b Semi-automatically quantified tumor volume using Ga-68-PSMA-11-PET as biomarker for survival in patients with advanced prostate cancer By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-04-24T14:33:41-07:00 Prostate specific membrane antigen (PSMA) targeting Positron Emission Tomography (PET) imaging is becoming the reference standard for prostate cancer (PC) staging, especially in advanced disease. Yet, the implications of PSMA-PET derived whole-body tumor volume for overall survival are poorly elucidated to date. This might be due to the fact that (semi-) automated quantification of whole-body tumor volume as PSMA-PET biomarker is an unmet clinical challenge. Therefore, a novel semi-automated software is proposed and evaluated by the present study, which enables the semi-automated quantification of PSMA-PET biomarkers such as whole-body tumor volume. Methods: The proposed quantification is implemented as a research prototype (MI Whole Body Analysis Suite, v1.0, Siemens Medical Solutions USA, Inc., Knoxville, TN). PSMA accumulating foci were automatically segmented by a percental threshold (50% of local SUVmax). Neural networks were trained to segment organs in PET-CT acquisitions (training CTs: 8,632, validation CTs: 53). Thereby, PSMA foci within organs of physiologic PSMA uptake were semi-automatically excluded from the analysis. Pretherapeutic PSMA-PET-CTs of 40 consecutive patients treated with 177Lu-PSMA-617 therapy were evaluated in this analysis. The volumetric whole-body tumor volume (PSMATV50), SUVmax, SUVmean and other whole-body imaging biomarkers were calculated for each patient. Semi-automatically derived results were compared with manual readings in a sub-cohort (by one nuclear medicine physician using syngo.MM Oncology software, Siemens Healthineers, Knoxville, TN). Additionally, an inter-observer evaluation of the semi-automated approach was performed in a sub-cohort (by two nuclear medicine physicians). Results: Manually and semi automatically derived PSMA metrics were highly correlated (PSMATV50: R2=1.000; p<0.001; SUVmax: R2=0.988; p<0.001). The inter-observer agreement of the semi-automated workflow was also high (PSMATV50: R2=1.000; p<0.001; ICC=1.000; SUVmax: R2=0.988; p<0.001; ICC=0.997). PSMATV50 [ml] was a significant predictor of overall survival (HR: 1.004; 95%CI: 1.001-1.006, P = 0.002) and remained so in a multivariate regression including other biomarkers (HR: 1.004; 95%CI: 1.001-1.006 P = 0.004). Conclusion: PSMATV50 is a promising PSMA-PET biomarker that is reproducible and easily quantified by the proposed semi-automated software. Moreover, PSMATV50 is a significant predictor of overall survival in patients with advanced prostate cancer that receive 177Lu-PSMA-617 therapy. Full Article
b Radioiodine Ablation of Remaining Thyroid Lobe in Patients with Differentiated Thyroid Cancer Treated by Lobectomy. A systematic review and meta-analysis. By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-04-24T14:33:41-07:00 Purpose: We aimed to conduct a systematic review and meta-analysis of studies reporting the performance of radioactive iodine therapy (131-I therapy) in differentiating thyroid cancer (DTC) patients requiring a completion treatment following lobectomy. We also evaluated the response to 131-I therapy according to 2015ATA guidelines and the adverse events. Methods: A specific search strategy was designed to find articles evaluating the use of I-131 in patients with evidence of DTC after lobectomy. PubMed, CENTRAL, Scopus and Web of Science were searched. The search was updated until January 2020, without language restriction. Data were cross-checked and any discrepancy discussed. A proportion meta-analysis (with 95%CI) was performed using the random-effects model. Meta-regressions on I-131 success were attempted. Results: The pooled success ablation rate was 69% with better results in patients receiving a single administration of about 3.7 GBq; high heterogeneity was found (I2 85%), and publication bias was absent (Egger test: P = 0.57). Incomplete structural responses were recorded in only 14 of 695 (2%) patients enrolled in our analysis. Incomplete biochemical responses were observed in 8 to 24% of patients, with higher rates (24%) in patients receiving low radioiodine activities (~1.1 GBq) and lower rates (from 8 to 18%) in patients receiving higher activities of radioiodine (~3.7 Gbq). Neck pain due to thyroiditis was reported in up to 18% of patients but, in most cases, symptoms resolved after oral paracetamol or a short course of prednisone. Conclusion: Lobar ablation with 131-I is effective especially when high 131I activities are used. However, the rate of incomplete biochemical response to initial treatment appears to be slightly higher than the classical scheme of initial treatment of DTC. "Radioisotopic lobectomy" should be considered for patients with low-to-intermediate risk DTC requiring completion treatment after lobectomy due to specific individual risk factors and/or patient’s preferences. Full Article
b Yttrium-90 Radioembolization: Telemedicine during COVID-19 outbreak, opportunity for prime time. By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-04-24T14:33:41-07:00 Full Article
b The Impact of Radiobiologically-Informed Dose Prescription on the Clinical Benefit of Yttrium-90 SIRT in Colorectal Cancer Patients By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-01T11:16:57-07:00 The purpose of this study was to establish the dose-response relationship of selective internal radiation therapy (SIRT) in patients with metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC), when informed by radiobiological sensitivity parameters derived from mCRC cell lines exposed to yttrium-90 (90Y). Methods: 23 mCRC patients with liver metastases refractory to chemotherapy were included. 90Y bremsstrahlung SPECT images were transformed into dose maps assuming the local dose deposition method. Baseline and follow-up CT scans were segmented to derive liver and tumor volumes. Mean, median, and D70 (minimum dose to 70% of tumor volume) values determined from dose maps were correlated with change in tumor volume and vRECIST response using linear and logistic regression, respectively. Radiosensitivity parameters determined by clonogenic assays of mCRC cell lines HT-29 and DLD-1 after exposure to 90Y or external beam radiotherapy (EBRT; 6MV photons) were used in biological effective dose (BED) calculations. Results: Mean administered radioactivity was 1469±428 MBq (847-2185 MBq), achieving a mean radiation absorbed tumor dose of 35.5±9.4 Gy and mean normal liver dose of 26.4±6.8 Gy. A 1.0 Gy increase in mean, median, and D70 absorbed dose was associated with reduction in tumor volume of 1.8%, 1.8%, and 1.5%, respectively, and increased probability of vRECIST response (odds ratio: 1.09, 1.09, and 1.10 respectively). Threshold mean, median and D70 doses for response were 48.3, 48.8, and 41.8 Gy respectively. EBRT-equivalent BEDs for 90Y are up to 50% smaller than those calculated by applying protraction-corrected radiobiological parameters derived from EBRT alone. Conclusion: Dosimetric studies have assumed equivalence between 90Y SIRT and EBRT, leading to inflation of BED for SIRT and possible under-treatment. Radiobiological parameters for 90Y were applied to a BED model, providing a calculation method that has the potential to improve assessment of tumor control. Full Article
b Reshaping the amyloid buildup curve in Alzheimer's disease? - Partial volume effect correction of longitudinal amyloid PET data By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-01T11:16:57-07:00 It was hypothesized that the brain β-amyloid buildup curve plateaus at an early symptomatic Alzheimer's disease (AD) stage. Atrophy-related partial volume effects (PVEs) degrade signal in hot-spot imaging techniques, such as amyloid positron emission tomography (PET). This longitudinal analysis of amyloid-sensitive PET data investigated the shape of the β-amyloid curve in AD applying PVE correction (PVEC). We analyzed baseline and 2-year follow-up data of 216 symptomatic individuals on the AD continuum (positive amyloid status) enrolled in Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (17 AD dementia, 199 mild cognitive impairment), including 18F-florbetapir PET, magnetic resonance imaging and mini mental state examination (MMSE) scores. For PVEC, the modified Müller-Gärtner method was performed. Compared to non-PVE-corrected data, PVE-corrected data yielded significantly higher regional and composite standardized uptake value ratio (SUVR) changes over time (P=0.0002 for composite SUVRs). Longitudinal SUVR changes in relation to MMSE decreases showed a significantly higher slope of the regression line in the PVE-corrected as compared to the non-PVE-corrected PET data (F=7.1, P=0.008). These PVEC results indicate that the β-amyloid buildup curve does not plateau at an early symptomatic disease stage. A further evaluation of the impact of PVEC on the in-vivo characterization of time-dependent AD pathology, including the reliable assessment and comparison of other amyloid tracers, is warranted. Full Article
b Molecular imaging of PD-L1 expression and dynamics with the adnectin-based PET tracer 18F-BMS-986192 By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-01T11:16:57-07:00 18F-BMS-986192, an adnectin-based human programmed cell death ligand 1 (PD-L1) tracer, was developed to non-invasively determine whole-body PD-L1 expression by positron emission tomography (PET). We evaluated usability of 18F-BMS-986192 PET to detect different PD-L1 expression levels and therapy-induced changes of PD-L1 expression in tumors. Methods: In vitro binding assays with 18F-BMS-986192 were performed in human tumor cell lines with different total cellular and membrane PD-L1 protein expression levels. Subsequently, PET imaging was executed in immunodeficient mice xenografted with these cell lines. Mice were treated with interferon gamma (IFN) intraperitoneally for 3 days or with the mitogen-activated protein kinase kinase (MEK1/2) inhibitor selumetinib by oral gavage for 24 hours. Thereafter 18F-BMS-986192 was administered intravenously, followed by a 60-minute dynamic PET scan. Tracer uptake was expressed as percentage injected dose per gram tissue (%ID/g). Tissues were collected to evaluate ex vivo tracer biodistribution and to perform flow cytometric, Western blot, and immunohistochemical tumor analyses. Results: 18F-BMS-986192 uptake reflected PD-L1 membrane levels in tumor cell lines, and tumor tracer uptake in mice was associated with PD-L1 expression measured immunohistochemically. In vitro IFN treatment increased PD-L1 expression in the tumor cell lines and caused up to 12-fold increase in tracer binding. In vivo, IFN did neither affect PD-L1 tumor expression measured immunohistochemically nor 18F-BMS-986192 tumor uptake. In vitro, selumetinib downregulated cellular and membrane levels of PD-L1 of tumor cells by 50% as measured by Western blotting and flow cytometry. In mice, selumetinib lowered cellular, but not membrane PD-L1 levels of tumors and consequently no treatment-induced change in 18F-BMS-986192 tumor uptake was observed. Conclusion: 18F-BMS-986192 PET imaging allows detection of membrane-expressed PD-L1, as soon as 60 minutes after tracer injection. The tracer can discriminate a range of tumor cell PD-L1 membrane expression levels. Full Article
b 177Lu-EB-PSMA radioligand therapy with escalating doses in patients with metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-01T11:16:57-07:00 Purpose: This study is designed to assess the safety and therapeutic response to 177Lu-EB-PSMA treatment with escalating doses in patients with metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC). Methods: With institutional review board approval and informed consent, patients were randomly divided into three groups: Group A (n = 10) were treated with 1.18 ± 0.09 GBq/dose of 177Lu-EB-PSMA. Group B (n = 10) were treated with 2.12 ± 0.19 GBq/dose of 177Lu-EB-PSMA. Group C (n = 8) were treated with 3.52 ± 0.58 GBq/dose of 177Lu-EB-PSMA. Eligible patients received up to three cycles of 177Lu-EB-PSMA therapy, at eight-week intervals. Results: Due to disease progression or bone marrow suppression, 4 out of 10, 5 out of 10, and 5 out of 10 patients completed three cycles therapy as planned in Groups A, B, and C, respectively. The prostate-specific antigen (PSA) response was correlated with treatment dose, with PSA disease control rates in Group B (70%) and C (75%) being higher than that in Group A (10%) (P = 0.007), but no correlation between Group B and Group C was found. 68Ga-PSMA PET/CT showed response in all the treatment groups, however, there was no significant difference between the three groups. Hematologic toxicity study found that platelets in Group B and Group C decreased more than those in Group A, and that Grade 4 thrombocytopenia occurred in 2 (25.0%) patients in Group C. No serious nephritic or hepatic side effects were observed. Conclusion: This study demonstrates that 2.12 GBq/dose of 177Lu-EB-PSMA seems to be safe and adequate in tumor treatment. Further investigations with increased number of patients are warranted. Full Article
