Is it possible to isolate the well-established mode of Arctic cooperation from the disruptive impact of the Ukraine crisis? Many stake-holders in cooperative projects with Russia keep insisting on an affirmative answer and seek to bracket out tensions emanating from such obscure locations as Debaltsevo or Mariupol. The European Union (EU), which is due to adopt a new Arctic Policy by the end of the year, would have been content to maintain the focus on environmental protection and economic development; the discussions in Brussels, however, have increasingly shifted to far less appealing “hard security” matters. Officials from the European Commission seem deeply reluctant to deal with Russia’s military activities in the high north but have to acknowledge that they are making it much more difficult to cooperate with Russia. As April’s Arctic Council ministerial meetings approach, the United States and Europe must be realistic about the ways in which far away events will negatively affect the possible achievement of their goals. 

Moscow is expanding rather than camouflaging the scope of exercises undertaken by its newly-formed Arctic Joint Strategic Command. Russian President Vladimir Putin used to proudly proclaim Russia’s abiding interest in Arctic cooperation, but even the most pro-engagement Arctic partners cannot fail to see that Russia’s interest is clearly slackening. This may be partly due to the disappearing attractiveness of exploration of the Arctic resources, since the estimated production costs of the off-shore platforms go far beyond the expected returns on the current level of oil prices. Another reason may be the disappointment in the commercial prospects of the Northern Sea Route (or Sevmorput), where maritime transit contracted by an astounding 77 percent in 2014, after several years of promising growth. A further reason may be Moscow’s recognition that the much trumpeted (and still not submitted) claim for expanding its “ownership” over the Arctic shelf cannot be legally approved because Denmark has presented its own claim, and the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf cannot make any recommendations on clashing claims.

It is hard to find an active lobby in Russia for sustaining cooperative projects or at least the joint work in the Arctic Council, as many actors who promoted the Barents Cooperation in the 1990s, are either on a short leash (as is the case with regional governors) or branded as “foreign agents” (the NGOs that want to avoid such branding have to curtail or cut ties with Western colleagues). The appointment of Dmitri Rogozin as a chair of the new government commission on Arctic matters bodes ill for the cooperative endeavors because this firebrand “patriot” deservedly holds a spot on U.S., EU, and Canadian sanctions lists. 

The Russian Foreign Ministry is still circulating a message of commitment to the Arctic dialogue. The forthcoming session of the Arctic Council ministers in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada, might test this commitment with the issue of granting observer status to the EU. It was Canada who blocked the resolution of this issue at the previous meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, but the controversy about seal products has been resolved, and Canada is ready to put the question on the agenda as its chairmanship of the Council expires. European Commission officials expect that during the 2015 meeting, Russia will raise objections because the EU is now seen as an antagonist, but EU officials still feel it is important to force Moscow to put their opposition on the record.

One external party that aims at enhancing and also at reformatting the Arctic cooperation is China, and while Moscow has to show eager attention to Beijing’s opinions, it cannot be comfortable with this “encroachment.” Russia’s traditional position has been that Arctic matters were the responsibility of the littoral states, but China insists on having a say and even entertains notions of the high north as a “global common,” a prospect which Moscow finds hard to swallow. 

It is indeed futile to praise the value of cooperative ties when seven members of the Arctic Council are compelled to tighten step by step the regime of sanctions against the eighth member, which is sinking into a deep economic crisis but persists in building its power projection capabilities in the High North. The usefulness of engaging Russia is beyond doubt, but it would be irresponsible to expect that joint projects in monitoring climate change could reduce the risks from expanding Russian military activities. The high north is one area where Moscow fancies itself to be in a position of power, but so far it has not found a way to enjoy it. It is not my intention to give the Kremlin war-mongers ideas about putting this military advantage to good political use, but when the likes of Rogozin or Nikolai Patrushev (secretary of the Security Council and former head of the Russian Federal Security Service) profess particular interest in the Arctic, it is only prudent to expect a brainstorm of sorts. The technique of “hybrid war” is not only the continuation but also a driver of Putin’s politics of confrontation, and this drive transforms the unique Arctic landscapes into just another “theater.”

