w Circulating oxidized LDL increased in patients with acute myocardial infarction is accompanied by heavily modified HDL. [Research Articles] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-14T05:33:23-07:00 Oxidized low-density lipoprotein (oxLDL) is a known risk factor for atherogenesis. This study aimed to reveal structural features of oxLDL present in human circulation related to atherosclerosis. When LDL was fractionated on an anion-exchange column, in vivo-oxLDL, detected by the anti-oxidized phosphatidylcholine (oxPC) monoclonal antibody, was recovered in flow-through and electronegative LDL (LDL(-)) fractions. The amount of the electronegative in vivo-oxLDL, namely oxLDL in LDL(-) fraction, present in patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) was three-fold higher than that observed in healthy subjects. Surprisingly, LDL(-) fraction contained apoA1 in addition to apoB, and HDL-sized particles were observed with transmission electron microscopy. In LDL(-) fractions, acrolein adducts were identified at all lysine residues in apoA1, with only a small number of acrolein-modified residues were identified in apoB. The amount of oxPC adducts of apoB was higher in LDL(-) than in L1 fraction as determined using western blotting. The electronegative in vivo-oxLDL was immunologically purified from the LDL(-) fraction with an anti-oxPC monoclonal antibody. Majority of PC species was not oxidized, whereas oxPC and lysoPC did not accumulate. Here, we propose that there are two types of in vivo-oxLDL in human circulating plasma and the electronegative in vivo-oxLDL accompanies oxidized HDL. Full Article
w Phosphatidylinositol Metabolism, Phospholipases, Lipidomics, and Cancer:In Memoriam of Michael J. O. Wakelam (1955-2020) [Tribute] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-28T14:30:27-07:00 Full Article
w Bisretinoid phospholipid and vitamin A aldehyde: Shining a light [Thematic Reviews] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-05T13:30:26-07:00 Vitamin A aldehyde covalently bound to opsin protein is embedded in a phospholipid-rich membrane that supports photon absorption and phototransduction in photoreceptor cell outer segments. Following absorption of a photon, the 11-cis-retinal chromophore of visual pigment in photoreceptor cells isomerizes to all-trans-retinal. To maintain photosensitivity 11-cis-retinal must be replaced. At the same time, however, all-trans-retinal has to be handled so as to prevent nonspecific aldehyde activity. Some molecules of retinaldehyde upon release from opsin are efficiently reduced to retinol. Other molecules are released into the lipid phase of the disc membrane where they form a conjugate (N-retinylidene-PE, NRPE) through a Schiff base linkage with phosphatidylethanolamine (PE). The reversible formation of NRPE serves as a transient sink for retinaldehyde that is intended to return retinaldehyde to the visual cycle. However, if instead of hydrolyzing to PE and retinaldehyde, NRPE reacts with a second molecule of retinaldehyde a synthetic pathway is initiated that leads to the formation of multiple species of unwanted bisretinoid fluorophores. We report on recently identified members of the bisretinoid family some of which differ with respect to the acyl chains associated with the glycerol backbone. We discuss processing of the lipid moieties of these fluorophores in lysosomes of retinal pigment epithelial (RPE) cells, their fluorescence characters and new findings related to light and iron-associated oxidation of bisretinoids. Full Article
w Coronavirus: Why The EU Needs to Unleash The ECB By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 13:00:36 +0000 18 March 2020 Pepijn Bergsen Research Fellow, Europe Programme @pbergsen LinkedIn COVID-19 presents the eurozone with an unprecedented economic challenge. So far, the response has been necessary, but not enough. 2020-03-18.jpg EU President of Council Charles Michel chairs the coronavirus meeting with the leaders of EU member countries via teleconference on March 17, 2020. Photo by EU Council / Pool/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images. The measures taken to limit the spread of the coronavirus - in particular social distancing - come with significant economic costs, as the drop both in demand for goods and services and in supply due to workers being at home sick will create a short-term economic shock not seen in modern times.Sectors that are usually less affected by regular economic swings such as transport and tourism are being confronted with an almost total collapse in demand. In the airline sector, companies are warning they might only be able to hold out for a few months more.Building on the calls to provide income support to all citizens and shore up businesses, European leaders should now be giving explicit permission to the European Central Bank (ECB) to provide whatever financial support is needed.Although political leaders have responded to the economic threat, the measures announced across the continent have mainly been to support businesses. The crisis is broader and deeper than the current response.Support for weaker governmentsThe ECB already reacted to COVID-19 by announcing measures to support the banking system, which is important to guarantee the continuity of the European financial system and to ensure financially weaker European governments do not have to confront a failing banking system as well.Although government-subsidised reduced working hours and sick pay are a solution for many businesses and workers, crucially they are not for those working on temporary contracts or the self-employed. They need direct income support.This might come down to instituting something that looks like a universal basic income (UBI), and ensuring money keeps flowing through the economy as much as possible to help avoid a cascade of defaults and significant long-term damage.But while this is likely to be the most effective remedy to limit the medium-term impact on the economy, it is particularly costly. Just as an indication, total compensation of employees was on average around €470bn per month in the eurozone last year.Attempting to target payments using existing welfare payment channels would reduce costs, but is difficult to implement and runs the risk of many households and businesses in need missing out.The increase in spending and lost revenue associated with these support measures dwarf the fiscal response to the 2008-09 financial crisis. The eurozone economy could contract by close to 10% this year and budget deficits are likely be in double digits throughout the bloc.The European Commission has already stated member states are free to spend whatever is necessary to combat the crisis, which is not surprising given the Stability and Growth Pact - which includes the fiscal rules - allows for such eventualities.Several eurozone countries do probably have the fiscal space to deal with this. Countries such as Germany and the Netherlands have run several years of balanced budgets recently and significantly decreased their debt levels. For countries such as Italy, and even France, it is a different story and the combination of much higher spending and a collapse in tax revenue is more likely to lead to questions in the market over the sustainability of their debt levels. In order to avoid this, the Covid-19 response must be financed collectively.The Eurogroup could decide to use the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to provide states with the funds, while suitably ditching the political conditionality that came with previous bailout. But the ESM currently has €410bn in remaining lending capacity, which is unlikely to be enough and difficult to rapidly increase.So this leaves the ECB to pick up the tab of national governments’ increase in spending, as the only institution with effectively unlimited monetary firepower. But a collective EU response is complicated by the common currency, and particularly by the role of the ECB.The ECB can’t just do whatever it likes and is limited more than other major central banks in its room for manoeuvre. It does have a programme to buy government bonds but this relies on countries agreeing to a rescue programme within the context of the ESM, with all the resulting political difficulties.There are two main ways that the ECB could finance the response to the crisis. First, it could buy up more or all bonds issued by the member states. A first step in this direction would be to scrap the limits on the bonds it can buy. Through self-imposed rules, the ECB can only buy up to a third of every country’s outstanding public debt. There are good reasons for this in normal times, but these are not normal times. With the political blessing of the European Council, the Eurosystem of central banks could then start buying bonds issued by governments to finance whatever expenditure they deem necessary to combat the crisis.Secondly, essentially give governments an overdraft with the ECB or the national central banks. Although a central bank lending directly to governments is outlawed by the European treaties, the COVID-19 crisis means these rules should be temporarily suspended by the European Council.Back in 2012, the then president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, proclaimed the ECB would do whatever it takes, within its mandate, to save the euro, which was widely seen as a crucial step towards solving the eurozone crisis. The time is now right for eurozone political leaders to explicitly tell the ECB that together they can do whatever it takes to save the eurozone economy through direct support for businesses and households. Full Article
w Let's Emerge From COVID-19 with Stronger Health Systems By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 26 Mar 2020 09:33:28 +0000 26 March 2020 Robert Yates Director, Global Health Programme; Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health @yates_rob Heads of state should grasp the opportunity to become universal health heroes to strengthen global health security 2020-03-26-Health-Protest A "Big Insurance: Sick of It" rally in New York City. Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images. As the COVID-19 pandemic presents the greatest threat to human health in over a century, people turn to their states to resolve the crisis and protect their health, their livelihoods and their future well-being.How leaders perform and respond to the pandemic is likely to define their premiership - and this therefore presents a tremendous opportunity to write themselves into the history books as a great leader, rescuing their people from a crisis. Just as Winston Churchill did in World War Two.Following Churchill’s advice to “never let a good crisis go to waste”, if leaders take decisive action now, they may emerge from the COVID-19 crisis as a national hero. What leaders must do quickly is to mitigate the crisis in a way which has a demonstrable impact on people’s lives.Given the massive shock caused by the pandemic to economies across the world, it is not surprising that heads of state and treasury ministers have implemented enormous economic stimulus packages to protect businesses and jobs – this was to be expected and has been welcome.National heroes can be madeBut, in essence, this remains primarily a health crisis. And one obvious area for leaders to act rapidly is strengthening their nation’s health system to stop the spread of the virus and successfully treat those who have fallen sick. It is perhaps here that leaders have the most to gain - or lose - and where national heroes can be made.This is particularly the case in countries with weak and inequitable health systems, where the poor and vulnerable often fail to access the services they need. One major practical action that leaders can implement immediately is to launch truly universal, publicly-financed health reforms to cover their entire population – not only for COVID-19 services but for all services.This would cost around 1-2% GDP in the short-term but is perfectly affordable in the current economic climate, given some of the massive fiscal stimuluses already being planned (for example, the UK is spending 15% GDP to tackle COVID-19).Within one to two years, this financing would enable governments to implement radical supply side reforms including scaling up health workforces, increasing the supply of essential medicines, diagnostics and vaccines and building new infrastructure. It would also enable them to remove health service user fees which currently exclude hundreds of millions of people worldwide from essential healthcare. Worldwide these policies have proven to be effective, efficient, equitable and extremely popular.And there is plenty of precedent for such a move. Universal health reform is exactly what political leaders did in the UK, France and Japan as post-conflict states emerging from World War Two. It is also the policy President Kagame launched in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, as did Prime Minister Thaksin in Thailand after the Asian Financial Crisis in 2002, and the Chinese leadership did following the SARS crisis, also in 2003.In China’s case, reform involved re-socialising the health financing system using around 2% GDP in tax financing to increase health insurance coverage from a low level of one-third right up to 96% of the population.All these universal health coverage (UHC) reforms delivered massive health and economic benefits to the people - just what is needed now to tackle COVID-19 - and tremendous political benefits to the leaders that implemented them.When considering the current COVID-19 crisis, this strategy would be particularly relevant for countries underperforming on health coverage and whose health systems are more likely to be overwhelmed if flooded with a surge of patients, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia and most of sub-Saharan Africa, where many governments spend less than 1% of their GDP on health and most people have to buy services over the counter.But also the two OECD countries without a universal health system – the United States and Ireland – are seeing the threat of COVID-19 already fuelling the debate about the need to create national, publicly-financed health system. And the presidents of South Africa, Kenya and Indonesia have already committed their governments to eventually reach full population coverage anyway, and so may use this crisis to accelerate their own universal reforms. Although difficult to predict which leaders are likely to grasp the opportunity, if some of these countries now fast-track nationwide UHC, at least something good will be coming from the crisis, something which will benefit their people forever. And ensuring everyone accesses the services they need, including public health and preventive services, also provides the best protection against any future outbreaks becoming epidemics.Every night large audiences are tuning in to press briefings fronted by their heads of state hungry for the latest update on the crisis and to get reassurance that their government’s strategy will bring the salvation they desperately need. To truly improve health security for people across the world, becoming UHC heroes could be the best strategic decision political leaders ever make. Full Article
w In a COVID-19 World, Russia Sticks to International Distancing By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 20:49:14 +0000 29 March 2020 Mathieu Boulègue Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @matboulegue LinkedIn Google Scholar While a global response is needed against the coronavirus crisis, Russia does not see it as in its interests to contribute – and in fact the Kremlin is using the crisis to further destabilise the world. 2020-03-29-Coronavirus-Russia-Moscow Young woman wearing a face mask in front of St. Basil's Cathedral, Moscow. Photo by ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images. Persistent internet rumours claiming the coronavirus outbreak originated from a secret American pharmaceutical company with the aim of destroying China from within were quickly discredited. Pop culture fans recognised the supposed activities of the Umbrella Corporation as being from the famous Japanese video games series Resident Evil.However, although fake news, it can likely be attributed to Russian trolls conducting this and other similar activities online, especially when considered within the wider context of how the Russian regime is using this worldwide crisis to further destabilize the West and test its resolve.Russian trolls never sleepRussia’s COVID-19 related actions first and foremost take the form of a vast information warfare campaign, with media outlets simultaneously downplaying the threat of the pandemic - ‘it is less dangerous than seasonal flu’ - while stoking fear about what is happening elsewhere in Europe.For the domestic audience in Russia, some media are reporting the pandemic marks the collapse of the Western world and liberalism altogether, calling it a form of collective punishment. Other point out how fast liberal democracies have curbed individual and entrepreneurial freedoms in order to slow down the viral outbreak, and seek to diminish the credibility of the Western response to the crisis.Exploiting the coronavirus crisis in this way is a new low in Russia’s wider political warfare campaign to undermine global governance overall, as these activities are detrimental to people's very safety. For example, in Ukraine, it is thought a Russian-engineered disinformation operation may have caused the outburst of violence in the city of Novi Sanzhary following the arrival of evacuees from China.In the military realm, fake news has been targeting the US-led multinational exercise DEFENDER-Europe 2020. The Russian leadership criticized the exercise as an offensive ‘anti-Russian scenario’ but then used accompanying propaganda that it could actively facilitate the spread of COVID-19 across Europe because of the arrival and movement of large numbers of troops.The large-scale drills were planned to involve 18 participating nations and should have taken place across ten European countries from April to May 2020. But the exercise has now been scaled down – as has the Russian disinformation targeting it.And while the world is pre-occupied with managing COVID-19, Moscow is able to grow bolder in its provocations. Recent air incursions were reported into Irish controlled airspace as well as over the North Sea. Although this practice is - unfortunately - routine as part of Russian constant military sabre-rattling, it does increase the risk of tactical errors and miscalculation.Self-isolation, Kremlin styleMeanwhile, just when a global response is needed to fight the pandemic, Moscow’s response has been, at best, self-serving. On March 22, Russian military reportedly started sending medical equipment and supplies to Italy. While the nature and the scope of this assistance can be doubted, it still represents a charm offensive for Russia to be brought back in from the cold in Europe - since successive Italian leaderships have been accommodating to the Kremlin. And sending virologists to Italy might also be a useful learning curve for Russia’s regime.But within Russia itself, Vladimir Putin does have to face the problem that, on top of all the projected social and healthcare costs, the coronavirus is also having negative political consequences. On March 25, the ‘popular vote’ - a mock referendum designed to rubber-stamp Putin’s recent constitutional changes - was pushed back. And the Ministry of Communications has been forced to postpone a major exercise aimed at ensuring the ‘stable and safe operation of Runet’ - namely eliminating vulnerabilities in the Russian ‘sovereign’ internet to potential external threats.Certainly it would be naive to believe Moscow will put self-interest to one side during this pandemic. ‘International distancing’ is not new for the Kremlin, and Russia has been practising self-isolation since at least 2008 through its own actions, most notably in Georgia and Ukraine.Its self-perception as a ‘besieged fortress’ is being reinforced by this crisis and Russia will, at the very least, likely come out of the crisis feeling vindicated in its view that internationalism is dying or already dead.With the health systems of many countries under massive strain, and societal resilience being tested by social distancing, the Kremlin continues to probe for weaknesses, and is also carefully watching other countries’ responses to the crisis in terms of adaptation and mobilization of resources.COVID-19 provides a major intelligence-gathering opportunity for Moscow to learn how well others can implement wartime-like planning in peacetime. In a rapidly changing world, Russia is still Russia. Full Article