b NEMESIS: Non-inferiority, Individual Patient Meta-analysis of Selective Internal Radiation Therapy with Yttrium-90 Resin Microspheres versus Sorafenib in Advanced Hepatocellular Carcinoma By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-01T11:16:57-07:00 In randomized clinical trials (RCTs), no survival benefit has been observed for selective internal radiotherapy (SIRT) over sorafenib in patients with advanced hepatocellular carcinoma (aHCC). This study aimed to assess by means of a meta-analysis whether overall survival (OS) with SIRT, as monotherapy or followed by sorafenib, is non-inferior to sorafenib, and compare safety profiles for patients with aHCC. Methods: We searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, and the Cochrane Library up to February 2019 to identify RCTs comparing SIRT as monotherapy, or followed by sorafenib, to sorafenib monotherapy among patients with aHCC. The main outcomes were OS and frequency of treatment-related severe adverse events (AEs grade ≥3). The per-protocol population was the primary analysis population. A non-inferiority margin of 1.08 in terms of hazard ratio (HR) was pre-specified for the upper boundary of 95% confidence interval (CI) for OS. Pre-specified subgroup analyses were performed. Results: Three RCTs, involving 1,243 patients, comparing sorafenib with SIRT (SIRveNIB and SARAH) or SIRT followed by sorafenib (SORAMIC), were included. After randomization, 411/635 (64.7%) patients allocated to SIRT and 522/608 (85.8%) allocated to sorafenib completed the studies without major protocol deviations. Median OS with SIRT, whether or not followed by sorafenib, was non-inferior to sorafenib (10.2 and 9.2 months, [HR 0.91, 95% CI 0.78–1.05]). Treatment-related severe adverse events were reported in 149/515 patients (28.9%) who received SIRT and 249/575 (43.3%) who received sorafenib only (p<0.01). Conclusion: SIRT as initial therapy for aHCC is non-inferior to sorafenib in terms of OS, and offers a better safety profile. Full Article
b Unexplained Hyperthyroglobulinemia in Differentiated Thyroid Cancer Patients Indicates Radioiodine Adjuvant Therapy: A Prospective Multicenter Study By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-01T11:16:58-07:00 Background: The management for totally thyroidectomized differentiated thyroid cancer (TT-DTC) patients with unexplained hyperthyroglobulinemia remains indeterminate due to evidence scarcity. This multicenter study aimed at prospectively evaluating the response to radioiodine (131I) adjuvant therapy (RAT) and its potential role in risk stratification and causal clarification. Methods: TT-DTC patients with stimulated serum thyroglobulin (Tgoff) levels > 10 ng/mL but no structurally evident disease were consecutively enrolled in five tertiary care institutions. After the administration of 5.55 GBq of 131I, the risk of presence of persistent/recurrent/metastatic DTC (prmDTC) was compared to that before RAT. The causes of hyperthyroglobulinemia were explored and the response to RAT was assessed 6-12 months post RAT. The change in suppressed thyroglobulin (Tgon) level was reported. Results: A cohort of 254 subjects with a median Tgoff of 27.1 ng/mL was enrolled for the analyses. Immediately after RAT, low-, intermediate-, and high-risk were identified in 5.9%, 88.6%, and 5.5% patients, respectively, with no significant difference in risk stratification compared with that before RAT (P = 0.952). During the follow-up (median, 10.6 months), hyperthyroglobulinemia was ultimately attributed to thyroid remnant, biochemical disease, and structural/functional disease in 17.3%, 54.3%, and 28.3% of subjects, respectively. In addition, excellent, indeterminate, biochemical incomplete, and structural/functional incomplete responses were achieved in 18.1%, 27.2%, 36.2%, and 18.5% of patients, respectively. Notably, distribution for either cause of hyperthyroglobulinemia or response to RAT was comparable among the three postoperative risk groups. Tgon levels in patients who merely received RAT declined significantly over time. Conclusion: Our study demonstrated that over 90% of TT-DTC patients with unexplained hyperthyroglobulinemia are stratified as intermediate-high risk, and RAT using 5.55 GBq of 131I reveals biochemical/functional/structural disease and yields non-structural/functional incomplete response in more than 80% patients, suggesting TT-DTC patients with unexplained hyperthyroglobulinemia as explicit candidates for RAT. Full Article
b Reported differences between Digital and Analog PET/CT studies By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-01T11:16:57-07:00 Full Article
b Editor's Page: Unacceptable Denials By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-01T11:16:57-07:00 Full Article
b Confirmation of 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT (ioflupane) quantification methods in dementia with Lewy body and other neurodegenerative disorders By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-08T13:18:58-07:00 Rationale: To conduct a retrospective study comparing three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods in patients with neurodegenerative syndromes as referenced to neuropathological findings. Methods: 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT and neuropathological findings among patients with neurodegenerative syndromes from the Mayo Alzheimer's Disease Research Center and Mayo Clinic Study of Aging were examined. Three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative assessment Methods: MIMneuro (MIM Software Inc.), DaTQUANT (GE Healthcare), and manual region of interest (ROI) creation on an Advantage Workstation (GE Healthcare) were compared to neuropathological findings describing the presence or absence of Lewy body disease (LBD). Striatum to background ratios (SBRs) generated by DaTQUANT were compared to the calculated SBRs of the manual method and MIMneuro. The left and right SBRs for caudate, putamen and striatum were evaluated with the manual method. For DaTQUANT and MIMneuro the left, right, total and average SBRs and z-scores for whole striatum, caudate, putamen, anterior putamen, and posterior putamen were calculated. Results: The cohort included 24 patients [20 (83%) male, aged 75.4 +/- 10.0 at death]. The antemortem clinical diagnoses were Alzheimer’s disease dementia (ADem, N = 6), probable dementia with Lewy bodies (pDLB, N = 12), mixed ADem/pDLB (N = 1), Parkinson’s disease with mild cognitive impairment (N = 2), corticobasal syndrome (N = 1), idiopathic rapid eye movement sleep behavior disorder (iRBD) (N = 1) and behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (N = 1). Seventeen (71%) had LBD pathology. All three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods had area under the receiver operating characteristics (AUROC) values above 0.93 and up to 1.000 (p<0.001) and showed excellent discrimination between LBD and non-LBD patients in each region assessed, p<.001. There was no significant difference between the accuracy of the regions in discriminating the two groups, with good discrimination for both caudate and putamen. Conclusion: All three 123I-FP-CIT-SPECT quantitative methods showed excellent discrimination between LBD and non-LBD patients in each region assessed, using both SBRs and z-scores. Full Article
b Interim PET evaluation in diffuse large B-cell lymphoma employing published recommendations: Comparison of the Deauville 5-point scale and the {Delta}SUVmax method By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-08T13:18:58-07:00 The value of interim 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography (iPET) guided treatment decisions in patients with diffuse large B-cell lymphoma (DLBCL) has been the subject of much debate. This investigation focuses on a comparison of the Deauville score and the deltaSUVmax (SUVmax) approach – two methods to assess early metabolic response to standard chemotherapy in DLBCL. Methods: Of 609 DLBCL patients participating in the Positron Emission Tomography-guided Therapy of Aggressive non-Hodgkin Lymphomas (PETAL) trial, iPET scans of 596 patients originally evaluated using the SUVmax method were available for post-hoc assessment of the Deauville score. A commonly used definition of an unfavorable iPET result according to the Deauville score is an uptake greater than that of the liver, whereas an unfavorable iPET scan with regard to the SUVmax approach is characterized as a relative reduction of the maximum standardized uptake value between baseline and iPET staging of less than or equal to 66%. We investigated the two methods’ correlation and concordance by Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient and the agreement in classification, respectively. We further used Kaplan-Meier curves and Cox regression to assess differences in survival between patient subgroups defined by the pre-specified cut-offs. Time-dependent receiver operating curve analysis provided information on the methods’ respective discrimination performance. Results: Deauville score and SUVmax approach differed in their iPET-based prognosis. The SUVmax approach outperformed the Deauville score in terms of discrimination performance – most likely due to a high number of false-positive decisions by the Deauville score. Cut-off-independent discrimination performance remained low for both methods, but cut-off-related analyses showed promising results. Both favored the SUVmax approach, e.g. for the segregation by iPET response, where the event-free survival hazard ratio was 3.14 (95% confidence interval (CI): 2.22 – 4.46) for SUVmax and 1.70 (95% CI: 1.29 – 2.24) for the Deauville score. Conclusion: When considering treatment intensification, the currently used Deauville score cut-off of an uptake above that of the liver seems to be inappropriate and associated with potential harm for DLBCL patients. The SUVmax criterion of a relative reduction of the maximum standardized uptake value of less than or equal to 66% should be considered as an alternative. Full Article
b The effects of monosodium glutamate on PSMA radiotracer uptake in men with recurrent prostate cancer: a prospective, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled intra-individual imaging study. By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-08T13:18:58-07:00 The prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA) is an excellent target for theranostic applications in prostate cancer (PCa). However, PSMA-targeted radioligand therapy can cause undesirable effects due to high accumulation of PSMA radiotracers in salivary glands and kidneys. This study assessed orally administered monosodium glutamate (MSG) as a potential means of reducing kidney and salivary gland radiation exposure using a PSMA targeting radiotracer. Methods: This prospective, double-blind, placebo-controlled study enrolled 10 biochemically recurrent PCa patients. Each subject served as his own control. [18F]DCFPyl PET/CT imaging sessions were performed 3 – 7 days apart, following oral administration of either 12.7 g of MSG or placebo. Data from the two sets of images were analyzed by placing regions of interest on lacrimal, parotid and submandibular glands, left ventricle, liver, spleen, kidneys, bowel, urinary bladder, gluteus muscle and malignant lesions. The results from MSG and placebo scans were compared by paired analysis of the ROI data. Results: A total of 142 pathological lesions along with normal tissues were analyzed. As hypothesized a priori, there was a significant decrease in maximal standardized uptake values corrected for lean body mass (SULmax) on images obtained following MSG administration in the parotids (24 ± 14%, P = 0.001), submandibular glands (35 ± 11%, P<0.001) and kidneys (23 ± 26%, P = 0.014). Significant decreases were also observed in lacrimal glands (49 ± 13%, P<0.001), liver (15 ± 6%, P<0.001), spleen (28 ± 13%, P = 0.001) and bowel (44 ± 13%, P<0.001). Mildly lower blood pool SULmean was observed after MSG administration (decrease of 11 ± 13%, P = 0.021). However, significantly lower radiotracer uptake in terms of SULmean, SULpeak, and SULmax was observed in malignant lesions on scans performed after MSG administration compared to the placebo studies (SULmax median decrease 33%, range -1 to 75%, P<0.001). No significant adverse events occurred and vital signs were stable following placebo or MSG administration. Conclusion: Orally administered MSG significantly decreased salivary gland, kidney and other normal organ PSMA radiotracer uptake in human subjects, using [18F]DCFPyL as an exemplar. However, MSG caused a corresponding reduction in tumor uptake, which may limit the benefits of this approach for diagnostic and therapeutic applications. Full Article
b Discussions with Leaders: A Conversation Between Johnese Spisso and Johannes Czernin By jnm.snmjournals.org Published On :: 2020-05-08T13:18:58-07:00 Full Article