U.S. chairmanship in the Arctic Council will receive a needed boost from the upcoming conference in Anchorage, which President Barack Obama is due to address on August 31. His message is predictable: He’ll talk about climate change. Russia has received an invitation to the conference, but decided to send a fairly low-level delegation. Russia certainly has important interests in the Arctic region and even higher ambitions, but its Arctic agenda has little to do with climate change. Instead, it can be best described in the old-fashioned and often quite unhelpful terms of geopolitics.

An Arctic superpower stymied

By just about any measure, Russia is an Arctic superpower. It has an enormous coastline, a significant number of people living above the Arctic Circle, six nuclear-powered icebreakers in the region, and industrial centers in Nikel and Norilsk (which produce a high volume of industrial pollution). 

Russia used to play up this status, staging large-scale annual conferences, graced by President Vladimir Putin’s presence. Not anymore, and it is not just the fallout from the Ukraine crisis that has poisoned that climate of cooperation. Russia has experienced two major setbacks in its vision for “conquering” the High North.

The first setback came from the seriously reduced value of the natural resources that are presumed to be hidden in the depths of the Arctic shelf. Putin’s lieutenants—including Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council of Russia—loved to engage in speculations about the fierce competition for access to the rich oil and gas fields that were certain to be discovered there. The problem is not only that the U.S. and EU sanctions have made it impossible for the state-owned oil giant Rosneft to continue the exploration of Arctic seas. (Sanctions prevent the import of technology and know-how, and U.S. companies—such as Exxon Mobil—who had worked in partnership with Rosneft have left.) The real problem is that estimated production costs and low oil prices add huge liabilities to any off-shore project. 

The second disappointment has to do with international maritime transit along the Northern Sea Route (called Sevmorput in Russian). Many politicians in Moscow expected that climate change would shrink the Arctic ice, increase the commercial viability of a shorter connection between China and Europe, and provide useful employment for Russian icebreakers. The problem is that the old Soviet infrastructure along the Sevmorput is so rotten that navigation in the difficult northern waters remains too risky. Egypt, in the meantime, has swiftly constructed the New Suez Canal, which offers a far more reliable route for tanker and container traffic.

Military means for geopolitical ends

As the economic rationale for high political attention to the Arctic disappears, Moscow focuses on the game it knows best: military power plays. As the crowd of environmentalists and climate-concerned politicians prepare to gather in Anchorage, a Russian navy squadron executed a large series of exercises along the Sevmorput. Although the ships are 30-plus years old and their hulls have no ice protection, Russia is determined to show readiness to deploy the newly-created Arctic brigade to any desolate shore in the northern seas. This follows the revised Maritime Doctrine that Putin approved a month ago, which places a heavy emphasis on protecting Russia’s interests in the Arctic.

It takes a lot of strategic imagination to construct threats to these interests. Aleksandr Bortnikov, the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), has argued that there is an urgent need to upgrade defenses against terrorist attacks. In fact, the only challenge Russia has encountered in the area was the Greenpeace protest against Gazprom’s drilling platform in the Pechora Sea in September 2013. The FSB launched a swift operation to arrest the eco-activists and their ship Arctic Sunrise on the charge of piracy. The permanent court of arbitration in The Hague then ordered Russia to pay damages for that harsh arrest, much to the consternation of Russian authorities. 

What Moscow really worries about is the examination of its claim for expanding the continental shelf under its control all the way to the North Pole (a claim currently sitting with the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, or CLCS). After many years of preparation, this revised claim was finally submitted on August 3, and the success is a matter of high political prestige. But it is very doubtful that demonstrations of military might would help that process. Further complicating matters is that Denmark has submitted an overlapping claim and Canada is finalizing its own—and the CLCS cannot make a recommendation on competing claims unless parties agree on a compromise.

Russia appears firmly set on its course of militarization of the Arctic. In a region where economic activities are mostly declining and where environmental challenges are on the rise, Russia appears to be engaged in a one-sided arms race. It is glaringly obvious to observers outside the Kremlin that Russia’s severe economic recession makes this course unsustainable. Russia may aspire to Arctic greatness, but there is little there to achieve and Russia is unlikely to be able to achieve it. 

