y The Struggle for the State in Syria By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 14 Jan 2020 10:50:01 +0000 Research Event 11 March 2020 - 9:00am to 6:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE This conference brings together policymakers, experts, academics and civil society leaders to explore the current condition of the state in Syria. It examines the structure, interrelations and importance of the regime’s core institutions and their interactions with international actors. It also highlights the regime’s different approaches in dealing with state institutions and non-state actors.The speakers discuss governance dynamics in north-western Syria and the east Euphrates region and will analyse governance variations between regions within the regime-controlled areas after the dramatic changes in 2018 and 2019.The conference also aims to evaluate the possibility for Syrians to move from a regime-led state to one that is accountable to its citizens and is governed by the rule of law. Event attributes Livestream Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Syria from Within Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
y Synergy in North Africa: Furthering Cooperation By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 15:57:54 +0000 21 January 2020 Discussions of North African integration have evoked ideas of a shared identity and a common destiny in the region. However, recent attempts to build regional blocs in North Africa have been unsuccessful. This paper examines the benefits of a ‘synergistic’ approach to North African cooperation. Read online Download PDF in English Download PDF in Arabic Dr Mohammed Masbah Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @MasbahMohammed LinkedIn Google Scholar Mohamed El Dahshan Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @eldahshan LinkedIn Google Scholar 2020-01-21-Market.jpg A Tunisian vendor poses as he sells white truffles at a market in the town of Ben Guerdane, 40km west of the Libyan border, in February 2016. Photo: Getty Images. SummaryNorth African integration is not a new idea. However, countries in the region have so far struggled to form a cohesive bloc with deep political, economic and social ties. Political instability has effectively deprioritized North African integration. A focus on thematic (political, economic and security) ‘synergies’ may provide a better framework for cooperation than seeking opportunities for all-encompassing ‘deep’ and ‘comprehensive’ integration.Governments of North Africa dedicate considerable resources to domestic security. Much of their efforts are conducted at the national-level and directed towards threats from terrorists, insurgents and militias. Improved security cooperation would achieve better outcomes and economies of scale, including efforts to tackle human trafficking.A new generation of jihadis has emerged in North Africa since 2011. Nearly 27 per cent of the 30,000 fighters who travelled to Syria are from the Maghreb. While government counterterrorism operations have been effective, countries have failed to address the root causes of radicalization.Border economies have suffered as a consequence of a security focus on terrorism and smuggling, which has rendered many previously accepted cross-border trade activities illegal. States have struggled to provide alternative livelihoods for those who have lost this source of income. Border forces tend to lack the right combination of capacity, training and equipment to secure borders and often resort to heavy-handed tactics.New thinking is required to develop a more human-centric and proactive approach to migration issues in the region, which continues to witness huge flows of migrants. The migration policy of Morocco, introduced through legislation in 2014, could be a model for North Africa.The countries of North Africa have varying economic profiles, ranging from economically diverse Morocco to oil-and-gas-dependant Libya. However, they all face similar challenges including unemployment (particularly among the young), poor public-service delivery, low FDI levels, an oversized public sector, ineffective tax collection, and high informality.Fostering entrepreneurship and the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are priorities for North African countries, particularly regarding job creation. Regulatory cooperation – such as harmonizing SME definitions, legislation and support institutions – across North Africa is an obvious area where further integration would encourage the development of start-ups and small businesses.With the advent of the fourth industrial revolution, North African governments must address their technological gaps and work to improve public–private cooperation. In some sectors, such as the fintech industry, North African countries can build upon nascent synergies that have developed organically, such as those of start-up incubators and angel investors that work across the region.Renewables, particularly solar energy production, are a promising development for North Africa. While regional initiatives, such as Desertec, have stalled due to political differences between countries, the sector has witnessed exponential growth in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, where the involvement of the private sector has proved successful. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, North Africa Dialogues Full Article
y Local Pathways Towards De-escalation of Libya's Conflict By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 10:20:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 28 January 2020 - 3:00pm to 4:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Usama Otman Essed, Libya Center for Strategic & Future StudiesChair: Tim Eaton, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House A shaky truce remains broadly in place among rival Libyan forces fighting for control of Tripoli. However, a durable ceasefire to bring an end to the current bout of conflict, which was initiated by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ (LAAF) offensive on the capital in April 2019, has not been reached. In recent weeks attention has focused on talks hosted in Moscow and Berlin, with the former aimed at agreeing a ceasefire and the latter seeking to reach agreement among international actors to bring an end to external military support for Libyan warring actors, and to craft a way forward for future intra-Libyan talks. Yet, there has been little emphasis on Libyan actors – beyond Haftar and prime minister Fayez al-Serraj – in this process. This roundtable will bring together experts and policymakers to discuss means of de-escalating the conflict and seeking a lasting resolution through the development of interconnected intra-Libyan social and security negotiation tracks. Mr Usama Otman Essed of the Libya Center for Strategic and Future Studies (LCSFS) will present his research group’s ideas on these issues and discuss their ongoing efforts to promote dialogue among social and security actors.Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
y Prospects for Reforming Libya’s Economic Governance: Ways Forward By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 15:45:02 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 6 February 2020 - 10:30am to 12:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Jason Pack, Non-Resident Fellow, Middle East InstituteTim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham HouseChair: Elham Saudi, Director, Lawyers for Justice Libya There is a broad consensus that Libya’s rentier, patronage-based system of governance is a driver, and not only a symptom, of Libya’s continuing conflict. The dysfunction of Libya’s economic system of governance has been exacerbated by the governance split that has prevailed since 2014 whereby rival administrations of state institutions have emerged. Despite these challenges, a system of economic interdependence, whereby forces aligned with Field Marshal Haftar control much of the oil and gas infrastructure and the UN-backed Government of National Accord controls the means of financial distribution, has largely prevailed. Yet, at the time of writing, this is under threat: a damaging oil blockade is being implemented by forces aligned with Haftar and those state institutions that do function on a national basis are finding it increasingly difficult to avoid being dragged into the conflict.This roundtable will bring together analysts and policymakers to discuss these dynamics and look at possible remedies. Jason Pack, non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, will present the findings of his latest paper on the issue which recommends the formation of 'a Libyan-requested and Libyan-led International Financial Commission vested with the requisite authorities to completely restructure the economy.' Tim Eaton, who has been leading Chatham House’s work on Libya’s conflict economy, supporting UNSMIL’s efforts in this field, will act as respondent.Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Libya’s Conflict Economy Full Article
y Lebanon Is Paying the Cost of Its Dysfunctional Politics By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 05:27:10 +0000 26 February 2020 Nadim Shehadi Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @Confusezeus A series of fights to political stalemate have led its economy to the brink and cut it off from its natural economic partners in the Gulf. 2020-02-25-Leb1.jpg Protests against economic conditions and government inaction turned violent in January. Photo: Getty Images. To understand Lebanon’s financial collapse, look to its politics.The country has been deeply damaged by an increasingly dysfunctional political system. A series of compromises have alienated it from its main markets in the Gulf and strangled its economy; anyone that has glanced at fluctuations in Lebanese bank deposits over the last 10 years can see the correlation.Imagine if Boris Johnson or Donald Trump were obliged to form joint governments with Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders. The result would be paralysis and lack of accountability as each party pulls the country in opposite directions and blames the other for the state of limbo. This has been the state of affairs in Lebanon since the Doha agreement of 2008. That agreement followed an 18-month siege that paralyzed Beirut and an attack on the city by Hezbollah’s ‘black shirts’. The Doha formula imposed governments of national unity between Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s pro-Saudi camp and Hezbollah’s pro-Iran camp and their respective internal allies.The pattern was set: each period of subsequent paralysis was followed by further compromise as the tug of war pulled the country away from its principal economic partners, the Arab Gulf states, with the regional balance of power tilting towards Hezbollah. It was not supposed to be like this. The Baabda Declaration in June 2012, reached after a process of national dialogue, was meant to secure Lebanon’s neutrality in regional conflicts, with both sides promising to hold back on external alliances and coexist despite difference over major regional issues like the war in Syria, the standoff between the US and Iran or relations with Israel or the Gulf states.This has worn away. The Baabda declaration itself became a sham when Hezbollah inserted itself into the war in Syria in support of the Assad regime and overtly got involved in Iraq and Yemen as an Iranian proxy. This was followed by Saudi opposition to concessions by Hariri that led to the election of General Michel Aoun, an ally of Hezbollah, as president in October 2016; again, after a political paralysis that lasted 29 months with no active government and no head of state. The Saudis were also furious when President Aoun’s son-in-law, Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, abstained from condemning the burning of the Saudi embassy in Tehran at an Arab League meeting in Cairo in January 2016, citing the need to preserve national unity.Fearing that he was simply providing Hezbollah with protection in the guise of compromise, the Saudis pressured Hariri to resign in November 2017 during a trip to Riyadh, but he later challenged that by retracting on his resignation when back in Beirut. Lebanon was caught between two sides, and as the regional conflict intensified from tension to open confrontation, neutrality was no longer an option.Gulf connectionsAn estimated 350,000 Lebanese expats live and work in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. These countries are also the main clients for Lebanese contractors, consultants and advertising companies, some of which have offices there. The domestic tourism industry relies heavily on Arab Gulf visitors and they are a principal source of foreign investments especially in the real estate sector.Lebanon also enjoyed a certain degree of political and economic protection from the US and the Gulf, and Hezbollah benefited indirectly from that protection, as it also shielded it to a certain degree from sanctions.The deterioration of relations meant that the country was cut off by its Gulf partners. This was manifested in travel bans for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals to Lebanon and a decrease in investments and bank deposits, as well as a decrease in remittances from Lebanese expats, partly because of economic crisis in the Gulf countries themselves.Saudi Arabia withdrew $4 billion of aid to the Lebanese army and internal security forces, and no aid or deposits were forthcoming as the economic and financial situation deteriorated. The costs to the Lebanese economy include the opportunity cost created by the annual threat of war with Israel, after which trips are cancelled and projects postponed. Hezbollah also controls a section of Beirut port where it pays no duty or taxes. Add to that the economic fallout from the war in Syria, such as the impact on exports, the inflow of refugees and the cost of Hezbollah’s involvement.The burden of these political factors is difficult to estimate but it constitutes the ransom that the Lebanese economy bears as a cost of the compromise. This is not to absolve Lebanese politicians from corruption or bankers of mismanagement but to add that political factors cannot be ignored.The cumulative cost and economic impact of being cut off from its main economic partner eventually bankrupted the country. The fiscal and financial aspects, with Lebanon’s inability to service its debt, are but a reflection of these political factors. In the long run, the key to avoiding complete collapse is to restore relations with the GCC and free Lebanon from that very costly grip. Full Article
y POSTPONED: Libya: Political Fragmentation, War and Foreign Intervention By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 27 Feb 2020 10:15:01 +0000 Members Event 24 March 2020 - 6:00pm to 7:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Dr Wolfram Lacher, Senior Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs; Author, Libya's Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent ConflictChair: Maryam Nemazee, Anchor, Al JazeeraFurther speakers to be announced. PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. Libya's third bout of civil war in a decade began when Khalifa Haftar's Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) launched an offensive on Tripoli in April 2019. Since then, a growing number of foreign states have intervened ever more deeply in the conflict. Warring Libyan armed factions, broadly aligned with either the internationally recognized Government of National Accord or the LAAF, have become increasingly reliant on foreign support to prosecute their war effort. Against this backdrop, the panellists will reflect on the forces that have shaped Libya’s trajectory since 2011. As the prospects for international mediation remain bleak, what motivations and grievances are driving the country’s warring parties? How can this war be explained beyond a scramble for the control of Libya’s oil wealth? And are Libyans at risk of being mere pawns in a proxy war? Members Events Team Email Full Article