b Inclusive Growth and Job Creation in Africa: The Outlook for 2019 and Beyond By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 15:25:01 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 30 September 2019 - 1:30pm to 2:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director, African Department, International Monetary FundChair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Head and Research Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House The IMF projects real GDP growth of 3.3 per cent in 2019 for sub-Saharan Africa but there is a mixed picture across the continent with growth in Mauritania, Senegal, Ethiopia and Rwanda outstripping projected growth rates for South Africa and Nigeria, for example, while a handful of economies seek to emerge from crisis. Yet, as is increasingly well documented, even strong growth has not delivered lasting socio-economic transformation in many contexts. And that most pressing of needs – job creation including to accommodate, in the next 15 years, an increase in the working age population greater than that in the rest of the world combined – remains a pressing concern for governments and societies. With populations continuing to grow at faster rates than economic growth, and a significant proportion of jobs outside agriculture being in the informal sector, investment in formal labour markets is crucial to creating inclusive economic growth. At this event, the International Monetary Fund’s Africa Director, Abebe Aemro Selassie will discuss the outlook for sub-Saharan African economies in 2019 and progress towards achieving inclusive economic growth to accommodate future demographic change. Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Department/project Africa Programme, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology Yusuf Hassan Parliamentary and Media Outreach Assistant, Africa Programme +44 (0) 20 7314 3645 Email Full Article
b Violent Extremist Groups in Africa: Local and Global Factors By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 14:00:01 +0000 Research Event 10 October 2019 - 5:00pm to 6:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Professor Stig Jarle Hansen, Professor, Norwegian University of Life Sciences; Author, Horn, Sahel and Rift: Fault-lines of the African JihadBulama Bukarti, PhD Candidate, SOAS, University of London; Analyst, Tony Blair Institute for Global ChangeChair: Aoife McCullough, PhD Candidate, LSE Islamist-inspired radical organizations in Africa have had a historical presence that extends well beyond the more recent emergence of groups including Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Despite more than three decades of international efforts to immobilize these organizations, they have proven to be adaptable and resilient, continuing to engage in insurgent campaigns against the state and employing terrorist violence against civilians. As they operate within and across different states and regions, the key to understanding this persistence – as well as the challenges of responding to it – often lies in the interaction between global dynamics and frequently underappreciated local factors. At this event, which will launch the book Horn, Sahel and Rift: Fault-lines of the African Jihad, speakers will discuss key factors leading to the emergence of radical Islamist violence in Africa, its impact and the outlook ahead for African and other actors in addressing these issues. THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED. Department/project Africa Programme, African Peace and Security, Horn of Africa Yusuf Hassan Parliamentary and Media Outreach Assistant, Africa Programme +44 (0) 20 7314 3645 Email Full Article
b Sudan Stakeholder Dialogues: Options for Economic Stabilization, Recovery and Inclusive Growth By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 01 Oct 2019 13:54:18 +0000 3 October 2019 The Chatham House Africa Programme designed the Sudan Stakeholder Dialogues series to help identify the factors that have led to the current economic crisis, the immediate steps that need to be taken to avert collapse and stabilize the economy, and the longer-term structural reforms required to set Sudan on the path to recovery. The project is funded by Humanity United. Read online Download PDF in Arabic Download PDF in English Ahmed Soliman Research Fellow, Horn of Africa, Africa Programme @AhmedSolHoA 2019-10-03-Sudan.jpg An employee removes bread from the oven at a bakery in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, on 24 May 2019. Photo: Getty Images. Three private roundtable meetings were convened in the first quarter of 2019, with the aim of generating informed and constructive new thinking on policy options and reforms that could help Sudan build a more economically prosperous, stable and inclusive nation. The roundtables were held under the Chatham House Rule.The project sought to offer a neutral space for discussion to policymakers and influencers from a broad range of backgrounds: Sudanese government officials, opposition figures, economists, experts on Sudan’s political economy and governance, civil society figures, representatives of international financial institutions, and other international policymakers.This paper draws together the key themes and findings from each of the three roundtables, ranging from broad structural economic issues to sector-specific priority interventions. It presents options and recommendations for Sudanese leaders, including the transitional government, in support of building a more economically prosperous, peaceful and inclusive nation. Department/project Africa Programme, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology, Horn of Africa, Sudan Stakeholder Dialogues: Options for Economic Stabilization, Recovery and Inclusive Growth Full Article
b Forging Inclusive Economic Growth in Zimbabwe: Insights from the Zimbabwe Futures 2030 Roundtable Series By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 09 Oct 2019 13:11:37 +0000 10 October 2019 This briefing note is the result of a collaborative research process with the Zimbabwean private sector, government representatives, industry organizations and experts, drawing on best practice and senior-level insights to identify policy options for long-term economic revival and expansion in Zimbabwe, and pathways for inclusive development. Read online Download PDF Dr Knox Chitiyo Associate Fellow, Africa Programme LinkedIn Christopher Vandome Research Fellow, Africa Programme LinkedIn Caleb Dengu Development Banking and Finance Specialist David Mbae Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Resident Representative for Zimbabwe 2019-10-10-Zim.jpg Central to the research process was the Zimbabwe Futures 2030 roundtable series, complemented by additional interviews and research. Participants at the three roundtables, held in Harare and Bulawayo in the first half of 2019, discussed the necessary policies and business strategies to enable and support the effective implementation of the Mnangagwa administration’s Transitional Stabilisation Programme, Vision 2030, and other longer-term national development plans.This process was conducted by the Chatham House Africa Programme, the Zimbabwe Business Club and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS); and in partnership with the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries for a roundtable in Bulawayo. The project was supported by KAS and the Dulverton Trust. Department/project Africa Programme, Southern Africa, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology Full Article
b Mobilizing Multinational Military Operations in Africa: Quick Fixes or Sustainable Solutions? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 16 Oct 2019 09:55:01 +0000 Research Event 25 October 2019 - 9:30am to 11:15am Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Professor Tony Chafer, University of PortsmouthProfessor Gordon Cumming, Cardiff UniversityDr Roel van der Velde, Cardiff UniversityAhmed Soliman, Research Fellow, Horn of Africa, Chatham HouseDr Elisa Lopez Lucia, Université Libre de Bruxelles; University of PortsmouthChair: Janet Adama Mohammed, West Africa Programme Director, Conciliation Resources Peacekeeping missions which have sought to address evolving forms of conflict and instability on the African continent – led by the United Nations, African Union and European Union – have frequently been overstretched.Across regions including the Sahel, the Horn and West Africa, the issues of violent extremism and criminality – often set against a backdrop of collapsing or severely weakened central states – have led to the mobilisation of a diverse set of new collective responses.These include notable African-led efforts such as AMISOM in Somalia or more recently the G5 Sahel, where France have played a pivotal role in initiating new and more ad hoc approaches to coalition-building.As existing multinational missions in Africa continue to evolve on the ground and while new collective opportunities increasingly present themselves, it is critical for policymakers to understand how far such efforts reflect meaningful long-term solutions to the challenges of conflict and insecurity.At this roundtable event, participants will reflect on how such missions become mobilised and legitimised, the extent to which they can be defined as ‘new’, and whether they represent a truly sustainable means to tackle the issue of conflict in Africa.This roundtable is held in partnership with Cardiff University and the University of Portsmouth and is supported by the Leverhulme Trust. Department/project Africa Programme, West Africa, African Peace and Security, Horn of Africa Fergus Kell Projects Assistant, Africa Programme + 44 (0) 20 7314 3671 Email Full Article
b Prospects for Peace and Stability in South Sudan By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 15:20:01 +0000 Research Event 11 November 2019 - 5:00pm to 6:15pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Alan Boswell, Senior Analyst for South Sudan, International Crisis GroupMiklos Gosztonyi, Conflict Analyst, South Sudan, Norwegian Refugee CouncilNaomi Pendle, Research Fellow, Firoz Lalji Centre for Africa, London School of EconomicsGolda Abbé, Founding Member, Ghidam (Via Skype)Chair: Teohna Williams, CEO, Business Plan for Peace South Sudan’s prolonged peace process is approaching a critical juncture. There is uncertainty about whether the country’s political leaders will meet the 12 November 2019 deadline to form a transitional government of national unity – a process already delayed after a revitalized power-sharing deal was signed in September 2018. A political impasse has been caused by a lack of progress on outstanding issues such as deciding on the number of states and reunifying the security forces. The latter issue is seen as critical to preventing the reoccurrence of large-scale violence which would exacerbate already considerable humanitarian needs. Continued mediation by regional and international partners remains important to finding a way forward and preventing a return to widespread conflict.At this event, a panel of speakers will examine the status of the peace deal, the issue of federalism and subdivision, measures needed to prevent the humanitarian crisis from worsening and opportunities to foster greater security and unity in the country.THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED. Department/project Africa Programme, African Peace and Security, Horn of Africa Sahar Eljack Programme Administrator, Africa Programme + 44 (0) 20 7314 3660 Email Full Article
