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China’s Foreign Policy




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Re-imagining trade for domestic and foreign policy

Re-imagining trade for domestic and foreign policy Expert comment NCapeling 7 December 2021

Exploring future trade policy through issues such as the green transition, labour standards, human rights, the role of the WTO, and non-trade policy objectives.

Balancing trade and non-trade policy objectives

Marianne Schneider-Petsinger

The supply chain disruptions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic highlight trade cannot be taken for granted, and economic interdependencies have both benefits and costs. As international commerce rebounds and trade policy is increasingly seen through the prism of enhancing resilience, the moment is ripe to redefine and reimagine trade.

The goal of trade policy has never been to increase trade for trade’s sake, so a new narrative and framework for global trade requires striking a careful balance between pursuing trade and non-trade policy objectives.

Protecting the environment, strengthening labour standards, and upholding human rights have long been goals for which trade policy is used as a lever, and the interaction of trade and national security interests as well as the links between trade and competition policy are not new issues either.

All these non-trade policy aspects have come to the forefront as the geopolitical context has shifted and the transition to green and digital economies has gathered force – and, at times, these different non-trade policy goals clash.

The US and European Union (EU) are promoting solar energy to fight climate change but supply chains for solar panels are heavily reliant on forced labour from Xinjiang, and hence it is not yet certain whether environmental or human rights concerns will prevail. However, it is clear trade policy tools can be part of a comprehensive solution which manages inherent tensions while still advancing both objectives.

A new narrative and framework for global trade requires striking a careful balance between pursuing trade and non-trade policy objectives

Trade policy is also not just a foreign policy instrument but links closely to domestic policy – the populist backlash against globalization in much of the developed world, especially the US and Europe, was in part driven by anti-trade sentiment.

While American attitudes towards trade improved after the 2016 election of Donald Trump, positive views towards trade dropped sharply in 2021. The Biden administration’s worker-centred trade policy aims to address distributional effects of international economic integration which is a long-standing challenge. Thus, tackling non-trade policy issues without losing sight of this unresolved core issue requires careful calibration.

Trade policy is being pulled in many different directions at the same time as the core institution governing global trade – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – is in crisis, and it is uncertain how much of the non-trade policy agenda the WTO can handle. If the linkage to non-trade policy becomes too strong, this could be the straw that breaks the WTO’s back, but if it is too weak, the WTO risks becoming irrelevant in efforts to tackle key global challenges.

But if its 164 members can generate trade-oriented solutions to non-trade issues, they can revive the organization and mobilize domestic support for global trade at the same time. This balancing act in managing the tensions between trade and non-trade policy objectives lies at the centre of future-proofing trade policy and global trade governance.

Developing countries must be part of green trade revolution

Carolyn Deere Birkbeck

The biggest challenge in taking environmental efforts forward within the multilateral context is to successfully combine environmental ambition with an approach which engages developing countries as partners, reflects their environment-related trade priorities, and addresses their sustainable development interests.

Meaningful, inclusive dialogue and action at the WTO also requires deeper efforts to build policy coherence among environment, development, and trade policymaking at home

The importance of engaging developing countries must not be underestimated because it is vital a global green economy does not leave the poorest behind, or becomes two-tier where green trade happens only between certain countries and the essential task of incentivizing and supporting sustainable production and consumption patterns in all countries is neglected.

The new member-led initiatives at the WTO do signal that, while the rulemaking and negotiating functions remain central to the global trade body, governments recognize the need for enhanced, transparent, and inclusive policy dialogue as well as problem-solving on sectoral issues and specific trade-related challenges.

Given the well-documented challenges of achieving multilateral consensus at the WTO, governments are exploring new ways to work within multilateral frameworks and to redefine what progress and successful outcomes should look like.

Therefore, there is a need for best practices, voluntary action, pledges, and guidelines to both sustain the relevance of the multilateral trading system and support policy action at the national level for trade which underpins environmental and wider sustainable goals.

Making progress on an environmental agenda which reflects sustainable development concerns requires stronger leadership, engagement, and advocacy from business, civil society, and research communities in both developing and developed countries, as well as economies in transition.

Meaningful, inclusive dialogue and action at the WTO also requires deeper efforts to build policy coherence among environment, development, and trade policymaking at home, with environmental ministries having a key role to play in bringing expertise to bear and ensuring strong regulatory environments and institutions for the implementation of national, regional, and international environmental commitments.

But at the domestic level, many countries still have to overcome complex politics and diverse interests as they work to transform their economies toward greater sustainability and tackle the costs of transition.

Social preparation holds the key to trade transitions

Bernice Lee 

Trade being often depicted as the mother of all ills should not come as a surprise, as politicians are only too happy to put the blame on trade when all sorts of exogenous shocks, such as technological change, could actually be the trigger which fires the bullet into local industries or jobs.

