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UK Should Focus on Better Defining Objectives in the Sahel

22 July 2020

Dr Alex Vines OBE

Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme
The Sahel is one of Africa’s poorest and most fragile regions witnessing an escalation in jihadist activity and illegal migration, writes Alex Vines.

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Pictured is a Nigerian refugee living in the Awaradi settlement that houses some 9,000 displaced people fleeing violence from Boko Haram. Image: Getty Images.

The UK has been redeploying diplomatic, defence and development capabilities towards the Sahel since 2018 – a strategic pivot intended to deliver development impact, address long term security threats to UK interests and support alliances with international partners.

The Sahel is one of Africa’s poorest and most fragile regions and has witnessed an escalation in jihadist activity, illegal migration and trafficking since a security crisis erupted in Mali in 2012.

The crisis spread to Niger and Burkina Faso and may now spill over into Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal. With Nigeria also facing insurgency in the Lake Chad basin, all major regional security and economic anchors in the region are under threat including key UK partners. 

Reviewing the Sahel pivot

This pivot has already resulted in the expanding of UK embassies in Senegal, Mauritania and Mali and public commitments to opening new ones in Chad and Niger.

Back in London, there has also been a large uplift of staff including the setting up of a cross-Whitehall Joint Sahel Department in late 2018 and plans for more UK civil servants to have placements with the French government on the Sahel.

Yet in light of looming economic shocks from Brexit and Covid-19, there has been a lively debate in Whitehall on whether this is stretching UK resources too thin in an area of Africa that does not have close ties with the UK.

UK ministers are this week reviewing the Sahel pivot and will decide if it continues or grinds to a standstill including whether full embassies are opened in Niger and Chad.

This debate is not new. The UK has opened and closed its diplomatic missions in the Sahel in fits and starts since the early 1960s. More recently, MI6 pushed the re-opening of the embassy in Bamako in 2010 foreseeing Mali’s fragility before the current crisis started.

Partnering with the French

But though the Sahel is likely to dominate the Africa peace and security agenda for decades to come, the UK’s serious engagement in the region is not just about strategic foresight.

It also fulfils two other objectives: of partnership with two key bilateral allies, particularly France, and authority and leverage in multilateral fora such as the United Nations, African Union and the EU.

Partnering with the French in the Sahel has become even more important due to Brexit and the need to reinforce relationships with key European partners.

In 2012, David Cameron concluded that the rapid French response to stop a jihadist advance on the Malian capital Bamako was 'in our interests' and authorized the deployment of 330 UK military personnel, two cargo aircraft and a surveillance plane.

In July 2018, the UK announced further support to French led Opération Barkhane sending three Royal Air Force Chinook helicopters – supported by almost 100 personnel  which remain in theatre to this day.

UN commitment

Demonstrating the UK’s commitment to UN peacekeeping has also resulted in the deployment of 250 troops to join a UN peacekeeping mission to Mali later this year.

Based in Gao, these troops will form a long-range reconnaissance capability providing threat awareness, contributing to the protection of civilians and helping to prevent conflict from spilling over to neighbouring states.

This represents one of the biggest British peacekeeping deployments since Bosnia and it will be the most dangerous mission for British forces since Afghanistan.

The UK is also one of the largest humanitarian donors to the region and has contributed over £500 million in bilateral development and humanitarian assistance since 2015.

With COVID-19 now an additional challenge in the Sahel, a significant part of the UK’s £764 million contribution to the global COVID-19 effort will be channelled to the region.

New embassies are 'global Britain' strategy pillars

Keeping an eye on the impact of these initiatives requires a meaningful UK diplomatic network on the ground.

New embassies in the Sahel cost a fraction of maintaining three Chinook helicopters in the region providing the government real time insight in the post-Brexit absence of a regular supply of country analysis from the European External Action Service and support for the UK’s international relationships.

It also underlines the UK’s commitment to UN peacekeeping and standing as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in light of regular discussions of the Sahel.

The tripartite ministerial review of the Sahel pivot by the secretaries of state for foreign affairs, international development and defence that is underway should not penny pinch by reversing the opening of small embassies in Niger and Chad nor threaten the overall strategic focus on the Sahel – most recently welcomed by the House of Lord’s Select Committee on International Relations and Defence in its July report on UK Africa policy.

Instead, UK ministers should focus on better defining what the UK’s specific objectives are in the Sahel and particularly what the UK plans to do about Burkina Faso whose rapidly deteriorating security threatens to over-spill into key UK partner Ghana.

This article was first published in the Daily Telegraph.




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Russia’s Behaviour Risks Weaponizing Outer Space

27 July 2020

Dr Beyza Unal

Deputy Director, International Security Programme

Mathieu Boulègue

Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
With negotiations in Vienna between the US and Russia hoping to prevent the weaponization of space, how much do Russia’s satellites pose a threat to the peaceful use of outer space, ask Beyza Unal and Mathieu Boulègue?

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Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, during a video link with cosmonauts on the International Space Station (ISS). Photo: Getty Images.

Days before the publication of last week’s report into Russian activity in the UK, and the subsequent call from several UK parliamentarians for a swift response to the ‘Russian threat’, Russia tested a new anti-satellite weapon capability releasing a small projectile from its Kosmos-2543 sub-satellite.

Kosmos-2543, a small satellite contained inside a larger satellite, Kosmos-2542, and 'birthed’ into orbit in late 2019, recently came under scrutiny in January 2020 when it was reportedly caught ‘buzzing’ US spy satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

By releasing a small projectile from the Kosmos-2543 sub-satellite, the US claims that Russia has launched a new projectile into orbit with relatively high speed – estimated at around 500 km per hour – leading to concerns about the potential of Russia to develop this technology as a weapon to target foreign satellites.

It is not the first time Moscow has relied on a Russian doll – or matryoshka – approach to launching satellites into outer space. In October 2017, a sub-satellite, Kosmos-2521, was ejected from its main satellite, Kosmos-2519, into a high-speed object in low orbit.

The Russian Ministry of Defence has declared that its latest activity is just for ‘routine’ inspections and surveillance of Russia’s other space assets, with the government’s official statement avoiding recognizing the existence of the new object while, at the same time, Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, recalling Russia’s commitment for the ‘complete demilitarization’ of space.

While it is possible that Russia’s matryoshka satellites have indeed been developed to carry out routine repairs of Russia’s space fleet, they also have the potential to interfere with, and destroy, other satellites with such action needing to be considered a threat until Russia demonstrates otherwise.

Russia’s use of outer space

Russia is not the only state investigating anti-satellite weaponry capabilities. There is a wider trend (e.g. China, India, US) to demonstrate advanced space capabilities with nefarious, if not directly offensive, intent. But, for the past few years, Russia in particular, has been provocative in testing its space weapon capabilities. 

For example, in April 2020, Russia launched and tested into low orbit the PL-19 Nudol direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) interceptor missile system from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome demonstrating its space assets with potential offensive capabilities, in particular, Russia’s capacity to destroy satellites in Low Earth Orbit.

In addition, the satellites, Kosmos-2535 and Kosmos-2536, launched in July 2019, are also suspected to be operating beyond their official mission of studying Russian orbital assets. It is reported that these satellites conducted a close proximity activity, coming within one kilometre from each other, which led to the creation of orbital debris.

Russia’s space strategy

By exploiting asymmetric advantages in space, Russia seeks to leverage its capabilities against competitors in space and in other domains, falling in line with its wider military strategy as well as its current Federal Space Programme for 2016 to 2025.

Russian space activities also have a cyber and electronic warfare angle. With the help of remote-sensing capabilities, Russian spy satellites potentially seek to disrupt military and civilian satellite communications and navigation systems. Indeed, in 2018, French authorities publicly accused Russia of seeking to intercept communication satellites for French and Italian armed forces putting data transmission through Western civilian and military satellites at risk of interception.

Furthermore, earlier this year, both Kosmos-2542 and 2543 came within 160 kilometres of a US spy satellite, US KH-11, similarly to Russia ‘buzzing’ around the British Isles or submarine surveillance that Norway and Sweden have been subjected to recently.

Shadowing and tailing in space is regarded as spying and this recent anti-satellite weapon test is part of a trend which demonstrates Russia’s persistent space strategy for close-proximity operations with foreign countries.

