The histopathological subtype of lung adenocarcinoma (LUAD) is closely associated with prognosis. Micropapillary or solid predominant LUAD tends to relapse after surgery at an early stage, whereas lepidic pattern shows a favorable outcome. However, the molecular mechanism underlying this phenomenon remains unknown. Here, we recruited 31 lepidic predominant LUADs (LR: low-risk subtype group) and 28 micropapillary or solid predominant LUADs (HR: high-risk subtype group). Tissues of these cases were obtained and label-free quantitative proteomic and bioinformatic analyses were performed. Additionally, prognostic impact of targeted proteins was validated using The Cancer Genome Atlas databases (n=492) and tissue microarrays composed of early-stage LUADs (n=228). A total of 192 differentially expressed proteins were identified between tumor tissues of LR and HR and three clusters were identified via hierarchical clustering excluding eight proteins. Cluster 1 (65 proteins) showed a sequential decrease in expression from normal tissues to tumor tissues of LR and then to HR and was predominantly enriched in pathways such as tyrosine metabolism and ECM-receptor interaction, and increased matched mRNA expression of 18 proteins from this cluster predicted favorable prognosis. Cluster 2 (70 proteins) demonstrated a sequential increase in expression from normal tissues to tumor tissues of LR and then to HR and was mainly enriched in pathways such as extracellular organization, DNA replication and cell cycle, and high matched mRNA expression of 25 proteins indicated poor prognosis. Cluster 3 (49 proteins) showed high expression only in LR, with high matched mRNA expression of 20 proteins in this cluster indicating favorable prognosis. Furthermore, high expression of ERO1A and FEN1 at protein level predicted poor prognosis in early-stage LUAD, supporting the mRNA results. In conclusion, we discovered key differentially expressed proteins and pathways between low-risk and high-risk subtypes of early-stage LUAD. Some of these proteins could serve as potential biomarkers in prognostic evaluation.

Gonadal soma-derived factor (gsdf) has been demonstrated to be essential for testicular differentiation in medaka (Oryzias latipes). To understand the protein dynamics of Gsdf in spermatogenesis regulation, we used a His-tag "pull-down" assay coupled with shotgun LC-MS/MS to identify a group of potential interacting partners for Gsdf, which included cytoplasmic dynein light chain 2, eukaryotic polypeptide elongation factor 1 alpha (eEF1α), and actin filaments in mature medaka testis. As for the interaction with TGFβ-dynein being critical for spermatogonial division in Drosophila melanogaster, the physical interactions of Gsdf-dynein and Gsdf-eEF1α were identified through a yeast 2-hybrid (Y2H) screening of an adult testis cDNA library using Gsdf as bait, which were verified by a paired Y2H assay. Co-immunoprecipitation of Gsdf and eEF1α was defined in adult testes as supporting the requirement of a Gsdf and eEF1α interaction in testis development. Proteomics analysis (data are available via ProteomeXchange with identifier PXD022153) and ultrastrutural observations showed that Gsdf deficiency activated eEF1α-mediated protein synthesis and ribosomal biogenesis, which in turn led to the differentiation of undifferentiated germ cells. Thus, our results provide a framework and new insight into the coordination of a Gsdf (TGFβ and eEF1α complex in the basic processes of germ cell proliferation, transcriptional and translational control of sexual RNA which may be fundamentally conserved across phyla during sexual differentiation.

Prices, Products and Priorities: Meeting Refugees’ Energy Needs in Burkina Faso and Kenya Other resource sysadmin 24 January 2018

As the number of displaced people increases, and aid budgets come under further pressure, the imperative to identify cost-effective and sustainable solutions for delivering energy to refugees is more pressing than ever.

This paper examines the issue of energy and displacement in detail, using insights from refugees in camps in Burkina Faso and Kenya. It seeks to promote a better understanding of their energy needs, priorities and preferences, and explores how increased access to energy might help to achieve lasting impact in the two camps surveyed. The paper is based on primary research from the Goudoubo camp in Burkina Faso and the Kakuma I camp in Kenya, but the analysis and conclusions are pertinent in the wider context of camps for forcibly displaced people.