Can the United States and Russia actually cooperate in the Arctic? It might seem like wishful thinking, given that Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev asserted that there is in fact a “New Cold War” between the two countries in a speech at the Munich Security Conference. Many people—at that conference and elsewhere—see the idea as far-fetched. Sure, Russia is launching air strikes in what has become an all-out proxy war in Syria, continues to be aggressive against Ukraine, and has increased its military build-up in the High North. To many observers, the notion of cooperating with Russia in the Arctic was a non-starter as recently as the mid-2015. There have been, however, significant changes in Russia’s behavior in the last several months—so, maybe it is possible to bracket the Arctic out of the evolving confrontation.

These and other matters were the subject of discussion at a recent conference at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University in New York, in which we had the pleasure to partake last week.

Moscow learns its limitations

Russia steadily increased its military activities and deployments in the High North until autumn 2015, including by creating a new Arctic Joint Strategic Command. There have been, however, indirect but accumulating signs of a possible break from this trend. Instead of moving forward with building the Arctic brigades, Russian top brass now aim at reconstituting three divisions and a tank army headquarters at the “Western front” in Russia. News from the newly-reactivated airbases in Novaya Zemlya and other remote locations are primarily about workers’ protests due to non-payments and non-delivery of supplies. Snap exercises that used to be so worrisome for Finland and Norway are now conducted in the Southern military district, which faces acute security challenges. Russia’s new National Security Strategy approved by President Vladimir Putin on the last day of 2015 elaborates at length on the threat from NATO and the chaos of “color revolutions,” but says next to nothing about the Arctic.

The shift of attention away from the Arctic coincided with the launch of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, and was strengthened by the sharp conflict with Turkey. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin—who used to preside over the military build-up in the High North—is these days travelling to Baghdad, instead. Sustaining the Syrian intervention is a serious logistical challenge on its own—add low oil prices into the mix, which threw the Russian state budget and funding for major rearmament programs into disarray, and it’s clear that Russia is in trouble. 

The shift of attention away from the Arctic coincided with the launch of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, and was strengthened by the sharp conflict with Turkey.

The government is struggling with allocating painful cuts in cash flow, and many ambitious projects in the High North are apparently being curtailed. In the squabbles for dwindling resources, some in the Russian bureaucracy point to the high geopolitical stakes in the Arctic—but that argument has lost convincing power. The threats to Russian Arctic interests are in fact quite low, and its claim to expanding its control over the continental shelf (presented at the U.N. earlier this month) depends upon consent from its Arctic neighbors.

Let’s work together

Chances for cooperation in the Arctic are numerous, as we and our colleagues have described in previous studies. The current economic climate (i.e. falling oil prices, which makes additional energy resource extraction in most of the Arctic a distant-future scenario), geopolitical climate (sanctions on Russia targeting, amongst others, Arctic energy extraction), and budget constraints on both ends (Russia for obvious reasons, the United States because it chooses not to prioritize Arctic matters) urge us to prioritize realistically.

• Improving vessel emergency response mechanisms. Though many analysts like to focus on upcoming resource struggles in the Arctic, the chief concern of naval and coast guard forces there is actually increased tourism. Conditions are very harsh most of the year and can change dramatically and unexpectedly. Given the limited capacity of all Arctic states to navigate Arctic waters, a tourist vessel in distress is probably the main nightmare scenario for the short term. Increased cooperation to optimize search and rescue capabilities is one way to prepare as much as possible for such an undesirable event. 
• Additional research on climate change and methane leakage. Many questions remain regarding the changing climate, its effects on local flora and fauna, and long-term consequences for indigenous communities. Increasingly appreciated in the scientific community, an elephant in the room is trapped methane in permafrost layers. As the Arctic ice thaws, significant amounts of methane may be released into the atmosphere, further exacerbating global warming.
• Expanding oil emergency response preparedness. The current oil price slump likely put the brakes on most Arctic exploration in the short term. We also believe that, unless all long-term demand forecasts are false, an additional 15 million barrels of oil per day will be needed by 2035 or so—the Arctic is still viewed as one of the last frontiers where this precious resource may be found. At the moment, Arctic states are ill-prepared to deal with a future oil spill, and more has to be learned about, for instance, oil recovery on ice and in snow. The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic was an important first step.
• Preparing Bering Strait for increased sea traffic. As the Arctic warms, increased sea traffic is only a matter of time. The Bering Strait, which is only 50 miles wide at its narrowest point, lacks basic communication infrastructure, sea lane designation, and other critical features. This marks another important and urgent area of cooperation between the United States and Russia, even if dialogue at the highest political level is constrained. 

