During much of the past three years, the Syrian civil war has been the most prominent item on the Middle Eastern political agenda and has dominated the political-diplomatic discourse in the region and among policy makers, analysts and pundits interested in its affairs. 

Preoccupation with the Syrian crisis has derived from the sense, apparent since its early phases, that it was much more than a domestic issue. It has, indeed, become a conflict by-proxy between Iran and its regional rivals and the arena of American-Russian competition. It has also had a spillover effect on several neighboring countries and has been a bellwether for the state of the Arab Spring.

As the conflict festered it also prompted a broader discussion and debate over the future of the Arab State system. The collapse of Syria, the ongoing fighting in Iraq, and the general instability in the Middle East has led some observers to question whether the very geography of the region will be changed. Robin Wright, a journalist and scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, argues that “the map of the modern Middle East, a political and economic pivot in the international order, is in tatters.” Wright also warns that competing groups and ideologies are pulling the region apart: “A different map would be a strategic game changer for just about everybody, potentially reconfiguring alliances, security challenges, trade and energy flows for much of the world, too.”  Similarly, Parag Khanna, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, argues, “Nowhere is a rethinking of “the state” more necessary than in the Middle East.” He contends that “The Arab world will not be resurrected to its old glory until its map is redrawn to resemble a collection of autonomous national oases linked by Silk Roads of commerce.” Lt. Colonel Joel Rayburn, writing from the Hoover Institution, points out that the alternative may not be new states but rather simply collapse. “If watching the fall or near-fall of half a dozen regimes in the Arab Spring has taught us anything, it should be that the Arab states that appeared serenely stable to outsiders for the past half century were more brittle than we have understood,” warning darkly, “This conflict could very well touch us all, perhaps becoming an engine of jihad that spews forth attackers bent on bombing western embassies and cities or disrupting Persian Gulf oil markets long before the fire burns out.” 

This discussion touches on a key question: Will the collapse of one or several other Arab states produce a new order in the region? 

The regional order has been threatened before, but today’s challenge is unique. Syria is what has prompted the latest reevaluation of the Skyes-Picot borders, but many of the problems predated the Syrian civil war. Ambitious monarchs in the 1930s and 1940s challenged the order after the colonial period. The doctrine of Pan-Arab Nationalism and Gamal Abd al-Nasir’s messianic leadership in the 1950s and by Saddam Hussein in 1990 again posed a threat. Now it is now challenged not by a powerful state or a sweeping ideology but by the weakness of several Arab states that seem to be on the verge of implosion or disintegration.

This paper assesses the situation in Syria, with an emphasis on what might lead to its de facto partition or lasting collapse. It then examines Syria’s neighbors and their prospects for stability. The paper concludes by exploring how the United States, Israel and Iran might affect this tenuous balance.

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• The End of Sykes-Picot?: Reflections on the Prospects of the Arab State System

The 2016 presidential election confronts the U.S. electorate with political choices more fundamental than any since 1964 and possibly since 1932. That statement may strike some as hyperbolic, but the policy differences between the two major parties and the positions of candidates vying for their presidential nominations support this claim.

A victorious Republican candidate would take office backed by a Republican-controlled Congress, possibly with heightened majorities and with the means to deliver on campaign promises. On the other hand, the coattails of a successful Democratic candidate might bring more Democrats to Congress, but that president would almost certainly have to work with a Republican House and, quite possibly, a still Republican Senate. The political wars would continue, but even a president engaged in continuous political trench warfare has the power to get a lot done.

Candidates always promise more than they can deliver and often deliver different policies from those they have promised. Every recent president has been buffeted by external events unanticipated when he took office. But this year, more than in half a century or more, the two parties offer a choice, not an echo. Here is a partial and selective list of key issues to illustrate what is at stake.

The Affordable Care Act, known as Obamacare or the ACA, passed both houses of Congress with not a single Republican vote. The five years since enactment of the ACA have not dampened Republican opposition.

The persistence and strength of opposition to the ACA is quite unlike post-enactment reactions to the Social Security Act of 1935 or the 1965 amendments that created Medicare. Both earlier programs were hotly debated and controversial. But a majority of both parties voted for the Social Security Act. A majority of House Republicans and a sizeable minority of Senate Republicans supported Medicare. In both cases, opponents not only became reconciled to the new laws but eventually participated in improving and extending them. Republican members of Congress overwhelmingly supported, and a Republican president endorsed, adding Disability Insurance to the Social Security Act.  In 2003, a Republican president proposed and fought for the addition of a drug benefit to Medicare.

The current situation bears no resemblance to those two situations. Five years after enactment of Obamacare, in contrast, every major candidate for the Republican presidential nomination has called for its repeal and replacement. So have the Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives and Majority Leader in the Senate.  

Just what 'repeal and replace' might look like under a GOP president remains unclear as ACA critics have not agreed on an alternative. Some plans would do away with some of the elements of Obamacare and scale back others. Some proposals would repeal the mandate that people carry insurance, the bar on 'medical underwriting' (a once-routine practice under which insurers vary premiums based on expected use of medical care), or the requirement that insurers sell plans to all potential customers. Other proposals would retain tax credits to help make insurance affordable but reduce their size, or would end rules specifying what 'adequate' insurance plans must cover.

Repeal is hard to imagine if a Democrat wins the presidency in 2016. Even if repeal legislation could overcome a Senate filibuster, a Democratic president would likely veto it and an override would be improbable. 

But a compromise with horse-trading, once routine, might once again become possible. A Democratic president might agree to Republican-sponsored changes to the ACA, such as dropping the requirement that employers of 50 or more workers offer insurance to their employees, if Republicans agreed to changes in the ACA that supporters seek, such as the extension of tax credits to families now barred from them because one member has access to very costly employer-sponsored insurance.

In sum, the 2016 election will determine the future of the most far-reaching social insurance legislation in half a century.

Social Security faces a projected long-term gap between what it takes in and what it is scheduled to pay out. Every major Republican candidate has called for cutting benefits below those promised under current law. None has suggested any increase in payroll tax rates. Each Democratic candidate has proposed raising both revenues and benefits. Within those broad outlines, the specific proposals differ.

Most Republican candidates would cut benefits across the board or selectively for high earners. For example, Senator Ted Cruz proposes to link benefits to prices rather than wages, a switch that would reduce Social Security benefits relative to current law by steadily larger amounts: an estimated 29 percent by 2065 and 46 percent by 2090. He would allow younger workers to shift payroll taxes to private accounts. Donald Trump has proposed no cuts in Social Security because, he says, proposing cuts is inconsistent with winning elections and because meeting current statutory commitments is 'honoring a deal.' Trump also favors letting people invest part of their payroll taxes in private securities. He has not explained how he would make up the funding gap that would result if current benefits are honored but revenues to support them are reduced. Senator Marco Rubio has endorsed general benefit cuts, but he has also proposed to increase the minimum benefit. Three Republican candidates have proposed ending payroll taxes for older workers, a step that would add to the projected funding gap.

Democratic candidates, in contrast, would raise benefits, across-the-board or for selected groups—care givers or survivors. They would switch the price index used to adjust benefits for inflation to one that is tailored to consumption of the elderly and that analysts believe would raise benefits more rapidly than the index now in use. All would raise the ceiling on earnings subject to the payroll tax. Two would broaden the payroll tax base.

As these examples indicate, the two parties have quite different visions for Social Security. Major changes, such as those envisioned by some Republican candidates, are not easily realized, however. Before he became president, Ronald Reagan in numerous speeches called for restructuring Social Security. Those statements did not stop him from signing a 1983 law that restored financial balance to the very program against which he had inveighed but with few structural changes. George W. Bush sought to partially privatize Social Security, to no avail. Now, however, Social Security faces a funding gap that must eventually be filled. The discipline of Trust Fund financing means that tax increases, benefit cuts, or some combination of the two are inescapable. Action may be delayed beyond the next presidency, as current projections indicate that the Social Security Trust Fund and current revenues can sustain scheduled benefits until the mid 2030s. But that is not what the candidates propose. Voters face a choice, clear and stark, between a Democratic president who would try to maintain or raise benefits and would increase payroll taxes to pay for it, and a Republican president who would seek to cut benefits, oppose tax increases, and might well try to partially privatize Social Security.

On no other issue is the split between the two parties wider or the stakes in their disagreement higher than on measures to deal with global warming. Leading Republican candidates have denied that global warming is occurring (Trump), scorned evidence supporting the existence of global warming as bogus (Cruz), acknowledged that global warming is occurring but not because of human actions (Rubio, Carson), or admitted that it is occurring but dismissed it as not a pressing issue (Fiorina, Christie). Congressional Republicans oppose current Administration initiatives under the Clean Air Act to curb emission of greenhouse gases.

Democratic candidates uniformly agree that global warming is occurring and that it results from human activities. They support measures to lower those emissions by amounts similar to those embraced in the Paris accords of December 2015 as essential to curb the speed and ultimate extent of global warming.

Climate scientists and economists are nearly unanimous that unabated emissions of greenhouse gases pose serious risks of devastating and destabilizing outcomes—that climbing average temperatures could render some parts of the world uninhabitable, that increases in sea levels that will inundate coastal regions inhabited by tens of millions of people, and that storms, droughts, and other climatic events will be more frequent and more destructive. Immediate actions to curb emission of greenhouse gases can reduce these effects. But no actions can entirely avoid them, and delay is costly.  Environmental economists also agree, with little partisan division, that the way to proceed is to harness market forces to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” 

The division between the parties on global warming is not new. In 2009, the House of Representatives narrowly passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act. That law would have capped and gradually lowered greenhouse gas emissions. Two hundred eleven Democrats but only 8 Republicans voted for the bill. The Senate took no action, and the proposal died.

Now Republicans are opposing the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan, a set of regulations under the Clean Air Act to lower emissions by power plants, which account for 40 percent of the carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere. The Clean Power Plan is a stop-gap measure. It applies only to power plants, not to other sources of emissions, and it is not nationally uniform. These shortcomings reflect the legislative authority on which the plan is based, the Clean Air Act. That law was designed to curb the local problem of air pollution, not the global damage from greenhouse gases. Environmental economists of both parties recognize that a tax or a cap on greenhouse gas emissions would be more effective and less costly than the current regulations, but superior alternatives are now politically unreachable.

Based on their statements, any of the current leading Republican candidates would back away from the recently negotiated Paris climate agreement, scuttle the Clean Power Plan, and resist any tax on greenhouse gas emissions. Any of the Democratic candidates would adhere to the Clean Power Plan and support the Paris climate agreement. One Democratic candidate has embraced a carbon tax. None has called for the extension of the Clean Power Plan to other emission sources, but such policies are consistent with their current statements.

The importance of global policy to curb greenhouse gas emissions is difficult to exaggerate. While the United States acting alone cannot entirely solve the problem, resolute action by the world’s largest economy and second largest greenhouse gas emitter is essential, in concert with other nations, to forestall climate catastrophe.

If the next president serves two terms, as six of the last nine presidents have done, four currently sitting justices will be over age 86 and one over age 90 by the time that presidency ends—provided that they have not died or resigned.

The political views of the president have always shaped presidential choices regarding judicial appointments. As all carry life-time tenure, these appointments influence events long after the president has left office. The political importance of these appointments has always been enormous, but it is even greater now than in the past. One reason is that the jurisprudence of sitting Supreme Court justices now lines up more closely than in the past with that of the party of the president who appointed them. Republican presidents appointed all sitting justices identified as conservative; Democratic presidents appointed all sitting justices identified as liberal. The influence of the president’s politics extends to other judicial appointments as well.

A second reason is that recent judicial decisions have re-opened decisions once regarded as settled. The decision in the first case dealing with the Affordable Care Act (ACA), NFIB v. Sibelius is illustrative.

When the ACA was enacted, few observers doubted the power of the federal government to require people to carry health insurance. That power was based on a long line of decisions, dating back to the 1930s, under the Constitutional clause authorizing the federal government to regulate interstate commerce. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court rejected an older doctrine that had barred such regulations. The earlier doctrine dated from 1905 when the Court overturned a New York law that prohibited bakers from working more than 10 hours a day or 60 hours a week. The Court found in the 14^th Amendment, which prohibits any state from ‘depriving any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,’ a right to contract previously invisible to jurists which it said the New York law violated. In the early- and mid-1930s, the Court used this doctrine to invalidate some New Deal legislation. Then the Court changed course and authorized a vast range of regulations under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.  It was on this line of cases that supporters of the ACA relied.

Nor did many observers doubt the power of Congress to require states to broaden Medicaid coverage as a condition for remaining in the Medicaid program and receiving federal matching grants to help them pay for required medical services.

To the surprise of most legal scholars, a 5-4 Supreme Court majority ruled in NFIB v. Sibelius that the Commerce Clause did not authorize the individual health insurance mandate. But it decided, also 5 to 4, that tax penalties could be imposed on those who fail to carry insurance. The tax saved the mandate. But the decision also raised questions about federal powers under the Commerce Clause. The Court also ruled that the Constitution barred the federal government from requiring states to expand Medicaid coverage as a condition for remaining in the program. This decision was odd, in that Congress certainly could constitutionally have achieved the same objective by repealing the old Medicaid program and enacting a new Medicaid program with the same rules as those contained in the ACA that states would have been free to join or not.