w Why The Insurgency in Northern Mozambique Has Got Worse By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 01 Apr 2020 17:14:28 +0000 1 April 2020 Dr Alex Vines OBE Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme Two attacks on towns in northern Mozambique by suspected jihadists point to a rapidly deteriorating security crisis. 2020-04-01-Mozambique Macomia, Cabo Delgado, Northern Mozambique. Photo by EMIDIO JOSINE/AFP via Getty Images. On March 23 to 24, the centre of Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado province was occupied by up to 40 “jihadists”, who targeted government facilities, including a barracks, and brandished banners of affiliation to the so-called Islamic State.On March 25, suspected jihadists raided the town of Quissanga and destroyed the district police headquarters. They too carried an Islamic State flag. Twenty to 30 members of Mozambique’s security forces were killed in both attacks.Mocimboa da Praia is just south of the Afungi Peninsula, the location of gas projects worth $60- billion. Mocimboa was briefly occupied in late 2017, during attacks claimed by a group known as Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama (or al-Sunnah) that marked the start of a brutal low-intensity conflict, with widespread human rights abuses and attacks on civilians.Up to 1,000 people have now been killed and 100,000 displaced. More recently, The Islamic State Central Africa Province (Iscap), affiliated with the Islamic State group, has claimed responsibility for the attacks. Video and photos of these most recent events, along with the testimony of frightened residents and overstretched government officials, suggest a shift of strategy by the insurgents.There seems to have been an effort to avoid harming civilians, to win hearts and minds by redistributing stolen food, medicine and fuel to “loyal” residents, and to direct attacks on the state and its symbols, such as police stations and military barracks. It is difficult from a distance to assess if there was any genuine pleasure over these attacks among local people; while residents in both towns that did not flee seemed to welcome the attackers, this may well have been out of fear that the government is currently unable to guarantee their security.These attacks also indicate that the jihadist-linked insurgents are growing in confidence. They are confronting government security forces with little appetite for fighting. The Mozambican government has been expecting setbacks like those of Mocimboa and Quissanga — its forces are demoralised and many commanders exhausted or corrupted by an emerging war economy. Jihadists are also taking tactical advantage before a reformed and more effective government counterinsurgency effort is introduced in response.President Filipe Nyusi, inaugurated in January for his second term, has made this crisis his prime focus and has become the de-facto minister of defence.Military reform and the role of private military companiesBut there is no quick fix. Most importantly, the Mozambican military and security forces need to be restructured. They were unable to win the Mozambican civil war (1977-1992), even with international support, and have not improved in capacity or conduct since. They now face a complex, multilayered and asymmetrical conflict, mostly drawing upon local and regional grievances and networks but increasingly also attracting some limited encouragement and advice from further afield.Nyusi will need to build-up trusted relationships in the military in the way he has successfully done with parts of the intelligence community. The Mozambican government has already reached out to international expertise — though not necessarily the right kind. The founder of the Blackwater private military company, Erik Prince, supplied two helicopters and support crew for the Mozambican military in mid-2019, before being replaced by some 170 Russian privateers linked to the Wagner Group.The Wagner contingent arrived in September 2019 at Nacala airport with trucks, drones and a Mi-17 helicopter gunship, then deployed into the combat zone of northern Cabo Delgado. Setbacks, including at least two dead Russians, forced a tactical fallback to Nacala, though a new effort is reported to have been underway since late February 2020.The Mozambican government is also considering a number of proposals from other private military companies. Maputo needs to consider these carefully; Israeli or Gulf State involvement in any form might exasperate rather than alleviate this crisis.The Tanzanian connectionBut market-led security and military providers will not end this insurgency. Nor will the engagement of states such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom or Angola, all of which have made their own offers of support. What would significantly make a difference is much closer to home: serious Tanzanian engagement.This insurgency is concentrated in districts bordering Tanzania and there is clear-cut intelligence of connections into Tanzania and beyond. Swahili is also a lingua franca for the jihadists, connecting them up the East African coast, and into eastern Congo and elsewhere.It is puzzling, given the deep shared history between Tanzania and Mozambique, that the bilateral relationship is as patchy as it is today: during the liberation struggle (1965-1974) against the Portuguese, Mozambique’s ruling party Frelimo maintained rear bases in Tanzania, and Nyusi was educated there.Conspiracy theories circulate that Tanzania has encouraged the Cabo Delgado insurgency to weaken its neighbour, or at least displace radicalised individuals from Tanzanian soil into Mozambique.President John Magafuli of Tanzania did not attend the January inauguration of Nyusi. It has become urgent that Magafuli (who is also the current chair of the regional body, the Southern African Development Community) and Nyusi meet face-to-face to map out improved intelligence sharing and a joint strategy to respond to an emerging regional threat.Southern Africa is locking down because of Covid-19, which will distract the government’s ability to focus fully on this crisis and create a perfect moment for the infant insurgency in Cabo Delgado to grow. More military setbacks should be expected in coming months.But the Mozambican government can still contain and prevail if it seriously reforms its military, builds strong alliances with its regional neighbours (especially Tanzania), chooses its private security contractors and international partnerships wisely, and backs military efforts with better intelligence and developmental interventions that offer alternative pathways to potential recruits.But despite Maputo’s hope that significant progress will be made over the coming year, and the setting up of a presidential task force to evaluate progress and intelligence, it is likely that Mozambique and its partners will need to prepare themselves for a drawn-out struggle.This article originally appeared in the Mail & Guardian Full Article
w Can Ukraine’s Appeal to the International Courts Work? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 03 Apr 2020 13:33:33 +0000 3 April 2020 Kateryna Busol Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @KaterynaBusol LinkedIn First in a two-part series analysing why Ukraine’s attempts at international justice are worth taking - and outlining how the impact goes far beyond just the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Part one examines the response of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to the possibility of holding Russia accountable as a state. 2020-04-03-Ukraine-Russia Rally in support of keeping Crimea as part of Ukraine. Photo by Spencer Platt/Getty Images. Russia’s ongoing occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula and support of separatist hostilities in the eastern provinces of Donbas have resulted in 1.5 million internally displaced persons, 3,000 civilians killed, and a growing list of alleged violations of international law and socio-economic hardship.But Ukraine is struggling in its efforts to hold Russia accountable – either as a state or through individual criminal responsibility - as it cannot unilaterally ask any international court to give an overall judgment on the conflict.So it focuses on narrower issues, referring them to authorised adjudication and arbitration platforms such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), European Court of Human Rights, UNCLOS arbitration, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). These options are limited, but still worth taking - and their relevance is proving to be far wider than the Russia-Ukraine conflict.Policy of cultural eradicationIn 2017, Ukraine initiated proceedings against Russia at the ICJ on the basis of two international treaties: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), with regard to Crimea; and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT), with regard to Donbas.Under the CERD, Ukraine alleges Russia has carried out a policy of cultural eradication of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea, including enforced disappearances, no education in the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages, and the ban of the Mejlis, the main representative body of the Crimean Tatars.Under the ICSFT, Ukraine alleges Russia has supported terrorism by providing funds, weapons and training to illegal armed groups in eastern Ukraine. In particular Ukraine alleges Russian state responsibility - through its proxies - for downing the infamous MH17 flight.Both these treaties are binding upon Ukraine and Russia and entitle an individual state party to refer a dispute concerning them to the ICJ, but certain procedural pre-conditions must first be exhausted. These include a failed attempt to settle a dispute either through negotiations or the CERD Committee (for the CERD) or unsuccessful negotiations and arbitration (for the ICSFT).Russia challenged Ukraine’s compliance with the pre-conditions, but the ICJ disagreed with Russia’s submission that Ukraine had to resort both to negotiations and to the CERD Committee. For the first time, the court clarified these procedures under the CERD were two means to reach the same aim, and therefore alternative and not cumulative.Requiring states to avail of both procedures before going to the ICJ would undermine the very purpose of the CERD to eliminate racial discrimination promptly, and ensure the availability of effective domestic protection and remedies.The relevance of this clarification transcends the Ukraine-Russia dispute. With the rise of discriminatory practices, from populist hate-filled rhetoric endangering vulnerable communities to large-scale persecution such as that of the Rohingyas, the UN’s principal judicial body is sending a clear larger message to the world: such practices are unacceptable and must be dealt with expeditiously and efficiently. If states fail to do so, there are now fewer procedural impediments to do it internationally.The ICJ also confirmed Ukraine had complied with both procedural preconditions under the ICSFT and that it would give judgement on the alleged failure of Russia to take measures to prevent the financing of terrorism. The outcome of this will be of great importance to the international community, given the general lack of international jurisprudence on issues of terrorism.The court’s interpretation of knowledge and intent in terrorism financing, as well as clarification of the term ‘funds’, is particularly relevant both for the Ukraine-Russia case and for international law.As the final judgement may take several years, the ICJ granted some provisional measures requested by Ukraine in April 2017. The court obliged Russia to ensure the availability of education in Ukrainian and enable the functioning of the Crimean Tatar representative institutions, including the Mejlis.When Russia contested Ukraine’s references to the alleged Stalin-ordered deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the rule of law in the Soviet Union being hypocritical, by arguing that history did not matter, the court disagreed.In fact, Judge James Crawford emphasised the relevance of the ‘historical persecution’ of Crimean Tatars and the role of Mejlis in advancing and protecting their rights in Crimea ‘at the time of disruption and change’.These conclusions are important reminders that the historical inheritance of injustices inflicted on vulnerable groups should be taken into account when nations address their imperial legacies.The court’s provisional measures and Judge Crawford’s position are particularly relevant in light of Russia’s policy of the total - territorial, historical, cultural – ‘russification’ of Crimea, as they highlight the role of the historical background for assessing the alleged discriminatory and prosecutorial policy of Russia’s occupying authorities against the Crimean Tatars.The ICJ’s judgement on the merits of this as well as other human rights, and terrorism issues of Crimea and Donbas will be an important consideration for the international community in its view of the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict and the sanctions policy against Russia.The development of this case also has a mutually catalysing impact on Ukraine’s efforts to establish those individually criminally responsible for atrocities in Crimea and Donbas, through domestic proceedings and through the International Criminal Court.Ukraine’s attempts to seek individual criminal responsibility for gross abuses in Donbas and Crimea at the International Criminal Court (ICC) are assessed in part two of this series, coming soon. Full Article
w COVID-19 and the Iranian Shadows of War By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 08 Apr 2020 13:24:47 +0000 8 April 2020 Dr Sanam Vakil Deputy Director and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme @SanamVakil Coronavirus has plunged Iran into the country’s biggest crisis since its war with Iraq. More than 30 years later, the lingering effects of the war are shaping Iran’s reaction to the pandemic. 2020-04-08-Iran-COVID-Tehran Spraying disinfectant at Tajrish bazaar in Tehran, Iran, during the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020. Photo by Majid Saeedi/Getty Images. In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, many global leaders have invoked war analogies – from the Pearl Harbor attack to the collective spirit on display during the Second World War – to highlight past lessons learned or rally their populations.For Iran’s leadership, more recent war analogies hold resonance and help explain the ideological and political conundrum limiting an effective COVID-19 response. While the Islamic Republic has weathered a multitude of challenges, COVID-19 is putting unprecedented strain on Iran’s already fragile, heavily-sanctioned economy and further exposing domestic political fissures amid ongoing international tensions.Iran has been identified as the regional epicentre of the pandemic with a steadily rising number of deaths, including several of the country’s political and military elite. Yet the Iranian government has not evoked the collective memory of the war as an opportunity for national resistance and mobilization.Sluggish and poorly managedThis is unsurprising, because thus far the Iranian government’s response to COVID-19 has been sluggish and poorly managed. After an initial slow response, Iran then attempted to downplay the impact of the virus, covering up the number of cases and deaths and blaming the United States, before implementing a poorly coordinated action plan marred by government infighting.For the Iranian leadership, the Iran-Iraq war has been the single most influential and defining period – it has impacted its political ideology, domestic and security policies and international relations. More than half a million Iranians died, and a paranoid worldview and sense of isolation was cemented among many elite leaders such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.The war created a valiant culture of leadership from Qassem Soleimani to presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani and, over time, has resulted in the development of Iran’s asymmetrical defense capabilities.The war enabled a dark purge of political opponents and the gradual birth of Iran’s reformist faction, all while the ethos of sacrifice and martyrdom was linked to the collective notions of resistance.These would be carried forward in other resistance campaigns both regional and economic. Most defining was Ayatollah Khomeini’s infamous 1988 decision to ‘drink the poisoned chalice’ and end the long war. Three decades later, Iran continues to contend with those outcomes.To acknowledge that the COVID-19 crisis could have equally profound consequences would add further pressure to the Islamic Republic at a time of incomparable vulnerability. Even before this crisis, the Iranian government linked sanctions to economic warfare, making future negotiations conditional on sanctions relief.Iranian hardliners used the opportunity to promote Iran’s subsistence-based resistance economy designed to insulate Iran’s economy from external shocks such as sanctions. While both groups recognize the economic urgency, their contending strategies help explain the muddled government response and the ongoing ideological competition between the political elites.Rouhani has argued that a full lockdown of the Iranian economy is impossible because it is already under significant strain from sanctions - the Iranian economy experienced a 9.5% contraction in 2019 and is expected to worsen in the coming year.That said, through Iran’s New Year holidays the government did take action to slow the spread of the virus, discouraging travel and shutting schools, pilgrimage sites and cancelling Friday prayers. Finally, on 4 April, after receiving permission from Khamenei to do so, Rouhani withdrew $1 billion from Iran’s National Development Fund and is distributing the money through loans and credits to 23 million households.Aid from a number of Iran’s parastatal agencies was also announced. Conversely, in his annual New Year’s speech the supreme leader securitized the crisis by laying blame on the United States for spreading the virus as a form of biological terrorism. Iran’s army chief of staff Major General Bagheri was tasked with building hospitals and the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps given authority to clear the streets.The recent expulsion of Médecins Sans Frontières from Iran highlights the mix of paranoia and resistance culture still on display. US sanctions on Iran have significantly weakened Iran’s economy and limited Tehran’s ability to purchase much needed medical supplies and equipment. Unable to access its foreign reserves due to sanctions, the Rouhani government has applied for a $5 billion loan from the IMF.European countries alongside a number of US members of congress have appealed to the Trump administration to ease sanctions on humanitarian grounds. While Washington continues to pursue its steadfast approach, referring to Iran’s campaign as a ‘sanctions relief scam’, Germany, France, and the UK have offered $5 million in aid and launched INSTEX – a trading mechanism designed to circumvent sanctions to allow non-sanctioned humanitarian trade.The impact of coronavirus on Iranian society remains to be seen. But the impact of sanctions has placed heavy economic and psychological burden on the people. Feeling abandoned by the Iranian state and the United States could produce a mix of contradictory nationalistic and independent impulses.The social contract – already fragile amid protests and government repression – reveals declining trust. Without national mobilization and calls for unity reminiscent of the war period, Iranians have stepped in, highlighting the continued resilience of civil society. Support for the medical establishment has been celebrated throughout the country and on social media. Charities, the private sector - through one initiative known as Campaign Nafas (Breathe) - and diaspora groups have initiated fundraising drives and assistance measures.Iran’s relations with the international community, and specifically the United States, remain an unresolved consequence of the war. The 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement was the closest Tehran and Washington came to resolving decades of tensions, containment and sanctions.COVID-19 has further heightened the trajectory of tensions between Tehran and Washington suggesting that any new deal, while necessary, is not on the cards. Tit-for-tat military exchanges have been on the rise in Iraq and Yemen while American and Iranian leaders issue threats and warnings of potential escalation.Abdullah Nasseri, an advisor to Iran’s reformists, recently stated that in order to manage the coronavirus crisis, the Iranian government needed to make a decision akin to the 1988 United Nations resolution 598 that ended war hostilities. Ayatollah Khomeini famously commented on that ceasefire, stating: ‘Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Unhappy am I that I still survive.… Taking this decision is more deadly than drinking from a poisoned chalice. I submitted myself to Allah's will and took this drink for His satisfaction’. While a similar compromise today might appear deadly to the political establishment, it is clear that a paradigm shift away from the shadows of Iran’s last war is urgently needed to manage the challenges stemming from COVID-19. Full Article