Can the Arctic be siloed?

There is no doubt that the current cooled climate between Russia and the other Arctic states, in particular the United States, complicates an ongoing dialogue. It is even true that it may prohibit a meaningful conversation about certain issues that have already been discussed. 

Skeptics will argue that it is unrealistic to isolate the Arctic from the wider realm of international relations. Though we agree, we don’t think leaders should shy away from political dialogue altogether. To the contrary, in complicated political times, the stakes are even higher: Leaders should continue existing dialogues where possible and go the extra mile to preserve what can be preserved. Russia’s desire for expanding its control over the Arctic shelf is entirely legitimate—and opens promising opportunities for conversations on issues of concern for many states, including China, for that matter.

Realists in the United States prefer to focus on expanding American military capabilities, their prime argument being that Russia has significantly more capacity in the Arctic. While we would surely agree that America’s current Arctic capabilities are woefully poor, as our colleagues have described, an exclusive focus on that shortcoming may send the wrong signal. 

We would therefore argue in favor of a combined strategy: making additional investments in U.S. Arctic capabilities while doubling down on diplomatic efforts to preserve the U.S.-Russian dialogue in the Arctic. That may not be easy, but given the tremendous success of a constructive approach in the Arctic in recent years, this is something worth fighting for. Figuratively speaking, that is.

Boris Nemtsov’s murder may be a turning point in current Russian history. Unfortunately, it is almost surely not a turn to the better, but one to something bad or to something even worse. This point needs to be made clear from the beginning. It is an illusion to think that this event will lead to anything positive, such as a backlash in the population at large against nationalistic rhetoric or even some kind of liberal revolution, or “Russian Spring.” 

Liberalism in Russia was left near-dead once Putin prevailed over the wave of protests in late 2011 and early 2012. The geopolitical conflict with the West over Ukraine—both Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions and the Western response of imposing sanctions—virtually guaranteed that liberal, democratic, pro-Western forces would remain irrelevant for now and, likely, for some years to come. Nemtsov’s murder only exacerbates this trend.

There are two probable scenarios going forward. Both begin with the realization that the most important conclusion from the Nemtsov murder is that it signals a lack of control by Putin over very dangerous elements in Russian society. Putin will respond by further tightening Kremlin control over Russian politics and society. The question is how forcefully and how successfully. In one scenario, Putin succeeds in stabilizing the political situation. This will result in an even more authoritarian, but somewhat stable, Russia. In the other, Putin fails to establish control and the result is a breakdown of all control and reversion to an even more extreme nationalism than now.

We do not know who murdered Boris Nemtsov. The most likely version is that it was rogue nationalist, anti-Maidan, forces. If so, this means that Putin has serious problems with his own security forces. They are either inexcusably negligent (because they allowed the murder to happen) or criminally complicit (if anyone inside the security forces in any way facilitated the crime).

Most everyone outside the Kremlin is obsessed with, as they say, the eternal Russian question of Kto vinovat—”Who is to blame?” Putin’s priorities are different. His first question is not, “Who did this?” but “Who let this happen?” So his primary concern is to solve the problem of the competence of and/or control over his security services.

Second, his main target now has to be extremist-nationalists inside Russia. They are the biggest threat to his regime, far greater than the demonstrators on Bolotnaya Square in 2011-2012. Despite the fact that it is the Kremlin itself that has been the biggest promoter of nationalism, it is aware that extreme nationalism is a danger. Last October, at the Valdai Club meeting in Sochi, Putin’s number two man, Sergey Ivanov, was asked about the threat of nationalist-extremists in Russia. He admitted there was a problem. “They do exist. They are a tiny minority. But they represent a clear risk. We need to think about that. And, especially, we need to do something about it. ... We have to make it clear to extremists that the law will be strictly enforced, and that committing illegal acts is a road that leads to nowhere.” And when we do act against those who violate the law, he said, “we will not be constrained by concerns about human rights.”