y POSTPONED: The Development of Libyan Armed Groups since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 04 Mar 2020 14:15:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 18 March 2020 - 9:00am to 10:30am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Abdul Rahman Alageli, Associate Fellow, MENA Programme, Chatham HouseEmaddedin Badi, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East InstituteTim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, MENA Programme Chatham HouseValerie Stocker, Independent Researcher Since the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths. While many of these have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. In the west and south of the country, armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks.In the east, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will need to address the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities, even while the development of armed groups’ capacities dilutes their accountability to those communities.This roundtable will discuss the findings of a forthcoming Chatham House research paper, ‘The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests’, which presents insights from over 200 interviews of armed actors and members of local communities and posits how international policymakers might seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy.PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Countering Conflict Economies in MENA, Libya’s Conflict Economy Georgia Cooke Project Manager, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7957 5740 Email Full Article
y Is the GCC Cyber Resilient? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 09 Mar 2020 14:58:35 +0000 9 March 2020 How would the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) respond to a serious cyber incident? This could be a global ransomware event, a critical infrastructure incident targeted at the energy sector, or an attack on government departments. This paper examines cyber resilience in the states of the GCC. Read online Download PDF Joyce Hakmeh Senior Research Fellow, International Security Programme; Co-Editor, Journal of Cyber Policy @joycehakmeh LinkedIn James Shires Assistant Professor at the Institute for Security and Global Affairs, University of Leiden GettyImages-1052280468.jpg Saudi nationals attend the Gitex 2018 exhibition at the Dubai World Trade Center in Dubai on 16 October 2018. Photo: Getty Images. SummaryGCC states seek to be leaders in digital innovation, but this leaves them vulnerable to an increasing range of cyberthreats. Governments have invested significantly in cybersecurity but these measures have been unevenly implemented, makingit difficult for these states to be resilient against a large-scale cyber incident.Strategies, structures and processes (‘approaches’) for achieving cyber resilience can be conceptualized along a scale from centralized to distributed: centralized approaches maintain decision-making power in a single body, while distributed ones disperse power over many sites.Centralized approaches provide more resilience against unwanted influence, while distributed approaches provide more resilience against intrusions into infrastructure. The GCC states have so far prioritized centralized over distributed cyber resilience, seeking internet and social media control over sustainable network recovery.GCC governments should make a sustainable commitment to cyber resilience that provides clear guidance to organizations and makes best use of emerging cybersecurity structures. This may involve further engagement with international initiatives and partners to increase cyber resilience.Given limited resources, GCC governments should rebalance their efforts from centralized towards distributed approaches to resilience.GCC governments should examine the impact of relevant new technologies, discussing openly the risks of these technologies and appropriate solutions. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, International Security Programme Full Article
y The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Dynamics and Economic Interests By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 16 Mar 2020 17:25:16 +0000 17 March 2020 This paper explores armed group–community relations in Libya and the sources of revenue that have allowed armed groups to grow in power and influence. It draws out the implications for policy and identifies options for mitigating conflict dynamics. Read online Download PDF Tim Eaton Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @el_khawaga LinkedIn Abdul Rahman Alageli Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @abdulrahmanlyf Emadeddin Badi Policy Leader Fellow, School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute Mohamed Eljarh Co-founder and CEO, Libya Outlook Valerie Stocker Researcher Amru_24-2_13.jpg Fighters of the UN-backed Government of National Accord patrol in Ain Zara suburb in Tripoli, February 2020. Photo: Amru Salahuddien SummaryLibya’s multitude of armed groups have followed a range of paths since the emergence of a national governance split in 2014. Many have gradually demobilized, others have remained active, and others have expanded their influence. However, the evolution of the Libyan security sector in this period remains relatively understudied. Prior to 2011, Libya’s internal sovereignty – including the monopoly on force and sole agency in international relations – had been personally vested in the figure of Muammar Gaddafi. After his death, these elements of sovereignty reverted to local communities, which created armed organizations to fill that central gap. National military and intelligence institutions that were intended to protect the Libyan state have remained weak, with their coherence undermined further by the post-2014 governance crisis and ongoing conflict. As a result, the most effective armed groups have remained localized in nature; the exception is the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), which has combined and amalgamated locally legitimate forces under a central command.In the west and south of the country, the result of these trends resembles a kind of inversion of security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): the armed groups have used their state affiliation to co-opt the state and professionals from the state security apparatus into their ranks; and have continued to arm, mobilize and integrate themselves into the state’s security apparatus without becoming subservient to it. In the eastern region, the LAAF projects a nationalist narrative yet is ultimately subservient to its leader, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LAAF has co-opted social organizations to dominate political and economic decision-making.The LAAF has established a monopoly over the control of heavy weapons and the flow of arms in eastern Libya, and has built alliances with armed groups in the east. Armed groups in the south have been persuaded to join the LAAF’s newly established command structure. The LAAF’s offensive on the capital, which started in April 2019, represents a serious challenge to armed groups aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA). The fallout from the war will be a challenge to the GNA or any future government, as groups taking part in the war will expect to be rewarded. SSR is thus crucial in the short term: if the GNA offers financial and technical expertise and resources, plus legal cover, to armed groups under its leadership, it will increase the incentive for armed groups to be receptive to its plans for reform.Prevailing policy narratives presuppose that the interests of armed actors are distinct from those of the communities they claim to represent. Given the degree to which most armed groups are embedded in local society, however, successful engagement will necessarily rely on addressing the fears, grievances and desires of the surrounding communities. Yet the development of armed groups’ capacities, along with their increasing access to autonomous means of generating revenue, has steadily diluted their accountability to local communities. This process is likely to be accelerated by the ongoing violence around Tripoli.Communities’ relationship to armed groups varies across different areas of the country, reflecting the social, political, economic and security environment:Despite their clear preference for a more formal, state-controlled security sector, Tripoli’s residents broadly accept the need for the presence of armed groups to provide security. The known engagement of the capital’s four main armed groups in criminal activity is a trade-off that many residents seem able to tolerate, providing that overt violence remains low. Nonetheless, there is a widespread view that the greed of Tripoli’s armed groups has played a role in stoking the current conflict.In the east, many residents appear to accept (or even welcome) the LAAF’s expansion beyond the security realm, provided that it undertakes these roles effectively. That said, such is the extent of LAAF control that opposition to the alliance comes at a high price.In the south, armed groups draw heavily on social legitimacy, acting as guardians of tribal zones of influence and defenders of their respective communities against outside threats, while also at times stoking local conflicts. Social protections continue to hold sway, meaning that accountability within communities is also limited.To varying extents since 2014, Libya’s armed groups have developed networks that enmesh political and business stakeholders in revenue-generation models:Armed groups in Tripoli have compensated for reduced financial receipts from state budgets by cultivating unofficial and illicit sources of income. They have also focused on infiltrating state institutions to ensure access to state budgets and contracts dispersed in the capital.In the east of the country, the LAAF has developed a long-term strategy to dominate the security, political and economic spheres through the establishment of a quasi-legal basis for receiving funds from Libya’s rival state authorities. It has supplemented this with extensive intervention in the private sector. External patronage supports military operations, but also helps to keep this financial system, based on unsecured debt, afloat.In the south, limited access to funds from the central state has spurred armed groups to become actively involved in the economy. This has translated into the taxation of movement and the imposition of protection fees, particularly on informal (and often illicit) activity.Without real commitment from international policymakers to enforcing the arms embargo and protecting the economy from being weaponized, Libya will be consigned to sustained conflict, further fragmentation and potential economic collapse. Given the likely absence of a political settlement in the short term, international policymakers should seek to curtail the continued expansion of the conflict economy by reducing armed groups’ engagement in economic life.In order to reduce illicit activities, international policymakers should develop their capacity to identify and target chokepoints along illicit supply chains, with a focus on restraining activities and actors in closest proximity to violence. Targeted sanctions against rent maximizers (both armed and unarmed) is likely to be the most effective strategy. More effective investigation and restraint of conflict economy actors will require systemic efforts to improve transparency and enhance the institutional capacity of anti-corruption authorities. International policymakers should also support the development of tailored alternative livelihoods that render conflict economy activities less attractive. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chaos States, Countering Conflict Economies in MENA, Libya’s Conflict Economy Full Article
y Webinar: Can the Justice and Development Party Still Absorb Popular Anger in Morocco? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 13:50:01 +0000 Webinar Research Event 8 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm Event participants Mohammed Masbah, Director, Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis; Associate Fellow, MENA Programme, Chatham HouseModerator: Lina Khatib, Director, MENA Programme, Chatham House Ever since independence, the Moroccan monarchy has used political parties to legitimize the country’s authoritarian political process and structure, and to absorb social and political anger. The palace puts successive governments and other elected institutions, such as local and regional councils, at the frontline of public blame, and replaces them once they fail this function.In a recent article, MENA Programme Associate Fellow, Mohammed Masbah, examines how the Moroccan monarchy has used this strategy with the ruling Justice and Development Party (PJD) so that the palace remains the centre of political power, while the PJD – and other political parties before it– takes responsibility for coping with the mounting socio-economic crisis.In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on The Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa, the article’s author will discuss the risks this approach presents for the long-term stability of Morocco and what reforms are needed to increase citizens’ dwindling confidence in the political process.You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, The Future of the State in the Middle East Full Article
y Can Morocco Effectively Handle the COVID-19 Crisis? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 06 Apr 2020 09:10:24 +0000 6 April 2020 Dr Mohammed Masbah Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @MasbahMohammed LinkedIn Google Scholar Anna Jacobs Senior Research Assistant, Brookings Doha Center The Moroccan government is capitalizing on a burst of unity, social solidarity and public support in the face of a crisis. However, if it fails to effectively mitigate the public health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, this spirit of solidarity and cooperation will not last long. GettyImages-1208907580.jpg A general view of empty stores during curfew as a precaution against the new type of coronavirus (COVID-19) in Rabat, Morocco on 1 April 2020. Photo by Jalal Morchidi/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images. In Morocco, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased public trust in government, but people still have doubts about the effectiveness of the healthcare system. According to a recent study conducted by the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA), the majority of Moroccans surveyed are generally satisfied with the measures taken by the government to battle the coronavirus. However, the same survey also shows that Moroccans do not have confidence in the healthcare sector’s ability to respond to this pandemic.The positive perceptions of the government’s response can be explained by the swift and strict measures enacted. King Mohammed VI held a high-level meeting with the prime minister, the minister of health, and top security officials on 17 March and a few days later, on 20 March, the Moroccan government declared a state of health emergency and began to implement aggressive measures to contain the virus.This has included closing airports, schools, mosques, cafés and shops – with the exception of food markets – preventing large gatherings, as well as strict guidelines to ensure social distancing. As of 2 April, nearly 5000 people have been arrested for violating the state of health emergency.In order to address urgent medical needs and to mitigate the economic impact of the pandemic, the King ordered the creation of an emergency fund, raising more than 32.7 billion Moroccan Dirhams ($3.2 billion). The Ministry of Finance will begin to make cash transfers to vulnerable citizens, and especially those who have lost their jobs. However, the stipulations surrounding these cash transfers will be decided in the coming weeks.Updates about the virus are communicated daily by the Ministry of Health, despite growing criticism of its communication strategy. As of 4 April, Moroccan authorities have confirmed 883 cases and 58 deaths.Call for national unityIn times like these, there is a call for unity in the face of a national and global crisis, and opposition groups such as Adl wal Ihssan and Rif activists have expressed their support for government measures and have encouraged people to follow the new guidelines and restrictions. However, despite calls to release political prisoners, Moroccan authorities have not indicated that they will do so. This is a missed opportunity vis-à-vis the opposition because it could have served as a way to further strengthen national unity during the crisis.These are all promising signs and point to what is likely to be a short-term burst in unity and institutional trust. However, the institutional weaknesses in governance and the healthcare system have not disappeared, which is why this increase in institutional trust should be taken with a grain of salt.Public trust issuesThis pandemic poses tremendous challenges for governments across the globe, and this holds especially true for states in the Middle East and North Africa region, where citizens do not approve of government performance and do not trust key state institutions. The 2019 Arab Barometer