ind

Secularism, Nationalism and India's Constitution




ind

Single-molecule level structural dynamics of DNA unwinding by human mitochondrial Twinkle helicase [Molecular Biophysics]

Knowledge of the molecular events in mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) replication is crucial to understanding the origins of human disorders arising from mitochondrial dysfunction. Twinkle helicase is an essential component of mtDNA replication. Here, we employed atomic force microscopy imaging in air and liquids to visualize ring assembly, DNA binding, and unwinding activity of individual Twinkle hexamers at the single-molecule level. We observed that the Twinkle subunits self-assemble into hexamers and higher-order complexes that can switch between open and closed-ring configurations in the absence of DNA. Our analyses helped visualize Twinkle loading onto and unloading from DNA in an open-ringed configuration. They also revealed that closed-ring conformers bind and unwind several hundred base pairs of duplex DNA at an average rate of ∼240 bp/min. We found that the addition of mitochondrial single-stranded (ss) DNA–binding protein both influences the ways Twinkle loads onto defined DNA substrates and stabilizes the unwound ssDNA product, resulting in a ∼5-fold stimulation of the apparent DNA-unwinding rate. Mitochondrial ssDNA-binding protein also increased the estimated translocation processivity from 1750 to >9000 bp before helicase disassociation, suggesting that more than half of the mitochondrial genome could be unwound by Twinkle during a single DNA-binding event. The strategies used in this work provide a new platform to examine Twinkle disease variants and the core mtDNA replication machinery. They also offer an enhanced framework to investigate molecular mechanisms underlying deletion and depletion of the mitochondrial genome as observed in mitochondrial diseases.




ind

A neuroglobin-based high-affinity ligand trap reverses carbon monoxide-induced mitochondrial poisoning [Molecular Biophysics]

Carbon monoxide (CO) remains the most common cause of human poisoning. The consequences of CO poisoning include cardiac dysfunction, brain injury, and death. CO causes toxicity by binding to hemoglobin and by inhibiting mitochondrial cytochrome c oxidase (CcO), thereby decreasing oxygen delivery and inhibiting oxidative phosphorylation. We have recently developed a CO antidote based on human neuroglobin (Ngb-H64Q-CCC). This molecule enhances clearance of CO from red blood cells in vitro and in vivo. Herein, we tested whether Ngb-H64Q-CCC can also scavenge CO from CcO and attenuate CO-induced inhibition of mitochondrial respiration. Heart tissue from mice exposed to 3% CO exhibited a 42 ± 19% reduction in tissue respiration rate and a 33 ± 38% reduction in CcO activity compared with unexposed mice. Intravenous infusion of Ngb-H64Q-CCC restored respiration rates to that of control mice correlating with higher electron transport chain CcO activity in Ngb-H64Q-CCC–treated compared with PBS-treated, CO-poisoned mice. Further, using a Clark-type oxygen electrode, we measured isolated rat liver mitochondrial respiration in the presence and absence of saturating solutions of CO (160 μm) and nitric oxide (100 μm). Both CO and NO inhibited respiration, and treatment with Ngb-H64Q-CCC (100 and 50 μm, respectively) significantly reversed this inhibition. These results suggest that Ngb-H64Q-CCC mitigates CO toxicity by scavenging CO from carboxyhemoglobin, improving systemic oxygen delivery and reversing the inhibitory effects of CO on mitochondria. We conclude that Ngb-H64Q-CCC or other CO scavengers demonstrate potential as antidotes that reverse the clinical and molecular effects of CO poisoning.




ind

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Perspectives to 2024 - Workshop 3

Invitation Only Research Event

17 October 2019 - 9:30am to 2:00pm

Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 27 rue de la Procession, 75740 Paris Cedex 15, France

This closed-door roundtable explores possible strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific between now and 2024. Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, it aims to enhance the understanding of the regional goals of, and strategic relationships between, the key countries active in the region.

The workshop is part of a larger project funded by the Strategic Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence. The project includes workshops in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India and the Pacific Islands (Tonga).

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




ind

Climate Change, Energy Transition, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)

Invitation Only Research Event

17 January 2020 - 9:30am to 5:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Climate change and energy transition are re-shaping the extractive sectors, and the opportunities and risks they present for governments, companies and civil society. As the central governance standard in the extractives sector, the EITI has a critical role in supporting transparency in producer countries.