Trade brings positive benefits only if a society is ready for trade, which often means having the cushion for social protection such as healthcare, unemployment benefits, and opportunities for training and reskilling

Admittedly trade does have a way of breaking the seams in the social fabric but the fact politicians often ignore negative impacts of trade means its benefits can be likened to Schrodinger’s cat, both real and illusive. But trade being mainly depicted as a ‘zero-sum’ pursuit and trade deals as the result of swashbuckling duels belie the reality that the real business of trade is often boring, bureaucratic, but necessary.

This is particularly true when trade provides access to a much larger variety of necessary products, such as medicine, food, and minerals, which can be expensive to make domestically. Selling products and services abroad also brings in the hard currency needed to buy these goods or to spend on trips abroad.

This does not take away the fact trade is extremely disruptive but, as a result of all the theorizing and understandable rants about trade, large swathes of the international community have effectively foregone it as a force for good or as an instrument which – while not the answer to all problems – can help smooth the path to well-being through efficiency gains and income growth, as well as putting to work the theory of comparative advantage as promised by the textbooks.

Alas, what the textbooks do not clearly spell out – until recently – is that trade brings positive benefits only if a society is ready for trade, which often means having the cushion for social protection such as healthcare, unemployment benefits, and opportunities for training and reskilling.

The ‘China shock’ literature vividly depicts how workers rarely seamlessly move from one job or sector to another and so, without adequate social protection, trade not only magnifies existing fractures, it also exacerbates inequality. As the aftershock lingers for decades, the lesson learned is the importance of social readiness for trade, especially the role played by governments in providing support for workers as part of the adjustment to trade and globalization.

Authors of this China shock literature recently suggested the next shock will be the transition from fossil fuel production, but the good news is this so-called ‘just transition’ challenge is one which proponents of green energy are well aware of.

But ultimately the China shock could be the dry run for the advent of machine intelligence, meaning better preparation is needed with solid social policies, investment in institutional readiness, and social preparedness to ensure the machines only take on monotonous and unsafe work – not our livelihoods and communities.

Trading partners must move to creating human rights impact

Dr Jennifer Zerk

The question of whether, and how, trade policy should be used as a way of addressing human rights concerns remains controversial and attempts to link the two still attract accusations of ‘protectionism’ and ‘neo-colonialism’.

Momentum appears to be behind those arguing for greater alignment between trade policy and human rights objectives – a trend which is most noticeable in the increasing willingness of trade partners to reference human rights standards in their trade agreements and in the growth of complementary activities such as human rights impact assessment and monitoring.

Evidence that these are having an impact ‘on the ground’ remains elusive. Nevertheless, efforts to enhance scrutiny of trade agreements from a human rights perspective, and to signal the importance of respect for human rights to a trading relationship, can still have value.

Even if causal relationships between trading arrangements and human rights impacts are difficult to establish conclusively, human rights impact assessment and subsequent monitoring activities provide valuable opportunities for stakeholders to weigh in on aspects of trade policy which are of concern.

Such processes not only help governments to realize rights of public participation, they also contribute to good governance by making it more likely that potential human rights problems will be recognized and addressed.

Turning to the agreements themselves, various ideas have been put forward on how to make these more responsive to human rights concerns.

Options mooted by EU institutions in recent years include an enhanced monitoring and enforcement role for consultative bodies established under specialized ‘trade and sustainable development’ chapters, and better mainstreaming of human rights commitments in sector-specific chapters.

However, given the political and resource-related difficulties in developing credible monitoring systems for human rights-related issues, and the unlikelihood of actual enforcement, many view this as little more than window-dressing.

For governments wanting to see real impact, ‘supply chain due diligence’ regimes pioneered by the EU in relation to timber and conflict minerals present a promising regulatory model.

The question of whether, and how, trade policy should be used as a way of addressing human rights concerns remains controversial

These regimes seek to curb trade in products derived from, or which aggravate, human rights abuses as well as aiming to promote more responsible sourcing of products by EU importers. They create powerful incentives within partner countries to crack down on harmful practices by producers, which are bolstered further by regulations that demand more proactive human rights risk management by EU operators throughout their supply chains. Capacity-building and aid packages have been deployed to help speed up the necessary reforms.

New regulatory measures imposing mandatory human rights due diligence obligations on companies operating in a much broader range of sectors are now under consideration by the European Commission. While the role of trade-related measures in the enforcement of this new regime is still unclear, trading partners should be sure to preserve the regulatory space for sector-level and company-level initiatives such as these in future agreements.

Understanding the impact of NTPOs on investment

Professor Michael Gasiorek

Increasingly, trade policy is not just all about achieving trade-related outcomes as international trade, by definition, involves interaction with partner countries and therefore trade policy with regard to those partner countries can be used as a means to achieve ‘non-trade policy objectives’ (NTPOs).

In turn this means trade policy is also no longer just about the domestic economy but also about policies and economies in other countries – such as poorer countries achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs), concerns about practices in other countries in areas such as governance or corruption, or a desire to address broader challenges such as climate change.