survey found that Moroccans do not trust most of the country’s political institutions (notably the parliament and the Council of Ministers) and the level of satisfaction with the government’s performance remains extremely low.On the public health front, as shown in two of MIPA’s recent surveys, trust in the healthcare system is also very low. Around three-quarters of those surveyed do not trust Moroccan hospitals, highlighting the acute structural problems in the healthcare system. In fact, there is a stark divide between private and public healthcare, as well as a huge gap in access to healthcare facilities between urban and rural areas. Most of the country’s hospitals and doctors are located in major urban areas and the only three laboratories with capabilities for COVID-19 testing are located in Rabat and Casablanca, but even there, testing capacity is very limited.Similar to other countries, there could be a major shortage of doctors and medical equipment throughout Morocco. So far, the Ministry of Finance has said that 2 billion dirhams of the emergency fund will go towards purchasing medical equipment such as beds, ventilators, tests, prevention kits and radiology equipment, but the timeline remains unclear.A vulnerable economyThere is significant concern about the medium- and long-term economic impact of the virus. Two of the country’s key economic sectors have already been hit hard: agriculture and tourism. The agricultural sector was already struggling due to the impact of drought, while the coronavirus pandemic is likely to impact Morocco’s tourism industry not just this year, but well into 2021. In terms of government response, the emergency fund is a strong start, but questions surrounding the management of these funds have already been raised.The most vulnerable parts of the population have been affected by the economic crisis because of the country’s bulging informal sector – in which most people work - and a very weak private sector. In fact, two-thirds of the workforce are not covered by a pension plan, almost half of the working population does not currently benefit from medical coverage and there is no social care system for vulnerable parts of the population. As of 1 April, more than 700,000 workers have lost their jobs.Moving forward?Even if public perceptions of the government’s response are positive at the moment, this is most likely a short-term surge that should not be taken for granted. Despite the efforts made by the government, Morocco’s health system is not equipped to handle this crisis. Even with the new measures that have been implemented, if the spread of the virus gets out of control, more funds, more doctors, and more equipment will be needed. Given the structural weaknesses of the healthcare system, this will be an uphill battle.Moreover, even if the government manages to mitigate the public health impact, the economic consequences will be dire—especially in the tourism industry—and will severely hurt those workers in the informal sector who are living without a safety net. In Morocco, this category represents most of the working population.This crisis highlights that the Moroccan government must urgently tackle its large portfolio of unfinished reforms, notably in healthcare, the economy, and labour rights. So far, the government is capitalizing on the spirit of unity, social solidarity and public support. The future trajectory of the pandemic and the effectiveness of governance will determine if this spirit of solidarity will last. If the government fails to effectively mitigate the public health and economic impacts of this pandemic, this solidarity and cooperation will not last long. Full Article
y Webinar: Federalism in a Fragmented State: Rethinking Decentralization in Yemen By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 07 Apr 2020 11:40:01 +0000 Research Event 15 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm Event participants Osamah Al Rawhani, Deputy Director, Sana’a Center for Strategic StudiesModerator: Nadim Houry, Executive Director, Arab Reform Initiative Yemen suffered from the excessive control of the central government prior to the current conflict. Federalism has been put forward by many Yemeni political parties since the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as the supposed magic cure for this significant problem. Today, Yemen is more fragmented than ever, its state central institutions have been scattered and lack leadership and the state has lost most of its sovereignty. The prevailing narrative that decentralization through federalism is Yemen’s inevitable path post-conflict often fails to acknowledge that there are prerequisites for effective local governance, beyond political will. In a recent article, Osamah Al Rawhani addressed how the weakness of central state institutions is the key challenge to proceeding with federalism in Yemen and highlighted prerequisites and contextual factors that need to be addressed before reforming the structure of the state. He argued that the viability of decentralization relies on the presence of a functioning, representative central government that is capable of devolving power but also able to keep the state from further fragmentation. In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on The Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa, the article’s author will discuss recent developments in Yemen, where shifting frontlines and regional divisions are fragmenting the country in new ways. The speaker will explore alternative approaches to pursue the path of federalism that recognize the current realities and the critical need for strong central institutions. He will also survey the internal and external factors that must be considered to rebuild a stable state in Yemen.You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, The Future of the State in the Middle East Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
y Lebanon: Futile Victory By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 07 Apr 2020 15:11:46 +0000 1 June 2008 , Number 3 For the third time in less than two years, Beirut has been turned into a battleground, with Hizbollah and the opposition taking over the city. The government and its allies did not engage militarily, managing to avoid civil war and becoming a regional battlefield. The Arab League is now trying to sort things out, highlighting the regional and international dimensions. Nadim Shehadi Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @Confusezeus APLeb2.jpg Full Article
y Webinar: Reimagining the Role of State and Non-State Actors in (Re)building National Health Systems in the Arab World By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 14:15:01 +0000 Research Event 22 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm Event participants Fadi El-Jardali, Professor of Health Policy and Systems, American University of BeirutModerator: Nadim Houry, Executive Director, Arab Reform Initiative As new cases of COVID-19 continue to surge, countries around the world struggle to mitigate the public health and economic effects of the virus. It is becoming increasingly clear that an effective pandemic response requires a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach. In the Arab world, where health systems are already strained by armed conflicts and displaced populations, a whole-of-society response to the pandemic is particularly critical as countries have become increasingly dependent on non-state actors, notably the private sector, for healthcare provision and any response that includes the state alone may not be sufficient to address the pandemic.In a recent article, Fadi El-Jardali, argued that while the pandemic will have grave health and economic consequences for years to come, it brings with it a valuable opportunity to re-envision the role of state and non-state actors in strengthening health systems. The article addressed the need for increased collaboration between state and non-state actors, and the rethinking of existing cooperation models to provide quality healthcare services for all. In this webinar, part of the Chatham House project on the future of the state in the Middle East and North Africa, Dr El-Jardali will discuss how state and non-state actors can collaborate more effectively to address the shortcomings of national health care systems amidst the pandemic and beyond. The article’s author will share insights on the different capacities available in Arab societies that governments can draw upon to ensure that Universal Health Coverage, equity considerations and social justice are at the core of health systems.You can express your interest in attending by following this link. You will receive a Zoom confirmation email should your registration be successful. Alternatively, you can watch the event live on the MENA Programme Facebook page. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, The Future of the State in the Middle East Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
y Webinar: Idlib at Risk – Doctors and First Responders in Northwest Syria By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 08:55:01 +0000 Members Event Webinar 23 April 2020 - 5:00pm to 6:00pm Online Event participants Dr Munzer al-Khalil, Head, Idlib Health DirectorateRaed Al Saleh, Director, Syria Civil Defence (The White Helmets)Alaa Rajaa Mughrabieh, Child Protection Officer, Hurras NetworkChair: Dr Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House In Syria, uncertainty about the safety of the ceasefire agreed between Russia and Turkey last month is inhibiting 1 million people who have been displaced since December 2019 from returning home.The looming COVID-19 global health crisis threatens to further devastate those most vulnerable as the conditions in northwest Syria’s refugee camps make it hard to practice common social distancing guidelines. Added to this, the medical infrastructure in the region has been decimated after years of bombings which has disabled over 70 health facilities since April 2019.This webinar highlights the potentially catastrophic risks of a coronavirus outbreak in Idlib and displacement camps in northwest Syria by speaking with medical and civil society actors working in the region. How are doctors and local humanitarian organizations scaling up their medical and prevention response to the COVID-19 outbreak?What key supplies such as ventilators, testing kits and critical sanitary equipment are still lacking? And how can the international community step in to help mitigate the potentially devastating consequences of an outbreak in these refugee camps?This event is run in collaboration with The Syria Campaign, a human rights organization working with Syrian civil society to raise the voices of those struggling for democracy, and support frontline activists and humanitarians. Full Article
y Egypt and the Gulf: Allies and Rivals By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Sun, 19 Apr 2020 20:38:18 +0000 20 April 2020 There is and will continue to be an edge of rivalry in Egypt’s relations with the dominant Gulf Arab powers. This paper will focus primarily on the Egypt–Gulf relationship during the Sisi era. Read online Download PDF David Butter Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @DavidCButter 2020-04-20-Egypt-Gulf.jpg Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed is welcomed by Egypt’s President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi in Cairo on 19 June 2017. Photo: Getty Images. Summary Egypt and the Gulf Arab region have long been important poles of political, military economic and cultural power and influence in the Middle East. Under the presidency of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Egypt was the dominant force in the region, but the balance of power shifted towards the Gulf in the 1970s, as Egypt’s economy faltered and the Gulf Arab states reaped the benefits of resurgent oil prices in the wake of the 1973 OPEC embargo. The popular uprising against President Hosni Mubarak’s regime in 2011 elicited divergent reactions in the Gulf. The leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were concerned about the risks of a movement for revolutionary change spreading to their own region, while Qatar saw an opportunity to strengthen its regional role through supporting the Muslim Brotherhood.The forcible removal of Egypt’s elected president, Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, in July 2013 by the army commander, Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, ushered in a new era in Egypt–Gulf relations. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait quickly mobilized financial support for the new administration. Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed, known for his intense opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood, signalled his strong support for the new regime by visiting Cairo only weeks after hundreds of Morsi’s supporters were killed.Between July 2013 and August 2016, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided about $30 billion in aid to the Sisi regime through placing deposits with the Central Bank of Egypt and supplying petroleum products as grants. The UAE sought to link its aid to a programme of economic reforms, but the Egyptian government finally decided in mid-2016 to negotiate a loan agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since the signing of the $12 billion loan with the IMF in November 2016, Egypt has no longer been reliant on Gulf Arab financial support, although some of the deposits placed previously have been rolled over on reaching maturity.During the Sisi era, Egypt has benefited from its economic links to the Gulf over a wide spectrum of activities. The UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular are increasingly important export markets for Egyptian companies, as well as major sources of foreign direct investment. The financial aid provided by Sisi’s Gulf allies in 2013–16 has also helped to underpin the surge in Egypt’s arms procurement. Another critical element in the economic relationship is the presence of millions of expatriate Egyptian workers in the Gulf, who are responsible for a large share of the annual inflow of about $25 billion in remittances.Egypt’s most important political relationships in the Gulf have been with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Ties with Saudi Arabia were affected by the death of King Abdullah at the start of 2015 and by the subsequent emergence of Mohammed bin Salman as the most influential figure in the kingdom. During a visit by King Abdullah’s successor, King Salman, to Cairo in April 2016, Egypt announced a decision to cede sovereignty over two Red Sea islands, Tiran and Sanafir, to Saudi Arabia. Relations soured after this decision was challenged in the Egyptian courts, but the issue was resolved in favour of the deal. Egypt played no active role in the Saudi- and UAE-led intervention in Yemen, but joined its two principal Gulf allies and Bahrain in imposing sanctions on Qatar in mid-2017. Relations between Sisi and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed have remained close throughout the past seven years. The UAE and Egypt have been among the most important external supporters of the Libyan National Army, commanded by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, although they have not created an overt alliance in this arena. Egypt has adopted a more prominent diplomatic profile in relation to Libya, while the UAE has been more deeply engaged militarily, to judge from assessments by the panel of experts tasked to monitor adherence to the UN embargo on the supply of weapons to Libya. The relationship between the Egyptian and Emirati leaders is underpinned by a strong shared ideological antipathy to the Muslim Brotherhood.Following the completion of the IMF programme in 2019, the Egyptian economy is in a much stronger position than it was in the early period of Sisi’s rule, even though this has exacted a harsh toll on the 60 per cent of the population classified by the World Bank as poor or vulnerable. There is no pressing need for direct financial support from the Gulf, but Egypt still depends on economic linkages through trade, investment, tourism and remittances. In this respect, the balance of power has tilted marginally back towards Egypt. However, Egypt is still beset by deep internal political contradictions, as reflected in the regime’s heavy reliance on coercion and repression, and the economy remains vulnerable to external shocks – of which the coronavirus pandemic is a prime example. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Full Article