NFIB v. Sibelius and other cases the Court has recently heard or soon will hear raise questions about what additional attempts to regulate interstate commerce might be ruled unconstitutional and about what limits the Court might impose on Congress’s power to require states to implement legislated rules as a condition of receiving federal financial aid. The Court has also heard, or soon will hear, a series of cases of fundamental importance regarding campaign financing, same-sex marriage, affirmative action, abortion rights, the death penalty, the delegation of powers to federal regulatory agencies, voting rights, and rules under which people can seek redress in the courts for violation of their rights.

Throughout U.S. history, the American people have granted nine appointed judges the power to decide whether the actions taken by elected legislators are or are not consistent with a constitution written more than two centuries ago. As a practical matter, the Court could not maintain this sway if it deviated too far from public opinion. But the boundaries within which the Court has substantially unfettered discretion are wide, and within those limits the Supreme Court can profoundly limit or redirect the scope of legislative authority. The Supreme Court’s switch in the 1930s from doctrines under which much of the New Deal was found to be unconstitutional to other doctrines under which it was constitutional illustrates the Court’s sensitivity to public opinion and the profound influence of its decisions.

The bottom line is that the next president will likely appoint enough Supreme Court justices and other judges to shape the character of the Supreme Court and of lower courts with ramifications both broad and enduring on important aspects of every person’s life.

***

The next president will preside over critical decisions relating to health care policy, Social Security, and environmental policy, and will shape the character of the Supreme Court for the next generation. Profound differences distinguish the two major parties on these and many other issues. A recent survey of members of the House of Representatives found that on a scale of ‘liberal to conservative’ the most conservative Democrat was more liberal than the least conservative Republican. Whatever their source, these divisions are real.  The examples cited here are sufficient to show that the 2016 election richly merits the overworked term 'watershed'—it will be the most consequential presidential election in a very long time.

The Venezuelan opposition Movement for Democratic Unity (or MUD by its Spanish acronym) won a major victory over pro-government parties in the December 6 legislative elections. Updated official results show 107 seats for the MUD, 55 for the governing party, 3 representing indigenous communities, with 2 still undecided.

This is remarkable considering the extent to which the government manipulated electoral rules and conditions ahead of the elections. There were a number of reported problems on election day, the most serious of which was to keep polling stations open for up to two additional hours so government supporters could scour voter rolls to find eligible voters who had not yet cast ballots and take them to polling stations. The result was a record 74 percent turnout for legislative elections, with 58 percent voting for the opposition and 42 percent for the government—the mirror image of electoral results in almost all elections since former President Hugo Chávez first took office in 1999. 

In the end, electoral dirty tricks were not enough to prevent an opposition landslide, and President Nicolás Maduro was forced to concede defeat shortly after midnight on December 7. Although the final number of opposition-held seats in the legislature is not yet certain, there are three main questions that should focus our attention over the coming weeks and months:

Venezuela’s legislative election rules are designed to over-represent the majority party and rural areas. This traditionally favored Chavista parties, but in this election, they have given the opposition a boost in the number of seats they won relative to the popular vote. The opposition has already achieved a three-fifths majority, which enables them to pass laws, approve government-proposed budgets, censure and remove government ministers and the executive vice president, and name new appointees to lead the national electoral authority and new magistrates to the Supreme Tribunal. The MUD has already promised to pass an amnesty law for political prisoners aimed at liberating a number of opposition political leaders imprisoned by the Maduro administration. It has also pledged to move legislation designed to promote economic recovery.

The opposition appears to be within striking distance of securing a two-thirds majority (112 seats), which would allow them a much wider array of powers: to remove the existing electoral authorities (with the support of the Supreme Tribunal), submit legislation to approval by popular referendum, and the equivalent of the “nuclear option” for Venezuelan legislators: convene a Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution. But with a few remaining seats in play, it appears that the MUD has more work to do to clear this hurdle and then to maintain discipline among legislators to keep a razor-thin two-thirds majority.

Either way, there is a dangerous gap between the euphoric expectations created by the elections and the actual power of the National Assembly. Not only are legislatures in Latin America typically weak, but the legislative branch has not operated independently thus far during the Chavista period. So many of its potential powers have not been exercised in practice. 

Before the vote, there was a general consensus among analysts that President Maduro would try to limit the power of the legislature in the event of an electoral loss. The tactic has many precedents, with the governments of Presidents Chávez and Maduro previously gutting the power and budgets of opposition-controlled elected offices at state and local levels.

One possibility is that the outgoing Chavista-dominated National Assembly that leaves office in January 2016 will simply pass an enabling law (Ley Habilitante) that would allow President Maduro to rule by decree for the rest of his term. There are plenty of precedents for this in Venezuela, although an enabling law that lasted for the remainder of the presidential term would be exceptional. But others have suggested that given the overwhelming opposition victory, such an approach may run too blatantly contrary to public opinion and consolidate popular sentiment against the government.

Instead, the government may simply use the Supreme Tribunal to invalidate opposition-initiated legislation. Of the 32 magistrates appointed to the highest court in Venezuela, 13 judges are retiring. Together with 5 empty seats, that will allow the outgoing legislative assembly to approve 18 new judges. These will join 12 magistrates appointed by the Chavista-controlled legislature in December 2014. With the government appointing so many members of the Supreme Tribunal, it will likely be easy for the Maduro administration to block inconvenient legislative proposals. The question for the opposition then becomes whether it can figure out how to use control of the legislature to affect the composition of the court and dilute the power of pro-government magistrates, something that would undoubtedly set off a struggle among the various branches of government.

It seems unlikely that the Chavista movement will simply accept divided government, something unknown to Venezuela since 1999. There are simply too many in the Chavista movement who cannot afford an “accountability moment” due to alleged participation in official corruption; waste, fraud, and abuse; or drug trafficking. Others will be ideologically opposed to allowing so much power to flow to an opposition-dominated national assembly.

The Chavista movement spans from the military to the governing party to armed pro-government militias and gangs (colectivos). Former President Chávez was adept at keeping the movement together. President Maduro is not nearly as skilled, and with this stunning electoral loss, his leadership within the movement (already damaged by poor economic results) is likely to come under further pressure. 

In a normal country, one might imagine some incentives for both sides to negotiate—the legislature and executive could work together to avert the coming economic catastrophe, for one. And the weakening of President Maduro’s leadership may lead to more open disagreement within Chavismo about the way ahead, allowing the possibility that moderates on both sides will find room to work together. But as journalist and long-time Venezuela observer Francisco Toro has argued, Chavismo is a machine for not negotiating; the selection process for top leadership has been designed to winnow out anyone who would consider sitting down to talk with the opposition. And in such a polarized situation, moderates always run the risk of being targeted by radicals from their own side if they negotiate with opponents.

Get the house in order

All Venezuelans should feel proud (and relieved) that these highly significant elections have been carried out peacefully. But a lot of work remains to be done. 

First, the outside study missions and electoral accompaniment missions need to remain focused on the tabulation process to ensure that the few undecided legislative seats are allocated according to electoral rules and the votes cast rather than government fiat. 

Second, Venezuela is entering a period of divided government, one that will potentially be riven by conflict among the branches of government. The outside actors that have thus far played a positive role—such as regional multilateral institutions, civil society, legislators across the hemisphere, and governments interested in supporting democracy—will need to continue to pay attention to and support favorable outcomes in Venezuela even when the country is out of the international headlines. 

And third, Venezuela’s economy is in very serious trouble now that oil has fallen as low as $35 a barrel. Further economic contraction, poverty rates not seen since before Hugo Chávez took office, and inflation in excess of 200 percent are all expected in 2016. If the government (both Chavistas and opponents) come to their senses and agree to a negotiated plan on how to address the economy, they will need the support of both traditional multilateral financial institutions and non-traditional sources of financing (such as China). 

As the opposition celebrates this major electoral win, it will undoubtedly dwell on the political implications of its victory over Chavismo. But it should not lose sight of the mandate it has now been given to make needed policy changes as well.

Update: As of December 9, 2015, media are reporting that the opposition party has won at least 112 seats, achieving a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.

The votes have been counted in the presidential and legislative elections that Taiwan held earlier today. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a sweeping victory in both contests, displacing the Kuomintang (KMT).

There will no doubt be extensive and useful analysis on what the election means, particularly on the underlying preferences of the Taiwan public. But attention is already shifting to the policies that the new administration will pursue, and whether they will complicate relations on the three sides of the Taiwan-China-United States triangle.

By the numbers

On the election itself, Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP’s chairperson and presidential candidate, won with 56.1 percent of the vote, with virtually all polling places reporting. Eric Chu, the leader and candidate of the more conservative KMT, received 30.1 percent. James Soong, chairman of the People First Party (PFP), a small spinoff from the KMT, got 12.8 percent. This is the second time that the DPP candidate won in an open contest; Chen Shui-bian was the first to do so, in 2000, but only with 40 percent of the vote in a previous three-person race. 

For the elections for the Legislative Yuan (LY), voters cast two ballots. One is for a candidate to represent their geographic election district, of which there are 78. The other is for the voter’s preferred political party—that outcome produces 35 legislators, drawn from party lists. Final results are not yet available for all of the 78 geographic seats, but the Central News Agency reports that the DPP will have at least 60 seats, enough for an absolute majority. We do know the final result in the party vote: DPP with 44.1 percent; KMT with 26.9 percent; PFP with 6.5 percent; New Power Party with 6.1 percent; the pro-unification New Party with 4.2 percent; and the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union with 2.5 percent.

Not a fluke

Several tentative implications flow from these results.

The DPP victory is similar to the KMT’s in 2008, when voters rejected the eight-year presidency of DPP leader Chen Shui-bian. Tsai’s percentage this time is slightly less than the 58 percent that Ma Ying-jeou won in his first election in eight years ago (in 2008, the KMT won 81 legislative seats). Both elections have a “throw the bums out” flavor.

Although Tsai will not have a totally free hand, she has gained significant political capital and freedom of action. The question now is how she will use them. She has the scope to address a number of domestic problems that were on voters’ minds when they went to the polls. I suspect that she will want to conduct her presidency in a way that helps ensure that the DPP will be Taiwan’s majority party for a long time to come. Whether succeeds will depend a lot on the response of the Legislative Yuan, including the DPP caucus, to her agenda and whether the legislature is willing to undertake reforms that would make it a more effective institution.

Although Tsai will not have a totally free hand, she has gained significant political capital and freedom of action. The question now is how she will use them.

The size of the DPP victory should induce Beijing to reconsider the hardline stance that it has taken during the run-up to the election. It said, in effect, that Dr. Tsai would have to accept its own parameters preserving the status quo if she is to secure mutually beneficial cross-Strait relations. But today’s result was no fluke. It occurred not because of Tsai’s “cool” charisma or the DPP’s skill at mobilizing its supporters, although those were not trivial. It was the result of the public growing more skeptical about Ma Ying-jeou’s policy of engaging China, at least economically—a skepticism grew that throughout Ma’s second term. If Beijing can adjust its strategy and Tsai is willing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping half way, a mutual accommodation between them is not impossible. But it will not be easy.

Cross-Strait shifts?

The open question, which only future developments can answer, is whether today’s result reflects a more fundamental shift in political attitudes than simply dissatisfaction with Ma Ying-jeou’s policies and their consequences. Such a more fundamental shift would not only change the balance of power within Taiwan but also the continued feasibility of China’s approach to reaching its goal of unification. If so, should Beijing offer more and different carrots to better “win the hearts and minds” of Taiwan people? Or would it consider greater reliance on sticks?

The open question...is whether today’s result reflects a more fundamental shift in political attitudes than simply dissatisfaction with Ma Ying-jeou’s policies and their consequences.

The implication that the U.S. government drew from the election results is captured in the statement the State Department released today: 

“We share with the Taiwan people a profound interest in the continuation of cross-Strait peace and stability. We look forward to working with Dr. Tsai and Taiwan’s leaders of all parties to advance our many common interests and further strengthen the unofficial relationship between the United States and the people on Taiwan.”

It is worth noting that Taiwan is the only ethnic Chinese society in the world in which genuinely competitive elections pick senior political leaders. The powers that be in China, Hong Kong, and Singapore all seek to preserve control over the outcomes of their leadership selection processes. Taiwan is the one system where the outcome reflects the preferences of over 12 million voters. Moreover, this is Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of power through direct elections, and it should further consolidate Taiwan’s democracy. Finally, that Taiwan has elected its first female president signals the removal of one more significant social barrier to talented people holding the island’s highest political office.

Editors’ Note: How do states manage their armed forces, domestic politics, and foreign affairs? Stephen Cohen, senior fellow with the India Project at Brookings, has studied this and a range of other issues in Southeast Asia since the 1960s. In a new book, titled “The South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings,” Cohen reflects on more than a half-century of scholarship on India, describing the dramatic changes he has personally witnessed in the field of research. The following is an excerpt from the book’s preface.