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On December 1, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted a discussion exploring Russian power throughout history and how two of its most pivotal rulers—Josef Stalin and Vladimir Putin—defined Russian leadership and its role in the world in the 20^th and 21^st centuries. The discussion featured remarks by Stephen Kotkin, professor at Princeton University and author of the authoritative new biography, Stalin Volume I: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928 (Penguin Press, 2014).

In his book, Kotkin reveals Stalin as a ruler who is both astute and blinkered, diligent and paranoid, cynical and true-believing, charming and vicious. However, Stalin is more than just an eminent biography; it is a book about Russian power in the world as well as Stalin’s power in Russia, recast as the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Stalin offers an analysis of power—where it comes from, how it is utilized or squandered, and what its human consequences are.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott offered introductory remarks and moderated the discussion.  Prior to assuming the leadership of Brookings, Talbott served in the U.S. State Department as ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet Union and then as deputy secretary.

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• Putin and Russian Power in the World: The Stalin Legacy

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20141201_putin_russia_stalin_transcript

As the Obama administration copes with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and continuing pressure on Ukraine, its actions invariably invite comparison to the Bush administration’s response to the 2008 Georgian-Russian war. But as the Obama White House readies potentially more potent economic sanctions against Russia, former Bush administration officials are bandying a revisionist history of the Georgia conflict that suggests a far more robust American response than there actually was.

Neither White House had good options for influencing Russian President Vladimir Putin. And this time, the fast-moving developments on the ground in Ukraine confront the United States with tough choices. Because the West will not go to war over Crimea, U.S. and European officials must rely on political, diplomatic and financial measures to punish Moscow, while seeking to launch negotiations involving Russia in order to de-escalate and ultimately stabilize the Ukraine situation. They are not having an easy time of it.

Neither did the Bush administration during the 2008 Georgia-Russia war. In a brief, five-day conflict, the Russian army routed its outnumbered and outgunned Georgian opponent and advanced to within a short drive of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. Bush officials ruled out military options and found that, given the deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations over the previous five years, they had few good levers to influence the Kremlin. The sanctions Washington applied at the time had little resonance in Moscow.

In recent days, however, former Bush administration officials have described a forceful and effective U.S. response in Georgia. On “Fox News Sunday” on March 16, former senior White House adviser Karl Rove told Chris Wallace, “What the United States did was it sent warships to, to the Black Sea, it took the combat troops that Georgia had in Afghanistan, and airlifted them back, sending a very strong message to Putin that ‘you’re going to be facing combat-trained, combat-experienced Georgian forces.’ And not only that, but the United States government is willing to give logistical support to get them there, and this stopped them.”

Rove was echoing what former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote in a March 7 op-ed in The Washington Post: “After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, the United States sent ships into the Black Sea, airlifted Georgian military forces from Iraq back to their home bases and sent humanitarian aid. Russia was denied its ultimate goal of overthrowing the democratically elected government.” Really? These statements do not match well with the history of the conflict.

War broke out the night of Aug. 7, when Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili ordered his troops into the breakaway region of South Ossetia, after Russian forces shelled Georgian villages just outside South Ossetia. The Russians — by appearances, spoiling for a fight — responded swiftly with massive force. They turned the Georgian army back and overran much of Georgia.

As has been widelyreported, when the conflict began, one of Georgia’s five army brigades was serving as part of the coalition force in Iraq (not Afghanistan, as Rove claimed). On Aug. 10, U.S. C-17s began returning the brigade to Tbilisi, and it promptly went into combat.

The brigade was well-trained and experienced — but in counterinsurgency operations for Iraq, not combined arms operations. Facing a larger and far better-armed opponent, the brigade added little to the failing Georgian effort to halt the Russian advance. On Aug. 12, Moscow announced a cease-fire. French President Nicolas Sarkozy traveled to the Russian and Georgian capitals to formalize an end to the hostilities.

Did the U.S. airlift of the Georgian troops to Tbilisi change the tide of battle or Moscow’s political calculations? No. The Russian army handily drove them back.