y Webinar: Egypt and the Gulf: Allies and Rivals By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 08:25:01 +0000 Research Event 23 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm Event participants Speaker: David Butter, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham HouseModerator: Mohamed El Dahshan, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House The webinar will be livestreamed on the MENA Programme Facebook page.Egypt and the Gulf Arab region have long been important poles of political, military, economic and cultural power and influence in the Middle East. A recently published Chatham House paper examines the strategic and economic relationship between Egypt and the Gulf, focusing in particular on the period since Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi came to power in Egypt. Author David Butter offers a detailed evaluation of these economic relationships, in the broader context of a strategic alliance that, since 2013, has been informed by a common commitment between Egypt and the UAE in particular to keep in check the Muslim Brotherhood and its regional state supporters, primarily Turkey and Qatar.In this webinar, the author will discuss the paper’s main argument, namely, that the degree of Egypt’s dependence on Gulf countries has fluctuated, and that by 2019, Egypt’s direct financial dependence on the Gulf was significantly reduced by comparison with the initial three years of the Sisi era, although other economic linkages such as investment, trade, remittances and tourism remained strong, with potential for growth. The speaker will also discuss the impact of the global crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on Egypt’s and Gulf countries’ economies and will explore the implications for the relationship between Egypt and the Gulf.This webinar is part of the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme's Online Event Series. The event will be held on the record. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
y Why is it So Hard for Iraq to Form A Government? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Sat, 25 Apr 2020 17:03:58 +0000 25 April 2020 Dr Renad Mansour Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative @renadmansour Mustafa al-Kadhimi has emerged as the compromise prime minister designate, but his potential appointment is built on shaky foundations. 2020-04-25-Iraq-Security-COVID A member of Iraqi security forces stands guard behind a yellow line after the government declared curfew due to coronavirus. Photo by Fariq Faraj Mahmood/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images. On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih gathered the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni political blocs at the presidential palace to task head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi with forming a government.Kadhimi is the third prime minister-designate assigned since Prime Minister Adil abd al-Mehdi resigned in November, in the wake of mass protests against government corruption and the country’s ethno-sectarian based political system.Kadhimi’s two predecessors, Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi, both failed to form a government. This third attempt came as Iraq struggles with repeated crises since October 2019, when the government began responding with deadly force to large-scale mass protests, killing more than 600 and injuring tens of thousands.In January, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani escalated tensions between the United States and Iran, with Iraq stuck in the middle and becoming the home for regular tit-for-tat attacks. The Islamic State — never completely defeated — took advantage of these crises and increased its attacks in disputed territories.The outbreak of COVID-19 challenges the country’s fragile public health sector, while the decline in the price of oil will make it harder for leaders to pay the public salaries that keep the system (and patronage) moving.What does the delay in forming a government amid multiple crises mean for the post-2003 Iraqi political system? Iraq’s post-2003 political system is designed to withstand crisis. Over the years, political parties reflecting the country’s ethnic and sectarian divides have had a tacit understanding that crises represent a risk to their collective interests. These elite stakeholders have together weathered civil war, insurgency and multiple protests — despite deep conflicts with one another.For instance, in September 2018 protesters attacked most major political party headquarters and the Iranian consulate in Basra, and authorities killed some 20 protesters.Since the May election of that year, the fragmented Shia elite had been unable to even declare which side has the largest parliamentary bloc, let alone decide on a government.But after the September crisis, the previously gridlocked parties swiftly came together to form an “understanding” that pushed through the impasse leading to the Mehdi government. In 2020, however, Iraq’s political parties were slower to come back together despite the multiple crises — far greater than 2018. The system is less able to swiftly fix itself, based primarily on the fragmentation of the elite — and their determination to prevent any challenge to their rule.Why did the two prior attempts fail? The two previous prime minister-designates each fell short for different reasons. When I met Allawi in February at the prime minister’s guesthouse in Baghdad, he was very clearly convinced that his mandate was to sideline the parties.He hoped that simply choosing technocratic ministers outside the elite pact, with the support of Moqtada al-Sadr behind him, would garner support from protesters and the disillusioned public. He failed, however, because his cabinet had to go through parliament and the parties rejected what they saw a threat to the elite pact and the system.Zurfi similarly failed after being directly appointed in March by Salih after the Shia parties failed to come up with a candidate. From the beginning, then, Zurfi faced challenges because parties were not in agreement. He attempted to directly confront his opposition, and spoke out against Iranian influence in Iraq. As a result, Zurfi was unable to even get to parliament with his proposed cabinet, as the Shia parties got back together to bring him down.The failure of both strategies — Allawi attempting to work outside the elite party system and Zurfi trying to target certain parties — reveals tensions in Iraq’s political system. This fragmentation strains the parties’ ability to swiftly unite, and the system’s ability to withstand crises.The endemic problems are a consequence of fragmentation, including the failure following the 2018 elections to declare governing parliamentary bloc. Moreover, after that election, newcomers into the political system (two-thirds of the MPs are serving their first term) are increasingly making their own demands and less willing to blindly toe party lines.Can Kadhimi overcome the impasse?Kadhimi’s appointment as prime minister-designate nonetheless is on shaky foundations. His appointment had previously faced a veto from Iran and its allied groups which make up the Fateh bloc. Kataeb Hezbollah, an armed group close to Iran and linked to the Popular Mobilization Units, issued a statement accusing Kadhimi with blood on his hands for the deaths of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.Many Fateh bloc members had for months vetoed Kadhimi’s name due to this allegation. Immediately before Kadhimi addressed the nation for the first time, Iraqi state television broadcast a prerecorded statement by PMU (and Fateh) leader Qais al-Khazali, who had also previously accused Kadhimi of spying for the Americans and being complicit in the two killings.Khazali, who commands the second-largest party within Fateh, accepted the party line to back Kadhimi but came out with his own conditions on television. However, the concerns about the COVID-19 crisis and the collapse of the price of oil finally brought all sides to compromise — a design of the political system.Kadhimi has signalled he will play by the old rules with these stakeholders. Because of the magnitude of these simultaneous crises, Iraqi politics is moving back to the post-2003 norm. The ethno-sectarian based political system is geared to weather such existential crises more than it is to handling day-to-day governance. Despite the notion of “post-sectarianism” in Iraq, this system is based on ethno-sectarian political party compromise.In his television address, Khazali, who had previously attempted to move away from sectarian language, explained that the process of selecting a prime minister is reserved to the Shia, who have the right as the majority, and not to Salih, a Kurd.Over the years Kadhimi has expressed an admiration of the bravery of the protesters and of the importance of civil society. Many Iraqi civil society activists owe their lives to the work of the former intelligence chief. However, he has also been part of the same system that has violently suppressed protesters.As the compromise prime minister-designate, he will find it difficult to transform his country as long as he plays by the rules of post-2003 Iraq — an irony not lost on the protesters who immediately rejected the candidacy of a man whom until recently many protesters had supported.This article was originally published in The Washington Post Full Article
y Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Transitional Justice for the Victims of ISIS in Syria By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 15:50:01 +0000 28 April 2020 This paper aims to assist the region’s local authorities, and their key foreign backers, in understanding how transitional justice can provide alternative avenues for holding local ISIS members to account while contributing to the healing of communities. Read online Download PDF Haid Haid Senior Consulting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @HaidHaid22 2020-04-28-Syria-prison.jpg A fighter with the Syrian Democratic Forces monitors prisoners accused of being affiliated with ISIS, at a prison in the northeastern Syrian city of Hassakeh on 25 October 2019. Photo: Getty Images. SummaryFollowing the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.The piecemeal approach to justice is deeply flawed, and raises particular concerns about due process. No precise instruments exist to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. In any event, the scale of the crimes and the number of victims – as well as severe shortages of resources and workers – make dispensation of justice extremely difficult through the traditional legal system.Not all detained ISIS members receive prison sentences. Individuals who did not hold senior roles in the group’s apparatus and are not accused of ‘major’ crimes (in practice, largely defined as fighting for ISIS and murder) are being released under limited reconciliation deals with tribal leaders. But the involvement of local community leaders in those efforts is not enough to ensure positive results. Many victims are upset at seeing ISIS members walk free without even admitting their guilt publicly or apologizing for the pain they caused.To overcome the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework, a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members. A combination of non-judicial mechanisms such as truth commissions, missing persons’ committees, and reparations and victim-healing programmes could play a vital role in providing ISIS victims with a sense of justice while contributing to peacebuilding and stability.Ignoring the urgency of developing a long-term plan to serve justice and contribute to community healing will almost certainly allow ISIS to continue to prevent the recovery and development of northeastern Syria. This, in turn, risks undermining the stability of the country and the region at large. Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme Full Article
y Can Protest Movements in the MENA Region Turn COVID-19 Into an Opportunity for Change? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 14:07:38 +0000 29 April 2020 Dr Georges Fahmi Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @GeorgesFahmi The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region, that depends on the ability of both governments and protest movements to capitalize on this moment. After all, crises do not change the world - people do. 2020-04-28-covid-19-protest-movement-mena.jpg An aerial view shows the Lebanese capital Beirut's Martyrs Square that was until recent months the gathering place of anti-government demonstrators, almost deserted during the novel coronavirus crisis, on 26 March 2020. Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images. COVID-19 has offered regimes in the region the opportunity to end popular protest. The squares of Algiers, Baghdad, and Beirut – all packed with protesters over the past few months – are now empty due to the pandemic, and political gatherings have also been suspended. In Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon, COVID-19 has achieved what snipers, pro-regime propaganda, and even the economic crisis, could not.Moreover, political regimes have taken advantage of the crisis to expand their control over the political sphere by arresting their opponents, such as in Algeria where the authorities have cracked down on a number of active voices of the Hirak movement. Similarly, in Lebanon, security forces have used the pandemic as an excuse to crush sit-ins held in Martyr’s Square in Beirut and Nour Square in Tripoli.However, despite the challenges that the pandemic has brought, it also offers opportunities for protest movements in the region. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization in the streets, it has created new forms of activism in the shape of solidarity initiatives to help those affected by its consequences.In Iraq, for example, protest groups have directed their work towards awareness-raising and sharing essential food to help mitigate the problem of food shortages and rising prices across the country. In Algeria, Hirak activists have run online campaigns to raise awareness about the virus and have encouraged people to stay at home. Others have been cleaning and disinfecting public spaces. These initiatives increase the legitimacy of the protest movement, and if coupled with political messages, could offer these movements an important chance to expand their base of popular support.Exposes economic vulnerabilityEconomic grievances, corruption and poor provision of public services have been among the main concerns of this recent wave of protests. This pandemic only further exposes the levels of economic vulnerability in the region. COVID-19 is laying bare the socio-economic inequalities in MENA countries; this is particularly evident in the numbers of people engaged in the informal economy with no access to social security, including health insurance and pensions.Informal employment, approximately calculated by the share of the labour force not contributing to social security, is estimated to amount to 65.5% of total employment in Lebanon, 64.4% in Iraq, and 63.3% in Algeria. The crisis has underscored the vulnerability of this large percentage of the labour force who have been unable to afford the economic repercussions of following state orders to stay at home.The situation has also called attention to the vital need for efficient public services and healthcare systems. According to the fifth wave of the Arab Barometer, 74.4% of people in Lebanon are dissatisfied with their country’s healthcare services, as are 67.8% of people in Algeria and 66.5% in Iraq.Meanwhile, 66.2% of people in Lebanon believe it is necessary to pay a bribe in order to receive better healthcare, as do 56.2% of people in Iraq and 55.9% in Algeria. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the need for more government investment in public healthcare systems to render them more efficient and less corrupt, strengthening the protesters’ case for the need for radical socio-economic reforms.On the geopolitical level, the crisis puts into question the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region. For years, Western powers have directed their aid towards security forces in the interests of combating terrorism but COVID-19 has proved itself to be a much more lethal challenge to both the region and the West.Facing this new challenge requires international actors to reconsider their approach to include supporting health and education initiatives, as well as freedom of expression and transparency. As argued by Western policymakers themselves, it was China’s lack of transparency and slow response that enabled the proliferation of the virus, when it could have been contained in Wuhan back in December 2019.This crisis therefore offers regional protest movements the opportunity to capitalize on this moment and push back against the policies of Western powers that have invested in regional stability only to the extent of combating Islamic jihad. But crises do not change the world, people do. The COVID-19 pandemic will not in itself result in political change in the MENA region. Rather, it brings opportunities and risks that, when exploited, will allow political actors to advance their own agendas. While the crisis has put an end to popular mobilization and allowed regimes to tighten their grip over the political sphere, behind these challenges lie real opportunities for protest movements.The current situation represents a possibility for them to expand their popular base through solidarity initiatives and has exposed more widely the importance of addressing socio-economic inequalities. Finally, it offers the chance to challenge the stability-focused approach of Western powers towards the region which until now has predominantly focused on combating terrorism. Full Article