But the inclusion of NTPOs in trade policy arrangements between countries also creates possible impacts on investment flows between countries. Stronger NTPO commitments could have a negative impact both on foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment because the commitments increase costs for the companies involved which makes the investment less attractive.

However, NTPOs bringing progress on governance, or strengthening institutions, or giving more clarity on environmental regulations could signal a more stable and safe business environment, with production standards which create increased market access for exports – all of which may lead to increased incentives to invest.

A third possibility is that NTPOs do not have much effect either way because, although trade agreement increasingly include provisions on economic and social rights, or civil and political rights, or environmental protection – these are typically ‘best endeavour’ clauses which are frequently not binding or subject to dispute settlement, making them less likely to be implemented.





foreign

US Electorate Shows Distrust of the Realities of Foreign Policy

4 September 2020

Bruce Stokes

Associate Fellow, US and the Americas Programme (based in the US)
The identity of the next US president is yet to be determined, but the foreign policy views of the American public are already clear. In principle, Americans support US engagement in the world but, in practice, they worry other countries take advantage of the United States.

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A poll station official holding "I Voted" stickers in South Carolina. Photo by Mark Makela/Getty Images.

Whoever occupies the White House after the election, it is evident the emphasis will be on ‘America First’, and that only characteristics and approaches will differ. If Donald Trump is re-elected, his electoral base will support a continuation of isolationist, protectionist policies. If Joe Biden becomes president, he will enjoy some limited popular backing for international re-engagement, but his voters still clearly want him to prioritize domestic issues.

Implications for the foreign policy of the next US administration are evident. America may have a long history of isolationism, but that should not be confused with ignorance of the growing interconnectedness of today’s world. However, Americans are struggling to find a new equilibrium for their country’s role in the world.

Around seven-in-ten hold the view that the United States should take a leading or major role in international affairs, and the same number acknowledge that international events affect their daily life. But Americans remain reticent about global engagement, and half of registered voters believe other countries take unfair advantage of the United States.

This clear contradiction is mirrored in what can be expected from the election victor, with a Joe Biden administration likely to speak for those who want America to lead, while a second Donald Trump administration is expected to continue complaining about US victimization by an ungrateful world.

A majority (57%) of Americans say foreign policy is 'very important' to them as they decide who to vote for in the 2020 election. This may seem like a high priority, but American polls often show many issues are 'very important' to voters. What matters is relative importance and foreign policy pales in comparison with the significance the public accords to the economy (79%) or healthcare (68%). Immigration (52%) and climate change (42%) are of even less relative importance to voters.

Notably, despite the deep partisanship in American politics today, there is no difference between Republican and Democrat voters on the low priority they accord foreign policy. And barely one-third (35%) of the public give top priority to working with allies and international institutions to confront global challenges such as climate change, poverty and disease — in fact only 31% say improving relations with allies should be a top foreign policy priority over the next five years.

However, despite this apparent lack of support for international relations, a rising majority of Americans believe international trade is good for the economy — running contrary to many international assumptions that Americans are inherently protectionist. But this increased interest may not amount to much in reality. Americans also believe trade destroys jobs and lowers wages. Trump is clearly wedded to a protectionist worldview and may continue to try dismantling the World Trade Organization (WTO). Biden is unlikely to initiate any new trade liberalizing negotiations given what would be, at best, a slim Democratic majority in the Senate and anti-trade views held by many unions and blue-collar voters among his constituency. Any political capital he commits to trade is likely to focus on reforming the WTO, but privately his advisers admit they are not optimistic.

In addition, both Biden and Trump face strong public support for ratcheting up pressure on China, although their lines of attack may differ, with Trump likely to double down on tariffs while Biden would work closely with Europe on both trade and human rights issues. More broadly, almost three-quarters (73%) of Americans now express an unfavourable view of China, up 18 points since the last presidential election. One-quarter of Americans classify Beijing as an ‘enemy’ with almost half saying the US should get tougher with China on economic issues, although attitudes do divide along partisan lines, with Republicans generally more critical of Beijing, but Democrats are tougher on human rights.

On immigration, Trump’s policies are out of step with the public. Six-in-ten Americans oppose expanding the border wall with Mexico, 74% support legal status for immigrants illegally brought to the United States as children — including a majority of Republicans (54%) — and as many Americans favour increasing immigration as support decreasing it. But Trump has already promised to double down on limiting immigration if he wins because it is what his Republican electoral base wants and, as with trade, this is one of his long-expressed personal beliefs. If he wins, expect more mass roundups of undocumented people, completion of his border wall and stricter limitations on legal immigration.

In contrast, Biden is likely to loosen constraints on immigration because he believes immigration has been good for the economy and the Democratic party is increasingly dependent on Hispanic and Asian voters, the two fastest growing portions of the population. However, open borders are not a Biden option. The US foreign-born population is at near-record levels and, every time in American history the portion of foreign born has come close to being 14% of the total population — in the 1880s, the 1920s and now — there has been a populist backlash. Democrats cannot risk that again.

