At the previous Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012, President Barack Obama was badly roughed up by his Latin American counterparts (and embarrassed by his Secret Service for entertaining sex workers). Happily, the president and his entourage did much better at last week’s Summit in Panama, but the United States still has a way to go before the Summits once again become the productive vehicle for U.S. foreign policy that they once were, at their founding in Miami in 1994.

In Cartagena, leader after leader criticized the United States for allegedly heavy-handed counter-narcotics policies; oppressive treatment of immigrants; a weak response to crime and poverty in Central America; and monetary policies that supposedly harmed their economies. Most pointedly, speakers denounced the decades-old economic sanctions against Cuba. But given the upcoming Congressional elections, Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not want to do anything to endanger their Democratic Party’s chances. Obama was reduced to affirming, uncharacteristically, “I am here to listen, but our policies will not change.”

Once the November 2012 mid-term elections were over, policies did, in fact, change as the United States took a more relaxed approach to counternarcotics; the administration announced immigration policy reforms, including negotiating agreements with Central American nations to reduce the outflow of children and promote economic growth and jobs at home; and Vice President Joseph Biden met repeatedly with Central American leaders, and offered $1 billion in economic and security assistance.

In Cartagena, the Latin Americans threatened to boycott the Panama Summit if Cuba was not invited. But last December 17, President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro announced their agreement to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations, and in one blow, the United States transformed a thorn in relations with Latin America into a triumph of inter-American diplomacy that significantly enhanced U.S. prestige in the region.

So in Panama, most of the Latin American and Caribbean leaders, rather than berate the U.S. president, praised him for his courage and generally treated him with courtesy and respect. The three leaders of Central America’s Northern Tier (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—whose president is a former guerrilla commander) were effusive in their praise. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who in Cartagena had sharply criticized U.S. monetary policies and had cancelled a visit to the White House to protest NSA spying, was pleased to announce that her visit had been rescheduled for this June. 

Obama’s own performance was more spirited than it had been in Cartagena. In response to a harsh polemic by Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, Obama shot back: “The U.S. may be a handy excuse for diverting attention from domestic political problems, but it won’t solve those problems.” After listening politely through Raúl Castro’s extended remarks—during which Castro praised him as a man of honesty and authenticity—Obama departed to avoid having to sit through the predictable harangues of Argentine President Cristina Kirchner and Bolivian leader Evo Morales. Few could blame him.

At the parallel CEO Summit of business executives, Obama delivered thoughtful responses to questions posed by several entrepreneurs including Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, distinguishing himself from the facile rhetorical answers of the other presidents on the panel. At a Civil Society Forum where delegates affiliated with Cuban government organizations engaged in disruptive tactics, Obama lectured firmly on the virtues of civility and tolerance. Together with two other presidents (Tabaré Vasquez of Uruguay and Guillermo Solis of Costa Rica), Obama met privately with a dozen leaders of nongovernmental organizations, took notes, and incorporated at least one of their suggestions into his later public remarks.

But Obama’s Panama experience was marred by an inexplicable misstep by his White House aides a month earlier—the very public sanctioning of seven Venezuelan officials for alleged human rights violation and corruption, and the declaration that Venezuela was a “threat to U.S. national security.” To Latin American ears, that language recalled Cold War-era justifications for CIA plots and military coups. The State Department claims it warned the White House against Latin American blowback, but perhaps not forcefully enough. Once Latin American anger become apparent, the White House tried to walk the “national security” language back, saying it was just a formality required by U.S. legislation, but the damage was done. Speaker after speaker condemned the “unilateral sanctions” and called for their repeal.