What about the deployment of U.S. Navy ships to the Black Sea? The guided missile destroyer USS McFaul did enter the Black Sea to deliver humanitarian supplies to Georgia, passing through the Bosporus on Aug. 22 — 10 days after the cease-fire.

No evidence suggests these actions had much, if any, impact on Putin’s decision making. The Russians halted their offensive short of Tbilisi, figuring that occupying the capital was unnecessary. They thought — as did many in Georgia and the West — that the political shock of the rout would suffice to bring down Saakashvili’s government (though, in the end, it did not).

U.S. C-17s did fly humanitarian supplies to Tbilisi, but President Bush ruled out military action. His administration imposed modest penalties on Russia, ratcheting down bilateral relations, freezing a U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation agreement and ending support for Moscow’s bid to join the World Trade Organization. U.S. officials found that they had little leverage to affect Moscow’s behavior.

The Obama administration has applied similar measures as it seeks to sway Putin again, but it has added a new penalty: visa and financial sanctions targeted at individual Russians, including some close to Putin. On March 20, the president also announced a new executive order to enable U.S. sanctions against key sectors of the Russian economy, including finance, energy and defense — the kinds of tough penalties that the United States has not previously applied against Moscow.

Despite the bluster of former Bush administration officials today, Washington in fact has a stronger hand in the current crisis in Ukraine in one other regard. In 2008, many European states held Saakashvili partially responsible for triggering the war with the Georgian advance into South Ossetia. Ukraine, by contrast, has acted with great restraint. This time, nearly all of Europe agrees that Russia’s actions are out of bounds. Sure enough, European states also appear more ready to sanction Russia than in 2008. Along with the various sanctions the U.S. alone has announced, European Union officials last week also announced visa and financial sanctions on individual Russians.

These moves might not end up shaking Putin from his course, but applying the new executive order could inflict real pain on the Russian economy — something Washington did not accomplish in 2008. Those who faced the challenge of punishing Russia over Georgia should understand the complexities of dealing with Putin and, at a minimum, cut the current administration a little slack.

Read the original article at POLITICO Magazine»

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Welcome and Introduction:
Philip H. Gordon , Director, Center on the United States and Europe

Is the European Union Failing? Politics and Policy after the Referendums
Philip H. Gordon , Director, Center on the United States and Europe

Panelists:
Gerard Baker, The Times (London)
Joschka Fischer, Member of Bundestag and former German Foreign Minister
Noëlle Lenoir, President of the European Institute of HEC, former French Minister for European Affairs
Andrew Moravcsik, Princeton University/Brookings

Is Russia Lost? The Future of Russian Democracy and Relations with the West
Fiona Hill, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Panelists:
Daniel Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Anatol Lieven, New America Foundation
Strobe Talbott, President, The Brookings Institution
Dmitri Trenin, Carnegie Moscow Center

Is America above the Law? A U.S.-Europe Dialogue about the War on Terror
Jeremy Shapiro, Director of Research, Center on the United States and Europe

Panelists:
Joschka Fischer, Member of Bundestag and former German Foreign Minister
Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch
Pauline Neville-Jones, Chair, British Conservative Party National and International Security Group
Victoria Toensing, former U.S. Justice Department Official
Ruth Wedgwood, Johns Hopkins-SAIS

There are lots of ways for Syria to go wrong for Russia. Analysts have tended to focus on Moscow’s military shortcomings in that theater, wondering if Syria will become Russia’s Vietnam. They’ve also pointed to Russia’s deep economic troubles—exacerbated, of course, by very low oil prices—which call into question its ability to pay for the military campaign over time.

One of the understudied aspects of Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict is the ramifications it could have for the Russian government’s relations with Muslims back at home. Moscow is now home to the largest Muslim community of any city in Europe (with between 1.5 and 2 million Muslims out of a population of around 13 million, although illegal immigration has distorted many of the figures). Russian President Vladimir Putin and other leaders have consciously avoided choosing sides in the Sunni-Shiite divide in the Middle East—recognizing that doing so could provoke a backlash among Russian Muslims.

