-Cold War geopolitical stability and a massive commodity boom—are receding, replaced by a more fractious and dangerous international system. Despite troubles at home, it is not too early for Brazil’s leaders to think anew about how to strengthen national capabilities and deploy them strategically to address this new environment. This includes fortifying domestic institutions, both to address the present crisis but also to restore the luster of Brazil’s soft power. It means bolstering Brazil’s hard power capabilities once the economy improves and deploying them in ways that contribute to its soft power, for example by taking on additional responsibility for leading critical international peacekeeping operations as it has in Haiti. It means thinking carefully about how to signal to the democratic great powers Brazil’s commitment to a strengthened liberal international order, even as it holds onto its own principles and works towards reform of multilateral institutions. And eventually, as Brazil completes its recovery, it means contributing more substantially to the costs of maintaining its preferred global order. A Brazil that achieves all this will be well positioned to have a positive global impact, continuing to be a strong (if sometimes critical) partner for the United States in shaping the international order.

Are Turkey and Israel on the verge of signing a normalization agreement, after a six-year hiatus? Comments in recent days by senior officials in both countries suggest so. A senior Israeli official, quoted in the Times of Israel, stated that “95% of the agreement is completed,” while Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said the parties are “one or two meetings away” from an agreement.

Media outlets in both countries have revealed that a meeting between senior Turkish and Israeli officials is expected to be held in Turkey on June 26—and that shortly after, an agreement is likely to be signed and go into effect. 

For two of America’s closest allies in the Middle East to bury the hatchet, reinstate ambassadors, and resume senior-level dialogue would surely be a boost for U.S strategic interests in the region. It would contribute to greater cohesion in dealing with the Syrian crisis, for example, and in the fight against the Islamic State. 

A quick recap

Let’s first recall how the crisis between the two former strategic allies developed, when in the aftermath of the Mavi Marmara incident (May 31, 2010)—resulting in the deaths of 9 Turks—Turkey recalled its ambassador in Tel Aviv and suspended nearly all defense and strategic ties with Israel. Israel also called back its ambassador in Ankara. At the time, Turkey set three conditions for resuming dialogue with Israel: a formal apology, compensation for the families of the victims, and a removal of Israel’s Gaza naval blockade. Relations came to a practical standstill, except in the economic sphere: trade between the two countries exceeded $5 billion in 2014, an unprecedented level. 

Israel formally apologized to Turkey in 2013 and in 2014 committed to paying compensation to the families of the victims. But the Gaza naval blockade has not been lifted. Turkey further demands greater access and presence in Gaza. For its part, Israel demands that Turkey not allow Hamas operative Salah al-Arouri, who resides in Istanbul, to coordinate terrorist operations against Israeli targets in the West Bank. Israel also wants Ankara to pressure Hamas to return the remains of two Israeli soldiers killed in the 2014 war in Gaza. 

Since the flotilla incident, Turkey was not always convinced that repairing relations with Israel actually served its interests. As the Arab Spring unfolded, Turkey hoped to assume a leadership role in the Arab and Muslim worlds—having good relations with Israel did not serve that purpose. And as Turkey went through periods of some unrest in the political arena (whether during the Gezi Park protests in 2013 or the hotly contested local and national elections), many in the ruling AKP party saw restoring relations with Israel as a potential liability in domestic politics. Israel, for its part, was mostly in a reactive mode: sometimes it tried to initiate contacts with Turkey, and sometimes it denounced Turkish anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic rhetoric.

The times they are a-changing

Now, however, new developments have prompted Turkey to seek a rapprochement with Israel. One key factor is the crisis in the Turkish-Russian relationship—in the aftermath of the suspension of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline project, Israeli natural gas is viewed as a possible substitute in the medium term for some of Turkey’s natural gas imports from Russia. And as the impact of the war in Syria on Turkey (including the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks) has made clear to Turkey that it must enhance its intelligence capabilities, and Israel can help. Israel, meanwhile, is searching for an export destination for its natural gas (Israeli Energy Minister Steinitz stated recently that “Turkey is a huge market for gas…they need our gas and we need this market”). Israeli leaders also know that resuming a political and military dialogue with Turkey may contribute to a more comprehensive view of the challenges Israel faces in the region. 

Five years after Israel’s formal request to open a representation office at NATO’s Brussels headquarters, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced last month that NATO has approved the Israeli request. Turkey had opposed it, blocking progress, since NATO decisions are adopted by consensus. In a move seen signaling a thawing of relations, Turkey recently removed its objection to Israel’s request, paving the way to NATO’s decision. Israel continues to be a partner in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue along with Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Mauritania and Morocco. 

At a time when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to strengthen his country’s regional strategic position and enhance its economic opportunities, a rapprochement with Israel makes sense. Bilateral negotiations are in the final stretch, as they have reached a compromise on the complex issue of Gaza and Hamas (Turkey will reportedly not demand the full lifting of Israel’s naval blockade on Gaza, settling for greater access and presence in Gaza. Israel will acquiesce to continued Hamas political activities in Turkey and will not demand the removal of Hamas operative al-Arouri from Turkey, but will get Turkish assurances that al-Arouri’s involvement in terror will cease.)