The ill-timed sanctions announcement provided Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his populist allies with a ready stick to beat the United States. For whileObama’s diplomacy had managed to peel off most of the Central Americans and win over or at least diminish the antagonism of other leaders, it had not found a way to tranquilize the rejectionist states (Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina) tied to Venezuela in an “anti-imperialist” alliance. Although a relatively small minority, these spoilers seriously disrupt plenary meetings with long and vituperative monologues, and small minorities of “veto” players can block the signing of otherwise consensus documents such that in Panama, as in Cartagena, no consensus declaration was issued; rather the host leader signed brief “mandates for action” that lacked full legitimacy.

The problem of the rejectionist minority will be partially alleviated when Kirchner is shortly replaced, likely by a more moderate government in Argentina, and political turnover will eventually come in Venezuela, but the hemisphere needs new rules that protect majority rights to get things done. Some simple procedural innovations, such as a more forceful chair, or even the simple system of red-yellow-green lights that alert speakers to their time limits, would help.

Notwithstanding the misstep on Venezuela sanctions and the disruptive tactics of the rejectionist minority, the overall mood in Panama was upbeat, even celebratory. Leaders made reference to the xenophobic violence and religious intolerance plaguing other continents, and remarked with some pride that, in comparison, Latin America was a zone of peace that was also making progress, however inadequate, on human rights, poverty alleviation, and clean energy. With some procedural fixes, favorable political winds, and continued progress on concrete issues of mutual interest, inter-American relations could well continue their upward trajectory.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on Cuba's multi-level strategy at the Seventh Summit of the Americas.

Editor’s Note: The following chapter is part of the report, "After the Drug Wars," published in February 2016 by the London School of Economics and Political Science's Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy.

Even as the administration of Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto has scored important reform successes in the economic sphere, its security and law enforcement policy toward organized crime remains incomplete and ill-defined. Despite the early commitments of his administration to focus on reducing drug violence, combating corruption, and redesigning counternarcotics policies, little significant progress has been achieved. Major human rights violations related to the drug violence, whether perpetrated by organized crime groups or military and police forces, persist – such as at Iguala, Guerrero, where 43 students were abducted by a cabal of local government officials, police forces and organized crime groups. This has also been seen in Tatlaya and Tanhuato, Michoacán, where military forces have likely been engaged in extrajudicial killings of tens of people. Meanwhile, although drug violence has abated in the north of the country, such as in Ciudad Juárez, Monterrey and Tijuana, government policies have played only a minor role. Much of the violence reduction is the result of the vulnerable and unsatisfactory narcopeace – the victory of the Sinaloa or Gulf Cartels. 

The July 2015 spectacular escape of the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel and the world’s most notorious drug trafficker – Joaquín Guzmán Loera, known as El Chapo – from a Mexican high-security prison was a massive embarrassment for the Peña Nieto government. Yet it serves as another reminder of the deep structural deficiencies of Mexico’s law enforcement and rule-of law system which persists more than a decade after Mexico declared its war on the drug cartels.

The Peña Nieto administration often pointed to the February 2014 capture of El Chapo as the symbol of its effectiveness in fighting drug cartels and violent criminal groups in Mexico. The Peña Nieto administration’s highlighting of Chapo’s capture was both ironic and revealing: ironic, because the new government came into office criticizing the anti-crime policy of the previous administration of Felipe Calderón of killing or capturing top capos to decapitate their cartels; and revealing, because despite the limitations and outright counterproductive effects of this high-value-targeting policy and despite promises of a very different strategy, the Peña Nieto administration fell back into relying on the pre-existing approach. In fact, such high-value-targeting has been at the core of Pena Nieto’s anti-crime policy. Moreover, Chapo’s escape from Mexico’s most secure prison through a sophisticated tunnel (a method he had also pioneered for smuggling drugs and previously used for escapes) showed the laxity and perhaps complicity at the prison, and again spotlighted the continuing inadequate state of Mexico’s corrections system.

Read the full chapter here.