[In the 1960s, questions about how states manage their armed forces] were not only unasked in the South Asian context by scholars; they were also frowned on by the Indian government. This made preparation both interesting and difficult. It was interesting because a burgeoning literature on civil–military relations in non-Western states could be applied to India. Most of it dealt with two themes: the “man on horseback,” or how the military came to power in a large number of new states, and how the military could assist in the developmental process. No one had asked these questions of India, although the first was relevant to Pakistan, then still governed by the Pakistani army in the form of Field Marshal Ayub Khan.

***

During my first and second trips [in the 1960s] my research was as a historian, albeit one interested in the army’s social, cultural, and policy dimensions. I discovered, by accident, that this was part of the movement toward the “new military history.” Over the years I have thus interacted with those historians who were interested in Indian military history, including several of my own students. 

While the standard of historians in India was high in places like the University of Calcutta, military history was a minor field, just as it was in the West. Military historians are often dismissed as the “drums and trumpets” crowd, interested in battles, regiments, and hardware, but not much else. My own self-tutoring in military history uncovered something quite different: a number of scholars, especially sociologists, had written on the social and cultural impact of armed forces, a literature largely ignored by the historians. While none of this group was interested in India, the connection between one of the world’s most complicated and subtle societies, the state’s use of force, and the emergence of a democratic India was self-evident. 

***

A new generation of scholars and experts, many of them Indians (some trained in the United States) and Indian Americans who have done research in India, have it right: this is a complex civilizational-state with expanding power, and its rise is dependent on its domestic stability, its policies toward neighbors (notably Pakistan), the rise of China, and the policies of the United States. 

The literature that predicts a conflict between the rising powers (India and China), and between them and America the “hegemon,” is misguided: the existence of nuclear weapons by all three states, plus Pakistan, ensures that barring insanity, any rivalries between rising and established states will be channeled into “ordinary” diplomatic posturing, ruthless economic competition, and the clash of soft power. In this competition, India has some liabilities and many advantages, and the structure of the emerging world suggests a closer relationship between the United States and India, without ruling out much closer ties between China and India. 

There remain some questions: Can the present Indian leadership show magnanimity in dealing with Pakistan, and does it have the foresight to look ahead to new challenges, notably environmental and energy issues that require new skills and new international arrangements? Importantly, some of the best work on answering these questions is being done in India itself, and the work of Kanti Bajpai, Amitabh Mattoo, Harsh Pant, C. Raja Mohan, Rajesh Basrur, and others reveals the maturity of Indian thinking on strategic issues. It has not come too soon, as the challenges that India will face are growing, and those of Pakistan are even more daunting.

Visiting Fellow Michael P. McDonald joins Kojo Nnamdi and guests to discuss congressional redistricting and other pressing election reform issues.

Listen to the interview »

Executive Summary

In the concluding chapter of Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America’s Polarized Politics (Brookings Press, 2007), Pietro S. Nivola and William A. Galston lay out a series of changes aimed at “depolarizing” the politics of the United States. One of their recommendations calls on the states to introduce fundamental changes to the process of redistricting congressional electoral districts. A handful of states have already established redistricting commissions, so the first steps have been taken in reforming one of the most important pillars of the electoral process.

This paper explores the possibility that the United States could build on those initial moves. Additionally, would it be possible to “import” the Canadian model of independent electoral boundary redistricting commissions? For the first 100 years of Canadian history redistricting seats in the federal House of Commons followed a pattern familiar to Americans. It was a process firmly under the control of the politicians, and the results reflected that. Wide disparities in population size were a tell-tale sign of the extent to which Canada’s parliamentary districts were gerrymandered.

Starting at the provincial level in the 1950s, partisan redistricting eventually gave way in all jurisdictions to nonpartisan commissions. How that change came about and why the Canadian commission-directed redistricting commends itself to Americans concerned about the highly politicized state of redistricting in the United States are the subjects of this study.

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The special election in California and the beginning of the recall process in Wisconsin are only the start of what promises to a be a hyper-partisan election. On July 13, Thomas Mann answered your questions on the new forces at work in the political landscape, in a live web chat moderated by POLITICO Senior Editor David Mark.

The transcript of this chat follows.

David Mark: Welcome to the chat, let's get started.

12:30 Comment From Brooke: Were you surprised by the results of California's special election?

12:32 Tom Mann: No, Hahn's 10 point victory was expected. This was less than the natural Democratic strength of the district and reflected the generously self-funded opposition campaign.

12:32 Comment From Travis: What's the significance of that CA seat remaining Democrat?

12:34 Tom Mann: Not much in the way of national significance. If anything, it's a step back for the Democrats, who in the last, NY special in a Republican district, pulled off a genuine upset, running substantially ahead of Obama and the party registration. But the Democrats avoided an upset in California, which would have been discouraging and distracting to them.

12:34 Comment From Yan: Can you explain what's going on in Wisconsin?

12:39 Tom Mann: No!! It's been a crazy year in my home state. Yesterday's six elections were not for real. They had fake Democratic candidates challenging the slated Democrats solely to delay the actual recall elections by a month. All of the "real" Democrats won and three or four of them have a good chance to defeat the incumbent Republican state senators on August. Next week on July 19 three Democratic incumbents will be on the ballot -- two facing fake candidates but one facing a Republican challenger. The latter is important, as are the August 16 elections featuring the other two Democratic incumbents. Bottom line-- Democrats need a net gain of three seats to take control of the State Senate and slow Governor Walker's agenda. Turnout was relatively high yesterday and control of the State Senate is genuinely up for grabs.

12:39 David Mark: Realizing that the lines aren't final, what's your sense about how effective the independent California redistricting commission has been in drawing districts that are potentially more competitive?

12:42 Tom Mann: It appears they have been successful in increasing the number of competitive districts. At the same time, they have boosted Democratic prospects for a seat gain and disappointed Hispanics who feel that their population growth in the state has not been reflected in the Commission's maps. I suspect some significant revision in the plans that are finally released by the Commission and if necessary, an appeal to the courts.

12:42 Comment From Henry: What do you expect from the next election cycle?

12:47 Tom Mann: I believe the presidency and control of both House and Senate are up for grabs. It will be a very high stakes election with huge warchests. (Obama and the DNC together raised $86 million in the second quarter, which dwarfs what the Republican candidates combined have raised.) But both parties will be well-funded in the presidential and congressional races. At this point, I'd say Obama probably has the best prospect of winning; same is true of Republicans taking the Senate and holding the House. But it is early; the economic climate remains volatile; and events could overwhelm the present situation.

12:47 Comment From Danny (MD): What kind of a role do you see Super PACs playing in the next round of elections?

12:50 Tom Mann: The SuperPacs and their affiliated 501c organizations will be major players in the 2012 elections. Disclosure of donors will continue to diminish and large corporate and individual contributions will support extensive independent spending campaigns. Democrats have decided to follow the Republicans rather than fight them on campaign finance reform.

12:50 Comment From Danny (MD):What do you think about Stephen Colbert's Super PAC?

12:52 Tom Mann: Colbert is being Colbert. With his trusted legal advisor Trevor Potter, he is creating the PAC and testing the rules to educate the public about the inadequacy of campaign finance law and regulation. Political satire may be one of the more effective means of pushing political reform.

12:52 Comment From Bill in Va.: Beyond the immediate results of elections in California and Wisconsin, there are new laws in a lot of swing states that will seem to make it harder for certain people to cast their vote. Will these laws stand, or be challenged, and can they have an impact in the 2012 outcome?

12:56 Tom Mann: Election law in the States has sadly become yet another tool of partisan war. New voter ID laws have been passed in states controlled by Republicans but not in the others. I expect Democrats will gear up at the grassroots level to try to contest any efforts to deny access to the ballot of any of their legitimate voters. It all makes one yearn for the Australian compulsory voting system. Giving parties the incentive to depress turnout is downright depressing.

12:57 Comment From Ron: Just to step back from the specifics for a moment, how do you explain the very nasty tone of our politics these days...and what will it take to return some civility to the process?

1:00 Tom Mann: I'm not looking for civility any time soon. The ideological polarization of the parties and the partisan team play that now characterizes our politics and governance is deeply rooted in American society and reinforced by the new media. The populist Tea Party, with its certainty and righteous indignation, has been embraced by the Republicans in Washington and makes it almost impossible for politicians on opposite sides of the aisle to treat one another respectfully and work toward compromise.

1:00 David Mark: Thanks for the chat, everybody.

One year from the 2014 midterm congressional elections, the Center for Effective Public Management will host a panel previewing those races. Joining CEPM scholars Elaine Kamarck and John Hudak are Charlie Cook (Cook Political Report), Susan Page (USA Today), and Robert Boatright (Clark University).

Join us at 10AM for a live webcast of the event. We will discuss the congressional elections, gubernatorial races, and what the implications are for policymaking in the coming years.

We welcome questions via Twitter using the hashtag #2014Midterms.

INTRODUCTION

Elections that follow dramatic downfalls of authoritarian regimes present policymakers with difficult choices. They are an opportunity to establish a sound basis for democratization, putting in place institutions and strengthening actors that help guarantee free and fair elections. Yet such elections are part of a high-stakes conflict over the future that takes place in a context of enormous uncertainty, as new actors emerge, old elites remake themselves, and the public engages in politics in new and unpredictable ways.

Assisting elections in the Arab world today is made more challenging by two factors that have thus far distinguished the region from others. First, transitions are made more difficult by extraordinarily strong demands to uproot the old regime. Fears that former regime elements will undermine ongoing revolutions along with demands for justice after decades of wrongdoing invariably create pressures to exclude former elites. In other regions, reformers within autocratic regimes, like Boris Yeltsin and South Africa’s F.W. DeKlerk, split from hardliners to spearhead reforms, muting demands for excluding old regime allies writ large. In the Middle East, however, old regime elites have been unable to credibly commit to reforms, partly given decades-long histories of empty promises and oppositions that remain largely determined to accept nothing less than Ben Ali-like departures. Room for compromise is difficult to find.

Second, for an international community hoping to support Arab transitions, widespread distrust of outside forces compounds these problems. Such distrust is inevitable in all post-colonial states; however, skepticism is particularly high in the Arab world, especially toward the United States. Cynicism about American intentions has been fed by U.S. support for Israel, its continued backing of Arab autocrats for nearly two decades after the Cold War, and, more recently, its unwillingness to take stronger stands against Mubarak, Asad, and others early on in the uprisings. Even if transitioning elites believe international expertise can help smooth the election process and enhance faith in the outcomes, they find it difficult to embrace in the context of heightened nationalism and a strong desire to assert sovereignty.

In light of these challenges, this paper explores how the international community can best engage in “founding” elections in the Arab world. Examining Egypt and Tunisia, the first two Arab states to hold elections, it focuses on challenges in leveling the playing field, managing electoral processes, and creating just and sustainable outcomes. These cases are undoubtedly unique in many ways and – as in any transition – remain in flux. Nevertheless, examining their early experience yields insights into how international actors can best approach those cases that may follow (e.g., Libya, Syria, and Yemen).

Most notably, these cases suggest that the democracy promotion community should approach first elections differently than it does subsequent ones. It should prioritize different goals and activities, in some cases even leaving off the agenda well-intentioned and generally constructive programs in order to focus on more urgent activities critical to strengthening electoral processes. Recognizing the enormous fear and uncertainty with which democrats approach first elections, international actors should resist the understandable urge to seek immediate, permanent democratic arrangements and “favorable” electoral outcomes. They should also encourage revolutionary forces to resist understandable, but counterproductive, urges to exclude allies of the former regime from new democratic processes. Rather, democracy promoters should suggest interim measures, encourage tolerance toward “unfavorable” results, and, in so doing, support democrats as they make their way through a long, imperfect process.

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As the 2016 election draws near, issues related to immigration and broader cultural change continue to dominate the national political dialogue. Now, an extensive new survey sheds light on how Americans view these issues. How do they feel about the proposed policy to build a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border or a temporary ban on Muslims entering the country? The survey of more than 2,500 Americans explores opinions on these questions and others concerning the current immigration system, immigrants’ contributions to American culture, and the cultural and economic anxieties fueling Donald Trump’s success among core Republican constituencies.

On June 23, Governance Studies at Brookings and the Public Religion Research Institute released the PRRI/Brookings Immigration Survey and hosted a panel of experts to discuss its findings. Additional topics explored in the survey and by the panel included perceptions of discrimination against white Americans and Christians, and the extent to which Americans believe that the uncertain times demand an unconventional leader.

Join the conversation on Twitter at #immsurvey and @BrookingsGov

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• The battle over the border: Public opinion on immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the election

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• The battle over the border: Public opinion on immigration and cultural change at the forefront of the election

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160623_prri_jones_presentation
• 20160623_immigration_prri_transcript

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Recent events in Taiwan, including the Sunflower Movement and the November 29 municipal elections in 2014, indicate changes in Taiwan’s political landscape. Political parties and candidates will have to adjust to changing public opinion and political trends as the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections approach. The two main parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), face both opportunities and challenges in disseminating their messages and garnering public support. The strategies that each party develops in order to capture the necessary votes and seats will be critical. 