Orbital hypocrisy

Despite Russia’s calls for a treaty to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space, there remains little international trust in Russia’s behaviour in space so far with a US-Russia Space Security Exchange meeting scheduled to take place in Vienna on 27 July to discuss outer space stability and security.

This is amid a backdrop of bilateral nuclear arms control talks on the extension of the extant nuclear weapons reduction treaty, New START, which is scheduled to expire in February 2021. There is no guarantee, however, that the talks will achieve anything especially since the future of outer space requires a wider multilateral dialogue with all parties involved – including China.

Anti-satellite tests (ASATs) are a particularly dangerous form of weapon. Not only do they create major vulnerabilities in a domain where so much of humanity depends on for navigation, communications and environmental monitoring, they are also primarily a target for destabilization and undermining global positioning information in times of crisis.

And, perhaps most significantly, they possess the highly destructive potential to create even more space debris in Earth’s orbits that endanger the peaceful use of satellites and could do serious damage to large parts of the economies of developed and developing countries.

Avoiding space warfare

Space is for all but there is a risk that it is being hijacked by a few. It is time to re-assert and reinforce the rules, principles and norms of responsible state behaviour in outer space enshrined in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and its associated international agreements.

And, because the treaty specifically prohibits stationing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies, it is necessary to build on it to ban other types of weapons in space.

Space has been militarized since 1957 with the launch of Soviet satellite Sputnik. But the increasing weaponization of space adds more uncertainty, and unveils more vulnerabilities, that states need to address before space warfare becomes a reality.




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International Donors Can End Lebanon's Corruption

10 August 2020

Dr Lina Khatib

Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Change must come from within Lebanon, but Emmanuel Macron and others can help by ending their patronage of a disastrous regime.

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An anti-government protester in Beirut puts up a poster accusing corruption in Lebanon's state judiciary. Photo by Sam Tarling/Getty Images.

In the aftermath of the devastating Beirut port explosion last week, it is not just the role of the Lebanese political class that has come under scrutiny, but that of their international peers too.

Sunday’s international donor conference led by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, raised €253m (£228m) in relief funds, but it also signalled an important change in rhetoric. For the first time, donors affirmed that relief funds would directly go to the Lebanese people, and that longer-term economic assistance would be dependent on Lebanon implementing structural reforms.

This affirmation came hot on the heels of growing international attention on rampant corruption among Lebanon’s ruling political class, which is widely blamed for the port explosion. It sends the message to Lebanon’s rulers that, while their country desperately needs foreign assistance to stand on its feet, no one can help Lebanon if it does not also help itself.

But the communique issued following the conference glossed over the international community’s own role in sustaining Lebanon’s corrupt political class over a period of decades. At the aid conference, Macron said that Lebanon’s future is at stake. What donors need to recognise is that this future is a shared responsibility for them and Lebanon’s leaders alike.

With Lebanon’s debt greater than 170% of its GDP, and with the port explosion costing an estimated $15bn of damage, Lebanon needs foreign assistance to prevent it becoming a failed state. But what it needs even more desperately are reforms that would counter the corruption and lack of accountability that led it to this sorry state of affairs in the first place.

It is Lebanon’s existing political system – a power-sharing pact between different sects rather than a system of governance on the basis of competence – that facilitates its leaders’ reckless behaviour.

The international community is partly responsible for sustaining this system through cascading patronage. For decades, Lebanese leaders grew accustomed to neglecting the national interest and eventually being bailed out by international assistance. Dollar deposits would land in the central bank from Gulf donors, loans would be offered by European countries and foreign aid packages would flow to Lebanese state institutions – only for the majority of this money to end up lining the pockets of the country’s rulers, who frequently overcame their political differences to share state resources between them. The Lebanese state came to exist as a shell in the eyes of its citizens.

Lebanon’s rulers benefited from citizens’ low expectations from the state and the lack of measures ensuring transparency and accountability in the country. They brokered a social contract that cast the leaders as patrons and the people as clients rather than citizens. Foreign powers were well aware of this dynamic but they often turned a blind eye to it, and even nurtured it, because they believed the Lebanese political system brought stability and predictability following the tumultuous civil war.

With time the leaders’ greed grew, and with that the economic situation worsened. Leaders who behaved as de facto local authorities, granting constituents civil service jobs or minor privileges, provided them less and less. There was some international recognition that this dynamic was becoming unsustainable – international donors pledged $11bn during the CEDRE conference of 2018 on condition that Lebanon implemented structural reforms.

And in the wake of Lebanon’s recent economic deterioration, the International Monetary Fund said in April that any discussion of a loan to Lebanon would be subject to more reforms. On both occasions, Lebanon’s rulers ignored the calls for reform, counting on foreign support eventually coming in unconditionally as it used to in the past. International donor follow-up was sluggish.

The port explosion needs to be a wake-up call for any international entity seeking a stable Lebanon. The blast is ultimately the result of the decades during which political classes in Lebanon and outside it fostered the country’s dysfunctional political system. No long-term assistance should flow into Lebanon without strong conditions on transparency and accountability in how this assistance would be employed.

Foreign support is not the problem per se, but rather when it is handed on a plate unconditionally, maintaining the patronage cascade, exacerbating the weakness of state institutions, and further impoverishing Lebanese citizens.

With Lebanon’s economy almost crumbling in the aftermath of the explosion, there is an opportunity for the international community to exert leverage over Lebanese leaders – whose personal wealth grew partially from legal and illegal transactions through the devastated port – so that necessary reforms are implemented. Such leverage would not remove Lebanon’s defective political system, but would pressure its leaders to accept at least some basic reforms.

But for Lebanon to really turn a new page, it needs a new social contract and a new political system based on fairness, transparency and accountability. This is a change that can only start from within Lebanon, but it also depends on the international community abandoning their tacit support of a disastrous political status quo.

This article was originally published in The Guardian.




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Nile Basin States Must Persist with Water Diplomacy

11 August 2020

Owen Grafham

Assistant Director, Energy, Environment and Resources Programme

Ahmed Soliman

Research Fellow, Horn of Africa, Africa Programme

Dr Nouar Shamout

Water Resources and Sustainability (Independent Researcher)
After multiple failed negotiations, any serious breakdown in current talks mediated by the African Union would be dangerous for regional stability. The international community must ramp up its support for this crucial diplomacy to ensure that an agreement is reached.

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The Blue Nile river passes through the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) near Guba in Ethiopia. Photo by EDUARDO SOTERAS/AFP via Getty Images.

Ongoing talks between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan attempting to find a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the dispute over the Blue Nile Basin offer a unique opportunity for trans-boundary cooperation and have huge significance for a region dealing with multiple complex issues.

With trust clearly at a premium, the continuation of talks demonstrates good faith, but there is an urgent need to strengthen negotiations through all available diplomatic channels. The African Union (AU) is well-placed to continue mediating, but sustained high-level engagement is also needed from regional and international partners such as the EU and US, as well as multilateral support in terms of both financial and technical resources.

A tense history to overcome

At the heart of this dispute is the new Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) – set to become Africa's biggest hydroelectric dam when complete. Egypt and Sudan, who lie downstream, fear that Ethiopia, as the dam builders, will effectively gain control of the flow of the Nile, a turn of events that radically changes the way that water resources have been shared in the region.

Egypt - widely described as a ‘gift of the Nile’ - is almost entirely dependent on the Nile to meet its various water needs, and is the major beneficiary of the 1929 and 1959 agreements on using the shared river’s water. The 1959 agreement gives Egypt a share of 55.5 billion cubic meters (BCM) annually out of 74 billion available, and a veto right over projects being developed upstream, while Sudan is allocated 18.5 BCM.

Crucially neither of these old agreements recognises the interests of other upstream countries on the Nile, some of which have asserted their own development ambitions on the river over the last two decades and pushed for a new agreement to enshrine equitable rights and harmonious use of the water.

One such country is Ethiopia where the Blue Nile River originates. The GERD is a central part of Ethiopia’s ambitions for economic prosperity. The dam, which is largely self-financed, will have a capacity of 74 BCM when completed, enough to provide abundant cheap energy to power both national and regional developments. Currently, more than half Ethiopia’s 110 million people do not have access to electricity, but demand is increasing by 30 per cent annually.

Unclear impacts

The unclear impact of the GERD – and lower volumes of water – on food security and agriculture complicate the negotiations. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan’s populations are set to increase significantly in the coming decades and each are already dealing with significant challenges around food insecurity and nutrition, which in Egypt and Sudan, are partly exacerbated by the colonial-era agricultural structures set up to exploit cash crops.