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• Cuidado: The inescapable necessity of better law enforcement in Mexico

Donald Trump has made waves during this year’s election cycle by taking a hard line on illegal immigration. This, however, builds on years of heated debate among policymakers. It is also an enduring hot-button issue in Arizona, which has passed several immigration laws over the years.  In 2010, the passage of SB 1070 brought national attention to this debate.  Deemed the strictest immigration law to date, SB 1070 sought to achieve “attrition [of illegal immigrants] through enforcement” by requiring law enforcement to detain any person whom they believed to be residing in the country illegally. Although SB 1070’s effects on individuals and families have been well documented, little is known about its impact on students and schools. To this end, we sought to estimate the relationship between the passage of SB 1070 and school-level student achievement.

We anticipated that anti-immigration policies would primarily affect children from the families of undocumented immigrants. Such effects could be observed in different ways. For instance, the emotional and psychological distress of these children could result in a decline in average test scores at the school-level. On the other hand, students might have left the country or the state under the threat of being deported in which case school-level test scores would rise (since these students often perform below their peers). To this end, we considered three scenarios: 

1. Immigrant children remain in the state but experience higher levels of stress.  As a result, average school-level test scores will drop while Hispanic enrollment remains the same.
2. Children of undocumented immigrants leave the state, which results in a drop in Hispanic enrollment accompanied by an increase in school-level test scores.
3. Or, the first two scenarios occur simultaneously and we do not observe any change in test scores since the two effects would cancel each other, but note a slight decrease in Hispanic enrollment.

In order to see which of these hypothetical scenarios is supported by the data, we first estimated the relationship between the passage of SB 1070 and average school-level reading test scores. We then attempted to unpack the mechanism through which such an effect might have taken place. To this end, we used publicly available data on school-level achievement and enrollment collected by the Arizona Department of Education (ADE). Given the targeted nature of the policy and the demographics of immigrants in Arizona, the majority of whom are of Hispanic or Mexican descent, we focused on schools that traditionally enroll large proportions of Hispanic students. We identified schools with high (more than 75 percent) shares of Hispanic students as those whose average achievement and student composition are most likely to be affected by immigration reform. We contrasted changes in school-level achievement and enrollment in those schools with schools that enroll less than 25 percent Hispanic students, as these schools are less likely to experience any changes as a result of tightening immigration laws.

Figures 1 and 2 show trends in the average percentage of students passing the state reading test and average Hispanic enrollment at these schools between 2006-2007 and 2011-2012.           

Figure 1. Average Percent of Students Passing AIMS Reading

Figure 2. Average Hispanic Student Enrollment

Clearly, the rate of growth in school-level reading scores was much higher for high Hispanic schools after the passage of SB 1070 in 2010 (Figure 1). At the same time, there was a significant decrease in Hispanic enrollment in these schools (Figure 2). Thus, it appears the second scenario is likely driving the patterns we observe.

The data also suggest that the trends for high Hispanic and low Hispanic schools started diverging before the passage of SB 1070 - after the 2007-2008 school year.  This happens to be the year that Arizona passed an even more restrictive, though less controversial, immigration law – the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA). LAWA required Arizona business owners to verify the legal status of their employees using E-Verify, an online tool managed by the federal government. Although LAWA used a different mechanism, similar to SB 1070 it sought to achieve the attrition of undocumented immigrants from the state. 

We then would anticipate both laws to have similar effects on school-level achievement and Hispanic enrollment. Indeed, we estimated that LAWA likely led to an average increase of roughly 4 percent of students passing the state reading test at high Hispanic schools. This was accompanied by an average loss of 38 Hispanic students per school. Because the passage of SB 1070 was preceded by the passage LAWA as well as a language policy that would have affected treatment schools, disentangling the effects of these two policies is not straightforward. However, based on our analysis, we estimate that SB 1070 is associated with an average increase of between 1.5 percent and 4.5 percent of students passing the state reading test at the school-level accompanied by an average loss of between 14 and 40 Hispanic students. 