w Beware Russian and Chinese Positioning for After the Pandemic By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 09 Apr 2020 10:00:11 +0000 9 April 2020 Keir Giles Senior Consulting Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @KeirGiles LinkedIn Google Scholar Authoritarian regimes can use the COVID-19 crisis to improve their international standing, taking advantage of others’ distraction. Their aims are different, but their methods have much in common. 2020-04-09-Russia-Aid-Serbia An airlifter of the Russian Aerospace Forces prepares to fly to Serbia carrying equipment and professionals during the COVID-19 crisis. Photo by Russian Defence MinistryTASS via Getty Images. Both Russia and China have mounted combined charm offensives and disinformation campaigns on the back of the pandemic. Shipments of ‘aid’ – reportedly of questionable utility and quality - have gone hand in hand with a concerted effort to deflect any blame from China for the early spread, and an ongoing drive by Russia to undermine states’ confidence and have sanctions lifted.These concurrent operations have very different objectives, as Russia seeks to subvert international order while China is continuing its bid to demonstrate global leadership - but in both cases, they are seeking long-term gains by exploiting the inattention and distraction of their targets.Both seek to present themselves as globally responsible stakeholders, but for divergent reasons – especially China which needs the rest of the world to recover and return to stability to ensure its own economic recovery. But despite this, the two campaigns appear superficially similar.Fertile ground for disinformationOne reason lies in the unique nature of the current crisis. Unlike political issues that are local or regional in nature, COVID-19 affects everybody worldwide. The perceived lack of reliable information about the virus provides fertile ground for information and disinformation campaigns, especially feeding on fear, uncertainty and doubt. But Russia in particular would not be succeeding in its objectives without mis-steps and inattention by Western governments.Confused reporting on Russia sending medical supplies to the United States showed Moscow taking advantage of a US administration in apparent disarray. Claims Russia was sending ’humanitarian aid’ were only belatedly countered by the US State Department pointing out it had been paid for. Meanwhile the earlier arrival of Russian military equipment in Italy also scored a propaganda victory for Russia, facilitated by curious passivity by the Italian government.In both cases Russia also achieved secondary objectives. With the United States, Russia scored bonus points by shipping equipment produced by a subsidiary of a company under US sanctions. In the case of Italy, Russian state media made good use of misleading or heavily edited video clips to give the impression of widespread Italian acclaim for Russian aid, combined with disdain for the efforts of the EU.Beijing’s external information campaigns have sought to deflect or defuse criticism of its early mishandling and misinformation on coronavirus and counter accusations of secrecy and falsifying data while also pursuing an opportunity to exercise soft power. For Moscow, current efforts boost a long-standing and intensive campaign to induce the lifting of sanctions, demonstrating if nothing else that sanctions are indeed an effective measure. Official and unofficial lobbying has intensified in numerous capital cities, and will inevitably find supporters.But both the aid and the information campaigns are seriously flawed. While appropriate and useful aid for countries that are struggling should of course be welcomed, both Russian and Chinese equipment delivered to Europe has repeatedly been found to be inappropriate or defective. Russian photographs of cardboard boxes stacked loose and unsecured in a transport aircraft bound for the United States sparked alarm and disbelief among military and aviation experts - and there has still been no US statement on what exactly was purchased, and whether it was found to be fit for purpose when it arrived.Reporting from Italy that the Russian equipment delivered there was ‘80% useless’ has not been contradicted by the Italian authorities. In fact, although the Italian sources criticizing Russia remain anonymous it is striking that - President Trump aside - no government has publicly endorsed materials and assistance received from Russia as actually being useful and helpful.Even in Serbia, with its traditionally close ties with Russia, the only information forthcoming on the activities of the Russian Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection Troops and their equipment that arrived on April 3 was from Russian press releases.Both countries’ strategic communications efforts are similarly fallible. China’s notoriously heavy-handed approach to its critics is of only limited use in the face of such a severe and immediate threat. One suggestion that the virus originated in the US – an early response to US criticism – has already been walked back by the Chinese diplomat who made it.And Russia continues to be capable of spectacularly misjudging its targets. When investigative journalists looked more closely at the nature of the assistance to Italy, Russia’s official response was rage and personal threats, laying bare the real nature of the campaign and immediately alienating many of those whom Moscow had sought to win over.Errors and deficiencies such as these provide opportunities to mitigate the worst side-effects of the campaigns. And actions by individuals can also mitigate much of the impact. The most effective disinformation plays on deeply emotional issues and triggers visceral rather than rational reactions.Advocates of ’informational distancing’ as well as social distancing suggest a tactical pause to assess information calmly, instead of reacting or spreading it further unthinkingly. This approach would bolster not only calm dispassionate assessment of the real impact of Russian and Chinese actions, but also counter spreading of misinformation on the pandemic as a whole - especially when key sources of disinformation are national leaders seeking to politicize or profit from the crisis.Limitations of Russian and Chinese altruism must be stated clearly and frankly to fill gaps in public understanding. Where help is genuine, it should of course be welcomed: but if it is the case that assistance received from Moscow or Beijing is not appropriate, not useful, or not fit for purpose, this should be acknowledged publicly.Even without central direction or coordination with other Russian strategic communications efforts, the self-perpetuating Russian disinformation ecosystem continues to push narratives designed to undermine confidence in institutions and their ability to deal with the crisis. This too must continue to be monitored closely and countered where it matters.In all cases, miscalculations by Russia or China that expose the true intent of their campaigns – no matter how different their objectives might be - should be watched for closely and highlighted where they occur.Despite the enormity of the present emergency it is not a time for any government to relax its vigilance over longer-term threats. States must not lose sight of manoeuvres seeking to exploit weakness and distraction. If Russia and China emerge from the current crisis with enhanced authority and unjustifiably restored reputations, this will make it still harder to resist their respective challenges to the current rules-based international order in the future. Full Article
w Why an Inclusive Circular Economy is Needed to Prepare for Future Global Crises By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 13:23:01 +0000 15 April 2020 Patrick Schröder Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme @patricks_CH Google Scholar The risks associated with existing production and consumption systems have been harshly exposed amid the current global health crisis but an inclusive circular economy could ensure both short-term and long-term resilience for future challenges. 2020-04-15-Waste-Collection-Peru.jpg Lima city employees picking up garbage during lockdown measures in Peru amid the COVID-19 crisis. Photo: Getty Images. The world is currently witnessing how vulnerable existing production and consumption systems are, with the current global health crisis harshly exposing the magnitude of the risks associated with the global economy in its current form, grounded, as it is, in a linear system that uses a ‘take–make–throw away’ approach.These ‘linear risks’ associated with the existing global supply chain system are extremely high for national economies overly dependent on natural resource extraction and exports of commodities like minerals and metals. Equally vulnerable are countries with large manufacturing sectors of ready-made garments and non-repairable consumer goods for western markets. Furthermore, workers and communities working in these sectors are vulnerable to these changes as a result of disruptive technologies and reduced demand.In a recently published Chatham House research paper, ‘Promoting a Just Transition to an Inclusive Circular Economy’, we highlight why a circular economy approach presents the world with a solution to old and new global risks – from marine plastic pollution to climate change and resource scarcity.Taking the long viewSo far, action to transition to a circular economy has been slow compared to the current crisis which has mobilized rapid global action. For proponents of transitioning to a circular economy, this requires taking the long view. The pandemic has shown us that global emergencies can fast-forward processes that otherwise might take years, even decades, to play out or reverse achievements which have taken years to accomplish.In this vein, there are three striking points of convergence between the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to transition to an inclusive circular economy.Firstly, the current crisis is a stark reminder that the circular economy is not only necessary to ensure long-term resource security but also short-term supplies of important materials. In many cities across the US, the UK and Europe, councils have suspended recycling to focus on essential waste collection services. The UK Recycling Association, for example, has warned about carboard shortages due to disrupted recycling operations with possible shortages for food and medicine packaging on the horizon.Similarly, in China, most recycling sites were shut during the country’s lockdown presenting implications for global recycling markets with additional concerns that there will be a fibre shortage across Europe and possibly around the world.Furthermore, worldwide COVID-19 lockdowns are resulting in a resurgence in the use of single-use packaging creating a new wave of plastic waste especially from food deliveries – already seen in China – with illegal waste fly-tipping dramatically increasing in the UK since the lockdown.In this vein, concerns over the current global health crisis is reversing previous positive trends where many cities had established recycling schemes and companies and consumers had switched to reusable alternatives.Secondly, the need to improve the working conditions of the people working in the informal circular economy, such as waste pickers and recyclers, is imperative. Many waste materials and recyclables that are being handled and collected may be contaminated as a result of being mixed with medical waste.Now, more than ever, key workers in waste management, collection and recycling require personal protective equipment and social protection to ensure their safety as well as the continuation of essential waste collection so as not to increase the potential for new risks associated with additional infectious diseases.In India, almost 450 million workers including construction workers, street vendors and landless agricultural labourers, work in the informal sector. In the current climate, the poorest who are unable to work pose a great risk to the Indian economy which could find itself having to shut down.Moreover, many informal workers live in make-shift settlements areas such as Asia’s largest slum, Dharavi in Mumbai, where health authorities are now facing serious challenges to contain the spread of the disease. Lack of access to handwashing and sanitation facilities, however, further increase these risks but circular, decentralized solutions could make important contributions to sustainable sanitation, health and improved community resilience.Thirdly, it is anticipated that in the long term several global supply chains will be radically changed as a result of transformed demand patterns and the increase in circular practices such as urban mining for the recovery and recycling of metals or the reuse and recycling of textile fibres and localized additive manufacturing (e.g. 3D printing).Many of these supply chains and trade flows have now been already severely disrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the global garment industry has been particularly hard-hit due to the closure of outlets amid falling demand for apparel.It is important to note, workers at the bottom of these garment supply chains are among the most vulnerable and most affected by the crisis as global fashion brands, for example, have been cancelling orders – in the order of $6 billion in the case of Bangladesh alone. Only after intense negotiations are some brands assuming financial responsibility in the form of compensation wage funds to help suppliers in Myanmar, Cambodia and Bangladesh to pay workers during the ongoing crisis.In addition, the current pandemic is damaging demand for raw materials thereby affecting mining countries. Demand for Africa’s commodities in China, for example, has declined significantly, with the impact on African economies expected to be serious, with 15 per cent of the world’s copper and 20 per cent of the world’s zinc mines currently going offline. A further threat is expected to come from falling commodity prices as a result of the curtailment of manufacturing activity in China particularly for crude oil, copper, iron ore and other industrial commodities which, in these cases, will have direct impacts on the Australian and Canadian mining sectors.This is all being compounded by an associated decline in consumer demand worldwide. For example, many South African mining companies – leading producers of metals and minerals – have started closing their mining operations following the government’s announcement of a lockdown in order to prevent the transmission of the virus among miners who often work in confined spaces and in close proximity with one another. As workers are laid off due to COVID-19, there are indications that the mining industry will see fast-tracking towards automated mining operations. All of these linear risks that have been exposed through the COVID-19 pandemic reinforce the need for a just transition to a circular economy. But while the reduction in the consumption of resources is necessary to achieve sustainability, the social impacts on low- and middle- income countries and their workers requires international support mechanisms.In addition, the current situation also highlights the need to find a new approach to globalized retail chains and a balance between local and global trade based on international cooperation across global value chains rather than implementation of trade protectionist measures.In this vein, all of the recovery plans from the global COVID-19 pandemic need to be aligned with the principles of an inclusive circular economy in order to ensure both short-term and long-term resilience and preparedness for future challenges and disruptions. Full Article
w Same Old Politics Will Not Solve Iraq Water Crisis By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 15:36:21 +0000 15 April 2020 Georgia Cooke Project Manager, Middle East and North Africa Programme Dr Renad Mansour Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative @renadmansour Glada Lahn Senior Research Fellow, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme @Glada_Lahn Addressing Iraq’s water crisis should be a priority for any incoming prime minister as it is damaging the country’s attempts to rebuild. But successive governments have allowed the problem to fester. 2020-04-15-Iraq-Water Punting in the marshes south of the Iraqi city of Ammarah. Photo by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad/Getty Images. Historically, Iraq lay claim to one of the most abundant water supplies in the Middle East. But the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers has reduced by up to 40% since the 1970s, due in part to the actions of neighbouring countries, in particular Turkey, upstream.Rising temperatures and reduced rainfall due to climate change are also negatively impacting Iraq’s water reserves. Evaporation from dams and reservoirs is estimated to lose the country up to 8 billion cubic metres of water every year.A threat to peace and stabilityShortages have dried up previously fertile land, increasing poverty in agricultural areas. Shortages have also served to fuel conflict: communities faced with successive droughts and government inertia proved to be easy targets for ISIS recruiters, who lured farmers into joining them by offering money and food to feed their families. Economic hardship for those whose livelihoods relied upon river water has also driven rural to urban migration, putting significant strain on already over-populated towns and cities, exacerbating housing, job and electricity shortages, and widening the gap between haves and have-nots.But scarcity isn’t the most crucial element of Iraq’s water crisis – contamination is. Decades of local government mismanagement, corrupt practices and a lack of regulation of dumping (it is estimated up to 70% of Iraq’s industrial waste is dumped directly into water) has left approximately three in every five citizens without a reliable source of potable water.In 2018, 118,000 residents of Basra province were hospitalised with symptoms brought on by drinking contaminated water, which not only put a spotlight on the inadequacies of a crumbling healthcare system but sparked mass protests and a subsequent violent crackdown.The water crisis is also undermining the stability of the country’s federal governance model, by occasionally sparking disputes between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as between governorates in the south.The crisis is both a symptom and a cause of poor governance. Iraq is stuck in a cycle whereby government inaction causes shortages and contamination, which result in economic losses, reduced food supply, increased prices and widespread poor health. This in turn leads to increasing levels of poverty, higher demand on services and civil unrest, increasing the pressure on a weak, dysfunctional system of government.What can be done?The first priority should be modernising existing water-management infrastructure - a relic of a time when the problem was an excess rather than a shortage of water (the last time Iraq’s flood defences were required was 1968). Bureaucratic hurdles, widespread corruption and an endless cycle of other crises taking precedent prevent good initiatives from being implemented or scaled up.Diversifying energy sources to improve provision is crucial. Baghdad has a sewage treatment plant that originally ran on its own electricity source, but this capacity was destroyed in 1991 and was never replaced. The city continues to suffer from dangerous levels of water pollution because the electricity supply from the grid is insufficient to power the plant. Solar energy has great potential in sun-drenched Iraq to bridge the gaping hole in energy provision, but successive governments have chosen to focus on fossil fuels rather than promoting investment to grow the renewables sector.Heightened tension with upstream Turkey could turn water into another cause of regional conflict. But, if approached differently, collaboration between Iraq and its neighbour could foster regional harmony.Turkey’s elevated geography and cooler climate mean its water reserves suffer 75% less evaporation than Iraq’s. Given that Turkey’s top energy priority is the diversification of its supply of imported hydrocarbons, a win-win deal could see Turkey exchange access to its water-management infrastructure for delivery of reduced cost energy supplies from Iraq.German-French cooperation on coal and steel in the 1950s and the evolution of economic integration that followed might provide a model for how bilateral cooperation over one issue could result in cooperation with other regional players (in this case Iran and Syria) on a range of other issues. This kind of model would need to consider the future of energy, whereby oil and gas would be replaced by solar-power exports.These solutions have been open to policymakers for years and yet they have taken little tangible action. While there are leaders and bureaucrats with the will to act, effective action is invariably blocked by a complex and opaque political system replete with vested interests in maintaining power and wealth via a weak state and limited services from central government.Breaking the cycleTo break this cycle, Iraq needs a group of professional and able actors outside of government to work with willing elements of the state bureaucracy as a taskforce to pressure for action and accountability. Publishing the recommendations from a hitherto withheld report produced in the aftermath of Basra’s 2018 heath crisis would be a great start.In time, this taskforce could champion the prioritisation of water on the national agenda, the implementation of infrastructure upgrades, and hold more productive conversations with neighbour states.With such a high degree of state fragmentation and dysfunction in Iraq, looking to the central government to provide leadership will not yield results. Engagement with a coalition of non-state actors can begin to address the water crisis and also open a dialogue around new models of governance for other critical issues. This might even be a starting point for rewriting the tattered social contract in Iraq.This piece is based on insights and discussion at a roundtable event, Conflict and the Water Crisis in Iraq, held at Chatham House on March 9 as part of the Iraq Initiative. Full Article