Any change in water quality would have a huge impact on the 67% of Egyptian farm holdings considered as ‘small’ – the majority of which are on the banks of the Nile. And changes in water volumes might increase desertification and loss of livelihoods, potentially causing civil unrest if not addressed properly.

The environmental impact of the GERD on the complex Nile River system also raises concerns about the river’s ecosystem, the surrounding environment, and the river’s downstream course. Despite talks in 2015 leading to an agreement on declaration of principles, thorough technical studies have not been implemented.

Although there is little evidence that overall water levels in the Nile Basin have reduced in recent years, climate change is causing more variation in the Nile’s flow which increases the risk of flooding and extended droughts. Downstream states are also concerned about impacts from any breaches, damage or failure of the dam, including possible seismic activity.

Of course, the GERD also offers some added value to the downstream states. The dam can help manage floods in Sudan, reduce the significant water loss to evaporation - as in the case of Lake Nasser - and lessen the effect of sediment on downstream dams. In Sudan, where less than one-quarter of the estimated 70 million hectares of arable land is currently cultivated, any reduction in seasonal flooding would boost agricultural output and aid economic recovery. The dam will offer Ethiopia significant opportunities for the trade of cheap renewable energy to Sudan and neighbouring states earning it a possible $1bn a year in revenues. And adopting a more ‘basin-integrated’ management approach can be a springboard for enhanced regional cooperation between the three states.

But geopolitical tensions between the three have escalated since satellite imagery revealed apparent significant filling of the dam prior to reaching any agreement. Ethiopia has long said it would begin filling the dam during its rainy season, but insists the filling occurred naturally through June-July from rainfall and runoff and its first-year target of 4.9 BCM was reached without needing to close the dam gates. Egypt and Sudan have restated their calls for a binding legal agreement on the rules for filling and management of disputes.

Security response not the answer

Internal pressures are particularly acute, with all three countries experiencing public uprisings and regime change in the last decade, and current leaders are under pressure not to appear weak from influential sections of society pushing a hard nationalist line.

Hawkish elements in Egypt have long supported a more securitized response to any potential threats from the GERD, and the recent request from President Sisi that Egyptian air forces be ready to handle targets inside and outside of the country was interpreted as a threat to Turkey in Libya, and Ethiopia.

Egypt has also asked for the GERD to be discussed at the UN Security Council but Ethiopia’s Nobel peace prize-winning prime minister Abiy Ahmed, facing significant internal unrest himself, has made it clear that a costly confrontation is not in anyone’s interests. Meanwhile, Sudan’s transitional government - being jointly run by civilians and the military - is keen to assert its own interests on the Nile but has also played a conciliatory role with its neighbours. Increased engagement of Gulf states in the Horn of Africa and the impacts of conflicts in Libya, Yemen and Syria add more complexity to the overall regional picture.

Certainly none of the major parties sharing the river would benefit from a hard security response to the dam. For Egypt, such a move would torpedo its re-engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa under President Sisi and likely lead to its expulsion from the AU. For Ethiopia, overt conflict would be a huge setback for its development and regional integration ambitions. And Sudan’s nascent transition can ill-afford to be part of another regional conflict.

Thankfully, such an outcome is both highly unlikely and historically rare, and behind the scenes there has been significant progress. Some reports suggest a provisional agreement has been reached on the volume of filling required and the timeframe for the filling to happen. If so, most dispute now revolves around what to do in the event of a drought, provisions for information exchange, and how to translate all this into a binding agreement.

A two-phase approach, consisting of a short-term deal on filling and operating the GERD followed by discussions on future developments and allocation, could be the best way to reach a lasting settlement and replace the extremely outdated existing water-sharing agreements.

Reaching a successful deal between the three countries is not easy as it requires brave leadership and political goodwill, a de-escalation of long-standing rhetoric and brinkmanship, and a willingness to compromise on all sides to ensure the gaps between the countries' positions are significantly narrowed.

What is required is a determined effort to keep the countries talking and provide the solutions which can bridge the parties’ differences, build confidence, and secure the vital diplomatic success so badly needed for wider stability and progress in the region.




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Why the Mali Coup Should Matter to the UK

20 August 2020

Dr Alex Vines OBE

Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience; Director, Africa Programme
This coup was not unexpected as it followed months of mass protests against alleged corruption, a worsening economy and disputed elections.

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Press conference in Kati after the military arrested Malian president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and he officially resigned. Photo by ANNIE RISEMBERG / AFP via Getty Images.

The coup in Mali is not a putsch by disgruntled soldiers in a distant land. It is an extended European neighbourhood and matters to Britain. The UK already has three Chinook helicopters deployed in country and 250 British troops are scheduled to take up UN peacekeeping duties in December in what could be the ministry of defence’s most dangerous deployment since Afghanistan.

This coup was not unexpected as it followed months of mass protests against alleged corruption, a worsening economy, disputed legislative election results and deteriorating security in this West African country. Mali’s military is struggling to stop the insurgents, some of them now also affiliated with the ISIL (ISIS) armed group, despite UN, EU, French and regional military support.

The departure of Mali's President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was met with jubilation by anti-government demonstrators in Bamako and the leaders of the military coup say they would enact a political transition and stage elections within a 'reasonable time'.

Coups, followed by transitional arrangements and then new elections, are not rare in this region and have happened before in Mali when Keita’s predecessor Amadou Toumani Toure was overthrown by the military in 2012. The current cycle of insecurity followed despite a significant military intervention by France to restore elected government and stop the spread of Islamic extremist insurgency.

This is a reminder of how fragile the Sahel regon is and the importance of seeking stability and state building in a region of spreading Islamic extremist insurgency and rapidly-eroding state legitimacy.

The regional bloc ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) has denounced the coup and ordered the closing of regional borders with Mali as well as the suspension of all financial flows between Mali and its 15 members states. What follows now will be negotiations over the transitional arrangements and the timetable for new elections.

This will not be straightforward. Although the opposition was united in their demand for Keita's resignation there is little consensus on what to do next, while the UN Security Council and ECOWAS are divided on how to respond beyond initial condemnation.

It is urgent that three UK cabinet ministers, led by the first secretary of state Dominic Raab, who are currently reviewing the UK’s Sahel strategy complete this and decide upon its future direction.

The UK government needs crystal clarity on its Mali objectives as the clock ticks down to the deployment of British troops there. Increasingly this UN duty looks to become more peacemaking than peacekeeping.

This article was originally published in The Telegraph.




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Can the International Criminal Court Help Belarus?

26 August 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
A referral of election violence in Belarus to the International Criminal Court could enhance the support for the Belarusian people at other crucial platforms.

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A protester carries a former Belarusian flag during an opposition rally by the Minsk Hero City Obelisk. Photo by Valery SharifulinTASS via Getty Images.

Making the case

The recent election results in Belarus have triggered revolution in yet another post-Soviet country and Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s response has been devastatingly brutal. However, the Belarusian people’s resilience and Western sanctionsadopted on 14 August – have proved effective. As some of the 6,700 jailed protesters were released, accounts of horrific treatment by law enforcement emerged: overcrowded cells, no food, torture, forced confessions, severe beatings , and threats of rape.

With reports of mounting violence, Polish MEP Radosław Sikorski warned Lukashenka to expect not just sanctions but also the possible intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC), an idea supported by the opposition-led Belarus’ National Salvation. While there are significant impediments to the Court’s involvement, the impact of such an initiative could be ground-breaking.

Legal framework

The ICC considers criminal responsibility of top civilian or military leaders for only the most serious atrocities - war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and, in certain cases, the crime of aggression. In the context of Belarus, the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity might be relevant. According to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding treaty, crimes against humanity include widespread or systematic abuses directed against a civilian population. Atrocities relevant to Belarus include arbitrary imprisonment, torture, inhuman treatment, sexual violence, and enforced disappearances.

The ICC is a last resort. It can intervene only if states are unable or unwilling to properly investigate and prosecute serious crimes themselves. Although Belarus’s Criminal Code punishes crimes against humanity, as Lukashenka himself is implicated, impartial trials in the country are impossible while he is still in power. Other countries may investigate specific atrocities in Belarus under the universal jurisdiction principle. Universal jurisdiction greenlights investigations into the most serious crimes regardless of where they are perpetrated. German, Swedish and French proceedings on Syria are illustrative examples of this. Protesters may also file individual complaints of abuse to UN bodies under the protocols of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The European Court of Human Rights is not an option for the protesters because Belarus is not a member of the Council of Europe.