This workshop will bring together experts from the energy and extractives sectors, governance and transparency, and climate risk and financial disclosure initiatives to discuss the role of governance and transparency through the transition. It will consider the appropriate role for the EITI and potential entry points for policy and practice, and the potential for coordination with related transparency and disclosure initiatives. 

Please note attendance is by invitation only.




ind

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4

Invitation Only Research Event

26 November 2019 - 9:30am to 12:00pm

Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

This closed-door roundtable explores possible strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific between now and 2024.

Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, it aims to enhance the understanding of the regional goals of, and strategic relationships between, the key countries active in the region.

The workshop is part of a larger project funded by the Strategic Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence.

The project includes workshops in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India and the Pacific Islands (Tonga).

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




ind

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5

Invitation Only Research Event

18 February 2020 - 12:00pm to 4:30pm

Langafonua Centre

This roundtable explores possible strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific between now and 2024. Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, it aims to enhance the understanding of the regional goals of, and strategic relationships between, the key countries active in the region.

The workshop is part of a larger project funded by the Strategic Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence. The project includes workshops in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India and the Pacific Islands (Tonga).
 

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




ind

A novel GPER antagonist protects against the formation of estrogen-induced cholesterol gallstones in female mice [Research Articles]

Many clinical studies and epidemiological investigations have clearly demonstrated that women are twice as likely to develop cholesterol gallstones as men, and oral contraceptives and other estrogen therapies dramatically increase that risk. Further, animal studies have revealed that estrogen promotes cholesterol gallstone formation through the estrogen receptor (ER) α, but not ERβ, pathway. More importantly, some genetic and pathophysiological studies have found that G protein-coupled estrogen receptor (GPER) 1 is a new gallstone gene, Lith18, on chromosome 5 in mice and produces additional lithogenic actions, working independently of ERα, to markedly increase cholelithogenesis in female mice. Based on computational modeling of GPER, a novel series of GPER-selective antagonists were designed, synthesized, and subsequently assessed for their therapeutic effects via calcium mobilization, cAMP, and ERα and ERβ fluorescence polarization binding assays. From this series of compounds, one new compound, 2-cyclohexyl-4-isopropyl-N-(4-methoxybenzyl)aniline (CIMBA), exhibits superior antagonism and selectivity exclusively for GPER. Furthermore, CIMBA reduces the formation of 17β-estradiol-induced gallstones in a dose-dependent manner in ovariectomized mice fed a lithogenic diet for 8 weeks. At 32 μg/day/kg CIMBA, no gallstones are found, even in ovariectomized ERα (–/–) mice treated with 6 μg/day 17β-estradiol and fed the lithogenic diet for 8 weeks. In conclusion, CIMBA treatment protects against the formation of estrogen-induced cholesterol gallstones by inhibiting the GPER signaling pathway in female mice. CIMBA may thus be a new agent for effectively treating cholesterol gallstone disease in women.­




ind

Vitamin E does not prevent Western diet-induced NASH progression and increases metabolic flux dysregulation in mice [Research Articles]

Fatty liver involves ectopic lipid accumulation and dysregulated hepatic oxidative metabolism, which can progress to a state of elevated inflammation and fibrosis referred to as nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (NASH). The factors that control progression from simple steatosis to NASH are not fully known. Here, we tested the hypothesis that dietary vitamin E (VitE) supplementation would prevent NASH progression and associated metabolic alterations induced by a Western diet (WD). Hyperphagic melanocortin-4 receptor-deficient (MC4R–/–) mice were fed chow, chow+VitE, WD, or WD+VitE starting at 8 or 20 weeks of age. All groups exhibited extensive hepatic steatosis by the end of the study (28 weeks of age). WD feeding exacerbated liver disease severity without inducing proportional changes in liver triglycerides. Eight weeks of WD accelerated liver pyruvate cycling, and 20 weeks of WD extensively upregulated liver glucose and oxidative metabolism assessed by 2H/13C flux analysis. VitE supplementation failed to reduce the histological features of NASH. Rather, WD+VitE increased the abundance and saturation of liver ceramides and accelerated metabolic flux dysregulation compared with 8 weeks of WD alone. In summary, VitE did not limit NASH pathogenesis in genetically obese mice, but instead increased some indicators of metabolic dysfunction.






ind

Finite-dimensional approximations to the Poincaré–Steklov operator for general elliptic boundary value problems in domains with cylindrical and periodic exits to infinity