w Avoiding a Virus-Induced Cold War with China By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 17 Apr 2020 16:05:40 +0000 17 April 2020 Robin Niblett Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House @RobinNiblett Managing relations with China once the COVID-19 crisis abates will be one of the biggest challenges facing political leaders in the United States and Europe – two of the areas worst-hit by the virus that originated in China. 2020-04-17-Trump-Xi Chinese president Xi Jinping and US president Donald Trump in Beijing, China. Photo by Thomas Peter-Pool/Getty Images. So far, there has been a noticeable worsening of relations that had already soured in recent years – the latest step being President Donald Trump’s suspension of US funding for the World Health Organization (WHO) in response to accusations of Chinese interference in its operations.Should the world now simply prepare for a period of intense and extended hostility? As director of a policy institute founded 100 years ago in the shadow of the First World War, I believe we must do all in our power to avoid a return of the global strategic rivalries that blighted the 20th century.Deepening suspicionsOf course, the outcome does not lie only in the hands of the US and Europe. In the 1930s, as much as they wanted to avoid another great war, British and French leaders were forced to respond to Germany’s aggression in central Europe. In the late 1940s, America’s instinct to disentangle itself from war-ravaged Europe was quickly tempered by the realization that the Soviet Union would impose or infiltrate Communist control as far into Europe as possible.Today, those who warned that China - a one-party, surveillance state with a power-centralising leader - could never be treated as a global stakeholder feel vindicated. They see in COVID-19 an opportunity to harden policies towards China, starting by blocking all Chinese investment into 5G infrastructure and breaking international dependence on Chinese supply chains.They can point to the fact that Chinese Communist Party officials in Wuhan initially prioritised sustaining economic growth and supressed reports about COVID-19’s capacity for human-to-human transmission, epitomised by their treatment of Dr Li Wenliang. They can highlight how Beijing’s obsession with denying Taiwan a voice in the WHO prevented Taiwanese input into the early analysis of the crisis. They can highlight the ways in which Beijing has instrumentalised its medical support for coronavirus-afflicted countries for diplomatic gain.For their part, those in China who believed the US and Europe would never allow China’s return as a regional and world power see this criticism as further evidence. They can point to comments about this being the ‘Chinese virus’, a leaked biological weapon or China’s ‘Chernobyl moment’. ‘Wolf warrior’ Chinese diplomats have sought to outdo each other by challenging narratives about COVID-19, while propagating disinformation about the origins of the virus.There are major risks if this blame game escalates, as it could in the lead-up to a fraught US presidential election. First, consciously uncoupling the US economically from China will make the post-coronavirus recovery that much harder. China already accounts for nearly 20% of world GDP but, unlike after the global financial crisis in 2008, it is fast becoming the world’s leading consumer market. Its financial stimulus measures need to be closely coordinated with the G7 and through the G20.Second, Chinese scientists were the first to uncover the genetic code of the virus and shared it with the WHO as early as January 12, enabling the roll-out of effective testing around the world. They are now involved in the global search for a vaccine alongside American and European counterparts. While the Chinese government will remain a legitimate target for criticism, Chinese citizens and companies will contribute to many of the most important technical breakthroughs this century.Third, if COVID-19 creates a long-term schism between China and the US, with Europeans caught on its edge, this could do deep damage to world order. China may become a less willing partner in lowering global greenhouse gas emissions and sharing renewable energy technologies; in helping African and other developing countries grow sustainably; and in helping to build a more resilient global health infrastructure.Getting the balance rightBut the COVID-19 crisis can also be the hinge point to a more coherent and self-interested transatlantic approach to China, one whose motto should be ‘beware but engage’. There should indeed be limits on state-backed Chinese investment in strategic US and European economic sectors, just as China limits Western access to its market. But the goal should be to lower barriers to trade and investment over time on a mutually beneficial and transparent basis, not to recreate an economic Cold War.Chinese human rights violations, at home and abroad, should be called out. The dissemination of Chinese systems of citizen surveillance, which will be more popular in a post-coronavirus world, should be monitored and contested with US and European alternatives. And the extent of Chinese exports’ access to international markets should be conditional on China improving its phytosanitary standards - which protect humans, animals, and plants from diseases, pests, or contaminants - and strictly regulating unhygienic wet markets.But to go further and try to make disengagement the dominant transatlantic policy as COVID-19 subsides will not only divide Europe and America. It will also contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy; in which a resentful China grows apart from the US and Europe during a period where they must work together.Given that it will likely be the world’s largest economy in 2030, how the US and Europe manage their relations with China after this crisis is a question at least as seminal as the one they faced after 1945 with the Soviet Union. In the ensuing years, the Soviet Union became a military superpower and competitor, but not an economic one. Containment was a viable, correct and, ultimately, successful strategy. The same options are not available this time. There will be no winners from a new Cold War with China. Full Article
w WHO Can Do Better - But Halting Funding is No Answer By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 20 Apr 2020 09:11:18 +0000 20 April 2020 Dr Charles Clift Senior Consulting Fellow, Global Health Programme @CliftWorks Calling a halt to funding for an unspecified time is an unsatisfactory halfway house for the World Health Organization (WHO) to deal with. But with Congress and several US agencies heavily involved, whether a halt is even feasible is under question. 2020-04-20-PPE-Ethiopia-WHO Checking boxes of personal protective equipment (PPE) at the Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Photo by SAMUEL HABTAB/AFP via Getty Images. Donald Trump is impulsive. His sudden decision to stop funding the World Health Organization (WHO) just days after calling it 'very China-centric” and 'wrong about a lot of things' is the latest example. And this in the midst of the worst pandemic since Spanish flu in 1918 and a looming economic crisis compared by some to the 1930s. But the decision is not really just about what WHO might or might not have done wrong. It is more about the ongoing geopolitical wrangle between the US and China, and about diverting attention from US failings in its own response to coronavirus in the run-up to the US presidential election.It clearly also derives from Trump’s deep antipathy to almost any multilateral organization. WHO has been chosen as the fall guy in this political maelstrom in a way that might please Trump’s supporters who will have read or heard little about WHO’s role in tackling this crisis. And the decision has been widely condemned in almost all other countries and by many in the US.What is it likely to mean in practice for WHO?Calling a halt to funding for an unspecified time is an unsatisfactory halfway house. A so-called factsheet put out by the White House talks about the reforms it thinks necessary 'before the organization can be trusted again'. This rather implies that the US wants to remain a member of WHO if it can achieve the changes it wants. Whether those changes are feasible is another question — they include holding member states accountable for accurate data-sharing and countering what is referred to as 'China’s outsize influence on the organization'. Trump said the funding halt would last while WHO’s mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic was investigated, which would take 60-90 days. The US is the single largest funder of WHO, providing about 16% of its budget. It provides funds to WHO in two ways. The first is the assessed contribution — the subscription each country pays to be a member. In 2018/19 the US contribution should have been $237 million but, as of January this year it was in arrears by about $200 million.Much bigger are US voluntary contributions provided to WHO for specified activities amounting in the same period to another $650 million. These are for a wide variety of projects — more than one-quarter goes to polio eradication, but a significant portion also is for WHO’s emergency work. The US assessed contribution represents only 4% of WHO’s budget. Losing that would certainly be a blow to WHO but a manageable one. Given the arrears situation it is not certain that the US would have paid any of this in the next three months in any case. More serious would be losing the US voluntary contributions which account for about another 12% of WHO’s budget—but whether this could be halted all at once is very unclear. First Congress allocates funds in the US, not the president, raising questions about how a halt could be engineered domestically.Secondly, US contributions to WHO come from about ten different US government agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health or USAID, each of whom have separate agreements with WHO. Will they be prepared to cut funding for ongoing projects with WHO? And does the US want to disrupt ongoing programmes such as polio eradication and, indeed, emergency response which contribute to saving lives? Given the president’s ability to do 180 degree U-turns we shall have to wait and see what will actually happen in the medium term. If it presages the US leaving WHO, this would only facilitate growing Chinese influence in the WHO and other UN bodies. Perhaps in the end wiser advice will be heeded and a viable solution found.Most of President Trump’s criticisms of WHO do not bear close scrutiny. WHO may have made mistakes — it may have given too much credence to information coming from the Chinese. China has just announced that the death toll in Wuhan was 50% higher than previously revealed. It may have overpraised China’s performance and system, but this was part of a deliberate strategy to secure China’s active collaboration so that it could help other countries learn from China’s experience. The chief message from this sorry story is that two countries are using WHO as a pawn in pursuing their respective political agendas which encompass issues well beyond the pandemic. China has been very successful in gaining WHO’s seal of approval, in spite of concerns about events prior to it declaring the problem to the WHO and the world. This, in turn, has invited retaliation from the US. When this is over will be the time to learn lessons about what WHO should have done better. But China, the US, and the global community of nations also need to consider their own responsibility in contributing to this terrible unfolding tragedy.This article was originally published in the British Medical Journal Full Article
w COVID-19: How Do We Re-open the Economy? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 14:41:47 +0000 21 April 2020 Creon Butler Research Director, Trade, Investment & New Governance Models: Director, Global Economy and Finance Programme LinkedIn Following five clear steps will create the confidence needed for both the consumer and business decision-making which is crucial to a strong recovery. 2020-04-21-Shop-Retail-Closed Chain wrapped around the door of a Saks Fifth Avenue Inc. store in San Francisco, California, during the COVID-19 crisis. Photo by David Paul Morris/Bloomberg via Getty Images With the IMF forecasting a 6.1% fall in advanced economy GDP in 2020 and world trade expected to contract by 11%, there is intense focus on the question of how and when to re-open economies currently in lockdown.But no ‘opening up’ plan has a chance of succeeding unless it commands the confidence of all the main actors in the economy – employees, consumers, firms, investors and local authorities.Without public confidence, these groups may follow official guidance only sporadically; consumers will preserve cash rather than spend it on goods and services; employees will delay returning to work wherever possible; businesses will face worsening bottlenecks as some parts of the economy open up while key suppliers remain closed; and firms will continue to delay many discretionary investment and hiring decisions.Achieving public confidenceTaken together, these behaviours would substantially reduce the chances of a strong economic bounce-back even in the absence of a widespread second wave of infections. Five key steps are needed to achieve a high degree of public confidence in any reopening plan.First, enough progress must be made in suppressing the virus and in building public health capacity so the public can be confident any new outbreak will be contained without reverting to another full-scale lockdown. Moreover, the general public needs to feel that the treatment capacity of the health system is at a level where the risk to life if someone does fall ill with the virus is at an acceptably low level.Achieving this requires the government to demonstrate the necessary capabilities - testing, contact tracing, quarantine facilities, supplies of face masks and other forms of PPE (personal protective equipment) - are actually in place and can be sustained, rather than relying on future commitments. It also needs to be clear on the role to be played going forward by handwashing and other personal hygiene measures.Second, the authorities need to set out clear priorities on which parts of the economy are to open first and why. This needs to take account of both supply side and demand side factors, such as the importance of a particular sector to delivering essential supplies, a sector’s ability to put in place effective protocols to protect its employees and customers, and its importance to the functioning of other parts of the economy. There is little point in opening a car assembly plant unless its SME suppliers are able to deliver the required parts.Detailed planning of the phasing of specific relaxation measures is essential, as is close cooperation between business and the authorities. The government also needs to establish a centralised coordination function capable of dealing quickly with any unexpected supply chain glitches. And it must pay close attention to feedback from health experts on how the process of re-opening the economy sector-by-sector is affecting the rate of infection. Third, the government needs to state how the current financial and economic support measures for the economy will evolve as the re-opening process continues. It is critical to avoid removing support measures too soon, and some key measures may have to continue to operate even as firms restart their operations. It is important to show how - over time - the measures will evolve from a ‘life support’ system for businesses and individuals into a more conventional economic stimulus.This transition strategy could initially be signalled through broad principles, but the government needs to follow through quickly by detailing specific measures. The transition strategy must target sectors where most damage has been done, including the SME sector in general and specific areas such as transport, leisure and retail. It needs to factor in the hard truth that some businesses will be no longer be viable after the crisis and set out how the government is going to support employees and entrepreneurs who suffer as a result.The government must also explain how it intends to learn the lessons and capture the upsides from the crisis by building a more resilient economy over the longer term. Most importantly, it has to demonstrate continued commitment to tackling climate change – which is at least as big a threat to mankind’s future as pandemics.Fourth, the authorities should explain how they plan to manage controls on movement of people across borders to minimise the risk of new infection outbreaks, but also to help sustain the opening-up measures. This needs to take account of the fact that different countries are at different stages in the progress of the pandemic and may have different strategies and trade-offs on the risks they are willing to take as they open up.As a minimum, an effective border plan requires close cooperation with near neighbours as these are likely to be the most important economic counterparts for many countries. But ideally each country’s plan should be part of a wider global opening-up strategy coordinated by the G20. In the absence of a reliable antibody test, border control measures will have to rely on a combination of imperfect testing, quarantine, and new, shared data requirements for incoming and departing passengers. Fifth, the authorities must communicate the steps effectively to the public, in a manner that shows not only that this is a well thought-through plan, but also does not hide the extent of the uncertainties, or the likelihood that rapid modifications may be needed as the plan is implemented. In designing the communications, the authorities should develop specific measures to enable the public to track progress.Such measures are vital to sustaining business, consumer and employee confidence. While some smaller advanced economies appear close to completing these steps, for many others there is still a long way to go. Waiting until they are achieved means higher economic costs in the short-term. But, in the long-term, they will deliver real net benefits.Authorities are more likely to sustain these measures because key economic actors will actually follow the guidance given. Also, by instilling confidence, the plan will bring forward the consumer and business decision-making crucial to a strong recovery. In contrast, moving ahead without proper preparation risks turning an already severe economic recession into something much worse. Full Article
w Beyond Lockdown: Africa’s Options for Responding to COVID-19 By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 21 Apr 2020 15:42:52 +0000 21 April 2020 Ben Shepherd Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme Nina van der Mark Research Analyst, Global Health Programme @vdm_nina LinkedIn The continent’s enormous diversity means that there will be no one African experience of COVID-19, nor a uniform governmental response. But there are some common challenges across the continent, and a chance to get the response right. 2020-04-22-Africa-COVID-Dakar Dakar after the Interior Ministry announced compulsory wearing of masks in public and private services, shops and transport, under penalty of sanctions. Photo by SEYLLOU/AFP via Getty Images. African policymakers face a dilemma when it comes to COVID-19. The first hope is to prevent the virus from gaining a foothold at all, and many African states have significant experience of managing infectious disease outbreaks. The establishment of the Africa Centre for Disease Control highlights the hugely increased focus on public health in recent years.But capacities to track, test and isolate vary wildly, notably between neighbours with porous and poorly controlled borders and, in most cases, sustained national-level disease control is difficult. Initial clusters of COVID-19 cases are already established in many places, but a lack of testing capacity makes it hard to know the full extent of transmission.It is not obvious what African states should do as a response. Lack of information about COVID-19 means the proportion of asymptomatic or mild cases is not known, still less the ways in which this is influenced by human geography and demographics.Africa is an overwhelmingly young continent with a median age under 20. But it also faces chronic malnutrition, which may weaken immune responses, and infectious diseases such as malaria, TB and HIV are widespread which could worsen the impact of COVID-19, particularly if treatment for these diseases is interrupted.Complex and unknownUltimately, how all these factors interact with COVID-19 is complex and remains largely unknown. Africa may escape with a relatively light toll. Or it could be hit harder than anywhere else.What is clear, however, is that cost of simply following the rest of the world into lockdown could be high. Africa is relatively rural but has higher populations living in informal settlements than anywhere in the world. Many live in cramped and overcrowded accommodation without clean water or reliable electricity, making handwashing a challenge and working from home impossible.And the benefits appear limited. The goal of lockdowns in most places is not to eliminate the virus but to accept the economic and social costs as a price worth paying in order to ‘flatten the curve’ of infection and protect healthcare systems from being overwhelmed. But this logic does not hold when many of Africa’s healthcare systems are barely coping with pre-coronavirus levels of disease.Africa suffers in comparison to much of the rest of the world in terms of access to quality and affordable healthcare, critical care beds and specialist personnel. For example, in 2017, Nigeria had just 120 ICU beds for a country of 200 million, equating to 0.07 per 100,000 inhabitants compared to 12.5 per 100,000 in Italy and 3.6 per 100,000 in China.The pandemic’s ruinous economic impacts could also be more acute for Africa than anywhere else. The continent is highly vulnerable to potential drops in output and relies heavily on demand from China and Europe. Many states are already facing sharply falling natural resource revenues, and investment, tourism and remittances will suffer - all on top of a high existing debt burden.Analysis by the World Bank shows that Africa will likely face its first recession in 25 years, with the continental economy contracting by up to 5.1% in 2020. Africa will have scant financial ammunition to use in the fight against COVID-19 with currencies weakening, food prices rising, local agri-food supply chains disrupted and food imports likely to decrease as well. A food security emergency appears a strong possibility.So, although several states have imposed national lockdowns and others closed major urban centres, lockdowns are difficult to manage and sustain, especially in places where the daily hustle of the informal sector or subsistence agriculture are the only means of survival and where the state has neither the trust of the population nor the capacity to replace lost earnings or meet basic needs.Of course, this is not simply a binary choice between lockdown or no lockdown - a range of intermediate options exist, such as some restriction on movement, curfews, shutting places of worship, banning only large gatherings, or closing pubs, schools and borders.A significant number of African states have so far taken this middle path. This will not prevent the virus from spreading nor, in all probability, be enough to ensure adequate healthcare for all Africans infected with COVID-19. But it may help slow the spread and buy invaluable time for African states and partners to prepare.How this time is used is therefore of paramount importance. Popular trust in the state is low in many African countries so strategies must empower communities, not alienate them. Africa’s experience of previous epidemics and long traditions of collective resilience and community-based crisis response - which persist in many places – are significant strengths.The right messages must be carried by the right messengers, and policies - including cash transfers and food distribution - implemented sensitively. If not, or if responses become militarized, public consent is unlikely to be sustained for long. Full Article