Summary points

• There is a low level of energy access in the refugee camps of Kakuma I and Goudoubo, which contributes to poverty and hampers relief and development efforts. Trying to meet basic cooking, lighting and phone-charging needs is costly for refugees, consuming a significant share of stretched monthly budgets.
• The predominant cooking solution consists of basic improved cookstoves burning wood and charcoal. The ‘three-stone fire’ method also remains commonplace. Three out of five families in Kakuma I report health problems due to smoke from cookstoves.
• Street lighting is a high priority for residents, due to concerns about security and safety in camps. In Goudoubo, 86 per cent of survey respondents said that more household members would go out after dark if there were better public lighting.
• A significant proportion of refugees would pay for cleaner and more efficient energy technologies, but many lack the financial resources required, and the development of markets for such products remains partially contingent on sustained financial support.
• There is a need for a diversity of energy technologies that give varying levels and qualities of service; a ‘one size fits all’ approach is inappropriate if universal access to sustainable energy is to be achieved.
• Clean cookstoves and fuels (LPG, ethanol, biogas, etc.) are in high demand, but require much greater investment if they are to be introduced at scale. Solid biomass and improved cookstoves will continue to be important cooking solutions in Kakuma I and Goudoubo, as well as in other refugee camps. A shift to more efficient cooking can be achieved at little or no extra cost for the significant proportion of people who still cook on three-stone fires.
• Users of quality-verified household solar products spend dramatically less on light and power than do people using inferior technologies. Strong brand recognition and a high willingness to pay indicate a large market and a significant opportunity for the solar private sector.
• Centralized electricity supply solutions – mini-grids or grid connections – are more economic than multiple standalone diesel generators. The current piecemeal and ad hoc approach, with each facility managing its own power supply, is inherently wasteful. Greater coordination among humanitarian clusters is required so that centralized solutions can be assessed, designed, financed and implemented.
• Collecting data on energy expenditure and use, as well as quantification of the wide ranging impacts of improved technologies, is necessary to build a compelling case for investment in electricity infrastructure. In addition, engaging refugees on their needs, preferences and willingness to pay can improve the sustainability and impact of energy interventions.
• Private-sector and market development approaches offer long-term, cost-effective solutions for refugees and can also benefit host communities. As the number of displaced people in the world increases, and as aid budgets come under further pressure, the imperative to identify cost-effective and sustainable solutions is more pressing than ever.

Chatham House is a part of the Moving Energy Initiative, a consortium working towards clean energy for refugees. For more information visit movingenergy.earth

Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness Research paper sysadmin 9 April 2018

As Libya’s war economy persists, prospects for the restoration of functioning central governance become more distant.

Summary

• Libya suffers from interlinked political, security and economic crises that are weakening state institutions, damaging its economy and facilitating the continued existence of non-state armed groups. As rival authorities continue to compete for power, the resulting fragmentation and dysfunction have provided a fertile environment for the development of a pervasive war economy dependent on violence.
• This war economy is dynamic and constantly in flux. Relative to earlier problems, there were signs of progress on several fronts in 2017: a reduction in human smuggling, a tripling in oil revenues, and increased local action against fuel smuggling. Yet the dynamics that have supported the war economy’s rise remain.
• Libya’s war economy is highly damaging for the future of the state for three reasons:
  • First, it provides an enabling environment for networks of armed groups, criminal networks, corrupt businessmen and political elites to sustain their activities through illicit sales and predatory practices. Their operations are closely linked to the dispensation of violence, and are thus a spur for further conflict.
  • Second, the war economy perpetuates negative incentives for those who profit from the state’s dysfunction. Only effective governance, supported by a durable political settlement, can tackle the foundations of Libya’s war economy. But neither a return to functioning central governance nor the development of a security sector that is fit for purpose is in the interests of war economy profiteers, who are therefore motivated to act as powerful spoilers of reform.
  • Third, the political contestation and resource predation practised by those engaged in the war economy are having a disastrous impact on Libya’s formal economy, undermining what remains of its institutions. As the war economy persists, therefore, the prospects for the restoration of functioning central governance become more distant. This threatens to create a vicious cycle that accelerates further state collapse.
• Due to the limited capacity for coercion available to any actor or entity connected with the state, a strategy of co-opting networks of war economy profiteers has almost exclusively prevailed. This has failed. Drawing on the lessons from these attempts, a more successful policy must pursue targeted measures to combat the enabling structures of Libya’s war economy where possible, and to co-opt war economy profiteers only where necessary.
• In this, state authorities can do more to utilize what power they have to name and shame war economy profiteers in order to weaken the local legitimacy critical to profiteers’ survival. The state must present credible alternative livelihood opportunities to those engaged in, or benefiting from, the war economy. Progress will depend in part on the creation of positive incentives to abandon such activity. Where profiteers cannot be incentivized to move towards more legitimate economic activities, greater and more effective efforts must be made to reduce the profit margins of illicit schemes.
• The international community can do more to support Libyan efforts in countering the war economy. Cooperation over the targeting of criminal groups’ overseas assets, support for increased transparency over the dispensation of state funds, and measures to reduce the viability of illicit activities can all help to strengthen the position of state authorities.