As the UN mechanisms are yet to be triggered and there has not yet been any talk of universal jurisdiction proceedings, the question of recourse to the ICC remains. But as Belarus is not party to the Rome Statute, the only way to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction is a referral by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Even though it would be vetoed by Russia –  and, almost certainly, China – it could be worth pursuing.

The importance of symbolism

So far, the UNSC has referred to the ICC two situations in non-party states – Sudan and Libya. But for cases that do not end up being referred to the Court, the UNSC debates are as significant for what they manage to agree upon as they are for what they do not. Regarding Belarus, two impeded UNSC accountability initiatives are relevant: on Syria and MH17.

In 2014, Russia and China vetoed the referral of cases of violence in Syria to the ICC. In 2015, Russia was the only country to block the creation by the UNSC of a special tribunal to investigate Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, downed by a Russian missile over war-affected eastern Ukraine. In both cases, the vetoes delayed justice, but they did not prevent it. For Syria, special independent mechanisms to collect evidence for adjudication were developed. Although justice has yet to be done, except in states like Germany, the evidence is ready for any future court. For MH17, a proceeding at a domestic Dutch court became an alternative. Parallel to that, new evidence of Russia’s role in both Syria and the downing of MH17 emerged - contextualising its UNSC vetoes.

Russia’s stakes in the Belarusian elections are probably even higher: the victory of democracy in Belarus will deprive it of one of its closest and most dependent post-Soviet allies.

Even if Russia destroys any chance of Belarusian citizens using the ICC, the attempted ICC-Belarus discussion will not have been in vain. Russia’s opposition to the respective UNSC resolution would be a self-defeating validation of Lukashenka’s atrocities against his own people, unashamedly restated at one of the world’s top diplomatic negotiation tables. Similar to Syria and MH17, the UNSC would reconfirm its self-imposed impotency to defend basic human rights amid political conjuncture. This would bring more attention to the issue and catalyse action through other platforms, including the discussions across UN bodies and the consideration of Belarusians’ individual complaints of abuse, and could lead to tougher sanctions. It could also further make the case for universal jurisdiction proceedings in other countries.      

Supporting civil society

Belarusian civil society will need stronger support from democratic governments and human rights organizations in reporting and documenting the crimes. Other countries, neighbouring states in particular, should be ready to welcome Belarusian protesters through refugee schemes, so they are able to continue their activities from abroad.

When nationwide strikes enveloped Belarus, singers from the Minsk Opera supported protesters by singing Va, pensiero, the famed chorus of the Hebrew slaves from Verdi’s Nabucco – and a symbol of united Italy’s revival. The people of Belarus also want to live in a democratic state ‘where the mind is without fear and the head is held high’. And they deserve all the support they can get. The inevitable fall of Lukashenka’s regime might take time but it should not take more lives.




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Kuwait: Brighter Future Beckons for Domestic Violence Sufferers

16 September 2020

Dr Alanoud Alsharekh

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
The passing of a new family protection law is a major step forward for a country which has long suffered from high levels of hidden domestic abuse. But much work remains to be done in ensuring the principles it enshrines are translated to practical action and support for victims.

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Safa Al Hashem MP holds a red rose to mark Valentine's Day at the National Assembly in Kuwait City on February 14, 2017, the year a domestic violence bill was first introduced. Photo by YASSER AL-ZAYYAT/AFP via Getty Images.

Domestic violence has always been a complex issue in Kuwaiti culture, often tied to norms and beliefs relating to family structures and concepts of guardianship, honour and discipline. As with other forms of abuse within the family, it is also considered a private matter and therefore not addressed publicly.

Despite a lack of up to date figures, the problem is widespread, affecting 53.1% of women in Kuwait according to a 2018 study. But Kuwait’s last submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) showed only 447 domestic violence cases had been through the court system in 2016, and only 76 of those resulted in a conviction. Given the known difficulties of reporting abuse and getting a case to court, it is not a stretch to conclude the actual figures of abused women is much higher than this figure given by the Ministry of Justice.

In one recently reported case, a pregnant woman was shot in the head and killed by one of her brothers while she was recovering in the in the intensive care unit of Mubarak Hospital from being shot by her other brother the day before. The reason for such a horrific double attack was she had married without her sibling's consent, even though her father had accepted the match.

Worryingly, activists and experts claim domestic violence has been rising in Kuwait during COVID-19, in keeping with global trends during lockdowns, and aggravated by the lack of legal resources and shelters for survivors. Highlighting this unfortunate situation, along with worldwide interest in the issue of domestic violence within the current epidemic, did lead to renewed media interest in the issue in Kuwait, and brought the lack of resources available to abuse survivors into the public eye.

And it is this renewed attention – alongside the fact Kuwait is about to enter an election cycle in November – that may well have driven recent governmental and parliamentary moves on the long-awaited family protection law, which recently passed in Kuwait’s national assembly with 38 votes for, one MP abstaining, and another voting against.

But 17 MPs were conspicuously absent from the room, including the Women and Family Committee rapporteur Alhumaidi Alsubaei, known for his human rights activism. This signals how complex the social and political issues associated with domestic violence as, although the official version of the law is yet to be made public, the submitted bill contained 26 articles.

The articles call for the formation of a National Family Protection Committee to draw up plans countering the spread of domestic violence in Kuwait, as well as the review and amendment of existing national laws which may be perpetuating the violence. Other provisions cover mandatory training programs for all government sectors involved in family protection, awareness programmes on detection, reporting and survivor advocacy, and issuing an annual report about domestic violence statistics.

Article 5 specifically calls for activating a domestic violence shelter and offering rehabilitation and advisory services, while Article 13 tackles the punishment of those who try and coerce survivors not to report abuse. These two articles are especially important because, although the Fanar Advisory Service and Domestic Abuse Shelter was formally opened in 2017, it has never actually been functional due to the delay of legislation needed to make it operational. Described as a ’stillborn dream’, the unused building is surrounded by sewage water.

The new family protection law also gives important provision for cooperation with civil society organizations, such as Eithar, Abolish 153, and Soroptomists Kuwait working on this issue. Although Kuwait already has several official bodies meant to be dealing with ending violence against women, in reality it has been these groups effectively dealing with the plight of abuse survivors. With no functional shelters, dedicated hotlines or specialized resources to assist victims, Eithar and Soroptimists Kuwait provide resources and support, while Abolish 153 focuses on filling the hitherto legal vacuum.

The path to getting this law put to a vote has been a long and winding one. Back in 2017, Saleh Ashoor MP submitted the first version of the domestic violence bill when he was heading up the Women and Family Affairs Committee. At that time, the bill was signed by just four other MPs - Safa Al Hashem, Ahmad Al Fadhel, Khalil Al Saleh and Faisal Al Kanderi. But it was the starting point and, several iterations later, it is essentially a version of that proposal which has been voted into law.

Much of the delay over the past three years, both with the legislation and activation of the shelter, has been due to the fact there were many bodies involved, such as the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Social and Labor Affairs, and civil society representatives, all of whom at times had different agendas. But alongside the amendment to the press and publication law which also passed that same historic day in parliament, the family protection law is undoubtedly a major win for all those liberal civil society activists who have lobbied long and hard to change these dangerous and restrictive legislations in Kuwait.




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Post-translational control of the long and winding road to cholesterol [Lipids]

The synthesis of cholesterol requires more than 20 enzymes, many of which are intricately regulated. Post-translational control of these enzymes provides a rapid means for modifying flux through the pathway. So far, several enzymes have been shown to be rapidly degraded through the ubiquitin–proteasome pathway in response to cholesterol and other sterol intermediates. Additionally, several enzymes have their activity altered through phosphorylation mechanisms. Most work has focused on the two rate-limiting enzymes: 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl CoA reductase and squalene monooxygenase. Here, we review current literature in the area to define some common themes in the regulation of the entire cholesterol synthesis pathway. We highlight the rich variety of inputs controlling each enzyme, discuss the interplay that exists between regulatory mechanisms, and summarize findings that reveal an intricately coordinated network of regulation along the cholesterol synthesis pathway. We provide a roadmap for future research into the post-translational control of cholesterol synthesis, and no doubt the road ahead will reveal further twists and turns for this fascinating pathway crucial for human health and disease.