Despite the fact that we cannot pin down the exact magnitude of SB 1070’s effect on school-level achievement, our analysis shows that when Arizona passed restrictive immigration laws in 2008 and 2010, it looked as if the state’s lowest performing schools were improving rapidly. This, however, likely had more to do with the changing composition of schools as an indirect though anticipated effect of immigration policies than with policies aimed at improving student achievement. 

Despite this, the Arizona Department of Education took credit for these gains. Similarly, Arizona was recently recognized as one of the nation’s leaders in growth on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) over the last ten years. Although wrongly attributing these gains may seem harmless at first glance, it is important to remember that Arizona is viewed by many as a model for controversial education reforms like school choice and high-stakes accountability. It is easy to imagine how policymakers might look at increasing test scores in Arizona and wrongly attribute them to these kinds of reforms. That’s not to say that these policies don’t have merit. However, if other states adopt education policy reforms under the assumption that they worked in Arizona, then they might find that these policies fail to deliver.

In the developing world, more than 200 million children under the age of five years are at risk of not reaching their full development potential because they suffer from the negative consequences of poverty, nutritional deficiencies and inadequate learning opportunities. Overall, 165 million children (one in four) are stunted, and 90 percent of these children live in Africa and Asia. And though some progress has been made globally, child malnutrition remains a serious public health problem with enormous human and economic costs. Worldwide, only about 50 percent of children are enrolled in preprimary education, and in low-income countries a mere 17 percent. And though more and more children are going to school, millions have little to show for it. By some accounts, 250 million children of primary school age cannot read even part of a sentence. Some of these children have never been to school (58 million); but more often, they perform poorly despite having spent several years in school, which reflects not only the poor quality of many schools but also the multiple disadvantages that characterize their early life.

Ensuring that all children—regardless of their place of birth and parental income or education level—have access to opportunities that will allow them to reach their full potential requires investing early in their development. To develop their cognitive, linguistic, socioemotional and physical skills and abilities, children need good nutrition and health, opportunities for play, nurture and learning with caregivers, early stimulation and protection from violence and neglect.

The Case for Early Interventions 

The arguments for investing in children early are simple and convincing. Early investment makes sense scientifically. The brain is almost fully developed by age three, providing a prime opportunity to achieve high gains. We know that the rapid rate of development of the brain’s neural pathways is responsible for an individual’s cognitive, social and emotional development, and there is solid evidence that nutrition and stimulation during the first 1,000 days of life are linked to brain development. 

Early investment makes sense in terms of equity. The playing field has the highest chances of being leveled early on, and we know that programs have a higher impact for young children from poorer families. In the United States, for example, increasing preschool enrollment to 100 percent for low-income children would reduce disparities in school readiness by 24 percent between black and white children and by 35 percent between Hispanic and white children. We also know that equalizing initial endowments through early childhood development (ECD) programs is far more cost-effective than compensating for differences in outcomes later in life. 

Early investment makes sense economically. Investing early prevents higher costs down the road, and interventions yield a high return on investment. There is evidence of the benefits for the individual and for society more broadly. For instance, at the level of the individual, in Jamaica children participating in an early childhood stimulation program were found to have 25 percent higher earnings 20 years later compared with children who did not participate. At the economy-wide level, eliminating malnutrition is estimated to increase gross domestic product by 1 to 2 percentage points annually, while countries with school systems that have a 10-percentage-point advantage in the proportion of students

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The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is one of the federal government’s most effective antipoverty policies. In 2012 alone, it lifted about 6.5 million people out of poverty, including roughly 3.3 million children. Designed to incentivize work, the program has been hugely successful in boosting employment rates among poor single mothers. And these accomplishments have led to broad bipartisan support from figures such as Paul Ryan, Greg Mankiw, and Patty Murray.

However, the EITC still falls short of its potential, in large part because it offers little to no support to many of the workers who need it most. As such, it’s encouraging that President Obama chose to make expanding the EITC a priority in his fiscal year 2015 budget. Still, we think there’s opportunity for more robust reforms that further broaden the reach of this important program—at no additional cost to taxpayers.