Further reading

Discover the six things you need to know about Libya’s war economy

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and the Graduate Institute Geneva held a two-day roundtable meeting in Geneva on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Geneva was co-hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva and involved 19 participants, 9 Chinese (from six research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 11 non-Chinese (from eight research institutions in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the third meeting included a mix of participants from the first two meetings and some new participants

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Timely repair of DNA double-strand breaks (DSBs) is essential to maintaining genomic integrity and preventing illnesses induced by genetic abnormalities. We previously demonstrated that the E3 ubiquitin ligase SMURF2 plays a critical tumor suppressing role via its interaction with RNF20 (ring finger protein 20) in shaping chromatin landscape and preserving genomic stability. However, the mechanism that mobilizes SMURF2 in response to DNA damage remains unclear. Using biochemical approaches and MS analysis, we show that upon the onset of the DNA-damage response, SMURF2 becomes phosphorylated at Ser384 by ataxia telangiectasia mutated (ATM) serine/threonine kinase, and this phosphorylation is required for its interaction with RNF20. We demonstrate that a SMURF2 mutant with an S384A substitution has reduced capacity to ubiquitinate RNF20 while promoting Smad3 ubiquitination unabatedly. More importantly, mouse embryonic fibroblasts expressing the SMURF2 S384A mutant show a weakened ability to sustain the DSB response compared with those expressing WT SMURF2 following etoposide treatment. These data indicate that SMURF2-mediated RNF20 ubiquitination and degradation controlled by ataxia telangiectasia mutated–induced phosphorylation at Ser384 constitutes a negative feedback loop that regulates DSB repair.

The Phillies continued to bolster their infield depth on Friday by signing versatile veteran Sean Rodriguez to a Minor League contract with an invite to big league Spring Training, MLB.com has learned.

Jake Arrieta on Thursday offered an unexpected explanation for his second-half struggles in 2018: he pitched much of last season with an injured left knee.

The Phillies have been the favorites in the Bryce Harper sweepstakes for months, and that speculation heated up over the weekend.

Right-hander Matt Harvey sustained a glute strain while participating in agility drills on Wednesday and will be out for roughly a week and a half, Angels manager Brad Ausmus said Thursday.

Shohei Ohtani is continuing to make progress in his rehab from Tommy John surgery. On Sunday, he said he is hopeful he'll be able to start hitting off a tee in the next week.

South Africa Needs a Strategic Vision for Its Continent Expert comment sysadmin 24 November 2017

South Africa has the potential to catalyse growth across its sub-region and the continent, but the government must develop a comprehensive strategy that aligns political, ideological and commercial interests.

South Africa’s status as the ‘gateway to Africa’ is under serious threat. Its companies continue to flourish, but complex relationships at home and abroad constrain government capacity to match its economic dominance with political reach and influence.

South Africa’s policies towards the rest of the continent are often accused of being inconsistent and incoherent. It has been a development partner to the region and to international donors; a moral leader, championing human rights and exporting its own model of transition; and an advocate and representative for the continent in international forums. However, it has simultaneously been accused of exploiting its economic dominance at the expense of its neighbours; handicapped by the political debts owed by the ANC to other liberation movements for their assistance in the struggle; and criticized for its arrogance in seeking to position itself as the ‘legitimate’ voice of Africa.