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Ascertaining the biochemical function of an essential pectin methylesterase in the gut microbe Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron [Metabolism]

Pectins are a major dietary nutrient source for the human gut microbiota. The prominent gut microbe Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron was recently shown to encode the founding member (BT1017) of a new family of pectin methylesterases essential for the metabolism of the complex pectin rhamnogalacturonan-II (RG-II). However, biochemical and structural knowledge of this family is lacking. Here, we showed that BT1017 is critical for the metabolism of an RG-II–derived oligosaccharide ΔBT1017oligoB generated by a BT1017 deletion mutant (ΔBT1017) during growth on carbohydrate extract from apple juice. Structural analyses of ΔBT1017oligoB using a combination of enzymatic, mass spectrometric, and NMR approaches revealed that it is a bimethylated nonaoligosaccharide (GlcA-β1,4-(2-O-Me-Xyl-α1,3)-Fuc-α1,4-(GalA-β1,3)-Rha-α1,3-Api-β1,2-(Araf-α1,3)-(GalA-α1,4)-GalA) containing components of the RG-II backbone and its side chains. We showed that the catalytic module of BT1017 adopts an α/β-hydrolase fold, consisting of a central twisted 10-stranded β-sheet sandwiched by several α-helices. This constitutes a new fold for pectin methylesterases, which are predominantly right-handed β-helical proteins. Bioinformatic analyses revealed that the family is dominated by sequences from prominent genera of the human gut microbiota, including Bacteroides and Prevotella. Our re-sults not only highlight the critical role played by this family of enzymes in pectin metabolism but also provide new insights into the molecular basis of the adaptation of B. thetaiotaomicron to the human gut.




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The bacterial cell division protein fragment EFtsN binds to and activates the major peptidoglycan synthase PBP1b [Metabolism]

Peptidoglycan (PG) is an essential constituent of the bacterial cell wall. During cell division, the machinery responsible for PG synthesis localizes mid-cell, at the septum, under the control of a multiprotein complex called the divisome. In Escherichia coli, septal PG synthesis and cell constriction rely on the accumulation of FtsN at the division site. Interestingly, a short sequence of FtsN (Leu75–Gln93, known as EFtsN) was shown to be essential and sufficient for its functioning in vivo, but what exactly this sequence is doing remained unknown. Here, we show that EFtsN binds specifically to the major PG synthase PBP1b and is sufficient to stimulate its biosynthetic glycosyltransferase (GTase) activity. We also report the crystal structure of PBP1b in complex with EFtsN, which demonstrates that EFtsN binds at the junction between the GTase and UB2H domains of PBP1b. Interestingly, mutations to two residues (R141A/R397A) within the EFtsN-binding pocket reduced the activation of PBP1b by FtsN but not by the lipoprotein LpoB. This mutant was unable to rescue the ΔponB-ponAts strain, which lacks PBP1b and has a thermosensitive PBP1a, at nonpermissive temperature and induced a mild cell-chaining phenotype and cell lysis. Altogether, the results show that EFtsN interacts with PBP1b and that this interaction plays a role in the activation of its GTase activity by FtsN, which may contribute to the overall septal PG synthesis and regulation during cell division.




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Will Africans’ calls for better democracy be met?

Will Africans’ calls for better democracy be met? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Voters want the continent’s ageing leaders to step aside to usher in a new age of political engagement and robust democracy, say the experts of Afrobarometer.

Across Africa, recent years have been marked by both encouraging democratic highs and troubling anti-democratic lows. Notable advances from last year include the Gambia’s successful presidential election, a ruling-party transition in Zambia and the first democratic transfer of power in Niger. In the lead up to this, add Malawi’s retake of its flawed presidential election in 2020 and an earlier succession of oustings of long-serving autocrats in Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Gambia. 

Contrast these gains, though, with setbacks elsewhere, including increasing restrictions on opposition parties in Benin, Senegal and Tanzania; the use of violence and intimidation during elections in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda; and military coups, with the latest in Burkina Faso this year and last year in Chad, Mali, Sudan and Guinea.


These contradictory developments join dire warnings from experts that democracy is losing ground on the continent. But what can we learn about the state of democracy on the continent from Africans themselves?

Afrobarometer, a pan-African, non-partisan research network, has been surveying people about their views on democracy, governance and quality of life for more than 20 years. After interviewing nearly 50,000 citizens across 34 countries during Afrobarometer Round 8, which spans 2019-2021, we find that despite the efforts of some leaders to undermine democratic norms, Africans remain committed to democracy and democratic institutions.

They believe that the military should stay out of politics, that political parties should freely compete for power, that elections are an imperfect but essential tool for choosing their leaders, and that it is time for the old men who cling to power to step aside.

But their political reality falls short of these expectations. The perception of widespread and worsening corruption is particularly corrosive, leaving people increasingly dissatisfied with political systems that are yet to deliver on their aspirations to live in societies that are democratically and accountably governed. And although citizens find myriad ways to voice their concerns, they feel that their governments are not listening.

Simply put, Africans want more democratic and accountable governance than they think they are getting.

Africans’ democratic aspirations

Over the past decade, democracy watchers have been alarmed by declining trends in Africa. Concerns have been exacerbated in the past two years as some governments have taken advantage of the Covid pandemic to limit freedoms, restrict fair campaigning or postpone elections. Activists fear that supposedly temporary rollbacks in hard-won governance reforms could become permanent.

But for the most part, African citizens remain committed to democracy and democratic institutions. Across 30 countries that Afrobarometer has surveyed consistently since Round 5 (2011–2013), most indicators are strong and quite steady.


For example, seven in 10 Africans say that ‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of government’. While this is down modestly from 73 per cent a decade ago, more specific indicators seem to affirm popular commitment to democracy. Large and steady majorities consistently reject authoritarian alternatives, including one-person or ‘strongman’ rule (82 per cent), one-party rule (77 per cent) and military rule (75 per cent), which is clearly rejected even in many of the countries rocked by recent military coups.

Africans also express strong support for a limit to presidential terms, a feature of democratic governance that researchers and activists argue nurtures political participation, demonstrates that change via the ballot box is possible, and reduces the risk of personality cults, authoritarianism, corruption and coups. Across 34 countries, an average of 76 per cent favour limiting their presidents to two terms, including a majority (54 per cent) who ‘strongly’ support this rule. Term limits enjoy majority support in every surveyed country. 

The public’s democratic commitment is undergirded by strong and in some cases growing support for core democratic institutions. Support for multiparty competition and parliamentary oversight of leaders remains steady, while expectations that governments should be accountable to the courts have increased significantly over the past decade.

In addition, growing numbers of people say it is more important to have a government that is accountable to the people rather than one that just ‘gets things done’, an especially strong indicator of deepening commitment to democratic norms among citizens. 

Trouble at the polling booth

Elections remain a central, though controversial, institution of democracy for Africans. They have served as the foundation for real change, as in Zambia last year. But in other cases, such as Uganda’s January 2021 poll, they have been marred by violence and human rights abuses, as well as the weaponization of Covid to justify restrictions on campaigning.

The public is also sceptical about the capacity of elections to bring about real change: fully 50 per cent say they do not think elections are effective in enabling voters ‘to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want’.

At the same time, large majorities report positively on their country’s election environment. Asked about their most recent election, at least eight in 10 say they did not observe intimidation (87 per cent) or interference (81 per cent) by security forces and did not fear violence (80 per cent).

We must keep in mind that these encouraging averages can obscure deep problems in some countries. For example, while only 3 per cent of Namibians say votes are ‘often’ not counted fairly, between a quarter and one-third cite inaccurate counts as a frequent problem in Zimbabwe, Sudan and Gabon. 


In addition, confidence in the fairness of the media environment is drastically lower, on average just 36 per cent.

But perhaps most importantly, almost nine in 10 Africans (87 per cent) say they are free to vote as they choose, including sizeable majorities in every surveyed country. And a solid majority of 63 per cent rate their most recent election as completely or mostly free and fair. 

All of this may help to explain still-strong support for competitive elections as the best system for selecting leaders. A robust three-quarters confirm their commitment to elections, though this has fallen slightly over the past decade, probably reflecting disillusionment with electoral processes that are too often torn by violence and produce contested results. 