The president’s plan takes some modest (but important) steps toward strengthening this make-work-pay policy. First, it would increase benefits to workers without children—a subgroup that has historically received very little help from the program. More specifically, the White House would double their maximum credit from about $500 to about $1,000, raise the income level at which their benefits are fully phased out from about $15,000 a year to about $18,000 a year, and loosen the age eligibility restrictions so as to include childless young adults between the ages of 21 and 25. The president also proposes making permanent the benefit expansions for married couples and families with three or more children that were temporarily enacted through the Recovery Act.

This piece is posted in full at the Spotlight on Poverty and Opportunity website »

Executive Summary

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is one of the outstanding innovations of the eight-year presidency of George W. Bush. No other aid agency—foreign or domestic—can match its purposeful mandate, its operational flexibility and its potential muscle.

In the first year after it became operational in May 2004, however, the MCC made a number of mistakes from which it has not fully recovered. It also had the bad luck of facing an increasingly tight budget environment as its performance improved.

The MCC may not survive as an independent agency. Critics have advocated closing it down, while many supporters of foreign assistance reform would maintain the MCC program but consolidate it with the Agency for International Development and the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief under a single individual with broad development responsibilities.

In our assessment, one of the singular achievements of this innovation is the “MCC effect”: steps taken by a number of countries to improve their performance against the MCC’s objective indicators in order to become eligible for an MCC compact.

A Rough Start

The Millennium Challenge Corporation started off in the wrong direction in 2004. New leadership a year later put the MCC back on track. Unfortunately, however, the MCC has not been able to recover quickly enough from its early mistakes to compete successfully for funding in the face of increasingly severe government-wide budget constraints. After more than four years of operation, it has not yet achieved “proof of concept.” As a result, its future as an independent agency is in jeopardy.

The Concept

In March 2002, six months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush announced a commitment to increase U.S. aid to low-income countries by $5 billion per year, representing a jump of 50 percent from the baseline level of official development assistance (ODA).

More remarkable than the size of the commitment was the nature of the commitment. It would not be more of the same. It would be better. It would reward good performance by focusing exclusively on poor countries implementing sound economic development and poverty reduction strategies, as reflected in objective indicators. It would achieve measurable results.

President Bush’s initial concept did not specify the organizational form of the new program. Instead of putting it under the State Department or Agency for International Development (USAID), President Bush opted for creating a special-purpose government corporation—the Millennium Challenge Corporation—to run the program.

Conception turned out to be the easy part. It took almost a year for the administration to send legislation proposing the MCC to Congress, and it took another year for the Congress to send authorizing legislation to the president.

While the purity of the MCC concept was compromised significantly in the process of obtaining enough votes in Congress to establish it, six key elements were preserved: rewarding good performance; country ownership; measurable results; operational efficiency; sufficient scale at the country level to be “transformational”; and global commitments at the rate of $5 billion per year.

The Record

Perhaps the biggest mistake in the MCC’s first year of operations was a failure to develop a good working relationship with the U.S. Congress. Some staffing choices gave the impression that the MCC had no interest in the experience and expertise that existed in USAID, the multilateral development banks and NGOs working in low-income countries. In retrospect, a third problem may have been starting compact negotiations with more than a dozen countries instead of building its portfolio of compact countries more slowly and carefully.

Paul Applegarth resigned as CEO in June 2005 and John Danilovich took over the following October. At that point, compacts had been signed with five countries. Funding problems were already visible. Against the original proposal seeking a combined $4.6 billion for the first two start-up years (reaching the target $5 billion in FY 2006), the budget request added up to only $3.8 billion, Congress authorized only $3.6 billion, and appropriations only reached $2.5 billion.