On April 22, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings and Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies co-hosted a public forum to identify and analyze the politics behind the 2016 elections in Taiwan. Leading experts from Taiwan and the United States assessed the new forces and phenomena within Taiwan politics; how the election system itself may contribute to election outcomes, especially for the Legislative Yuan; and how the major parties must respond to emerging trends.

 Join the conversation on Twitter at #TaiwanElections

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• Taiwan’s shifting political landscape and the politics of the 2016 elections

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20150422_taiwan_transcript

With the GOP convention now in the electoral rearview mirror, attention is pivoting quickly from Ohio to Pennsylvania as the Democrats kick off their own nominating convention in Philadelphia.

Although it has voted Democratic in the last six presidential elections, political analysts have historically regarded the Keystone State as a swing state. FiveThirtyEight’s latest general election forecast projects a 46 percent vote share for Hillary Clinton, versus just under 44 percent for Donald Trump, making it the sixth-most competitive state. Pennsylvania also features what is shaping up to be a tight Senate race between incumbent Republican Pat Toomey and Democratic nominee Katie McGinty. Thus, it is useful to see how the state’s voters might view the condition of the economy, which could very well influence turnout levels and candidate preferences amid close contests this November.

The economic perspectives of Pennsylvanians are perhaps best understood through the prism of the state’s highly distinctive major metropolitan areas. Five large metro areas span the state—Allentown, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Scranton—and together account for 63 percent of Pennsylvania’s population and 75 percent of its GDP. Their economic specializations are diverse: trade, transportation, and manufacturing in Allentown and Scranton; financial, professional, and educational services in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh; and government in the state capital of Harrisburg. While much political news coverage of Pennsylvania is likely to focus on its iconic small towns, it is really these large metro areas that define the state demographically and economically.

While Pennsylvania was not one of the states hardest hit by the Great Recession, most of its major metropolitan areas bounced back relatively slowly. According to the Brookings Metro Monitor, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and Scranton ranked among the 20 slowest-growing large metropolitan economies from 2009 to 2014. All performed somewhat better on achieving increases in the local standard of living (prosperity), but Pittsburgh stood out for its 6 percent average wage growth during that time, seventh-fastest in the nation. This wage trend also seems to have propelled Pittsburgh to a better performance than other Pennsylvania metro areas on indicators of employment, wages, and relative poverty (inclusion). Allentown, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia, on the other hand, registered declines in typical worker wages during the first five years of the recovery and little to no progress in reducing poverty.

The picture over a longer timeframe is similar, though somewhat less dire. Pittsburgh posted middling growth but very strong performance on prosperity and inclusion over the past 10 to 15 years. That provided a contrast with Allentown, where the economy grew somewhat faster but productivity and average standards of living did not, and economic inclusion suffered. The remaining metro areas—Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and Scranton—all grew weakly but managed to post middling performance on prosperity and inclusion indicators.

Pennsylvania remains a whiter state than the national average, but its major metro areas are increasingly diverse, particularly in the southeastern part of the state around Philadelphia and Allentown. Nonetheless, Pennsylvania’s economic challenges are frequently framed around the plight of the white working class, which, as my colleague Bill Frey notes, comprises 59 percent of the state’s eligible voter population. In Allentown, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia, whites have indeed suffered long-term wage stagnation. Yet in the more manufacturing-oriented Pittsburgh and Scranton areas, median wages for whites rose significantly from 2000 to 2014. By contrast, workers of color have experienced much more troublesome wage trends, losing ground to whites in every major metro area. Across the five metro areas, typical earnings differences between whites and other workers in 2014 averaged between $10,000 and $12,000.

A look at the most recent job trends, from 2014 to 2016, suggests a shifting metro growth map in Pennsylvania. Over the past two years, Philadelphia and Harrisburg have posted much stronger job gains, Allentown’s average annual job growth rate has halved, and Pittsburgh’s job level has flat-lined. The state’s two largest urban centers frame this stark change. In every major industry category, average annual job growth in Philadelphia over the past two years outpaced its rate over the previous five years. In Pittsburgh, on the other hand, job growth slowed—or turned negative—in nearly every sector. The recent energy price crash has halted a fracking boom that buoyed the western Pennsylvania economy through much of the recovery, at the same time that Philadelphia is enjoying a surge in professional services and construction employment. Fittingly, Donald Trump used Allegheny County, outside Pittsburgh, as the backdrop for one of his first post-primary campaign stops, while Philadelphia’s economic momentum will be the background of the Democrats’ argument for another four years in the White House.

The Pennsylvania economy is thus not easily characterized, and the attitudes of its voters are likely to be shaped by regionally specific short-term and long-term trends. Those trends seem sure to keep the Keystone State’s electoral votes and U.S. Senate seat highly contested over the next several months.

As expected, on August 10, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) decisively won Turkey’s first directly-elected presidential election. He received just about 52 percent of the votes, falling somewhat short of the 55 percent that the polls were predicting.

At a time when Turkey’s neighborhood is in a state of chaos and the country is deeply polarized, what will his next steps as president be? Will he transform Turkey’s political system from a parliamentary to a presidential one? Will he be able to simultaneously run his party, control the prime minister and be the president of Turkey? Will he be able to overcome the authoritarian and abrasive politics of the last two years and replace it with politics reminiscent of the mid-2000s characterized by consensus building and liberal reforms? Or will it be a case of more of the same?

Traditionally, presidents were elected by members of the Turkish Parliament, and had limited powers. However, Erdoğan has been aspiring for a strong presidency since AKP won close to half of the votes at the national elections in June 2011. While serving as prime minister, Erdoğan attempted to write a new constitution, but resistance from opposition parties together with the May 2013 Gezi Park protests and the December 2013 corruption scandal prevented him from achieving his goal. Consequently, his fallback plan has been to emerge triumphant from the 2014 presidential elections,use the presidential powers in the current constitution to its full extent and aim to get AKP to emerge from the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2015 with enough seats, enabling him to see to the adoption of a new constitution. This new constitution would transform Turkey’s parliamentary system into a presidential one and give Erdoğan the possibility to run the country until 2023, the Republic’s centenary.

Erdoğan’s Opponents: İhsanoğlu and Demirtaş

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and Selahattin Demirtaş were Erdoğan’s main opponents. Although neither constituted major challenges for Erdoğan, each represent something significant for Turkey. The left-leaning secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP) and right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) joined forces to support İhsanoğlu’s candidacy. İhsanoğlu, born and raised in Cairo, a prominent religious scholar, and a secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation from 2004 to 2010, was seen as the best candidate to attract former AKP members, and votes from the wider conservative electorate. Though he lacked political experience and visibility in Turkey, he managed to receive more than 38 percent of the votes. This performance falls short of the 44 percent that CHP and MHP garnered at the local elections in March this year, but would still be considered as a respectable performance.

Demirtaş, a prominent figure amongst Turkey’s Kurdish minority population and a keen partner in government efforts to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, ran for presidency on a secular and somewhat leftist agenda, sensitive to the interests of especially minorities and women. He received almost 10 percent of the votes, one point short of most poll predictions, but almost twice the amount that his party, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), received in March local elections. This suggests that Demirtaş received support not just from Kurdish, but also Turkish voters, a very significant development in terms of politics in Turkey.

How Has the Turkish Political System Worked in the Past?

With Erdoğan’s victory, Turkey is now at an important crossroad. Since World War II, Turkey has been a parliamentary system. The prime minister was the head of the executive branch of government and the president, elected by the parliament, held a ceremonial role. This changed after General Kenan Evren led the 1980 military coup d’état. In 1982, Evren introduced a new constitution that empowered the president with some executive powers intended to exert some control over civilian politicians. However, with the exception of Evren and his successor, Turgut Özal, subsequent presidents, Süleyman Demirel and Ahmet Necdet Sezer, refrained from using these constitutional powers in any conspicuous manner. So where did the notion of a directly-elected president come from?

The idea of a president elected directly by the electorate, rather than by the parliament, is an outcome of the military’s interference in politics in 2007. As the end of the staunchly secular and politically shy Sezer’s term approached, the military in a rather undemocratic manner, tried to prevent the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, from becoming president. The military and the judicial establishment deeply distrusted Gül’s, as well as the AKP’s, commitment to secularism. The government overcame the challenge by calling for an early snap election that AKP won handsomely, opening the way for Gül’s election as the new president. Furthermore, the electoral victory encouraged Erdoğan to hit back at the military by calling for a referendum on whether future presidents should be directly elected by the people or by the parliament. Erdoğan’s initiative received support from 58 percent of the electorate, thereby quite decisively demonstrating to his opponents the very extent of his popularity while allowing him to emphasize the “will of the people” as the basis of his understanding of democracy.

The Campaigns: Two Approaches to Turkey’s Future

The 2014 presidential campaign unfolded as a competition between two political approaches to the future of governance in Turkey. The first approach, represented by Erdoğan, calls for a narrow and majoritarian understanding of democracy based on the notion of the “will of the people” (milli irade) at the expense of constitutional checks and balances and separation of powers. In return for such an authoritarian form of governance, Erdoğan promises a prosperous Turkey that will grow to be the 10th largest economy by 2023 and become a major regional, if not global power. It is with this in mind that Erdoğan aspires for a powerful presidential system dominated by him alone. The second approach, especially pushed for by İhsanoğlu, advocates the maintenance of the existing parliamentary system and warns that a hybrid system where both the prime minister and the president is elected directly by the people, risks creating instability, tension and polarization within the country. He advocated for a president who would be above party politics and who would focus on protecting freedoms and the rule of law.

Does Erdoğan Have a Mandate?

What will Erdoğan do now? He is confident that he enjoys wide-spread popularity among the masses. However, it is difficult to conclude if the electorate went to the polls on Sunday with a referendum to change the political system in mind. If they did, then they did so with a rather slim margin. Nevertheless, it is likely that Erdoğan will interpret the results of the elections as an explicit approval of his political agenda, and will thus proceed to transform Turkey towards a presidential system. However, a number of challenges will be awaiting his project. The first and immediate challenge will emerge with respect to the next prime minister. As a prominent Turkish columnist put it, Erdoğan will want a prime minister who will always be “one step behind”. But will politics allow for this to occur? Can Erdoğan find a loyal and unquestioning prime minister? The current constitution requires the president to resign his/her political party affiliations. Once he takes up his position as president at the end of August, will he be able to continue to enjoy control over AKP from a distance? This is not a challenge to be taken lightly considering that there will be parliamentary elections in 2015 and the ranks of AKP will be quite restless both in terms of the selection of candidates, as well as the prospects of ensuring a victory at the polls. Lastly, with ISIS’s growing power, political instability in many neighboring countries, a troubled relationship with the European Union and the United States and continued bloodbath in Syria, keeping the Turkish economy on course may turn out to be Erdogan’s greatest challenge. The coming months are going to be critical in terms of whether Erdoğan will overcome these challenges and succeed in transforming Turkey’s political system. The outcome will illustrate if Erdoğan is actually bigger than Turkey or vice versa. However, whatever happens in the next few months, it will largely determine if in 2023, Turkey will celebrate its centenary as a liberal or illiberal democracy. In the meantime, the fact that Erdoğan plans to use a constitution that was drawn up under military tutelage to achieve his presidential ambitions is both ironic, but also not very promising in terms of Turkey’s democracy turning liberal.

Editor's Note: Ranu Nath, the Turkey Project intern in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings, contributed to this piece.

Introduction

Guaranteeing the right to vote and to participate in public and political affairs for all citizens is an important responsibility. Given the precarious position that IDPs can find themselves in and considering the extent to which they may need to rely on national authorities for assistance, IDPs have a legitimate and a heightened interest in influencing the decisions that affect their lives by participating in elections.   

Internally displaced persons often exist on the margins of society and are subject to a number of vulnerabilities because of their displacement. For instance, IDPs face an immediate need for protection and assistance in finding adequate shelter, food, and health care. Over time, they can suffer discrimination in accessing public services and finding employment on account of being an IDP from another region or town. IDPs also face an especially high risk of losing ownership of their housing, property, and land, something which can lead to loss of livelihoods and economic security as well as physical security. Women and children, who often make up the majority of IDP populations, face an acute risk of sexual exploitation and abuse.  

In addition to influencing public policy, elections can also be about reconciliation and addressing divisions and inequities that exist within society. For these reasons and others, IDPs should be afforded an opportunity to fully participate in elections as voters and as candidates.   

As noted in a press release of the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons following an official mission to Georgia in December 2005, 

“[IDP] participation in public life, including elections, needs promotion and support. Supporting internally displaced persons in their pursuit of a normal life does not exclude, but actually reinforces, the option of eventual return. … Well integrated people are more likely to be productive and contribute to society, which in turn gives them the strength to return once the time is right."[1]

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It’s a fair question to ask: what was all the fuss about last October? The elections in Georgia and Azerbaijan came and went and the results were no surprise. Azerbaijani incumbent Ilham Aliyev won and Georgia's Mikhail Saakashvilli did not. The Azerbaijani elections were bogus; the Georgian elections were not. So what? Life goes on.