w The Hurdles to Developing a COVID-19 Vaccine: Why International Cooperation is Needed By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 09:26:36 +0000 23 April 2020 Professor David Salisbury CB Associate Fellow, Global Health Programme LinkedIn Dr Champa Patel Director, Asia-Pacific Programme @patel_champa While the world pins its hopes on vaccines to prevent COVID-19, there are scientific, regulatory and market hurdles to overcome. Furthermore, with geopolitical tensions and nationalistic approaches, there is a high risk that the most vulnerable will not get the life-saving interventions they need. 2020-04-23-Covid-Vaccine.jpg A biologist works on the virus inactivation process in Belo Horizonte, Brazil on 24 March 2020. The Brazilian Ministry of Health convened The Technological Vaccine Center to conduct research on COVID-19 in order to diagnose, test and develop a vaccine. Photo: Getty Images. On 10 January 2020, Chinese scientists released the sequence of the COVID-19 genome on the internet. This provided the starting gun for scientists around the world to start developing vaccines or therapies. With at least 80 different vaccines in development, many governments are pinning their hopes on a quick solution. However, there are many hurdles to overcome. Vaccine developmentFirstly, vaccine development is normally a very long process to ensure vaccines are safe and effective before they are used. Safety is not a given: a recent dengue vaccine caused heightened disease in vaccinated children when they later were exposed to dengue, while Respiratory Syncytial Virus vaccine caused the same problem. Nor is effectiveness a given. Candidate vaccines that use novel techniques where minute fragments of the viruses’ genetic code are either injected directly into humans or incorporated into a vaccine (as is being pursued, or could be pursued for COVID-19) have higher risks of failure simply because they haven’t worked before. For some vaccines, we know what levels of immunity post-vaccination are likely to be protective. This is not the case for coronavirus. Clinical trials will have to be done for efficacy. This is not optional – regulators will need to know extensive testing has taken place before licencing any vaccine. Even if animal tests are done in parallel with early human tests, the remainder of the process is still lengthy. There is also great interest in the use of passive immunization, whereby antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 (collected from people who have recovered from infection or laboratory-created) are given to people who are currently ill. Antivirals may prove to be a quicker route than vaccine development, as the testing requirements would be shorter, manufacturing may be easier and only ill people would need to be treated, as opposed to all at-risk individuals being vaccinated.Vaccine manufacturingDevelopers, especially small biotechs, will have to make partnerships with large vaccine manufacturers in order to bring products to market. One notorious bottleneck in vaccine development is getting from proof-of-principle to commercial development: about 95 per cent of vaccines fail at this step. Another bottleneck is at the end of production. The final stages of vaccine production involve detailed testing to ensure that the vaccine meets the necessary criteria and there are always constraints on access to the technologies necessary to finalize the product. Only large vaccine manufacturers have these capacities. There is a graveyard of failed vaccine candidates that have not managed to pass through this development and manufacturing process.Another consideration is adverse or unintended consequences. Highly specialized scientists may have to defer their work on other new vaccines to work on COVID-19 products and production of existing products may have to be set aside, raising the possibility of shortages of other essential vaccines. Cost is another challenge. Vaccines for industrialized markets can be very lucrative for pharmaceutical companies, but many countries have price caps on vaccines. Important lessons have been learned from the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic when industrialized countries took all the vaccines first. Supplies were made available to lower-income countries at a lower price but this was much later in the evolution of the pandemic. For the recent Ebola outbreaks, vaccines were made available at low or no cost. Geopolitics may also play a role. Should countries that manufacture a vaccine share it widely with other countries or prioritize their own populations first? It has been reported that President Trump attempted to purchase CureVac, a German company with a candidate vaccine. There are certainly precedents for countries prioritizing their own populations. With H1N1 flu in 2009, the Australian Government required a vaccine company to meet the needs of the Australian population first. Vaccine distributionGlobal leadership and a coordinated and coherent response will be needed to ensure that any vaccine is distributed equitably. There have been recent calls for a G20 on health, but existing global bodies such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and GAVI are working on vaccines and worldwide access to them. Any new bodies should seek to boost funding for these entities so they can ensure products reach the most disadvantaged. While countries that cannot afford vaccines may be priced out of markets, access for poor, vulnerable or marginalized peoples, whether in developed or developing countries, is of concern. Developing countries are at particular risk from the impacts of COVID-19. People living in conflict-affected and fragile states – whether they are refugees or asylum seekers, internally displaced or stateless, or in detention facilities – are at especially high risk of devastating impacts. Mature economies will also face challenges. Equitable access to COVID-19 vaccine will be challenging where inequalities and unequal access to essential services have been compromised within some political systems. The need for global leadership There is an urgent need for international coordination on COVID-19 vaccines. While the WHO provides technical support and UNICEF acts as a procurement agency, responding to coronavirus needs clarity of global leadership that arches over national interests and is capable of mobilizing resources at a time when economies are facing painful recessions. We see vaccines as a salvation but remain ill-equipped to accelerate their development.While everyone hopes for rapid availability of safe, effective and affordable vaccines that will be produced in sufficient quantities to meet everyone’s needs, realistically, we face huge hurdles. Full Article
w Privileging Local Food is Flawed Solution to Reduce Emissions By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 13:59:11 +0000 23 April 2020 Christophe Bellmann Associate Fellow, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy LinkedIn The COVID-19 pandemic has brought food security and food imports to the forefront again. Some fear that the crisis could quickly strain global food supply chains as countries adopt new trade restrictions to avoid domestic food shortages. 2020-04-23-Trade-Food-Apples Apples being picked before going into cold storage so they can be bought up until Christmas. Photo by Suzanne Kreiter/The Boston Globe via Getty Images. The pressure of the coronavirus pandemic is adding to a widely held misconception that trade in food products is bad for the environment due to the associated ‘food miles’ – the carbon footprint of agricultural products transported over long distances.This concept, developed by large retailers a decade ago, is often invoked as a rationale for restricting trade and choosing locally-produced food over imports. Consuming local food may seem sensible at first glance as it reduces the carbon footprint of goods and generates local employment. However, this assumption ignores the emissions produced during the production, processing or storage stages which often dwarf transport emissions. Other avenues to address the climate change impact of trade are more promising.Demystifying food emissionsIn the US, for example, food items travel more than 8,000 km on average before reaching the consumer. Yet transport only accounts for 11 per cent of total emissions with 83 per cent – mostly nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) emissions – occurring at the production stage.US Department of Agriculture data on energy use in the American food system echoes this finding, showing that processing, packaging, and selling of food represent ten times the energy used to transport food.In practice, it may be preferable from an environmental perspective to consume lamb, onion or dairy products transported by sea because the lower emissions generated at the production stage offset those resulting from transport. Similarly, growing tomatoes under heated greenhouses in Sweden is often more emissions-intensive than importing open-grown ones from Southern Europe.Seasonality also matters. British apples placed in storage for ten months leads to twice the level of emissions as that of South American apples sea-freighted to the UK. And the type of transport is also important as, overall, maritime transport generates 25 to 250 times less emissions than trucks, and air freight generates on average five times more emissions than road transport.Therefore, air-freighted Kenyan beans have a much larger carbon footprint than those produced in the UK, but crossing Europe by truck to import Italian wine might generate more emissions than transatlantic shipments.Finally, one should take into account the last leg of transport. A consumer driving more than 10 km to purchase 1 kg of fresh produce will generate proportionately more greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than air-freighting 1 kg of produce from Kenya.Shifting consumption towards local foods may reduce GHG emissions in sectors with relatively low emissions intensities but, when non-carbon dioxide emissions are taken into account, this is more often the exception than the rule.Under these circumstances, preventing trade is an inefficient and expensive way of reducing GHG emissions. Bureau et al. for example, calculate that a global tariff maintaining the volume of trade at current levels until 2030 may reduce global carbon dioxide emissions by 3.5 per cent. However, this would be roughly seven times less than the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and cost equivalent to the current GDP of Brazil or 1.8 per cent of world GDP.By preventing an efficient use of resources, such restrictions would also undermine the role of trade in offsetting possible climate-induced production shortfalls in some parts of the world and allowing people to access food when they can’t produce it themselves.Reducing the climate footprint of tradeThis is not to say that nothing should be done to tackle transport emissions. The OECD estimates that international trade-related freight accounted for over 5 per cent of total global fuel emissions with shipping representing roughly half of it, trucks 40 per cent, air 6 per cent and rail 2 per cent. With the projected tripling of freight transport by 2050, emissions from shipping are expected to rise between 50 and 250 per cent.Furthermore, because of their international nature, these emissions are not covered by the Paris Agreement. Instead the two UN agencies regulating these sectors – the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization – are responsible for reducing these emissions and, so far, significant progress has proven elusive.Regional or bilateral free trade agreements to further stimulate trade could address this problem by exploiting comparative advantages. Impact assessments of those agreements often point towards increases in GHG emissions due to a boost in trade flows. In the future, such agreements could incorporate – or develop in parallel – initiatives to ensure carbon neutrality by connecting carbon markets among contracting parties or by taxing international maritime and air transport emissions.Such initiatives could be combined with providing additional preferences in the form of enhanced market access to low-carbon food and healthier food. The EU, as one of the chief proponents of bilateral and regional trade agreements and a leader in promoting a transition to a low-carbon economy could champion such an approach.This article is part of a series from the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum, designed to promote research and policy recommendations on the future of global trade. It is adapted from the research paper, Delivering Sustainable Food and Land Use Systems: The Role of International Trade, authored by Christophe Bellmann, Bernice Lee and Jonathan Hepburn. Full Article
w Nigeria’s Political Leaders Need to Win Trust to Tackle COVID-19 By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Thu, 23 Apr 2020 16:00:22 +0000 23 April 2020 Elizabeth Donnelly Deputy Director, Africa Programme @LizzyDonn Idayat Hassan Director, Centre for Democracy and Development COVID-19 will require Nigeria's government to rely on already stretched communities and informal institutions. But there is a yawning gap in trust and accountability between citizens and the state in Nigeria – the crisis will force the state to attempt to bridge this divide. 2020-04-23-Nigeria-News-Coronavirus News stand in Lagos, Nigeria on April 12, 2020. Photo by PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP via Getty Images. Nigeria is better placed than many to respond to the arrival of the coronavirus disease. In 2014, it successfully contained a deadly Ebola virus outbreak and the country’s current score on the Epidemic Preparedness Index (38.9 per cent) is higher than the African and global averages.But the outbreak is compounding Nigeria’s numerous pre-existing crises. It was already grappling with a Lassa fever outbreak that has claimed more than one hundred lives in 2020, the aftermath of recession, and conflict and insecurity within its borders.Effective leadership to build confidence will be vital. However, President Muhammadu Buhari has made few appearances, delivering his first speech on Nigeria’s response more than one month after the country’s first recorded case. And the indefinite suspension of meetings of the Federal Executive Council has raised questions on the efficacy of the response.Extended lockdown imposedThe recent loss of President Buhari’s steadfast chief of staff Abba Kyari as a result of contracting COVID-19 is a further significant setback for the presidency. But the administration has established a presidential task force to develop a national strategy and an extended lockdown has been imposed on the most affected states – Lagos, Ogun and the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. The country has also closed national borders and is expanding testing capacity to 1,500 per day.However, when Nigeria’s first case was recorded on February 27 it was state governments that initially took action – shutting schools, closing state borders and imposing lockdowns. Going forwards, the 36 state governments will have a key role to play although their governance capacity and commitment varies widely.The federal government has released $2.7 million to support the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), and promised an additional $18 million – but this falls well short of the estimated $330 million needed to tackle the coronavirus disease in Nigeria. The government is looking to its private sector to help make up the difference. The country’s finances are under severe pressure with Nigerian crude oil – the main source of government revenue and foreign exchange reserves – selling for as low as $12 or $13 a barrel (with production costs of around $22 per barrel), and a debt servicing to revenue ratio of more than 50 per cent even before the oil price crash.Facing its second recession in four years, with -3.4 per cent GDP growth forecast by the IMF, the country has little economic resilience. Nigeria will not be able to sustain restrictions on its 81.15 million-strong workforce, 83.2 per cent of which operate in the informal sector. One area at particular risk is food security, as the pandemic is disrupting farming, supply chains and trade. By building on past benefit programmes, the federal government is providing cash and distributing food to vulnerable households, but this important effort is being hampered by poor communication, inefficiencies and a lack of transparency – longstanding challenges in many aspects of public service delivery in Nigeria.In the absence of a reliable social safety net, Nigerians trust and rely on their families, communities and the informal economy to see them through difficult times. It is these informal mechanisms that lend Nigeria its oft-referenced resilience, which has enabled society to function and continue while a largely disconnected political class has focused on self-enrichment.It is through these traditional channels that the government will need to deliver information, support, testing and treatment. But without high levels of trust, the administration may find it difficult to do so. Many Nigerians initially considered the pandemic a hoax, some describing it as a ‘rich man’s disease’, while others see it as another conspiracy by politicians to loot the treasury.Lockdown measures have also heightened tensions across the country. Some citizens are rebelling and in one instance burned down a police station in response to the closure of mosques in Katsina state. Marking a further breakdown in the relationship between the population and its leaders, the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) recently reported security services enforcing the lockdown have extrajudicially killed 18 people, while, so far, COVID-19 has killed 25 people in Nigeria.Mitigating the spread and worst consequences of the virus will depend on the state rebuilding trust with its citizens through effective communication and action. It is particularly important that the community mechanisms of support are protected as they come under growing pressure as communities become increasingly affected by the virus.The stark choice facing most Nigerians – between risking starvation and risking contagion – means a sustained lockdown is not a tenable option. People will choose to go to work. This will especially be the case as people grow weary of measures imposed upon them by a state that the vast majority of the population believe does not serve or care for them.Having largely ignored the needs of Nigeria’s citizens for decades, the political class face an uphill battle in building trust with the population. Earning this trust is not only crucial for the struggle against COVID-19 but also for Nigeria’s longer-term progress and system of political governance. Full Article