At the same time, reputational risks, a weakened policy environment and poor growth have taken the shine off South Africa’s ‘Gateway to Africa’ rhetoric. South Africa faces considerable domestic economic issues. Growth forecasts have fallen from 1.3 to 0.7 per cent, State owned enterprises are a huge burden on the treasury, and the forecast budget deficit is R50.8 billion (£2.7 billion), at a time when the cost of borrowing is increasing following downgrades of the country’s credit ratings.

Political risk is high, lowering investor confidence. Corruption, poor service delivery and the government’s under-delivery on citizen’s expectations are exacerbating social tensions in a country with expanded unemployment at 36.4 per cent, and one of the highest rates of inequality in the world. McKinsey, KPMG and HSBC have all become entangled in scandal relating to their dealings with government entities that have become ‘captured’ by private interests.

Despite these concerns, South Africa nonetheless remains the backbone of the regional economy, and its firms are key players across the continent. Johannesburg hosts the deepest and most sophisticated capital market on the continent, and Pretoria has one of the highest numbers of diplomatic missions in the world. ESKOM provides around 75 per cent of the electricity contribution to the Southern Africa SADC Power pool – comprising 12 countries, including those as far north as DRC and Tanzania – and South African ports facilitate over half of sub-Saharan Africa’s non-commodity trade with the rest of the world.

Post-apartheid expansion across the continent by South African companies was initially met with resistance, but these relationships have improved significantly – and South African firms retain significant advantages. South African retailers have the scale to incorporate regional producers into continental supply chains, purchasing fresh produce at a competitive price from regional agri-businesses, then re-selling further afield. For example, Zambeef supplies meat from Zambia to Shoprite stores in west Africa.

African companies in turn rely on South Africa as a significant consumer of goods, services and primary commodities. A South African government agreement with the DRC to import about half of the electricity that will be produced by a new grand-scale hydro-power project guaranteed its bankability. Mozambique is looking to maximize the potential of its world-class natural gas reserves by building a pipeline into South Africa, thus benefitting from the purchasing power of South African parastatal electricity utility firm ESKOM.

But South Africa’s status as an economic hegemon is not mirrored in its political relationships. South Africa’s GDP is five times higher than the six countries with which it shares a border, combined. But successive ANC governments have been unable to fully flex this economic muscle. Partly this is a legacy of history. It is not forgotten that the regional economic body, the Southern African Development Community, originated as the organization of Front Line States coordinating efforts to end apartheid, and ZANU-PF officials in Zimbabwe lecture their ANC counterparts on liberation.

The pan-African vision of former president Thabo Mbeki, and promotion of South Africa’s transition as a model for the continent, reflected the values that have driven ANC policy since the end of apartheid. But the coherence of South Africa’s foreign policy has been undermined by conflict and contradiction within the government. Appetite for engagement in Africa is dwindling. The country’s ability to project military influence across the continent is in critical decline. Jacob Zuma’s use of regional political bodies as a means of removing political rivals from domestic politics has corroded goodwill.

A new Africa Programme research paper argues that a fresh approach to South African engagement on the continent is both possible and necessary. South Africa can use its relative economic weight to play a stronger developmental role, leveraging the strengths of its business sector and its financial agencies. But it must match this with stronger and more cooperative political engagement, particularly through cultivating relationships with pivotal states such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and Angola.

In December, the ANC will elect a new leader to take the party into elections in 2019. Both leading candidates have international experience – Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was the chair of the African Union, and Cyril Ramaphosa has led regional responses to crises in South Sudan, Lesotho and Burundi. South Africa still has considerable foreign policy resources at its disposal. A new strategic vision for Africa that unites the interests of government and business, both domestically and in partner states, can deliver prosperity for both South Africa and the region – and need not contradict the values that have shaped South Africa’s aspirations for the continent in the post-apartheid era.

Mozambique’s Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement: One Year On 6 August 2020 — 2:30PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2020 Online

August 6, 2020 marks one year since the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed in Maputo. The agreement, signed by the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade, and witnessed by regional and international political and religious leaders, ended the return to conflict that started in 2013.

It also paved the way for Mozambique’s national elections in October 2019. Since the agreement, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won a landslide victory in the elections, weakening RENAMO, and a splinter group has conducted targeted armed violence in Manica and Sofala provinces. Yet, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has made progress.