On climate change, there is strong evidence the American public is increasingly worried, and likely to support rejoining the Paris Agreement if Biden is elected and increases US commitments to cut carbon emissions. But the public also appears unlikely to punish Trump if, as promised, he leaves that accord, and he is almost certain to continue denying climate science in the interest of the coal, oil, and gas industries.

The public’s concern about global warming does not necessarily translate into support for taking substantive action. There is a huge partisan divide between the number of Democrats (68%) and Republicans (11%) who say climate change is a very important issue in the 2020 election. When pressed on what action they want on climate change, and who they trust to do it, Americans are less likely than Europeans to accept paying higher prices. A carbon tax stands no chance of passing the Senate, thanks to moderate Democrats from fossil-fuel states, and America’s love affair with large, CO²-emitting vehicles shows no signs of ebbing.

The outcome of the 2020 US election will almost certainly not be determined by foreign concerns, although an international crisis — a terrorist incident, a military confrontation with China or North Korea — could impact voting in an unforeseen way. But given the mood of the American electorate, if Trump is re-elected, there will be scant public pressure for a more activist, collaborative US foreign policy, beyond support for a tough line on China, while a win for Biden will give more room for some international initiatives.

But public opinion data is clear. Voters want the next US president to focus first on domestic issues — overcoming the pandemic, digging the country out of a deep economic hole, calming racial tensions, and reversing inequality. The outcome of the election may end America’s recently antagonistic foreign policy and halt the deterioration of its international role. But dramatic American re-engagement appears unlikely as the public’s priorities lie elsewhere.




foreign

Picking Up the Broken Pieces of UK Foreign Policy

14 September 2020

Sir Simon Fraser

Deputy Chairman, Chatham House; Senior Adviser, Europe Programme
The challenge is to define a credible new role for a medium-sized international power.

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US president Donald Trump (right) is welcomed by British prime minister Boris Johnson (centre) and NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg during the NATO Summit in London, December 2019. Photo by Mustafa Kamaci/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images.

Does the UK have a foreign policy? The failures in Iraq and Afghanistan curbed our Blairite appetite for intervention. Then the Brexit referendum and the advent of Donald Trump as US president upended the European and Atlantic pillars of our strategy. The UK has been outflanked by Russian opportunism, and on China it is confused about the balance of security risk and economic opportunity. Meanwhile, the world is accelerating into a dangerous, bipolar era of geopolitics.

The claim that leaving the EU would open a highway to British global influence was always hollow. Since 2016, the UK’s influence has declined; our forces are barely present in international theatres of conflict and, as recent days have again shown, the Brexit soap opera undermines our diplomacy and soft power. So far, there are only glimmers of a new direction.

On issues such as Iran, climate change and excluding Russia from the G7, the UK has stayed close to EU positions. Elsewhere, it has taken a tougher stance on China and Hong Kong that is aligned more closely with the US and the Five Eyes intelligence community, which includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand. There is also a renewed focus on human rights.

However, this does not add up to a coherent strategy. Getting it to do so is the job of this autumn’s 'integrated review' of security, defence, development and foreign policy. The timing is driven by the government’s comprehensive spending review, which — bizarrely — means they will reach conclusions without knowing what sort of deal, if any, we will strike with the EU, or who will be the next US president.

The challenge is to define a credible and distinctive role for a freestanding medium power with strong traditions of diplomacy, defence, intelligence, trade and aid. Not everything has changed; although unmoored from the EU, the UK remains a significant player in Nato, the UN Security Council and other international organisations. 

The review needs to start by deciding what matters most. A sensible list would include avoiding conflict between the US and China, maintaining global prosperity, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing environmental damage and climate change, and shoring up a multilateral system of international rules. There will always be urgent problems, and it matters how we respond to them. But a foreign policy should be geared to enduring aims.

On each priority, the review must examine how the UK, outside the EU, can make a difference. Sometimes it may find a specific national role, such as convening next year’s COP26 climate conference. Nine times out of 10, however, the route to our national goals will lie, as before, through leveraging relationships with others.

Three relationships matter most. We need a plan for the US, whoever wins the election. If Boris Johnson is the European leader closest to Donald Trump, how will the British prime minister turn that to his advantage if Trump wins? On the other hand, a Joe Biden victory would better serve our wider interest in a reinvigorated Euro-Atlantic community — although, under this government, that would also weaken our hand in Washington compared with Berlin and Paris. What is the plan to counter that?

Second, we need clear thinking on China. In the new bipolar geopolitics, the UK should stand firmly with the US — although not to the extent of allowing Washington to dictate our policy, or of cutting necessary and useful links with China. We need to decide on a strategic objective. Are we preparing for lasting great-power confrontation or even conflict; or are we working for a more sophisticated global equilibrium? In either case, who will be our best international partners?