b Central and Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa: The Potential of Investment Partnerships for Mutual Benefit By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 08:54:39 +0000 31 October 2019 Trade between Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa has increased significantly in the last decade and a half. There is a strong case to be made for greater economic re-engagement, especially in terms of investment, that has the potential to support inclusive growth in both regions. Read online Download PDF Damir Kurtagic Former Academy Robert Bosch Fellow, Africa Programme @kurtagic_damir LinkedIn recycled-containerboard-warehouse_mondi_poland.jpg Recycled containerboard warehouse, Mondi Group, Poland. Photo: Mondi Group. SummaryThere are growing economic links between the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa in terms of both trade and investment. However, while trade has picked up significantly from pre-EU accession levels, investment has not increased to the same extent.Contrary to common assumption, investment flows are not solely from Central and Eastern Europe to sub-Saharan Africa. In reality, the largest investment flow between the two blocs occurs in the opposite direction – from South Africa into Central and Eastern Europe.Sub-Saharan Africa can benefit from a greater commercial relationship focused on attracting sustainable investment from Central and Eastern Europe. For this to happen, commercial strategies towards Central and Eastern European countries need to be put in place before strategy can be reinforced by greater diplomatic and informational support.For many sub-Saharan African governments, there is no overall targeted approach to attracting Central and Eastern European investors. A notable exception is South Africa, where departments have been established at provincial government level to specifically target investment from Central and Eastern Europe.Sub-Saharan African governments expect Central and Eastern European private-sector investment to result not only in job creation, but also to bring spillover benefits such as the transfer of skills and knowledge to domestic industries.Each sub-Saharan African country, in accordance with its individual circumstances, will need to adopt a discrete mix of administrative reform (particularly aimed at cutting red tape), as well as infrastructural and other policies that improve the business environment and generate investor confidence.Much of the private sector in Central and Eastern Europe is somewhat hesitant to invest in sub-Saharan Africa on a greater scale. Many companies are most comfortable operating within their domestic environment; when they invest abroad, it tends to be in the ‘neighbourhood’ with which they are already familiar. Perceptions of risk are often compounded by popular misperceptions and generalizations about sub-Saharan Africa.Central and Eastern European countries stand to gain from a deeper investment relationship. While greater engagement with sub-Saharan Africa has already been pursued by some countries, most of them focus on trade. Institutional support to companies from Central and Eastern Europe (both public and private) has evolved to a degree, but is still not comprehensive. Information for companies interested in investing is either lacking or not shared in an efficient way. And the greatest challenge is ensuring top-level political engagement.EU membership offers clear opportunities for Central and Eastern European countries to invest sustainably and responsibly in sub-Saharan Africa. Not only is financial support forthcoming, through innovative EU financial instruments, but the availability of information relevant to business and the EU’s extensive diplomatic presence in Africa should help to alleviate some of the concerns of Central and Eastern European investors. Department/project Africa Programme, Foreign Relations and Africa’s Agency in the International System, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology Full Article
b Secrecy, spies and the global South: intelligence studies beyond the 'Five Eyes' alliance By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 09:08:36 +0000 6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6 Zakia Shiraz and Richard J. Aldrich Read online The study of secrecy and spies remain subjects dominated by Anglo-American experiences. In recent years there has been some effort to refocus the lens of research upon ‘intelligence elsewhere’, including the global South. This is partly because of intense interest in the Arab Spring and ‘managed democracy’, placing a wider range of secret services under the spotlight. However, the approach to research is still dominated by concepts and methods derived from studying the English-speaking states of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance and their European outriders. This article calls for a re-examination of research strategies for Intelligence Studies and for those theorizing surveillance, suggesting that both fields have much to learn from area studies and development studies, especially in the realm of research practice and ethics. If the growing number of academics specializing in intelligence genuinely wish to move forward and examine the global South they will need to rethink their tool-kit and learn from other disciplines. We suggest there is a rich tradition to draw upon. Full Article
b Rebel diplomacy and digital communication: public diplomacy in the Sahel By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 09:12:16 +0000 6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6 Michèle Bos and Jan Melissen Read online Most research on social media as a tool for public diplomacy focuses on its use by recognized international actors to advance their national interest and reputation, deliver foreign policy objectives or promote their global interests. This article highlights the need for paying more attention to non-state diplomacy in conflict situations outside the western world. We examine how rebel groups use new media to enhance their communications, and what the motivations behind this are. Our public diplomacy perspective helps convey the scope of rebel communications with external actors and provides insights for policy-makers seeking to ascertain the nature, intentions and capacities of myriad rebel groups. Our focus is on the Sahel region, where numerous such groups vying for international attention and support make use of multiple social media channels. We analyse two groups in Mali: the MNLA, a Tuareg secessionist group; and Ansar Dine, a Salafist insurgency with ties to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Our qualitative analysis of Ansar Dine and MNLA communications on several digital platforms helps identify these African rebel groups' international and local framing activities. Rebel groups use public diplomacy nimbly and pragmatically. The digital age has fundamentally changed which stakeholders such groups can reach, and we suggest that social media increase the power they are able to carve out for themselves on the international stage. Full Article
b China's ivory bans: enhancing soft power through wildlife conservation By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 09:20:21 +0000 6 November 2019 , Volume 95, Number 6 Jonas Gamso Read online China has been a major market for elephant ivory for centuries. However, the Chinese government recently enacted bans on imports and exports of ivory (2015) and on the domestic ivory trade (2017). These bans appear to have come in response to intensive influence campaigns and public shaming from domestic and foreign activists, who cited declining elephant populations and highlighted China's role. However, this shaming-narrative is at odds with conventional wisdom regarding Chinese policy-making: China typically resists international pressures and its authoritarian government is thought to be largely insulated from domestic efforts by civil society groups. This article reconciles Beijing's ivory policy with these conventional beliefs about policy-making in China. I argue that the Chinese government saw unique benefits to banning the ivory trade, under growing international scrutiny, as doing so enhanced Chinese soft power while having very little impact on its sovereignty or development. Non-government organizations (NGOs) operating both inside and outside of China played a role as well: NGOs in China helped to shift Chinese public opinion towards favouring the bans, while those operating abroad led public relations efforts to publicize Chinese demand for ivory to foreign audiences. Efforts by the latter group of NGOs intensified pressure on the Chinese government to rein in the ivory market, while increasing the soft power benefits that banning ivory would bring to Beijing. Full Article
b The African Continental Free Trade Area Could Boost African Agency in International Trade By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 10 Dec 2019 09:17:12 +0000 10 December 2019 Tighisti Amare Assistant Director, Africa Programme @tighistiamare Treasure Thembisile Maphanga Director, Trade and Industry, African Union Commission (2012–19) The agreement, which entered into force in May, could be a major step for Africa’s role in international trade, if the continent can overcome barriers to implementation. 2019-12-10-Niger.jpg Delegates arrive at the closing ceremony of the African Union summit in Niger in July. Photo: Getty Images. The entry into force of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on 30 May, after only three years of negotiations, is an economic, political and diplomatic milestone for the African Union (AU) and its member states, crucial for economic growth, job creation, and making Africa a meaningful player in international trade. But the continent will have to work together to ensure that the potential benefits are fully realized.A necessary innovationWith its advances in maintaining peace and security, abundant natural resources, high growth rates, improved linkages to global supply chains and a youthful population, Africa is emerging as a new global centre of economic growth, increasingly sought after as a partner by the world’s biggest economies. Governments from across Africa have been taking a more assertive role in international markets, including through proactive diversification of trading partners, and the continent remains a strong advocate for the multilateral trading system.However, this is not yet reflected in outcomes. The African Union does not have observer status at the World Trade Organization, despite diplomatic efforts in the past decade. Africa has less than a three per cent share of global trade, and the growing trend towards protectionism across the global economy may only increase the vulnerability of a disunited Africa. Its fractured internal market means that trade within Africa is lower than for any other region on the globe, with intra-African trade just 18 per cent of overall exports, as compared to 70 per cent in Europe.The AfCFTA is the continent’s tool to address the disparity between Africa’s growing economic significance and its peripheral place in the global trade system, to build a bridge between present fragmentation and future prosperity. It is an ambitious, comprehensive agreement covering trade in goods, services, investment, intellectual property rights and competition policy. It has been signed by all of Africa’s states with the exception of Eritrea.It is the AU's Agenda 2063 flagship project, brought about by the decisions taken at the January 2012 African Union Summit to boost intra-African trade and to fast track the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area. It builds upon ambitions enshrined in successive agreements including the Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty. Access to new regional markets and reduced non-tariff barriers are intended to help companies scale up, driving job creation and poverty reduction, as well as attracting inward investment to even Africa’s smaller economies.The signing in 2018 of the instruments governing the Single Air Transport Market and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment provided another step towards the gradual elimination of barriers to the movement of goods, services and people within the continent.Tests to comeHowever, while progress is being made towards the ratification of the AfCFTA, much remains to be done before African countries can fully trade under its terms. The framework for implementation is still under development, and the creation of enabling infrastructure that is critical for connectivity will take time to develop and requires extensive investment. Africa’s Future in a Changing Global Order: Africa’s Economic Diplomacy Treasure Thembisile Maphanga talks about the international implications of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). So, the first test for the AfCFTA will be the level to which Africa’s leaders make it a domestic priority, and whether a consensus can be maintained across the AU’s member states as the costs of implementation become clear.There is no guarantee that the gains of free trade will be evenly distributed. They will mainly depend on the extent to which countries embrace industrialization, liberalization of their markets and opening of their borders for free movement of goods and people – policies that some incumbent leaders may be reluctant to implement. Political will to maintain a unified negotiating position with diverse stakeholders, including the private sector, will come under increasing stress. A second challenge is how the AfCFTA relates to already existing trade arrangements, notably with the EU. The AU has long preferred to pursue a continent-to-continent trading arrangement instead of the bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements being sought by the EU under the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) framework to which, with the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and South Africa, all African states belong. The signing of the AfCFTA is one important step towards making this possible.But there are currently negotiations under the ACP to replace the Cotonou Accord (the framework governing trade between ACP members and the EU, including Economic Partnership Agreements [EPAs], that is due to expire in 2020). Negotiations on the African pillar of the accord are due to take place after the AfCFTA has entered into force. So African states and the AU will face the challenge of balancing their commitment to the ACP bloc with pursuing their own interests.And though the AfCFTA should supersede any other agreements, the EPAs or their successors, will continue to govern day-to-day trading, in parallel to the new pan-African market. It is not yet clear how these contradictions will be reconciled.A new role for the AU?The AU will need to play an active role as the main interlocutor with Africa´s international trading partners, with the AfCFTA secretariat being the arbiter of internal tensions and trade disputes. The AU´s engagement at continental level has to date revolved mainly around headline political diplomacy, security and peacekeeping. With the continental free market becoming a reality, an effective pivot to economic diplomacy will be critical for growth and development.With the AfCFTA, the AU has endeavoured to address Africa’s unsustainable position in global trade, to stimulate growth, economic diversification and jobs for its growing population. Much will depend on the commitment of African leaders to maintaining a unified negotiating position to implement the agreement and the AU’s capacity to effectively move from political to economic diplomacy. Full Article