At this event, senior figures reflect on the peace agreement and the key factors of its success. The event also draws upon insights from the authors of recent publications on the latest peace agreement in the context of longer term trends of democratization and peace-building in Mozambique.

A Chatham House Africa Programme research paper published in August 2019, Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?, examined how the deal was achieved. The Portuguese version includes the full text of the peace accord. Read the research paper in Portuguese or English here.

An employment judge has cleared the way for Farah Jameel, a former chair of the BMA’s General Practitioners Committee for England (GPCE), to go ahead with claims of discrimination and unfair dismissal against the association over her removal from the post during maternity leave.Jameel, who was elected the first female chair in November 2021, was put on temporary suspension in 2022 after complaints by BMA staff. The BMA told her in August 2023 that her contract was being terminated.The contract described her as a contractor providing consultancy services rather than an employee. But in a preliminary ruling the employment judge Natasha Joffe has held that Jameel was in reality an office holder and an employee, opening the way for her claims to proceed to a full hearing by an employment tribunal.The GPCE passed a vote of no confidence in Jameel in July 2023, as a means of electing a new...

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

The tumor marker cancer antigen 15-3 (CA 15-3) is that most commonly used to monitor metastatic breast cancer during active therapy and surveillance for disease recurrence after treatment. The association of CA 15-3 and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT findings can be considered complementary, since any significant rise may indicate the presence of disease and imaging is able to map the tumor sites. Although current guidelines do not recommend the routine performance of CA 15-3 in asymptomatic patients being followed up after definitive breast cancer treatment, most oncologists perform serial assessment of the tumor markers as part of routine follow-up of patients. The aim of this study was to evaluate the correlation between CA 15-3 levels and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scan findings in patients with recurrent breast cancer. Methods: This was a cross-sectional study with data collected retrospectively. Patients being evaluated for breast cancer recurrence with ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT imaging and CA 15-3 level were included. Evaluation of the association between CA 15-3 levels and ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scan findings was then done. Results: In total, 154 cases were included in this study; 62 patients had recurrence (positive) on the ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scans, whereas 92 patients had normal (negative) findings on follow-up ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scans. There was an association between CA 15-3 levels and the presence or absence of recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT scans, with 84.4% (27/32) of patients who had elevated CA 15-3 levels having disease recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT and 84.4% (27/32) of patients who had elevated CA 15-3 levels having disease recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT as well as a correlation with the burden of metastases. Most patients with disease recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT, however, had normal CA 15-3 levels. Conclusion: Higher CA 15-3 levels correlate with breast cancer recurrence on ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT as well as with burden of metastasis. Notably, CA 15-3 levels within the reference range do not exclude breast cancer disease recurrence since more than half of patients with recurrence had normal CA 15-3 levels. ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT should therefore be considered in patients with suspected breast cancer recurrence but normal CA 15-3 levels.

Turkey Needs Radical New Direction to Save the Economy Expert comment NCapeling 23 November 2020

Turkey should emulate the reformist approach it adopted after the 2001 crisis to prevent an economic and financial breakdown - but this looks highly unlikely.

Although Ankara has witnessed what appears to be an abrupt change of its top economic team with two fresh appointments to key positions – Naci Ağbal as governor of the central bank and Lütfi Elvan as finance and treasury minister – a cardinal rule of thumb in Turkish politics is that the more drama one sees, the less policy change there will actually be.

Financial markets reacted positively to the moves in the expectation they will signal a change of Turkey’s overall economic approach, but the reality is Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is simply putting loyalists into key bureaucratic positions to help ensure the primary role of these functions becomes ‘selling’ his policies more effectively, rather than altering them.

The hope from the markets – which saw the beleaguered Turkish lira appreciate against the US dollar at the news – is that Turkey adopts substantial interest rate increases as well as measures to repress liquidity expansion in order to temper its controversial so-called ‘Triple C’ approach of using cheap credit to stimulate growth with an unsustainable consumption and construction boom.

But instead, Erdoğan’s declaration after the appointments were made indicates the new restrictions in which they will now operate, saying ‘we are in a historic struggle against those who want to force Turkey into modern capitulations through the shackles of interest rates, foreign exchange rates and inflation’.