But perhaps it is not that simple. Most outside observers saw these elections as a barometer of democratic progress in a region where the West — and the U.S. in particular — has invested time, resources and effort over more than 20 years to help these countries to build a better future for themselves. As stakeholders in the democratic process in the South Caucasus since Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia gained their independence in 1991, Europe and the U.S. must fuss over the outcomes of the Azerbaijani and Georgian elections. 

Beyond Election Day

Evaluating these elections and their impact on the domestic social and political landscape as well as foreign relations requires, however, a focus on more than just election day. The excellent report from the European Stability Inititive on the election observation mission to Azerbaijan makes a strong case for not judging democratic progress based only on how the elections may appear to be conducted on election day.

The Georgian elections proved that post-Soviet governments could change, politicians could change and a European path be chosen. The Azerbaijani elections proved that a regime could “buy” favorable reports from short-term observers imported for election day, carry on with election rigging, continue human rights violations and ignore international criticism, whether from the Department of State or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s long-term observer mission.

Why the difference between the two neighboring countries? There are several reasons. First, Georgia’s generally free and fair 2012 parliamentary elections set a strong example for the 2013 presidential elections, and Georgia welcomed outside involvement and observation. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, prevented the visit of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Human Rights Tom Melia before its elections. Second, Georgian political parties, including the opposition, agreed on electoral ground rules. Third, the Georgian population demanded leadership change. Fourth, the outcome of elections in Georgia was accepted as a transparent way to — for the first time in modern Georgian history — transfer political legitimacy.

Test of Democratic Evolution

The real test of democratic evolution has to do with actions — over a period of months before and after election day — as well as rhetoric that affect the integrity of the elections. The pre- and post-election environments in Azerbaijan consist of continuing intimidation of the political opposition and independent NGO leadership, suppression of freedom of expression and official dismissal of any need to change. While Georgia had a pretty good pre-election period, the post-election period remains fraught with challenges to the effectiveness of Parliament and other fragile institutions, and whether the current government will pursue criminal charges against former President Saakashvili.

Is it Our Business?

There are different views regarding whether democratic evolution — in its broadest sense — is our (e.g. the West, U.S.) business at all. Who are we — despite our support for democratic change — with all our defects to establish standards for others to follow? At least for the short-term the Maidan events in Ukraine put this point into practical focus. If a country wants to be part of the West there are certain standards of economic and political reform that must be met as part of that association. In other words values matter. The traditional excuses of geopolitical importance or interests of energy security for failure to accept even the minimal international norms for treatment of a country’s own citizens are gone.

A major issue for the post-election period has become the choice between closer association with the EU or Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union. This choice really is about values that countries choose to be identified by. Armenia and Georgia made clear choices at Vilnius summit for the Eastern Partnership: Georgia and Moldova for the EU; Armenia for Eurasian Union. Ukraine was asked to make a decision but chose to walk the line between short-run financial expediency and a long-term commitment to a European future. Azerbaijan decided to choose none of the above; “neutrality” the regime called it. All the while proclaiming — along with its apologists in the West — the strategic importance of Azerbaijani energy for Europe’s future.

These countries can no longer talk their way around this or employ foreign surrogates to do this for them. Arguments for overlooking bogus elections, corruption and human rights abuses based on overriding strategic importance to the U.S. (e.g. war against terror, Northern Distribution Network, energy security) are excuses for inaction on the fundamental values that must be at the core of our relationships in the 21st century.

When countries like Azerbaijan fail to live up to these standards we do not walk away. Rather we continue to insist on solid, value-based behavior by those who profess they are partners with us. That means economic and political reforms to complete the transition from post-Soviet to 21st Century status. This requires observance of human rights, respect for freedom of expression, and release of political prisoners. It also requires a pattern of increasingly democratic elections. That’s why we need to care about elections in the south Caucasus.

We must congratulate Tbilisi on its accomplishments in the October electoral process. At the same time we must encourage the Georgian government to move along with strengthening institutions like Parliament and the judiciary so Georgia can avoid a political justice system.

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On April 30, 2007, the Brookings Center on the United States and Europe held its fourth annual conference. As in previous years, the annual conference brought together scholars, officials, and policymakers from both sides of the Atlantic to examine the evolving roles of the United States and Europe in the global arena. Panel discussions covered some critical issues about Europe and the U.S.-Europe relationship: "The French Elections", "NATO and Afghanistan" and "Islam in Europe". Panelists included, among others, Lt. General Karl Eikenberry, Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; Ashraf Ghani, former Finance Minister of Afghanistan; Tufyal Choudhury of Durham University; Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution; and Corine Lesnes from Le Monde.

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• Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20070430

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With many national economies slipping back into recession and voters in Greece, France and the United Kingdom rejecting austerity measures in recent elections, the European political and economic landscape has shifted again. Europe now seems headed towards a revised social contract and a new round of negotiations to respond to the continuing financial crisis. The United States, while experiencing a mild recovery, also strives to find the right balance between fiscal consolidation and growth preservation—a mission made more challenging with the upcoming November elections. A new loss of confidence in Europe may well imperil the U.S. economy’s fragile recovery. Will similar anti-austerity political currents cross the Atlantic and bring "change" to the United States? Despite the crisis, transatlantic cooperation has increased during the Obama administration, but U.S.-EU relations will be subjected to critical examination during the election year.

On May 23, the same day European leaders will gather for an extraordinary summit in Brussels, the Center on the United States at Brookings (CUSE) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation hosted a discussion featuring experts and top officials from both sides of the Atlantic for the 2012 CUSE Annual Conference. Panelists explored critical issues shaping the future of transatlantic relations in a year of elections and political transitions, from the euro crisis and the future of NATO to relations with Russia, Turkey and the Middle East.

After each panel, participants took audience questions.

The event is available in full on C-SPAN »

Video

• NATO in Afghanistan: In Together, Out Together
• U.S. Has Enormous Stake in Euro Crisis
• U.S., European Allies United on Iran
• U.S. Will Move Forward with Russia on Areas of Mutual Interest

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• Visions of Europe in an Election Year: Part 1
• Visions of Europe in an Election Year: Part 2
• Visions of Europe in an Election Year: Part 3

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• Intro And Remarks With Phillip Gordon (.pdf)
• Panel One Transcript (.pdf)
• Panel Two Transcript (.pdf)
• Complete Transcript (.pdf)

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It is no secret that American elections are getting wildly expensive. If you are unlucky enough to live in a swing state or a state with a competitive race for US House, US Senate or Governor, you know that every even numbered year means frequent phone calls, a barrage of campaign mail, and endless television ads. Candidates want your vote, and sometimes it seems their strategy is to annoy the average voter into turning out to the polls.

However, beyond direct candidate appeals, outside groups are now spending heavily on competitive races of all types. Many statewide campaigns now cost tens of millions of dollars, and interest groups, PACs, and other organizations are ponying up with substantial sums to try to reach voters and do one of two things. They either try to convince you one candidate deserves your vote or dissuade you from voting for the other candidate.

How much money is flowing into races beyond what candidates themselves spend? The answer is staggering. Below we profile the 20 most expensive Senate races since 2010 in terms of independent expenditures. The chart shows not only how expensive races are, but the extent to which outside groups seek to influence electoral outcomes.  

This chart shows that races are getting more expensive. Among these races, only two (Colorado and Pennsylvania) are from 2010. Half (10) of the races are being waged this cycle, and even though data are updated through Sunday, the totals are certain to rise. Those ten races alone have totaled over $435 million in spending in those states.

The totals provide a small picture into the magnitude of money in American politics. The totals exclude direct candidate spending and spending by other, outside groups not subject to as rigorous FEC disclosure requirements.

As campaigns continue to become more expensive and outside groups see participation in elections as a path toward influencing outcomes of both races and policy, there is one political certainty: over the next two to four years, many of the campaigns on this list will be displaced by future, more expensive campaigns for the Senate.

The news that Charles and David Koch and their network of conservative activists plan to spend $889 million on the 2016 elections has sent shockwaves throughout the political landscape. Publicized this week at a California gathering hosted by the business group Freedom Partners, this declaration of financial war raises the question of whether billionaires and their allies can buy elections.

As I note in my Brookings Institution Press book Billionaires: Reflections on the Upper Crust, the answer in 2012 clearly was no. A few billionaires devoted several hundred million dollars seeking to defeat President Barack Obama yet lost. Republicans nominated a candidate who was easy to caricature as an out-of-touch plutocrat who did not share the values of ordinary Americans. The President was successful in using that stereotype to mobilize voters, expand the electorate, and appeal to basic fairness on the part of the general public.

Yet 2014 was a different story. Conservative billionaires were far more successful in helping Republicans regain control of the Senate, boost their House numbers, and increase their domination over governorships and state legislatures.  The country now has GOP control of the House and Senate, and 31 governorships across the country.

In analyzing why they lost the 2012 presidential campaign, conservative billionaires decided they needed to recalibrate their message and strategy for the midterms. For example, Americans for Prosperity (AFP) focused on ads that employed moving personal stories to deliver policy messages and a robust field operation. Central to their approach was the idea that Obamacare was a failure and hurting ordinary people.

Explaining this communications shift, AFP President Tim Phillips told a reporter that “too often, we did kind of broader statistical ads or messages, and we decided that we needed to start telling the story of how the liberals’ policies, whether it’s the administration or Congress, are practically impacting the lives of Americans every day.” Media expert Elizabeth Wilner of Kantar Media/CMAG correctly anticipated that those kinds of ads would have a greater likelihood of electoral success. “Ads that tell stories are more compelling than ads that don’t,” she said. “And ads that use sympathetic figures are more compelling, generally, than those that don’t.”

In looking ahead to 2016, there are ominous signs that big money may distort the election outcome. Wealthy interests were far more likely in 2012 to contribute to Republicans than Democrats. Even if Democrats mobilize liberal billionaires, the GOP nominee is going to have a substantial fundraising advantage.

Money alone, of course, does not dictate elections. Research shows clearly that public opinion, media coverage, campaign strategies, policy positions, and the nature of the times matter as well. However, during a time of rising campaign costs and limited public engagement in the political process, big money sets the agenda, affects how the campaign develops, and shapes how particular people and policy problems get defined. It takes skilled candidates, favorable media coverage, and strong organizational efforts to offset the power of great wealth.

There are no guarantees that the future Democratic nominee will replicate Obama’s 2012 success. If Republicans nominate someone who relates well to ordinary voters and they tone down policies that disproportionately benefit the wealthy, the money story in 2016 likely will turn out very different from the last time. Billionaire activism very well could tilt a close election in favor of conservative interests.

Editor’s Note: This post was originally published by the Institute of Governmental Studies. Thomas Mann is also Resident Scholar at IGS.

Donald Trump and the Amen chorus of Republican presidential aspirants may have appeared to monopolize the capacity to make fantastical claims about what’s wrong with America and how to fix it. But a rival has appeared on the scene, outlining a very different fantasy plan to run for president on the Democratic side of the aisle.

Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig looks meek—a dead ringer for Mr. Peepers—yet is anything but. Lessig built an impressive career in legal scholarship on the regulation of cyberspace, and the mild-mannered, soft-spoken academic became a cult hero among libertarians fearful of increasing legal restrictions on copyright, trademark and the electromagnetic spectrum. But Lessig’s transformation into a political activist was spurred by his personal revelation that money in politics is the root of all our governing problems. Eliminate the dependence of elected officials on private donors and the formidable obstacles to constructive policymaking will crumble. Simple but searing truth, or a caricature of a complex governing system shaped by institutions, ideas/ideologies, and interests?

Lessig became a whirlwind of energy and organization to promote his new values and beliefs, leading efforts to “Change Congress,” convene a second constitutional convention, raise awareness of corruption in politics through the “New Hampshire Rebellion,” and start the “Mayday PAC,” a super PAC designed to end all super PACs. He wrote the bestselling book Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and A Plan to Stop It, delivered a series of popular TED talks, and tirelessly traveled the country with his PowerPoint.

With none of these enterprises yet bearing fruit, Lessig has decided to raise the stakes. He has announced that if he receives $1 million from small donors by September, he will seek the Democratic presidential nomination, running as a “referendum candidate.” His single-issue platform, built around the concept of “Citizen Equality,” consists of “true” campaign finance reform supplemented by electoral reform (to weaken the influence of gerrymandering) and voting rights. His goal is to use the election to build a mandate for political reform that will cure our democratic ills. Lessig will apparently have nothing to say about anything other than political reform, insisting that his issue should be and can be the number one priority of voters in the 2016 elections. If nominated and elected, President Lessig will serve in office only long enough to enact the Citizen Equality Act and then resign, turning over the powers and responsibilities of the office to the vice president. Recently he generously informed the Vice President that he would happily enable a third Joe Biden term by selecting him as his running mate.