For the next three years, FY 2006 – FY 2008, the administration’s budget request for the MCC was straight-lined at $3 billion. Appropriations peaked in FY 2006 at $1.77 billion, and then slipped to $1.75 billion in FY 2007 and $1.482 billion in FY 2008 (after an across-the-board rescission). Thirteen more compacts were signed, bringing the total number of compact countries to 18. In addition, threshold agreements totaling $361 million were being implemented in 14 countries. At the end of FY 2008, cumulative MCC appropriations were $7.5 billion, and cumulative compact commitments were $6.3 billion.

As the Bush administration winds down and the Obama administration gears up, the MCC is in an awkward situation. It has recovered from its start-up problems and now has significant support in Congress and the development community. The evidence of an “MCC effect” is particularly notable. The compact countries are fans of the program, and other potentially eligible countries appear eager to conclude compacts.

However, the “measurable results” promised to an impatient Congress have not yet materialized. Since the first compact will not reach the end of its original four year lifespan until July 2009, it is too early to expect such results. Still, enough questions about the effectiveness of the MCC have been raised to strengthen the position of skeptics in the Congress.

A moment of truth is approaching. Assuming FY 2009 funding remains capped by continuing resolutions at a level no higher than $1.5 billion, the MCC will not be able to conclude more than three compacts averaging $400 million each during this fiscal year. While a strong case can be made for an independent aid agency operating at the rate of $5 billion per year, a rate of $1-$1.5 billion per year for a stand-alone agency is not so easy to justify. Meanwhile, an important coalition of foreign aid advocates sees the change of administration as an opportunity to consolidate a wide range of development and humanitarian assistance programs, including the MCC, into a single agency or cabinet-level department.

Findings and Recommendations

Our assessment of the MCC at the end of FY 2008 focuses on six operational issues and ends with a recommendation to the Obama administration. (The full assessment is in our working paper “The Millennium Challenge Corporation: An Opportunity for the Next President.”)

1. Objective indicators. From the outset, objective indicators of country performance have been at the core of the MCC approach to development assistance. The concept is simple: the MCC will provide funding to countries that excel against performance indicators in three areas: ruling justly, investing in people and providing economic freedom. Selecting countries is not so simple.

The MCC’s 17 indicators of country performance are state of the art. But they are not embedded in concrete. The MCC has been pushing hard for improvements. A number of the independent providers of these indicators have tightened their procedures and methodology, and others have shortened the time between data collection and dissemination. The publication of updated country “scorecards” on the MCC Web site each year provides an unprecedented level of visibility linking country performance to donor assistance. In general, the MCC’s indicators have met broad approval in the donor community.

The “MCC effect” has been the most important benefit of these indicators. The MCC’s indicators provide a comprehensive, objective and highly visible system for comparing a country with its peer group and showing where its performance falls short. One academic study found that eligible countries improved their indicators significantly more after the MCC was established than in the pre-MCC period, and that eligible countries improved their indicators significantly faster than developing countries not eligible for compacts.

The MCC’s objective indicator approach has been very successful. Still, it is important to recognize certain inherent limitations. Four are worth singling out:

• The majority of the measures used to measure performance are available only with a time lag.
• The indicators reveal relative performance, not absolute performance. Good performers on the basis of the indicators still face daunting challenges.
• Even a top performing country is likely to see its ranking slip on one of the indicators at some point during compact implementation. This can create a credibility problem for the program even when the underlying trend is positive.
• Measuring corruption is especially problematic. The corruption indicator is probably state of the art, but corruption has many elements, and there is no agreement on which weights to assign to each one.

Recommendation: Retain and continue to refine the objective indicators.

2. Country selection. Initially, the MCC was limited to funding low-income countries. Since FY 2006, the MCC has been able to commit up to 25 percent of its resources to lower-middle-income countries. For FY 2008, these were countries with annual per capita incomes between $1,736 and $3,595. Together, the two groups included 95 countries.