w Why is it So Hard for Iraq to Form A Government? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Sat, 25 Apr 2020 17:03:58 +0000 25 April 2020 Dr Renad Mansour Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme; Project Director, Iraq Initiative @renadmansour Mustafa al-Kadhimi has emerged as the compromise prime minister designate, but his potential appointment is built on shaky foundations. 2020-04-25-Iraq-Security-COVID A member of Iraqi security forces stands guard behind a yellow line after the government declared curfew due to coronavirus. Photo by Fariq Faraj Mahmood/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images. On April 9, Iraqi President Barham Salih gathered the Shia, Kurdish and Sunni political blocs at the presidential palace to task head of intelligence Mustafa al-Kadhimi with forming a government.Kadhimi is the third prime minister-designate assigned since Prime Minister Adil abd al-Mehdi resigned in November, in the wake of mass protests against government corruption and the country’s ethno-sectarian based political system.Kadhimi’s two predecessors, Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi, both failed to form a government. This third attempt came as Iraq struggles with repeated crises since October 2019, when the government began responding with deadly force to large-scale mass protests, killing more than 600 and injuring tens of thousands.In January, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani escalated tensions between the United States and Iran, with Iraq stuck in the middle and becoming the home for regular tit-for-tat attacks. The Islamic State — never completely defeated — took advantage of these crises and increased its attacks in disputed territories.The outbreak of COVID-19 challenges the country’s fragile public health sector, while the decline in the price of oil will make it harder for leaders to pay the public salaries that keep the system (and patronage) moving.What does the delay in forming a government amid multiple crises mean for the post-2003 Iraqi political system? Iraq’s post-2003 political system is designed to withstand crisis. Over the years, political parties reflecting the country’s ethnic and sectarian divides have had a tacit understanding that crises represent a risk to their collective interests. These elite stakeholders have together weathered civil war, insurgency and multiple protests — despite deep conflicts with one another.For instance, in September 2018 protesters attacked most major political party headquarters and the Iranian consulate in Basra, and authorities killed some 20 protesters.Since the May election of that year, the fragmented Shia elite had been unable to even declare which side has the largest parliamentary bloc, let alone decide on a government.But after the September crisis, the previously gridlocked parties swiftly came together to form an “understanding” that pushed through the impasse leading to the Mehdi government. In 2020, however, Iraq’s political parties were slower to come back together despite the multiple crises — far greater than 2018. The system is less able to swiftly fix itself, based primarily on the fragmentation of the elite — and their determination to prevent any challenge to their rule.Why did the two prior attempts fail? The two previous prime minister-designates each fell short for different reasons. When I met Allawi in February at the prime minister’s guesthouse in Baghdad, he was very clearly convinced that his mandate was to sideline the parties.He hoped that simply choosing technocratic ministers outside the elite pact, with the support of Moqtada al-Sadr behind him, would garner support from protesters and the disillusioned public. He failed, however, because his cabinet had to go through parliament and the parties rejected what they saw a threat to the elite pact and the system.Zurfi similarly failed after being directly appointed in March by Salih after the Shia parties failed to come up with a candidate. From the beginning, then, Zurfi faced challenges because parties were not in agreement. He attempted to directly confront his opposition, and spoke out against Iranian influence in Iraq. As a result, Zurfi was unable to even get to parliament with his proposed cabinet, as the Shia parties got back together to bring him down.The failure of both strategies — Allawi attempting to work outside the elite party system and Zurfi trying to target certain parties — reveals tensions in Iraq’s political system. This fragmentation strains the parties’ ability to swiftly unite, and the system’s ability to withstand crises.The endemic problems are a consequence of fragmentation, including the failure following the 2018 elections to declare governing parliamentary bloc. Moreover, after that election, newcomers into the political system (two-thirds of the MPs are serving their first term) are increasingly making their own demands and less willing to blindly toe party lines.Can Kadhimi overcome the impasse?Kadhimi’s appointment as prime minister-designate nonetheless is on shaky foundations. His appointment had previously faced a veto from Iran and its allied groups which make up the Fateh bloc. Kataeb Hezbollah, an armed group close to Iran and linked to the Popular Mobilization Units, issued a statement accusing Kadhimi with blood on his hands for the deaths of Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.Many Fateh bloc members had for months vetoed Kadhimi’s name due to this allegation. Immediately before Kadhimi addressed the nation for the first time, Iraqi state television broadcast a prerecorded statement by PMU (and Fateh) leader Qais al-Khazali, who had also previously accused Kadhimi of spying for the Americans and being complicit in the two killings.Khazali, who commands the second-largest party within Fateh, accepted the party line to back Kadhimi but came out with his own conditions on television. However, the concerns about the COVID-19 crisis and the collapse of the price of oil finally brought all sides to compromise — a design of the political system.Kadhimi has signalled he will play by the old rules with these stakeholders. Because of the magnitude of these simultaneous crises, Iraqi politics is moving back to the post-2003 norm. The ethno-sectarian based political system is geared to weather such existential crises more than it is to handling day-to-day governance. Despite the notion of “post-sectarianism” in Iraq, this system is based on ethno-sectarian political party compromise.In his television address, Khazali, who had previously attempted to move away from sectarian language, explained that the process of selecting a prime minister is reserved to the Shia, who have the right as the majority, and not to Salih, a Kurd.Over the years Kadhimi has expressed an admiration of the bravery of the protesters and of the importance of civil society. Many Iraqi civil society activists owe their lives to the work of the former intelligence chief. However, he has also been part of the same system that has violently suppressed protesters.As the compromise prime minister-designate, he will find it difficult to transform his country as long as he plays by the rules of post-2003 Iraq — an irony not lost on the protesters who immediately rejected the candidacy of a man whom until recently many protesters had supported.This article was originally published in The Washington Post Full Article
w IMF Needs New Thinking to Deal with Coronavirus By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 27 Apr 2020 08:59:48 +0000 27 April 2020 David Lubin Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Finance Programme @davidlubin The IMF faces a big dilemma in its efforts to support the global economy at its time of desperate need. Simply put, the Fund’s problem is that most of the $1tn that it says it can lend is effectively unusable. 2020-04-27-IMF-Virtual-News Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), speaks during a virtual news conference on April 15, 2020. Photo by Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg via Getty Images There were several notable achievements during last week’s Spring meetings. The Fund’s frank set of forecasts for world GDP growth are a grim but valuable reminder of the scale of the crisis we are facing, and the Fund’s richer members will finance a temporary suspension on payments to the IMF for 29 very poor countries.Most importantly, a boost to the Fund’s main emergency facilities - the Rapid Credit Facility and the Rapid Financing Instrument - now makes $100bn of proper relief available to a wide range of countries. But the core problem is that the vast bulk of the Fund’s firepower is effectively inert.This is because of the idea of 'conditionality', which underpins almost all of the IMF’s lending relationships with member states. Under normal circumstances, when the IMF is the last-resort lender to a country, it insists that the borrowing government tighten its belt and exercise restraint in public spending.This helps to achieve three objectives. One is to stabilise the public debt burden, to ensure that the resources made available are not wasted. The second is to limit the whole economy’s need for foreign exchange, a shortage of which had prompted a country to seek IMF help in the first place. And the third is to ensure that the IMF can get repaid.Role within the international monetary systemSince the IMF does not take any physical collateral from countries to whom it is lending, the belt-tightening helps to act as a kind of collateral for the IMF. It helps to maximise the probability that the IMF does not suffer losses on its own loan portfolio — losses that would have bad consequences for the Fund’s role within the international monetary system.This is a perfectly respectable goal. Walter Bagehot, the legendary editor of The Economist, established modern conventional wisdom about managing panics. Relying on a medical metaphor that feels oddly relevant today, he said that a panic 'is a species of neuralgia, and according to the rules of science you must not starve it.' Managing a panic, therefore, requires lending to stricken borrowers 'whenever the security is good', as Bagehot put it. The IMF has had to invent its own form of collateral, and conditionality is the result. The problem, though, is that belt-tightening is a completely inappropriate approach to managing the current crisis.Countries are stricken not because they have indulged in any irresponsible spending sprees that led to a shortage of foreign exchange, but because of a virus beyond their control. Indeed, it would seem almost grotesque for the Fund to ask countries to cut spending at a time when, if anything, more spending is needed to stop people dying or from falling into a permanent trap of unemployment.The obvious solution to this problem would be to increase the amount of money that any country can access from the Fund’s emergency facilities well beyond the $100bn now available. But that kind of solution would quickly run up against the IMF’s collateral problem.The more the IMF makes available as 'true' emergency financing with few or no strings attached, the more it begins to undermine the quality of its loan portfolio. And if the IMF’s senior creditor status is undermined, then an important building block of the international monetary system would be at risk.One way out of this might have been an emergency allocation of Special Drawing Rights, a tool last used in 2009. This would credit member countries’ accounts with new, unconditional liquidity that could be exchanged for the five currencies that underpin the SDR: the dollar, the yen, the euro, sterling and the renminbi. That will not be happening, though, since the US is firmly opposed, for reasons bad and good.So in the end the IMF and its shareholders face a huge problem. It either lends more money on easy terms without the 'collateral' of conditionality, at the expense of undermining its own balance sheet - or it remains, in systemic terms, on the sidelines of this crisis.And since the legacy of this crisis will be some eye-watering increases in the public debt burdens of many emerging economies, the IMF’s struggle to find a way to administer its medicine will certainly outlive this round of the coronavirus outbreak.This article is a version of a piece which was originally published in the Financial Times Full Article
w Fighting COVID-19 the Ukrainian Way By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 08:29:19 +0000 28 April 2020 Orysia Lutsevych Research Fellow and Manager, Ukraine Forum, Russia and Eurasia Programme @Orysiaua LinkedIn Google Scholar Coronavirus has exposed vulnerabilities in Ukraine but also activated private sector and citizen engagement in delivering help. This could accelerate social change if a smart response is adopted and political reforms follow. 2020-04-28-Ukraine-COVID-Chernobyl Girls wearing face masks at the monument to Chernobyl victims in Slavutich during a memorial ceremony amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images. Ukrainians are accustomed to crisis. As COVID-19 spread, forest fires were raging in the Chernobyl exclusion zone, turning Kyiv into the most polluted city in the world. The fighting in Donbas continued, claiming the lives of more Ukrainian soldiers, bringing the total to more than 4,000 — and, on top of that, President Zelenskyy overhauled his government. So Ukraine is fighting three battles at the same time — war with Russia, the struggle against its own ineffective system, and now COVID-19.Every crisis is a reality check — the coronavirus provoked and exposed the strategic vulnerabilities and deep-rooted features of Ukraine’s system of governance. Three trends have come to the fore. First, the inefficiency and paralysis of many state agencies, particularly the lack of coordination between them and the prevalence of vested interests. Second, the reliance of the country’s leaders on large financial-industrial groups (FIGs) to compensate for weak institutional capacity. Third, a strong societal and private sector mobilization to fill the gaps in the dilapidated public health system.State agencies are rigid and ineffective. Despite the modern Prozorro digital public procurement system, and the government’s allocation of $2.5 million from the early days of the epidemic, the Ministry of Health blocked COVID-related purchases for over a month. This was a tactic by — now ex-minister — Yemets to pressure the state medical procurement agency into appointing a protégé of his as one of its deputy heads.Lowest testing rate in EuropeSimilarly, in some regions, notably Odesa, procurement stalled and orders went to politically connected businesses at higher-than-market prices. Lack of tests and laboratory equipment means Ukraine has administered only 72,000 tests within a population of 42 million to date — the lowest rate in Europe.Doctors were given orders to ensure they only test patients in hospitals with COVID-19 symptoms and only those arriving from Asia, while ignoring the fact that millions of Ukrainian labour migrants were in Europe. Indeed, the first confirmed case was imported from Italy.Ukrainian government and public health officials lack information to take informed decisions. There is no accurate electronic database of registered deaths and reporting is lagging behind events. Information on testing availability in the regions is missing.Thirteen days after the first case of the virus was recorded, Zelenskyy exhorted business tycoons to come to the rescue. Taking a populist tone, Zelenskyy said ‘Ukraine has been feeding you for a long time and it is time that you helped the country’. The tycoons divided the regions among themselves to deliver relief efforts according to the location of their enterprises.It is believed FIGs have donated around $25 million to procure testing kits, ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and disinfectants. This may sound impressive, but many of those same tycoons actually owe millions to the state, some even billions, and cause serious problems by perpetuating the current rent-seeking system, where public resources benefit those groups resulting in serious social losses.Reliance on these groups makes Zelenskyy a hostage to their favour in any potential reform efforts. It is a dangerous solution, as these tycoons often obstruct Ukraine’s economic development.An alternative — and more transformative — trend of public-private partnerships is emerging in some regions. Across Ukraine, hundreds of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have led efforts to deliver PPE, support the vulnerable with food supplies, and to procure ventilators for key hospitals.They have mobilised hundreds of volunteers to deliver assistance and partnered with local non-profits. Fundraising initiatives have begun in Lviv, Odesa, Kyiv and Poltava with donations and expenditure has been posted online for transparency. Companies have repurposed to produce PPE kits and medical equipment. The efforts unfolded quickly and, in some cases, in smooth collaboration with municipal and regional authorities.Ukraine cannot afford to ‘waste’ this crisis, which could help accelerate healthcare reform, decentralization, modernize governance, and boost citizen empowerment. But for this to happen, the country has to deploy a ‘smart response’.Such ‘smart response’ means applying a resilience framework that nurtures the agility of the system of governance, ensures a diversity of actors in decision-making, supporting both self-regulation and better coordination. Rather than reaching out to tycoons, Zelenskyy should enter a coalition with true agents of change — SME leaders, volunteers, and mayors who have mobilized effective grassroots action. These actors demand a level playing field with accountable governance and effective state institutions.Civic COVID-19 response hubs and local authorities should be joined in a network that spans the regions, and connected with the national agencies designing pandemic responses. For a national strategy to be effective, central headquarters should draw information from local communities and manage a ‘team of teams’ in a decentralised fashion.Ensuring effective public service delivery without compromising integrity and keeping the risk of corruption low should also be a priority of political reform, with volunteers and the private sector ensuring civic oversight of both regional and national funding.Civic engagement such as this can be transformative as it defies the Soviet legacy of paternalism and expands the belief among citizens that society can work for them. By assisting the relief effort, citizens are gaining valuable insights into quality of public services and participate in holding them to account.Citizens are also developing a better understanding of the purpose of having effective armed forces, police, border guards and modern hospitals. They are coming to understand the value of taxpayer money and witnessing how corruption erodes institutions.This survival mobilization — if properly harnessed by the state — could drive transformative change and make Ukraine more resilient, not just against present crises, but future ones too. Full Article