y Webinar: Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Transitional Justice for the Victims of ISIS in Syria By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 May 2020 09:05:01 +0000 Research Event 12 May 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pmAdd to CalendariCalendar Outlook Google Yahoo Haid Haid, Senior Consulting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham HouseSara Kayyali, Syria Researcher, Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights WatchModerator: Lina Khatib, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House You can register your interest here. Alternatively, you can watch the webinar live on the MENA Programme Facebook page.Following the territorial defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in the region is now grappling with the task of quickly dealing with thousands of the group’s detained members while bringing justice to their victims. To that end, local authorities are focusing on the use of counterterrorism laws and courts to charge captured ISIS members and determine their guilt accordingly.In a recent research paper, author Haid Haid argues that this approach to justice is deeply flawed as it raises concerns about due process and lacks the precise instruments to determine the personal responsibility of ISIS individuals for specific crimes, or for their role in war crimes committed by the group. The paper proposes that a ‘transitional justice’ approach could provide judicial and non-judicial instruments to establish accountability for ISIS crimes and reduce community resistance to the reintegration of group members.In this webinar, part of the MENA Programme’s Online Event Series, speakers will examine the benefits of such an approach to justice for overcoming the limitations of the current, counterterrorism-focused framework. Panelists will discuss the alternative mechanisms local authorities and their key foreign backers can use to hold local ISIS members to account while contributing to the healing of communities. The event will be held on the record. Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email Department/project Middle East and North Africa Programme, Syria from Within Full Article
Reni Zhelyazkova Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme +44 (0)20 7314 3624 Email
y Politics, policy-making and the presence of images of suffering children By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 07 May 2020 08:45:52 +0000 7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3 Helen Berents Read Online In 2017 Trump expressed pity for the ‘beautiful babies’ killed in a gas attack on Khan Shaykhun in Syria before launching airstrikes against President Assad's regime. Images of suffering children in world politics are often used as a synecdoche for a broader conflict or disaster. Injured, suffering, or dead; the ways in which images of children circulate in global public discourse must be critically examined to uncover the assumptions that operate in these environments. This article explores reactions to images of children by representatives and leaders of states to trace the interconnected affective and political dimensions of these images. In contrast to attending to the expected empathetic responses prompted by images of children, this article particularly focuses on when such images prompt bellicose foreign policy decision-making. In doing this, the article forwards a way of thinking about images as contentious affective objects in international relations. The ways in which images of children's bodies and suffering are strategically deployed by politicians deserves closer scrutiny to uncover the visual politics of childhood inherent in these moments of international politics and policy-making. Full Article
y Soundscapes of war: the audio-visual performance of war by Shi'a militias in Iraq and Syria By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 07 May 2020 09:16:54 +0000 7 May 2020 , Volume 96, Number 3 Helle Malmvig Read online This article sets out to bring sound and music to the field of visual studies in International Relations. It argues that IR largely has approached the visual field as if it was without sound; neglecting how audial landscapes frame and direct our interpretation of moving imagery. Sound and music contribute to making imagery intelligible to us, we ‘hear the pictures’ often without noticing. The audial can for instance articulate a visual absence, or blast visual signs, bring out certain emotional stages or subjects’ inner life. Audial frames steer us in distinct directions, they can mute the cries of the wounded in war, or amplify the sounds of joy of soldiers shooting in the air. To bring the audial and the visual analytically and empirically together, the article therefore proposes four key analytical themes: 1) the audial–visual frame, 2) point of view/point of audition, 3) modes of audio-visual synchronization and 4) aesthetics moods. These are applied to a study of ‘war music videos’ in Iraq and Syria made and circulated by Shi'a militias currently fighting there. Such war music videos, it is suggested, are not just artefacts of popular culture, but have become integral parts of how warfare is practiced today, and one that is shared by soldiers in the US and Europe. War music videos are performing war, just as they shape how war is known by spectators and participants alike. Full Article
y Insulin-Like Growth Factor Dysregulation Both Preceding and Following Type 1 Diabetes Diagnosis By diabetes.diabetesjournals.org Published On :: 2020-02-20T11:55:30-08:00 Insulin-like growth factors (IGFs), specifically IGF1 and IGF2, promote glucose metabolism, with their availability regulated by IGF-binding proteins (IGFBPs). We hypothesized that IGF1 and IGF2 levels, or their bioavailability, are reduced during type 1 diabetes development. Total serum IGF1, IGF2, and IGFBP1–7 levels were measured in an age-matched, cross-sectional cohort at varying stages of progression to type 1 diabetes. IGF1 and IGF2 levels were significantly lower in autoantibody (AAb)+ compared with AAb– relatives of subjects with type 1 diabetes. Most high-affinity IGFBPs were unchanged in individuals with pre–type 1 diabetes, suggesting that total IGF levels may reflect bioactivity. We also measured serum IGFs from a cohort of fasted subjects with type 1 diabetes. IGF1 levels significantly decreased with disease duration, in parallel with declining β-cell function. Additionally, plasma IGF levels were assessed in an AAb+ cohort monthly for a year. IGF1 and IGF2 showed longitudinal stability in single AAb+ subjects, but IGF1 levels decreased over time in subjects with multiple AAb and those who progressed to type 1 diabetes, particularly postdiagnosis. In sum, IGFs are dysregulated both before and after the clinical diagnosis of type 1 diabetes and may serve as novel biomarkers to improve disease prediction. Full Article
y Evidence Against an Important Role of Plasma Insulin and Glucagon Concentrations in the Increase in EGP Caused by SGLT2 Inhibitors By diabetes.diabetesjournals.org Published On :: 2020-03-20T11:50:28-07:00 Sodium–glucose cotransport 2 inhibitors (SGLT2i) lower plasma glucose but stimulate endogenous glucose production (EGP). The current study examined the effect of dapagliflozin on EGP while clamping plasma glucose, insulin, and glucagon concentrations at their fasting level. Thirty-eight patients with type 2 diabetes received an 8-h measurement of EGP ([3-3H]-glucose) on three occasions. After a 3-h tracer equilibration, subjects received 1) dapagliflozin 10 mg (n = 26) or placebo (n = 12); 2) repeat EGP measurement with the plasma glucose concentration clamped at the fasting level; and 3) repeat EGP measurement with inhibition of insulin and glucagon secretion with somatostatin infusion and replacement of basal plasma insulin and glucagon concentrations. In study 1, the change in EGP (baseline to last hour of EGP measurement) in subjects receiving dapagliflozin was 22% greater (+0.66 ± 0.11 mg/kg/min, P < 0.05) than in subjects receiving placebo, and it was associated with a significant increase in plasma glucagon and a decrease in the plasma insulin concentration compared with placebo. Under glucose clamp conditions (study 2), the change in plasma insulin and glucagon concentrations was comparable in subjects receiving dapagliflozin and placebo, yet the difference in EGP between dapagliflozin and placebo persisted (+0.71 ± 0.13 mg/kg/min, P < 0.01). Under pancreatic clamp conditions (study 3), dapagliflozin produced an initial large decrease in EGP (8% below placebo), followed by a progressive increase in EGP that was 10.6% greater than placebo during the last hour. Collectively, these results indicate that 1) the changes in plasma insulin and glucagon concentration after SGLT2i administration are secondary to the decrease in plasma glucose concentration, and 2) the dapagliflozin-induced increase in EGP cannot be explained by the increase in plasma glucagon or decrease in plasma insulin or glucose concentrations. Full Article
y The National Oncology PET Registry (NOPR): A monumental effort by a few leaders By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2018-01-25T14:01:12-08:00 Full Article
y PARP-1-targeted Auger emitters display high-LET cytotoxic properties in vitro but show limited therapeutic utility in solid tumor models of human neuroblastoma By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-01T13:36:37-07:00 The currently available therapeutic radiopharmaceutical for high-risk neuroblastoma, 131I-MIBG, is ineffective at targeting micrometastases due to the low linear energy transfer (LET) properties of high-energy beta particles. In contrast, Auger radiation has high-LET properties with nanometer ranges in tissue, efficiently causing DNA damage when emitted in close proximity to DNA. The aim of this study was to evaluate the cytotoxicity of targeted Auger therapy in pre-clinical models of high-risk neuroblastoma. Methods: Using a radiolabeled poly(ADP-ribose) polymerase (PARP) inhibitor, 125I-KX1, we delivered an Auger emitter iodine-125 to PARP-1: a chromatin-binding enzyme overexpressed in neuroblastoma. In vitro cytotoxicity of 125I-KX1 was assessed in nineteen neuroblastoma cell lines, followed by in-depth pharmacological analysis in a sensitive and resistant pair of cell lines. Immunofluorescence microscopy was used to characterize 125I-KX1-induced DNA damage. Finally, in vitro/in vivo microdosimetry was modeled from experimentally derived pharmacological variables. Results: 125I-KX1 was highly cytotoxic in vitro across a panel of neuroblastoma cell lines, directly causing double strand DNA breaks. Based on subcellular dosimetry, 125I-KX1 was approximately twice as effective compared to 131I-KX1, whereas cytoplasmic 125I-MIBG demonstrated low biological effectiveness. Despite the ability to deliver focused radiation dose to the cell nuclei, 125I-KX1 remained less effective than its alpha-emitting analog 211At-MM4, and required significantly higher activity for equivalent in vivo efficacy based on tumor microdosimetry. Conclusion: Chromatin-targeted Auger therapy is lethal to high-risk neuroblastoma cells with potential use in micrometastatic disease. This study provides the first evidence for cellular lethality from a PARP-1 targeted Auger emitter, calling for further investigation into targeted Auger therapy. Full Article
y 18F-DCFPyL PET/CT Imaging in Patients with Biochemical Recurrence Prostate Cancer after Primary Local Therapy By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-01T13:36:37-07:00 Objective: To investigate the lesion detection rate of 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT, a prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) targeted PET agent, in biochemical relapse prostate cancer patients after primary local therapy. Methods: This is a prospective institutional review board-approved study of 90 patients with documented biochemical recurrence (median PSA 2.5 ng/mL, range 0.21-35.5 ng/mL) with negative conventional imaging after primary local therapies, including radical prostatectomy (n = 38), radiation (n = 27) or combination (n = 25). Patients on androgen deprivation therapy were excluded. Patients underwent whole-body 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT (299.9±15.5 MBq) at 2 h p.i. PSMA-PET lesion detection rate was correlated with PSA, PSA kinetics and original primary tumor grade. Results: Seventy patients (77.8%) showed a positive PSMA-PET scan, identifying a total of 287 lesions: 37 prostate bed foci, 208 lymph nodes, and 42 bone/organ distant sites; 11 patients had a negative scan and 9 patients showed indeterminate lesions, which were considered negative in this study. The detection rates were 47.6% (n = 10/21), 50% (n = 5/10), 88.9% (n = 8/9), and 94% (n = 47/50) for PSA >0.2 to <0.5, 0.5 to <1.0, 1 to <2.0, and ≥2.0 ng/mL, respectively. In post-surgical patients, PSA, PSAdt and PSAvel correlated with PET results but the same was not true for post-radiation patients. These parameters also correlated with the extent of disease on PET (intrapelvic vs. extrapelvic). There was no significant difference between the rate of positive scans in patients with higher grade vs lower grade primary tumors (Gleason score ≥4+3 vs <3+4). Tumor recurrence was histology confirmed in 40% (28/70) of patients. On a per-patient basis, positive predictive value was 93.3% (95% CI, 77.6-99.2%) by histopathologic validation, and 96.2% (95% CI, 86.3-99.7%) by the combination of histology and imaging/clinical follow-up. Conclusion: 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT imaging offers high detection rates in biochemically recurrent prostate cancer patients; and is positive in about 50% of patients with PSA <0.5 ng/mL, which could substantially impact clinical management. In post-surgical patients, 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT correlates with PSA, PSAdt and PSAvel suggesting it may have prognostic value. 18F-DCFPyL-PET/CT is highly promising for localizing sites of recurrent prostate cancer. Full Article
y 3-year freedom from progression following 68GaPSMA PET CT triaged management in men with biochemical recurrence post radical prostatectomy. Results of a prospective multi-center trial. By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-01T13:36:36-07:00 Background: 68Ga PSMA PET CT (PSMA) is increasingly used in men with biochemical recurrence (BCR) post radical prostatectomy (RP), but its longer term prognostic / predictive potential in these men is unknown. The aim of this study was to evaluate the predictive value of PSMA PET for 3 year freedom from progression (FFP) in men with BCR post RP undergoing salvage radiotherapy (sRT). Methods: This prospective multi-center study enrolled 260 men between 2015 and 2017. Eligible patients were referred for PSMA with rising PSA following RP. Management following PSMA was recorded but not mandated. PSMA protocols were standardised across sites and reported prospectively. Clinical, pathological and surgical information, sRT, timing and duration of androgen deprivation (ADT), 3 year PSA results and clinical events were documented. FFP was defined as a PSA rise ≤ 0.2ng/mL above nadir post sRT, with no additional treatment. Results: The median PSA was 0.26ng/mL (IQR 0.15 - 0.59) and follow-up 38 months (IQR 31-43). PSMA was negative in 34.6% (90/260), confined to prostate fossa 21.5% (56/260), pelvic nodes 26.2% (68/260), and distant disease 17.7% (46/260). 71.5% (186/260) received sRT, 38.2% (71/186) to the fossa only, 49.4% (92/186) fossa + pelvic nodes and 12.4% (23/186) nodes alone/SBRT. PSMA was highly predictive of FFP at 3 years following sRT. Overall, FFP was achieved in 64.5% (120/186) of those who received sRT, 81% (81/100) with negative/fossa confined vs. 45% (39/86) for extra fossa disease (p<0.0001). On logistic regression PSMA was more independently predictive of FFP than established clinical predictors, including PSA, T-stage, surgical margin status or Gleason score (P < 0.002). 32% of men with a negative PSMA PET did not receive treatment. Of these, 66% (19/29) progressed, with a mean rise in PSA of 1.59ng/mL over the 3 years. Conclusion: PSMA PET result is highly predictive of FFP at 3 years in men undergoing sRT for BCR following RP. In particular, men with negative PSMA PET or disease identified as still confined to the prostate fossa demonstrate high FFP, despite receiving less extensive radiotherapy and lower rates of additional ADT than those with extra fossa disease. Full Article
