We are kicking off the new Millions Learning video series with a spotlight on Teach For All, one of the 14 case studies examined in the Millions Learning report. Teach For All is an international network of local, independent partner country organizations dedicated to improving educational opportunities for children and youth around the globe. From China to Bulgaria to Peru to Ghana, each partner organization recruits and trains recent top-performing graduates and professionals to teach in their country’s underserved communities for two years, with the ultimate goal of developing a cadre of education leaders, both inside and outside of the classroom.

In this video, Wendy Kopp, CEO and co-founder of Teach For All, discusses Teach For All’s unique approach to building a pipeline of future “learning leaders and champions” and the role that a supportive policy environment plays in enabling this process. Kopp then explains how Teach For All grew from the original Teach For America and Teach First in the United Kingdom to an international network of 40 partner countries, sharing her own lessons learned along the way.

To learn more about Millions Learning, please visit our interactive report, Millions Learning: Scaling up quality education in developing countries, and/or visit our webpage.

Video

• Getting millions to learn: Interview with Wendy Kopp of Teach For All

Extreme poverty around the world has decreased from around 2 billion people in 1990 living under $2 per day to 700 million today. Further, nine out of 10 children are now enrolled in primary schools, an increase over the last 15 years. Progress in both areas since 2000 has been part of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which set targets for reducing extreme poverty in eight areas, and which were the guiding principles for global development from 2000 to 2015. Today, the global community, through the UN, has adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals to continue these poverty reduction efforts. 

In this new episode of Intersections podcast, host Adrianna Pita engages Brookings scholars Laurence Chandy and Rebecca Winthrop in a discussion of how digital technologies can be harnessed to bring poverty reduction and education to the most marginalized populations.

Listen:

Chandy, a fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings, says that the trends in getting people digitally connected "are progressing at such speed that they’re starting to reach some of the poorest people in the world. Digital technology is changing what it means to be poor because it’s bringing poor people out of the margins.”

Winthrop, a senior fellow and director of the Center for Universal Education at Brookings, says that "I think [education] access is crucial. And I do think that’s almost the first wave because without it we could work on all the ed tech—fabulous apps, great language translated content—but if you do not have the access it’s not going to reach the most marginalized."

Listen to this episode above; subscribe on iTunes; and find more episodes on our website.

Chandy was a guest on the Brookings Cafeteria Podcast in 2013; Winthrop has been a guest on the Cafeteria a few times to discuss global education topics, including: access plus education; investing in girls' education; and getting millions learning in the developing world.

While Israeli and Palestinian interests are best served by a negotiated two-state state solution, the peace plan that Sam Bahour proposed in his February post disregards Israel's demographic and security concerns and is tantamount to a Palestinian veto on a negotiated solution. His insistence on the right of return for Palestinian refugees and rejection of security limitations on Palestinian sovereignty in effect asks Israel to become a binational state while creating a militarized Palestinian state alongside it. Bahour rejects the notion of unilateral action, but his case only reinforces my belief that Israel may need to act independently to protect its interests.

The logic behind the Clinton parameters and President Obama’s peace plan was that in return for the creation of a Palestinian state, Palestinian refugees would relinquish their claim to Israel; the hope was that this would allow for the "two states for two peoples" to exist side-by-side. Yet Bahour rejects compromise on the refugee issue as the forfeiture of “basic components of statehood and basic principles of Israeli-Palestinian peace that are enshrined in international law.” Any peace agreement that both establishes a Palestinian state and recognizes the rights of millions of Palestinians to enter Israel would hasten the end of Israel's Jewish identity.

Israel's interest in the creation of a Palestinian state is also built upon the assumption that a sound agreement would improve its security rather than threaten it. To this end, Israel has called for a demilitarized Palestinian state, and this has been echoed by the United States, France, the Czech Republic, the European Union, and Australia’s Labor Party. Even Mahmoud Abbas accepted the premise of demilitarization, saying, “We don’t need planes or missiles. All we need is a strong police force.” Nevertheless, Bahour’s piece declares any limitations on the sovereignty of Palestine unacceptable. For Israel, a peace deal that grants one’s adversaries access to more deadly weaponry would be absurd.

Bahour argues that my strategies for reaching a two-state solution are doomed because they do not meet the "mutual interests" of the parties to the conflict, but his plan does not offer incentives for Israel to make peace.

Bahour argues that my strategies for reaching a two-state solution are doomed because they do not meet the "mutual interests" of the parties to the conflict, but his plan does not offer incentives for Israel to make peace. His proposal not only fails to improve Israel's situation in any tangible sense, but further endangers it. Rejectionist Palestinian positions like Bahour's (and Abbas's recent dismissal of Biden's initiative) would veto the two-state solution as a means to move towards a single binational state. That is precisely why Israel may need to act independently to keep a two-state solution viable.

INTRODUCTION

In August, 2010 the government of Kenya adopted a new constitution. This followed a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Kenyans voted for change. The decisive impetus for reform came from the widespread violence and political crisis that followed the 2007 election. While claims of electoral fraud provided the immediate catalyst for violence, the deeper causes were to be found in the interaction of a highly centralized ‘winner-take-all’ political system with deep social disparities based in part on group identity (Hanson 2008).

Provisions for equity figure prominently in the new constitution. Backed by a bill of rights that opens the door to legal enforcement, citizenship rights have been strengthened in many areas,including access to basic services. ‘Equitable sharing’ has been introduced as a guiding principle for public spending. National and devolved governments are now constitutionally required to redress social disparities, target disadvantaged areas and provide affirmative action for marginalized groups.

Translating these provisions into tangible outcomes will not be straightforward. Equity is a principle that would be readily endorsed by most policymakers in Kenya and Kenya’s citizens have provided their own endorsement through the referendum. However, there is an ongoing debate over what the commitment to equity means in practice, as well as over the pace and direction of reform. Much of that debate has centered on the constitutional injunction requiring ‘equitable sharing’ in public spending.

On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared.

There are compelling grounds for a strengthened focus on equity in Kenya. In recent years, the country has maintained a respectable, if less than spectacular, record on economic growth. Social indicators are also on an upward trend. On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared. Some regions and social groups face levels of deprivation that rank alongside the worst in Africa. Moreover, the deep fault lines running through society are widely perceived as a source of injustice and potential political instability.

High levels of inequality in Kenya raise wider concerns. There has been a tendency in domestic debates to see ‘equitable sharing’ as a guiding principle for social justice, rather than as a condition for accelerated growth and enhanced economic efficiency. Yet international evidence strongly suggests that extreme inequality—especially in opportunities for education— is profoundly damaging for economic growth. It follows that redistributive public spending has the potential to support growth.

The current paper focuses on a group of 12 counties located in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). They are among the most disadvantaged in the country. Most are characterized by high levels of income poverty, chronic food insecurity and acute deprivation across a wide range of social indicators.

Nowhere is the deprivation starker than in education. The ASAL counties account for a disproportionately large share of Kenya’s out-of-school children, pointing to problems in access and school retention. Gender disparities in education are among the widest in the country. Learning outcomes for the small number of children who get through primary school are for the most part abysmal, even by the generally low national average standards.

Unequal public spending patterns have played no small part in creating the disparities that separate the ASAL counties from the rest of Kenya—and ‘equitable sharing’ could play a role in closing the gap. But what would a more equitable approach to public spending look like in practice?

This paper addresses that question. It looks in some detail at education for two reasons. First, good quality education is itself a powerful motor of enhanced equity. It has the potential to equip children and youth with the skills and competencies that they need to break out of cycles of poverty and to participate more fully in national prosperity. If Kenya is to embark on a more equitable pattern of development, there are strong grounds for prioritizing the creation of more equal opportunities in education. Second, the education sector illustrates many of the wider challenges and debates that Kenya’s policymakers will have to address as they seek to translate constitutional provisions into public spending strategies. In particular, it highlights the importance of weighting for indicators that reflect need in designing formulae for budget allocations.

Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of the approach to equity enshrined in the constitution. While the spirit of the constitution is unequivocal, the letter is open to a vast array of interpretations. We briefly explore the implications of a range of approaches. Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Although this paper focuses principally on basic services, we caution against approaches that treat equity as a matter of social sector financing to the exclusion of growth-oriented productive investment.

Part 2 provides an analysis of some key indicators on poverty, health and nutrition. Drawing on household expenditure data, the report locates the 12 ASAL counties in the national league table for the incidence and depth of poverty. Data on health outcomes and access to basic services provide another indicator of the state of human development. While there are some marked variations across counties and indicators, most of the 12 counties register levels of deprivation in poverty and basic health far in excess of those found in other areas.

Part 3 shifts the focus to education. Over the past decade, Kenya has made considerable progress in improving access to basic education. Enrollment rates in primary education have increased sharply since the elimination of school fees in 2003. Transition rates to secondary school are also rising. The record on learning achievement is less impressive. While Kenya lacks a comprehensive national learning assessment, survey evidence points to systemic problems in education quality. In both access and learning, children in the ASAL counties—especially female children—are at a considerable disadvantage. After setting out the national picture, the paper explores the distinctive problems facing these counties.

In Part 4 we look beyond Kenya to wider international experience. Many countries have grappled with the challenge of reducing disparities between less-favored and more-favored regions. There are no blueprints on offer. However, there are some useful lessons and guidelines that may be of some relevance to the policy debate in Kenya. The experience of South Africa may be particularly instructive given the weight attached to equity in the post-apartheid constitution.

Part 5 of the paper explores a range of approaches to financial allocations. Converting constitutional principle into operational practice will require the development of formulae-based approaches. From an equitable financing perspective there is no perfect model. Any formula that is adopted will involve trade-offs between different goals. Policymakers have to determine what weight to attach to different dimensions of equity (for example, gender, income, education and health), the time frame for achieving stated policy goals, and whether to frame targets in terms of outcomes or inputs. These questions go beyond devolved financing. The Kenyan constitution is unequivocal in stipulating that the ‘equitable sharing’ provision applies to all public spending. We therefore undertake a series of formula-based exercises illustrating the allocation patterns that would emerge under different formulae, with specific reference to the 12 ASAL focus counties and to education.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Parents, educators, government ministers and policymakers in all contexts and countries around the world are concerned with learning and how to improve it. There are many reasons for this, but none is more important than the fact that learning is at the heart of success at the individual, community and global levels. Learning First is the title of this report, with the strong implication that learning should be the foremost goal of education policies worldwide.

The present review seeks not only to explain why this is the case but also focuses on what we need to know—that is, what research is needed—in order to improve learning in the decades to come, particularly among those children most in need. This question is addressed in the following six sections.

1. Learning Goals and Research. The first section begins with a historical synopsis of international education goals put forward in 1990 at the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien (Thailand), in 2000 at the Education for All conference in Dakar, and later in 2000 as a part of the UN Millennium Development Goals for 2015. In 2011, the Center for Universal Education at the Brookings Institution published A Global Compact on Learning: Taking Action on Education in Developing Countries, which stated that there is a “global learning crisis—which affects children and youth who are out of school with limited learning opportunities and those who are in school but not learning the skills they need for their futures.” The present review of learning research in low-income countries follows from that report. The overall purpose is to explore the most pressing learning issues today that require further research attention in the years to come.
    
2. Learning Definitions and Contexts. This section reviews how the field of education has defined learning over the years. Here, learning is defined as a modification of behavior due to experience—such as in knowledge, skills, attitudes and values. Three main principles of effective learning are suggested: individual active involvement, social participation, and meaningful engagement. As a way to emphasize the importance of learning contexts, three individual stories—Illa, a four-year-old Quechua-speaking girl in Peru; Pawan, an eight-year-old primary school student in urban India; and Rachida, a young illiterate woman in rural Morocco—are provided in order to better explain the importance of learning as a culturally specific phenomenon. These stories help to illustrate a more general learning framework, encompassing the relationship between two dimensions of learning—its processes and contexts. A discussion follows concerning the need to disaggregate learners and their learning contexts—between countries and within countries—as a way to overcome frequent and simplistic generalizations about how the “average” child learns.
    
3. Global Change and the Contexts of Learning. This section considers the issue of global change on how learning and learning contexts are being transformed around the world. For example, researchers need to pay more attention to the impact of migration on children’s learning and on educational systems more broadly. In each instance of translocation, children confront the challenges of adapting to a new environment that may include different languages, dialects or cultures within the nonformal learning contexts of daily life. Similarly, in formal education contexts, student migrants have to cope with contrasts in culture, lifestyle and language of schooling, and demonstrate skills and achievement that may vary dramatically with their culture of origin. Other changes due to globalization include increased multilingualism in schools, growing overcrowding in classrooms, inability to keep up with teacher training, changes in intergenerational learning, and the growing importance of 21st-century skills. Based on these observations, it is suggested that learning contexts and needs should be understood as a shifting target.

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INTRODUCTION

With fewer than three years until the planned end-date of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), attention is rapidly turning to what will follow. The elaboration of the next global development agenda is a complex, multi-pronged process that is academic, political and practical, involving experts from a myriad of social and economic sectors and representing a cross-section of constituencies. While the formal U.N. process is still in the early stages, the ongoing discourse (predominantly occurring in the global north, but not exclusively) has introduced several potential frameworks for this agenda. This paper describes the leading frameworks proposed for the post-2015 global development agenda and discusses how education and learning fit within each of those frameworks. While many within the education community are working to develop a cohesive movement to advance an “access plus learning” agenda, it remains equally important to engage proactively with the broader development community to ensure that education fits within the agreed upon overarching organizing framework.

The frameworks described below represent a snapshot of current thinking in 2012. On the road to 2015, the education community will need to refine and sharpen its thinking with respect to how learning is incorporated into the prevailing framework. The seven frameworks that will be addressed in this paper are:

1. Ending Absolute Poverty
2. Equity and Inclusion
3. Economic Growth and Jobs
4. Getting to Zero
5. Global Minimum Entitlements
6. Sustainable Development
7. Well-Being and Quality of Life

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In the 13 years since the dawn of the new millennium, significant progress has been made in addressing some of the world’s most important problems. One billion fewer people live in extreme poverty, 3 million children’s lives are saved annually and 610 million children in developing countries are enrolled in primary school, more than ever before. However, this progress has not been shared evenly around the globe. Populations affected by weak systems of governance and that suffer violence and disasters have systematically been left behind.

They are much less likely to enjoy progress vis-à-vis any of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which include eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, improving children and women’s health, and enrolling children in school. No country classified as a “fragile state,” for example, has met all eight of the MDGs. Children born in low-income, conflict-affected countries are twice as likely to die before the age of five years, twice as likely to lack access to clean water and more than three times as likely to not attend school than children living in peaceful, low-income countries. People living in poverty, many of whom are affected by conflict, are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change and disasters. Children are especially affected, and those from the poorest families are up to 10 times more likely to bear the brunt of environmental disasters linked to climate change.

The needs of people living in fragile states are an urgent priority for our time, and thus will almost certainly be prominent in the next round of global development goals. As the global community reflects on the new agenda that will replace the MDGs when they expire in 2015, it will do well to take stock of the existing strategies for supporting the needs of populations in fragile states. A range of strategies are undoubtedly needed, and there is good reason why there is a heavy emphasis on the economic, legal and security dimensions of development efforts in fragile states. However, efforts in the social sphere are equally needed, and education is one important strategy for supporting populations in fragile states that was often overlooked until recently.

This report provides a broad review of the field of education in fragile states and charts a new agenda for maximizing education’s contribution to the development and well-being of people living in these contexts. We hope it serves as a comprehensive introduction to the topic for those coming to this issue for the first time as well as provides new insights for those already actively engaged in the subject. The arguments we make here are based on evidence developed both from careful analysis and synthesis of the latest available data as well as primary research.

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Summer jobs programs for young people have experienced a resurgence of interest and investment since the Great Recession, driven by concerns about high youth unemployment rates, particularly among low-income, black, and Hispanic youth. 

Summer jobs programs typically last five to seven weeks and provide work opportunities to teens and young adults who otherwise might struggle to find jobs. They offer a paycheck, employment experiences, and other organized activities in the service of multiple goals: increasing participants’ income, developing young people’s skills and networks to improve their labor market prospects, and offering constructive activities to promote positive behavior. Most young people are placed in subsidized positions in the public and nonprofit sectors, although most cities also secure unsubsidized and private-sector placements, which typically come with higher skill and work-readiness requirements. Recent research finds that summer jobs programs have positive effects: reducing violence, incarceration, and mortality and improving academic outcomes.

But a strong program does not automatically follow from good intentions. Program design and implementation carry the day and determine the results. Moreover, research has not yet linked summer jobs programs to improved employment outcomes; evaluations to date are silent on effective program design; and, in the absence of agreed-upon standards and best practices, there is no guarantee of quality.

This paper is written to help clarify what is known about summer jobs programs and to provide information and guidance to city leaders, policymakers, and funders as they consider supporting larger and better summer efforts. Many jurisdictions are rebuilding their summer programs after a long hiatus that followed the end of dedicated federal funding in the late 1990s. Summer jobs programs are complex endeavors to design and deliver. Local leaders and administrators make a multitude of choices about program design, implementation, and funding, and these choices have a direct impact on quality and results. It is an opportune moment to assess the knowledge base and gaps about the operations and impacts of summer jobs programs.

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• Press release

In this speech at the annual meeting of the Downtown Detroit Partnership, Chris Leinberger discussed the downtown Detroit strategic planning process Brookings has started in partnership with the University of Michigan.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Speeches and Events page which provides copies of major speeches, PowerPoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

Selected Media Coverage
Expert Offers Tips to Give Downtown a Lift
UM Land-Use Strategist: Detroit Poised for Downtown Redevelopment

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With more than 700 deaths reported over three days last week, and with a confirmed 800,000 more migrants waiting in Libya to attempt the crossing into Europe, it is becoming increasingly clear that Italy could become the new Greece in the global refugee crisis, and that the central Mediterranean could become the new Aegean.

The dirty deal cut between the European Union and Turkey this spring seems to be working: It’s effectively shut down the eastern Mediterranean route to Europe. But it has also pushed those attempting to reach the continent onto the arguably more dangerous central Mediterranean route, which claimed thousands of lives last summer. Now we’re seeing the consequences.

It’s clear that this crisis will not be resolved in Libya. The country may be ground zero for migration from North Africa to southern Europe—the result of a power vacuum left by Western powers after the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011—but coming up with a solution that involves this troubled country will be difficult, to put it mildly. Libya is a failed state. Or rather, it is a jigsaw of four ethnic groups (Arab, Berber, Tuareg, and Toubou) and several dozen Ashraf tribes with no serious central authority to speak of. While a unity government and a draft constitution are in place, the former effectively controls only parts of Tripoli, while the latter is littered with both procedural deficiencies and substantive flaws.

Libya is also a security nightmare. The Islamic State controls over 150 miles of the coast around the city of Sirte, while dozens of militias vie for supremacy in localized, low-intensity conflicts throughout the country. The increasing military involvement of both the United States and its European allies in Libya is testimony to the concern elicited by the Islamic State’s presence. Were this not enough, Libya has a terrible record when it comes to its treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. The country never signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol; it is host to detention centers where migrants survive in atrocious conditions; and it has signed up to appalling migration deals with Italy under Silvio Berlusconi. Multiple reports talk of the regular abuses, which include abysmal sanitary conditions, beatings, torture, hard labor, and even murder, which migrants have suffered in the country.

Up until recently, European officials appeared to be discussing plans to strike a deal with Libya similar to the one cut with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government in Turkey. Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano, for example, repeatedly claimed that what Europe needed was a migration compact with Libya along the lines of the one Brussels signed with Ankara in March. But such a deal, for the time being at least, is hardly a likely prospect. The deal with Turkey rested on the assumption that, with the right incentives in place, Ankara could exercise a baseline level of control over its borders. Brussels should not worry about Libya’s willingness to fulfill the key provisions of a similar migration compact. What Europeans should be concerned about, rather, is that the Libyan state—with its malfunctioning government, which lacks a bare minimum of administrative capacity—has no ability to fulfill them.

In the long run, Libya and Europe need to seek a comprehensive solution to this migration crisis. But with the high season for smuggling and trafficking across the Mediterranean almost upon us, an interim solution is critical.

Libya, which sits 280 miles from the southernmost point of mainland Italy, is the primary launching point for those seeking to cross from Africa to Europe. But it remains only one variable within the broader migration equation. An interim solution for the current crisis needs a broader focus and should involve three geographic areas: Libya, the countries sharing land borders with Libya, and the Mediterranean Sea itself.

In Libya, EU governments should pressure the unity government to immediately sign up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol. These would provide a firm legal framework within which all stakeholders would have to operate. Signing them would make it clear that Libya is ready to respect the rights of migrants under international law. And, crucially, it would mandate Libya to respect refugees’ right, in particular, to non-refoulement—that is, to not be returned to countries where they risk physical harm or abuse. Secondly and where the security situation allows, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should be provided with all necessary means to massively scale up their presence in the country. By doing so, they would be able to become crucial representatives for the rights of migrants and asylum seekers.

Finally—and with the explicit permission of the unity government—the European Union should start patrolling Libyan territorial waters, while international humanitarian organizations must take over the management of Libyan detention centers where migrants are held. Because Libyan authorities do not exercise any meaningful control over the coastline and because they lack the resources to adequately administer the detention centers they are supposedly managing, these measures would only technically—but not substantively—infringe upon the central government’s sovereignty.

Europe must also seek to form partnerships with Libya’s neighbors—a strategy it appears to be beginning to pursue. Countries sharing land borders with Libya have a significant comparative advantage over Tripoli when it comes to being candidates for partnerships: They have (relatively) stable governments. Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia face tremendous challenges in a variety of policy areas, yet they have the bare minimum of what it takes to resolve those challenges: established state structures.

These countries are often the countries of origin or earlier transit for the sub-Saharan migrants who converge on Libya as a springboard to Europe. Crucially, the European Union has a well-established relationship with all these governments through the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. More specifically, the Khartoum Process for East Africa, the Rabat Process for West Africa, and the EU strategy for the Sahel provide regional frameworks within which Europe and its partner countries can address migration issues. These regular and structured dialogues between European and African governments provide a system of financial and diplomatic rewards for African countries that proactively engage with migration issues. In particular, they’ve resulted in concrete projects that aim to discourage irregular migration by establishing readmission agreements while providing legal avenues for those trying to get to Europe, such as temporary migration plans.

It is high time for Brussels to further increase cooperation by providing additional resources to address migration issues: Europe must enable its African partners to set up projects that contribute to creating employment opportunities, ensuring food and nutrition security, improving migration management, and promoting conflict prevention. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa should substantially be boosted for this purpose.

Europe appears to be taking steps to make migration control a cornerstone of its relationship with its African neighbors. Ad hoc migration compacts are in the works with selected origin and transit countries, including Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, and proposals are being made to launch a comprehensive €62 billion investment plan to tackle the long-term root causes of economic migration. The EU has renewed its focus on re-admissions to these countries, prioritizing speedy returns for those whose asylum claims are rejected over establishing formal readmission agreements, which is a sign of Europe’s determination to push this through—though also a warning of the potential dodginess of the various deals in the making.

Lastly, Brussels must do its homework where it is most able to bring about change: in the Mediterranean Sea and along Europe’s southern coast. The EU’s naval Operation Sophia in the south-central Mediterranean is trying to tackle migrant smuggling at sea. Its geographic scope, however, is significantly more limited compared with the Operation Mare Nostrum carried out by the Italian Navy and later superseded by Frontex’s Operation Triton. This should be expanded again. At the same time, the mandate of the operation should be widened to explicitly encourage search-and-rescue operations on top of its primary aim of disrupting smugglers’ networks. On its Italian shores, Europe should intensify its support for Italian authorities engaged in the establishment and management of so-called migrant hot spots. Indeed, while Rome has fulfilled most of its obligations by setting up new headquarters and boosting its processing rates, its European partners are struggling to make available specialized personnel for the hot spots and to relocate migrants already in Italy.

The ideas above are only a short-term interim solution, however. In the medium to long term, the international community needs to address the tremendous underlying challenges producing chaos in Libya. The newly established Government of National Accord must secure the support of all ethnic groups and major tribes. Having done that, the Islamic State must be rooted out through a very high-intensity but hopefully brief and localized conflict. Finally, a minimum degree of administrative capacity must be re-established beyond Tripoli.

All of the above require meaningful engagement with Libya on the part of Europe that will probably take years to reap benefits. Until that is forthcoming, an interim solution must be found, for the sake of the hundreds of thousands of lives at risk.

The piece was originally published in Foreign Policy. 

In the three months since the EU-Turkey migrant pact came into force, the number of migrants arriving on Greek shores has dropped precipitously. But the number of migrants making the even more dangerous crossing to Italy has increased substantially. After months of chaos, Rome—having adopted a variety of measures in partnership with European authorities—is now much better prepared than last summer to deal with a new migrant surge. But, despite its efforts, Italy—like its peers—cannot possibly cope on its own with a new wave of migration on the order of magnitude as the one witnessed last summer.

Yet that possibility is real. With almost 19,000 arriving from Libya in the first three months of this year, an EU-Libya migration compact is urgently needed. But for it to work, Europe as a whole must engage with Libya comprehensively and across policy areas. That will require time—and an interim solution in the meantime. 

Fewer arrivals in Greece, more in Italy

Notwithstanding its many flaws, the EU-Turkey deal appears to be working at deterring people from making the treacherous crossing from Turkey to Greece. Although weather conditions have improved, the number of migrants reaching Greece dropped by 90 percent in April, to less than 2,700. Syrians, Pakistanis, Afghans, and Iraqis made up the bulk of new arrivals, as has been the case for the last few months. Further north, along the Western Balkans route, the number of migrants reaching Europe’s borders in April dropped by 25 percent, down to 3,830. In this case, Macedonia’s de facto closure of its southern border with Greece clearly contributed to stemming the flow. 

With the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes sealed, the Central Mediterranean pathway presents new and worrying trends. In the month of April alone, 9,149 migrants arrived in Italy. As in the past, they were overwhelmingly from Sub-Saharan Africa (mostly Nigeria), many of them economic migrants unlikely to be granted asylum. For the first time since May 2015, more migrants are now reaching Italy than Greece. Many more are likely to have lost their lives trying to do so. 

For the first time since May 2015, more migrants are now reaching Italy than Greece.

Learning from past mistakes 

Italy is doing its homework. A revamped headquarters for the European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF) overseeing migrant arrivals across the Central Mediterranean opened at the end of April in the town of Catania. Five of its six hotspots—first reception centers fully equipped to process new arrivals—are now in place, with a combined reception capacity for 2,100 people and the involvement of Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office, Europol, Eurojust, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Fingerprinting rates have now reached virtually 100 percent at all active hotspots. Long-term reception capacity across the country is currently at 111,081, and plans are in place to boost this to 124,579. This would probably not be enough to host the share that the country could be expected to take under a permanent and fair pan-European relocation mechanism. And yet, at least for the time being, the European Commission judged the Italian reception system to be more than sufficient.

Within this context, European partners seem to be slowly becoming more confident in Rome’s willingness to take up its responsibilities. It is no coincidence that on the same day that German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble invited Vienna to support Italy in its efforts to control migrant movements within the Schengen area, Austria’s Interior Minister Wolfgang Sobotka announced that work on building a “migrants protection fence” at the Italy-Austria border was halted. 

A sustainable solution before it’s too late

Still, should a new massive migrant wave reach its shores, Italy could not cope on its own. Indeed, no single European country could. Should such a new wave materialize, Libya would be by far the most likely country of origin. Italy is the key to fighting ISIS and stabilizing Libya, but it would be unrealistic to expect Italy to do so on its own. 

The current European migrant crisis is part of a broader global refugee crisis and Europe has a shared interest and responsibility in dealing with it. Because of that, an EU-Libya deal is now necessary. This must—and can—be better than the agreement between the EU and Turkey. But a strategic pan-European approach is urgently needed. As Mattia Toaldo recently highlighted, a joint EU-Libya migration plan would be one of five priority areas for Libya. These would also include supporting a Libyan joint command to fight ISIS, a diplomatic offensive in support of the recently-established unity government, a reconciliation of local militias through power devolution, and the re-launch of the country’s economy. In April, Italy shared proposals with its European partners for a new migration compact with Libya but which also involves the broader region. That might be wise: since Europe is certainly unable to stabilize Libya in the short term, its leaders should start thinking about the country as a variable within a far broader equation. 

What can Italy do in the meantime?

The European Union should step up its support for Italy and an interim solution to migrant crisis in the Central Mediterranean must be found. Meanwhile, Italy has to brace itself for the potential arrival of over 800,000 migrants currently in Libya and waiting to cross the Mediterranean. While Rome could never cope with such a surge in migrant flows on its own, it still can—and must—plan for such an eventuality.

Three measures could be taken to address this challenge. First of all, Italy could consider setting up a seventh—and possibly even an eight—hotspot. This would be an important step given that an idea Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano floated—to set up “hotspots at sea”–is unlikely to be viable on both legal and humanitarian grounds. Second, Italy should increase its long-term reception capacity to around 150,000 people. The exact number would depend on the calculations that the European Commission is currently finalizing. Crucially, this should mirror the number of individuals beyond which an emergency relocation mechanism would be activated to re-distribute asylum seekers from Italy to another EU member state. Finally and should a sudden surge in the number of arrivals materialize, Italy could prepare contingency plans to mobilize virtually its entire navy to support ongoing EU efforts with its Operation Sophia. These policy proposals involve a significant effort in terms of state capacity. Yet, Italy has both a moral responsibility as well as a vested interest in implementing them. 

With more than 700 deaths reported over three days last week, and with a confirmed 800,000 more migrants waiting in Libya to attempt the crossing into Europe, it is becoming increasingly clear that Italy could become the new Greece in the global refugee crisis, and that the central Mediterranean could become the new Aegean.

The dirty deal cut between the European Union and Turkey this spring seems to be working: It’s effectively shut down the eastern Mediterranean route to Europe. But it has also pushed those attempting to reach the continent onto the arguably more dangerous central Mediterranean route, which claimed thousands of lives last summer. Now we’re seeing the consequences.

It’s clear that this crisis will not be resolved in Libya. The country may be ground zero for migration from North Africa to southern Europe—the result of a power vacuum left by Western powers after the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011—but coming up with a solution that involves this troubled country will be difficult, to put it mildly. Libya is a failed state. Or rather, it is a jigsaw of four ethnic groups (Arab, Berber, Tuareg, and Toubou) and several dozen Ashraf tribes with no serious central authority to speak of. While a unity government and a draft constitution are in place, the former effectively controls only parts of Tripoli, while the latter is littered with both procedural deficiencies and substantive flaws.

Libya is also a security nightmare. The Islamic State controls over 150 miles of the coast around the city of Sirte, while dozens of militias vie for supremacy in localized, low-intensity conflicts throughout the country. The increasing military involvement of both the United States and its European allies in Libya is testimony to the concern elicited by the Islamic State’s presence. Were this not enough, Libya has a terrible record when it comes to its treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. The country never signed up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol; it is host to detention centers where migrants survive in atrocious conditions; and it has signed up to appalling migration deals with Italy under Silvio Berlusconi. Multiple reports talk of the regular abuses, which include abysmal sanitary conditions, beatings, torture, hard labor, and even murder, which migrants have suffered in the country.

Up until recently, European officials appeared to be discussing plans to strike a deal with Libya similar to the one cut with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government in Turkey. Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano, for example, repeatedly claimed that what Europe needed was a migration compact with Libya along the lines of the one Brussels signed with Ankara in March. But such a deal, for the time being at least, is hardly a likely prospect. The deal with Turkey rested on the assumption that, with the right incentives in place, Ankara could exercise a baseline level of control over its borders. Brussels should not worry about Libya’s willingness to fulfill the key provisions of a similar migration compact. What Europeans should be concerned about, rather, is that the Libyan state—with its malfunctioning government, which lacks a bare minimum of administrative capacity—has no ability to fulfill them.

In the long run, Libya and Europe need to seek a comprehensive solution to this migration crisis. But with the high season for smuggling and trafficking across the Mediterranean almost upon us, an interim solution is critical.

Libya, which sits 280 miles from the southernmost point of mainland Italy, is the primary launching point for those seeking to cross from Africa to Europe. But it remains only one variable within the broader migration equation. An interim solution for the current crisis needs a broader focus and should involve three geographic areas: Libya, the countries sharing land borders with Libya, and the Mediterranean Sea itself.

In Libya, EU governments should pressure the unity government to immediately sign up to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol. These would provide a firm legal framework within which all stakeholders would have to operate. Signing them would make it clear that Libya is ready to respect the rights of migrants under international law. And, crucially, it would mandate Libya to respect refugees’ right, in particular, to non-refoulement—that is, to not be returned to countries where they risk physical harm or abuse. Secondly and where the security situation allows, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should be provided with all necessary means to massively scale up their presence in the country. By doing so, they would be able to become crucial representatives for the rights of migrants and asylum seekers.

Finally—and with the explicit permission of the unity government—the European Union should start patrolling Libyan territorial waters, while international humanitarian organizations must take over the management of Libyan detention centers where migrants are held. Because Libyan authorities do not exercise any meaningful control over the coastline and because they lack the resources to adequately administer the detention centers they are supposedly managing, these measures would only technically—but not substantively—infringe upon the central government’s sovereignty.

Europe must also seek to form partnerships with Libya’s neighbors—a strategy it appears to be beginning to pursue. Countries sharing land borders with Libya have a significant comparative advantage over Tripoli when it comes to being candidates for partnerships: They have (relatively) stable governments. Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, and Tunisia face tremendous challenges in a variety of policy areas, yet they have the bare minimum of what it takes to resolve those challenges: established state structures.

These countries are often the countries of origin or earlier transit for the sub-Saharan migrants who converge on Libya as a springboard to Europe. Crucially, the European Union has a well-established relationship with all these governments through the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. More specifically, the Khartoum Process for East Africa, the Rabat Process for West Africa, and the EU strategy for the Sahel provide regional frameworks within which Europe and its partner countries can address migration issues. These regular and structured dialogues between European and African governments provide a system of financial and diplomatic rewards for African countries that proactively engage with migration issues. In particular, they’ve resulted in concrete projects that aim to discourage irregular migration by establishing readmission agreements while providing legal avenues for those trying to get to Europe, such as temporary migration plans.

It is high time for Brussels to further increase cooperation by providing additional resources to address migration issues: Europe must enable its African partners to set up projects that contribute to creating employment opportunities, ensuring food and nutrition security, improving migration management, and promoting conflict prevention. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa should substantially be boosted for this purpose.

Europe appears to be taking steps to make migration control a cornerstone of its relationship with its African neighbors. Ad hoc migration compacts are in the works with selected origin and transit countries, including Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, and proposals are being made to launch a comprehensive €62 billion investment plan to tackle the long-term root causes of economic migration. The EU has renewed its focus on re-admissions to these countries, prioritizing speedy returns for those whose asylum claims are rejected over establishing formal readmission agreements, which is a sign of Europe’s determination to push this through—though also a warning of the potential dodginess of the various deals in the making.

Lastly, Brussels must do its homework where it is most able to bring about change: in the Mediterranean Sea and along Europe’s southern coast. The EU’s naval Operation Sophia in the south-central Mediterranean is trying to tackle migrant smuggling at sea. Its geographic scope, however, is significantly more limited compared with the Operation Mare Nostrum carried out by the Italian Navy and later superseded by Frontex’s Operation Triton. This should be expanded again. At the same time, the mandate of the operation should be widened to explicitly encourage search-and-rescue operations on top of its primary aim of disrupting smugglers’ networks. On its Italian shores, Europe should intensify its support for Italian authorities engaged in the establishment and management of so-called migrant hot spots. Indeed, while Rome has fulfilled most of its obligations by setting up new headquarters and boosting its processing rates, its European partners are struggling to make available specialized personnel for the hot spots and to relocate migrants already in Italy.

The ideas above are only a short-term interim solution, however. In the medium to long term, the international community needs to address the tremendous underlying challenges producing chaos in Libya. The newly established Government of National Accord must secure the support of all ethnic groups and major tribes. Having done that, the Islamic State must be rooted out through a very high-intensity but hopefully brief and localized conflict. Finally, a minimum degree of administrative capacity must be re-established beyond Tripoli.

All of the above require meaningful engagement with Libya on the part of Europe that will probably take years to reap benefits. Until that is forthcoming, an interim solution must be found, for the sake of the hundreds of thousands of lives at risk.

The piece was originally published in Foreign Policy. 

In the three months since the EU-Turkey migrant pact came into force, the number of migrants arriving on Greek shores has dropped precipitously. But the number of migrants making the even more dangerous crossing to Italy has increased substantially. After months of chaos, Rome—having adopted a variety of measures in partnership with European authorities—is now much better prepared than last summer to deal with a new migrant surge. But, despite its efforts, Italy—like its peers—cannot possibly cope on its own with a new wave of migration on the order of magnitude as the one witnessed last summer.

Yet that possibility is real. With almost 19,000 arriving from Libya in the first three months of this year, an EU-Libya migration compact is urgently needed. But for it to work, Europe as a whole must engage with Libya comprehensively and across policy areas. That will require time—and an interim solution in the meantime. 

Fewer arrivals in Greece, more in Italy

Notwithstanding its many flaws, the EU-Turkey deal appears to be working at deterring people from making the treacherous crossing from Turkey to Greece. Although weather conditions have improved, the number of migrants reaching Greece dropped by 90 percent in April, to less than 2,700. Syrians, Pakistanis, Afghans, and Iraqis made up the bulk of new arrivals, as has been the case for the last few months. Further north, along the Western Balkans route, the number of migrants reaching Europe’s borders in April dropped by 25 percent, down to 3,830. In this case, Macedonia’s de facto closure of its southern border with Greece clearly contributed to stemming the flow. 

With the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes sealed, the Central Mediterranean pathway presents new and worrying trends. In the month of April alone, 9,149 migrants arrived in Italy. As in the past, they were overwhelmingly from Sub-Saharan Africa (mostly Nigeria), many of them economic migrants unlikely to be granted asylum. For the first time since May 2015, more migrants are now reaching Italy than Greece. Many more are likely to have lost their lives trying to do so. 

For the first time since May 2015, more migrants are now reaching Italy than Greece.

Learning from past mistakes 

Italy is doing its homework. A revamped headquarters for the European Union Regional Task Force (EURTF) overseeing migrant arrivals across the Central Mediterranean opened at the end of April in the town of Catania. Five of its six hotspots—first reception centers fully equipped to process new arrivals—are now in place, with a combined reception capacity for 2,100 people and the involvement of Frontex, the European Asylum Support Office, Europol, Eurojust, the International Organization for Migration, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Fingerprinting rates have now reached virtually 100 percent at all active hotspots. Long-term reception capacity across the country is currently at 111,081, and plans are in place to boost this to 124,579. This would probably not be enough to host the share that the country could be expected to take under a permanent and fair pan-European relocation mechanism. And yet, at least for the time being, the European Commission judged the Italian reception system to be more than sufficient.

Within this context, European partners seem to be slowly becoming more confident in Rome’s willingness to take up its responsibilities. It is no coincidence that on the same day that German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble invited Vienna to support Italy in its efforts to control migrant movements within the Schengen area, Austria’s Interior Minister Wolfgang Sobotka announced that work on building a “migrants protection fence” at the Italy-Austria border was halted. 

A sustainable solution before it’s too late

Still, should a new massive migrant wave reach its shores, Italy could not cope on its own. Indeed, no single European country could. Should such a new wave materialize, Libya would be by far the most likely country of origin. Italy is the key to fighting ISIS and stabilizing Libya, but it would be unrealistic to expect Italy to do so on its own. 

The current European migrant crisis is part of a broader global refugee crisis and Europe has a shared interest and responsibility in dealing with it. Because of that, an EU-Libya deal is now necessary. This must—and can—be better than the agreement between the EU and Turkey. But a strategic pan-European approach is urgently needed. As Mattia Toaldo recently highlighted, a joint EU-Libya migration plan would be one of five priority areas for Libya. These would also include supporting a Libyan joint command to fight ISIS, a diplomatic offensive in support of the recently-established unity government, a reconciliation of local militias through power devolution, and the re-launch of the country’s economy. In April, Italy shared proposals with its European partners for a new migration compact with Libya but which also involves the broader region. That might be wise: since Europe is certainly unable to stabilize Libya in the short term, its leaders should start thinking about the country as a variable within a far broader equation. 

What can Italy do in the meantime?

The European Union should step up its support for Italy and an interim solution to migrant crisis in the Central Mediterranean must be found. Meanwhile, Italy has to brace itself for the potential arrival of over 800,000 migrants currently in Libya and waiting to cross the Mediterranean. While Rome could never cope with such a surge in migrant flows on its own, it still can—and must—plan for such an eventuality.

Three measures could be taken to address this challenge. First of all, Italy could consider setting up a seventh—and possibly even an eight—hotspot. This would be an important step given that an idea Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano floated—to set up “hotspots at sea”–is unlikely to be viable on both legal and humanitarian grounds. Second, Italy should increase its long-term reception capacity to around 150,000 people. The exact number would depend on the calculations that the European Commission is currently finalizing. Crucially, this should mirror the number of individuals beyond which an emergency relocation mechanism would be activated to re-distribute asylum seekers from Italy to another EU member state. Finally and should a sudden surge in the number of arrivals materialize, Italy could prepare contingency plans to mobilize virtually its entire navy to support ongoing EU efforts with its Operation Sophia. These policy proposals involve a significant effort in terms of state capacity. Yet, Italy has both a moral responsibility as well as a vested interest in implementing them. 

Editor’s Note: This post is part of a series on the 2015 Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) Report and Scorecard, which were launched at a Brookings public event in August. Previous posts have highlighted regional findings from Southeast and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, as well as selected financial inclusion milestones from FDIP countries. This post focuses on key financial inclusion achievements and challenges regarding the five Latin American FDIP countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.

Financial inclusion growth and opportunities in Latin America

With its well-developed banking infrastructure and growing mobile ecosystem, Latin America presents a unique set of opportunities and obstacles with respect to promoting greater financial inclusion. From 2011 to 2014, there was a 12 percentage point increase in the number of adults in Latin America and the Caribbean with formal financial accounts, according to the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database. As noted in the 2015 GSMA report “Mobile financial services in Latin America & the Caribbean,” in 2014 Latin America and the Caribbean saw the fastest growth of any region in terms of new registered mobile money accounts.

Moreover, these accounts are often used for more advanced transactions that go beyond simple transfers: As stated in a 2015 post published by the GSMA, “ecosystem transactions (transactions that involve third parties, e.g. bill payment, merchant payment or bulk payment) already make up 27% of transaction volumes in Latin America & the Caribbean.” In contrast, only 6 percent of transaction volumes over the same period were considered ecosystem transactions in East Africa, where mobile money has been most widely adopted and used.

Moving forward, facilitating greater adoption of a suite of digital financial services (e.g., savings) will be a vital component of promoting sustainable financial inclusion in the region. Recent regulatory changes in several Latin American countries designed to promote a greater diversity of service providers should propel financial inclusion growth, although a need for regulatory clarity persists in some places. Financial inclusion strengths and challenges germane to our five Latin American FDIP countries are explored below.

Brazil: Branchless banking leadership combined with dynamic mobile market

Brazil achieved the highest ranking of any Latin American country on the Brookings 2015 FDIP Scorecard, ranking 3^rd overall with a score of 78 percent. Brazil’s economy is the largest in Latin America, with a GDP (in current US dollars) of about $2.3 trillion as of 2014; for comparison, Mexico, the Latin American country with the second largest economy, had a GDP of about $1.3 trillion within that same period.

Brazil received strong country commitment and mobile capacity scores (89 and 83 percent, respectively) in the 2015 FDIP Scorecard and earned the highest regulatory environment score among the Latin American FDIP countries, which also included Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. As noted in the 2015 FDIP Report, Brazil launched a National Partnership for Financial Inclusion in November 2011, which has supported the development of a number of enabling financial inclusion initiatives. In 2013, Law 12865 and associated regulations permitted non-banks to issue e-money as payments institutions. Brazil boasted the largest mobile market in Latin America as of 2014, with a unique subscribership rate of about 57 percent in 2015 (a lower unique subscribership rate than Chile’s by about 7 percentage points, but otherwise higher than that of any of the other Latin American FDIP countries).

Brazil received 4^th place on the 2015 FDIP Scorecard for adoption of selected traditional and digital financial services. As with many other countries in Latin America, branchless banking (i.e., access to formal financial services beyond a traditional brick-and-mortar bank) through “agents” is popular in Brazil — as of 2014, Brazilian banks’ agent networks had a presence in all of the country’s approximately 6,000 municipalities, contributing to formal account growth. Chile was the only Latin American country that received a higher ranking for the adoption dimension, placing 2^nd. In terms of account usage, government-to-person payments comprise a significant source of activity for formal accounts: The 2014 Global Findex report noted that among recipients of government payments in Brazil, 88 percent received their transfers directly into an account.

Yet according to the Global Findex, about 32 percent of Brazilian adults age 15 and older still do not have accounts with a formal financial institution or mobile money provider. As with the other Latin American countries in the FDIP sample, mobile money adoption in Brazil has remained low: Brazil received the lowest score (one out of three possible points) for all six mobile money indicators included in the 2015 FDIP Scorecard. However, given that as of 2014 Brazil had the fifth-largest global smartphone market in the world in terms of subscribers, a combination of growing smartphone penetration and an increasingly enabling regulatory environment should drive greater adoption of digital financial services in the future.

Chile: Opportunities for enhanced e-money regulatory clarity

Chile tied with Colombia and Turkey for 6^th place on the overall 2015 FDIP Scorecard. Chile’s financial inclusion environment is characterized by a firm national commitment to financial inclusion (earning a country commitment score of 89 percent) but a less developed mobile money environment than the other Latin American FDIP countries. While Chile’s unique mobile subscribership rate and 3G network coverage rate by population are higher than and on par with other countries in the region, respectively, Chile’s mobile money offerings are limited. The lack of a robust mobile money market contributed to Chile’s mobile capacity score of 72 percent, the lowest score among the FDIP Latin American countries.

Chile’s regulatory environment score (67 percent) was also the lowest of the Latin American FDIP countries, primarily due to a lack of regulatory clarity surrounding digital financial services. Developing or clarifying regulations pertaining to electronic money in particular could potentially drive more engagement with the sector and advance the diversity of mobile money providers and offerings. Further, supporting the interoperability of digital and traditional financial services could enhance the utility of these products for customers.

Given that 37 percent of adults in Chile did not have an account with a formal financial provider as of 2014, there is also room for growth in terms of expanding financial inclusion. However, it should be noted that Chile earned the highest adoption ranking of any Latin American country featured in the 2015 FDIP Scorecard. While Chile’s adoption levels with respect to mobile money services were limited, adoption rates of other formal financial services were among the highest of the FDIP countries. Chile received three out of three possible points for all but one indicator (savings at a formal financial institution) related to traditional financial services. Chile’s performance on the adoption dimension of the scorecard contributed to its 6^th place ranking overall.

While Chile’s mobile money adoption rates are low, use of other digital financial services is increasingly popular. For example, as noted in the “2015 Maya Declaration Progress Report,” since 2012 the number of CuentaRUT accounts (accounts that feature debit cards associated with a savings account provided by Chile’s BancoEstado) has increased by about 47 percent. As of 2014, there were over 7 million active CuentaRUT cards in Chile.

Colombia: Regulatory advancements coupled with sustained country commitment

As noted above, Colombia tied with Chile for 6^th place on the overall 2015 FDIP Scorecard. Colombia has demonstrated strong commitment to financial inclusion, including through involvement in multinational organizations such as the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI). An example of Colombia’s national-level financial inclusion commitment is the 2006 establishment of Banca de las Oportunidades, an entity charged with fostering regulatory reforms conducive to financial inclusion. Another key player in the financial inclusion space is the Intersectoral Economic and Financial Education Committee, created in February 2014 under Decree 457.

In terms of the country’s regulatory environment, Law 1735 of 2014 permitted new institutions, called Sociedades Especializadas en Depósitos y Pagos Electrónicos, to offer mobile financial services. As part of the law, proportionate “know-your-customer” (KYC) requirements were also instituted for under-resourced customers in order to facilitate greater access to financial services among low-risk populations. In July 2015, Decree 1491 implemented Colombia’s financial inclusion law and highlighted the regulatory regime for the mobile money market. Colombia’s regulatory environment earned a score of 89 percent, ranking it 2^nd among the Latin American FDIP countries in this dimension.

On the supply side, banking correspondents (also known as agents) have been utilized to extend financial access to underserved populations.  As of 2015, all of Colombia’s 1,102 municipalities had at least one financial access point, defined as bank branches, banking correspondents, and ATMs. Another innovative approach to branchless banking in Colombia is bank Davivienda’s initiative to use DaviPlata mobile wallet accounts to distribute government transfers to more than 900,000 recipients of welfare program “Familias en Accion.”

With respect to demand side figures, Colombia tied with Mexico for 7^th place on the adoption dimension. As of 2014, about 38 percent of adults in Colombia had an account with a formal financial institution, and about 2 percent of adults were mobile money account holders. In terms of advancing future mobile money use, Colombia received the highest score of the Latin American countries on the mobile capacity dimension; thus, Colombia is well-positioned to advance access to and use of mobile money services in the future. Promoting usage of appropriate, quality financial services is critical, as dormancy rates have been identified as an obstacle to financial inclusion; about half of accounts in Colombia (including savings accounts, simplified accounts, and electronic deposits) were identified as dormant in 2014.

Mexico: Recent reforms may enhance competition and drive digital takeup

Mexico ranked 9^th on the overall 2015 FDIP Scorecard, with adoption of traditional and digital financial services as its highest-ranked dimension. Among the Latin American FDIP countries, Mexico features the greatest parity in terms of formal financial account ownership rates among men and women, at about 39 percent each.  In terms of national-level commitment to financial inclusion, Mexico tied with Peru for the highest ranking among the Latin American countries. AFI’s Maya Declaration was signed at the 2011 Global Policy Forum held in Riviera Maya, Mexico, signaling Mexico’s public commitment to financial inclusion.

With respect to mobile capacity, as of the first quarter of 2015 Mexico’s unique subscribership rates were the lowest of the Latin American countries. Mexico tied with Chile and Brazil for 3G network coverage by population. In terms of mobile money, Mexico’s market is still developing; several providers were available as of May 2015, but the extent of offerings was somewhat limited. As noted in the GSMA’s “Mobile Economy: Latin America 2014” report, new telecommunications reforms recently passed in Mexico are expected to affect the mobile market and potentially increase competition among the telecommunications sector. This increased competition could in turn drive the development of a greater array of innovative, affordable mobile money products.

Regarding Mexico’s regulatory environment, the country has been lauded for its risk-based KYC requirements that enable underserved individuals to access low-value accounts without fulfilling the full array of traditional identification processes, which can sometimes be burdensome for under-resourced groups. Under Mexico’s four-tiered KYC system (introduced in 2011), “level one” (very low-risk) accounts feature monthly deposit limits and a maximum balance limit of about 400 dollars; accounts can be opened at a bank branch, banking agent, over the internet, or by telephone. Higher-tier accounts have more stringent KYC requirements. A 2015 AFI article noted that Mexico's banking and securities regulator, the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, indicated about 7.5 million new accounts were opened between August 2011 and September 2012, including over 4 million “level one” accounts.

Mexico tied with Colombia for 7^th place on the adoption dimension of the 2015 FDIP Scorecard. About 39 percent of adults in Mexico held accounts with a formal financial institution as of 2014, while about 3 percent of adults held mobile money accounts. As with other countries in Latin America, debit card and credit card use were much higher than mobile money use as of 2014, although usage of both kinds of cards was lower in Mexico than in several other Latin American FDIP countries such as Brazil and Chile. Initiatives such as the Saldazo debit card, which enables customers to use a debit card associated with a savings account and does not require a minimum balance, have helped drive adoption of digital financial services in Mexico.

Peru: Enabling regulatory environment, but constrained adoption of financial services

Peru presents perhaps one of the most interesting paradoxes among the FDIP countries. While Peru’s regulatory environment has been consistently recognized as among the best in the world for enabling financial inclusion, adoption of formal financial services remains quite low. Peru received 17^th place overall on the 2015 FDIP Scorecard, which can primarily be attributed to its low adoption score: Peru received a 15^th place ranking on the adoption dimension, the lowest score among the Latin American FDIP countries. However, we anticipate that recent regulatory changes in Peru, coupled with increasing smartphone penetration rates (Peru’s 2014 adoption rates were about 12 percentage points below the Latin American average), will facilitate adoption of digital financial services and drive greater financial inclusion in the future.

With respect to the supply side aspect of financial inclusion, as of 2014 about 92 percent of Peru’s population lived in a district with access to financial services, according to the Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP (SBS) del Peru. Nonetheless, demand side figures lag behind: The Global Findex found that only about 29 percent of adults had an account with a formal financial provider as of 2014. Peru received a “1” for two-thirds of the non-mobile money indicators on the adoption dimension of the 2015 FDIP Scorecard, and mobile money adoption was negligible. Moreover, as of 2014 there was a 14 percentage point disparity in financial account ownership between men and women, the highest financial inclusion “gender gap” among the Latin American FDIP countries.

However, given Peru’s strong national commitment to financial inclusion (reflected in Peru’s country commitment score of 94 percent) and legislative initiatives designed to promote an enabling regulatory environment, we fully anticipate that financial inclusion growth will accelerate in the future. For example, Peru recently finalized its national financial inclusion strategy, as discussed in our earlier post. Moreover, Peru has adopted laws and regulations that permit a greater diversity of players to enter the financial services market. Law 2998 of January 2013 allowed both banks and non-banks to issue e-money, and October 2013 regulations issued by the SBS enabled e-money issuers to follow a simplified account opening process. These initiatives should facilitate greater access to and usage of formal financial accounts in the future.

In terms of electronic payments specifically, diversifying the mobile money market and increasing unique subscribership could help facilitate greater adoption of mobile money services. Demand side factors, such as ensuring that services are a good fit for customers, are also critical — as evidenced by the fact that Mexico, which had comparable smartphone adoption rates to Peru and lower unique subscribership rates as of 2014, features significantly higher rates of mobile money adoption across all demographics than Peru. Peru is making a concerted effort to develop innovative electronic platforms — for example, the Peruvian Association of Banks (ASBANC) is working on the creation of an electronic money platform accessible by both financial institutions and telecommunications companies. Implementation of this interoperable platform is expected to promote further adoption of digital financial services.

While significant progress has been made in terms of facilitating greater access to and use of financial services among underserved populations, barriers to financial inclusion remain. The global dialogue surrounding the financial inclusion gender gap (referring to the disproportionate exclusion of women from access to and usage of formal financial services) has intensified as key stakeholders—including financial service providers, regulatory bodies, policymakers, civil society entities, and consumers—explore how best to engage prospective women customers in ways that meet the needs of both consumers and providers situated within different market contexts.

As part of the consultation process for the second annual Brookings Financial and Digital Inclusion Project (FDIP) report and scorecard, to be published in late summer 2016, the FDIP team held a roundtable in March 2016 to facilitate dialogue and knowledge-sharing regarding the issue of gender disparities in access to and usage of formal financial services. The first FDIP report and scorecard, published in August 2015, are available here.

The roundtable provided an opportunity for participants to discuss the legal, policy, and cultural drivers of the gender gap, highlight examples of enabling approaches in countries that have made strides in reducing the gender gap, and identify action steps for governments, financial service providers, and consumers in terms of promoting greater equity within the financial landscape. Before diving into the key themes and action items explored at the roundtable, below is some background on the nature and implications of the gender gap.

What is the financial inclusion gender gap, and why does it matter?

From 2011 to 2014, the percentage of women in developing economies with formal financial accounts increased by 13 percentage points, according to the World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database. In relative terms, these gains were comparable to those among men in developing economies during the same time period—but in absolute terms, there remains considerable room for growth, as half of women in developing economies still did not have formal financial accounts as of 2014.

While there is good reason to celebrate the tremendous gains made across the financial inclusion landscape in recent years, significant opportunity for expanding access to and usage of financial services among women remains. Globally, the financial inclusion gender gap remained at seven percentage points between 2011 and 2014, and in developing economies the gap was even higher, at nine percentage points.

The FDIP focus countries reflect this global trend. Of the 21 FDIP focus countries examined within the 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard, only four (Indonesia, the Philippines, Mexico, and South Africa) exhibited either gender parity or a greater percentage of women than men who reported using mobile money within the previous 12 months or holding an account at a bank or another type of financial institution.

The gender gap is of course not the only global disparity in terms of access to and usage of financial services—for example, rural and low-income populations are often underserved by formal financial service providers compared with their more urban and wealthier counterparts. (You can learn more about financial inclusion among these underserved groups across different economic, political, and geographic contexts in the 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard.) Indeed, in 2014 the gap between account ownership among the poorest 40 percent of households in developing economies and the richest 60 percent of households in developing economies was about five percentage points higher than the gender gap in developing economies.

However, as noted by the Global Findex, the global financial inclusion gender gap remained essentially static from 2011 to 2014, while the financial inclusion income gap was reduced by several percentage points. Additionally, the increase in ownership of formal accounts among the poorest 40 percent of households in developing economies was slightly higher proportionately than the increase in ownership of formal accounts among women in developing economies over the same period. In short, the gender gap is particularly noteworthy for its persistence over time and for the broad scope of the underserved population it represents.

Investing in women and girls should be a shared priority across public and private sector stakeholders given the economic and civic implications of female participation in the formal financial ecosystem. From a micro perspective, having convenient access to a suite of quality financial services enables women to invest in themselves, in their families, and in their communities by saving for the future, paying for educational and health expenses, putting money toward small businesses, and engaging in other productive financial activities. Participants at the roundtable noted that a less tangible—but no less valuable—outcome of facilitating access to and usage of formal financial services among women is the sense of empowerment many women feel when they are equipped with greater control of their finances.

For businesses, reaching an untapped segment of the market with products and services that individual customers find useful would augment providers’ revenue. From a macroeconomic perspective, women’s economic empowerment has increasingly been regarded as “contributing to sustained inclusive and equitable economic growth, and sustainable development,” as noted in a recent study by the Global Banking Alliance for Women in partnership with Data2X and the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank.

If women’s participation in the financial ecosystem is so advantageous, why hasn’t the gender gap improved?

A number of legal, policy, and cultural restrictions have constrained access to and usage of financial services among women. A few examples of these constraints are described below; additional information on access and usage barriers is available in the 2015 FDIP Report.

• Legal, regulatory, and policy barriers: The World Bank Group’s Women, Business, and the Law project has examined data regarding legal and regulatory restrictions on entrepreneurship and employment among women since 2009. The project’s 2016 report found that about 90 percent of the 173 economies covered in the study had at least one law impeding women’s economic opportunities. For example, in some countries women are not permitted to open a bank account or are required to provide specific permission or additional documentation that is burdensome (or even impossible) to obtain. Restrictions on whether property is titled in a women’s name can also impede access to finance since titled land is often a preferred form of collateral among banks. Moreover, women are less likely than men to have the identification documents needed to open formal financial accounts. Among adults without an account at a financial institution as of 2014, 17 percent of women stated that a lack of necessary documentation was a barrier to their use of an account. Promoting a unique, universal identification system can facilitate access to formal labor markets and formal financial services.
• Cultural barriers: One example of a cultural constraint on usage of financial services among women is that many women may be more comfortable utilizing formal financial services when they can interact with a female point of contact, which is often not a readily available option.  
• Technological barriers: Digital financial services such as mobile money can help mitigate financial access barriers, in part by enabling women to more easily open accounts and to complete transactions through their phones without visiting a “brick and mortar” store. However, the gender gap in mobile phone ownership and usage must be addressed to fully take advantage of the benefits of digital financial services. The GSMA’s 2015 report noted that the most frequently cited barrier to mobile phone ownership and usage was cost, and cultural dynamics in which men prohibit women from owning or using a phone also contribute to the gap. Incongruous policies in some markets such as more stringent registration processes for SIMs and mobile money accounts than for bank accounts can also inhibit adoption of digital financial services.

What are examples of initiatives to facilitate greater financial inclusion among women?

Participants highlighted several examples of initiatives that were designed to promote women’s financial inclusion. For example, Diamond Bank in Nigeria and Women’s World Banking developed a savings product called a BETA account that could be opened over the phone with no minimum balance and no fees. The product was designed to be affordable and convenient for individuals engaging in frequent deposits, with agents visiting customers’ businesses to facilitate transactions. Other add-on products are being built around this basic product to provide more opportunities for individuals to use the financial services most useful to them. While the product was developed for women, it is available to both men and women.

Also in Nigeria, MasterCard and UN Women have partnered on an initiative that aims to educate women on the benefits of a national identification program and enroll half a million Nigerian women in this program so that they receive identification cards that include electronic payments functionality.

What can be done to advance gender equity within the financial ecosystem?

One of the central questions discussed during the roundtable was how to reconcile the sometimes diverging mandates of businesses, public sector actors, and the development community in order to foster a sustainable financial and economic ecosystem. In short, businesses must generate profits to be sustainable, while development community and public sector entities often focus on longer-term micro- and macro-economic growth and development. The challenge with these potentially competing time horizons is that initiatives involving a complex network of participants (such as those to cultivate women’s financial participation) may take time to scale. Moreover, some of the major factors contributing to the financial inclusion gender gap (such as lower financial literacy levels among women) will require a long-term approach to fully address.

The good news is that serving women customers ultimately meets the complementary objectives of benefiting providers by expanding their customer base and benefiting consumers by enabling them to use financial services to improve their lives and invest in their communities. Thus, leveraging data to present the business case to providers (see point 1 below) and promoting dialogue across public and private sector representatives (see point 2 below) will enable different players in the financial ecosystem to identify the best approaches to closing the gender gap in ways that are sustainable for consumers and providers.

While the list below is certainly not exhaustive, it highlights several pathways for promoting women’s financial inclusion.

1. Generate data to better serve customers and attract providers: While we delineate the gender gap in terms of men and women, women (like all customer segments) are not monolithic. Thus, the intent of demand- and supply-side data collection should be to inform the development and delivery of a suite of products and services that target customer segments and to make a business case for offering those products and services. Many financial institutions have historically refrained from collecting data disaggregated by sex because doing so was perceived as discriminatory and/or ineffective given the issue of duplicability in reporting. Government leadership on collecting sex-disaggregated data can help ameliorate this issue. An in-depth look at the process of collecting and analyzing sex-disaggregated data is provided in the recent case study on Chile published by the Global Banking Alliance for Women, Data2X, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank.
2. Promote inward and outward-facing stakeholder collaboration: Financial service providers and non-government entities active within the financial services landscape should find champions of women’s economic empowerment within their organizations to help build strategies for reaching women customers with appropriate products and services. Representatives from both the public and private sectors should work together to facilitate dialogue and collaboration across relevant stakeholders such as telecommunications providers, formal and informal financial institutions, public sector representatives, and consumers. This objective should be reflected in countries’ national financial inclusion strategies where possible.
3. Engage in client-centric design: Providers should deploy relevant data to evaluate customers’ needs and reflect those needs in product design, provision, and promotion. By thinking about the customer experience of access and usage holistically, providers will have the potential to sustainably amplify adoption of financial services.
4. Invest in financial education and financial capability among women and girls: Many women feel that they do not have enough money to hold an account with a formal financial institution, as evidenced by the 2014 Global Findex results noting that 57 percent of women without an account at a financial institution cited having insufficient funds as a barrier to account ownership. Financial inclusion stakeholders should aim to familiarize prospective female customers with appropriate, affordable financial services and promote sound financial behaviors that will help spur greater financial inclusion.
5. Adapt anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism requirements to reflect perceived risks: Enabling risk-based “know your customer” (KYC) processes such as the tiered KYC approach applied in the Diamond Bank example above or in other countries such as Mexico reduces access barriers to formal financial accounts. For more information on KYC processes among different countries, please see the 2015 FDIP Report and Scorecard.
6. Formalize informal financial entities as appropriate: According to the 2014 Global Findex, about 160 million unbanked adults in developing economies saved through informal savings clubs or a non-family member. Vetting and formalizing certain informal providers to ensure adequate consumer protection while preserving services that are familiar and accessible to customers could advance women’s financial inclusion.
7. Leverage digital financial tools to facilitate greater access to and usage of formal financial services:
• Digital platforms can help reduce disparities in access to identification documents. For example, an initiative in Tanzania allows health workers to deliver birth certificates using a mobile phone. Birth certificates facilitate access to healthcare, education, and other important government services, including government-to-person payments.
• Digital financial services such as mobile money can provide greater privacy, convenience, and security to customers who have been disproportionately excluded from the formal financial system. For more information on developing enabling infrastructure and policy environments to support mobile money access and usage, please refer to the 2015 FDIP Report.
• Using “big data” generated by and about consumers on digital platforms helps providers better evaluate the creditworthiness of individuals who may previously have been excluded from the formal financial system due to a lack of or minimal credit history. Since women often lack credit history, these innovative measures to assess credit risk and collateral issues can contribute to women’s economic empowerment by facilitating access to credit. As with all financial services, these “big data, small credit” propositions should be coupled with adequate consumer protection and privacy mechanisms.

An American drone strike that killed leader of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour may seem like a fillip for the United States’ ally, the embattled government of Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani. But as Vanda Felbab-Brown writes in a new op-ed for The New York Times, it is unlikely to improve Kabul’s immediate national security problems—and may create more difficulties than it solves.

The White House has argued that because Mansour became opposed to peace talks with the Afghan government, removing him became necessary to facilitate new talks. Yet, as Vanda writes in the op-ed, “the notion that the United States can drone-strike its way through the leadership of the Afghan Taliban until it finds an acceptable interlocutor seems optimistic, at best.”

[T]he notion that the United States can drone-strike its way through the leadership of the Afghan Taliban until it finds an acceptable interlocutor seems optimistic, at best.

Mullah Mansour's death does not inevitably translate into substantial weakening of the Taliban's operational capacity or a reprieve from what is shaping up to be a bloody summer in Afghanistan. Any fragmentation of the Taliban to come does not ipso facto imply stronger Afghan security forces or a reduction of violent conflict. Even if Mansour's demise eventually turns out to be an inflection point in the conflict and the Taliban does seriously fragment, such an outcome may only add complexity to the conflict. A lot of other factors, including crucially Afghan politics, influence the capacity of the Afghan security forces and their battlefield performance.

Nor will Mansour’s death motivate the Taliban to start negotiating. That did not happen when it was revealed last July’s the group’s previous leader and founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar, had died in 2013. To the contrary, the Taliban’s subsequent military push has been its strongest in a decade—with its most violent faction, the Haqqani network, striking the heart of Kabul. Mansour had empowered the violent Haqqanis following Omar’s death as a means to reconsolidate the Taliban, and their continued presence portends future violence. Mansour's successor, Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban’s former minister of justice who loved to issue execution orders, is unlikely to be in a position to negotiate (if he even wants to) for a considerable time as he seeks to gain control and create legitimacy within the movement.

The United States has sent a strong signal to Pakistan, which continues to deny the presence of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network within its borders. Motivated by a fear of provoking the groups against itself, Pakistan continues to show no willingness to take them on, despite the conditions on U.S. aid.

Disrupting the group’s leadership by drone-strike decapitation is tempting militarily. But it can be too blunt an instrument, since negotiations and reconciliation ultimately depend on political processes. In decapitation targeting, the U.S. leadership must think critically about whether the likely successor will be better or worse for the counterinsurgency endgame.

Event Information

2015 is a crucial year for the international community. For the first time, all nations will converge upon a new set of Sustainable Development Goals applicable to advanced countries, emerging market economies, and developing countries, with the experience of implementing the Millennium Development Goals to build upon. Implementation is the critical component.

The Brookings Global Economy and Development program hosted a day-long private conference at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC on Monday, March 30 to focus on “Governance innovations for implementing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda.”

Hosted in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, this high-level conference drew on experiences from the North-South Helsinki Process on Globalization and Development carried out over the past 15 years. The Helsinki Process presaged many of the prerequisites for achieving accelerated progress by linking goal-setting to goal-implementation and by utilizing multistakeholder processes to mobilize society and financing for social and environmental goals to complement sound economic and financial policies. 

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Brookings President Strobe Talbott shakes hands with Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja after welcoming participants to the conference.

Former President of Finland Tarja Halonen shares insights in the conference’s opening panel.

Over 75 conference participants from governments, multilateral institutions, civil society, the private sector, and think tanks participated in a number of roundtable discussions throughout the day.

President Halonen and Minister Tuomioja share lessons from the Helsinki process as conference participants consider paths forward for implementing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.

Event Materials

• 330 PostReportFinal
• Conference Agenda_FINAL
• March 30 List of Registrants
• Conference Statement Brookings Post2015 Implementation

Event Information

The year 2015 will be a milestone year, with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the post-2015 development agenda by world leaders in September; the Addis Ababa Accord on financing for development in July; and the conclusion of climate negotiations at COP21 in Paris in December. The draft Addis Ababa Accord, which focuses on the actions needed to attain the SDGs, highlights the key role envisaged for the multilateral development banks (MDBs) in the post-2015 agenda. Paragraph 65 of the draft accord notes: “We call on the international finance institutions to establish a process to examine the role, scale, and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda.”          

Against this backdrop, on April 18, 2015, the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings held a private roundtable with the leaders of the MDBs and other key stakeholders to discuss the role of the MDBs in supporting the post-2015 development agenda.

The meeting focused on four questions:

1. What does the post-2015 development agenda and the ambitions of the Addis and Paris conferences imply for the MDBs?


Given the ability of the MDBs to leverage shareholder resources, they can be efficient and effective mechanisms for scaling up development cooperation, particularly with respect to the agenda on investing in people and to the financing of sustainable infrastructure. New roles, instruments and partnerships might be needed.

2. How can MDBs best take advantage of the political attention that is being paid to the various conferences in 2015?   


The World Bank and selected regional development banks have launched a series of initiatives to optimize their balance sheets, address other constraints and enhance their catalytic role in crowding in private finance. And new institutions and mechanisms are coming to the fore. But the responses are not coordinated to best take advantage of each MDB’s comparative advantage.

3. What are the key impediments to scaling up the role and engagement of the MDBs?


Views on constraints are likely to differ but discussions should cover policy dialogue, capacity building, capital, leverage, shareholder backing on volume, instruments on leverage and risk mitigation, safeguards, and governance. 

4. How should the MDBs respond to the proposal to establish a process to examine the role, scale and functioning of the multilateral and regional development finance institutions to make them more responsive to the sustainable development agenda?   


A proactive response and engagement on the part of the MDBs would facilitate a better understanding of the contribution that the MDBs can make and greater support among shareholders for a coherent and stepped-up role.

Event Materials

• Participant List
• MDB PostEvent Summary

2015 is a pivotal year. Three major workstreams among all the world’s nations are going forward this year under the auspices of the United Nations to develop goals, financing, and frameworks for the “post-2015 sustainable development agenda.” First, after two years of wide-ranging consultation, the U.N. General Assembly in New York in September will endorse a new set of global goals for 2030 to follow on from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that culminate this year. Second, to support this effort, a financing for development (FFD) conference took place in July in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to identify innovative ways of mobilizing private and public resources for the massive investments necessary to achieve the new goals. And third, in Paris in December the final negotiating session will complete work on a global climate change framework. 

These three landmark summits will, with luck, provide the broad strategic vision, the specific goals, and the financing modalities for addressing the full range of systemic threats. Most of all, these three summit meetings will mobilize the relevant stakeholders and actors crucial for implementing the post-2015 agenda—governments, international organizations, business, finance, civil society, and parliaments—into a concerted effort to achieve transformational outcomes. Achieving systemic sustainability is a comprehensive, inclusive effort requiring all actors and all countries to be engaged.

These three processes represent a potential historic turning point from “business-as-usual” practices and trends and to making the systemic transformations that are required to avoid transgressing planetary boundaries and critical tipping points. Missing from the global discourse so far is a realistic assessment of the political decisions and institutional innovations that would be required to implement the post-2015 sustainable development agenda (P2015).

For 2015, it is necessary is to make sure that by the end of year the three workstreams have been welded together as a singular vision for global systemic transformation involving all countries, all domestic actors, and all international institutions. The worst outcome would be that the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030 are seen as simply an extension of the 2015 MDGs—as only development goals exclusively involving developing countries. This outcome would abort the broader purposes of the P2015 agenda to achieve systemic sustainability and to involve all nations and reduce it to a development agenda for the developing world that by itself would be insufficient to make the transformations required.

Systemic risks of financial instability, insufficient job-creating economic growth, increasing inequality, inadequate access to education, health, water and sanitation, and electricity, “breaking points” in planetary limits, and the stubborn prevalence of poverty along with widespread loss of confidence of people in leaders and institutions now require urgent attention and together signal the need for systemic transformation.

As a result, several significant structural changes in institution arrangements and governance are needed as prerequisites for systemic transformation. These entail (i) political decisions by country leaders and parliaments to ensure societal engagement, (ii) institutional innovations in national government processes to coordinate implementation, (iii) strengthening the existing global system of international institutions to include all actors, (iv) the creation of an international monitoring mechanism to oversee systemic sustainability trajectories, and (v) realize the benefits that would accrue to the entire P2015 agenda by the engagement of the systemically important countries through fuller utilization of  G20 leaders summits and finance ministers meetings as enhanced global steering mechanisms toward sustainable development.   Each of these changes builds on and depends on each other.

I. Each nation makes a domestic commitment to a new trajectory toward 2030

For global goal-setting to be implemented, it is essential that each nation go beyond a formal agreement at the international level to then embark on a national process of deliberation, debate, and decision-making that adapts the global goals to the domestic institutional and cultural context and commits the nation to them as a long-term trajectory around which to organize its own systemic transformation efforts. Such a process would be an explicitly political process involving national leaders, parliaments or rule-making bodies, societal leaders, business executives, and experts to increase public awareness and to guide the public conversation toward an intrinsically national decision which prioritizes the global goals in ways which fit domestic concerns and circumstances. This political process would avoid the “one-size-fits-all” approach and internalize and legitimate each national sustainability trajectory.

So far, despite widespread consultation on the SDGs, very little attention has been focused on the follow-up to a formal international agreement on them at the U.N. General Assembly in September 2015. The first step in implementation of the SDGs and the P2015 agenda more broadly is to generate a national commitment to them through a process in which relevant domestic actors modify, adapt, and adopt a national trajectory the embodies the hopes, concerns and priorities of the people of each country. Without this step, it is unlikely that national systemic sustainability trajectories will diverge significantly enough from business-as-usual trends to make a difference. More attention needs to now be given to this crucial first step.  And explicit mention of the need for it should appear in the UNGA decisions in New York in September.

II. A national government institutional innovation for systemic transformation

The key feature of systemic risks is that each risk generates spillover effects that go beyond the confines of the risk itself into other domains. This means that to manage any systemic risk requires broad, inter-disciplinary, multi-sectoral approaches. Most governments have ministries or departments that manage specific sectoral programs in agriculture, industry, energy, health, education, environment, and the like when most challenges now are inter-sectoral and hence inter-ministerial. Furthermore, spillover linkages create opportunities in which integrated approaches to problems can capture intrinsic synergies that generate higher-yield outcomes if sectoral strategies are simultaneous and coordinated.

The consequence of spillovers and synergies for national governments is that “whole-of-government” coordinating committees are a necessary institutional innovation to manage effective strategies for systemic transformation. South Korea has used inter-ministerial cabinet level committees that include private business and financial executives as a means of addressing significant interconnected issues or problems requiring multi-sectoral approaches. The Korea Presidential Committee on Green Growth, which contained more than 20 ministers and agency heads with at least as many private sector leaders, proved to be an extremely effective means of implementing South Korea’s commitment to green growth.

III.  A single global system of international institutions

The need for a single mechanism for coordinating the global system of international institutions to implement the P2015 agenda of systemic transformation is clear. However, there are a number of other larger reasons why the forging of such a mechanism is crucial now.

The Brettons Woods era is over. It was over even before the initiative by China to establish the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in Beijing and the New Development Bank (NDB) in Shanghai. It was over because of the proliferation in recent years of private and official agencies and actors in development cooperation and because of the massive growth in capital flows that not only dwarf official development assistance (concessional foreign aid) but also IMF resources in the global financial system. New donors are not just governments but charities, foundations, NGOs, celebrities, and wealthy individuals. New private sources of financing have mushroomed with new forms of sourcing and new technologies. The dominance of the IMF and the World Bank has declined because of these massive changes in the context.

The emergence of China and other emerging market economies requires acknowledgement as a fact of life, not as a marginal change. China in particular deserves to be received into the world community as a constructive participant and have its institutions be part of the global system of international institutions, not apart from it. Indeed, China’s Premier, Li Keqiang, stated at the World Economic Forum in early 2015 that “the world order established after World War II must be maintained, not overturned.”

The economic, social and environmental imperatives of this moment are that the world’s people and the P2015 agenda require that all international institutions of consequence be part of a single coordinated effort over the next 15 years to implement the post-2015 agenda for sustainable development. The geopolitical imperatives of this moment also require that China and China’s new institutions be thoroughly involved as full participants and leaders in the post-2015 era. If nothing else, the scale of global investment and effort to build and rebuild infrastructure requires it.

It is also the case that the post-2015 era will require major replenishments in the World Bank and existing regional development banks, and significantly stronger coordination among them to address global infrastructure investment needs in which the AIIB and the NDB must now be fully involved. The American public and the U.S. Congress need to fully grasp the crucial importance for the United States, of the IMF quota increase and governance reform.  These have been agreed to by most governments but their implementation is stalled in the U.S. Congress. To preserve the IMF’s role in the global financial system and the role of the U.S. in the international community, the IMF quota increase and IMF governance reform must be passed and put into practice. Congressional action becomes all the more necessary as the effort is made to reshape the global system of international institutions to accommodate new powers and new institutions within a single system rather than stumble into a fragmented, fractured, and fractious global order where differences prevail over common interests.

The IMF cannot carry out its significant responsibility for global financial stability without more resources. Other countries cannot add to IMF resources proportionately without U.S. participation in the IMF quota increase.   Without the US contribution, IMF members will have to fund the IMF outside the regular IMF quota system, which means de-facto going around the United States and reducing dramatically the influence of the U.S. in the leadership of the IMF. This is a self-inflicted wound on the U.S., which will damage U.S. credibility, weaken the IMF, and increase the risk of global financial instability. By blocking the IMF governance reforms in the IMF agreed to by the G-20 in 2010, the U.S. is single-handedly blocking the implementation of the enlargement of voting shares commensurate with increased emerging market economic weights.  This failure to act is now widely acknowledged by American thought leaders to be encouraging divergence rather than convergence in the global system of institutions, damaging U.S. interests.

IV. Toward a single monitoring mechanism for the global system of international institutions

The P2015 agenda requires a big push toward institutionalizing a single mechanism for the coordination of the global system of international institutions.  The international coordination arrangement today, is the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation created at the Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011.  This arrangement, which recognizes the increasingly complex context and the heightened tensions between emerging donor countries and traditional western donors, created a loose network of country platforms, regional arrangements, building blocks and forums to pluralize the architecture to reflect the increasingly complex set of agents and actors. This was an artfully arranged compromise, responding to the contemporary force field four years ago.

Now is a different moment. The issues facing the world are both systemic and urgent; they are not confined to the development of developing countries, and still less to foreign aid. Geopolitical tensions are, if anything, higher now than then.  But they also create greater incentives to find areas of cooperation and consensus among major powers who have fundamentally different perspectives on other issues. Maximizing the sweet spots where agreement and common interest can prevail is now of geopolitical importance.  Gaining agreement on institutional innovations to guide the global system of international institutions in the P2015 era would be vital for effective outcomes but also importantly ease geopolitical tensions.

Measurement matters; monitoring and evaluation is a strategic necessity to implementing any agenda, and still more so, an agenda for systemic transformation.  As a result, the monitoring and evaluation system that accompanies the P2015 SDGs will be crucial to guiding the implementation of them.  The UN, the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF all have participated in joint data gathering efforts under the IDGs  in the 1990s and the MDGs in the 2000s.   Each of these institutions has a crucial role to play, but they need to be brought together now under one umbrella to orchestrate their contributions to a comprehensive global data system and to help the G20 finance ministers coordinate their functional programs.   

The OECD has established a strong reputation in recent years for standard setting in a variety of dimensions of the global agenda.  Given the strong role of the OECD in relation to the G20 and its broad outreach to “Key Partners” among the emerging market economies, the OECD could be expected to take a strong role in global benchmarking and monitoring and evaluation of the P2015 Agenda.  The accession of China to the OECD Development Centre, which now has over fifty member countries, and the presence and public speech of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at the OECD on July 1^st, bolsters the outreach of the OECD and its global profile.

But national reporting is the centerpiece and the critical dimension of monitoring and evaluation.  To guide the national reporting systems and evaluate their results, a  new institutional arrangement is needed that is based on national leaders with responsibility for implementation of the sustainable development agendas from each country and is undertaken within the parameters of the global SDGs and the P2015 benchmarks.

V.   Strengthening global governance and G20 roles

G-20 leaders could make a significant contribution to providing the impetus toward advancing systemic sustainability by creating a G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council charged with pulling together the national statistical indicators and implementing benchmarks on the SDGs in G-20 countries.  The G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council (G-20 GSDC) would consist of the heads of the presidential committees on sustainable development charged with coordinating P2015 implementation in G-20 countries.  Representing systemically important countries, they would also be charged with assessing the degree to which national policies and domestic efforts by G20 countries generate positive or negative spillover effects for the rest of the world.  This G-20 GSDC would also contribute to the setting of standards for the global monitoring effort, orchestrated perhaps by the OECD, drawing on national data bases from all countries using the capacities of the international institutions to generate understanding of global progress toward systemic sustainability. 

The UN is not in a position to coordinate the global system of international institutions in their functional roles in global sustainable development efforts.  The G-20 itself could take steps through the meetings of G-20 Finance Ministers to guide the global system of international institutions in the implementation phase of the P2015 agenda to begin in 2016. The G-20 already has a track record in coordinating international institutions in the response to the global financial crisis in 2008 and its aftermath. The G-20 created the Financial Stability Board (FSB), enlarged the resources for the IMF, agreed to reform the IMF’s governance structure, orchestrated relations between the IMF and the FSB, brought the OECD into the mainstream of G-20 responsibilities and has bridged relations with the United Nations by bringing in finance ministers to the financing for development conference in Addis under Turkey’s G-20 leadership. 

There is a clear need to coordinate the financing efforts of the IMF, with the World Bank and the other regional multilateral development banks (RMDBs), with the AIIB and the BRICS NDB, and with other public and private sector funding sources, and to assess the global institutional effort as whole in relation to the P2015 SDG trajectories.  The G-20 Finance Ministers grouping would seem to be uniquely positioned to be an effective and credible means of coordinating these otherwise disparate institutional efforts.  The ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum and the Busuan Global Partnership provide open inclusive space for knowledge sharing and consultation but need to be supplemented by smaller bodies capable of making decisions and providing strategic direction.

Following the agreements reached in the three U.N. workstreams for 2015, the China G-20 could urge the creation of a formal institutionalized global monitoring and coordinating mechanism at the China G-20 Summit in September 2016. By having the G-20 create a G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council (G-20 GSDC), it could build on the national commitments to SDG trajectories to be made next year by U.N. members countries and on the newly formed national coordinating committees established by governments to implement the P2015 Agenda, giving the G-20 GSDC functional effectiveness, clout and credibility.   Whereas there is a clear need to compensate for the sized-biased representation of the G20 with still more intensive G-20 outreach and inclusion, including perhaps eventually considering shifting to a constituency based membership, for now the need in this pivotal year is to use the momentum to make political decisions and institutional innovations which will crystallize the P2015 strategic vision toward systemic sustainability into mechanisms and means of implementation.

By moving forward on these recommendations, the G-20 Leaders Summits would be strengthened by involving G-20 leaders in the people-centered P2015 Agenda, going beyond finance to issues closer to peoples’ homes and hearts. Systemically important countries would be seen as leading on systemically important issues.  The G-20 Finance Ministers would be seen as playing an appropriate role by serving as the mobilizing and coordinating mechanism for the global system of international institutions for the P2015 Agenda.  And the G-20 GSDC would become the effective focal point for assessing systemic sustainability not only within G20 countries but also in terms of their positive and negative spillover effects on systemic sustainability paths of other countries, contributing to standard setting and benchmarking for global monitoring and evaluation.    These global governance innovations could re-energize the G20 and provide the international community with the leadership, the coordination and the monitoring capabilities that it needs to implement the P2015 Agenda. 

As the MDGs culminate this year, as the three U.N. workstreams on SDGs, FFD, and UNFCC are completed, the world needs to think ahead to the implementation phase of the P2015 sustainable development agenda. Given the scale and scope of the P2015 agenda, these five governance innovations need to be focused on now so they can be put in place in 2016.

These will ensure (i) that national political commitments and engagement by all countries are made by designing, adopting, and implementing their own sustainable development trajectories and action plans; (ii) that national presidential committees are established, composed of key ministers and private sector leaders to coordinate each country’s comprehensive integrated sustainability strategy; (iii) that all governments and international institutions are accepted by and participate in a single global system of international institutions;   (iv) that a G-20 monitoring mechanism be created by the China G-20 in September 2016 that is comprised of the super-minister officials heading the national presidential coordinating committees implementing the P2015 agenda domestically in G-20 countries, as a first step;  and (v) that the G-20 Summit leaders in Antalya in November 2015 and in China in September 2016 make clear their own commitment to the P2015 agenda and their responsibility for its adaption, adoption and implementation internally in their countries but also for assessing G-20 spillover impacts on the rest of the world, as well as for deploying their G-20 finance ministers to mobilize and coordinate the global system of international institutions toward achieving the P2015 agenda.

Without these five structural changes, it will be more likely that most countries and actors will follow current trends rather than ratchet up to the transformational trajectories necessary to achieve systemic sustainability nationally and globally by 2030.

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Xu Jiajun and Richard Carey, “China’s Development Finance: Ambition, Impact and Transparency,” (Sussex :  Institute for Development Studies, IDS Policy Brief, 2015).

Soogil Young, “Domestic Actions for Implementing Integrated Comprehensive Strategies:  Lessons from Korea’s Experience with Its Green Growth Strategy”, Washington: Paper for the Brookings conference on “Governance Innovations to Implement the Post-2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, March 30, 2015).

“The Earth in the coming decades could cease to be a ‘safe operating space’ for human beings,” concludes a paper by 18 researchers “trying to gauge the breaking points in the natural world,” published in Science in January 2015. That our planetary environment seems to be approaching “breaking points” is but one of several systemic threats looming on the horizon or lurking under the surface.

Since the economic crisis in 2008, the world has learned that financial instability is a global threat to sustainable livelihoods and economic progress. The underlying dynamics of technological change seem to be more labor displacing than labor absorbing, creating increasing anxiety that employment and career trajectories are permanently threatened. These two challenges undermine public confidence in the market economy, in institutions, and in political leaders. They constitute systemic threats to the credibility of markets and democracy to generate socially and politically sustainable outcomes for societies.

The fact that one billion people still live in extreme poverty, that there are scores of countries that are considered to be “failed states,” and that genocide, virulent violence, and terrorism are fed by this human condition of extreme deprivation together constitute a social systemic threat, global in scope. These challenges together merge with a growing public awareness of global inequality between nations and of increasing inequality within nations. The power of money in public life, whether in the form of overt corruption or covert influence, disenfranchises ordinary people and feeds anger and distrust of the current economic system. 

These challenges are global in reach, systemic in scale, and urgent. They require deliberate decisions to abandon “business-as-usual” approaches, to rethink current practices and engage in actions to transform the underlying fundamentals in order to avoid the collapse and catastrophe of systems that average people depend upon for normal life.  

Systemic risks are real. Generating new pathways to systemic sustainability are the new imperatives. Holistic approaches are essential, since the economic, social, environmental, and political elements of systemic risk are interrelated.  “Sustainable development,” once the label for environmentally sensitive development paths for developing countries, is now the new imperative for systemic sustainability for the global community as a whole.

2015 is a pivotal year for global transformation. Three major work streams among all nations are going forward this year under the auspices of the United Nations to develop goals, financing, and frameworks for the “post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda.”  First, in New York in September—after two years of wide-ranging consultation—the U.N. General Assembly will endorse a new set of global development goals to be achieved by 2030, to build upon and replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that culminate this year. Second, to support this effort, a Financing for Development (FFD) conference took place in July in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to identify innovative ways to mobilize private and public resources for the massive investments necessary to achieve the new goals. And third, in Paris in December, the final negotiating session will complete work on a global climate change framework.  

These three landmark summits will, with luck, provide the broad strategic vision, the specific goals, and the financing for addressing the full range of systemic threats.  Most of all, these events, along with the G-20 summit of leaders of the major economies in November in Antalya, Turkey, will mobilize the relevant stakeholders and actors crucial for implementing the post-2015 agenda—governments, international organizations, business, finance, civil society, and parliaments—into a concerted effort to achieve transformational outcomes. Achieving systemic sustainability is a comprehensive, inclusive effort requiring all actors and all countries to be engaged. [3]

Four major elements need to be in place for this process to become a real instrument for achieving systemic sustainability across the board. 