w Coronavirus Risks Worsening a Food Crisis in the Sahel and West Africa By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Fri, 01 May 2020 14:20:52 +0000 1 May 2020 Dr Leena Koni Hoffmann Associate Fellow, Africa Programme @leenahoffmann LinkedIn Paul Melly Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme @paulmelly2 In responding to the spread of the coronavirus, the governments of the Sahel and West Africa will need to draw on their collective experience of strategic coordination in emergency planning, and work together to prioritize the flow of food across borders. 2020-05-01-Africa-Market-Virus An informal market in the Anyama district of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, is sanitized against the coronavirus. Photo by SIA KAMBOU/AFP via Getty Images. The COVID-19 pandemic has struck the Sahel and West Africa at a time when the region is already under severe pressure from violent insecurity and the effects of climate change on its land, food and water resources.By the end of April, there had been 9,513 confirmed coronavirus cases across the 17 countries of the region, and some 231 deaths, with the highest overall numbers recorded in Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger and Burkina Faso. Low testing rates mean than these numbers give only a partial picture.The Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) forecast in early April that almost 17 million people in the Sahel and West Africa (7.1 million in Nigeria alone) will need food and nutritional assistance during the coming lean season in June–August, more than double the number in an average year. The combined impact of violent insecurity and COVID-19 could put more than 50 million other people across the region at risk of food and nutrition crisis.Rippling across the regionThe effects of the collapse in global commodity prices, currency depreciations, rising costs of consumer goods and disruptions to supply chains are rippling across the region. And for major oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Chad and Cameroon, the wipe-out of foreign currency earnings will hammer government revenues just as the cost of food and other critical imports goes up. It is likely that the number of people who suffer the direct health impact of the coronavirus will be far outstripped by the number for whom there will be harsh social and economic costs.In recent years, valuable protocols and capacities have been put in place by governments in West and Central Africa in response to Ebola and other infectious disease outbreaks.But inadequate healthcare funding and infrastructure across this region compound the challenge of responding to the spread of the COVID-19 infection – which is testing the resources of even the world’s best-funded public health systems.Over many years, however, the region has steadily built up structures to tackle humanitarian and development challenges, particularly as regards food security. It has an established system for assessing the risk of food crisis annually and coordinating emergency support to vulnerable communities. Each country monitors climate and weather patterns, transhumance, market systems and agricultural statistics, and terrorist disruption of agricultural productivity, from local community to national and regional level.The system is coordinated and quality-controlled, using common technical data standards, by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), a regional intergovernmental body established in 1973 in response to a devastating drought. Collective risk assessments allow emergency support to be mobilized through the RPCA.For almost three months already, countries in Sahelian West Africa have been working with the World Health Organization to prepare national COVID-19 response strategies and strengthen health controls at their borders. Almost all governments have also opted for domestic curfews, and variations of lockdown and market restrictions.Senegal has been a leader in rapidly developing Africa’s diagnostic capacity, and plans are under way to speed up production of test kits. Niger was swift to develop a national response strategy, to which donors have pledged €194.5 million. While the IMF has agreed emergency financial assistance to help countries address the urgent balance-of-payments, health and social programme needs linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, signing off $3.4 billion for Nigeria, $442 million for Senegal and $130 million for Mauritania.Steps are also now being taken towards the formulation of a more joined-up regional approach. Notably, Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari has been chosen by an extraordinary session of the Economic Community of West African States to coordinate the regional response to COVID-19. As Africa’s biggest economy and home to its largest population, Nigeria is a critical hub for transnational flows of goods and people. Its controversial August 2019 land border closure, in a bid to address smuggling, has already painfully disrupted regional agri-food trade and value chains. The active engagement of the Buhari administration will thus be crucial to the success of a multifaceted regional response.One of the first tough questions the region’s governments must collectively address is how long to maintain the border shutdowns that were imposed as an initial measure to curb the spread of the virus. Closed borders are detrimental to food security, and disruptive to supply chains and the livelihoods of micro, small and medium-sized entrepreneurs that rely on cross-border trade. The impact of prolonged closures will be all the more profound in a region where welfare systems are largely non-existent or, at best, highly precarious.Nigeria, in particular, with more than 95 million people already living in extreme poverty, might do well to explore measures to avoid putting food further beyond the reach of people who are seeing their purchasing power evaporate.In taking further actions to control the spread of the coronavirus, the region’s governments will need to show faith in the system that they have painstakingly developed to monitor and respond to the annual risk of food crisis across the Sahel. This system, and the critical data it offers, will be vital to informing interventions to strengthen the four components of food security – availability, access, stability and utilization – in the context of COVID-19, and for charting a post-pandemic path of recovery.Above all, careful steps will need to be put in place to ensure that preventing the spread of the coronavirus does not come at the cost of even greater food insecurity for the people of the Sahel and West Africa. The region’s governments must prioritize the flow of food across borders and renew their commitment to strategic coordination and alignment. Full Article
w Coronavirus Vaccine: Available For All, or When it's Your Turn? By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 04 May 2020 15:39:19 +0000 4 May 2020 Professor David Salisbury CB Associate Fellow, Global Health Programme LinkedIn Despite high-level commitments and pledges to cooperate to ensure equitable global access to a coronavirus vaccine, prospects for fair distribution are uncertain. 2020-05-04-Vaccine-COVID-Brazil Researcher in Brazil working on virus replication in order to develop a vaccine against the coronavirus. Photo by DOUGLAS MAGNO/AFP via Getty Images. When the H1N1 influenza pandemic struck in 2009, some industrialized countries were well prepared. Many countries’ preparedness plans had focused on preparing for an influenza pandemic and based on earlier alerts over the H5N1 ‘bird flu’ virus, countries had made advanced purchase or ‘sleeping’ contracts for vaccine supplies that could be activated as soon as a pandemic was declared. Countries without contracts scrambled to get supplies after those that already had contracts received their vaccine.Following the 2009 pandemic, the European Union (EU) developed plans for joint-purchase vaccine contracts that any member state could join, guaranteeing the same price per dose for everyone. In 2009, low-income countries were unable to get the vaccine until manufacturers agreed to let 10 per cent of their production go to the World Health Organization (WHO).The situation for COVID-19 could be even worse. No country had a sleeping contract in place for a COVID-19 vaccine since nobody had anticipated that the next pandemic would be a coronavirus, not an influenza virus. With around 80 candidate vaccines reported to be in development, choosing the right one will be like playing roulette.These candidates will be whittled down as some will fail at an early stage of development and others will not get to scale-up for manufacturing. All of the world’s major vaccine pharmaceutical companies have said that they will divert resources to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines and, as long as they choose the right candidate for production, they have the expertise and the capacity to produce in huge quantities.From roulette to a horse raceOur game now changes from roulette to a horse race, as the probability of winning is a matter of odds not a random chance. Countries are now able to try to make contracts alone or in purchasing consortia with other states, and with one of the major companies or with multiple companies. This would be like betting on one of the favourites.For example, it has been reported that Oxford University has made an agreement with pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, with a possibility of 100 million doses being available by the end of 2020. If the vaccine works and those doses materialize, and are all available for the UK, then the UK population requirements will be met in full, and the challenge becomes vaccinating everyone as quickly as possible.Even if half of the doses were reserved for the UK, all those in high-risk or occupational groups could be vaccinated rapidly. However, as each major manufacturer accepts more contracts, the quantity that each country will get diminishes and the time to vaccinate the at-risk population gets longer.At this point, it is not known how manufacturers will respond to requests for vaccine and how they will apportion supplies between different markets. You could bet on an outsider. You study the field and select a biotech that has potential with a good production development programme and a tie-in with a smaller-scale production facility.If other countries do not try to get contracts, you will get your vaccine as fast as manufacturing can be scaled up; but because it is a small manufacturer, your supplies may take a long time. And outsiders do not often win races. You can of course, depending on your resources, cover several runners and try to make multiple contracts. However, you take on the risk that some will fail, and you may have compromised your eventual supply.On April 24, the WHO co-hosted a meeting with the president of France, the president of the European Commission and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It brought together heads of state and industry leaders who committed to ‘work towards equitable global access based on an unprecedented level of partnership’. They agreed ‘to create a strong unified voice, to build on past experience and to be accountable to the world, to communities and to one another’ for vaccines, testing materials and treatments.They did not, however, say how this will be achieved and the absence of the United States was notable. The EU and its partners are hosting an international pledging conference on May 4 that aims to raise €7.5 billion in initial funding to kick-start global cooperation on vaccines. Co-hosts will be France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Norway and Saudi Arabia and the priorities will be ‘Test, Treat and Prevent’, with the latter dedicated to vaccines.Despite these expressions of altruism, every government will face the tension between wanting to protect their own populations as quickly as possible and knowing that this will disadvantage poorer countries, where health services are even less able to cope. It will not be a vote winner to offer a share in available vaccine to less-privileged countries.The factories for the biggest vaccine manufacturers are in Europe, the US and India. Will European manufacturers be obliged by the EU to restrict sales first to European countries? Will the US invoke its Defense Production Act and block vaccine exports until there are stocks enough for every American? And will vaccine only be available in India for those who can afford it?The lessons on vaccine availability from the 2009 influenza pandemic are clear: vaccine was not shared on anything like an equitable basis. It remains to be seen if we will do any better in 2020. Full Article
w WITHDRAWN: Extraordinary apolipoprotein oxidation in chronic hepatitis C and liver cirrhosis [13. Other] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2007-09-05T09:37:40-07:00 Withdrawn by Author. Full Article
w Detection of multiple autoantibodies in patients with ankylosing spondylitis using nucleic acid programmable protein arrays [11. Microarrays/Combinatorics/Display Technology] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2010-02-01T14:51:46-08:00 Ankylosing Spondylitis (AS) is a common, inflammatory rheumatic disease, which primarily affects the axial skeleton and is associated with sacroiliitis, uveitis and enthesitis. Unlike other autoimmune rheumatic diseases, such as rheumatoid arthritis or systemic lupus erythematosus, autoantibodies have not yet been reported to be a feature of AS. We therefore wished to determine if plasma from patients with AS contained autoantibodies and if so, characterize and quantify this response in comparison to patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) and healthy controls. Two high-density nucleic acid programmable protein arrays expressing a total of 3498 proteins were screened with plasma from 25 patients with AS, 17 with RA and 25 healthy controls. Autoantigens identified were subjected to Ingenuity Pathway Analysis in order to determine patterns of signalling cascades or tissue origin. 44% of patients with Ankylosing Spondylitis demonstrated a broad autoantibody response, as compared to 33% of patients with RA and only 8% of healthy controls. Individuals with AS demonstrated autoantibody responses to shared autoantigens, and 60% of autoantigens identified in the AS cohort were restricted to that group. The AS patients autoantibody responses were targeted towards connective, skeletal and muscular tissue, unlike those of RA patients or healthy controls. Thus, patients with AS show evidence of systemic humoral autoimmunity and multispecific autoantibody production. Nucleic Acid Programmable Protein Arrays constitute a powerful tool to study autoimmune diseases. Full Article
w Multiple hypothesis testing in proteomics: A strategy for experimental work [Invited] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2010-12-07T11:37:01-08:00 In quantitative proteomics work, the differences in expression of many separate proteins are routinely examined to test for significant differences between treatments. This leads to the multiple hypothesis testing problem: when many separate tests are performed many will be significant by chance and be false positive results. Statistical methods such as the false discovery rate (FDR) method that deal with this problem have been disseminated for more than one decade. However a survey of proteomics journals shows that such tests are not widely implemented in one commonly used technique, quantitative proteomics using two-dimensional electrophoresis (2-DE). We outline a selection of multiple hypothesis testing methods, including some that are well known and some lesser known, and present a simple strategy for their use by the experimental scientist in quantitative proteomics work generally. The strategy focuses on the desirability of simultaneous use of several different methods, the choice and emphasis dependent on research priorities and the results in hand. This approach is demonstrated using case scenarios with experimental and simulated model data. Full Article
w Interpretation of data underlying the link between CCD and an invertebrate iridescent virus [Invited] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2011-01-04T08:41:21-08:00 No abstract Full Article
w The ProteoRed MIAPE web toolkit: A user-friendly framework to connect and share proteomics standards [Technology] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2011-06-19T13:05:33-07:00 The development of the HUPO-PSI's (Proteomics Standards Initiative) standard data formats and MIAPE (Minimum Information About a Proteomics Experiment) guidelines should improve proteomics data sharing within the scientific community. Proteomics journals have encouraged the use of these standards and guidelines to improve the quality of experimental reporting and ease the evaluation and publication of manuscripts. However, there is an evident lack of bioinformatics tools specifically designed to create and edit standard file formats and reports, or embed them within proteomics workflows. In this article, we describe a new web-based software suite (The ProteoRed MIAPE web toolkit) that performs several complementary roles related to proteomic data standards. Firstly, it can verify the reports fulfill the minimum information requirements of the corresponding MIAPE modules, highlighting inconsistencies or missing information. Secondly, the toolkit can convert several XML-based data standards directly into human readable MIAPE reports stored within the ProteoRed MIAPE repository. Finally, it can also perform the reverse operation, allowing users to export from MIAPE reports into XML files for computational processing, data sharing or public database submission. The toolkit is thus the first application capable of automatically linking the PSI's MIAPE modules with the corresponding XML data exchange standards, enabling bidirectional conversions. This toolkit is freely available at http://www.proteored.org/MIAPE/. Full Article
w The Proteomics of Networks and Pathways: A Movie is Worth a Thousand Pictures [Editorial] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2014-09-24T12:35:15-07:00 none Full Article
w WITHDRAWN: Quantitative mass spectrometry analysis of PD-L1 protein expression, N-glycosylation and expression stoichiometry with PD-1 and PD-L2 in human melanoma [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2017-04-28T07:30:39-07:00 This article has been withdrawn by the authors. We discovered an error after this manuscript was published as a Paper in Press. Specifically, we learned that the structures of glycans presented for the PD-L1 peptide were drawn and labeled incorrectly. We wish to withdraw this article and submit a corrected version for review. Full Article
w WITHDRAWN: Heralds of parallel MS: Data-independent acquisition surpassing sequential identification of data dependent acquisition in proteomics [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2017-05-26T10:39:04-07:00 This article has been withdrawn by the authors. This article did not comply with the editorial guidelines of MCP. Specifically, single peptide based protein identifications of 9-19% were included in the analysis and discussed in the results and conclusions. We wish to withdraw this article and resubmit a clarified, corrected manuscript for review. Full Article
w MaxQuant software for ion mobility enhanced shotgun proteomics [Technological Innovation and Resources] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-03-10T07:35:19-07:00 Ion mobility can add a dimension to LC-MS based shotgun proteomics which has the potential to boost proteome coverage, quantification accuracy and dynamic range. Required for this is suitable software that extracts the information contained in the four-dimensional (4D) data space spanned by m/z, retention time, ion mobility and signal intensity. Here we describe the ion mobility enhanced MaxQuant software, which utilizes the added data dimension. It offers an end to end computational workflow for the identification and quantification of peptides and proteins in LC-IMS-MS/MS shotgun proteomics data. We apply it to trapped ion mobility spectrometry (TIMS) coupled to a quadrupole time-of-flight (QTOF) analyzer. A highly parallelizable 4D feature detection algorithm extracts peaks which are assembled to isotope patterns. Masses are recalibrated with a non-linear m/z, retention time, ion mobility and signal intensity dependent model, based on peptides from the sample. A new matching between runs (MBR) algorithm that utilizes collisional cross section (CCS) values of MS1 features in the matching process significantly gains specificity from the extra dimension. Prerequisite for using CCS values in MBR is a relative alignment of the ion mobility values between the runs. The missing value problem in protein quantification over many samples is greatly reduced by CCS aware MBR.MS1 level label-free quantification is also implemented which proves to be highly precise and accurate on a benchmark dataset with known ground truth. MaxQuant for LC-IMS-MS/MS is part of the basic MaxQuant release and can be downloaded from http://maxquant.org. Full Article
w Selection of features with consistent profiles improves relative protein quantification in mass spectrometry experiments [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-03-31T13:35:14-07:00 In bottom-up mass spectrometry-based proteomics, relative protein quantification is often achieved with data-dependent acquisition (DDA), data-independent acquisition (DIA), or selected reaction monitoring (SRM). These workflows quantify proteins by summarizing the abundances of all the spectral features of the protein (e.g., precursor ions, transitions or fragments) in a single value per protein per run. When abundances of some features are inconsistent with the overall protein profile (for technological reasons such as interferences, or for biological reasons such as post-translational modifications), the protein-level summaries and the downstream conclusions are undermined. We propose a statistical approach that automatically detects spectral features with such inconsistent patterns. The detected features can be separately investigated, and if necessary removed from the dataset. We evaluated the proposed approach on a series of benchmark controlled mixtures and biological investigations with DDA, DIA and SRM data acquisitions. The results demonstrated that it can facilitate and complement manual curation of the data. Moreover, it can improve the estimation accuracy, sensitivity and specificity of detecting differentially abundant proteins, and reproducibility of conclusions across different data processing tools. The approach is implemented as an option in the open-source R-based software MSstats. Full Article
w Proteome and phosphoproteome analysis of brown adipocytes reveals that RICTOR loss dampens global insulin/AKT signaling [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-06T05:35:14-07:00 Stimulating brown adipose tissue (BAT) activity represents a promising therapy for overcoming metabolic diseases. mTORC2 is important for regulating BAT metabolism, but its downstream targets have not been fully characterized. In this study, we apply proteomics and phosphoproteomics to investigate the downstream effectors of mTORC2 in brown adipocytes. We compare wild-type controls to isogenic cells with an induced knockout of the mTORC2 subunit RICTOR (Rictor-iKO) by stimulating each with insulin for a 30-minute time course. In Rictor-iKO cells, we identify decreases to the abundance of glycolytic and de novo lipogenesis enzymes, and increases to mitochondrial proteins as well as a set of proteins known to increase upon interferon stimulation. We also observe significant differences to basal phosphorylation due to chronic RICTOR loss including decreased phosphorylation of the lipid droplet protein perilipin-1 in Rictor-iKO cells, suggesting that RICTOR could be involved with regulating basal lipolysis or droplet dynamics. Finally, we observe mild dampening of acute insulin signaling response in Rictor-iKO cells, and a subset of AKT substrates exhibiting statistically significant dependence on RICTOR. Full Article