Evidently, this requires a constructive relationship with Europe, with which the UK has the most obvious shared interests. Bilateral relationships will be valuable, as will the E3 group of the UK, France and Germany. But our reluctance to negotiate a foreign policy relationship with the EU collectively is an error.

When the brainy Whitehall strategists have put down their pens, the review will then, as always, descend into a hard-nosed haggle over money. There are already large holes in Ministry of Defence procurement budgets; the COVID-induced recession will make things worse. With new priorities to fund, such as cybersecurity, the argument will be less about spending more than gouging out savings to redistribute.

Finally, the review must look at delivery. As Downing Street has disempowered ministries, Whitehall’s foreign policy machinery has become over-centralized. Trade and economic considerations should have more weight. Delivery of the new strategy should also be led by a reformed and renamed Department for International Affairs that has leadership on foreign, development and trade policy, oversees external intelligence and works closely with the Ministry of Defence.

Only with such clarity on priorities, relationships and resources can we craft the coherent foreign policy post-Brexit Britain needs. The task will be easier if the UK and EU reach a deal in December.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.




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South Africa’s foreign policy: Reflections on the United Nations Security Council and the African Union

South Africa’s foreign policy: Reflections on the United Nations Security Council and the African Union 20 January 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 January 2021 Online

HE Dr Naledi Pandor, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, discusses South Africa’s role in pursuing its regional and global goals.

To receive joining instructions, please finalise your registration by clicking the link below. Once you have registered you will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which will include the unique joining link you will need to attend.

In 2019-2020, South Africa served its third term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, seeking to strengthen its role as a bridge-builder and further justify a more permanent role for the country and continent on the body.

In February 2021, South Africa will also conclude its time as Chair of the African Union, having used its tenure to promote peace and security issues, including closer cooperation with the UNSC, and advance regional economic integration.

South Africa took up these roles at a time of global and regional upheaval. As COVID-19 tested countries’ commitment to cooperation over isolation, South Africa coordinated regional responses to address the challenges of stressed public health systems, vaccine strategies, and economic stimulus and debt support across Africa.

Its leadership has been further tested by ongoing and emerging insecurity in the Sahel, and in Cabo Delgado in neighbouring Mozambique. The crux of its regional strategy remains squaring the circle between promoting regional economic cooperation while protecting its own domestic economic priorities.

At this event, HE Dr Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa, reflects on the country’s two years on the UNSC and one year of chairing the AU, and discuss South Africa’s role in pursuing regional and global goals.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Read event transcript. 




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Nigeria's 2023 elections: Security, economic and foreign policy imperatives

Nigeria's 2023 elections: Security, economic and foreign policy imperatives 5 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 November 2022 Chatham House and Online

Bola Ahmed Tinubu, presidential candidate for the All-Progressives Congress, discusses his vision and recently-unveiled manifesto for ‘renewing hope’ in Nigeria.

Nigeria is scheduled to hold presidential and national assembly elections on 25 February 2023 as well as governorship and other subnational elections on 11 March 2023.

The elections will end President Muhammadu Buhari’s two terms in office since his election in 2015 and will mark the first time that he is not engaging in a presidential poll since Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999 – an important marker in Nigeria’s trajectory of democratic consolidation.

Nigeria’s recently enacted Electoral Act has contributed to improved hope around the election process, reflected in the addition of 12.29 million new voters in Nigeria’s voter registration exercise across the federation’s 36 states and 1,491 constituencies.

Yet Nigeria stands at a critical juncture, having suffered from two recessions in the past six years, unprecedented levels of food insecurity, persistent fuel scarcity and high levels of crude oil theft.

Civic fatigue also remains an important challenge and President Muhammadu Buhari’s three main policy pillars of security, economy and corruption continue to be defining issues for citizens.

At this event, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, presidential candidate for the All-Progressives Congress, discusses his vision and recently unveiled manifesto for ‘renewing hope’ in Nigeria including his policy proposals for economic reform and revival and how to deliver secure and inclusive job opportunities for Nigerian citizens.

Download a transcript

This event is a members and Africa programme event and is part of a series of events and outputs examining Nigeria’s 2023 elections and political developments.

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.




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What is Labour’s foreign policy?

What is Labour’s foreign policy? 24 January 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with David Lammy, the UK shadow foreign secretary.

David Lammy MP, shadow secretary of state for foreign, commonwealth and development affairs, outlines Labour’s plan for UK foreign policy if elected to government.

He addresses the UK’s strengths and opportunities in a world that has become more divided, more dangerous, and more unpredictable. He also offers a critique of the current UK government’s approach to foreign policy, particularly at strained relationships with allies and Britain’s economic woes.

The shadow foreign secretary explores the following key questions:

  • What would a future Labour government do to modernize Britain’s diplomacy and rebuild alliances to improve Britain’s global influence?

  • In a new age of warfare in Europe, how would Labour pursue security cooperation with allies?

  • How would Labour address high energy costs, energy security, and the climate crisis?