y Head-to-head comparison of 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT in patients with metastatic, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors: a prospective study By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-01T13:36:37-07:00 Purpose: 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 is an antagonist for somatostatin receptor used in neuroendocrine imaging. The purpose of this study is to compare 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT in patients with metastatic, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors. Methods: Patients with histologically-proven, metastatic and/or unresectable, well-differentiated neuroendocrine tumors were prospectively recruited in this study. They received an intravenous injection of 68Ga-DOTATATE (4.0 ± 1.3 mCi) on the first day and 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 (4.0 ± 1.4 mCi) on the second day. Whole-body PET/CT scans were performed at 40 to 60 minutes after injection on the same scanner. Physiologic uptake of normal organs, lesion numbers, and lesion uptake were compared. Results: Twenty-nine patients were prospectively enrolled in the study. The SUVmax of the spleen, renal cortex, adrenal glands, pituitary glands, stomach wall, normal liver parenchyma, small intestine, pancreas, and bone marrow were significantly lower on 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 than on 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT (P<0.001). 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 detected significantly more liver lesions (539 vs. 356, P = 0.002), but fewer bone lesions (156 vs. 374, P = 0.031, Figure 3) than 68Ga-DOTATATE. The tumor-to-background ratio of liver lesions was significantly higher on 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 (7.6 ± 5.1 vs. 3.4 ± 2.0, P<0.001). 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 and 68Ga-DOTATATE PET/CT showed comparable results for primary tumors and lymph node metastases based on either patient-based or lesion-based comparison. Conclusion: 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 performs better in the detection ability and TBR of liver metastases. However, 68Ga-DOTATATE outperforms 68Ga-DOTA-JR11 in the detection of bone metastases. The differential affinity of different metastatic sites provides key information for patient selection in imaging and peptide receptor radionuclide therapy. Full Article
y Can fluorescence-guided surgery help identify all lesions in unknown locations or is the integrated use of a roadmap created by preoperative imaging mandatory? A blinded study in prostate cancer patients. By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-11T12:55:20-08:00 Rationale: Lymphatic tracers can help visualize the lymphatic drainage patterns and sentinel nodes of individual prostate cancer patients. To determine the role of nuclear medicine, in particular the positional guidance of a SPECT/CT-based 3D imaging roadmap, in this process we studied to which extend fluorescence-guidance underestimated the number of target lesions. Methods: SPECT/CT imaging was performed after intraprostatic tracer administration of either ICG-99mTc-nanocolloid (hybrid tracer group) or 99mTc-nanocolloid to create a roadmap that depicted all sentinel nodes (SNs). Patients who received 99mTc-nanocolloid were injected with "free" ICG immediately prior to surgery ("free" ICG group). Before unblinding, fluorescence-guidance was used for intraoperative SN identification. This was followed by extended pelvic lymph node dissection (ePLND). Following unblinding of the SPECT/CT images, the number of missed SN’s were recorded and their resection was pursued when the anatomy allowed. Results: Preoperative SPECT/CT revealed no differences in the SN identification rate between ICG-99mTc-nanocolloid and 99mTc-nanocolloid. However, fluorescence-guidance only allowed intraoperative removal of all SNs in 40% of patients in the hybrid tracer group and in 20% of patients in the "free" ICG group. Overall, 75.9% of the intraoperatively resected SNs in the hybrid tracer group and 51.8% of the SNs in the "free" ICG group were removed solely under fluorescence-guidance. During ePLND 22 additional SNs were resected (7 in the hybrid tracer group and 15 in the "free" ICG group). After unblinding 18 remaining SNs were identified (6 in the hybrid group and 12 in the "free" ICG group). In the "free" ICG group, ex vivo evaluation of the excised specimens revealed that 14 SNs removed under ePLND or after unblinding contained radioactivity but no fluorescence. Conclusion: The preoperative imaging roadmap provided by SPECT/CT enhanced the detection of prostate SNs in more ectopic locations in 17 of the 25 patients and the hybrid tracer ICG-99mTc-nanocolloid was shown to outperform "free" ICG. Overall, fluorescence-guided pelvic nodal surgery underestimated the number of SNs in 60-80% of patients. Full Article
y Tau PET imaging with 18F-PI-2620 in patients with Alzheimer's disease and healthy controls: a first-in-human study By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-11T12:55:20-08:00 18F-PI-2620 is a positron emission tomography (PET) tracer with high binding affinity for aggregated tau, a key pathologic feature of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and other neurodegenerative disorders. Preclinically, 18F-PI-2620 binds to both, 3R and 4R tau isoforms. The purpose of this first-in-human study was to evaluate the ability of 18F-PI-2620 to detect tau pathology in AD patients using PET imaging, as well as to assess its safety and tolerability of this new tau PET tracer. Methods: Participants with clinical diagnosis of probable AD and healthy controls (HC) underwent dynamic 18F-PI-2620 PET imaging for 180 min. 18F-PI-2620 binding was assessed visually and quantitatively using Distribution Volume Ratios (DVR) estimated from non-invasive tracer kinetics and standardized uptake value ratios (SUVR) measured at different time points post-injection (p.i.) with the cerebellar cortex as the reference region. Time-activity curves and SUVR were assessed in AD and HC, as well as DVR and SUVR correlations and effect size (Cohen’s d) over time. Results: 18F-PI-2620 showed peak brain uptake around 5 min p.i. and fast wash-out in non-target regions. In AD subjects, focal asymmetric uptake was evident in temporal and parietal lobes, precuneus, and posterior cingulate cortex. DVR and SUVR in these regions were significantly higher in AD compared to HC. Very low background signal was observed in HC. 18F-PI-2620 administration was safe and well tolerated. SUVR time activity curves in most regions and subjects achieved a secular equilibrium after 40 min p.i.. A strong correlation (R2 > 0.93) was found between non-invasive DVR and SUVR for all imaging windows starting >30 min p.i.. Similar effect sizes between AD and HC groups were obtained across the different imaging windows. 18F-PI-2620 uptake in neocortical regions was significantly correlated with the degree of cognitive impairment. Conclusion: Initial clinical data obtained in AD and HC demonstrate the high image quality with excellent signal-to-noise of 18F-PI-2620 PET for imaging tau deposition in AD subjects. Non-invasive quantification using DVR and SUVR for 30 min imaging windows between 30-90 min p.i., e.g. 45-75 min, provides robust and significant discrimination between AD and HC subjects. 18F-PI-2620 uptake in expected regions is highly correlated to neurocognitive performance. Full Article
y Evaluation of dosimetry, quantitative methods and test-retest variability of 18F-PI-2620 PET for the assessment of tau deposits in the human brain By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-11T12:55:20-08:00 18F-PI-2620 is a next generation tau positron emission tomography (PET)-tracer that has demonstrated ability to image the spatial distribution of suspected tau pathology. The objective of this study was to assess the tracer biodistribution, dosimetry and quantitative methods of 18F-PI-2620 in the human brain. Full kinetic modelling approaches to quantify tau load were investigated. Non-invasive kinetic modeling approaches and semi-quantitative methods were evaluated against the full tracer kinetics. Finally, the reproducibility of PET measurements from test and retest scans was assessed. Methods: Three healthy controls (HC) and 4 Alzheimer disease (AD) subjects underwent two dynamic PET scans including arterial sampling. Distribution volume ratio (DVR) was estimated using full tracer kinetics (2 Tissue Compartment (2TC) models, Logan Graphical Analysis (LGA)) and non-invasive kinetic models (Non-Invasive Logan Graphical Analysis (NI-LGA) and the multilinear reference tissue model (MRTM2)). Standardized uptake value ratio (SUVR) was determined at different imaging windows after injection. Correlation between DVR and SUVR, effect size (Cohen’s d) and test-retest variability (TRV) were evaluated. Additionally, 6 HC subjects received one tracer administration and underwent whole-body PET for dosimetry calculation. Organ doses and the whole-body effective dose were calculated using OLINDA 2.0. Results: Strong correlation was found across different kinetic models (R2 >0.97) and between DVR(2TC) and SUVRs between 30 to 90 min with R2>0.95. Secular equilibrium was reached around 40 min post injection (p.i.) in most regions and subjects. The TRV and effect size for the SUVR across different regions was similar at 30-60 min (TRV=3.8%, d=3.80), 45-75 min (TRV=4.3%, d=3.77) and 60-90 min (TRV=4.9%, d=3.73) and increased at later time points. Elimination was via the hepatobiliary and urinary system. The whole-body effective dose was determined to be 33.3±2.1 μSv/MBq for an adult female and 33.1±1.4 μSv/MBq for an adult male with a 1.5 hour urinary bladder voiding interval. Conclusion: 18F-PI-2620 exhibits fast kinetics, suitable dosimetry and low TRV. DVR measured using the 2TC model with arterial sampling correlated strongly with DVR measured by NI-LGA, MRTM2 and SUVR. SUVR can be used for 18F-PI-2620 PET quantification of tau deposits avoiding arterial blood sampling. Static 18F-PI-2620 PET scans between 45-75min p.i. provide excellent quantification accuracy, large effect size and low TRV. Full Article
y Combined Visual and Semi-quantitative Evaluation Improves Outcome Prediction by Early Mid-treatment 18F-fluoro-deoxi-glucose Positron Emission Tomography in Diffuse Large B-cell Lymphoma. By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-22T10:43:33-08:00 The purpose of this study was to assess the predictive and prognostic value of interim FDG PET (iPET) in evaluating early response to immuno-chemotherapy after two cycles (PET-2) in diffuse large B-cell lymphoma (DLBCL) by applying two different methods of interpretation: the Deauville visual five-point scale (5-PS) and a change in standardised uptake value by semi-quantitative evaluation. Methods: 145 patients with newly diagnosed DLBCL underwent pre-treatment PET (PET-0) and PET-2 assessment. PET-2 was classified according to both the visual 5-PS and percentage SUV changes (SUV). Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis was performed to compare the accuracy of the two methods for predicting progression-free survival (PFS). Survival estimates, based on each method separately and combined, were calculated for iPET-positive (iPET+) and iPET-negative (iPET–) groups and compared. Results: Both with visual and SUV-based evaluations significant differences were found between the PFS of iPET– and iPET+ patient groups (p<0.001). Visually the best negative (NPV) and positive predictive value (PPV) occurred when iPET was defined as positive if Deauville score 4-5 (89% and 59%, respectively). Using the 66% SUV cut-off value, reported previously, NPV and PPV were 80 and 76%, respectively. SUV at 48.9% cut-off point, reported for the first time here, produced 100% specificity along with the highest sensitivity (24%). Visual and semi-quantitative SUV<48.9% assessment of each PET-2 gave the same PET-2 classification (positive or negative) in 70% (102/145) of all patients. This combined classification delivered NPV and PPV of 89% and 100% respectively, and all iPET+ patients failed to achieve or remain in remission. Conclusion: In this large consistently treated and assessed series of DLBCL, iPET had good prognostic value interpreted either visually or semi-quantitatively. We determined that the most effective SUV cut-off was at 48.9%, and that when combined with visual 5-PS assessment, a positive PET-2 was highly predictive of treatment failure. Full Article
y Initial studies with [11C]vorozole positron emission tomography detect over-expression of intra-tumoral aromatase in breast cancer By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-22T10:43:33-08:00 Introduction: Aromatase inhibitors are the mainstay of hormonal therapy in estrogen receptor positive, postmenopausal breast cancer, although response rate is just over 50%. The goal of the present study was to validate and optimize positron emission tomography (PET) with 11C-vorozole for measuring aromatase expression in postmenopausal breast cancer. Methods: Ten newly diagnosed, postmenopausal women with biopsy confirmed breast cancer were administered 11C-vorozole intravenously and PET emission data collected between 40 – 90 minutes post-injection. Tracer injection and scanning were repeated 2 hours after ingestion of 2.5mg letrozole p.o. Mean and maximal standard uptake values and ratios to non-tumor tissue (SUVs, SUVRs) were calculated for tumor and non-tumor regions at baseline and after letrozole. Biopsy specimens from the same tumors were stained for aromatase using immunohistochemistry and evaluated for stain intensity and the percentage of immune-positive cells. Results: Seven of the 10 women (70%) demonstrated increased focal uptake of tracer (SUVR>1.1) coinciding with the mammographic location of the lesion. The other 3 women (30%) did not show increased uptake in the tumor (SUVR <1.0). All of the cases with SUVR above 1.1 had SUVs above 2.4 and there was no overlap in SUV between the two groups, with mean SUV in tumors overexpressing aromatase (SUVR>1.1) ranging from 2.47 to 13.6, while tumors not overexpressing aromatase (SUVR<1) ranged from 0.8 to 1.8. Pretreatment with letrozole reduced tracer uptake in the majority of subjects; although the %blocking varied across and within tumors. Tumors with high SUV in vivo also showed high staining intensity on IHC. Conclusion: PET with 11C-vorozole is a useful technique for measuring aromatase expression in individual breast lesions, enabling a non-invasive quantitative measurement of baseline and post-treatment aromatase availability in primary tumors and metastatic lesions. Full Article