A growing number of people may also be recognizing that elections, especially poor-quality ones, are not enough to guarantee democracy and better governance, and that a healthy democracy must include such other features as government accountability, respect for the rule of law, responsiveness and citizen participation.

The ‘democratic disappointment’ gap

To what extent does political reality align with Africans’ democratic aspirations? Our findings suggest that it is falling well short of expectations.

While a slim majority has steadily reported that their country is a ‘full democracy’ or one ‘with minor problems’ over the past decade, satisfaction, however, has dropped to 43 per cent in that time. 

What explains this growing dissatisfaction? Other indicators of democratic supply offer some clues. While ratings of election quality have held steady, favourable public assessments of presidential accountability to parliament and to the courts have both declined.

The rising scourge of corruption

But one of the most significant driving factors may be burgeoning corruption, a trend that appears to parallel declining democratic satisfaction. On average across 34 countries, around six in 10 say both that corruption in their country increased over the past year, and that their government is doing a poor job of controlling it.

These perceptions matter. Over time, when perceptions of corruption rise or fall, levels of dissatisfaction with democracy tend to follow suit. 

In South Africa, dissatisfaction with democracy grew steadily alongside scandals involving President Jacob Zuma, and has continued to rise under his successor, Cyril Ramaphosa, whose office has been tainted by ‘Farmgate’ and a major Covid-relief scandal. The ‘Fishrot’ scandal in Namibia has had similar consequences.

Are governments listening?

African citizens are raising their voices, calling on their governments to fulfil their democratic aspirations. Since April 2017, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has recorded more than 70 episodes in 35 African countries of protests focused on issues ranging from demands for democracy in eSwatini to resisting police brutality, presidential third-term attempts and Covid restrictions. 

Citizen participation and government responsiveness are cornerstones of democracy. But are governments listening?

Voting is the most obvious and popular way for citizens to express themselves, and Africans take advantage of this opportunity. Two-thirds said they voted in their most recent national election. But elections occur only occasionally, and they force individuals to compress a wide array of views into very few choices. How do Africans find their voice during the long intervals between elections?

Many invest in personal efforts to act as agents of change. In fact, nearly half say they joined with others to raise an issue at least once in the past year, and a third contacted a political leader. A quarter report they acted with others to request government action. Less common but still important modes of engagement include asking for help from or lodging a complaint with government, contacting the media, and joining a demonstration.


These robust levels of citizen engagement suggest that people feel they can make a difference. Unfortunately, decision-makers aren’t always receptive or responsive to citizen voices. Less than a quarter of people think local government officials listen to them – and even fewer think their members of parliament do. 

What is more troubling is that fully two-thirds say they are at risk of retaliation or some form of negative consequences if they take action by reporting incidents of corruption. 

Lack of government responsiveness and respect for popular voices may have direct implications for both citizen engagement and citizen satisfaction. For example, we find that people are more likely to contact leaders or take other actions to solve problems if they believe that government officials respect and listen to them; that they will get a response if they raise an issue; and if they do not need to fear retaliation. 

Similarly, when we compare country averages for government responsiveness to the percentage of citizens who are satisfied with democracy, we again find positive associations. 

When governments are responsive, citizens are more likely to engage in addressing community needs and to be satisfied with their political system and optimistic about the future. Respectful and responsive governance has the potential to spur citizen action to solve critical development challenges – and may be the cure for what ails democracy.




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Eight ways to build better African cities

Eight ways to build better African cities The World Today mhiggins.drupal 2 August 2022

Young professionals from across the continent tell Emmanuel Adegboye how city life could be improved: from high-speed rail to people-centred urban planning.


Ahmed Elsawy, 33, Director of Talent
Cairo, Egypt
We must amend employment law in Egypt to support individual contractors to match with the global demand for short-term and project-based assignments within the tech and service industries. While we have a new, decent education system, I think we should care more about foreign languages to have a higher rank when it comes to the global competition of skilled workers.

Iman Abubaker, 31, Urban Mobility Project Manager, WRI Africa
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Rapid urbanization and increased motorization have exacerbated the city’s urban challenges. Addis Ababa would benefit from safer street design and people-centred city planning. Urban amenities should be located within walking and cycling distances. For longer trips, the city needs to invest in improving the accessibility, safety, integration and multimodality of its public transport system. I would love to see more pockets of green spaces and parks all around the city. 

Bree, 31, Project Manager
Nairobi, Kenya
I have a love-hate relationship with Nairobi. I spent four years smack in the middle of the city while attending the University of Nairobi. Being in the middle of all the hustle and bustle made the transition to a sleepy-ish coastal town easy. I would happily trade matatus [shared taxis] for tuktuks any day. I do miss the conveniences that come with a big city like a 24-hour grocery store and delivery services on those lazy days.

Mfon Bassey, 30, Co-Founder, TalentX Africa
Lagos, Nigeria
The government should improve the road networks and public transport systems, because the common challenge most Lagosians face is commuting from point A to B without traffic. There are so many private cars on the road because the public transport system isn’t optimally efficient yet. Once you take away the commute time most workers spend just to get work done, we’ll surely have happier Lagosians.

Olga Kiconco, 32, Innovation Strategist
Kampala, Uganda
As one of Africa’s fastest-growing cities with a projected 112 per cent population growth by 2035, there are a number of critical changes that need to be made in preparation for this. Our leaders should embrace coherent policies that will catalyze socio-economic transformation. We need to hold them accountable for better infrastructure and delivery of public services, while taking personal responsibility to protect our environment against the prevalent threat of climate change.

Etienne Amougou, 30, Curator/Arts Project Manager
Yaounde, Cameroon
What would make Yaounde better would be a good ecosystem that provides more opportunities for young people. If it was possible, I would like to see the creation of more cultural spaces, like parks, zoos, cinemas and sport areas. Also, we could use a more effective approach to waste management – sometimes we have trash everywhere in the ’hood.

Valentino Fernandez, 23, Writer
Johannesburg, South Africa
 We need better transportation to bridge the inequality gap and allow the youth to access spaces to be inspired and create change. Apartheid spatial planning is still affecting us. People of colour were relegated to the outskirts of the city, and very little has changed. It’s virtually impossible to move out of your childhood home, which means you’re looking at a two-hour commute every morning and two more hours to get home. I would like a reliable, affordable, high-speed rail system.

Jean-Louis Mbaka, 34, Co-Founder and Director, Education at Kinshasa Digital
Kinshasa, DRC
Our youth must receive a sufficient education that is in line with the strategic requirements of their future workplaces. By 2030, more than 130 million jobs in Africa will require digital skills, according to the International Finance Corporation. To close the gap between the conventional educational system and the labour market, our organisation is providing training for digital jobs. Initiatives like ours must be supported if the current and next generations are to have the means for their economic and social advancement. Scaling up investments in vital facilities like the internet is also necessary.




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The Climate Briefing: The nexus of water security and climate policy

The Climate Briefing: The nexus of water security and climate policy Audio NCapeling 22 August 2022

Examining the crossover between water security and climate change with the next two COPs taking place in regions with a history of being water stressed.

What should policymakers and negotiators from the Middle East and Africa working on water security focus on at COP27?

What does it mean to achieve water security? What are the main barriers or challenges? How is water security relevant to climate change?

This podcast was produced in collaboration with the UK Aid-funded Knowledge, Evidence and Learning for Development (K4D) programme which facilitates the use of evidence and learning in international development policy and programming.




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Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism

Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism 23 November 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2022 Online

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025.

The eighth edition of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in Tunisia from 27–28 August 2022, marked the second time that Japan’s now-triennial summit was hosted in an African country, after TICAD 6 was held in Kenya in 2016.

The summit was attended by 48 representatives of African countries and at least 20 heads of state and government and included a pledge by the Japanese government to commit $30 billion in public and private finance to Africa over the next three years.

In reaffirming the three pillars of TICAD 8 – revolving around the economy, societal resilience, and peace and stability – the newly adopted Tunis Declaration (28 August 2022) also outlined some of the key projects underpinning Japan’s pledge, including a $4 billion fund for a Green Growth Initiative with Africa (GGA).

2023 will mark 30 years since the inception of TICAD in 1993 and ten years since the African Union (AU)’s adoption of its flagship Agenda 2063, on which the Tunis Declaration placed distinct emphasis.

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025, exploring wider developments in summitry, Africa-Asia relations, and modes of multilateralism.