  • As Britain’s economy falters, how can foreign policy drive prosperity at home?

  • What is Labour’s plan for international development, following the UK government’s abandonment of the 0.7% commitment?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read a transcript




foreign

The state of the union? US foreign policy and a new US Congress

The state of the union? US foreign policy and a new US Congress 30 January 2023 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

As a new Congress takes shape, what is the impact for US foreign policy?  

The recent US 2022 midterm elections have led to a split with Republicans in command of the US House of Representatives and Democrats retaining a slim majority in the Senate.

Following a gruelling selection process for the new Speaker of the House, the new Congress took its seats in January 2023, but President Joe Biden no longer enjoys single-party control of Congress.

  • What will be the implications of this for US leadership and US foreign policy?
  • How will domestic politics constrain foreign policy objectives?
  • Can policymakers across government set aside political differences to tackle global challenges?

This panel also unpacks insights into the following questions:

  • What will this Congress view as foreign policy priorities?
  • Will policies that are tough on China ramp up?
  • Can the US continue its support for Ukraine with a split Congress?
  • Will the next two years lead to any considerable foreign policy pivots with a general election on the horizon?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.




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Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11

Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 14 October 2021 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2021 Chatham House

Former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

The dramatic events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates a profound shift in European security priorities since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of 9/11, former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses recent shifts in European foreign policy.

How has the focus on counterterrorism changed over the last two decades particularly in light of new and evolving strategic challenges? Why were many long-term objectives in Afghanistan left unachieved? Has the threat of terrorism changed across Europe? How has cooperation between security and intelligence services across the world changed particularly across the Atlantic? And, 20 years on, is the ‘war on terror’ really over?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.




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Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East 14 May 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey is cooperating closely with Russia to secure its border with Syria and to encourage a long-term political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Its efforts have staved off a humanitarian catastrophe in the northern Syrian province of Idlib and initiated the trilateral ‘Astana Process’ with Russia and Iran as the primary framework to settle the future of Syria.

By contrast, Turkey and the US disagree on a range of important issues including Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air missile defence systems and American support for the PKK-affiliated Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.

In this session, the speaker will outline Turkey’s foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and share his country’s perspectives on the US and Russian policies in that region.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.




foreign

Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Perspective of the Main Opposition Party

Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Perspective of the Main Opposition Party 5 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2020 Online

The Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main Turkish opposition party, is becoming a serious contender for a leading role in the country’s politics.

This is an online only event.

CHP’s mayoral candidates defeated the Justice and Development Party (AKP) incumbents in the 2019 local elections in Ankara and Istanbul, which held both cities for a quarter of a century. Its ascendency in Turkish politics is improving prospects for a CHP-led government after the next general election in 2023.

In this webinar, the speaker will share CHP’s stance on the country’s foreign policy towards key regional allies in Europe, as well as its take on relations with Russia, the US and Turkey’s position and role in the Middle East. Finally, the speaker will share how CHP’s external policy might differ from the ruling AKP. 




foreign

Turkey's foreign policy: The perspective of the İYİ Parti

Turkey's foreign policy: The perspective of the İYİ Parti 25 January 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 January 2021 Online

The centre-right İYİ Parti, the second largest opposition party in Turkey, is attracting voters from the governing alliance between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the pro-Turkish National Movement Party (MHP).

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

The İYİ Parti, which was set up in 2017, formed the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı) with the left-of-centre Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the pro-Islam Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) in the 2018 parliamentary elections winning 43 seats in the Grand National Assembly.

In the 2019 municipal elections, the İYİ Parti’s alliance alliance with the CHP played an important role in enabling the latter’s candidates to become the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara after a quarter-century dominance by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Its popularity has been rising steadily, according to recent polls. In this webinar, the speaker will outline the party’s viewpoint on the country’s foreign policy towards the European Union, as well as its perspectives on relations with Russia, the US, Iran and the Arab world. Finally, he will share the ways in which the İYİ Parti’s approach to external policy might differ from the ruling AKP.




foreign

Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy: A story of mutual creation?

Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy: A story of mutual creation? 1 November 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 October 2022 Online

Panellists discuss the link between Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies under President Erdoğan.

From Turkey’s ongoing rapprochement with its erstwhile Middle Eastern antagonists to its Syria policy and earlier approach towards the West, there has been extensive discussion on the domestic drivers behind Ankara’s foreign policy.

Less discussed but no less important is how Turkish foreign affairs have shaped its internal politics. Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s foreign and domestic policies have mutually reshaped each other.

In this webinar, launching Gönül Tol’s new book Erdoğan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria, panellists will take stock of how Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies under the leadership of President Erdoğan have influenced and shaped each other. Speakers will also discuss the internal drivers behind Turkey’s current reset in relations with the Middle East, and examine how Ankara’s foreign affairs play into the country’s political and identity fault lines.