b Can Liberation Movements Really Rid Southern Africa of Corruption? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 16 Dec 2019 16:20:43 +0000 17 December 2019 Christopher Vandome Research Fellow, Africa Programme LinkedIn Southern Africa’s national liberation movements have survived ‘end of decade’ elections across the region. Combating corruption has been at the heart of many of the campaigns, but the question is can they succeed? 2019-12-16-Namibia-Election.jpg Supporters of the Namibian incumbent president and ruling party South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) presidential candidate Hage Geingob cheer and dance. Photo by GIANLUIGI GUERCIA/AFP via Getty Images. Swapo’s victory in Namibia two weeks ago was the last in a series of recent ‘end of decade’ elections that have returned dominant parties to power across Southern Africa. However, the “enduring appeal of liberation” is wearing thin.Experiences across the region show that if governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within their party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.Avoid political factionalismSouth Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe all saw new presidents take over just before elections. All used the rhetoric of anti-corruption to distance themselves from the tainted image of their predecessors. But acting on this requires a shift in mind-set in parties that have always preferred to deal with their problems behind closed doors. High profile adversaries from past regimes make tempting targets but could also drive party divisions.In Angola, the transition of power was safeguarded by an agreement that former president José Eduardo dos Santos would be immune from prosecution. But this week his son faced corruption charges before the country’s supreme court, a high-profile example of a wave of anti-corruption cases across Southern Africa, driven by dominant parties wary of their future.The allegations against José Filemino De Sousa Dos Santos, nickname ‘Zenu’, include a $500-million fraud involving the country’s central bank. Pressure is also mounting on Zenu’s sister Isabel — once prominent in Angola, she is now absent from public life.Other leaders have had to tread more carefully. Immunity was a luxury Cyril Ramaphosa was neither willing nor politically able to grant Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Reliant on a few close allies at the top of the party, Ramaphosa lacks foot soldiers at the grassroots level, and his campaign against corruption within the ANC has faced persistent opposition.Rebuilding institutions and empowering authorities takes time, and with few high-profile cases to point to, people are getting restless. This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where a worsening economic situation has left policy reformers politically isolated.Party, state, and businessLong term incumbency has blurred the distinction between the party and the state. Liberation movements have created vast party-linked business empires. Political allegiance grants access to economic resources through appointments to lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises, preferential bids for tenders and licenses, and direct access to decision makers.In Angola, this was fuelled by oil revenues. In South Africa, state capture flourished in an environment where the ANC and its constituent elements had significant power on the panels that chose leaders for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In Namibia, an Icelandic fishing company paid backhanders to officials for fishing rights in what has become known as the ‘Fishrot’ scandal. Zanu-PF officials’ access to preferential foreign exchange rates present them with lucrative opportunities in Zimbabwe.Ending this bureaucratic rent seeking goes beyond appointing ‘clean’ officials, which has been central to the anti-corruption campaigns in Angola and South Africa. Governments must also allow scrutiny of the state and empower those institutions designed for that role, such as the National Prosecuting Authority and the Public Protector in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s auditor general has published an in-depth report of the state of corruption in the country’s SOEs.Companies must also be held to account for their role in aiding, and at worst directly benefitting, from state graft. International businesses have actively sought to benefit from corruption. They are now starting to face the consequences. A former Credit Suisse banker has pleaded guilty in the US over handling alleged kickbacks in Mozambique’s $2-billion “tuna bond” scandal. Global banks and consultancies continue to feel the squeeze for their complicity in state capture in South Africa.Competition and pluralismNational liberation movements may only have a limited window within which to act. Across the region civil society campaigns and investigative journalists have shed light on some of the worst abuses of power. Anti-corruption campaigns are starting to bite. The state will continue to play a central role in Southern African economies, an important arbiter of economic transformation able to balance the region’s highly unequal and resource-dependent economies.But opposition, civil society and the media are also critical for the progression towards democratic competition and pluralism in Southern Africa. Parliaments remain vital for holding rulers to account. Long used to unchallenged dominance, liberation movements have significant adjustments to make to rise to the challenge of a new era.This article was originally published in the Mail and Guardian. Full Article
b Central & Eastern Europe and Africa Engagement: Labour Mobility and Policy in East Africa By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 08 Jan 2020 12:35:01 +0000 Research Event 15 January 2020 - 10:00am to 12:30pm Nairobi, Kenya Strengthened links between the states of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are emerging marked by growth in diplomatic representation, trade and economic ties and supporting networks.Against this backdrop, labour migration within and from the CEE and East Africa sub-regions are a key policy area with significant potential for shared learning and cooperation. For both regions, migration trends in recent years have evolved as a result of a diverse range of interactions among public, private and civil society actors and at local, national, regional and international levels. Unpacking such interactions and their political and geographical specificities is essential to effective engagement and cooperation within and between the regions on issues of labour migration and their management.This roundtable brainstorming workshop will provide a platform for stakeholders based in East Africa to discuss the way in which different actors and agencies in the region influence and shape labour migration processes and policy responses.This event is supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Africa Programme, Foreign Relations and Africa’s Agency in the International System, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology Fergus Kell Projects Assistant, Africa Programme + 44 (0) 20 7314 3671 Email Full Article
b Nkirote Laiboni By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 15 Jan 2020 16:12:35 +0000 Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow (Central & Eastern Europe and Africa), Europe Programme Biography Nkirote Laiboni is a Kenyan international development and human rights practitioner with over 10 years of experience in managing humanitarian, human rights and international development programmes and coordinating research projects in Sub-Saharan Africa.She has worked with international nongovernmental organisations on a wide range of sectors and issues including migration, humanitarian support, media development, democracy and governance, education and health.Having previously worked on projects benefiting refugees, internally displaced persons, migrant workers, and trafficked persons in Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan and other African countries, Nkirote’s professional interest in migration has grown in recent years. Her research at Chatham House will explore and compare labour migration trends and patterns in Eastern Africa and Central and Eastern Europe.She holds an MA in International Law and International Human Rights from the University of Peace, Costa Rica. Areas of expertise Non-profit managementProgramme and project managementParticipatory action researchMigration and human rightsInternational developmentHumanitarian support Email LinkedIn Full Article
b Côte d'Ivoire’s 2020 Elections and Beyond: Ensuring Stability and Inclusion By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 10:10:01 +0000 Research Event 21 January 2020 - 11:30am to 12:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants HE Alassane Ouattara, President, Republic of Côte d'IvoireChair: Bob Dewar CMG, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House Please note, the second video on this page is from an interview with the president outside the event.HE Alassane Ouattara, president of Côte d'Ivoire, discusses governance and domestic priorities ahead of and beyond elections, as well as efforts to sustain stability and support an inclusive electoral process.Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire, the world’s top cocoa producer and the largest economy in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), will be held on 31st October 2020 against a backdrop of marked political dynamism in the country and wider region.Possible constitutional amendments and a newly announced major reform of the currency regime are among significant issues drawing focus.A credible and inclusive electoral process is critical for the improvement of socio-development outcomes and for the maintenance of a positive investment environment.But instability remains a serious risk and the stakes are high for Côte d'Ivoire and the wider region. Department/project Africa Programme, Elections and political systems, West Africa Full Article
b Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 16 Jan 2020 16:40:01 +0000 Research Event 21 January 2020 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Hon. Manuel José Nunes Júnior, Minister of State for Economic Coordination, Republic of AngolaChair: Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED. Department/project Africa Programme, Southern Africa, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology Sahar Eljack Programme Administrator, Africa Programme + 44 (0) 20 7314 3660 Email Full Article
b The Central African Republic: Security, Development and Responding to the Humanitarian Situation By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 11:00:02 +0000 Invitation Only Research Event 3 February 2020 - 2:00pm to 3:00pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Denise Brown, United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in the Central African RepublicChair: Ben Shepherd, Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House With two-thirds of the country’s population estimated to be in need of humanitarian aid and one-quarter either internally displaced or living as refugees in neighbouring countries, the Central African Republic (CAR) continues to face serious and complex humanitarian challenges. The country’s forthcoming presidential elections scheduled for December 2020 risk inflaming CAR’s volatile security situation particularly with the return of former leader, François Bozizé, ousted by the Séléka rebel coalition leader, Michel Djotodia, who has also returned from exile.At this event, Denise Brown will discuss CAR’s current security, humanitarian and development situations and the role of actors such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). She will also discuss prospects for much-needed governance reform and reconciliation.Attendance at this event is by invitation only. Event attributes Chatham House Rule Department/project Africa Programme, Elections and political systems, Central and East Africa Hanna Desta Programme Assistant, Africa Programme Email Full Article