The MCC board reviews country scorecards once a year and decides which countries to add to the eligibility list. Selection is not automatic based on the indicators. The board considers a wide range of political, economic and social factors.

The MCC’s overall track record in selecting countries is good but not brilliant. At the end of FY 2008, there were 18 countries with signed compacts, five threshold countries that had been declared eligible for compacts, and three additional countries declared eligible that were not in the threshold program. The few selections that have been criticized are cases where political factors might have tipped the balance in favor of the country.

Most of the selected countries have small populations, perhaps because it is easier to be transformational in a small country. Even large countries, however, have poor regions and a case can easily be made that the MCC might have a greater impact by focusing on one poor region in a large country like India or Indonesia than on one entire microstate like Vanuatu.

Recommendation: As long as the MCC’s funding level remains below $2 billion per year, stick with the current approach to selection but avoid new cases where political factors appear to be overriding performance indicators. At higher funding levels, give greater weight to improvements in absolute performance so that the indicators will not be a constraint to adding countries and enlarging the MCC’s impact.

3. Compact design. Compact design can be broken down into four elements: preparation, size, content and choice of partner. One of the hallmarks of the MCC approach to development assistance is an exceptional degree of participation by the host country government and civil society. In a relatively short time, the MCC approach to country ownership has set a high standard to which other donor agencies should aspire.

Compact size is seriously constrained by the statutory five-year limit on the length of a compact and by the prohibition against concurrent compacts. The limit leads to unrealistic expectations: anyone who believes a five-year program can be transformational does not understand development. The inability to have concurrent compacts has led the MCC to bundle together activities that would better be pursued separately. Within these constraints, compact size so far is defensible.

Regarding content, one early criticism of the MCC centered on its bias toward infrastructure projects. Agriculture and infrastructure were the clear priorities at the outset, based on partner-country priorities. These two sectors still account for more than half of all MCC funding, but attention to other sectors has grown. For example, funding for education was absent from the first 10 compacts, but was present in five of the next eight.

This evolution may reflect congressional pressure to be active in the social sectors despite evidence that more investment to expand productive capacity and lower costs could have a greater poverty reduction payoff.

The MCC has also shied away from non-project funding (budget support), which has the advantages of being fast-disbursing, having very low overhead costs and avoiding performance failure by rewarding countries for results recently achieved. Similarly, the MCC has yet to use its considerable ability to leverage funding from private investors, especially for infrastructure projects.

On partnership, all of the compacts to date have been with national governments even though the MCC has the authority to enter into compacts with regional/municipal authorities and private sector parties such as NGOs. With this narrow focus, the MCC is probably missing some opportunities to have a bigger impact.

Our major concern is that the design of the 18 compacts concluded so far reflects very little innovation. They can be characterized as collections of the kinds of development interventions that USAID, the World Bank and other donors have been undertaking for decades. Perhaps in the attempt to overcome its early start-up problems and minimize congressional criticism, the MCC has been too risk averse.

Recommendation: Immediately remove the prohibition against concurrent compacts that is a disincentive to improving performance. Allow the MCC to extend compacts beyond five years when unanticipated complications arise. Provide encouragement from the White House and Congress to be more innovative in compact design.

4. Compact implementation. No MCC compacts have been completed, so assessment of their impact is premature. One problem is the lag from the date of compact signing to the date of its entry into force, which has lengthened from about three months for the first three compacts to 10 months for the 10th and 11th compacts. This reflects the MCC’s tactical decision to delay entry into force until the legal framework is in place and the implementing organization is up and running. The normal process of tendering for infrastructure projects accounts for some of the slowness, and bad luck has also created recent problems in the form of unanticipated increases in fuel and commodity costs.

The choice of an appropriate local implementing agency is both difficult and critical to success. The objectives of country ownership and capacity building/institutional development argue for selecting an existing government ministry or agency. Realities on the ground have led the MCC typically to establish a special-purpose organization (“accountable entity” in the MCC’s jargon). In effect, the MCC has promoted strict accountability at the expense of building partner-country capacity.