y SUV25 and {micro}PERCIST: Precision Imaging of Response to Therapy in Co-Clinical FDG-PET Imaging of Triple Negative Breast Cancer (TNBC) Patient-Derived Tumor Xenografts (PDX) By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-22T10:43:33-08:00 Numerous recent works highlight the limited utility of established tumor cell lines in recapitulating the heterogeneity of tumors in patients. More realistic preclinical cancer models are thought to be provided by transplantable, patient-derived tumor xenografts (PDX). Inter- and intra-tumor heterogeneity of PDX, however, present several challenges in developing optimal quantitative pipelines to assess response to therapy. The objective of this work was to develop and optimize image metrics of FDG-PET to assess response to combination docetaxel/carboplatin therapy in a co-clinical trial involving triple negative breast cancer (TNBC) PDX. We characterize the reproducibility of SUV metrics to assess response to therapy and optimize a preclinical PERCIST (µPERCIST) paradigm to complement clinical standards. Considerations in this effort included variability in tumor growth rate and tumor size; solid tumor vs. tumor heterogeneity and necrotic phenotype; and optimal selection of tumor slice versus whole tumor. A test-retest protocol was implemented to optimize the reproducibility of FDG-PET SUV thresholds, SUVpeak metrics, and µPERCIST parameters. In assessing response to therapy, FDG-PET imaging was performed at baseline and +4 days following therapy. The reproducibility, accuracy, variability, and performance of imaging metrics to assess response to therapy were determined. We defined an index—"Quantitative Response Assessment Score (QRAS)"—to integrate parameters of prediction and precision, and thus aid in selecting optimal image metrics of response to therapy. Our data suggests that a threshold value of 25% (SUV25) of SUVmax was highly reproducible (<9% variability). Concordance and reproducibility of µPERCIST were maximized at α=0.7 and β=2.8 and exhibited high correlation to SUV25 measures of tumor uptake. QRAS scores favor SUV25 followed by SUVP14 as optimal metrics of response to therapy. Additional studies are warranted to fully characterize the utility of SUV25 and µPERCIST SUVP14 as image metrics of response to therapy across a wide range of therapeutic regiments and PDX models. Full Article
y Diagnostic value of 68Ga-PSMA PET/CT for detection of PTEN expression in prostate cancer: a pilot study By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-11-22T10:43:33-08:00 Purpose: To explore the value of 68Ga-PSMA-PET/CT for detection of phosphatase and tensin homolog (PTEN) - loss prostate cancer (PCa). Methods: We retrospectively enrolled 75 patients who underwent multiparametric MRI (mpMRI) and 68Ga-PSMA PET/CT before radical prostatectomy. Lesions were outlined on pathological images and regions of interest were drawn on matched mpMRI and PET/CT images. Imaging parameters including average apparent diffusion coefficient (ADCmean) and maximum standardized uptake value (SUVmax) were derived. Immunohistochemical staining was carried out to evaluate the PTEN status. The diagnostic performance of imaging parameters was analyzed by receiver operating characteristics (ROC) analysis. A univariate logistic regression analyses were used to evaluate the association between clinical and imaging variables and PTEN status. Results: Totally, 103 lesions from 54 patients were analyzed. Of these lesions, 34 of 103 (33.0%) showed PTEN-loss status. Our study showed a strong association between SUVmax and PTEN-loss tumors both in the per-patient analysis (P < 0.01) and per-lesion analysis (P < 0.01), yielding the sensitivity and specificity of 0.80 and 0.77 in the per-patient analysis and 0.83 and 0.74 in the per-lesion analysis. Meanwhile, higher pathological PSMA expression was found in the PTEN-deficiency tumors. However, there was no significant difference between PTEN-loss tumors and PTEN-intact tumors using parameters including ADCmean (P > 0.05) and PI-RADS score (P > 0.05). Surprisingly, SUVmax was a significant predictor for detection of PTEN-loss tumors (odds ratio: 7.56, 95% confidence interval: 2.18-26.24, per-patient analysis; odds ratio: 13.66, 95% confidence interval: 4.32-43.24, per-lesion analysis). Conclusion: 68Ga-PSMA-PET/CT could effectively detect aggressive PTEN-loss tumors. Full Article
y Pre-treatment 18F-FDG PET/CT Radiomics predict local recurrence in patients treated with stereotactic radiotherapy for early-stage non-small cell lung cancer: a multicentric study By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:41-08:00 Purpose: The aim of this retrospective multicentric study was to develop and evaluate a prognostic FDG PET/CT radiomics signature in early-stage non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) patients treated with stereotactic radiotherapy (SBRT). Material and Methods: Patients from 3 different centers (n = 27, 29 and 8) were pooled to constitute the training set, whereas the patients from a fourth center (n = 23) were used as the testing set. The primary endpoint was local control (LC). The primary tumour was semi-automatically delineated in the PET images using the Fuzzy locally adaptive Bayesian algorithm, and manually in the low-dose CT images. A total of 184 IBSI-compliant radiomic features were extracted. Seven clinical and treatment parameters were included. We used ComBat to harmonize radiomic features extracted from the four institutions relying on different PET/CT scanners. In the training set, variables found significant in the univariate analysis were fed into a multivariate regression model and models were built by combining independent prognostic factors. Results: Median follow-up was 21.1 (1.7 – 63.4) and 25.5 (7.7 – 57.8) months in training and testing sets respectively. In univariate analysis, none of the clinical variables, 2 PET and 2 CT features were significantly predictive of LC. The best predictive models in the training set were obtained by combining one feature from PET, namely information correlation 2 (IC2) and one from CT (Flatness), reaching a sensitivity of 100% and a specificity of 96%. Another model combining 2 PET features (IC2 and Strength), reached sensitivity of 100% and specificity of 88%, both with an undefined hazard ratio (HR) (p<0.001). The latter model obtained an accuracy of 0.91 (sensitivity 100%, specificity 81%), with a HR undefined (P = 0.023) in the testing set, however other models relying on CT radiomics features only or the combination of PET and CT features failed to validate in the testing set. Conclusion: We showed that two radiomic features derived from FDG PET were independently associated with LC in patients with NSCLC undergoing SBRT and could be combined in an accurate predictive model. This model could provide local relapse-related information and could be helpful in clinical decision-making. Full Article
y Label-free Visualization of Early Cancer Hepatic Micrometastasis and Intraoperative Image-guided Surgery by Photoacoustic Imaging By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:41-08:00 Objectives: The detection of cancer micrometastasis for early diagnosis and treatment poses a great challenge for conventional imaging techniques. The aim of study is to evaluate the performance of photoacoustic imaging (PAI) in detecting hepatic micrometastases from melanoma in a very early stage and perform tumor resection by intraoperative photoacoustic image-guidance. Methods: In vivo studies were performed by following protocols approved by the Ethical Committee for Animal Research at Xiamen University. First, a B16 melanoma hepatic metastasis mouse model (n = 10) was established to study the development of micrometastases in vivo. Next, the hepatic metastasis mice models were imaged by scalable PAI instrument, ultrasound, 9.4 T high-resolution magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), positron emission tomography/computed tomography (PET/CT), and bioluminescence imaging. Photoacoustic images acquired with optical wavelengths spanning from 680 to 850 nm were spectrally unmixed by using a linear least-squares method to differentiate various components. Differences in the signal-to-background ratios among different modalities were determined with the two-tailed paired t test. The diagnosis results were assessed with histologic examinations. Excised liver samples from patients diagnosed with hepatic cancer were also examined to identify tumor boundary. In vivo metastatic melanoma removal in surgery was precisely guided by the portable PAI system. Results: PAI achieved as small as ~400 µm hepatic melanoma detection at a depth up to 7 mm in vivo, which could early detect small melanoma compared with ultrasound and MRI in mouse models. The signal ratio of tumor-to-liver acquired with PAI in micrometastases at 8 days (4.2 ± 0.2, n = 6) and 14 days (9.2 ± 0.4, n = 5) were significantly higher than those obtained with PET/CT (1.8 ± 0.1, n = 5 and 4.5 ± 0.2, n = 5, P <0.001 for both). Functional PAI provided dynamic oxygen saturation changes during tumor growth. The limit of detection was measured to be approximately 219 cells per microliter in vitro. We successfully performed intraoperative photoacoustic image-guided surgery in vivo using the rapid portable PAI system. Conclusion: Our findings offer a rapid and effective tool to noninvasively detect micrometastases and guide intraoperative resection as a complementary clinical imaging application. Full Article
y Radiation Dosimetry in 177Lu-PSMA-617 Therapy Using a Single Post-treatment SPECT/CT: A Novel Methodology to Generate Time- and Tissue-specific Dose Factors By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:41-08:00 Calculation of radiation dosimetry in targeted nuclear medicine therapies is traditionally resource-intensive requiring multiple post-therapy SPECT acquisitions. An alternative approach is to take advantage of existing pharmacokinetic data from these smaller cohorts to enable dose computation from a single post-treatment scan in a manner that may be applied to a much broader patient population. Methods: In this work, a technical description for simplified dose estimation is presented and applied to assessment of 177Lu-PSMA-617 therapy (Prostate-Specific Membrane Antigen) for metastatic prostate cancer. By normalizing existing time-activity curves to a single measurement time, it is possible to calculate a mean and range of time-integrated activity values which relate to radiation absorbed dose. To assist with accurate pharmacokinetic modelling of the training cohort, a method for contour-guided image registration was developed. Results: Tissue-specific dose conversion factors for common post-treatment imaging times are reported along with a characterization of added uncertainty in comparison to a traditional serial imaging protocol. Single time point dose factors for tumor were determined to be 11.0, 12.1, 13.6, and 15.2 Gy per MBq/mL at image times of 24, 48, 72, and 96 hours, respectively. For normal tissues, parotid gland factors were 6.7, 9.4, 13.3, and 19.3 Gy per MBq/mL and kidneys were 7.1, 10.3, 15.0, and 22.0 Gy per MBq/mL at those times. Tumor dose estimates were most accurate using delayed scanning at times beyond 72 hours. Dose to healthy tissues is best characterized by scanning patients in the first two days of treatment owing to the larger degree of tracer clearance in this early phase. Conclusion: The work demonstrates a means for efficient dose estimation in 177Lu-PSMA-617 therapy. By providing methods to simplify and potentially automate radiation dosimetry we hope to accelerate the understanding of radiobiology and development of dose-response models in this unique therapeutic context. Full Article
y PET/MRI versus PET/CT in whole-body staging: results from a unicenter observational study in 1003 subsequent examinations By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:42-08:00 Purpose: To investigate differences between positron emission tomography/magnetic resonance imaging (PET/MRI) and PET/computed tomography (PET/CT) in lesion detection and classification in oncological whole-body examinations and to investigate radiation exposure differences between both modalities. Material and Methods: In this prospective, single-center, observational study 1003 oncological examinations (918 patients, mean age 57.8±14.4y) were included. Patients underwent PET/CT and subsequent PET/MRI (149.8±49.7min after tracer administration). Examinations were reviewed by radiologists and nuclear medicine physicians in consensus. Additional findings, characterization of indetermiante findings in PETCT, missed findings in PET/MRI including their clinical relevance and effective dose of both modalities were investigated. McNemar’s test was used to compare lesion detection between both hybrid imaging modalities (p<0.001 indicating statistical significance). Results: Additional information in PET/MRI was reported in 26.3% (264/1003) of examinations compared to PET/CT (p<0.001). Of these, additional malignant findings were detected in 5.3% (53/1003), leading to a change in TNM-staging in 2.9% (29/1003) due to PET/MRI. Definite lesion classification of indeterminate PET/CT findings was possible in 11.1% (111/1003) with PET/MRI. In 2.9% (29/1003), lesions detected in PET/CT were not visible in PET/MRI. Malignant lesions were missed in 1.2% (12/1003) by PET/MRI leading to a change in TNM-staging in 0.5% (5/1003). The estimated mean effective-dose for whole-body PET/CT amounted to 17.6±8.7mSv in comparison to 3.6±1.4mSv in PET/MRI, resulting in a potential dose reduction of 79.6% (p<0.001). Conclusion: PET/MRI improves lesion detection and potentially reduces additional examinations in tumor staging. Especially younger patients may benefit from the clinically relevant dose reduction of PET/MRI compared to PET/CT. Full Article
y Mapping prostate cancer lesions pre/post unsuccessful salvage lymph node dissection using repeat PSMA-PET By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:41-08:00 Introduction: The aim of this study was to analyze patterns of persistent versus recurrent or new PET lesions in a selected patient cohort with PSA persistence following salvage lymph node dissection (SLND) and pre/post procedure prostate-specific membrane antigen ligand positron emission tomography (PSMA-PET). Material and Methods: 16 patients were included in this multicenter study. Inclusion criteria were: a) PSMA-PET performed for biochemical recurrence before SLND (pre-SLND PET) and b) repeat PSMA-PET performed for persistently elevated PSA level (≥0.1 ng/mL) ≥6 weeks after SLND (post-SLND PET). Image analysis was performed by three independent nuclear medicine physicians applying the molecular imaging TNM system PROMISE. Lesions were confirmed by histopathology, presence on correlative CT/MRI/bone scan or PSA response after focal therapy. Results: post-SLND PET identified PCa-lesions in 88% (14/16) of patients with PSA persistence after SLND. Median PSA was 1.2 ng/mL (IQR, 0.6-2.8 ng/mL). Disease was confined to the pelvis in 56% of patients (9/16) and most of these men had common iliac (6/16, 38%) and internal iliac lymph node metastases (6/16, 38%). Extrapelvic disease was detected in 31% of patients (5/16). In pre- and post-SLND PET comparison, 10/16 had at least one lesion already detected at baseline (63% PET persistence); 4/16 had new lesions only (25% PET recurrence); 2 had no disease on post-SLND PET. All validated regions (11 regions in 9 patients) were true positive. 9/14 (64%) patients underwent repeat local therapies after SLND (7/14 radiotherapy, 2/14 surgery). Conclusion: SLND of pelvic nodal metastases was often not complete according to PSMA-PET. About two thirds of patients had PET positive nodal disease after SLND already seen on pre-SLND PSMA-PET. Notably, about one quarter of patients had new lesions, not detected by pre-surgical PSMA-PET. Full Article
y 11C-Methionine PET Identifies Astroglia Involvement in Heart-Brain Inflammation Networking after Acute Myocardial Infarction By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:41-08:00 Acute myocardial infarction (MI) triggers a local and systemic inflammatory response. We recently showed microglia involvement using TSPO imaging. Here, we evaluate whether 11C-methionine provides further insights into heart-brain inflammation networking. Methods: Male Bl6N mice underwent permanent coronary artery ligation followed by 11C-methionine PET at 3 and 7 days (n = 3). In subgroups, leukocyte homing was blocked by integrin antibodies (n = 5). The cellular substrate for PET signal was identified using brain section immunostaining. Results: 11C-methionine uptake peaked in the MI region at d3 (5.9±0.9vs 2.4±0.5 %ID/cc), decreasing to control level by d7 (4.3±0.6 %ID/cc). Brain uptake was proportional to cardiac uptake (r=0.47,p<0.05), peaking also at d3 (2.9±0.4vs 2.4±0.3 %ID/cc) and returning to baseline at d7 (2.3±0.4 %ID/cc). Integrin blockade reduced uptake at every time point. Immunostaining at d3 revealed co-localization of the L-type amino acid transporter with GFAP-positive astrocytes but not CD68-positive microglia. Conclusion: PET imaging with 11C-methionine specifically identifies an astrocyte component, enabling further dissection of the heart-brain axis in post MI inflammation. Full Article