Learn from past successes

To resolve its current underlying economic problems, Turkey should actually be looking to its recent past and aiming to emulate the approach pursued by former prime minister Bülent Ecevit during the 2001 financial crisis when he recruited Kemal Derviş, a senior World Bank official with extensive experience and international contacts in economic, financial, and monetary affairs.

As economy minister with a broad mandate to spearhead a durable economic recovery plan, Dervis established independent market regulatory agencies covering banking, telecommunications, energy, and other key sectors, and strengthened the competition authority.

He also either liquidated or merged insolvent banks, granted central bank autonomy to guarantee price stability, and ensured recruitment was based on competence, expertise, and meritocracy. Crucially, his productivity-enhancing restructuring blueprint was designed in Turkey rather than being imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or another external agency.

Ecevit also turbocharged reforms motivated in part by a desire to join the EU with constitutional, political and legal modernization which widened personal freedom, significantly curtailed capital punishment, liberalized the cultural environment for Kurds, and fortified the rule of law. And one of his coalition partners in that work, the right-wing pro-Turkish National Action Party (MHP), is now allied with the current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

His foreign minister Ismail Cem also enhanced Turkey’s relations with both Europe and the US, initiated the so-called ‘earthquake diplomacy’ with his Greek counterpart George Papandreou after twin tragedies struck both nations in 1999, and largely avoided entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts.

The net result of all these actions was that Turkey emerged from the crisis with greater resilience, a more robust regulatory framework, upgraded political and economic institutions, rapidly decreasing inflation, a credible central bank, a stronger financial system, closer relations with the EU and US, and heightened domestic and foreign investor confidence.

But now that similar woes are engulfing Turkey anew, is Erdogan and the AKP/MHP alliance able – and willing – to repeat the Ecevit recipe? Present signs indicate they are highly unlikely to as they are too committed to entrenching the Triple C model.

Although this model will likely further consolidate their power, it will also empty the civil service of qualified professionals, restrict civil liberties and freedoms, and create more ideological politics, affecting Turkey’s foreign policy.

Such a stubborn refusal to shift direction is increasing the inevitability of a deep economic and financial breakdown and so, unless Turkey undertakes a serious policy departure instead of continuing to resort to the quick fix approach, there is real likelihood it will simply accelerate towards disaster.

Tens of thousands of striking Boeing machinists voted Monday to ratify a new contract, ending their seven-week work stoppage.

Earlier this month, the United States and the Republic of Korea reached an agreement on greater cooperation on civil nuclear energy projects, the U.S. Department of Energy said this week.

About 1,100 workers will be laid off indefinitely in January from the Jeep Gladiator plant in Toledo, Ohio, Stellantis officials announced Wednesday.

The historic ocean liner SS United States, whose fate had been in limbo for years, will begin its transition into the world's largest sunken artificial reef beginning this week in Philadelphia, its owner says.

This is a Remote Eligible open rank research software engineer position. The OIT (Office of Information Technology) department, Home | Office of Information Technology (oit.gatech.edu) at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, Georgia invites applications for Partnership for Advanced Computing Environment (PACE) (pace.gatech.edu). This is a research faculty position, applications will be considered at all ranks. We seek a highly skilled and innovative Research Scientist to join our research software engineer team. The successful candidate will lead software lifecycle management with security and compliance efforts in PACE, in collaboration with other researchers, play a key role in supporting sensitive/regulated research projects while ensuring compliance with applicable regulations and security requirements. This position will also be responsible for the PACE software vulnerability management program. This role will closely work with the Research Facilitation and Cyberinfrastructure Teams to bring support to GT faculty on regulated research projects and evaluate underlying technologies. This role requires strong software engineering expertise, excellent communication skills, and the ability to bring innovative solutions to researchers’ projects and implement them to deliverable. Responsibilities • Define and implement standard operating procedures to incorporate software vulnerability management • Coordinate with other cyber security and research security personnel to satisfy software audit and compliance requirements • Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) management, identify and address software vulnerability for the PACE software stack • Take responsibility for the audit and compliance of restricted software/code (e.g. RSICC/NASA) • Provide domain expertise on CUI (Controlled Unclassified Information) and regulated software • Provide support on commercial/licensed software in the regulated environment • Work in partnership with other GT Colleges’ IT groups to support the deployment of HPC scientific applications and workflows for researchers on PACE systems • Closely work with other internal PACE units, including the Research Computing Facilitation (RCF) and Cyberinfrastructure (CI) teams, to address researchers’ needs • Coordinate review and software access processes with other research cyber security personnel • Implement best practices around research computing software vulnerability management • Research and evaluate any new technologies in software vulnerability and closely monitor NIST regulations • Author and publish scientific papers, reports, and presentations to communicate research results and findings to internal and external audiences