The hubris of the Harvard Professor is breathtaking. In virtually every respect, his strategy is absurd. Lessig’s political reform agenda is stymied by Republicans, not Democrats. Why not direct his energies where the opposition resides? All of the current Democratic presidential candidates support the thrust of these reforms. But saying that this is their highest priority is likely to harm, not boost, their candidacies. Why would even the most ardent supporter of the three pillars of Lessig’s reform agenda cast a ballot solely on this basis? Big and important issues divide the two parties today and the stakes of public action or inaction are huge. We don’t have the luxury of using the election to try to build a mandate for a set of political reforms that would have no chance of passing in the face of GOP opposition and would be of only incremental utility if they did.

Campaign finance does play a corrosive role in our democracy and I have invested much of my career grappling with it. There is no doubt that money in elections facilitates the transfer of economic inequality into political inequality, and the spectacle of several hundred plutocrats dominating the finance of our elections should be a target of serious reform efforts in the courts and the Congress. At the same time it is foolish to imagine that campaign finance is the only route for private wealth to influence public policy or that its reform will dramatically transform the policy process. Money did not prevent the major legislative enactments of 2009-2010—including the stimulus, student loans, the Affordable Care Act, and financial services reform. Nor is it likely to be the critical factor on climate change, immigration, infrastructure or jobs and wages; which party wins the White House and whether control with Congress is unified or divided is key. If anything, the Lessig campaign is likely to weaken the forces for political reform by demonstrating just how small the relative priority for this action is.

Trump offers the country his outsider status, success in building his personal wealth, an outsized personality, a brashness in asserting how easily he can solve the country’s problems, and a hearty appetite for and skill in stoking the anger and fears of a segment of the country. He feeds the notion that a strong, fearless, wily leader, inexperienced and mostly uninformed in politics and governing, can be the man on a white horse saving a great country losing its exceptional status. His claim that all politicians are bought by private interests—a claim Lessig eagerly embraces—fits well with his grandiose claims that he alone can fix what ails the country. A significant segment of Republican voters, presumably not well versed in the American constitutional system are attracted to him, at least enough for him to be a factor in this election campaign.

Lessig is a far less commanding presence but his ambition burns no less than that of Trump. The notoriety, celebrity, and adoring audiences are heady stuff, even if on a much smaller scale. Lessig told Bloomberg that Trump’s candidacy is evidence that his reform message is taking hold. Lessig said, Trump “strikes people as credible when he says all these people (politicians) are bought—I used to buy them …Trump is saying the truth.” Lessig will be a minor figure in this election and the causes for which he fights are unlikely to advance from it. Both Lessig and Trump, despite their differences in visibility and importance in the election, will have contributed to the dumbing down of American politics, a reality that will bring tears to the eyes of civics teachers and political science professors across the country.

Event Information

The Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings, hosted The Political Geography of America's Purple States: Five Trends That Will Decide the 2008 Election, a briefing on a new series of reports on the political demography of "purple" states in the 2008 election.

Purple states-or states where the current balance of political forces does not decisively favor one party or the other-will play an undeniably pivotal role in the upcoming election and include: Virginia and Florida in the South; the Intermountain West states of Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Arizona; Michigan, Missouri, and Ohio in the Heartland; and Pennsylvania.

On October 10, 2008 at the National Press Club in Washington DC, authors William Frey and Ruy Teixeira highlighted the political and demographic trends in these 10 battleground states, focusing not only on their role in the 2008 election, but their position as toss-ups in years to come.

The session opened with an overview of the demographic shifts shaping all the contested states studied, and evolved into a detailed presentation of the trends that are testing and reshaping the balance of their voting populations, focusing particularly on five trends that Frey and Teixeira believe will decide the 2008 election. Feedback from James Barnes, political correspondent for the National Journal, helped shape the conversation.

Event Materials

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Last month’s decision by the Palestinian Authority to schedule municipal elections in early October hardly registered in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, much less here in Washington. In light of Hamas’ recent decision to take part in the process, however, those elections have suddenly taken on new meaning. While the election of some 414 village, town, and city councils across the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not change the face of the Palestinian leadership or alter the diplomatic impasse with Israel, local elections have the potential to unlock the current paralysis within Palestinian politics.

Although Palestinian law calls for local elections to take place every four years, they have only been held twice since the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993, only one of which could be deemed genuinely competitive. The first and only local elections to take place in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip were held in 2004-05, in which Hamas—in its first foray into electoral politics—made major gains. Local elections were again held in 2012, although this time Hamas boycotted the process, preventing the vote from taking place in Gaza and allowing Fatah to declare a sweeping, if somewhat hollow, victory. 

Hamas’ decision to take part in this year’s local elections was therefore something of a surprise. Indeed, Hamas initially expressed dismay at the announcement, accusing the leadership in Ramallah of acting without consulting the other parties. Moreover, should the elections proceed as planned on October 8, they would be the first competitive electoral contest in the occupied territories since Hamas defeated Mahmoud Abbas’s ruling Fatah faction in the 2006 legislative election. Those elections triggered an international boycott of the PA which eventually led to the split between Fatah and Hamas and the current political paralysis.

If nothing else, Hamas’ entry into the elections averts another needless internal crisis in Palestinian politics. A boycott by Hamas would likely have further entrenched the political and geographic division between the Fatah-dominated West Bank and Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, while dealing yet another blow to the beleaguered National Consensus Government, which despite being accepted by both factions in April 2014 has yet to physically return to Gaza. Movement on the reconciliation track could also help push the long-stalled reconstruction of Gaza, which has yet to recover from the devastating war of 2014.

Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other...[and Fatah] has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested.

What explains Hamas’ apparent change of heart? For one, Hamas may believe it has an advantage over Fatah, which continues to suffer from widespread perceptions of corruption and incompetence—a perception reinforced by the collapse of the peace process as well as the unprecedented unpopularity of President Abbas. Hamas may also view the upcoming vote as a way to gauge its current standing and future prospects in anticipation of long-awaited legislative and presidential elections. Either way, Hamas has little to lose from participating in an election that is unlikely to significantly alter the political landscape one way or the other. 

Hamas’ decision to participate in the elections is welcome news for Palestinian voters eager to see the return of competitive elections and a revival of political life after years of stagnation. It even helps Fatah, which has little to gain from “winning” another electoral process that is largely uncontested. More important, as the party that lost both parliamentary elections and a civil war in 2006-07 and that remains the chief proponent of a failed process, Fatah desperately needs a political victory of some kind as well as a basis on which to stake its claim to legitimacy and continued grip on power.

That said, it is important not to overstate the significance of local elections, which in the end will do nothing to address the deeper problems facing Palestinians in the occupied territories, whether from Israel’s continued occupation and its ever-expanding settlement enterprise or the ongoing political dysfunction within their own ranks. On the other hand, the prospect of the first competitive Palestinian elections in a decade represents a small but significant ripple in the otherwise stagnant waters of Palestinian politics.

INTRODUCTION

In August, 2010 the government of Kenya adopted a new constitution. This followed a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Kenyans voted for change. The decisive impetus for reform came from the widespread violence and political crisis that followed the 2007 election. While claims of electoral fraud provided the immediate catalyst for violence, the deeper causes were to be found in the interaction of a highly centralized ‘winner-take-all’ political system with deep social disparities based in part on group identity (Hanson 2008).

Provisions for equity figure prominently in the new constitution. Backed by a bill of rights that opens the door to legal enforcement, citizenship rights have been strengthened in many areas,including access to basic services. ‘Equitable sharing’ has been introduced as a guiding principle for public spending. National and devolved governments are now constitutionally required to redress social disparities, target disadvantaged areas and provide affirmative action for marginalized groups.

Translating these provisions into tangible outcomes will not be straightforward. Equity is a principle that would be readily endorsed by most policymakers in Kenya and Kenya’s citizens have provided their own endorsement through the referendum. However, there is an ongoing debate over what the commitment to equity means in practice, as well as over the pace and direction of reform. Much of that debate has centered on the constitutional injunction requiring ‘equitable sharing’ in public spending.

On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared.

There are compelling grounds for a strengthened focus on equity in Kenya. In recent years, the country has maintained a respectable, if less than spectacular, record on economic growth. Social indicators are also on an upward trend. On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared. Some regions and social groups face levels of deprivation that rank alongside the worst in Africa. Moreover, the deep fault lines running through society are widely perceived as a source of injustice and potential political instability.

High levels of inequality in Kenya raise wider concerns. There has been a tendency in domestic debates to see ‘equitable sharing’ as a guiding principle for social justice, rather than as a condition for accelerated growth and enhanced economic efficiency. Yet international evidence strongly suggests that extreme inequality—especially in opportunities for education— is profoundly damaging for economic growth. It follows that redistributive public spending has the potential to support growth.

The current paper focuses on a group of 12 counties located in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). They are among the most disadvantaged in the country. Most are characterized by high levels of income poverty, chronic food insecurity and acute deprivation across a wide range of social indicators.

Nowhere is the deprivation starker than in education. The ASAL counties account for a disproportionately large share of Kenya’s out-of-school children, pointing to problems in access and school retention. Gender disparities in education are among the widest in the country. Learning outcomes for the small number of children who get through primary school are for the most part abysmal, even by the generally low national average standards.

Unequal public spending patterns have played no small part in creating the disparities that separate the ASAL counties from the rest of Kenya—and ‘equitable sharing’ could play a role in closing the gap. But what would a more equitable approach to public spending look like in practice?

This paper addresses that question. It looks in some detail at education for two reasons. First, good quality education is itself a powerful motor of enhanced equity. It has the potential to equip children and youth with the skills and competencies that they need to break out of cycles of poverty and to participate more fully in national prosperity. If Kenya is to embark on a more equitable pattern of development, there are strong grounds for prioritizing the creation of more equal opportunities in education. Second, the education sector illustrates many of the wider challenges and debates that Kenya’s policymakers will have to address as they seek to translate constitutional provisions into public spending strategies. In particular, it highlights the importance of weighting for indicators that reflect need in designing formulae for budget allocations.

Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of the approach to equity enshrined in the constitution. While the spirit of the constitution is unequivocal, the letter is open to a vast array of interpretations. We briefly explore the implications of a range of approaches. Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Although this paper focuses principally on basic services, we caution against approaches that treat equity as a matter of social sector financing to the exclusion of growth-oriented productive investment.

Part 2 provides an analysis of some key indicators on poverty, health and nutrition. Drawing on household expenditure data, the report locates the 12 ASAL counties in the national league table for the incidence and depth of poverty. Data on health outcomes and access to basic services provide another indicator of the state of human development. While there are some marked variations across counties and indicators, most of the 12 counties register levels of deprivation in poverty and basic health far in excess of those found in other areas.

Part 3 shifts the focus to education. Over the past decade, Kenya has made considerable progress in improving access to basic education. Enrollment rates in primary education have increased sharply since the elimination of school fees in 2003. Transition rates to secondary school are also rising. The record on learning achievement is less impressive. While Kenya lacks a comprehensive national learning assessment, survey evidence points to systemic problems in education quality. In both access and learning, children in the ASAL counties—especially female children—are at a considerable disadvantage. After setting out the national picture, the paper explores the distinctive problems facing these counties.

In Part 4 we look beyond Kenya to wider international experience. Many countries have grappled with the challenge of reducing disparities between less-favored and more-favored regions. There are no blueprints on offer. However, there are some useful lessons and guidelines that may be of some relevance to the policy debate in Kenya. The experience of South Africa may be particularly instructive given the weight attached to equity in the post-apartheid constitution.

Part 5 of the paper explores a range of approaches to financial allocations. Converting constitutional principle into operational practice will require the development of formulae-based approaches. From an equitable financing perspective there is no perfect model. Any formula that is adopted will involve trade-offs between different goals. Policymakers have to determine what weight to attach to different dimensions of equity (for example, gender, income, education and health), the time frame for achieving stated policy goals, and whether to frame targets in terms of outcomes or inputs. These questions go beyond devolved financing. The Kenyan constitution is unequivocal in stipulating that the ‘equitable sharing’ provision applies to all public spending. We therefore undertake a series of formula-based exercises illustrating the allocation patterns that would emerge under different formulae, with specific reference to the 12 ASAL focus counties and to education.

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On Monday, July 18, 2016, the world celebrated Nelson Mandela International Day, a day recognizing the former president of South Africa’s commitment to fostering peace and freedom. Every year the Nelson Mandela Foundation hosts a lecture, inviting prominent individuals to discuss significant social issues affecting the African continent. For this year’s lecture, Bill Gates was selected to speak on the theme of “Living Together” in front of a packed stadium in Pretoria. Gates focused on a topic Mandela returned to repeatedly throughout his life—the power of the youth. In the words of Gates, “…young people are better than old at driving innovation because they are not locked in by the limits of the past… we must clear away the obstacles standing in young people’s way so that they can seize all of their potential.”

Unfortunately, South Africa, the second-largest economy on the continent, has the highest youth unemployment rate at 54 percent, as seen in the figure below. Surprisingly, according to the figure the highest rates of youth unemployment lie in the upper-middle-income countries as classified by GNI per capita. Additionally, these unemployment rates might be depressed due to the fact that unemployment refers to people looking for jobs, and many of Africa’s youth are forced into the informal sector after giving up on their search for employment.