b Decentralization and Cross-border Integration in the Horn of Africa By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 15:10:01 +0000 Research Event 4 February 2020 - 5:00pm to 6:15pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Mohamed Guleid, Chief Executive Officer, Frontier Counties Development CouncilNuradin Dirie, Chair, Puntland Presidential Advisory CouncilAden Abdi, Horn of Africa Programme Director, Conciliation ResourcesChair: Dr Zahbia Yousuf, Senior Research Advisor, Saferworld The interdependence of communities across the Horn of Africa results from social, familial, linguistic and cultural ties that cross territorial borders. Such linkages are reinforced by established patterns of movement and trade, often leading to stronger political and social connections between communities on either side of borders, than with their respective national capitals. States in the region are increasingly being challenged by demands for decentralization and more effective local governance. Improved understanding of the complexity of sub-national and cross-border political and economic contexts will be required to meet these demands and support enhanced governance so that challenges such as marginalization, intercommunal conflict and more equitable sharing of resources can be effectively addressed.At this event, speakers will examine some of the key subnational and cross-border relations in the Horn of Africa. They will also discuss initiatives and stakeholders needed to support common solutions to building peace, furthering development and bolstering inclusive growth and integration. THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED. Department/project Africa Programme, African Peace and Security, Foreign Relations and Africa’s Agency in the International System, Horn of Africa Sahar Eljack Programme Administrator, Africa Programme + 44 (0) 20 7314 3660 Email Full Article
b Financing for Sustainable Development in Africa By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 19 Feb 2020 14:35:01 +0000 Research Event 27 February 2020 - 6:30pm to 7:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants HE Nana Akufo-Addo, President of the Republic of GhanaChair: Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House Please note, the second video on this page is from an interview carried out alongside the main event.HE Nana Akufo-Addo, the president of Ghana, discusses his government’s approach to sustainable development, and how different stakeholders can be involved in achieving long-term goals in Ghana and beyond.The government of Ghana has actively embedded sustainable development into its global and domestic policies. Ghana is signatory to international agreements including the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development, the African Union’s Agenda 2063, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change; as well as including these goals into its domestic 2017-2024 economic and social development programme.Private sector engagement has been central to Ghana’s approach to sustainable development. The government is also collaborating through the Private Enterprise Foundation on the implementation of the SDGs and is working with an Advisory Group of chief executives to establish a $100 million fund for the delivery of the SDGs and a further $200 million ‘Green Fund’ to help tackle climate change. Event attributes Livestream Department/project Africa Programme, West Africa, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology Sahar Eljack Programme Administrator, Africa Programme + 44 (0) 20 7314 3660 Email Full Article
b Freedom in the World 2020: Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Africa By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 14:30:01 +0000 Research Event 5 March 2020 - 3:30pm to 4:30pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Event participants Jon Temin, Director, Africa Programs, Freedom HouseChair: Rachael Jolley, Editor-in-chief, Index on Censorship Freedom House’s annual report, Freedom in the World, assesses the condition of political rights and civil liberties around the world. Its next report, to be published on 4 March, will examine trends and changes since its previous assessment which found that political rights and civil liberties have declined globally over 13 consecutive years. This event will launch the Africa findings of its forthcoming report, highlighting positive and negative changes, and why different regions are diverging.Jon Temin, Director of Africa Programs at Freedom House, will examine trends in political freedoms in Africa in the global context, discussing the causes and potential consequences of the shifts being seen, and what needs to be done to protect positive shifts and prevent further decline elsewhere.Please note that this event is at capacity and registration is now closed. Department/project Africa Programme, Elections and political systems, African Peace and Security Sahar Eljack Programme Administrator, Africa Programme + 44 (0) 20 7314 3660 Email Full Article
b POSTPONED: Africa, Japan and the UK: Emerging Partnerships Beyond Summits By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 13:00:02 +0000 Research Event 17 March 2020 - 9:30am to 1:15pm Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE Agendapdf | 133.11 KB Event participants HE Nabil Ben Khedher, Ambassador of Tunisia to the United KingdomProfessor Naohiro Kitano, Visiting Fellow, Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute (JICA-RI); Professor, Waseda UniversityTaku Miyazaki, Deputy Director General, Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) LondonSerge Mouangue, Founder and Art Director, WAfricaNorio Suzuki, Senior Strategist, BBOXXHE Professor Mohammed Gana Yisa, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to Japan; Chairman, African Diplomatic Corps in Tokyo (ADC) TICAD CommitteeChairs:Dr Champa Patel, Director, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham HouseDr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme Since Japan established its Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993, an increasing number of summits for African engagement have appeared across the Asia-Pacific region. TICAD VII, held on 28-30 August 2019 in Yokohama, sought to strengthen partnerships between Japan and Africa in three main areas: technical cooperation; business and women’s entrepreneurship; and next generation and people-to-people connectivity.The UK-Africa Investment Summit held in January 2020 highlighted similar themes, with an emphasis on investing to generate sustainable growth and create jobs. Common interests and goals among different African countries, Japan and the UK bring opportunities for trilateral cooperation.This event will examine how collaboration between African countries, Japan and the UK can help to more effectively achieve sustainable growth, business development and job creation.PLEASE NOTE THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. Department/project Africa Programme, Foreign Relations and Africa’s Agency in the International System, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology Hanna Desta Programme Assistant, Africa Programme Email Full Article
b Children 'born of war': a role for fathers? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 04 Mar 2020 13:28:47 +0000 4 March 2020 , Volume 96, Number 2 Camile Oliviera, Erin Baines Read Online In this article, we examine exceptional circumstances in which men who father children born as the result of conflict-related sexual violence assume full or partial responsibility for their child's well-being. Children ‘born of war’ are increasingly recognized as a particular victim group in relevant international policy frameworks. Their social status falls somewhere between the victimization of their mother and perpetration of their father. Given the circumstances of their birth, they often experience social rejection and loss of identity with a long-term impact on their well-being. Previous scholarship has primarily documented the challenges faced by their mothers as caregivers and as victims of wartime sexual violence. A discussion on fathers to children ‘born of war’ is absent, attributable not only to their perpetrator status, but also to the assumption that their identity is unknown or that a relationship between father and child is undesired. The article demonstrates this is not always the case. Based on research in northern Uganda between 2016 and 2019 which included interviews and focus group discussions with former male combatants in the rebel group the Lord's Resistance Army, we explore how some fathers seek to maintain a relationship with children born as the result of ‘forced marriage’ and assume partial or full responsibility for their well-being and care. Full Article
b Why The Insurgency in Northern Mozambique Has Got Worse By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 01 Apr 2020 17:14:28 +0000 1 April 2020 Dr Alex Vines OBE Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme Two attacks on towns in northern Mozambique by suspected jihadists point to a rapidly deteriorating security crisis. 2020-04-01-Mozambique Macomia, Cabo Delgado, Northern Mozambique. Photo by EMIDIO JOSINE/AFP via Getty Images. On March 23 to 24, the centre of Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado province was occupied by up to 40 “jihadists”, who targeted government facilities, including a barracks, and brandished banners of affiliation to the so-called Islamic State.On March 25, suspected jihadists raided the town of Quissanga and destroyed the district police headquarters. They too carried an Islamic State flag. Twenty to 30 members of Mozambique’s security forces were killed in both attacks.Mocimboa da Praia is just south of the Afungi Peninsula, the location of gas projects worth $60- billion. Mocimboa was briefly occupied in late 2017, during attacks claimed by a group known as Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama (or al-Sunnah) that marked the start of a brutal low-intensity conflict, with widespread human rights abuses and attacks on civilians.Up to 1,000 people have now been killed and 100,000 displaced. More recently, The Islamic State Central Africa Province (Iscap), affiliated with the Islamic State group, has claimed responsibility for the attacks. Video and photos of these most recent events, along with the testimony of frightened residents and overstretched government officials, suggest a shift of strategy by the insurgents.There seems to have been an effort to avoid harming civilians, to win hearts and minds by redistributing stolen food, medicine and fuel to “loyal” residents, and to direct attacks on the state and its symbols, such as police stations and military barracks. It is difficult from a distance to assess if there was any genuine pleasure over these attacks among local people; while residents in both towns that did not flee seemed to welcome the attackers, this may well have been out of fear that the government is currently unable to guarantee their security.These attacks also indicate that the jihadist-linked insurgents are growing in confidence. They are confronting government security forces with little appetite for fighting. The Mozambican government has been expecting setbacks like those of Mocimboa and Quissanga — its forces are demoralised and many commanders exhausted or corrupted by an emerging war economy. Jihadists are also taking tactical advantage before a reformed and more effective government counterinsurgency effort is introduced in response.President Filipe Nyusi, inaugurated in January for his second term, has made this crisis his prime focus and has become the de-facto minister of defence.Military reform and the role of private military companiesBut there is no quick fix. Most importantly, the Mozambican military and security forces need to be restructured. They were unable to win the Mozambican civil war (1977-1992), even with international support, and have not improved in capacity or conduct since. They now face a complex, multilayered and asymmetrical conflict, mostly drawing upon local and regional grievances and networks but increasingly also attracting some limited encouragement and advice from further afield.Nyusi will need to build-up trusted relationships in the military in the way he has successfully done with parts of the intelligence community. The Mozambican government has already reached out to international expertise — though not necessarily the right kind. The founder of the Blackwater private military company, Erik Prince, supplied two helicopters and support crew for the Mozambican military in mid-2019, before being replaced by some 170 Russian privateers linked to the Wagner Group.The Wagner contingent arrived in September 2019 at Nacala airport with trucks, drones and a Mi-17 helicopter gunship, then deployed into the combat zone of northern Cabo Delgado. Setbacks, including at least two dead Russians, forced a tactical fallback to Nacala, though a new effort is reported to have been underway since late February 2020.The Mozambican government is also considering a number of proposals from other private military companies. Maputo needs to consider these carefully; Israeli or Gulf State involvement in any form might exasperate rather than alleviate this crisis.The Tanzanian connectionBut market-led security and military providers will not end this insurgency. Nor will the engagement of states such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom or Angola, all