The MCC’s approach to monitoring and evaluation is a source of pride, but it could become the program’s Achilles’ heel. The MCC’s recent decision to make public the “economic rate of return” analysis for each new compact puts it at the head of the donor community. Other donor agencies have been unwilling to take this step, except in a more opaque form. A potentially critical problem with the MCC’s approach is latent in the micro performance benchmarks established for each compact. It seems likely that the results will be mixed at the end of most of the compacts. Given the high expectations created for the MCC’s impact, the failure to show superior results could undermine congressional support for the MCC going forward.

Finally, the MCC has largely lived up to its billing as a lean organization. It is now fully staffed at its ceiling of 300 positions. The MCC’s field offices, established after compact signing, are typically limited to two positions.

Recommendation: Continue to refine implementation techniques to the point of becoming a pace-setter and develop performance benchmarks that are less likely to generate disappointment.

5. Threshold Programs. The MCC has committed some $360 million to 16 “threshold” countries. Nearly all of these programs are managed by USAID. Two different visions seem to coexist. One vision is to prepare countries for a compact within a year or two. A second vision is to address a particular “target of opportunity” that will help a country qualify for a compact eventually. It is too soon to say how effective these programs have been under either approach.

However, the individual projects funded under the threshold programs have been indistinguishable from the typical USAID project involving a contract with an American firm to field a team of expatriate advisors focusing on a particular sector. A fundamental problem with the threshold programs is that they give the impression of trying to boost performance scores by short-term actions rather than rewarding the kind of self-generated progress that is more likely to be sustainable.

Recommendation: As long as MCC funding remains below $2 billion per year, shift funding of threshold programs to USAID funding. This will help to ensure that the activities being funded are of high value, and encourage USAID to take a more strategic approach to its operations in low-income countries.

6. Governance. The MCC legislation created a board of directors with five ex officio members and four private sector members. Having private sectors members on the board is one of the great strengths of the MCC, enhancing its objectivity and credibility, helping to ensure bipartisan support, and providing strategic links to the broader development community. By comparison to the boards of other government corporations, the MCC board is small in size and more biased toward public-sector members. Having the secretary of state chair the board weakens the image of the MCC as an agency focused on long-term development.

Recommendation: Amend the MCC legislation to add four more private sector members to the MCC board, allow the board to elect one of its private sector members as chairman.

The Existential Issue.

Although the MCC has not yet lived up to its promise, it still has the potential of offering the biggest bang for the buck among all U.S. development assistance programs. Six features are not only worth keeping but strengthening further: rewarding good performance; using objective indicators to guide the selection of countries; focusing on low-income countries; achieving a high degree of country ownership; avoiding earmarks and time limits on spending authority; and keeping staff small.

However, the current operating level of less than $2 billion per year is far below the original concept. Retaining a separate agency for such a small program within a much larger bilateral assistance program is questionable. With funding moving toward the pace of $5 billion per year, and with added authority to have concurrent compacts, the MCC can be more innovative and more transformational.

The MCC has the potential of being the world's leading "venture capitalist" focused on promoting economic growth in low-income countries. As a core component of a foreign policy that relies more on partnership with other countries, the Obama administration can realize this potential by affirming the MCC's bold mandate, strengthening its leadership, and boosting its annual appropriations to at least $3 billion beginning in FY 2010.R. Kent Weaver is a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution and a Professor of Public Policy and Government at Georgetown University. He is the author of the forthcoming book Reforming Social Security: Lessons from Abroad.

Lex Rieffel is a nonresident senior fellow in Brookings's Global Economy and Development program. He is a former U.S. Treasury official and teaches a graduate course at George Washington University.

James W. Fox, formerly chief economist for Latin America at USAID, is an economic consultant.