Questions explored include:

  • How has international summitry evolved over the past three decades since the inception of TICAD in 1993, which represented the first periodic high-level summit engagement with Africa by a ‘non-traditional’ partner?
  • Looking ahead to TICAD 9 in 2025, what are the priorities for enforcing the stated tenets of TICAD – ‘African ownership, international partnership, inclusivity and openness’ – in cooperation efforts?
  • What lessons can be drawn from TICAD’s co-partnership approach (with the African Union Commission and others) – particularly given increasing calls for AU membership of the G20 and Prime Minister Kishida’s pledge at TICAD 8 to support a permanent African UNSC seat during its non-permanent membership in 2023–24? Beyond membership, what are the priorities for furthering agency?
  • How are Africa-Asia relations evolving and diverging? How are Japan and other Asian countries perceived by different African countries?

This event is the third in the Chatham House – Japan House London webinar series (2022-2023). The series is held in partnership with Japan House London. You can watch previous webinars from the series here.




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Pattern of Failure in Patients with Biochemical Recurrence After PSMA Radioguided Surgery

Visual Abstract




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Impact of 18F-FDG PET/MRI on Therapeutic Management of Women with Newly Diagnosed Breast Cancer: Results from a Prospective Double-Center Trial

Visual Abstract




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Intraarterial Administration of Peptide Receptor Radionuclide Therapy in Patients with Advanced Meningioma: Initial Safety and Efficacy

Visual Abstract




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CT Enhancement of a Nasal Leech After Thrombectomy




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Performance Characteristics of a New Generation 148-cm Axial Field-of-View uMI Panorama GS PET/CT System with Extended NEMA NU 2-2018 and EARL Standards

Visual Abstract




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International Metabolic Prognostic Index Is Superior to Other Metabolic Tumor Volume-Based Prognostication Methods in a Real-Life Cohort of Diffuse Large B-Cell Lymphoma

Visual Abstract




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Pacific Rim timeline: Information for defenders from a braid of interlocking attack campaigns

Sophos X-Ops unveils five-year investigation tracking China-based groups targeting perimeter devices





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"Questioning the Quantifiable: Are We Measuring What Matters in Heart Failure Care?"




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Novel Proteomic Profiling of Epididymal Extracellular Vesicles in the Domestic Cat Reveals Proteins Related to Sequential Sperm Maturation with Differences Observed between Normospermic and Teratospermic Individuals

Tricia Rowlison
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2090-2103
Research




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Identification of novel serological autoantibodies in Takayasu arteritis patients using HuProt arrays

Xiao-Ting Wen
Dec 17, 2020; 0:RA120.002119v1-mcp.RA120.002119
Research




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Interspecies differences in proteome turnover kinetics are correlated with lifespans and energetic demands

Kyle Swovick
Dec 28, 2020; 0:RA120.002301v1-mcp.RA120.002301
Research




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Global Proteome and Phosphoproteome Characterization of Sepsis-induced Kidney Injury

Yi-Han Lin
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2030-2046
Research




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Unraveling the MAX2 Protein Network in Arabidopsis thaliana: Identification of the Protein Phosphatase PAPP5 as a Novel MAX2 Interactor

Sylwia Struk
Dec 28, 2020; 0:RA119.001766v1-mcp.RA119.001766
Research




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Systematic identification of P. falciparum sporozoite membrane protein interactions reveals an essential role for the p24 complex in host infection

Julia Knöckel
Dec 22, 2020; 0:RA120.002432v1-mcp.RA120.002432
Research




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In depth characterization of the Staphylococcus aureus phosphoproteome reveals new targets of Stk1

Nadine Prust
Dec 17, 2020; 0:RA120.002232v1-mcp.RA120.002232
Research




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On the robustness of graph-based clustering to random network alterations

R. Greg Stacey
Nov 4, 2020; 0:RA120.002275v1-mcp.RA120.002275
Research




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Thyroglobulin interactome profiling defines altered proteostasis topology associated with thyroid dyshormonogenesis

Madison T Wright
Nov 18, 2020; 0:RA120.002168v1-mcp.RA120.002168
Research




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A potential role for the Gsdf-eEF1{alpha} complex in inhibiting germ cell proliferation: A protein-interaction analysis in medaka (Oryzias latipes) from a proteomics perspective

Xinting Zhang
Dec 8, 2020; 0:RA120.002306v1-mcp.RA120.002306
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Proteogenomic characterization of the pathogenic fungus Aspergillus flavus reveals novel genes involved in aflatoxin production

Mingkun Yang
Nov 24, 2020; 0:RA120.002144v1-mcp.RA120.002144
Research




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A proteomic approach to understand the clinical significance of acute myeloid leukemia-derived extracellular vesicles reflecting essential characteristics of leukemia

Ka-Won Kang
Nov 30, 2020; 0:RA120.002169v1-mcp.RA120.002169
Research




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Protein modification characteristics of the malaria parasite Plasmodium falciparum and the infected erythrocytes

Jianhua Wang
Nov 4, 2020; 0:RA120.002375v1-mcp.RA120.002375
Research




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ProAlanase is an Effective Alternative to Trypsin for Proteomics Applications and Disulfide Bond Mapping

Diana Samodova
Dec 1, 2020; 19:2139-2156
Technological Innovation and Resources




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The amphipathic helices of Arfrp1 and Arl14 are sufficient to determine subcellular localizations [Cell Biology]

The subcellular localization of Arf family proteins is generally thought to be determined by their corresponding guanine nucleotide exchange factors. By promoting GTP binding, guanine nucleotide exchange factors induce conformational changes of Arf proteins exposing their N-terminal amphipathic helices, which then insert into the membranes to stabilize the membrane association process. Here, we found that the N-terminal amphipathic motifs of the Golgi-localized Arf family protein, Arfrp1, and the endosome- and plasma membrane–localized Arf family protein, Arl14, play critical roles in spatial determination. Exchanging the amphipathic helix motifs between these two Arf proteins causes the switch of their localizations. Moreover, the amphipathic helices of Arfrp1 and Arl14 are sufficient for cytosolic proteins to be localized into a specific cellular compartment. The spatial determination mediated by the Arfrp1 helix requires its binding partner Sys1. In addition, the residues that are required for the acetylation of the Arfrp1 helix and the myristoylation of the Arl14 helix are important for the specific subcellular localization. Interestingly, Arfrp1 and Arl14 are recruited to their specific cellular compartments independent of GTP binding. Our results demonstrate that the amphipathic motifs of Arfrp1 and Arl14 are sufficient for determining specific subcellular localizations in a GTP-independent manner, suggesting that the membrane association and activation of some Arf proteins are uncoupled.




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A Gs-RhoGEF interaction: An old G protein finds a new job [Cell Biology]

The heterotrimeric G proteins are known to have a variety of downstream effectors, but Gs was long thought to be specifically coupled to adenylyl cyclases. A new study indicates that activated Gs can also directly interact with a guanine nucleotide exchange factor for Rho family small GTPases, PDZ-RhoGEF. This novel interaction mediates activation of the small G protein Cdc42 by Gs-coupled GPCRs, inducing cytoskeletal rearrangements and formation of filopodia-like structures. Furthermore, overexpression of a minimal PDZ-RhoGEF fragment can down-regulate cAMP signaling, suggesting that this effector competes with canonical signaling. This first demonstration that the Gαs subfamily regulates activity of Rho GTPases extends our understanding of Gαs activity and establishes RhoGEF coupling as a universal Gα function.




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Interrogation of kinase genetic interactions provides a global view of PAK1-mediated signal transduction pathways [Gene Regulation]

Kinases are critical components of intracellular signaling pathways and have been extensively investigated with regard to their roles in cancer. p21-activated kinase-1 (PAK1) is a serine/threonine kinase that has been previously implicated in numerous biological processes, such as cell migration, cell cycle progression, cell motility, invasion, and angiogenesis, in glioma and other cancers. However, the signaling network linked to PAK1 is not fully defined. We previously reported a large-scale yeast genetic interaction screen using toxicity as a readout to identify candidate PAK1 genetic interactions. En masse transformation of the PAK1 gene into 4,653 homozygous diploid Saccharomyces cerevisiae yeast deletion mutants identified ∼400 candidates that suppressed yeast toxicity. Here we selected 19 candidate PAK1 genetic interactions that had human orthologs and were expressed in glioma for further examination in mammalian cells, brain slice cultures, and orthotopic glioma models. RNAi and pharmacological inhibition of potential PAK1 interactors confirmed that DPP4, KIF11, mTOR, PKM2, SGPP1, TTK, and YWHAE regulate PAK1-induced cell migration and revealed the importance of genes related to the mitotic spindle, proteolysis, autophagy, and metabolism in PAK1-mediated glioma cell migration, drug resistance, and proliferation. AKT1 was further identified as a downstream mediator of the PAK1-TTK genetic interaction. Taken together, these data provide a global view of PAK1-mediated signal transduction pathways and point to potential new drug targets for glioma therapy.