The event will be held on the record and will be live-streamed on the MENA Programme’s Facebook page.




foreign

Familiar to foreign

Students from OM Panama’s International Intensive School of Missions experience a different world inside a mosque in Panama City.




foreign

Rubio and Waltz picks put China back at the center of US foreign policy

Trump’s expected choice of Sen. Marco Rubio and Rep. Mike Waltz indicates China is going to be at the center of U.S. foreign policy, deepening U.S.-China tensions.




foreign

Japan's 7-Eleven May Go Private To Avoid $45 Billion Foreign Buyout

The Japanese owner of 7-Eleven is considering going private by buying back its own shares in a bid to avoid a takeover attempt by Canadian rival Alimentation Couche-Tard.




foreign

Japan's 7-Eleven May Go Private To Avoid $45 Billion Foreign Buyout

The Japanese owner of 7-Eleven is considering going private by buying back its own shares in a bid to avoid a takeover attempt by Canadian rival Alimentation Couche-Tard.




foreign

Noramco Foreign Trade Zone approval granted

Noramco Inc. has become the first company in the state to include their facility in Delaware’s Foreign-Trade Zone under the Alternative Site Framework (ASF) and to be granted "Production Authority" by the Foreign Trade Zone Board of the U.S. Department of Commerce.



  • Delaware Economic Development Office (2013-2017)
  • Former Governor Jack Markell (2009-2017)
  • News
  • Office of the Governor
  • DEDO
  • quality of life
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foreign

Family Members Of Foreign Workers In Canada Now Allowed To Work: Spouses, Working-Age Children Will Get Work Permits!

After its decision to strengthen visa infrastructure in Delhi and Chandigarh, Canada has now announced that family members of temporary international workers will also be allowed to work in the country. Sean Fraser, Canada’s Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship, recently informed the media that his agency will be granting work permits to relatives of […]




foreign

Gulf region loosens foreign investment laws

The Gulf region is making extensive reforms to its foreign investment landscape in an effort to attract foreign investors to sectors outside oil and gas, according to a recent report by PwC. 




foreign

India invites foreign capital

India’s 2020 budget continues the process of opening up to overseas investment.




foreign

How US rust belt has been revived by foreign investment

Once the powerhouse of the industrial US, the rust belt states have revived their economies with the help of foreign investment. 




foreign

Cairo standout African destination for foreign business services in 2018

The Egyptian capital Cairo led Africa in 2018, attracting 10 foreign business services investment projects, in its strongest performance since 2012. Joshua Crawford reports.




foreign

Inaugural China-Pacific Foreign Ministers' Meeting Sheds Light on Beijing’s Pacific Islands Strategy

Inaugural China-Pacific Foreign Ministers' Meeting Sheds Light on Beijing’s Pacific Islands Strategy Inaugural China-Pacific Foreign Ministers' Meeting Sheds Light on Beijing’s Pacific Islands Strategy
ferrard Thu, 12/02/2021 - 07:52

East-West Wire

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East-West Wire

The East-West Wire is a news, commentary, and analysis service provided by the East-West Center in Honolulu. Any part or all of the Wire content may be used by media with attribution to the East-West Center or the person quoted. To receive East-West Center Wire media releases via email, subscribe here.

For links to all East-West Center media programs, fellowships and services, see www.eastwestcenter.org/journalists.

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East-West Wire

Tagline
News, Commentary, and Analysis
East-West Wire

The East-West Wire is a news, commentary, and analysis service provided by the East-West Center in Honolulu. Any part or all of the Wire content may be used by media with attribution to the East-West Center or the person quoted. To receive East-West Center Wire media releases via email, subscribe here.

For links to all East-West Center media programs, fellowships and services, see www.eastwestcenter.org/journalists.

Explore




foreign

Police search for foreign national student kidnapped in Gqeberha




foreign

ActionSA details #Spaza4Locals strategy to combat foreign ownership and illicit trade in township spaza shops




foreign

Hawks confirm foreign student kidnapped in Gqeberha has been released




foreign

Hoteliers decry use of illicit foreign entities

The widespread use of Thai nominees by foreign businesses in Thailand is a growing concern among hoteliers, who fear that low prices and quality could destroy the tourism reputation of the country, according to the Thai Hotels Association's (THA) monthly sentiment index.




foreign

Why did Israel's new foreign minister embrace the Kurdish people?


Israel has long enjoyed positive relations with Kurdish people in the Middle East. It is part of a partnership between Jews and Kurds and also shared interests in the region 




foreign

Trump to appoint hardliners Rubio and Waltz as foreign policy chiefs, reports claim

Trump to appoint hardliners Rubio and Waltz as foreign policy chiefs, reports claim




foreign

2024 Asian Regional Forum on Investment Management of Foreign Exchange Reserves - Roberta Casali

Opening remarks by Roberta Casali, ADB Vice-President for Finance and Risk Management, at the 2024 Asian Regional Forum on Investment Management of Foreign Exchange Reserves, 25 September 2024, Japan




foreign

Foreign Direct Investment in South Asia: Policy, Trends, Impact and Determinants

South Asia study of foreign direct investments impact in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal on economic growth, domestic investment, and export; special emphasis on the role of infrastructure.