Although youth unemployment in Africa is often seen as a growing challenge, a number of experts interpret the large youth population as an opportunity, as long as the youth have access to the economic opportunities through which they can channel their energy into progress. As Africa’s youth is predicted to grow exponentially, achieving broad-based economic growth and development will rely on breaking down the barriers to economic opportunity, by investing in human capital (through education) and in improving business environments. 

Figure 2.3. Youth unemployment will continue to be a growing challenge in 2016

Interestingly, GDP and income classification have little correlation with youth unemployment rates. For example, South Africa, which has the second-largest economy on the continent and is considered an upper-middle-income country based on its GNI per capita, has the highest youth unemployment rate at nearly 54 percent. Meanwhile, the Liberian economy, which is nearly 200 times smaller than South Africa’s, has a youth unemployment rate 10 times smaller. Youth unemployment is measured as the share of the labor force (ages 15-24) without work but available for and seeking employment. Estimates may be low in some low-income countries like Liberia because many young people cannot afford not to work to seek employment and as a result, end up in low-paying jobs.

Source: Youth unemployment figures from World Development Indicators and GDP data from the World Bank databank.

See the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative’s Foresight Africa 2016 report, from which the figure below comes, for more highlights on the growing challenge of youth unemployment in Africa. In addition, earlier this month the Brookings Institution hosted an Africa Policy Dialogue on the Hill on jobs in Africa, alluding to the shortcomings of the educational systems and the importance of infrastructure and electricity to support business and attract investment. For a summary of the conversation, see here.

Tor Syvrud contributed to this post.

As I anticipated in my post on Tuesday, the Hong Kong government on Wednesday announced the details for the 2017 election of the Chief Executive (CE). Based on press commentary from China, it is clear that the PRC government, which has sovereignty over Hong Kong, approves the package. But to understand the implications for democracy in Hong Kong, it is important to look at the details of the proposal.

Since Hong Kong became a special administrative region of China in 1997, the CE has been chosen by an election committee of between 800 and 1,200 individuals. Beijing had promised that starting in 2017 the CE would be elected by the voters of Hong Kong through universal suffrage. Yesterday’s proposal is the latest step in a transition process toward that system. (For all of the recommendations, see the speech of Chief Secretary Carrie Lam to the Legislative Council.) As I outlined in Tuesday’s post, the principal point of controversy for more than a year has been Beijing’s insistence that a nominating committee choose who gets to stand for election. Hong Kong’s democratic camp believes that the nominating committee will give China an opportunity to “screen out” individuals it does not like.

The most prominent element of the Hong Kong government’s proposal yesterday is a recommendation on the procedural mechanism by which the Nominating Committee (NC) would review candidates. This was important for two reasons. One, under the plan the NC will have the authority to pick two or three final candidates to actually run in the election. Two, Mrs. Lam made clear that that the NC’s membership would be similar to the 1,200-person election committee that has picked the CE up until now and is weighted in favor of people who are biased toward Beijing.

Thus, who the NC considers before making its final nominations becomes critical. That will determine whether the election will provide a choice between the majority who have long favored a quick transition to democracy, and those who have preferred to move slower; and also between those who believe that the current economic system benefits only the rich and should be reformed, and those who are happy with current policies.

The proposed procedural mechanism mandates that any individual who can get recommendations from one-tenth to one-twentieth of the NC will be a “potential candidate” and have the opportunity to articulate his/her policy views to the NC and the public in a transparent way. In effect, this means that the NC will likely consider between five to ten individuals for final nomination. And because pan-democrats will have be at least a minority of the NC membership, as they do in the election committee, they will be able to recommend at least one democrat as a potential candidate. That in turn creates the possibility that a democrat could become a final nominee and compete to become CE. In that case, voters who have supported democracy and believe current economic policies are flawed would have a candidate who shares their general outlook. This mechanism would seem to be consistent with what the spokesman of the U.S. Consulate-General said earlier today: “The legitimacy of the chief executive will be greatly enhanced if the chief executive is selected through universal suffrage and Hong Kong’s residents have a meaningful choice of candidates.”

Let me be clear: the pan-democrats do not like this proposal. They do not like a mechanism that amounts to screening by China, and this one certainly opens a backdoor for Beijing to veto candidates it doesn’t like. In addition, the pan-democrats would like to have a promise from Beijing that this is not the end of the reform process when it comes to electing the CE, but Mrs. Lam gave no hope on that score, even though she said future circumstances might require more change.

The pan-democrats were likely unhappy about the government’s refusal to propose changes on two specific issues. Both concern the sub-sectors that will make up the NC, which will be copied from the current election committee. These subsectors represent different parts of the Hong Kong community, but the balance of voting power favors subsectors that 1) represent various business interests, 2) support Beijing on most issues, and 3) are afraid of populist movements. Back in December, the government floated the idea of shifting the balance of power among the existing subsectors so that under-represented groups got more votes, but on one condition, that the existing subsectors agreed. In the end, no change was made here, perhaps due to the stated reasons that there was no social consensus to make this change and that doing so would only create more political controversy. The more likely reason is that the subsectors that stood to lose their relative power were not willing to have their oxen gored.

The second issue had to do with “corporate voting” within subsectors. In some subsectors the constituent members decide their choices based on the preference of the leader of the member organizations. For example, in a subsector made up of commercial firms, the CEO of each member firm decides how to cast the firm’s vote. The alternative would be to have a larger number of people associated with the firm contribute to the decision, up to all the employees. As a matter of principle, the pan-democratic camp has long called for an end to corporate voting, and while there was an opportunity to do so on this occasion, the government didn’t take it.

So, the pan-democratic bloc in the Legislative Council walked out during Mrs. Lam’s presentation to the Legislative Council and has vowed to vote against this proposal. And if all of them did vote against, that would kill the proposal, because it must pass the Legislative Council by a two-thirds margin and the establishment caucus does not have enough votes on its own. On the other hand, Beijing and the Hong Kong government do not need to win over the whole of the disparate democratic camp. They just have to peel off four opposition legislators to secure the necessary majority. Presumably these would be more moderate politicians who might conclude that the reform package is “good enough” compared to the alternative. That is, Beijing and the Hong Kong government say that if the package is vetoed, election of the CE would revert to the 1,200-member election committee, delaying a one-person, one-vote election for some time. The danger for these moderates in voting for the proposal is that they will be excoriated by their colleagues for defecting and betraying principles, to the point of facing a challenge from within their camp in the next legislative election.

Hong Kong public opinion and legislators in particular have to face a couple of critical questions. The first is whether a system that produces a contest between at least one establishment candidate and one democratic candidate is indeed “good enough.” The recommended system could be improved upon in several ways, of that there is no doubt. On the other hand, if this system works as optimists think it could, then Hong Kong voters will have a real choice in picking their leader, for the first time in history.

Second, would this mechanism indeed produce an election contest between at least one establishment candidate and one democratic candidate? Is there a way in which members of the establishment could nominally consider a democratic potential candidate and then deny him or her the nomination? In fact there is. The government’s proposal specifies that after all the potential candidates have been heard from, the NC members then select two or three nominees. Each NC members get two votes, and nomination requires 50 percent. So establishment members of the NC, after going through the motions of considering a pan-democrat, could simply not give that person the majority needed for nomination. The procedure and their numerical majority give them the power to do so.

But is such a bait-and-switch tactic wise politically? If this mechanism is sold both to the public and moderate democrats as a “good enough” way to produce a competitive election but the result is a contest between two individuals associated with the establishment and the status quo, how much legitimacy will the process itself and the person ultimately selected have? Will the polarization, obstructionism, and protests that have come to mark Hong Kong politics subside or grow? Will Beijing face more stability in Hong Kong or less?

In short, does this mechanism not put the establishment in a position that it almost has to nominate a moderate democrat if it is to enjoy broad community respect? And if the establishment is being challenged to do the right thing, so are the democrats. As imperfect as they see the current package, if it creates a good enough chance of electing one of their own, would the democrats not lose community respect if they reject it and deny voters a choice (they already know that Beijing and others will blame them for reverting to the old system)?

This dual challenge creates the possibility of a compromise. The missing ingredient, of course, is the mistrust that each camp has about the intentions of the other, mistrust born of the decades-long struggle over whether Hong Kong should have a genuinely democratic system. Providing that ingredient will be a challenge itself. 

Hong Kong’s next vote for Chief Executive (CE)—scheduled for 2017—offers a narrow pathway for improving democratic governance. The question is will a few of Hong Kong’s democratic legislators recognize the opportunity and make the necessary compromises.

As I saw in a trip to the city last week, discussions about reforming the election process are already well underway. Up until now, the CE has always been chosen by a 1200-person selection committee, mostly comprised of members willing to follow China’s lead on major political issues. Now under consideration is a plan to elect the next CE through a one-person, one-vote election (universal suffrage). The number of eligible voters would jump from 1,200 to around 5 million.

The caveat from Beijing has been that the candidates for that election would be selected by a nominating committee to be modelled on—you guessed it—the old selection committee. Pro-democracy politicians have sought a more flexible and open-ended process. It was public opposition to Beijing’s nominating committee that set off the Umbrella Movement protests last September and the 79-day occupation of several downtown thoroughfares. The democrats’ opposition to the current plan is important because the tabled proposal must receive support from two-thirds of the Legislative Council to pass, and the government doesn’t have the votes. It needs four democrats to cross the aisle and vote for the package.

Outsized importance

Hong Kong is a small place (7.25 million people), but what happens to the universal suffrage proposal has rather large implications. I have often thought that how China calibrates its choices concerning Hong Kong’s political system says something about what kind of great power it will be. This is not the defining issue of China’s revival as a great power, to be sure. How Beijing uses its growing power economically, diplomatically, and coercively is more important.

Yet most of the objects of China’s exercise of power, particularly in East Asia, are countries with informed, patriotic populations who care about the security and independence of their countries. (The only real exceptions are the islands of the East and South China Sea whose only inhabitants are seagulls.) So China will have to balance any temptation to promote its interests in more assertive ways with a sensitivity to popular feeling. Indeed, its recent “big country” mentality has caused a backlash in the “small countries” it has tried to bend to its will.

Shifting politics

So Hong Kong should be a good test of China’s sensitivity level. It is constitutionally a part of China. Its population is predominantly ethnic Chinese. The overwhelming majority of people accept their lot as Chinese citizens and would do nothing to upset the status quo. They are inherently pragmatic and understand, most of them, the benefits Hong Kong enjoys by being a part of China, including the rule of law and some political freedoms.

But a significant majority also want genuine electoral democracy. If China had granted that ten years ago, the gratitude would have been profound. But the delay has had deleterious effects. Hong Kong’s politics have become more polarized and radicalized. Political mistrust is deep and moderates have been marginalized, especially in the democratic camp. Meanwhile, the new Chinese leadership is placing greater emphasis on national security, and Beijing’s propaganda organs warn of “foreign forces” (e.g. the United States) working behind the scenes to destabilize Hong Kong.

So far, therefore, the interaction between the Chinese central government and the majority of the Hong Kong public has not gone well as it could have. Things will come to a head in a couple of weeks when the Legislative Council votes on the electoral reform proposal. The democratic camp maintains an apparently strong united front and says it will vote as a bloc against the package, which will mean that Hong Kong reverts to the past “small circle” election of the CE.

During my visit I found a couple of brave souls who believe the game is not over; the dominant mood, however, was one of pessimism. If the package goes down, there will likely be no protests, since radical forces have at least blocked what they hate, even as they didn’t secure what they wanted. If the package passes, however, there will likely be protests akin to those last fall, but not as prolonged. Whatever happens, there will be a big demonstration on or around July 1, the eighteenth anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China. The size of that rally will be a barometer of the intensity of public feeling.

A “narrow pathway” to success?

There is a curious aspect about the package that Legislative Council will vote on. As I outlined in a Brookings blog post in late April, the proposal actually creates a narrow pathway for the democrats to first nominate and then elect one of their own as CE.

It would require, above all, a willingness on the part of at least four democrats to set aside their dissatisfaction with the undemocratic defects of the current proposal (and they do exist) and focus on the democratic opportunity that it presents. Later on, it would require the democrat camp to unite in supporting a moderate candidate who would not invite Beijing’s automatic rejection and who would have broad public support (and such individuals do exist). It should also have confidence that the majority of voters are on their side and would vote for that candidate. This is not a sure thing. The pro-Beijing members of the nominating committee will have the power not to name that person as a candidate—but rejecting a moderate, popular democrat would put them in a very awkward position.

The independent people that I spoke to in Hong Kong last week agreed with me that the current proposal creates this “narrow pathway.” But they also deplored the reality that the mutual mistrust between the democratic and pro-Beijing camps has become a serious obstacle to a sensible compromise. Radicals dominate the democratic camp. Their influence often constrains moderate democrats who might otherwise vote, as an act of conscience, for the package.

Beijing could have conducted its engagement with the Hong Kong public and the democratic camp in a much more skillful way. The priority it places on control of Hong Kong has outweighed its pledges to institute democracy. That has not changed, and it has contributed to the radicalization of Hong Kong politics. Yet the radicals, who would rather fight than win, are now providing Beijing with a pretext to take no chances.