S. A. Nazarov
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 80 (2020), 1-51.
Abstract, references and article information




ind

GoDaddy – “unauthorized individual” had access to login info

Web hosting behemoth GoDaddy just filed a data breach notification with the US state of California.




ind

Secularism, Nationalism and India's Constitution

Members Event

20 February 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm

Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Event participants

Dr Mukulika Banerjee, Associate Professor; Director, South Asia Centre, LSE

Kapil Komireddi, Author, Malevolent Republic: A Short History of the New India

Deepa Kumar, Lead India Analyst, Country Risk, IHS Markit

Chair: Dr Gareth Price, Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House

2019 saw a number of political developments in India that brought into question Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) commitment to one of India’s founding principles: secularism. The fallout from Modi and his party’s revocation of Articles 370 and 35A, updates to the National Register of Citizens and the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Bill have arguably demonstrated that power-sharing arrangements based on group divisions and representations fail to accord adequate protection to minorities in India in line with the country’s constitution.

This panel assesses the capacity of India’s republican framework to withstand the BJP and Prime Minister Modi’s brand of nationalism. What do recent developments tell us about Modi and the BJP’s vision for India and how do we explain this paradox where, despite a strong political centre, the BJP is faced with regional insecurity?

How might India reconcile its behaviour in the domestic sphere with its ambition as an emerging power that supports the rules-based order? And in the year of its 70th anniversary, how compatible has India’s constitution proved with the country’s ongoing religious and cultural divides?

Members Events Team




ind

The recalibration of Chinese assertiveness: China's responses to the Indo-Pacific challenge

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Feng Liu

In response to the changing geopolitical landscape in Asia, both China and the United States attempt to alter the regional order in their own favour, both in the economic and security realms. This article shows how diverging views on future arrangements are leading to strategic shifts and increasing tension between these two Great Powers. As part of its quest for Great-Power status, China has been actively pushing its regional initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as well as adopting assertive security policies towards its neighbours. In contrast, in order to counter China's growing influence America's regional strategy is undergoing a subtle shift from ‘rebalancing to Asia’ to focusing on the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region. However, amid an intensifying trade war and other challenges facing the region, China has chosen to moderate its proactive foreign policy-orientation in the past few years. In particular, China has made attempts to downplay its domestic rhetoric, rebuild strategic relationship with India and Japan, and to reassure ASEAN states in the South China Sea. In response to the Indo-Pacific strategy, it would be more effective for China to articulate a more inclusive regional vision and promote an institutional framework that also accommodates a US presence in the region.




ind

Non-traditional security cooperation between China and south-east Asia: implications for Indo-Pacific geopolitics

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Xue Gong

The ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy, actively promoted by the United States with support from its allies and partners, is a significant geopolitical response to China's growing power and expanding influence in Asia and beyond. Beijing has adopted various new strategies to cope with the challenges related to FOIP. One of these strategies is to secure a robust relationship with south-east Asia in order to make these regional states either neutral to or less supportive of the Indo-Pacific vision. In addition to economic statecraft and soft power, Beijing believes that it can also tap into the domain of non-traditional security (NTS) to strengthen relations with this region to position itself better in the intensifying regional geopolitical competition. The article addresses the following question: what is the impact of China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asia on Beijing's geopolitical rivalry with other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region? The article argues that China's NTS cooperation with south-east Asian countries may help China maintain its geopolitical standing in the region, but it is unlikely to lead to any dramatic increase of China's strategic influence in the region. This essentially means that Beijing may be able to prevent ASEAN or most ASEAN member states from lending substantive and strong support to the Indo-Pacific construct, but it will not be able to stop ASEAN states from supporting some elements of the FOIP.




ind

Japan's ‘Indo-Pacific’ question: countering China or shaping a new regional order?

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Kei Koga

Japan's primary objective of the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called ‘tactical hedging’. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future.




ind

Evasive balancing: India's unviable Indo-Pacific strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Rajesh Rajagopalan

India has adopted the Indo-Pacific concept with uncharacteristic speed. This article examines India's Indo-Pacific strategy, which evolved out of its earlier ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’ policies but is much more focused on strategic concerns than on trade or connectivity. As such, the strategy is subset of its China policy, and includes contradictory elements of balancing China by building partnerships with the United States as well as with regional powers, while simultaneously pursuing a reassurance strategy to convince Beijing that India is not really balancing China. The combination of these contradictory elements is characterized as evasive balancing, which is a more useful concept than either pure balancing or hedging for understanding the policies of India and of many other countries in the region that are trying to manage China's rise. However, reassurance strategies rarely work and the combination of balancing and reassurance is even less likely to be viable.




ind

Is Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy an illusion?