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Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection up-regulates MFN2 expression to promote NLRP3 inflammasome formation [Cell Biology]

Tuberculosis (TB), caused by the infection of Mycobacterium tuberculosis (MTB), is one of the leading causes of death worldwide, especially in children. However, the mechanisms by which MTB infects its cellular host, activates an immune response, and triggers inflammation remain unknown. Mitochondria play important roles in the initiation and activation of the nucleotide-binding oligomerization domain-like receptor with a pyrin domain 3 (NLRP3) inflammasome, where mitochondria-associated endoplasmic reticulum membranes (MAMs) may serve as the platform for inflammasome assembly and activation. Additionally, mitofusin 2 (MFN2) is implicated in the formation of MAMs, but, the roles of mitochondria and MFN2 in MTB infection have not been elucidated. Using mircroarry profiling of TB patients and in vitro MTB stimulation of macrophages, we observed an up-regulation of MFN2 in the peripheral blood mononuclear cells of active TB patients. Furthermore, we found that MTB stimulation by MTB-specific antigen ESAT-6 or lysate of MTB promoted MFN2 interaction with NLRP3 inflammasomes, resulting in the assembly and activation of the inflammasome and, subsequently, IL-1β secretion. These findings suggest that MFN2 and mitochondria play important role in the pathogen-host interaction during MTB infection.




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Distant coupling between RNA editing and alternative splicing of the osmosensitive cation channel Tmem63b [Cell Biology]

Post-transcriptional modifications of pre-mRNAs expand the diversity of proteomes in higher eukaryotes. In the brain, these modifications diversify the functional output of many critical neuronal signal molecules. In this study, we identified a brain-specific A-to-I RNA editing that changed glutamine to arginine (Q/R) at exon 20 and an alternative splicing of exon 4 in Tmem63b, which encodes a ubiquitously expressed osmosensitive cation channel. The channel isoforms lacking exon 4 occurred in ∼80% of Tmem63b mRNAs in the brain but were not detected in other tissues, suggesting a brain-specific splicing. We found that the Q/R editing was catalyzed by Adar2 (Adarb1) and required an editing site complementary sequence located in the proximal 5' end of intron 20. Moreover, the Q/R editing was almost exclusively identified in the splicing isoform lacking exon 4, indicating a coupling between the editing and the splicing. Elimination of the Q/R editing in brain-specific Adar2 knockout mice did not affect the splicing efficiency of exon 4. Furthermore, transfection with the splicing isoform containing exon 4 suppressed the Q/R editing in primary cultured cerebellar granule neurons. Thus, our study revealed a coupling between an RNA editing and a distant alternative splicing in the Tmem63b pre-mRNA, in which the splicing plays a dominant role. Finally, physiological analysis showed that the splicing and the editing coordinately regulate Ca2+ permeability and osmosensitivity of channel proteins, which may contribute to their functions in the brain.




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Murine GFP-Mx1 forms nuclear condensates and associates with cytoplasmic intermediate filaments: Novel antiviral activity against VSV [Immunology]

Type I and III interferons induce expression of the “myxovirus resistance proteins” MxA in human cells and its ortholog Mx1 in murine cells. Human MxA forms cytoplasmic structures, whereas murine Mx1 forms nuclear bodies. Whereas both HuMxA and MuMx1 are antiviral toward influenza A virus (FLUAV) (an orthomyxovirus), only HuMxA is considered antiviral toward vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) (a rhabdovirus). We previously reported that the cytoplasmic human GFP-MxA structures were phase-separated membraneless organelles (“biomolecular condensates”). In the present study, we investigated whether nuclear murine Mx1 structures might also represent phase-separated biomolecular condensates. The transient expression of murine GFP-Mx1 in human Huh7 hepatoma, human Mich-2H6 melanoma, and murine NIH 3T3 cells led to the appearance of Mx1 nuclear bodies. These GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies were rapidly disassembled by exposing cells to 1,6-hexanediol (5%, w/v), or to hypotonic buffer (40–50 mosm), consistent with properties of membraneless phase-separated condensates. Fluorescence recovery after photobleaching (FRAP) assays revealed that the GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies upon photobleaching showed a slow partial recovery (mobile fraction: ∼18%) suggestive of a gel-like consistency. Surprisingly, expression of GFP-MuMx1 in Huh7 cells also led to the appearance of GFP-MuMx1 in 20–30% of transfected cells in a novel cytoplasmic giantin-based intermediate filament meshwork and in cytoplasmic bodies. Remarkably, Huh7 cells with cytoplasmic murine GFP-MuMx1 filaments, but not those with only nuclear bodies, showed antiviral activity toward VSV. Thus, GFP-MuMx1 nuclear bodies comprised phase-separated condensates. Unexpectedly, GFP-MuMx1 in Huh7 cells also associated with cytoplasmic giantin-based intermediate filaments, and such cells showed antiviral activity toward VSV.




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HIV-1 Gag release from yeast reveals ESCRT interaction with the Gag N-terminal protein region [Molecular Bases of Disease]

The HIV-1 protein Gag assembles at the plasma membrane and drives virion budding, assisted by the cellular endosomal complex required for transport (ESCRT) proteins. Two ESCRT proteins, TSG101 and ALIX, bind to the Gag C-terminal p6 peptide. TSG101 binding is important for efficient HIV-1 release, but how ESCRTs contribute to the budding process and how their activity is coordinated with Gag assembly is poorly understood. Yeast, allowing genetic manipulation that is not easily available in human cells, has been used to characterize the cellular ESCRT function. Previous work reported Gag budding from yeast spheroplasts, but Gag release was ESCRT-independent. We developed a yeast model for ESCRT-dependent Gag release. We combined yeast genetics and Gag mutational analysis with Gag-ESCRT binding studies and the characterization of Gag-plasma membrane binding and Gag release. With our system, we identified a previously unknown interaction between ESCRT proteins and the Gag N-terminal protein region. Mutations in the Gag-plasma membrane–binding matrix domain that reduced Gag-ESCRT binding increased Gag-plasma membrane binding and Gag release. ESCRT knockout mutants showed that the release enhancement was an ESCRT-dependent effect. Similarly, matrix mutation enhanced Gag release from human HEK293 cells. Release enhancement partly depended on ALIX binding to p6, although binding site mutation did not impair WT Gag release. Accordingly, the relative affinity for matrix compared with p6 in GST-pulldown experiments was higher for ALIX than for TSG101. We suggest that a transient matrix-ESCRT interaction is replaced when Gag binds to the plasma membrane. This step may activate ESCRT proteins and thereby coordinate ESCRT function with virion assembly.




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Sterol regulatory element-binding protein Sre1 regulates carotenogenesis in the red yeast Xanthophyllomyces dendrorhous

Melissa Gómez
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1658-1674
Research Articles




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Bioavailability and spatial distribution of fatty acids in the rat retina after dietary omega-3 supplementation

Elisa Vidal
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1733-1746
Research Articles




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Human glucocerebrosidase mediates formation of xylosyl-cholesterol by {beta}-xylosidase and transxylosidase reactions.

Daphne E.C. Boer
Dec 23, 2020; 0:jlr.RA120001043v1-jlr.RA120001043
Research Articles




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Myeloid deletion and therapeutic activation of AMPK do not alter atherosclerosis in male or female mice

Nicholas D. LeBlond
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1697-1706
Research Articles




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LDL apheresis as an alternate method for plasma LPS purification in healthy volunteers and dyslipidemic and septic patients

Auguste Dargent
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1776-1783
Research Articles




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Cholesterol transport between red blood cells and lipoproteins contributes to cholesterol metabolism in blood

Ryunosuke Ohkawa
Dec 1, 2020; 61:1577-1588
Research Articles