William Galston and E.J. Dionne, Jr. make the case for universal voting – a new electoral system in which voting would be regarded as a required, civic duty. Why not treat showing up at the polls in the same way we treat a jury summons, which compels us to present ourselves at the court? Galston and Dionne argue that universal voting would enhance the legitimacy of our governing institutions, greatly increasing turnout and the diversity of the American voter base, and ease the intense partisan polarization that weakens our governing capacity.

Citing the implementation of universal voting in Australia in 1924, the authors conclude that universal voting increases citizen participation in the political process. In the United States, they write, universal voting would promote participation among citizens who are not likely to vote—those with lower levels of income and education, young adults, and recent immigrants. By evening out disparities in the electorate, universal voting would put the state on the side of promoting broad civic participation.

In addition to expanding voter participation, universal voting would improve electoral competition and curb hyperpolarization. Galston and Dionne assert that the addition of less partisan voters in the electorate, would force candidates to shift their focus from mobilizing partisan bases to persuading moderates and less committed voters. Reducing partisan rhetoric would help ease polarization and increase prospects for compromise.. Rather than focusing on symbolic, political gestures, Washington might have an incentive to tackle serious issues and solve problems.

Galston and Dionne believe that American democracy cannot be strong if citizenship is weak. And right now, they contend citizenship is strong on rights but weak on responsibilities. Making voting universal would begin to right this balance and send an important message: we all have the duty to help shape the country that has given us so much.

Galston and Dionne recognize that the majority of Americans are far from ready to endorse universal voting. By advancing a proposal that stands outside the perimeter of what the majority of Americans are likely to support, Galston and Dionne aim to enrich public debate—in the short term, by advancing the cause of more modest reforms that would increase participation; in the long term, by expanding public understanding of institutional remedies to political dysfunction. 

Downloads

• Download the paper

Audio

• Dionne and Galston discuss their paper on universal voting

Recently, Bolivian President Evo Morales declared himself a “slave of the people” and said he is backing the proposed constitutional reform that would enable him to seek re-election in 2019 if that’s what the citizens want. Last Saturday, September 26, the Legislative Assembly partially amended the Constitution (by a two-thirds majority), authorizing Morales to run for the presidency once again in 2019. February 21, 2016 is set as the date of the popular referendum to validate or reject the amendment.

This amendment allows presidential re-election for two consecutive terms, rather than just one re-election, as dictated by the previous constitutional provision. The change takes into account the current presidential term (2015-2020) and clarifies that Evo and his vice president are authorized to run only one more time, that is, to seek re-election only for the 2020 to 2025 period. The opposition immediately denounced the amendment as “tailoring the law to the needs of one person”.

It should be noted that Morales and García ran and won in the 2005, 2009, and 2014 elections. The current term is the second consecutive term under the new Bolivian Constitution (adopted in 2009) and the third since they were first elected, in 2005. If he wins the elections scheduled for 2019, Evo would become one of the leaders to hold power the longest in Bolivia and throughout Latin America.

Re-election fever

This constitutional amendment, recently adopted in Bolivia, is not an isolated event. Rather, it fits within a regional trend toward re-election that has been gaining ground in Latin America over the past 20 years.

While the region ushered in democracy in the late 1970s and many clearly opposing re-election, this situation changed dramatically a few years later. The first wave of reforms favorable to immediate or consecutive re-election came in the first half of the 1990s with the impetus of Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1993), Carlos Menem in Argentina (1994), and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil (1997). From then on, several more presidents introduced reforms during their administrations to keep themselves in power. A second wave of reforms, led by Hugo Chávez, took place in the middle of the last decade, with a view to moving from immediate re-election to indefinite re-election. Chávez secured this objective via referendum in 2009.

Chávez’s example was reproduced by Daniel Ortega in 2014 in Nicaragua (the second country to allow indefinite re-election). Currently one more president, Rafael Correa (Ecuador), is promoting a reform along similar lines.

Recent reforms and trends

The years 2014 and 2015 have been full of news a about re-election. In the last 20 years the Dominican Republic has led in the number of re-election related reforms, with four from 1994 to 2015. The most recent, in July 2015, has re-established immediate re-election, enabling President Danilo Medina to run once again in May 2016 elections to aspire to a second consecutive term.

Two more countries have moved in what some might call extreme directions in 2014 and 2015. Nicaragua eliminated any impediment to re-election from the constitution in January of 2014, while Colombia moved in the opposite direction when they approved a reform prohibiting presidential re-election, in June 2015, a decade after re-election was first adopted.

On April 22, 2015, the Honduran Supreme Court declared the articles of the constitution that prohibited presidential re-election inapplicable. These articles also punished public officials and any other citizen who proposed or supported amending them, as these articles were considered not subject to reform. In 2009 the effort to call a National Constitutional Assembly after a non-binding consultation to amend the constitution and do away with this provision, led to the coup d’état that removed former President Zelaya from office.

In Brazil, the Chamber of Deputies cast an initial vote in 2015 in favor of eliminating re-elections, which is now being examined in the Senate. Most analysts consider it likely that the senate will adopt a similar position as the lower house, i.e. in favor of doing away with re-election.

Finally, one should note the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, countries in which efforts are under way to amend the constitutions in relation to elections, in the terms analyzed above.

As a result of the reforms of the last few years, at this time 14 of the 18 countries in the region allow re-election, albeit with different specific rules. Venezuela (since 2009) and Nicaragua (since 2014) are the only countries so far that allow indefinite re-election. In five countries – Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic – consecutive re-election is allowed, but not indefinitely (only one re-election is permitted). Nonetheless, presidents who re-founded the institutional order through constitutional assemblies have been able to benefit from a third term, leaving out the first term on the argument that it pre-dated the constitutional reforms (Bolivia and Ecuador). To these five countries we should added the above-mentioned case of Honduras.

In six other countries one can return to the presidency after an interval of one or two presidential terms. These are Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. As we have observed, only four countries have an absolute prohibition on any type of re-election, namely Mexico, Guatemala, Paraguay, and, since last July, Colombia.

My opinion

This re-election fever is bad news for a region like ours given the institutional weaknesses, the crisis of the political parties, the growing personalization of politics, and, in several countries, hyper-presidentialism.

Something is very wrong when a president of a democracy considers himself or herself as indispensable as to change the constitution in order to stay in power. As Pope Francis noted recently; “a good leader is one who is capable of bringing up other leaders. If a leader wants to lead alone, he is a tyrant. True leadership is fruitful.”

“The leaders of today will not be here tomorrow. If they do not plant the seed of leadership in others, they are worthless. They are dictators,” he concluded.

I agree with Pope Francis. The health of a democracy depends essentially on its ability to limit the power of those in government so they cannot reshape the law to fit their personal ambitions. In other words, democracy in Latin America does not need leaders who are slaves of the people, but who are slaves to the law and the institutions.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA.

The European Union’s international partners often accuse it of not speaking with a single voice on key global issues. Yet, there are instances when Europe does display a coherent approach to policy-making in international affairs. In this paper for the Center on the United States and Europe, Matteo Garavoglia argues that EU Election Observation Missions (EU EOMs) are a worthy example of such occurrences.

Unlike in most other foreign policy domains, EU supranational institutions, rather than national capitals, lead EOMs' policymaking. More specifically, the European External Action Service’s Democracy and Electoral Observation Division, the European Commission’s Foreign Policy Instrument, and the European Parliament’s Directorate for Democracy Support are the key actors behind this policy area.

Writing for Brookings’s U.S.-Europe Analysis Series, Matteo Garavoglia investigates why European supranational actors are at the core of EOMs policymaking. Having done so, he analyzes the role that national governments and non-institutional agents play in conceptualizing and operationalizing EOMs. Finally, he explores ways in which Europe’s international partners could build bridges with Brussels in this policy area.

Downloads

• EU election observation policy: A supranationalist transatlantic bridge?

What if I told you I’d found a surefire way to decrease community involvement in our local schools while at the same time increasing the costs of providing education for taxpayers? Probably not a political winner, eh? And yet, for well over 100 years we’ve adopted such an approach to governing America’s public schools.

I’m talking of course, about the widespread and increasingly questionable practice of local school district governments holding their school board elections “off-cycle” so that they are contested apart from regular national elections.

Just how significant and widespread are “off-cycle” school board elections? And what are the consequences of using off-cycle elections for the tone and direction of education policy? UC Berkeley Political Scientist Sarah Anzia recently penned a terrific book examining the causes and consequences of off-cycle elections in American politics in which she finds that 90 percent of states hold at least some municipal races apart from major national elections and three quarters of states do so for school board elections. Data from the National School Boards Association seem to confirm Anzia’s descriptive account on the prevalence of these elections.

By exploiting the occasional episode in which a change in state law forced localities to move their elections “on cycle,” Anzia is able to provide some pretty rigorous causal evidence that off-cycle elections decrease voter turnout and equip organized interests (e.g. teachers unions) to obtain more favorable policy outcomes. Anzia’s findings mesh nicely with other work done by University of Pennsylvania Political Scientist, Marc Meredith, who found that when school boards are given the authority to choose election dates for raising revenue (e.g. bond elections) boards will “manipulate” the timing of elections in predictable ways to ensure an electorate that is most favorable to increased school spending.

"While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be 'elected' by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election."

While most citizens are tuned into the presidential primary contests this year, the important reality is that thousands of school board members will be “elected” by tiny and unrepresentative electorates prior to next November’s general election. This isn’t an accident or an oversight. The helpless position of today’s “education voter” is a predictable consequence of Progressive era reforms that sought to “take politics out of education.” As Columbia Professor, Jeffrey Henig, explains in his insightful and wide-ranging book, The End of Exceptionalism in American Education, the widespread use of single-purpose governments that are insulated from the electorate has been a hallmark of American school governance that is only recently beginning to come undone.

Advocates of off-cycle elections sometimes contend that holding school elections apart from major federal elections helps foster a more informed electorate. But shouldn’t the onus be on those who defend off-cycle elections to demonstrate better outcomes in districts that cling to a policy that often results in higher costs to taxpayers and diminishes small-d democracy. Of course it’s fair and important to ask, “How much democracy is good for our schools?” However, there are at least three reasons to be skeptical that the benefits of using “off-cycle” elections outweigh the costs:

First, I’m unaware of any scholarly evidence that the voters who participate in off-cycle elections are significantly more informed than the electorates participating in on-cycle elections. More importantly, I am not aware of any scholarly research that demonstrates a linkage between off-cycle elections and better student achievement outcomes. To the contrary, my friend and collaborator Arnie Shober (Lawrence University) and I found a strong association between a district’s relative academic performance and the use of on-cycle elections in a 2014 analysis that we undertook for the Fordham Institute. Although that report could not establish any causal relationship between on-cycle elections and better student achievement (clearly we could not randomly assign on-cycle elections), the fact that we found a positive correlation between on-cycle school board elections and a district’s academic performance arguably puts the ball back in the court of those who would prefer diminished citizen participation and higher fiscal costs.

Second, on the subject of higher costs, consider the takeaway from a recent piece in Governing Magazine that quotes Rice University Political Scientist and local elections expert, Melissa Marschall.  It paraphrases Marschall, saying “There's no doubt about it. Holding concurrent elections is bound to increase turnout…Holding elections less frequently should save them [local governments] money.” In short, even if some benefits (a marginally more informed electorate?) could in theory be demonstrated, one would also need to account for known costs: lower citizen participation and more frequent elections that school districts cannot piggyback onto national or statewide elections.

Third and finally, as Eitan Hersh explains in a hard-hitting recent post on FiveThirtyEight, there’s more than a tinge of hypocrisy when it comes to those who defend off-cycle elections. Ironically, while the Democratic Party and organized labor often advocate for policies that enhance workplace democracy and reduce barriers to voter participation (i.e., opposing voter ID laws, supporting same day registration and vote by mail), these two groups have, according to Hersh, led the charge to retain off-cycle school board elections that all but assure lower and more unrepresentative turnout.  

Admittedly, there’s no perfect approach to governing American K-12 education. And, governance “reform” is hardly a panacea for improving our schools. Nonetheless, as Noel Epstein wisely observed in her 2004 volume, Who’s in Charge Here?, when education governance is fragmented ordinary citizens are challenged to hold policy-makers accountable because it is difficult for the public to mobilize and readily identify which political authority or authorities are responsible. The bottom line: we don’t do the electorate any additional favors by purposefully staggering school board races across multiple off-year election cycles. Consolidating the school election calendar is a small, but nonetheless sensible step in the right direction.  

In the U.S., the older and younger generations look very different. While older Americans are predominantly white, young Americans, like millennials, have more varied racial backgrounds. These demographic chasms have political implications: white, older Americans tend to favor conservative politics and have overwhelmingly voted for Republican candidates in past elections; younger Americans, regardless of racial identity, tend to lean left and support broadening social support programs.

In a podcast segment, I explore how these racial and political divides between generations will, no doubt, impact this year’s presidential election and races in the future.

Listen to the full podcast here: