Does the Indonesian government adequately protect human rights?

It does and it does not; it really depends on the context. Indonesia looks good among its neighbours in Southeast Asia in terms of protection of civil and political rights, and to some extent economic, social and cultural rights, although room for improvements exists.

But one of the promises of the current president, Joko Widodo, during his 2014 campaign was about international criminal justice, which involves rights for many victims of past cases of human rights abuses in Indonesia. In that sense, it does not protect these rights, including the rights to justice, truth, reparations or guarantees of non-recurrence.

For example, in the case of the conflict over independence for East Timor in 1999, there were many gross violations of human rights. However, there has never been any sort of effective judicial process to address gross violations of human rights, and crimes against humanity in particular.

In 1965–66, during the government’s violent anti-communist operations, 500,000 people or more were killed. Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights was tasked with conducting an investigation into this period within its limited mandate, but it led to nothing; there have never been any prosecutions relating to these crimes.

The election promise of the current president was to deal with a number of these past human rights cases, and this promise has not been met at all. His opponent in 2014, Prabowo Subianto, was a former military general involved in alleged past human rights abuses, so it was politically expedient to make such a promise. But it has not been pursued in office.

In 2000, Indonesia established its own Human Rights Court. What is your assessment of its record?

Some human rights activists suggested that the establishment of the Human Rights Court took place under international pressure following the independence of East Timor. To avoid international scrutiny, for example the creation of an ad hoc international tribunal, the government established this court.

Based on the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor in 2000, it was indeed recommended that an international human rights tribunal be set up. Indonesian government rejected the proposal with strong assurances that it would provide justice for atrocities committed by its nationals. So it is fair for some to see the establishment of Indonesia’s Human Rights Court as a political move by the government at that time, in order to avoid scrutiny by the international community.

When it comes to performance, the Human Rights Court actually investigated and prosecuted cases relating to atrocities in East Timor. There were around 100 suspects identified, and 18 were put on trial. Out of these 18, only one trial, of Eurico Guterres, ended in a conviction for crimes against humanity. However, the Indonesian Supreme Court cleared Guterres of all charges in 2008. So the Human Rights Court did take steps, but the net result amounted to essentially nothing. Impunity remains.

So it has not lived up to its mandate, but there is another factor, which is that the founding law of the Human Rights Court does not accommodate international standards of criminal justice. It only covers two of the four categories of crime as outlined in the Rome Statute – crimes against humanity and genocide. It also does not provide adequate protection for victims and witnesses. So there are issues not only with the performance of the Human Rights Court but also with the legislation establishing it.

Why hasn’t Indonesia become a party to the Rome Statute to join the ICC?

The main opposition came from the military, because they were afraid of being targeted by the ICC. There was also a lot of discussion about Indonesia’s ‘sovereign right to prosecute’.

But what those opposing failed to understand is that the ICC is bound by temporal and territorial boundaries, meaning that it will not intervene if the state in question is able and willing to prosecute. So I think accession to the Rome Statute has not taken place because of this misunderstanding.

I think another factor since this was initially raised is there is a focus on other issues. Indonesia is an emerging country economically; there is a focus on building infrastructure. So many in government feel like they are done with the past. But for the millions of victims of past crimes and their families, the past is not done.

So it’s very important at this point in the country’s history to revisit the commitment to international criminal justice to be able to contribute to sustainable peace and development.

What steps could the Indonesian government take to improve how it handles these issues?

The establishment of the Human Rights Court was an important starting point, but clearly there has to be significant reform, both in terms of the substantive law underpinning it and its procedures.

Clearly the domestic laws need to be reformed, but also, an effort needs to be made to improve the courts capacity in terms of manpower and logistical support. This is why the government needs to restart the discussion about becoming a party to the Rome Statute. Through the outreach programme of the ICC, this would give the Human Rights Court the capacity, in terms of manpower and logistical support, to tackle past human rights violations in Indonesia, which the Human Rights Court is currently lacking.

Only if these two steps are taken – reforming the domestic Human Rights Court and restarting discussion about becoming a party to the Rome Statute – will the Indonesian government be able to say it has made progress on international criminal justice.

The Indonesian government is actually running for a seat on the UN Security Council for the period of 2019–20. So I think it is an urgent discussion that the Indonesian government needs to have before it makes another pledge to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is difficult to have sustainable peace without justice.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China's role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China's impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For China University of Political Science and Law, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The roundtable had a total of 22 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 12 non-Chinese (from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China's role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China's impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Beijing was hosted by CUPL and involved 20 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing) and 10 non-Chinese (from Australia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the experts network being built, the second meeting included a mix of participants from the first meeting and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China's role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China's impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Geneva was co-hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva and involved 19 participants, 9 Chinese (from six research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 11 non-Chinese (from eight research institutions in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the third meeting included a mix of participants from the first two meetings and some new participants

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China's role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China's impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting was co-hosted with CUPL and involved 28 participants, consisting of 19 Chinese participants (from six leading research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and nine nonChinese participants (from eight leading research institutions in Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Canada and Singapore).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the fifth meeting included a mix of participants from the previous meetings and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Capacity to contain and respond to biological threats varies considerably across the world. Yet such preparedness is vital for prevention, impact-reduction and resilience in the face of biological events, whether they be natural or deliberate outbreaks.

Chatham House is conducting a series of meetings to strengthen urban preparedness for, and resilience against, biological threats in African countries. This meeting will examine the preparedness and prevention mechanisms in Accra, reviewing the comprehensiveness of city-level preparedness.  

This meeting will focus on the formation and implementation of city-level action plans in the context of preparedness for managing biological threats. It will also explore how local authorities are contributing to this effort with their knowledge and expertise.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Summary

• Space situational awareness (SSA) and space traffic management (STM) are essential for sustainable near-Earth orbit. International cooperation in SSA and STM is vital with the growing number of satellite operators and the increasingly complex space environment.
• The various definitions of SSA and STM are ambiguous. Understanding the activities that fall under each term can better assist in finding areas for cooperation and collaboration.
• SSA has historically been a military activity, leading to an incomplete public catalogue of its use and barriers to sharing information with other states and the commercial sector. The rise in private space actors has increased the number of commercial STM providers and, with plans in the US to move responsibility for STM to civilian control, there will likely be more opportunities for international collaboration, particularly through the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) programme.
• Individual EU member states possess developed STM capabilities, but overall these are still some way behind those of allies such as the US. Further investment in STM infrastructure and programmes is required for the EU and individual European states to be an essential partner to the US and add value to the global effort.
• There are worldwide challenges, both political and technical, to providing STM coverage, which may lead to a lack of collaboration and gaps in understanding of activities in orbit. Existing sensors have limitations in terms of the size of objects that can be detected and the precision with which their movements can be predicted. These capability gaps represent opportunities for the EU to contribute.
• The EU can build on its tradition of support for openness and civil society by creating a system that fosters an environment of cooperation and collaboration involving industry, commercial STM providers and the wider international community.
• Although collaboration in STM is vital, the EU should also aim to tackle issues within the wider definition of SSA including space weather, intelligence and the security of ground stations.
• The EU is well placed to become a global leader in SSA and STM. However, it needs to take into consideration the current political and technical landscape when making decisions regarding investment in capabilities and the pursuit of international partnerships.

A controversial debate during COVID-19 is the state of readiness within governments and health systems for a pandemic, with lines of the debate drawn on the issues of testing provision, personal protective equipment (PPE), and the speed of decision-making.

President Macron in a speech to the nation admitted French medical workers did not have enough PPE and that mistakes had been made: ‘Were we prepared for this crisis? We have to say that no, we weren’t, but we have to admit our errors … and we will learn from this’.

In reality few governments were fully prepared. In years to come, all will ask: ‘how could we have been better prepared, what did we do wrong, and what can we learn?’. But after every crisis, governments ask these same questions.

Most countries have put in place national risk assessments and established processes and systems to monitor and stress-test crisis-preparedness. So why have some countries been seemingly better prepared?

Comparing different approaches

Some have had more time and been able to watch the spread of the disease and learn from those countries that had it first. Others have taken their own routes, and there will be much to learn from comparing these different approaches in the longer run.

Governments in Asia have been strongly influenced by the experience of the SARS epidemic in 2002-3 and - South Korea in particular - the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 which was the largest outside the Middle East. Several carried out preparatory work in terms of risk assessment, preparedness measures and resilience planning for a wide range of threats.

And, at the international level, there are frameworks for preparedness for pandemics. The International Health Regulations (IHR) - adopted at the 2005 World Health Assembly and binding on member states - require countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public health events to the World Health Organization (WHO) and ‘prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade’.

Under IHR, governments committed to a programme of building core capacities including coordination, surveillance, response and preparedness. The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk highlights disaster preparedness for effective response as one of its main purposes and has already incorporated these measures into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other Agenda 2030 initiatives. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has said COVID-19 ‘poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and security’ and that ‘a signal of unity and resolve from the Council would count for a lot at this anxious time’.

This pandemic looks set to continue to be a grave threat to humanity. But there will also be future pandemics – whether another type of coronavirus or a new influenza virus – and our species will be threatened again, we just don’t know when.

Other disasters too will befall us – we already see the impacts of climate change arriving on our doorsteps characterised by increased numbers and intensity of floods, hurricanes, fires, crop failure and other manifestations of a warming, increasingly turbulent atmosphere and we will continue to suffer major volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis. All high impact, unknown probability events.

Preparedness for an unknown future is expensive and requires a great deal of effort for events that may not happen within the preparers’ lifetimes. It is hard to imagine now, but people will forget this crisis, and revert to their imagined projections of the future where crises don’t occur, and progress follows progress. But history shows us otherwise.

Preparations for future crises always fall prey to financial cuts and austerity measures in lean times unless there is a mechanism to prevent that. Cost-benefit analyses will understandably tend to prioritise the urgent over the long-term. So governments should put in place legislation – or strengthen existing legislation – now to ensure their countries are as prepared as possible for whatever crisis is coming.

Such a legal requirement would require governments to report back to parliament every year on the state of their national preparations detailing such measures as:

• The exact levels of stocks of essential materials (including medical equipment)
• The ability of hospitals to cope with large influx of patients
• How many drills, exercises and simulations had been organised – and their findings
• What was being done to implement lessons learned & improve preparedness

In addition, further actions should be taken:

• Parliamentary committees such as the UK Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy should scrutinise the government’s readiness for the potential threats outlined in the National Risk register for Civil Emergencies in-depth on an annual basis.
• Parliamentarians, including ministers, with responsibility for national security and resilience should participate in drills, table-top exercises and simulations to see for themselves the problems inherent with dealing with crises.
• All governments should have a minister (or equivalent) with the sole responsibility for national crisis preparedness and resilience. The Minister would be empowered to liaise internationally and coordinate local responses such as local resilience groups.
• There should be ring-fenced budget lines in annual budgets specifically for preparedness and resilience measures, annually reported on and assessed by parliaments as part of the due diligence process.

And at the international level:

• The UN Security Council should establish a Crisis Preparedness Committee to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to respond to international crisis such as pandemics, within their borders and across regions. The Committee would function in a similar fashion as the Counter Terrorism Committee that was established following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
• States should present reports on their level of preparedness to the UN Security Council. The Crisis Preparedness Committee could establish a group of experts who would conduct expert assessments of each member state’s risks and preparedness and facilitate technical assistance as required.
• Regional bodies such as the OSCE, ASEAN and ARF, the AU, the OAS, the PIF etc could also request national reports on crisis preparedness for discussion and cooperation at the regional level.

COVID-19 has been referred to as the 9/11 of crisis preparedness and response. Just as that shocking terrorist attack shifted the world and created a series of measures to address terrorism, we now recognise our security frameworks need far more emphasis on being prepared and being resilient. Whatever has been done in the past, it is clear that was nowhere near enough and that has to change.

In August 2012, when the UN released its report Gaza in 2020: A liveable place?, they could not have imagined what the world would look like in 2020: cities under lockdown, restrictions on movement, border closures, widespread unemployment, economic collapse, fear and anxiety and, above all, uncertainty about what the future holds.

For Gaza’s population of 2 million people this reality is nothing new. The conditions that the rest of the world are currently experiencing as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic is similar to the tight blockade Gaza has been living under ever since Hamas took over in 2007. Israel has imposed severe restrictions on the movement of people and goods, youth unemployment has reached 60 per cent, and over 80 per cent of Gaza’s population are now dependent on international aid.

The people of Gaza are having to face the COVID-19 crisis already at a disadvantage, with poor infrastructure, limited resources and a shortage of the most basic services, such as water and power supply. It also has a fragile health system, with hospitals lacking essential medical supplies and equipment, as well as the capacity to deal with the outbreak as there are only 84 ICU beds and ventilators available.

Meanwhile, intra-Palestinian divisions have persisted and were evident in the initial reaction to the pandemic. When President Mahmoud Abbas announced a state of emergency, it took two days for the Hamas-led government in Gaza to follow suit and shut down schools and universities. They later made a separate emergency appeal to address the crisis and prepare for a COVID-19 response in Gaza. This lack of coordination is typical of the way the Palestinian Authority and Hamas approach crisis situations.

After the initial uncoordinated response, Hamas, as the de-facto ruler of Gaza, has asserted its ability to control Gaza’s borders by putting in place quarantine measures for everyone who enters the strip, whether through the Erez checkpoint with Israel or the Rafah border with Egypt. They have also assigned 21 hospitals, hotels, and schools as compulsory quarantine centres for all arrivals from abroad, who have to stay in quarantine for 21 days. In comparison, there are 20 quarantine centres in the West Bank.  These strict measures have prevented the spread of the virus in the community and confined it to the quarantine centres, with only 20 confirmed cases of COVID-19 as of 6 May. Gaza’s de-facto authorities have also been able to monitor markets and prices to ensure the availability of essential goods.

Faced with a major crisis, Al-Qassam Brigades – the armed wing of Hamas – have tried to play the role of a national army by participating in efforts to fight the pandemic. They have relatively good logistical capacity and have contributed to the construction of two quarantine facilities with a total capacity of 1,000 units to prepare for more arrivals into Gaza. At the local level, municipalities have been disinfecting public spaces and facilities in addition to disseminating information about the virus and related preventative and protective measures. Other precautionary measures put in place include closing the weekly open markets, and restricting social gatherings like weddings and funerals.

Despite COVID-19, it’s business as usual when it comes to international dealings with Gaza. The key parties in the conflict – Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority – along with the main external actors – Egypt, the United Nations and Qatar – have continued to stick to their policies aimed at keeping the security situation under control and preventing further escalation. Although Israel has allowed entry of pharmaceutical supplies and medical equipment into Gaza during the pandemic, it has kept its restrictions on the movement of goods and people in place, while keeping a close eye on the development of the COVID-19 outbreak in Gaza – a major outbreak here would be a nightmare scenario for Israel.

Meanwhile, Qatar has continued to address the humanitarian and economic needs of Gaza in an attempt to ease the pressure and prevent further escalation. It has pledged $150 million over the next six months to help families in Gaza from poorer backgrounds. Gaza has also been discussed by the Middle East Quartet, as Nickolay Mladenov, the UN special coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, expressed his concern about the risk of a disease outbreak in Gaza during a call with the members of the Quartet.

Amid the pandemic, threats are still being exchanged between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli defence minister, Naftali Bennett, requested that in return for providing humanitarian aid to Gaza, Hamas agrees to return the remains of two Israeli soldiers killed in the 2014 war. While openly rejecting Bennett's statement, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, has offered to move forward with a prisoner swap deal if Israel agrees to release elderly prisoners and detainees in addition to detained women and children. Though dealing with its own COVID-19 outbreak, Egypt has started to mediate between the two parties in an attempt to stabilize the situation and reach a prisoner swap deal.

In the wake of this pandemic, lessons should be learned and policies should be examined, by all parties. Firstly, Israel should re-evaluate its security measures towards Gaza by easing restrictions on movement and trade which would have a positive impact on living conditions for Gaza’s population. The current measures have proven to be unsustainable and have contributed to the endless cycle of violence. Secondly, the intra-Palestinian division should end, to save Palestinians from contradictory policies and insufficient capacity on both sides. In fact, all previous attempts have failed to end this self-destructive division and this is due to the absence of political will on both sides. Elections seem to be the only viable path towards unity. Finally, efforts by the international community should go beyond stabilizing the security situation and ongoing crisis inside Gaza, where disruption of normal life is the norm.

While the world has reacted to this pandemic with a whole host of new policies and emergency measures, it has remained business as usual when dealing with Gaza. Should COVID-19 spread in Gaza, its people – who have already paid the price of a continuous blockade and intra-Palestinian division for 13 years – will pay a heavy price yet again. However, this time it is not a crisis that they alone will have to face.