First, because everyone everywhere faces systemic threats, the response needs to be universal. The post-2015 agenda must be seen as involving advanced industrial countries, emerging market economies, and developing nations. Systemic sustainability is not a development agenda limited to developing countries, nor just a project to eradicate poverty, nor just an agenda for development cooperation and foreign aid. It is a high policy agenda for all countries that goes to the core of economics, governance, and society, addressing fundamental dynamics in finance, energy, employment, equity, growth, governance, and institutions.

Second, systemic threats are generated because of spillover effects from activities that used to be considered self-contained and circumscribed in their impact. The world of silos and vertical self-sufficiency has given way to an integrated world in which horizontal linkages are as important as vertical specialization. The result of these interlinkages is that synergies can be realized by taking comprehensive integrated approaches to major issues. In this new context, positive-sum benefits are potentially more easily realized, but integrated strategies are necessary for doing so. 

This new context of spillovers and synergies has two implications. The domestic dimension is that whole-of-government approaches are necessary for addressing systemic sustainability. Cross-sectoral, inter-ministerial approaches are essential.  Since markets alone are not able to realize optimal outcomes in the widespread presence of externalities, the only way to realize the positive sum potential of synergies is through coordination among related actors. On the international dimension, this new context also requires more cooperation and coordination than competition to realize synergistic, positive-sum outcomes.

Third, domestic political pressures are primary. This may be a variant of the old saying that “all politics is local.”  However, the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis has been a world of hurt in which impacted publics are feeling anger and alienation from an economic system that has threatened their jobs, incomes, pensions, homes, and livelihoods. The task of leaders is not to pander to these plights but to lead their people to understand the vital linkage between domestic conditions and external forces and the degree to which the global context inevitably impacts on domestic conditions. Leaders need to be able to explain to their people that systemic threats have inextricable global–domestic linkages that need to be managed, not ignored.

Fourth, given all this, it is absolutely necessary that the global system of international institutions be “on the same page,” share the same vision, strategy, and goals, rather than each taking its primary mandate as a writ for independence from the common agenda. 

The major challenges for global governance in this pivotal turn from goal-setting in 2015 to the beginning of implementation in 2016 are to ensure (i) that all countries adapt and adopt the post-2015 agenda in ways that are congruent with their national culture and context while at the same time committing to reporting on all aspects of the agenda; (ii) that whole-of-government institutional mechanisms and processes are put in place domestically to realize the synergies that can accrue only from comprehensive, integrated approaches and that international cooperation mechanisms gain greater traction to reap the positive-sum outcomes from global consultation, coordination, and cooperation;  (iii) that national political leaders learn new modes of domestic and international leadership that are capable of articulating the new context and new systemic risks that need to be managed both internally and globally; and (iv) that each international institution realizes the need to be part of a system-wide global effort to achieve systemic sustainability through concerted efforts of all relevant actors working together on behalf of a common global agenda. [2]

Currently under discussion are 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 indicators for 2030 to extend and replace the eight MDGs for 2015, which had 21 targets and a variety of indicators, which in turn extended and replaced seven International Development Goals (IDGs) agreed to in 1995 by development cooperation ministers from OECD countries. There is much chatter now about whether the SDGs and indicators are too many, too ambitious, and too widespread.  The Economist asserts that the SDGs “would be worse than useless,” dubbing them “stupid development goals”. And Charles Kenney at the Center for Global Development in a thoughtful piece argues that “we lost the plot.” 

It may be true that there is too much detail. Two previous efforts, one by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and the Korean Development Institute (KDI) had 10 goals, and the other, the U.N. High Level Panel of Eminent Persons report in 2013 had 12 goals.[iii] This quibble alone does not prevent the use of political imagination to conjure a storyline that connects the 17 proposed SDGs with the vision of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda as addressing systemic threats and having comprehensive integrated strategies for addressing them. 

Fourteen of the 17 SDGs can be clustered into four overarching strategic components: poverty (2); access (6); sustainability (5); and partnership (1). The other three goals have to do with growth and governance (institutions), which were underpinnings for both the IDGs and the MDGs though not embodied in the sets of goals themselves. The four SDG components seamlessly continue the storyline of the IDGs and the MDGs, both of which included poverty as the first goal, gender equality- education-and-health as issues of access, an environmental sustainability goal, and (in the MDGs) a partnership goal. The two underpinning components of growth and governance remain crucial and, if anything, are still more important today than 20 years ago when the global goal-setting process began. 

Continuity of strategic direction in transformational change is an asset, ensuring persistence and staying power until the goal is fulfilled.

The SDGs now convey a sense of the scale and scope of systemic threats. The sustainability goals (goals 11 through 15) highlight the environmental threats from urbanization, over-consumption/production, climate change, destruction of ocean life, to ecosystems, forests, deserts, land, and biodiversity. No knowledgeable person would leave out any of these issues when considering threats to environmental sustainability. 

The fact that goal 10, to “reduce inequality within and among countries,” is on the list of SDGs signals a new fact of political life that inequality is now front-and-center on the political agenda globally and nationally in many countries, advanced, emerging, and developing. This goal is really the “chapeaux” for goals 3 through 7, which deal with health, education, gender, water and sanitation, and energy for all—the access goals that must be met to “reduce inequality within and among countries.” It is inconceivable that a group of global goals for a sustainable future in the 21st century would leave out any of these goals crucial for achieving social sustainability, and undoubtedly political sustainability as well. 

Reducing inequality is not an end in itself but a means of providing skills and livelihoods for people in a knowledge-based global economy and hence the social and political sustainability required for stable growth. Growth is both a means and an end.

The two poverty goals are now more ambitious and inclusive than earlier. “Ending poverty” is different from reducing it, as in the IDGs and MDGs. And “ending hunger” through food security, nutrition, and sustainable agriculture are means to the end of eliminating poverty. For the Economist, eliminating extreme poverty should be the most important goal, stating that “it would have a much better chance of being achieved if it stood at the head of a very short list.”

This observation would apply if the SDGs are again intended to be, as the IDGs and MDGs were previously, development goals for developing countries. But development for developing countries is not the primary thrust and drive of the post-2015 agenda taken as a whole.  

The world is now facing systemic risks that threaten unacceptable collapse in social, political, economic, and environmental systems. A global community under threat from systemic risks needs a strategic vision and a pathway forward with specific guideposts, benchmarks, and means of implementation. 

The SDGs, the FFD documents and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change accords will not be perfect. But, the three U.N. processes in 2015 capture the main elements, attempt to get specific in terms of priority actions and accountability, and together will provide a vision for the future for achieving systemic sustainability in its multiple, interconnected dimensions.

To think that simplifying the wording is going to simplify the problems is illusory. To narrow the vision to poor countries and poor people is to misunderstand the systemic nature of the threats and the scope and scale of them. 

This is a global agenda for all. Partnership now means we are all in the same boat, no longer acting on a global North-South axis of donor and recipient. Without the participation of all nations, all stakeholders, and all the international institutions, actual transformation will fall short of necessary transformation, and the world will reach breaking points that will inflict pain, suffering, and high costs on everyone in the future. The post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda for 2030 brings an awareness of the future into the present and makes us understand that the time for action is now. 

Endnotes:

[1] For an example of a recent multistakeholder interactive conference on this set of issues, review the related report on the Brookings-Finland private meeting on March 30, 2015 on “implementing the post 2015 sustainable development agenda.

[2] See “Action Implications of Focusing Now on the Implementation of the post-2015 Agenda,” which outlines in more detail the key elements of implementation that need to be set in motion during 2015 and 2016, emphasizing especially roles for the Turkey G-20 summit in 2015 and the China G-20 summit in 2016.  

The consequences of the global financial crisis still ripple through the international system after the initial surge in global economic cooperation and governance immediately following the crisis. The ultimate effects have been that, while some elements of the international system of institutions have gotten stronger, the system as a whole is now seen as weaker, fractured, and driven more by geopolitical conflict than by institutional norms and frameworks.

The issue is how to move the global policy agenda forward in such a way that substantive progress induces institutional strengthening. The next two years offer new opportunities for creating a positive symbiosis between policy advance and systemic improvements.

I. The U.N. global agenda

The United Nations global agenda has three tracks that relate to each other and provide opportunities to pull the world together around an integrated, comprehensive strategic vision for the world’s people and strengthen the international system in the process.

The first track is the elaboration of a sustainable development agenda for each and all countries, not just developing countries, but advanced industrial economies and emerging market countries too. This effort is already well underway and will result in a summit of global leaders in September 2015 at the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) in New York. This process entails a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030 to be developed and affirmed by and for all countries, and which succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that culminate in 2015 and applied only to developing countries. This post-2015 goal-setting process will provide the substantive, cross-cutting, multidimensional agenda for the next 15 years. It is simultaneously a social, economic, and environmental agenda that relates goals to each other in functional terms requiring coordination among public and private sectors, ministries, civil society groups, and international institutions.

The second track is the financing for development (FFD) track, which goes well beyond reliance conceptually and practically on foreign aid or official development assistance as in the past. FFD for the SDGs includes a focus, first and foremost, on domestic sources of finance beyond government revenues. FFD is engaged in searches for innovative sources of finance, private sector mobilization of resources, creative market incentives and mechanisms, initiatives by civil society organizations, and development of entrepreneurial and small- and medium-size business opportunities that address global issues. This effort resulted in a global leaders meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in July of 2015 that reached agreement on the major thrusts for mobilizing resources for the post-2015 agenda (Kharas and MacArthur (2014)).

The third track is the global climate change negotiations currently under way to achieve a global agreement on the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), which will result in a global summit in Paris in December of 2015. While these detailed negotiations on climate are a separate track, it is clear that the sustainable human development trajectories being put forward in the post-2015 agenda impact and are crucially affected by the efficacy of the climate change arrangements worked out in the UNFCCC agreements in 2015.

Whereas these three tracks operationally are going forward separately, the substantive aspects of each track affect and are affected by the content of the other two. The ultimate convergence of these three streams of activities and actions will have to occur in the beginning of 2016 at the global, regional, and national levels if the implementation phase is to be successful. A business-as-usual approach will not be satisfactory if at the global level, for example, the international institutions are unable to coordinate their work, or if at the national level ministries remain within their “silos” of sectoral expertise and responsibility.

Synergies exist between goal areas that cannot be realized without coordination across sectors and institutions, impacting goal achievement (see OECD 2014 PCD). A systemic approach is necessary at all levels to address the global challenges identified in the post-2015 agenda.

II. The G-20 summits for 2015 and 2016

A major opportunity presents itself in terms of providing impetus, momentum, and leadership for these large work streams and their convergence by linking the G-20 presidency of Turkey for 2015 with the G-20 leadership of China in 2016. Turkey and China working together in tandem within the G-20 Troika over the next two years to explain, support, and sustain the mobilization effort toward the post-2015 agenda could be a major contribution to it but also strengthen the global system of international institutions in the process. For the Turkish G-20 summit, scheduled to take place in November 2015 in Antalya, between UNGA in New York in September and the UNFCCC in Paris in December, Turkey could use part of its G-20 summit to have the leaders of the world’s largest advanced and emerging market economies explain to the world the nature, importance, and relevance of the SDGs to domestic concerns and priorities of ordinary people.

A weakness of G-20 summits thus far has been that G-20 leaders have become trapped by finance ministers’ issues and discourse and have failed to connect with their publics on larger issues of direct concern to people everywhere. The post-2015 agenda provides an opportunity for G-20 leaders to lead their people in understanding how global efforts relate to domestic conditions and why dealing only domestically with issues will not suffice to advance the human agenda where the global interface is extremely palpable. G-20 leaders, under Turkey’s leadership, could step out beyond the technical jargon of finance ministries and central banks, as important as those issues continue to be, and directly address the longer-term, fundamental conditions that affect the lives and livelihoods of all people. They would thereby strengthen their own leadership profile internally by explaining the global dimensions of domestic issues as means of creating public support for the sustainability issues in the post-2015 agenda.

Past experience with the International Development Goals (IDGs) of the 1990s and the Millennium Development Goals since the early 2000s  demonstrates that linking the goal-setting effort to the implementation phase yields powerful results by capturing the political momentum of the goal setting phase and carrying that energy forward directly into implementation efforts. If Turkey and China were to work together in 2015 and 2016, thereby bridging the goal-setting year in 2015 to the beginning of the implementation phase in 2016, they could provide the catalytic leadership and continuity that would maximize the staying power of the momentum from one phase to the next.

China, for its G-20 summit preparations in 2016, could focus on developing a road map, in concert with the other countries and international organizations and especially with the United Nations, that would explicitly keep alive the activities, groups, and initiatives manifested in the goal-setting phase into the next phase of implementation beginning in 2016. These combined efforts by Turkey and China could jump-start societies focusing on accelerating efforts to transform their societies by mobilizing policies and resources for highly related goal areas of direct benefit to their people.

The immediate effects of coordinated sequential efforts by Turkey and China in their respective G-20 years to advance the post-2015 agenda would be to strengthen the relationship between the G-20 and the United Nations on the agenda itself and to strengthen the G-20 summits by having leaders lead on issues of central concern to their people, strengthening the G-20 as a leadership forum in the process. For these results to occur, Turkey and China would need to begin to work together now to develop concordance in their individual efforts and initiate activities that would benefit greatly by beginning now and running through 2016 and beyond.

Accelerating implementation: Several initiatives could be undertaken now that would set up the dynamics for accelerated implementation in 2016 and beyond.

• National strategies for achieving the SDGs: Encourage countries to adapt and adopt the SDGs to their respective priorities and social, political, and cultural contexts through deliberate decision processes and wide societal engagement.
• The role of parliaments: Bring parliamentarians and parliaments into the goal-setting process so that they are aware of the legislative, regulatory, and budgetary implications of the post-2015 agenda.
• The role of domestic ministries: Bring finance ministers and other domestic ministries and agencies together with foreign ministers in the goal-setting year to set in motion mutually involved functional relationships and operational guidelines to enhance implementation across sectors.
• The G-20 as broker and mobilizer: The G-20 could act as a broker between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and regional development banks and the U.N. and its agencies to assure not just coordination but more intensive interactions that would be designed to accelerate the mobilization of resources and as well as policies and private sector activities that would enhance implementation.
• The policy role of the OECD: The strong, substantive role of the OECD in G-20 summits on issues high on the G-20 agenda—such as structural reform, tax base erosion, development, environment, energy, employment, and social issues—position the OECD to continue to provide important substantive inputs to the G-20 in 2015 and 2016. The OECD would enhance the relationship of its 34 members with G-20 emerging market economies by OECD involvement in both the G-20 and the U.N. post-2015 agenda.
• Financial stability and the SDGs: Encouraged by the G-20 summits, the IMF, the Financial Stability Board, and the OECD could work together to integrate the financial regulatory reform agenda into the post-2015 U.N. process by clarifying the linkages between financial stability, regulatory reform, and incentives for long-term private investment in infrastructure (crucial to all the SDGs) and in productive activities which generate greater employment and growth.
• Multi-stakeholder participation in implementation: G-20 summits can facilitate multi-stakeholder processes for engaging civil society, labor, private sector, religious, academic, and expert communities not only in the G-20 summits, as is the current practice, but also in the post-2015 agenda and its implementation, connecting societal leaders with the SDG agenda.