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Brendan Taylor

Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a ‘dependent ally’ tradition and a ‘middle power’ approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, ‘pragmatic’ Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours.




ind

Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Indonesia has taken a leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in drafting a common outlook on the Indo-Pacific concept. The widening of Indonesia's geostrategic canvas from the Asia–Pacific to the Indo-Pacific is in line with President Joko Widodo's intent to make Indonesia a Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). In view of the rivalry between the US and China and the emergence of various Indo-Pacific initiatives from other countries, Indonesia believes that ASEAN must try to maintain its centrality. The draft of Indonesia's perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific: towards a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region was submitted for considerations by ASEAN, and after 18 months of intensive lobbying by Indonesia the concept was finally adopted at the ASEAN Summit in June 2019. The ASEAN outlook promotes the principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, respect for international law and ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. It proposes a building-block approach, seeking commonalities between existing regional initiatives in which ASEAN-led mechanisms will act as a fulcrum for both norm-setting and concrete cooperation. Rather than creating a new regional architecture, the East Asia Summit (EAS) is proposed as the platform for advancing the Indo-Pacific discourse and cooperation. Indonesia's ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific marks its renewed foreign policy activism as a middle power and underlines the continuing importance that Indonesia places on ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, emphasising ASEAN's centrality as the primary vehicle for managing relations with the major powers in the Indo-Pacific region.




ind

Consigned to hedge: south-east Asia and America's ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

See Seng Tan

This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.




ind

The institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific: problems and prospects

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Kai He and Huiyun Feng

Although the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become popular in the foreign policy discourse of some countries, we have yet to see any significant institution-building in the Indo-Pacific region. Borrowing insights from functional institutionalism and political leadership studies of international regimes, we introduce a ‘leadership–institution’ model to explore the problems and prospects of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific. Through a comparative case study of the institutionalization of the Asia–Pacific vs the Indo-Pacific, we argue that two crucial factors contributed to the slow institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific as a regional system in world politics: the lack of ideational leadership from an epistemic community and the weak executive leadership from a powerful state. While ideational leaders can help states identify and expand common interests in cooperation, executive leadership will facilitate states to overcome operational obstacles in cooperation, such as the ‘collective action’ problem and the ‘relative gains’ concern. The future of institution-building in the Indo-Pacific will depend on whether and how these two leadership roles are played by scholars and states in the region. In the conclusion, we discuss the challenges of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific and highlight China as a wild card in the future of Indo-Pacific regionalism.




ind

The Belt and Road Initiative: geo-economics and Indo-Pacific security competition

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Mingjiang Li

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been regarded by international society as a major policy tool in China's geo-economic strategy. Under this policy platform, Beijing has pledged to invest billions of dollars in the infrastructure and industrial sectors across Eurasia and in the Indo-Pacific nations. It is widely believed that such huge amount of investment will inevitably generate significant geostrategic repercussions in these regions. In response to the BRI, the United States and other powers have come up with a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. This article attempts to address the following question: what impact is the BRI likely to have on the security ties between China and the other major players in the Indo-Pacific? The author finds that the BRI may significantly transform China's international security policy and the expansion of Beijing's security influence may further intensify the security competition between China and other major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. The article also proposes a new analytical angle for the study of geo-economics that unpacks the role of economic activities and processes in generating geopolitical intentions and catalysing geopolitical competition.




ind

Developmental peace in east Asia and its implications for the Indo-Pacific

8 January 2020 , Volume 96, Number 1

Ling Wei

This article adopts a constructive approach to examining the problem of the Indo-Pacific construct. Through reflection on the east Asian experience, it proposes an analytical framework of developmental peace as a constellation of international practices, which means that the more economic development is prioritized by states in regional processes, the more likely it is that a sustainable peace will be achieved. States participating in regional integration comprise a community of practice. On the basis of a shared understanding that development is of overriding importance and underpins security and state legitimacy, the community takes economic development as the anchoring practice; this practice embodies and enacts constitutive rules and fundamental norms for a broader set of practices in regional processes, such as peaceful coexistence and non-interference. The more economic development is prioritized on domestic and regional agendas, the more likely it is that conflicts in the security realm will be relaxed or even resolved to protect security interests. The author draws some useful implications from the developmental peace in east Asia for the Indo-Pacific construct, among which the most important include building shared understandings on the prioritization of economic development, taking advantage of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and using the code of conduct process as a vehicle and best practice to facilitate rule-making for the maritime order. Finally, the author briefly discusses the contributions of the study and limitations of the model.




ind

Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US–China strategic competition, regional actors, and beyond

6 November 2019 , Volume 96, Number 1

The first issue of International Affairs in 2020 explores the geopolitics of the 'Indo-Pacific' region.