  • Publications/Papers and Briefs

foreign

Policy Environment and Regulatory Reforms for Private and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: A Case of the Indian Power Sector

To attract infrastructure investment to meet national goals for providing electricity to consumers, India needs continued macroeconomic stability as well as an improved policy and regulatory environment.



  • Publications/Papers and Briefs

foreign

Vaccinated Foreign Travelers Can Enter United States Beginning Nov. 8

Title: Vaccinated Foreign Travelers Can Enter United States Beginning Nov. 8
Category: Health News
Created: 10/15/2021 12:00:00 AM
Last Editorial Review: 10/18/2021 12:00:00 AM




foreign

U.S. Reopens Borders to Vaccinated Foreign Travelers

Title: U.S. Reopens Borders to Vaccinated Foreign Travelers
Category: Health News
Created: 11/8/2021 12:00:00 AM
Last Editorial Review: 11/8/2021 12:00:00 AM




foreign

Foreign Objects or Insects in the Ear

Title: Foreign Objects or Insects in the Ear
Category: Diseases and Conditions
Created: 11/29/1998 12:00:00 AM
Last Editorial Review: 8/3/2022 12:00:00 AM




foreign

The Rock Hall Was Cold As Ice to Foreigner

“Somehow, I couldn’t sing a rock song at the Rock Hall of Fame when I’m being inducted? It doesn’t make any sense to me, and it sticks in my craw.”




foreign

Foreign influence efforts reached a fever pitch during the 2024 elections

While some fake videos made by actors with Russian ties received millions of views, researchers say there's so far no indication that these efforts swayed U.S. election results.




foreign

Britain's soaring reliance on foreign power exposes great green energy scam...


Britain's soaring reliance on foreign power exposes great green energy scam...


(Third column, 5th story, link)





foreign

Moldova cleans up its act to attract foreign businesses

Deputy PM admits former Soviet state was until recently a 'highly corrupt country' - but insists things are changing fast.




foreign

Soldiers' Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict

When the U.S. military trains other states’ forces, it tries to impart liberal norms such as respect for human rights. But when liberal norms clash, these soldiers prioritize loyalty to their unit, the military, and shared goals.




foreign

148953: Boucher's meeting with Foreign Minister Qureshi

During a March 28 meeting with Assistant Secretary or South and Central Asian Affairs Boucher, Foreign Minister-designate Shah Mehmood Qureshi confirmed that the new government wanted to work with the U.S. to combat extremism, increase trade and extend cooperation with India and Afghanistan.




foreign

Ukraine's Foreign Minister Shares Insights on the War and Ukrainian Determination

The Belfer Center at Harvard Kennedy School hosted a virtual conversation with Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba Wednesday (Feb. 22) to discuss the war in Ukraine as it reaches a full year since Russia's invasion. 




foreign

It's Not Too Late for Restrained U.S. Foreign Policy

Stephen Walt writes that those who favor foreign policy restraint believe the United States should trade and invest in other countries, encourage other states to do the same, and be open to managed immigration instead of building walls in a fit of xenophobia.




foreign

When Foreign Countries Push the Button

Is there a norm against using nuclear weapons? Many policymakers believe that allied countries would severely condemn a state’s nuclear use. But survey research in the United States and India finds high absolute support for nuclear use, and that the public supports nuclear attacks by allies and strategic partners as much as those by the public’s own government. 




foreign

Biden's Foreign-Policy Problem Is Incompetence

Stephen Walt argues that those who fetishize credibility typically assume all that is needed is sufficient resolve. This overlooks the other key ingredient— competence.




foreign

Event Debrief: Sarah Ladislaw on U.S. Foreign Policy on Energy and Climate

Harvard Kennedy School hosted Sarah Ladislaw, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Climate and Energy of the U.S. National Security Council, for an Energy Policy Seminar on the U.S. approach to energy and climate issues in its foreign policy.




foreign

Rami Khouri: U.S. Voters Are Sick of Foreign Wars. Can Trump Strike a Grand Bargain in Middle East?

Shortly after Donald Trump was announced as the winner of the U.S. presidential election, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took to social media to enthusiastically congratulate him. Meanwhile, the Israeli military continued its violent assault on Gaza, killing multiple Palestinians in strikes on apartment buildings and homes. We speak to Palestinian American journalist Rami Khouri about what we know of Trump’s pro-Israel policies and how Trump beat Kamala Harris for the presidency. “Trump out-dramatized Harris, and that’s how he won,” he says.




foreign

Tax-News.com: Hong Kong To Amend Tax Rules For Foreign-Source Passive Income

The Hong Kong Government has issued a statement committing to amend its tax law with regards the tax exemption for foreign source passive income from 2023, to ensure the territory does not end up placed on the EU's tax blacklist of non-cooperative territories.