Fixing the troubled Turkish-Israeli relationship has been a mighty task for senior negotiators on both sides over the last few years, and although an agreement seems around the corner, the experience of recent years suggests that there can be last minute surprises. Israel’s Prime Minister had to jump over several hurdles, holding off pressure from Russia and Egypt not to seek rapprochement with Turkey, and ensuring support of the deal with Turkey from his newly appointed Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman, a known opponent of a deal. On the Turkish side, it seems that President Erdoğan wants a rapprochement with Israel, and feels that he needs it. This is tied directly to the Turkish domestic arena: Erdoğan has recently completed his consolidation of power, ousting Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and paving the way to the election of his trusted confidant, Binali Yıldırım, as prime minister. In addition, his new allies—the military-judicial establishment—are in favor of mending ties with Israel. One caveat is that Erdoğan’s top priority is establishing a presidential system, and so if he feels at any point that reaching an agreement with Israel will somehow undermine those efforts, he may opt for maintaining the status quo. 

The narratives on U.S. development aid to Pakistan—as well as Pakistan’s own development policy discussion—frequently invoke the conventional wisdom that more education and better economic opportunities result in lower extremism. In the debate surrounding the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill in 2009, for instance, the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke urged Congress to “target the economic and social roots of extremism in western Pakistan with more economic aid.”

But evidence across various contexts, including in Pakistan, has not supported this notion (see Alan Kreuger’s What Makes a Terrorist for a good overview of this evidence). We know that many terrorists are educated. And lack of education and economic opportunities do not appear to drive support for terrorism and terrorist groups. I have argued that we need to focus on the quality and content of the educational curricula—in Pakistan’s case, they are rife with biases and intolerance, and designed to foster an exclusionary identity—to understand the relationship between education and attitudes toward extremism.

My latest analysis with data from the March 2013 Pew Global Attitudes poll conducted in Pakistan sheds new light on the relationship between years of education and Pakistanis’ views of the Taliban, and lends supports to the conventional wisdom. The survey sampled 1,201 respondents throughout Pakistan, except the most insecure areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. This was a time of mounting terror attacks by the Pakistani Taliban (a few months after their attack on Malala), and came at the tail end of the Pakistan People's Party’s term in power, before the May 2013 general elections.

On attitudes toward the Pakistani Taliban, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 3 percent of respondents to the Pew poll said they had a very favorable view, 13 percent reported somewhat favorable views, while nearly 17 percent and 39 percent answered that they had somewhat unfavorable and very unfavorable views, respectively. A large percentage of respondents (28 percent) chose not to answer the question or said they did not know their views. This is typical with a sensitive survey question such as this one, in a context as insecure as Pakistan.

So overall levels of support for the TTP are low, and the majority of respondents report having unfavorable views. The non-responses could reflect those who have unfavorable views but choose not to respond because of fear, or those who may simply not have an opinion on the Pakistani Taliban.

The first part of my analysis cross-tabulates attitudes toward the TTP with education and income respectively. I look at the distribution of attitudes for each education and income category (with very and somewhat favorable views lumped together as favorable; similarly for unfavorable attitudes).

Figure 1. Pakistani views on the Pakistani Taliban, by education level, 2013

Figure 1 shows that an increasing percentage of respondents report unfavorable views of the Taliban as education levels rise; and there is a decreasing percentage of non-responses at higher education levels (suggesting that more educated people have more confidence in their views, stronger views, or less fear). However, the percentage of respondents with favorable views of the Taliban, hovering between 10-20 percent, is not that different across education levels, and does not vary monotonically with education. 

Figure 2. Pakistani views on the Pakistani Taliban, by income level, 2013

Figure 2 shows views on the Pakistani Taliban by income level. While the percentage of non-responses is highest for the lowest income category, the percentages responding favorably and unfavorably do not change monotonically with income. We see broadly similar distributions of attitudes across the four income levels.

But these cross-tabulations do not account for other factors that may affect attitudes: age, gender, and geographical location. Regressions (not shown here) accounting for these factors in addition to income and education show interesting results: relative to no education, higher education levels are associated with less favorable opinions of the Pakistani Taliban; these results are strongest for those with some university education, which is heartening. This confirms findings from focus groups I conducted with university students in Pakistan in May 2015. Students at public universities engaged in wide ranging political and social debates with each other on Pakistan and its identity, quoted Rousseau and Chomsky, and had more nuanced views on terrorism and the rest of the world relative to high school students I interviewed. This must at least partly be a result of the superior curriculum and variety of materials to which they are exposed at the college level.

My regressions also show that older people have more unfavorable opinions toward the Taliban, relative to younger people; this is concerning and is consistent with the trend toward rising extremist views in Pakistan’s younger population. The problems in Pakistan’s curriculum that began in the 1980s are likely to be at least partly responsible for this trend. Urban respondents seem to have more favorable opinions toward the Taliban than rural respondents; respondents from Punjab and Baluchistan have more favorable opinions toward the Taliban relative to those from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which as a province has had a closer and more direct experience with terror. The regression shows no relationship of income with attitudes, as was suggested by Figure 2.

Overall, the Pew 2013 data show evidence of a positive relationship between more education and lack of support for the Taliban, suggesting that the persisting but increasingly discredited conventional wisdom on these issues may hold some truth after all. These results should be complemented with additional years of data. That is what I will work on next.