w Characterization of signaling pathways associated with pancreatic {beta}-cell adaptive flexibility in compensation of obesity-linked diabetes in db/db mice [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-07T14:34:38-07:00 The onset of obesity-linked type 2 diabetes (T2D) is marked by an eventual failure in pancreatic β-cell function and mass that is no longer able to compensate for the inherent insulin resistance and increased metabolic load intrinsic to obesity. However, in a commonly used model of T2D, the db/db mouse, β-cells have an inbuilt adaptive flexibility enabling them to effectively adjust insulin production rates relative to the metabolic demand. Pancreatic β-cells from these animals have markedly reduced intracellular insulin stores, yet high rates of (pro)insulin secretion, together with a substantial increase in proinsulin biosynthesis highlighted by expanded rough endoplasmic reticulum and Golgi apparatus. However, when the metabolic overload and/or hyperglycemia is normalized, β-cells from db/db mice quickly restore their insulin stores and normalize secretory function. This demonstrates the β-cell’s adaptive flexibility and indicates that therapeutic approaches applied to encourage β-cell rest are capable of restoring endogenous β-cell function. However, mechanisms that regulate β-cell adaptive flexibility are essentially unknown. To gain deeper mechanistic insight into the molecular events underlying β-cell adaptive flexibility in db/db β-cells, we conducted a combined proteomic and post-translational modification specific proteomic (PTMomics) approach on islets from db/db mice and wild-type controls (WT) with or without prior exposure to normal glucose levels. We identified differential modifications of proteins involved in redox homeostasis, protein refolding, K48-linked deubiquitination, mRNA/protein export, focal adhesion, ERK1/2 signaling, and renin-angiotensin-aldosterone signaling, as well as sialyltransferase activity, associated with β-cell adaptive flexibility. These proteins are all related to proinsulin biosynthesis and processing, maturation of insulin secretory granules, and vesicular trafficking—core pathways involved in the adaptation of insulin production to meet metabolic demand. Collectively, this study outlines a novel and comprehensive global PTMome signaling map that highlights important molecular mechanisms related to the adaptive flexibility of β-cell function, providing improved insight into disease pathogenesis of T2D. Full Article
w Quantitative proteomics of human heart samples collected in vivo reveal the remodeled protein landscape of dilated left atrium without atrial fibrillation [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-14T13:35:16-07:00 Genetic and genomic research has greatly advanced our understanding of heart disease. Yet, comprehensive, in-depth, quantitative maps of protein expression in hearts of living humans are still lacking. Using samples obtained during valve replacement surgery in patients with mitral valve prolapse (MVP), we set out to define inter-chamber differences, the intersect of proteomic data with genetic or genomic datasets, and the impact of left atrial dilation on the proteome of patients with no history of atrial fibrillation (AF). We collected biopsies from right atria (RA), left atria (LA) and left ventricle (LV) of seven male patients with mitral valve regurgitation with dilated LA but no history of AF. Biopsy samples were analyzed by high-resolution mass spectrometry (MS), where peptides were pre-fractionated by reverse phase high-pressure liquid chromatography prior to MS measurement on a Q-Exactive-HF Orbitrap instrument. We identified 7,314 proteins based on 130,728 peptides. Results were confirmed in an independent set of biopsies collected from three additional individuals. Comparative analysis against data from post-mortem samples showed enhanced quantitative power and confidence level in samples collected from living hearts. Our analysis, combined with data from genome wide association studies suggested candidate gene associations to MVP, identified higher abundance in ventricle for proteins associated with cardiomyopathies and revealed the dilated LA proteome, demonstrating differential representation of molecules previously associated with AF, in non-AF hearts. This is the largest dataset of cardiac protein expression from human samples collected in vivo. It provides a comprehensive resource that allows insight into molecular fingerprints of MVP and facilitates novel inferences between genomic data and disease mechanisms. We propose that over-representation of proteins in ventricle is consequent not to redundancy but to functional need, and conclude that changes in abundance of proteins known to associate with AF are not sufficient for arrhythmogenesis. Full Article
w Developments and Applications of Functional Protein Microarrays [Review] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-17T09:38:19-07:00 Protein microarrays are crucial tools in the study of proteins in an unbiased, high-throughput manner, as they allow for characterization of up to thousands of individually purified proteins in parallel. The adaptability of this technology has enabled its use in a wide variety of applications, including the study of proteome-wide molecular interactions, analysis of post-translational modifications, identification of novel drug targets, and examination of pathogen-host interactions. In addition, the technology has also been shown to be useful in profiling antibody specificity, as well as in the discovery of novel biomarkers, especially for autoimmune diseases and cancers. In this review, we will summarize the developments that have been made in protein microarray technology in both in basic and translational research over the past decade. We will also introduce a novel membrane protein array, the GPCR-VirD array, and discuss the future directions of functional protein microarrays. Full Article
w Acquiring and Analyzing Data Independent Acquisition Proteomics Experiments without Spectrum Libraries [Perspective] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-20T11:35:14-07:00 Data independent acquisition (DIA) is an attractive alternative to standard shotgun proteomics methods for quantitative experiments. However, most DIA methods require collecting exhaustive, sample-specific spectrum libraries with data dependent acquisition (DDA) to detect and quantify peptides. In addition to working with non-human samples, studies of splice junctions, sequence variants, or simply working with small sample yields can make developing DDA-based spectrum libraries impractical. Here we illustrate how to acquire, queue, and validate DIA data without spectrum libraries, and provide a workflow to efficiently generate DIA-only chromatogram libraries using gas-phase fractionation (GPF). We present best-practice methods for collecting DIA data using Orbitrap-based instruments, and develop an understanding for why DIA using an Orbitrap mass spectrometer should be approached differently than when using time-of-flight instruments. Finally, we discuss several methods for analyzing DIA data without libraries. Full Article
w Seminal Plasma Proteome as an Indicator of Sperm Dysfunction and Low Sperm Motility [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-20T08:36:49-07:00 Molecular mechanisms underlying sperm motility have not been fully explained, particularly in chickens. The objective was to identify seminal plasma proteins associated with chicken sperm motility by comparing the seminal plasma proteomic profile of roosters with low sperm motility (LSM, n = 4) and high sperm motility (HSM, n = 4). Using a label-free MS-based method, a total of 522 seminal plasma proteins were identified, including 386 (~74%) previously reported and 136 novel ones. A total of 70 differentially abundant proteins were defined, including 48 more-abundant, 15 less-abundant, and seven proteins unique to the LSM group (specific proteins). Key secretory proteins like less-abundant ADGRG2 and more-abundant SPINK2 in the LSM suggested that the corresponding secretory tissues played a crucial role in maintaining sperm motility. Majority (80%) of the more-abundant and five specific proteins were annotated to the cytoplasmic domain which might be a result of higher plasma membrane damage and acrosome dysfunction in LSM. Additionally, more-abundant mitochondrial proteins were detected in LSM seminal plasma associated with lower spermatozoa mitochondrial membrane potential (m) and ATP concentrations. Further studies showed that the spermatozoa might be suffering from oxidative stress, as the amount of spermatozoa reactive oxygen species (ROS) were largely enhanced, seminal malondialdehyde (MDA) concentrations were increased, and the seminal plasma total antioxidant capacity (T-AOC) were decreased. Our study provides an additional catalog of chicken seminal plasma proteome and supports the idea that seminal plasma could be as an indicator of spermatozoa physiology. More-abundant of acrosome, mitochondria and sperm cytoskeleton proteins in the seminal plasma could be a marker of sperm dysfunction and loss of motility. The degeneration of spermatozoa caused the reduced seminal T-AOC and enhanced oxidative stress might be potential determinants of low sperm motility. These results could extend our understanding of sperm motility and sperm physiology regulation. Full Article
w Robust summarization and inference in proteome-wide label-free quantification [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-22T13:36:37-07:00 Label-Free Quantitative mass spectrometry based workflows for differential expression (DE) analysis of proteins impose important challenges on the data analysis due to peptide-specific effects and context dependent missingness of peptide intensities. Peptide-based workflows, like MSqRob, test for DE directly from peptide intensities and outperform summarization methods which first aggregate MS1 peptide intensities to protein intensities before DE analysis. However, these methods are computationally expensive, often hard to understand for the non-specialised end-user, and do not provide protein summaries, which are important for visualisation or downstream processing. In this work, we therefore evaluate state-of-the-art summarization strategies using a benchmark spike-in dataset and discuss why and when these fail compared to the state-of-the-art peptide based model, MSqRob. Based on this evaluation, we propose a novel summarization strategy, MSqRobSum, which estimates MSqRob’s model parameters in a two-stage procedure circumventing the drawbacks of peptide-based workflows. MSqRobSum maintains MSqRob’s superior performance, while providing useful protein expression summaries for plotting and downstream analysis. Summarising peptide to protein intensities considerably reduces the computational complexity, the memory footprint and the model complexity, and makes it easier to disseminate DE inferred on protein summaries. Moreover, MSqRobSum provides a highly modular analysis framework, which provides researchers with full flexibility to develop data analysis workflows tailored towards their specific applications. Full Article
w Flow-induced reorganization of laminin-integrin networks within the endothelial basement membrane uncovered by proteomics [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-24T09:36:17-07:00 The vessel wall is continuously exposed to hemodynamic forces generated by blood flow. Endothelial mechanosensors perceive and translate mechanical signals via cellular signaling pathways into biological processes that control endothelial development, phenotype and function. To assess the hemodynamic effects on the endothelium on a system-wide level, we applied a quantitative mass spectrometry approach combined with cell surface chemical footprinting. SILAC-labeled endothelial cells were subjected to flow-induced shear stress for 0, 24 or 48 hours, followed by chemical labeling of surface proteins using a non-membrane permeable biotin label, and analysis of the whole proteome and the cell surface proteome by LC-MS/MS analysis. These studies revealed that of the >5000 quantified proteins 104 were altered, which were highly enriched for extracellular matrix proteins and proteins involved in cell-matrix adhesion. Cell surface proteomics indicated that LAMA4 was proteolytically processed upon flow-exposure, which corresponded to the decreased LAMA4 mass observed on immunoblot. Immunofluorescence microscopy studies highlighted that the endothelial basement membrane was drastically remodeled upon flow exposure. We observed a network-like pattern of LAMA4 and LAMA5, which corresponded to the localization of laminin-adhesion molecules ITGA6 and ITGB4. Furthermore, the adaptation to flow-exposure did not affect the inflammatory response to tumor necrosis factor α, indicating that inflammation and flow trigger fundamentally distinct endothelial signaling pathways with limited reciprocity and synergy. Taken together, this study uncovers the blood flow-induced remodeling of the basement membrane and stresses the importance of the subendothelial basement membrane in vascular homeostasis. Full Article
w Organellar maps through proteomic profiling - a conceptual guide [Review] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-28T08:36:25-07:00 Protein subcellular localization is an essential and highly regulated determinant of protein function. Major advances in mass spectrometry and imaging have allowed the development of powerful spatial proteomics approaches for determining protein localization at the whole cell scale. Here, a brief overview of current methods is presented, followed by a detailed discussion of organellar mapping through proteomic profiling. This relatively simple yet flexible approach is rapidly gaining popularity, due to its ability to capture the localizations of thousands of proteins in a single experiment. It can be used to generate high-resolution cell maps, and as a tool for monitoring protein localization dynamics. This review highlights the strengths and limitations of the approach, and provides guidance to designing and interpreting profiling experiments. Full Article
w Peptide-based interaction proteomics [Review] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-04-28T12:34:32-07:00 Protein-protein interactions are often mediated by short linear motifs (SLiMs) that are located in intrinsically disordered regions (IDRs) of proteins. Interactions mediated by SLiMs are notoriously difficult to study, and many functionally relevant interactions likely remain to be uncovered. Recently, pull-downs with synthetic peptides in combination with quantitative mass spectrometry emerged as a powerful screening approach to study protein-protein interactions mediated by SLiMs. Specifically, arrays of synthetic peptides immobilized on cellulose membranes provide a scalable means to identify the interaction partners of many peptides in parallel. In this minireview we briefly highlight the relevance of SLiMs for protein-protein interactions, outline existing screening technologies, discuss unique advantages of peptide-based interaction screens and provide practical suggestions for setting up such peptide-based screens. Full Article
w Proteomics of Campylobacter jejuni growth in deoxycholate reveals Cj0025c as a cystine transport protein required for wild-type human infection phenotypes [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-06T13:56:38-07:00 Campylobacter jejuni is a major cause of food-borne gastroenteritis. Proteomics by label-based two-dimensional liquid chromatography coupled to tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) identified proteins associated with growth in 0.1% sodium deoxycholate (DOC, a component of gut bile salts), and system-wide validation was performed by data-independent acquisition (DIA-SWATH-MS). LC-MS/MS quantified 1326 proteins (~82% of the predicted C. jejuni proteome), of which 1104 were validated in additional biological replicates by DIA-SWATH-MS. DOC resulted in a profound proteome shift with 512 proteins showing significantly altered abundance. Induced proteins were associated with flagellar motility and antibiotic resistance; and these correlated with increased DOC motility and resistance to polymyxin B and ciprofloxacin. DOC also increased human Caco-2 cell adherence and invasion. Abundances of proteins involved in nutrient transport were altered by DOC and aligned with intracellular changes to their respective carbon sources. DOC increased intracellular levels of sulfur-containing amino acids (cysteine and methionine) and the dipeptide cystine (Cys-Cys), which also correlated with reduced resistance to oxidative stress. A DOC induced transport protein was Cj0025c, which has sequence similarity to bacterial Cys-Cys transporters. Deletion of cj0025c (cj0025c) resulted in proteome changes consistent with sulfur starvation, as well as attenuated invasion, reduced motility, atypical morphology, increased antimicrobial susceptibility and poor biofilm formation. Targeted metabolomics showed cj0025c was capable of utilizing known C. jejuni amino and organic acid substrates commensurate with wild-type. Medium Cys-Cys levels however, were maintained in cj0025c relative to wild-type. A toxic Cys-Cys mimic (selenocystine) inhibited wild-type growth, but not cj0025c. Provision of an alternate sulfur source (2 mM thiosulfate) restored cj0025c motility. Our data confirm that Cj0025c is a Cys-Cys transporter that we have named TcyP consistent with the nomenclature of homologous proteins in other species. Full Article
w Perlecan knockdown significantly alters extracellular matrix composition and organization during cartilage development [Research] By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: 2020-05-07T06:36:04-07:00 Perlecan is a critical proteoglycan found in the extracellular matrix (ECM) of cartilage. In healthy cartilage, perlecan regulates cartilage biomechanics and we previously demonstrated perlecan deficiency leads to reduced cellular and ECM stiffness in vivo. This change in mechanics may lead to the early onset osteoarthritis seen in disorders resulting from perlecan knockdown such as Schwartz-Jampel syndrome (SJS). To identify how perlecan knockdown affects the material properties of developing cartilage, we used imaging and liquid chromatography–tandem mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS) to study the ECM in a murine model of SJS, Hspg2C1532Y-Neo. Perlecan knockdown led to defective pericellular matrix formation, whereas the abundance of bulk ECM proteins, including many collagens, increased. Post-translational modifications and ultrastructure of collagens were not significantly different; however, LC-MS/MS analysis showed more protein was secreted by Hspg2C1532Y-Neo cartilage in vitro, suggesting that the incorporation of newly synthesized ECM was impaired. In addition, glycosaminoglycan deposition was atypical, which may explain the previously observed decrease in mechanics. Overall, these findings provide insight into the influence of perlecan on functional cartilage assembly and the progression of osteoarthritis in SJS. Full Article
w Algeria: Tired of Waiting By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 06 Apr 2020 11:36:32 +0000 1 January 2008 , Number 10 At the beginning of December, media reports put the violence which had plagued Algeria since the 1990s at an all time low. Only six people had been killed in November and four of those were armed Islamist militants. Then on December 11, two car bombs exploded in the capital Algiers, killing some 67 people, including at least eleven United Nations officials in the largely destroyed offices of the UN’s High Commission for Refugees. What lies beneath this return to high-level, targeted attacks? Claire Spencer Head, Middle East Programme, Chatham House algeria 2008.jpg Algerian policemen and bomb experts in front of the destroyed building of the Supreme Court, Algiers. One explosion targeted the offices of the UN refugee agency in Algiers, while the other bomb was triggered near the Algerian Supreme Court building. Full Article
w Wheat, Farmer's Woes By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Mon, 06 Apr 2020 16:15:42 +0000 1 February 2008 , Number 3 Oliver Walston Farms at Thriplow Farm, Cambridgeshire Walston.jpg Full Article
w Ukraine and NATO: Destination Unknown By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 09:25:35 +0000 1 August 2008 , Number 10 As ever between NATO and Ukraine, the process advances, the destination is in doubt. Or so it seemed until the Bucharest summit declaration of April 3. The statement that Ukraine and Georgia ‘will become members of NATO’ was designed to remove doubt. Yet it was also designed to alleviate pressure on the organisation. Four months later, as the European Union prepares for its summit with Ukraine, pressure remains and doubt has returned. James Sherr Head, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House APUkraine.jpg Full Article
w Moscow's Domestic Policy: Russian Roulette By feedproxy.google.com Published On :: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 11:20:12 +0000 1 October 2008 , Number 4 Russia’s military action in Georgia was driven by Moscow’s domestic agenda. Foreign policy has become a tool of collective control back home. While the ‘ruling tandem’ has gained popularity, the new consensus does not provide for modernisation. Will the predatory state reform or collapse? Lilia Shevtsova Senior Associate, Carnegie Moscow Centre bear copy.jpg Full Article