y Inflammation-based index and 68Ga-DOTATOC PET-derived uptake and volumetric parameters predict outcome in neuroendocrine tumor patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:41-08:00 We performed post-hoc analyses on the utility of pre-therapeutic and early interim 68Ga-DOTA-Tyr3-octreotide (68Ga-DOTATOC) positron emission tomography (PET) tumor uptake and volumetric parameters and a recently proposed biomarker, the inflammation-based index (IBI), for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy (PRRT) in neuroendocrine tumor (NET) patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC in the setting of a prospective phase II trial. Methods: Forty-three NET patients received up to four cycles of 1.85 GBq/m²/cycle 90Y-DOTATOC with a maximal kidney biologic effective dose of 37 Gy. All patients underwent a 68Ga-DOTATOC PET/computed tomography (CT) at baseline and seven weeks after the first PRRT cycle. 68Ga-DOTATOC-avid tumor lesions were semi-automatically delineated using a customized standardized uptake value (SUV) threshold-based approach. PRRT response was assessed on CT using RECIST 1.1. Results: Median progression-free survival (PFS) and overall survival (OS) were 13.9 and 22.3 months, respectively. An SUVmean higher than 13.7 (75th percentile (P75)) was associated with better survival (hazard ratio (HR) 0.45; P = 0.024), whereas a 68Ga-DOTATOC-avid tumor volume higher than 578 ml (P75) was associated with worse OS (HR 2.18; P = 0.037). Elevated baseline IBI was associated with worse OS (HR 3.90; P = 0.001). Multivariate analysis corroborated independent associations between OS and SUVmean (P = 0.016) and IBI (P = 0.015). No significant correlations with PFS were found. A composite score based on SUVmean and IBI allowed to further stratify patients in three categories with significantly different survival. On early interim PET, a decrease in SUVmean of more than 17% (P75) was associated with worse survival (HR 2.29; P = 0.024). Conclusion: Normal baseline IBI and high 68Ga-DOTATOC tumor uptake predict better outcome in NET patients treated with 90Y-DOTATOC. This can be used for treatment personalization. Interim 68Ga-DOTATOC PET does not provide information for treatment personalization. Full Article
y Imaging P-glycoprotein Induction at the Blood-Brain Barrier of a Beta-Amyloidosis Mouse Model with 11C-Metoclopramide PET By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:41-08:00 P-glycoprotein (ABCB1) plays an important role at the blood-brain barrier (BBB) in promoting the clearance of neurotoxic beta-amyloid (Aß) peptides from the brain into the blood. ABCB1 expression and activity were found to be decreased in the brains of Alzheimer disease (AD) patients. Treatment with drugs which induce cerebral ABCB1 activity may be a promising approach to delay the build-up of Aß deposits in the brain by enhancing the clearance of Aß peptides from the brain. The aim of this study was to investigate whether PET with the weak ABCB1 substrate radiotracer 11C-metoclopramide can measure ABCB1 induction at the BBB in a beta-amyloidosis mouse model (APP/PS1-21 mice) and in wild-type mice. Methods: Groups of wild-type and APP/PS1-21 mice aged 50 or 170 days underwent 11C-metoclopramide baseline PET scans or scans after intraperitoneal treatment with the rodent pregnane X receptor (PXR) activator 5-pregnen-3β-ol-20-one-16α-carbonitrile (PCN, 25 mg/kg) or its vehicle over 7 days. At the end of the PET scans, brains were harvested for immunohistochemical analysis of ABCB1 and Aß levels. In separate groups of mice, radiolabeled metabolites of 11C-metoclopramide were determined in plasma and brain at 15 min after radiotracer injection. As an outcome parameter of cerebral ABCB1 activity, the elimination slope of radioactivity washout from the brain (kE,brain) was calculated. Results: PCN treatment resulted in an increased clearance of radioactivity from the brain as reflected by significant increases in kE,brain (from +26% to +54% relative to baseline). Immunohistochemical analysis confirmed ABCB1 induction in the brains of PCN-treated APP/PS1-21 mice with a concomitant decrease in Aß levels. There was a significant positive correlation between kE,brain values and ABCB1 levels in the brain. In wild-type mice, a significant age-related decrease in kE,brain values was found. Metabolite analysis showed that the majority of radioactivity in the brain was composed of unmetabolized 11C-metoclopramide in all animal groups. Conclusion: 11C-metoclopramide can measure ABCB1 induction in the mouse brain without the need to consider an arterial input function and may find potential application in AD patients to non-invasively evaluate strategies to enhance the clearance properties of the BBB. Full Article
y 18F-Fluorodeoxyglucose Positron Emission Tomography / Computed Tomography in Left-Ventricular Assist Device Infection: Initial Results Supporting the Usefulness of Image-Guided Therapy By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-05T10:37:41-08:00 Background: Accurate definition of the extent and severity of left-ventricular assist device (LVAD) infection may facilitate therapeutic decision making and targeted surgical intervention. Here, we explore the value of 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) positron emission tomography/computed tomography (PET/CT) for guidance of patient management. Methods: Fifty-seven LVAD-carrying patients received 85 whole-body 18F-FDG PET/CT scans for the work-up of device infection. Clinical follow-up was obtained over a period of up to two years. Results: PET/CT showed various patterns of infectious involvement of the 4 LVAD components: driveline entry point (77% of cases), subcutaneous driveline path (87%), pump pocket (49%) and outflow tract (58%). Driveline smears revealed staphylococcus or pseudomonas strains as the underlying pathogen in a majority of cases (48 and 34%, respectively). At receiver-operating characteristics analysis, an 18F-FDG standardized uptake value (SUV) >2.5 was most accurate to identify smear-positive driveline infection. Infection of 3 or all 4 LVAD components showed a trend towards lower survival vs infection of 2 or less components (P = 0.089), while involvement of thoracic lymph nodes was significantly associated with adverse outcome (P = 0.001 for nodal SUV above vs below median). Finally, patients that underwent early surgical revision within 3 months after PET/CT (n = 21) required significantly less inpatient hospital care during follow-up when compared to those receiving delayed surgical revision (n = 11; p<0.05). Conclusion: Whole-body 18F-FDG PET/CT identifies the extent of LVAD infection and predicts adverse outcome. Initial experience suggests that early image-guided surgical intervention may facilitate a less complicated subsequent course. Full Article
y 18F-fluorodexyglucose Position Emission Tomography identifies altered brain metabolism in patients with Cri du Chat syndrome By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-13T13:35:10-08:00 Cri-Du-Chat Syndrome (CdCs) is a rare genetic disease caused by a deletion in the short arm of chromosome 5 (5p) with a variable clinical spectrum. To date no study in literature has ever investigated the alterations of brain glucose metabolism in these subjects by means of [18F]fluoro-2-deoxy-d-glucose Positron Emission Tomography/Computed Tomography (18F-FDG PET/CT). The aims of this study were to detect difference in brain FDG metabolism in patients affected by CdCs with different clinical presentations and identify possible "brain metabolic phenotypes" of this syndrome. Methods: 6 patients (age: 5 M and 1 F, age range: 10-27) with CdCs were assessed for presence of cognitive and behavioral symptoms with a battery of neuropsychological tests and then classified as patient with a severe or mild phenotype. Then, patients underwent a brain 18F-FDG PET/CT scan. PET/CT findings were compared to a control group, matched for age and sex, by using statistical parametric mapping (SPM). Association of different clinical phenotypes and 18F-FDG PET/CT findings was investigated. Results: Four patients presented a severe phenotype, whereas 2 patients demonstrated mild phenotype. SPM single subject and group analysis compared to the control cohort revealed a significant hypometabolism in the left temporal lobe (BAs 20, 36 and 38), in the right frontal subcallosal gyrus (BA 34) and caudate body, and in the cerebellar tonsils (p<0.001). Hypermetabolism (P = 0.001) was revealed in the right superior and precentral frontal gyrus (BA 6) in patient group compared to the control cohort. In SPM single subject analysis the hypermetabolic areas were detected only in patients with a severe phenotype. Conclusion: This study revealed different patterns of brain glucose metabolism in patients with severe and mild phenotype compared to control subjects. In particular, the hypermetabolic abnormalities in the brain, evaluated by18F-FDG PET/CT, seem to correlate with the severe phenotype in patients with CdCs. Full Article
y Radiation dosimetry and biodistribution of 68Ga-FAPI-46 PET imaging in cancer patients By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-13T13:35:10-08:00 Background: Targeting cancer-associated fibroblasts (CAFs) has become an attractive goal for diagnostic imaging and therapy as they can constitute as much as 90% of tumor mass. The serine protease fibroblast activation protein (FAP) is overexpressed selectively in CAFs, drawing interest in FAP as a stromal target. The quinoline-based FAP-inhibitor PET tracer, 68Ga-FAPI-04, has been previously shown to yield high tumor-to-background ratios (TBR) in patients with various cancers. Recent developments towards an improved compound for therapeutic application have identified FAPI-46 as a promising agent due to a longer tumor retention time in comparison with FAPI-04. Here we present a PET biodistribution and radiation dosimetry study of 68Ga-FAPI-46 in cancer patients. Methods: Six patients with different cancers underwent serial 68Ga-FAPI-46 PET/CT scans at three time points following radiotracer injection: 10 minutes, 1 hour, and 3 hours. The source organs consisted of the kidneys, bladder, liver, heart, spleen, bone marrow, uterus, and body remainder. OLINDA/EXM v.1.1 software was used to fit and integrate the kinetic organ activity data to yield total body and organ time-integrated activity coefficients/residence times and finally organ absorbed doses. Standardized uptake values (SUV) and TBR were generated from the contoured tumor and source organ volumes. Spherical volumes in muscle and blood pool were also obtained for TBR (Tumor SUVmax / Organ SUVmean). Results: At all timepoints, the highest organ SUVmax was observed in the liver. Tumor and organ mean SUVs decreased whereas TBRs in all organs but the uterus increased with time. The highest TBRs at 3 hours were observed with the bone marrow (31.1), muscle (22.8), heart (19.1), and spleen (19.0). Organs with the highest effective doses were the bladder wall (2.41E-03 mSv/MBq), followed by ovaries (1.15E-03 mSv/MBq) and red marrow (8.49E-04mSv/MBq). The average effective total body dose was 7.80E-03 mSv/MBq. Thus for administration of 200 MBq 68Ga-FAPI-46 the effective total body dose is 1.56 mSv ± 0.26 mSv, in addition to approximately 3.7 mSv from one low-dose CT scan done for attenuation correction. Conclusion: 68Ga-FAPI-46 PET/CT has a favorable dosimetry profile with an estimated whole body dose of 5.3 mSv for an administration of 200 MBq (5.4 mCi) of 68Ga-FAPI-46 (1.56± 0.26 mSv from the PET tracer and 3.7 mSv from one low-dose CT scan). The biodistribution study showed high TBRs increasing over time, suggesting high diagnostic performance and favorable tracer kinetics for potential therapeutic applications. Full Article
y Does 2-FDG-PET Accurately Reflect Quantitative In vivo Glucose Utilization? By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-13T13:35:10-08:00 2-Deoxy-2-[18F]fluoro-D-glucose (2-FDG) with positron emission tomography (2-FDG-PET) is undeniably useful in the clinic, among other uses, to monitor change over time using the 2-FDG standardized uptake values (SUV) metric. This report suggests some potentially serious caveats for this and related roles for 2-FDG PET. Most critical is the assumption that there is an exact proportionality between glucose metabolism and 2-FDG metabolism, called the lumped constant, LC. This report describes that LC is not constant for a specific tissue and may be variable before and after disease treatment. The purpose of this work is not to deny the clinical value of 2-FDG PET; it is a reminder that when one extends the use of an appropriately qualified imaging method, new observations may arise and further validation would be necessary. Current understanding of glucose-based energetics in vivo is based on the quantification of glucose metabolic rates with 2-FDG PET, a method that permits the non-invasive assessment in various human disorders. However, 2-FDG is only a good substrate for facilitated-glucose transporters (GLUTs) but not for sodium-dependent glucose co-transporters (SGLTs), which have recently been shown to be distributed in multiple human tissues. Thus, the GLUT-mediated in vivo glucose utilization measured by 2-FDG PET would be blinded to the potentially substantial role of functional SGLTs in glucose transport and utilization. Therefore, in these circumstances the 2-FDG LC used to quantify in vivo glucose utilization should not be expected to remain constant. 2-FDG LC variations have been especially significant in tumors, particularly at different stages of cancer development, affecting the accuracy of quantitative glucose measures and potentially limiting the prognostic value of 2-FDG, as well as its accuracy in monitoring treatments. SGLT-mediated glucose transport can be estimated using α-methyl-4-deoxy-4-[18F]fluoro-D-glucopyranoside (Me-4FDG). Utilizing both 2-FDG and Me-4FDG should provide a more complete picture of glucose utilization via both GLUT and SGLT transporters in health and disease stages. Given the widespread use of 2-FDG PET to infer glucose metabolism, appreciating the potential limitations of 2-FDG as a surrogate for glucose metabolic rate and the potential reasons for variability in LC is relevant. Even when the readout for the 2-FDG PET study is only an SUV parameter, variability in LC is important, particularly if it changes over the course of disease progression (e.g., an evolving tumor). Full Article
y What You See Is Not What You Get - On the Accuracy of Voxel-Based Dosimetry in Molecular Radiotherapy By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2019-12-20T13:25:42-08:00 Due to improvements in quantitative SPECT/CT, voxel-based dosimetry for radionuclide therapies has aroused growing interest as it promises the visualization of absorbed doses at a voxel level. In this work, SPECT/CT-based voxel-based dosimetry of a 3D printed 2-compartment kidney phantom was performed, and the resulting absorbed dose distributions were examined. Additionally, the potential of the PETPVC partial-volume correction tool was investigated. Methods: Both kidney compartments (70% cortex, 30% medulla) were filled with different activity concentrations and SPECT/CT imaging was performed. The images were reconstructed using varying reconstruction settings (iterations, subsets, and post-filtering). Based on these activity concentration maps, absorbed dose distributions were calculated with pre-calculated 177Lu voxel S values and an empirical kidney half-life. An additional set of absorbed doses was calculated after applying PETPVC for partial-volume correction of the SPECT reconstructions. Results: SPECT/CT imaging blurs the two discrete sub-organ absorbed dose values into a continuous distribution. While this effect is slightly improved by applying more iterations, it is enhanced by additional post-filtering. By applying PETPVC, the absorbed dose values are separated into 2 peaks. Although this leads to a better agreement between SPECT/CT-based and nominal values, considerable discrepancies remain. In contrast to the calculated nominal absorbed doses of 7.8/1.6 Gy (cortex/medulla), SPECT/CT-based voxel-level dosimetry resulted in mean absorbed doses ranging from 3.0-6.6 Gy (cortex) and 2.7-5.1 Gy (medulla). PETPVC led to improved ranges of 6.1-8.9 Gy (cortex) and 2.1-5.4 Gy (medulla). Conclusion: Our study shows that 177Lu quantitative SPECT/CT imaging leads to voxel-based dose distributions largely differing from the real organ distribution. SPECT/CT imaging and reconstruction deficiencies might directly translate into unrealistic absorbed dose distributions, thus questioning the reliability of SPECT-based voxel-level dosimetry. Therefore, SPECT/CT reconstructions should be adapted to ensure an accurate quantification of the underlying activity and, therefore, absorbed dose in a volume-of-interest of the expected object size (e.g. organs, organ sub-structures, lesions or voxels). As an example, PETPVC largely improves the match between SPECT/CT-based and nominal dose distributions. In conclusion, the concept of voxel-based dosimetry should be treated with caution. Specifically, it should be kept in mind that the absorbed dose distribution is mainly a convolved version of the underlying SPECT reconstruction. Full Article