of which have made their own offers of support. What would significantly make a difference is much closer to home: serious Tanzanian engagement.This insurgency is concentrated in districts bordering Tanzania and there is clear-cut intelligence of connections into Tanzania and beyond. Swahili is also a lingua franca for the jihadists, connecting them up the East African coast, and into eastern Congo and elsewhere.It is puzzling, given the deep shared history between Tanzania and Mozambique, that the bilateral relationship is as patchy as it is today: during the liberation struggle (1965-1974) against the Portuguese, Mozambique’s ruling party Frelimo maintained rear bases in Tanzania, and Nyusi was educated there.Conspiracy theories circulate that Tanzania has encouraged the Cabo Delgado insurgency to weaken its neighbour, or at least displace radicalised individuals from Tanzanian soil into Mozambique.President John Magafuli of Tanzania did not attend the January inauguration of Nyusi. It has become urgent that Magafuli (who is also the current chair of the regional body, the Southern African Development Community) and Nyusi meet face-to-face to map out improved intelligence sharing and a joint strategy to respond to an emerging regional threat.Southern Africa is locking down because of Covid-19, which will distract the government’s ability to focus fully on this crisis and create a perfect moment for the infant insurgency in Cabo Delgado to grow. More military setbacks should be expected in coming months.But the Mozambican government can still contain and prevail if it seriously reforms its military, builds strong alliances with its regional neighbours (especially Tanzania), chooses its private security contractors and international partnerships wisely, and backs military efforts with better intelligence and developmental interventions that offer alternative pathways to potential recruits.But despite Maputo’s hope that significant progress will be made over the coming year, and the setting up of a presidential task force to evaluate progress and intelligence, it is likely that Mozambique and its partners will need to prepare themselves for a drawn-out struggle.This article originally appeared in the Mail & Guardian Full Article
b Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for African Economies and Development By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 10:10:01 +0000 Research Event 21 April 2020 - 4:30pm to 5:30pm Event participants Dr Hafez Ghanem, Vice President for Africa, World BankChair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House Dr Hafez Ghanem discusses the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for African economies and their development and poverty reduction efforts, and assesses the priorities and obstacles for establishing a comprehensive response to the crisis. While the acute strain placed on health systems by the COVID-19 pandemic is already in evidence, the long-term economic fallout from the crisis is yet to fully manifest. For Africa it is the economic impact that may leave the most enduring legacy: from the direct expense of measures to treat, detect and reduce the spread of the virus; to the indirect costs of domestic lockdown measures, global supply chain disruptions and plummeting commodity prices. As decision-makers globally start to plan for the scale of this economic shock, strategizing in and on Africa to meet the challenge will require unprecedented planning and commitment - and will need to be matched by support from international partners to enable long-term recovery. Department/project Africa Programme, Inclusive Economic Growth, Governance and Technology Hanna Desta Programme Assistant, Africa Programme Email Full Article
b Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for Food Security and Resilience in Africa By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 10:15:01 +0000 Research Event 23 April 2020 - 1:00pm to 2:00pm Event participants Dr Arif Husain, Chief Economist and Director of Research, Assessment and Monitoring, United Nations World Food ProgrammeRespondent: Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham HouseChair: Professor Tim Benton, Research Director, Emerging Risks; Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme, Chatham House Dr Arif Husain gives his assessment of the potential impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have on food security in Africa and what can be done to prevent a food security emergency. Linked to the immediate public health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are those of economic and food security, particularly significant for low- and middle-income countries. Currently more than 821 million people globally go hungry, with 100 million of those suffering acute hunger, and this will worsen if the evolving economic emergency becomes a food security emergency. Sub-Saharan African countries rely on trade for food security and for revenue; they imported more than 40 million tons of cereal from around the world in 2018, according to the World Food Programme (WFP). The region faces stark new challenges due to the pandemic.This event launches the WFP paper COVID-19: Potential impact on the world’s poorest people. Department/project Africa Programme Hanna Desta Programme Assistant, Africa Programme Email Full Article
b Beyond Lockdown: Africa’s Options for Responding to COVID-19 By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 15:42:52 +0000 21 April 2020 Ben Shepherd Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme Nina van der Mark Research Analyst, Global Health Programme @vdm_nina LinkedIn The continent’s enormous diversity means that there will be no one African experience of COVID-19, nor a uniform governmental response. But there are some common challenges across the continent, and a chance to get the response right. 2020-04-22-Africa-COVID-Dakar Dakar after the Interior Ministry announced compulsory wearing of masks in public and private services, shops and transport, under penalty of sanctions. Photo by SEYLLOU/AFP via Getty Images. African policymakers face a dilemma when it comes to COVID-19. The first hope is to prevent the virus from gaining a foothold at all, and many African states have significant experience of managing infectious disease outbreaks. The establishment of the Africa Centre for Disease Control highlights the hugely increased focus on public health in recent years.But capacities to track, test and isolate vary wildly, notably between neighbours with porous and poorly controlled borders and, in most cases, sustained national-level disease control is difficult. Initial clusters of COVID-19 cases are already established in many places, but a lack of testing capacity makes it hard to know the full extent of transmission.It is not obvious what African states should do as a response. Lack of information about COVID-19 means the proportion of asymptomatic or mild cases is not known, still less the ways in which this is influenced by human geography and demographics.Africa is an overwhelmingly young continent with a median age under 20. But it also faces chronic malnutrition, which may weaken immune responses, and infectious diseases such as malaria, TB and HIV are widespread which could worsen the impact of COVID-19, particularly if treatment for these diseases is interrupted.Complex and unknownUltimately, how all these factors interact with COVID-19 is complex and remains largely unknown. Africa may escape with a relatively light toll. Or it could be hit harder than anywhere else.What is clear, however, is that cost of simply following the rest of the world into lockdown could be high. Africa is relatively rural but has higher populations living in informal settlements than anywhere in the world. Many live in cramped and overcrowded accommodation without clean water or reliable electricity, making handwashing a challenge and working from home impossible.And the benefits appear limited. The goal of lockdowns in most places is not to eliminate the virus but to accept the economic and social costs as a price worth paying in order to ‘flatten the curve’ of infection and protect healthcare systems from being overwhelmed. But this logic does not hold when many of Africa’s healthcare systems are barely coping with pre-coronavirus levels of disease.Africa suffers in comparison to much of the rest of the world in terms of access to quality and affordable healthcare, critical care beds and specialist personnel. For example, in 2017, Nigeria had just 120 ICU beds for a country of 200 million, equating to 0.07 per 100,000 inhabitants compared to 12.5 per 100,000 in Italy and 3.6 per 100,000 in China.The pandemic’s ruinous economic impacts could also be more acute for Africa than anywhere else. The continent is highly vulnerable to potential drops in output and relies heavily on demand from China and Europe. Many states are already facing sharply falling natural resource revenues, and investment, tourism and remittances will suffer - all on top of a high existing debt burden.Analysis by the World Bank shows that Africa will likely face its first recession in 25 years, with the continental economy contracting by up to 5.1% in 2020. Africa will have scant financial ammunition to use in the fight against COVID-19 with currencies weakening, food prices rising, local agri-food supply chains disrupted and food imports likely to decrease as well. A food security emergency appears a strong possibility.So, although several states have imposed national lockdowns and others closed major urban centres, lockdowns are difficult to manage and sustain, especially in places where the daily hustle of the informal sector or subsistence agriculture are the only means of survival and where the state has neither the trust of the population nor the capacity to replace lost earnings or meet basic needs.Of course, this is not simply a binary choice between lockdown or no lockdown - a range of intermediate options exist, such as some restriction on movement, curfews, shutting places of worship, banning only large gatherings, or closing pubs, schools and borders.A significant number of African states have so far taken this middle path. This will not prevent the virus from spreading nor, in all probability, be enough to ensure adequate healthcare for all Africans infected with COVID-19. But it may help slow the spread and buy invaluable time for African states and partners to prepare.How this time is used is therefore of paramount importance. Popular trust in the state is low in many African countries so strategies must empower communities, not alienate them. Africa’s experience of previous epidemics and long traditions of collective resilience and community-based crisis response - which persist in many places – are significant strengths.The right messages must be carried by the right messengers, and policies - including cash transfers and food distribution - implemented sensitively. If not, or if responses become militarized, public consent is unlikely to be sustained for long. Full Article
b Webinar: Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic for African Elections and Democracy By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 01 May 2020 15:10:01 +0000 Research Event 6 May 2020 - 2:30pm to 3:30pm Event participants Dr Christopher Fomunyoh, Senior Associate and Regional Director for Central and West Africa, National Democratic Institute (NDI)Chair: Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House 2020 was anticipated to be a year of landmark elections across Africa, including general elections scheduled in Somalia and Ethiopia – countries at critical junctures in their transitions to electoral democracy – as well as a re-run of annulled presidential elections in Malawi. The COVID-19 pandemic has created new challenges for African countries seeking to hold elections or further democratization – including the practicalities of adapting containment measures to electoral processes in the context of strained financial and logistical resources. It may also be used as a pretext for the pursuit of repressive legislation and constitutional amendments to preclude elections or bolster authoritarianism, compounded by new constraints on accountability mechanisms such as election observation missions. At this event, Dr Christopher Fomunyoh discusses the likely impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on elections and democracy in various African countries, as well as responses and measures to meet the multifaceted challenges posed. Department/project Africa Programme, Elections and political systems Hanna Desta Programme Assistant, Africa Programme Email Full Article