HANOVER, Md., Nov. 5, 2024 — Ciena has announced that its optical and routing and switching innovations will once again support the SCinet network at SC24, taking place November 17–22 […]

The post Ciena Powers SC24’s SCinet with High-Speed Connectivity and Advanced Optical Solutions appeared first on HPCwire.

Oct. 16, 2024 — The ISC High Performance Jack Dongarra Early Career Award and Lecture Series is an annual event that honors the remarkable contributions of Professor Jack Dongarra to […]

The post ISC Opens Nominations for 2025 Jack Dongarra Early Career Award in HPC appeared first on HPCwire.

SANTA CLARA, Calif., Oct. 25, 2024 — ServiceNow has announced that enterprise software industry veteran Amit Zavery will join the company as president, chief product officer (CPO), and chief operating officer […]

The post Google Cloud and Oracle Veteran Amit Zavery to Spearhead Product and Engineering at ServiceNow appeared first on HPCwire.

Tua Tagovailoa and Daniel Jones are among UPI senior sports writer Alex Butler's five must-start fantasy football quarterbacks for Week 10.

Billy Napier will remain in place as head football coach at Florida, despite the Gators producing another lackluster campaign during his third season, athletic director Scott Stricklin announced Thursday.

Mike Gesicki and Jonnu Smith are among UPI senior sports writer Alex Butler's four must-start fantasy football tight ends for Week 10.

Tyrone Tracy Jr. and Najee Harris are among UPI senior sports writer Alex Butler's four must-start fantasy football running backs for Week 10.

Brian Thomas Jr. and Jameson Williams are among UPI senior sports writer Alex Butler's four must-start wide receivers for Week 10 of the fantasy football campaign.

American horse racing turned to turf during the weekend, and Kentucky's Lane's End Farm enjoyed a banner weekend in the top contests.

All-Pro left tackle Tristan Wirfs and tight ends Sam LaPorta and Dalton Kincaid were among key players injured in Week 10 of the NFL season.

Premier League reference David Coote is suspended indefinitely after videos surfaced that appeared to show him criticizing former Liverpool coach Jurgen Klopp, officials announced Monday.

Linebacker Quinton Bell and Miami Dolphins defenders deleted drives and put the Los Angeles Rams offense in quicksand, holding them without a touchdown to propel a primetime victory and snap a three-game losing streak.

Justin Herbert, Russell Wilson and Quentin Johnston lead UPI senior sports writer Alex Butler's fantasy football waiver wire priority list for Week 11 of the 2024 NFL season.

Last week NSF issued a request for the next round of proposals for its Quantum Leap Challenge Institutes (QLCI). First established in 2020, the QLCI program, as directed by National […]

The post NSF Seeks Proposals for Next Round of Quantum Leap Challenge Institutes appeared first on HPCwire.

About This Webinar Oracle’s next generation HPC architecture with Intel compute instance based on 3rd Generation Intel® Xeon® Scalable processors, code named “Ice Lake”, changes the game for HPC in […]

The post Speed up Innovation with performance gains of up to 42% on the most powerful HPC Cloud appeared first on HPCwire.

How can manufacturers apply lessons learned from the dawn of the “Exascale Era” to Computer-Aided Engineering to achieve results like never before? Join Addison Snell, CEO, Intersect360 Research, Bill Mannel, VP, High Performance […]

The post Leveraging Exascale Era Technology for Advanced Computer-Aided Engineering appeared first on HPCwire.

A kangaroo that escaped from its Florida enclosure while fleeing from a bear has been safely returned home three weeks later.

A 77-year-old slice of cake from Queen Elizabeth II's wedding to Prince Philip was auctioned for $2,800.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has pledged to get to the bottom of reports of military personnel experiencing mysterious illnesses while overseas.