Kai He and Mingjiang Li

As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.




ind

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook to 2024 - Workshop 4

Invitation Only Research Event

26 November 2019 - 9:30am to 12:00pm

Gateway House, Stevens Street, Colaba

This closed-door roundtable explores possible strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific between now and 2024.

Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, it aims to enhance the understanding of the regional goals of, and strategic relationships between, the key countries active in the region.

The workshop is part of a larger project funded by the Strategic Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence.

The project includes workshops in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India and the Pacific Islands (Tonga).

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




ind

The Indo-Pacific: Geostrategic Outlook From Now to 2024 - Workshop 5

Invitation Only Research Event

18 February 2020 - 12:00pm to 4:30pm

Langafonua Centre

This roundtable explores possible strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific between now and 2024. Focusing on trade security, climate change disruptions and security cooperation, it aims to enhance the understanding of the regional goals of, and strategic relationships between, the key countries active in the region.

The workshop is part of a larger project funded by the Strategic Policy Division of the Australian Department of Defence. The project includes workshops in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India and the Pacific Islands (Tonga).
 

Anna Aberg

Research Analyst, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme
020 7314 3629




ind

How Polarized India Erupted Into Violence

27 February 2020

Dr Gareth Price

Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme
Growing social divisions, stoked by the BJP-led government, have mixed dangerously with a slowing economy.

2020-02-27-Delhi.jpg

A woman sits on the terrace of a damaged building following clashes between people supporting and opposing the amendment to India's citizenship law, in New Delhi on 27 February. Photo: Getty Images.

The outbreak of communal violence in Delhi this week is the worst in India’s capital for decades. It both reflects and will reinforce India’s polarization.

That polarization is between the view that India represents homogeneity, grounded on the fact that its citizens are overwhelmingly (around four-fifths) Hindu (the view of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] of Narendra Modi), and the alternative that India represents diversity – its population includes hundreds of millions of non-Hindus and speakers of dozens if not hundreds of different languages.

India’s polarization is reflected in the reaction to the three days of violence in northeast Delhi, which left hundreds injured and, at the time of writing, 34 dead. The government and its supporters portray the protesters as almost exclusively Muslim fifth-columnists, their actions facilitated by Islamist extremists or Pakistan or even the opposition Congress Party.

The alternative view is that violence has been initiated by state-supported thugs, with the police turning a blind eye. In this view the protesters reflect a broader spectrum of Indian society, with a shared aversion to communalism and a commitment to India’s secular ideals.

Delhi recently held a state election, and while the BJP lost, some of the rhetoric used by its politicians was vitriolic. One compared protesters to rapists and murderers. Another led his supporters in chants of ‘shoot the nation's traitors’, referring to the protestors.

In such an environment, in which Hindu vigilantes feel empowered and India’s Muslims feel defenceless, Delhi’s worst communal violence for decades erupted.

Some have drawn parallels between events in Delhi with the violence in Gujarat in 2002 when at least 1,000 people – the majority Muslim – were killed. There, the accusation against Modi, then chief minister of the state, was that the state turned a blind eye to violence.

In general, past outbreaks of communal violence in India have been dampened by the rapid imposition of a curfew and deployment of substantial security forces to enforce it. Such an approach was notably absent in both Gujarat and, thus far, Delhi.

The BJP, emboldened

The violence takes place in the wake of two controversial actions the BJP has taken since its re-election in 2019.

First, the BJP-led government revoked the special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. To the BJP, the special status accorded to Jammu and Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state, was simply the most egregious example of their long-held view that other parties pandered to the Muslim community.

While the move gained some international criticism, the general response in India to the crackdown that followed – including the restriction of internet access and arrest of a number of politicians – was muted.

Then, the government put forward the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA).

In 2013, a year before the BJP’s first term in office, India’s Supreme Court ordered that the National Register of Citizens (NRC) be updated in the northeast Indian state of Assam.

Migration from what is now Bangladesh has been a contentious issue in northeast India region since colonial times and was the cause of widespread agitation, and conflict, in the region from the late 1970s.

While militancy continued thereafter, tension was partly resolved by the 1985 Assam Accord, which stated that people who had moved into Assam after 1971 (after the creation of Bangladesh) should be deported. However, this provision was not acted upon until the 2013 order.

In August 2019, the final NRC was published. Just under 2 million people were found to be non-citizens. A substantial proportion of these, however, appear to have been Hindus, a dilemma for the BJP.

To solve this, the government put forward the CAA, under which Hindus (along with followers of several other religions) could become Indian citizens. Muslims, however, were excluded. The BJP argued that the act was a generous gesture to illegal immigrants who faced persecution in neighbouring countries, and not a discriminatory gesture.

Unlike moves in Kashmir, the CAA sparked nationwide protests across India. While Assam is something of a special case, concern over the possible nationwide rollout of the CAA caused alarm. The government has recently been ambiguous over its intentions, though had earlier directed states to establish at least one detention centre.

The economy, creaking

That this is all taking place during an economic slowdown provides additional cause for concern. Many of India’s long-running internal conflicts subsided in recent years as the economy grew rapidly. But for the past year and a half, growth has slowed each quarter, to just 4.5% year on year.

The common assumption has been that India needs to grow at 8% to stand still, given the need to create millions of jobs. Unemployment currently stands at a 45-year high. Among 20 to 24-year olds, unemployment stands at 37%. India’s demographic dividend is being wasted.

For now, India seems trapped in a self-created vicious circle. The more it focuses on social and religious division, the more its economy will suffer. And while its economy worsens, the need to double-down on division as a distraction for its underemployed young men will intensify.




ind

Avoiding a Virus-Induced Cold War with China

17 April 2020

Robin Niblett

Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House
Managing relations with China once the COVID-19 crisis abates will be one of the biggest challenges facing political leaders in the United States and Europe – two of the areas worst-hit by the virus that originated in China.

2020-04-17-Trump-Xi

Chinese president Xi Jinping and US president Donald Trump in Beijing, China. Photo by Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images.

So far, there has been a noticeable worsening of relations that had already soured in recent years – the latest step being President Donald Trump’s suspension of US funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to accusations of Chinese interference in its operations.

Should the world now simply prepare for a period of intense and extended hostility? As director of a policy institute founded 100 years ago in the shadow of the First World War, I believe we must do all in our power to avoid a return of the global strategic rivalries that blighted the 20th century.

Deepening suspicions

Of course, the outcome does not lie only in the hands of the US and Europe. In the 1930s, as much as they wanted to avoid another great war, British and French leaders were forced to respond to Germany’s aggression in central Europe. In the late 1940s, America’s instinct to disentangle itself from war-ravaged Europe was quickly tempered by the realization that the Soviet Union would impose or infiltrate Communist control as far into Europe as possible.

Today, those who warned that China - a one-party, surveillance state with a power-centralising leader - could never be treated as a global stakeholder feel vindicated. They see in COVID-19 an opportunity to harden policies towards China, starting by blocking all Chinese investment into 5G infrastructure and breaking international dependence on Chinese supply chains.

They can point to the fact that Chinese Communist Party officials in Wuhan initially prioritised sustaining economic growth and supressed reports about COVID-19’s capacity for human-to-human transmission, epitomised by their treatment of Dr Li Wenliang. They can highlight how Beijing’s obsession with denying Taiwan a voice in the WHO prevented Taiwanese input into the early analysis of the crisis. They can highlight the ways in which Beijing has instrumentalised its medical support for coronavirus-afflicted countries for diplomatic gain.

For their part, those in China who believed the US and Europe would never allow China’s return as a regional and world power see this criticism as further evidence. They can point to comments about this being the ‘Chinese virus’, a leaked biological weapon or China’s ‘Chernobyl moment’. ‘Wolf warrior’ Chinese diplomats have sought to outdo each other by challenging narratives about COVID-19, while propagating disinformation about the origins of the virus.

There are major risks if this blame game escalates, as it could in the lead-up to a fraught US presidential election. First, consciously uncoupling the US economically from China will make the post-coronavirus recovery that much harder. China already accounts for nearly 20% of world GDP but, unlike after the global financial crisis in 2008, it is fast becoming the world’s leading consumer market. Its financial stimulus measures need to be closely coordinated with the G7 and through the G20.

Second, Chinese scientists were the first to uncover the genetic code of the virus and shared it with the WHO as early as January 12, enabling the roll-out of effective testing around the world. They are now involved in the global search for a vaccine alongside American and European counterparts. While the Chinese government will remain a legitimate target for criticism, Chinese citizens and companies will contribute to many of the most important technical breakthroughs this century.

Third, if COVID-19 creates a long-term schism between China and the US, with Europeans caught on its edge, this could do deep damage to world order. China may become a less willing partner in lowering global greenhouse gas emissions and sharing renewable energy technologies; in helping African and other developing countries grow sustainably; and in helping to build a more resilient global health infrastructure.

Getting the balance right

But the COVID-19 crisis can also be the hinge point to a more coherent and self-interested transatlantic approach to China, one whose motto should be ‘beware but engage’. There should indeed be limits on state-backed Chinese investment in strategic US and European economic sectors, just as China limits Western access to its market. But the goal should be to lower barriers to trade and investment over time on a mutually beneficial and transparent basis, not to recreate an economic Cold War.

Chinese human rights violations, at home and abroad, should be called out. The dissemination of Chinese systems of citizen surveillance, which will be more popular in a post-coronavirus world, should be monitored and contested with US and European alternatives. And the extent of Chinese exports’ access to international markets should be conditional on China improving its phytosanitary standards - which protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests, or contaminants - and strictly regulating unhygienic wet markets.

But to go further and try to make disengagement the dominant transatlantic policy as COVID-19 subsides will not only divide Europe and America. It will also contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy; in which a resentful China grows apart from the US and Europe during a period where they must work together.

Given that it will likely be the world’s largest economy in 2030, how the US and Europe manage their relations with China after this crisis is a question at least as seminal as the one they faced after 1945 with the Soviet Union. In the ensuing years, the Soviet Union became a military superpower and competitor, but not an economic one. Containment was a viable, correct and, ultimately, successful strategy. The same options are not available this time. There will be no winners from a new Cold War with China.




ind

Finding Fake Photos

Actually, they weren.t caught together at all their images were put together with software. The shadows cast by the stars. faces give it away: The sun is coming from two different directions on the same beach! More elaborate digital doctoring is detected with mathematics. Calculus, linear algebra, and statistics are especially useful in determining when a portion of one image has been copied to another or when part of an image has been replaced. Tampering with an image leaves statistical traces in the file. For example, if a person is removed from an image and replaced with part of the background, then two different parts of the resulting file will be identical. The difficulty with exposing this type of alteration is that both the location of the replacement and its size are unknown beforehand. One successful algorithm finds these repetitions by first sorting small regions according to their digital color similarity, and then moving to larger regions that contain similar small ones. The algorithm.s designer, a leading digital forensics expert, admits that image alterers generally stay a step ahead of detectors, but observes that forensic advances have made it much harder for them to escape notice. He adds that to catch fakers, At the end of the day you need math.(1) For More Information: Can Digital Photos be Trusted?, Steve Casimiro, Popular Science, October 2005. _______ 1 It May Look Authentic; Here.s How to Tell It Isn't, Nicholas Wade, The New York Times, January 24, 2006.




ind

Harnessing Wind Power - Part 1

Mathematics contributes in many ways to the process of converting wind power into usable energy. Large-scale weather models are used to find suitable locations for wind farms, while more narrowly focused models incorporating interactions arising from factors such as wake effects and turbulence specify how to situate individual turbines within a farm. In addition, computational fluid dynamics describes air flow and drag around turbines. This helps determine the optimal shapes for the blades, both structurally and aerodynamically, to extract as much energy as possible, and keep noise levels and costs down. Mathematics also helps answer two fundamental questions about wind turbines. First, why three blades? Turbines with fewer blades extract less energy and are noisier (because the blades must turn faster). Those with more than three blades would capture more energy but only about three percent more, which doesn.t justify the increased cost. Second, what percentage of wind energy can a turbine extract? Calculus and laws of conservation provide the justification for Betz Law, which states that no wind turbine can capture more than 60% of the energy in the wind. Modern turbines generally gather 40-50%. So the answer to someone who touts a turbine that can capture 65% of wind energy is "All Betz" are off. For More Information: Wind Energy Explained: Theory, Design and Application, Manwell, McGowan, and Rogers, 2010.