III. The overarching importance of a single global agenda

If these efforts to bring together a wide cross-section of domestic and international agencies, public and private sector leaders, stakeholders, and civil society actors are to translate into actions that are meaningful to the lives and livelihoods of people, a single set of goals is essential. The lesson learned from the IDG-MDG experience was that the tendency to differentiate roles by identifying different institutions with different sets of goals was real. The United Nations had inadvertently put forward the Millennium Declaration at the September 2000 U.N. General Assembly that had “millennium targets” which were similar but not identical to the International Development Goals (IDGs). The IDGs had been developed in the mid-1990s by OECD development ministers and subsequently were endorsed by the World Bank, the IMF, the U.N. and the OECD. In fact, in 2000, for the first time ever, the heads of those four institutions signed, and the institutions themselves published, a joint report, A Better World For All: Progress towards the International Development Goals.

Despite the appearance of unity and in part because there was a lack of concordance between the Millennium Declaration Targets (MDTs) and the IDGs, there was a moment in March 2001 when it looked like there might be a decisive divergence between the U.N. and the Bretton Woods institutions, with the U.N. taking the lead on the MDTs and the World Bank and IMF taking the lead on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSPs), leaving the IDGs marginalized altogether. This potential division of labor was thwarted by a decision to reconcile the differences between the MDTs and the IDGs by forging the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which embodied the principal elements of both. The MDGs surfaced and were endorsed by the Monterrey Summit on Financing for Development in March of 2002, keeping the major global institutions on the same page with bilateral donors and the same path moving toward achieving the MDGs in 2015.

Most people who know about the MDGs think their origins began at the U.N. in the year 2000. It is an often overlooked fact that the MDGs only came forward in 2002 to bridge the potential divide between the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations. If that divide had occurred, it would have been disastrous from a goal setting-goal implementation point-of-view. This history is quite important to bring forward into public light now because it illustrates divisive dangers that currently lurk under the surface threatening unity if not squarely addressed.

From the perspective of prioritizing implementation, the truth is that multiple sets of goals blur the strategic vision, fail to communicate direction, weaken effective leadership, and encourage special pleading for differentiated interests instead focusing on the common, public interest. The U.N. has the lead role in global goal setting and has strengthened its own role in the global system in recent years. However, looking forward now to the SDG implementation phase, a danger might be that the Post-2015 agenda could be seen as the creature and captive of the United Nations, whereas it must be fully endorsed and internalized within the global system of international institutions as a whole. For that to happen, it would be necessary to move now, during the goal-setting year, to include all the relevant international and domestic actors that are crucial to the implementation phase of the post-2015 agenda.

The implications of including the post-2015 agenda in the G-20 summits in 2015 and 2016:

• It would make clear to relevant publics and actors that this set of global goals is universal, applicable to advanced countries, emerging market economies, and developing countries; it is not a “development agenda” but a “sustainability agenda,” which is broader, more strategic, and higher on the policy agenda of most countries.
• It would make clear the inextricable dynamics between domestic priorities and global goals; the SDGs are not foreign policy objectives or aid targets for development; they are domestic priorities affected by global impacts and generating global spillovers that need to be managed, not neglected.
• It would make the incorporation of finance ministers and domestic ministers with foreign ministers, along with international institutions, an imperative, rather than a utopian, ideal.
• It would make obvious the need to have a wide range of international institutions dealing with health, labor, education, women, climate, and the environment on the same page with the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions working together toward the SDGs.
• It would link the need for multi-stakeholder participation in goal setting to the goal implementation phase to mobilize support, policies, and resources but also to reveal and work on the interconnectedness of the goals themselves taken as a whole. 

Hence, the critical imperative is that there be a single narrative, a single set of goals, for all the domestic and global players to relate to, affirm, and implement. Otherwise, a fractured global order will produce lower-yield outcomes, and competition among priorities, sectors, and actors will result in poorer goal performance than would be possible with an integrated, concerted approach where all actors are working toward the same ends.

IV. Possible G-20 Actions by Turkey and China

Turkey has developed a process for the G-20 summit scheduled for November 14-15, 2015 in Antalya. Implementation, inclusion, and investment—the three “I’s”—are the overarching themes already established. The three “I’s” ties are tightly tied to the Australian G-20 outcomes—implementing action plans to achieve the incremental growth target of an additional 2 percentage points of GDP by 2018; including lower-income people in growth and lower-income countries in the global economy; and investing in infrastructure.

Each of these priorities is supportive of and compatible with the post-2015 agenda, even though they are not yet directly addressed to it. A decision by Turkey to include the post-2015 agenda in the 2015 G-20 would be easily achieved by cross-walking the SDGs over to and into the three “I’s” and vice versa. The central priority of the post-2015 agenda is, after all, “implementation.” The overarching meaning of the six elements of the post-2015 agenda (dignity, prosperity, justice, partnership, planet, and people (U.N. SG Synthesis Report December 2014)) is their impact on “inclusion.” And “investment” in infrastructure is crucial to all of the 17 SDGs.

The three pillars for Turkey’s 2015 agenda are: (i) strengthening the global recovery and lifting potential growth (the 2 percent target); (ii) enhancing resilience (financial regulatory reform]; and (iii) buttressing sustainability. Clearly, the third pillar on sustainability opens the door for the incorporation of the post-2015 agenda into the Turkey G-20, if Turkey wishes to do so. And the other two pillars fully support the sustainability agenda and are linked to it, or need to be.

For China, the post-2015 agenda presents a unique opportunity for the Chinese government to seize on a global agenda that has specific, strong, and visible links to the domestic concerns of the Chinese people. China could use the 2016 G-20 summit both to provide international leadership for global cooperation and to demonstrate the connection of global issues to domestic conditions through their impact and spillover effects. Because the post-2015 agenda is a universal agenda, by prioritizing it in its G-20 summit, China would be embracing the multiplicity of its own identity as a developing country but also as a dynamic emerging market economy that is destined to eventually play a global leadership role equivalent to advanced countries.

Furthermore, China seems intent on being a competitive nation in various spheres while at the same time being cooperative in others. The G-20 summit presidency for China in 2016 provides China with an opportunity to strengthen its role in international cooperation by being ambitious in the reach of its agenda for the G-20 in 2016, by its conduct as a member of the G-20 Troika for the next three years, and as the host government for the G-20 in 2016. By choosing to support Turkey in its consideration of incorporating the post-2015 agenda in the G-20 summit in 2015 and by China itself addressing the implementation issues in 2016, China would be reaping the demonstrably higher-yield gains generated by linking the SDG goal-setting phase in 2015 to the implementation phase in 2016.

Integrating the three tracks of SDG goal setting, financing for development, and progress on climate change actions is complementary but complex. While challenging, China has sufficiently high stakes in the outcomes of all three of these tracks to have a national interest in leading a global effort over the next three years to energize the convergence of agendas and institutional mandates necessary to generate bigger outcomes for people everywhere, including in China.

V. Results: Strengthening global governance and leadership

What follows from the analysis here is that the decision to include the post-2015 agenda in the Turkey and China G-20 summits would be a choice about the substance but also about the process of global economic governance, in which the G-20 has a leadership role. To do so in the way outlined here, would:

• Strengthen the global system of international institutions by bringing them together around a single comprehensive, integrated sustainability agenda;
• Create synergies between the United Nations and the other international institutions rather than identifying the post-2015 agenda with the U.N. alone and relying unnecessarily on the U.N. for its implementation;
• Connect G-20 leaders with a broader human and planetary agenda beyond economics and finance, which in turn would connect G-20 leaders with their publics as they visibly address the domestic concerns of their people in their global context; and
• Strengthen the role of the G-20 in global economic governance by putting the G-20 out in front as a broker among stakeholders, a catalytic coordinator of relevant domestic and international actors, and a leader on behalf of the concerns, lives, and livelihoods of people.

Selected References

Colin I. Bradford (2002), “Toward 2015: From Consensus Formation to Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. Issues for the Future: The Implementation Phase”, Development Economics Department (DEC), The World Bank, December 2002.

Colin I. Bradford (2014), “The Changing World Economy and Global Economic Governance”, power point presentation at the Korean Delegation seminar “The OECD and Global Governance”, OECD, Paris, December 11, 2014.

Colin I. Bradford (2014), “Global Economic Governance and the Role of International Institutions”, Second High-level Policy Forum on Global Governance:  Scoping Papers, UNDP Beijing China, 22 October 2014.

Colin I. Bradford (2015), “Governance Innovations for Implementing the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda: Conference Report”,  Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., March 30, 2015.  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Events/2015/03/30-post-2015-sustainable-development-agenda/330-PostReportFinal.pdf?la=en   

Ye Yu, Xue Lei and Zha Xiaogang (2014), “The Role of Developing Countries in Global Economic Governance---with a Special Analysis on China’s Role”, Second High-level Policy Forum on Global Governance:  Scoping Papers, UNDP Beijing China, 22 October 2014. Authors are from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies.

Homi Kharas and John McArthur (2014), “Nine Priority Commitments to be Made at the UN’s July 2015 Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,” October 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/02/united-nations-financing-for-development-kharas-mcarthur

OECD (2014), “Policy Coherence for Development and the Sustainable Development Goals”, Paris: OECD, 10 December 2014, prepared for the 8^th Meeting of the National Focal Points for Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) held at the OECD on 17-18 December 2014. 

2015 is a pivotal year for global development; this fall is a pivotal moment. Meetings this fall will determine the global vision for sustainable development for 2030.

Three papers being released today—“Action implications focusing now on implementation of the post-2015 agenda,” “Systemic sustainability as the strategic imperative for the post-2015 agenda,” and “Political decisions and institutional innovations required for systemic transformations envisioned in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda”—set out some foundational ideas and specific proposals for political decisions and institutional innovations, which focus now on the implementation of the new global vision for 2030. This blog summarizes the key points in the three papers listed below.

Fundamentals for guiding actions, reforms and decisions

1) Managing systemic risks needs to be the foundational idea for implementing the post-2015 agenda.

The key political idea latent but not yet fully visible in the post-2015 agenda is that it is not a developing country poverty agenda for global development in the traditional North-South axis but a universal agenda based on the perception of urgent challenges that constitute systemic threats.

The term “sustainable development” by itself as the headline for the P-2015 agenda creates the danger of inheriting terminology from the past to guide the future.

2) Goal-setting and implementation must be effectively linked.

The international community learned from the previous two sets of goal-setting experiences that linking implementation to goal-setting is critical to goal achievement.  G-20 leader engagement in the post-2015 agenda and linking the success of the G-20 presidencies of Turkey (2015), China (2016), and Germany (2017) would provide global leadership for continuity of global awareness and commitment.

3) Focus on the Sustainable Development Goals must be clear.

Criticism of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as being too defuse and too detailed is ill-founded and reveals a lack of political imagination. It is a simple task to group the 17 goals into a few clusters that clearly communicate their focus on poverty, access, sustainability, partnership, growth, and institutions and their linkages to the social, economic, and environmental systemic threats that are the real and present dangers.

The Bretton Woods era is over. It was over before China initiated the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). Never has it been clearer than now that maintaining a single global system of international institutions is essential for geopolitical reasons. For the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, all the major international institutions need to commit to them.

In a joint paper with Zhang Haibing from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS), we make five specific governance proposals for decision-makers: 

The implementation of the post-2015 agenda requires that nations internalize the SDGs by debating, adapting and adopting them in terms of their own domestic cultural, institutional, and political circumstances. It will be important for the U.N. declarations in September to urge all countries to undertake domestic decision-making processes toward this end.

2) Presidential coordination committees should be established.

To adequately address systemic risks and to implement the P-2015 agenda requires comprehensive, integrated, cross-sectoral, whole-of-government approaches.  South Korea’s experience with presidential committees composed of ministers with diverse portfolios, private sector and civil society leaders provides an example of how governments could break the “silos” and meet the holistic nature of systemic threats.

3) There needs to be a single global system of international institutions.

China’s Premier Li Keqiang stated at the World Economic Forum in early 2015 that “the world order established after World War II must be maintained, not overturned.” Together with a speech Li gave at the OECD on July 1st after signing an expanded work program agreement with the OECD and becoming a member of the OECD Development Center, clearly signals of China’s intention to cooperate within the current institutional system. The West needs to reciprocate with clear signals of respect for the increasing roles and influence of China and other emerging market economies in global affairs.

4) We must move toward a single global monitoring system for development targets.

The monitoring and evaluation system that accompanies the post-2015 SDGs will be crucial to guiding the implementation of them. The U.N., the OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF have all participated in joint data gathering efforts under the International Development Goals  (IDGs) in the 1990s and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the 2000s. Each of these institutions has a crucial role to play now, but they need to be brought together under one umbrella to orchestrate their contributions to a comprehensive global data system.

By engaging in the post-2015 agenda, the G-20 leaders’ summits would be strengthened by involving G-20 leaders in the people-centered post-2015 agenda. Systemically important countries would be seen as leading on systemically important issues. The G-20 finance ministers can play an appropriate role by serving as the coordinating mechanism for the global system of international institutions for the post-2015 agenda. A G-20 Global Sustainable Development Council, composed of the heads of the presidential committees for sustainable development from G20 countries, could become an effective focal point for assessing systemic sustainability.

These governance innovations could re-energize the G-20 and provide the international community with the leadership, the coordination, and the monitoring capabilities that it needs to implement the post-2015 agenda.

By 2020, Millennials will comprise more than one of three adult Americans. It is estimated that by 2025 they will make up as much as 75 percent of the workforce.  Millennials’ desire for pragmatic action that drives results will overtake today’s emphasis on ideology and polarization as Boomers finally fade from the scene. Thus, understanding the generation’s values offers a window into the future of corporate America.

Morley Winograd and Michael Hais outline the cultural force of the Millennial generation on the economy as Millennials increasingly dominate the nation’s workplaces and permeate its corporate culture. Winograd and Hais argue that the current culture on Wall Street is becoming increasingly isolated from the beliefs and values of America’s largest adult generation. The authors also include data on Millennials’ ideal employers, their financial behaviors, and their levels of institutional trust in order to provide further insight into this important demographic.

Key Millennial values shaping the future of the American economy include:

• Interest in daily work being a reflection of and part of larger societal concerns.
• Emphasis on corporate social responsibility, ethical causes, and stronger brand loyalty for companies offering solutions to specific social problems.
• A greater reverence for the environment, even in the absence of major environmental disaster.
• Higher worth placed on experiences over acquisition of material things.
• Ability to build communities around shared interests rather than geographical proximity, bridging otherwise disparate groups.

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