b Deletion of fatty acid transport protein 2 (FATP2) in the mouse liver changes the metabolic landscape by increasing the expression of PPAR{alpha}-regulated genes [Lipids] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-24T06:08:45-07:00 Fatty acid transport protein 2 (FATP2) is highly expressed in the liver, small intestine, and kidney, where it functions in both the transport of exogenous long-chain fatty acids and the activation of very-long-chain fatty acids. Here, using a murine model, we investigated the phenotypic impacts of deleting FATP2, followed by a transcriptomic analysis using unbiased RNA-Seq to identify concomitant changes in the liver transcriptome. WT and FATP2-null (Fatp2−/−) mice (5 weeks) were maintained on a standard chow diet for 6 weeks. The Fatp2−/− mice had reduced weight gain, lowered serum triglyceride, and increased serum cholesterol levels and attenuated dietary fatty acid absorption. Transcriptomic analysis of the liver revealed 258 differentially expressed genes in male Fatp2−/− mice and a total of 91 in female Fatp2−/− mice. These genes mapped to the following gene ontology categories: fatty acid degradation, peroxisome biogenesis, fatty acid synthesis, and retinol and arachidonic acid metabolism. Targeted RT-quantitative PCR verified the altered expression of selected genes. Of note, most of the genes with increased expression were known to be regulated by peroxisome proliferator–activated receptor α (PPARα), suggesting that FATP2 activity is linked to a PPARα-specific proximal ligand. Targeted metabolomic experiments in the Fatp2−/− liver revealed increases of total C16:0, C16:1, and C18:1 fatty acids; increases in lipoxin A4 and prostaglandin J2; and a decrease in 20-hydroxyeicosatetraenoic acid. We conclude that the expression of FATP2 in the liver broadly affects the metabolic landscape through PPARα, indicating that FATP2 provides an important role in liver lipid metabolism through its transport or activation activities. Full Article
b Combining Precursor and Fragment Information for Improved Detection of Differential Abundance in Data Independent Acquisition [Technological Innovation and Resources] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-02-01T00:05:30-08:00 In bottom-up, label-free discovery proteomics, biological samples are acquired in a data-dependent (DDA) or data-independent (DIA) manner, with peptide signals recorded in an intact (MS1) and fragmented (MS2) form. While DDA has only the MS1 space for quantification, DIA contains both MS1 and MS2 at high quantitative quality. DIA profiles of complex biological matrices such as tissues or cells can contain quantitative interferences, and the interferences at the MS1 and the MS2 signals are often independent. When comparing biological conditions, the interferences can compromise the detection of differential peptide or protein abundance and lead to false positive or false negative conclusions. We hypothesized that the combined use of MS1 and MS2 quantitative signals could improve our ability to detect differentially abundant proteins. Therefore, we developed a statistical procedure incorporating both MS1 and MS2 quantitative information of DIA. We benchmarked the performance of the MS1-MS2-combined method to the individual use of MS1 or MS2 in DIA using four previously published controlled mixtures, as well as in two previously unpublished controlled mixtures. In the majority of the comparisons, the combined method outperformed the individual use of MS1 or MS2. This was particularly true for comparisons with low fold changes, few replicates, and situations where MS1 and MS2 were of similar quality. When applied to a previously unpublished investigation of lung cancer, the MS1-MS2-combined method increased the coverage of known activated pathways. Since recent technological developments continue to increase the quality of MS1 signals (e.g. using the BoxCar scan mode for Orbitrap instruments), the combination of the MS1 and MS2 information has a high potential for future statistical analysis of DIA data. Full Article
b Mass Spectrometry Based Immunopeptidomics Leads to Robust Predictions of Phosphorylated HLA Class I Ligands [Technological Innovation and Resources] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-02-01T00:05:30-08:00 The presentation of peptides on class I human leukocyte antigen (HLA-I) molecules plays a central role in immune recognition of infected or malignant cells. In cancer, non-self HLA-I ligands can arise from many different alterations, including non-synonymous mutations, gene fusion, cancer-specific alternative mRNA splicing or aberrant post-translational modifications. Identifying HLA-I ligands remains a challenging task that requires either heavy experimental work for in vivo identification or optimized bioinformatics tools for accurate predictions. To date, no HLA-I ligand predictor includes post-translational modifications. To fill this gap, we curated phosphorylated HLA-I ligands from several immunopeptidomics studies (including six newly measured samples) covering 72 HLA-I alleles and retrieved a total of 2,066 unique phosphorylated peptides. We then expanded our motif deconvolution tool to identify precise binding motifs of phosphorylated HLA-I ligands. Our results reveal a clear enrichment of phosphorylated peptides among HLA-C ligands and demonstrate a prevalent role of both HLA-I motifs and kinase motifs on the presentation of phosphorylated peptides. These data further enabled us to develop and validate the first predictor of interactions between HLA-I molecules and phosphorylated peptides. Full Article
b Site-specific N-glycan Analysis of Antibody-binding Fc {gamma} Receptors from Primary Human Monocytes [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-02-01T00:05:30-08:00 FcRIIIa (CD16a) and FcRIIa (CD32a) on monocytes are essential for proper effector functions including antibody dependent cellular cytotoxicity (ADCC) and phagocytosis (ADCP). Indeed, therapeutic monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) that bind FcRs with greater affinity exhibit greater efficacy. Furthermore, post-translational modification impacts antibody binding affinity, most notably the composition of the asparagine(N)-linked glycan at N162 of CD16a. CD16a is widely recognized as the key receptor for the monocyte response, however the post-translational modifications of CD16a from endogenous monocytes are not described. Here we isolated monocytes from individual donors and characterized the composition of CD16a and CD32a N-glycans from all modified sites. The composition of CD16a N-glycans varied by glycosylation site and donor. CD16a displayed primarily complex-type biantennary N-glycans at N162, however some individuals expressed CD16a V158 with ~20% hybrid and oligomannose types which increased affinity for IgG1 Fc according to surface plasmon resonance binding analyses. The CD16a N45-glycans contain markedly less processing than other sites with >75% hybrid and oligomannose forms. N38 and N74 of CD16a both contain highly processed complex-type N-glycans with N-acetyllactosamine repeats and complex-type biantennary N-glycans dominate at N169. The composition of CD16a N-glycans isolated from monocytes included a higher proportion of oligomannose-type N-glycans at N45 and less sialylation plus greater branch fucosylation than we observed in a recent analysis of NK cell CD16a. The additional analysis of CD32a from monocytes revealed different features than observed for CD16a including the presence of a predominantly biantennary complex-type N-glycans with two sialic acids at both sites (N64 and N145). Full Article
b Blistering1 Modulates Penicillium expansum Virulence Via Vesicle-mediated Protein Secretion [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-02-01T00:05:30-08:00 The blue mold fungus, Penicillium expansum, is a postharvest apple pathogen that contributes to food waste by rotting fruit and by producing harmful mycotoxins (e.g. patulin). To identify genes controlling pathogen virulence, a random T-DNA insertional library was created from wild-type P. expansum strain R19. One transformant, T625, had reduced virulence in apples, blistered mycelial hyphae, and a T-DNA insertion that abolished transcription of the single copy locus in which it was inserted. The gene, Blistering1, encodes a protein with a DnaJ domain, but otherwise has little homology outside the Aspergillaceae, a family of fungi known for producing antibiotics, mycotoxins, and cheese. Because protein secretion is critical for these processes and for host infection, mass spectrometry was used to monitor proteins secreted into liquid media during fungal growth. T625 failed to secrete a set of enzymes that degrade plant cell walls, along with ones that synthesize the three final biosynthetic steps of patulin. Consequently, the culture broth of T625 had significantly reduced capacity to degrade apple tissue and contained 30 times less patulin. Quantitative mass spectrometry of 3,282 mycelial proteins revealed that T625 had altered cellular networks controlling protein processing in the endoplasmic reticulum, protein export, vesicle-mediated transport, and endocytosis. T625 also had reduced proteins controlling mRNA surveillance and RNA processing. Transmission electron microscopy of hyphal cross sections confirmed that T625 formed abnormally enlarged endosomes or vacuoles. These data reveal that Blistering1 affects internal and external protein processing involving vesicle-mediated transport in a family of fungi with medical, commercial, and agricultural importance. Full Article
b Molecular Basis of the Mechanisms Controlling MASTL [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-02-01T00:05:30-08:00 The human MASTL (Microtubule-associated serine/threonine kinase-like) gene encodes an essential protein in the cell cycle. MASTL is a key factor preventing early dephosphorylation of M-phase targets of Cdk1/CycB. Little is known about the mechanism of MASTL activation and regulation. MASTL contains a non-conserved insertion of 550 residues within its activation loop, splitting the kinase domain, and making it unique. Here, we show that this non-conserved middle region (NCMR) of the protein is crucial for target specificity and activity. We performed a phosphoproteomic assay with different MASTL constructs identifying key phosphorylation sites for its activation and determining whether they arise from autophosphorylation or exogenous kinases, thus generating an activation model. Hydrogen/deuterium exchange data complements this analysis revealing that the C-lobe in full-length MASTL forms a stable structure, whereas the N-lobe is dynamic and the NCMR and C-tail contain few localized regions with higher-order structure. Our results indicate that truncated versions of MASTL conserving a cryptic C-Lobe in the NCMR, display catalytic activity and different targets, thus establishing a possible link with truncated mutations observed in cancer-related databases. Full Article
b Deep Characterization of the Human Antibody Response to Natural Infection Using Longitudinal Immune Repertoire Sequencing [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-02-01T00:05:30-08:00 Human antibody response studies are largely restricted to periods of high immune activity (e.g. vaccination). To comprehensively understand the healthy B cell immune repertoire and how this changes over time and through natural infection, we conducted immune repertoire RNA sequencing on flow cytometry-sorted B cell subsets to profile a single individual's antibodies over 11 months through two periods of natural viral infection. We found that 1) a baseline of healthy variable (V) gene usage in antibodies exists and is stable over time, but antibodies in memory cells consistently have a different usage profile relative to earlier B cell stages; 2) a single complementarity-determining region 3 (CDR3) is potentially generated from more than one VJ gene combination; and 3) IgG and IgA antibody transcripts are found at low levels in early human B cell development, suggesting that class switching may occur earlier than previously realized. These findings provide insight into immune repertoire stability, response to natural infections, and human B cell development. Full Article
b Combined EGFR and ROCK Inhibition in Triple-negative Breast Cancer Leads to Cell Death Via Impaired Autophagic Flux [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-02-01T00:05:30-08:00 Triple-negative breast cancer (TNBC) is an aggressive subtype of breast cancer with very limited therapeutic options. We have recently shown that the combined inhibition of EGFR and ROCK in TNBC cells results in cell death, however, the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. To investigate this, here we applied a mass spectrometry-based proteomic approach to identify proteins altered on single and combination treatments. Our proteomic data revealed autophagy as the major molecular mechanism implicated in the cells' response to combinatorial treatment. We here show that EGFR inhibition by gefitinib treatment alone induces autophagy, a cellular recycling process that acts as a cytoprotective response for TNBC cells. However, combined inhibition of EGFR and ROCK leads to autophagy blockade and accumulation of autophagic vacuoles. Our data show impaired autophagosome clearance as a likely cause of antitumor activity. We propose that the inhibition of the autophagic flux on combinatorial treatment is attributed to the major cytoskeletal changes induced on ROCK inhibition, given the essential role the cytoskeleton plays throughout the various steps of the autophagy process. Full Article