ind

Finding Friends: Part 1

Facebook has over 700 million users with almost 70 billion connections. The hard part isn.t people making friends; rather it.s Facebook.s computers storing and accessing relevant data, including information about friends of friends. The latter is important for recommendations to users (People You May Know). Much of this work involves computer science, but mathematics also plays a significant role. Subjects such as linear programming and graph theory help cut in half the time needed to determine a person.s friends of friends and reduce network traffic on Facebook.s machines by about two-thirds. What.s not to like? The probability of people being friends tends to decrease as the distance between them increases. This makes sense in the physical world, but it.s true in the digital world as well. Yet, despite this, the enormous network of Facebook users is an example of a small-world network. The average distance between Facebook users the number of friend-links to connect people is less than five. And even though the collection of users and their connections may look chaotic, the network actually has a good deal of structure. For example, it.s searchable. That is, two people who are, say, five friend-links away, could likely navigate from one person to the other by knowing only the friends at each point (but not knowing anyone.s friends of friends). For More Information: Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World, David Easley and Jon Kleinberg, 2010.




ind

Revolutionizing and Industry

Researchers: Christopher Brinton, Zoomi, Inc. and Princeton University, and Mung Chiang, Purdue University Moment: http://www.ams.org/samplings/mathmoments/mm139-netflix.pdf Description: Christopher Brinton and Mung Chiang talk about the Netflix Prize competition.




ind

Catch rate is a poor indicator of lake fishery health

Fishery collapses can be difficult to forecast and prevent due to hyperstability, a phenomenon where catch rates remain high even as fish abundance declines. In a recent Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences study, researchers conducted a whole-lake experiment to reveal the causes of hyperstability in recreational fisheries. Fish habitat preferences were found to leave them vulnerable to overexploitation.




ind

Ocean biodiversity has not increased substantially for hundreds of millions of years, study finds

A new way of looking at marine evolution over the past 540 million years has shown that levels of biodiversity in our oceans have remained fairly constant, rather than increasing continuously over the last 200 million years, as scientists previously thought.




ind

Wildlife through the window: what readers have spotted during lockdown

We asked Guardian readers living in cities and towns across the world to share their images of the wildlife they can see from their homes. You answered in your droves, from Canada to Cardiff, and here are some of the best.




ind

Virtual Assistant from India




ind

Press release: Agreement reached to work towards a legally binding instrument on Liability and Redress with regard to GMOs.




ind

13 facts worth knowing about Google DeepMind




ind

CBD News: Message from the Executive Secretary, Ahmed Djoghlaf, on the Occasion of the Fourth International Conference on Sustainable Agriculture for Food, Energy and Industry, Sapporo, Japan, 2-5 July 2008




ind

CBD News: Message from Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf, Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity on the occasion of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples, 9 August 2008.




ind

CBD News: "Sustainable Development: Which way next", Statement by Executive Secretary, Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf, on the occasion of the Global Indian Diaspora Conference towards a Dynamic Indian Diaspora, Singapore, 9-11 October 2008.




ind

CBD News: Statement by Ahmed Djoghlaf, Exeutive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, at the Opening of the Expert Workshop on the Development of the City Biodiversity Index, Singapore 10-12 February 2009.




ind

CBD News: Statement by Ahmed Djoghlaf, Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, on the occasion of the Indigenous and Local Community, Business and Biodiversity Consultation, UN Headquarters, New York, 12 May 2009.




ind

CBD News: Inviting Parties, other Governments, other relevant organizations, and indigenous and local communities, to the peer review of the draft report of scientific synthesis on the impacts of ocean fertilization on marine biodiversity.




ind

CBD News: Message by the Executive Secretary, Dr. Ahmed djoghlaf, on the occasion of the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples, 9 August 2009.




ind

CBD Press Release: The Role of Indigenous and Local Communities in Protecting Life on Earth.




ind

CBD Communiqué: India Offers to Host the Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2012




ind

CBD News: Statement by Dr. Ahmed Djoghlaf, Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, on the occasion of the Third Business and the 2010 Biodiversity Challenge Conference, 30 November 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia.




ind

CBD News: Statement by Mr. Ahmed Djoghlaf on the occasion of Latin American and Caribbean Indigenous and Local Community Capacity-building Workshop on the Convention on Biological Diversity, Including Issues Relevant to Article 8(j), TK and ABS: Mesoameri