The rise of an extremist, Salafi- or Wahhabi-inspired, religious state in Syria—an Islamic caliphate established either by the Islamic State or by any religiously-based extremist group in the region—could pose a significant problem for Russia. That’s both because of how it’s likely to behave toward other states in the region (including key Russian partners like Israel, Egypt, and Iran) and because of what it could inspire in Mother Russia, where efforts by militant groups to create their own “caliphate” or “emirate” in the North Caucasus have created headaches for Moscow since the early 2000s. 

Islam and Russia go way back

Russia is a Muslim state. Islam is arguably older than Christianity in traditional Russian territory––with Muslim communities first appearing in southeastern Russia in the 8th century. It is firmly established as the dominant religion among the Tatars of the Volga region and the diverse peoples of the Russian North Caucasus. These indigenous Sunni Muslims have their own unique heritage, history, and religious experience. The Tatars launched a reformist movement in the 19th century that later morphed into ideas of “Euro-Islam,” a progressive credo that could coexist, and even compete, with Russian Orthodoxy and other Christian denominations. Sufi movements, rooted in private forms of belief and practice, similarly prevailed in the Russian North Caucasus after the late 18th century. 

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, when Central Asia and the South Caucasus were also part of the state, the USSR’s demography was in flux. The “ethnic” Muslim share of the population was rising as a result of high birthrates in Central Asia, while the Slavic, primarily Orthodox, populations of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were declining from high mortality and low birthrates. Since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s nominal Muslim population has swelled with labor migration from Central Asia and Azerbaijan, which has brought more Shiite Muslims into the mix, in the case of Azeri immigrants. As in other countries, Russia has also had its share of converts to Islam as the population rediscovered religion in the 1990s and 2000s after the enforced atheism of the Soviet period came to an end.

The foreign fighter problem

The Kremlin cannot afford the rise of any group that fuses religion and politics, and has outside allegiances that might encourage opposition to the Russian state among its Muslim populations. The religious wars in the Middle East are not a side show for Russia. Thousands of foreign fighters have flocked to Syria from Russia, as well as from Central Asia and the South Caucasus, all attracted by the extreme messages of ISIS and other groups.

Extremist groups have been active in Russia since the Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s. A recent Reuters report reveals how Russia allowed—and even encouraged—militants and radicals from the North Caucasus to go and fight in Syria in 2013, in an effort to divert them away from potential domestic terrorist attacks ahead of the February 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. The Kremlin now worries that these and other fighters will return from Syria and further radicalize and inflame the situation in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia. Putin intends to eliminate the fighters, in place, before they have an opportunity to come back home.

Putin also knows a thing or two about extremists from his time in the KGB, as well as his reading of Russian history. As a result, he does little to distinguish among them. For Putin, an extremist is an extremist—no matter what name he or she adopts. Indeed, Russian revolutionaries in the 19th and 20th centuries wrote the playbook for fusing ideology with terror and brutality; and Putin has recently become very critical of that revolutionary approach––moving even to criticize Soviet founder and Bolshevik Party leader Vladimir Lenin for destroying the Russian state and empire one hundred years ago in the Russian Revolution of 1917. For Putin, anyone whose views and ideas can become the base for violence in opposition to the legal, legitimate state (and its leader) is an extremist who must be countered. Syria is a crucial front in holding the line.

The long haul

With this in mind, we can be sure that Putin sees Russia in for the long haul in Syria. Recent signs that Russia may be creating a new army base in Palmyra to complement its bases in Latakia and Tarsus, underscore this point. Having watched the United States returning to its old battlegrounds in both Afghanistan and Iraq to head off new extremist threats, Putin will want to prepare contingencies and keep his options open. 

The fight with extremists is only beginning for Russia in Syria, now that Moscow has bolstered the position of Bashar Assad and the secular Alawite regime. For Putin and for Russia, Syria is the focal point of international action, and the current arena for diplomatic as well as military interaction with the United States, but it is also a critical element for Putin in his efforts to maintain control of the homefront.

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Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his fourth visit to China since President Xi Jinping became top party leader in 2012. During this latest meeting, the two countries inked more than 30 deals, including an oil supply contract, and issued numerous joint statements, one of which criticized the United States for its plans to deploy missile defense systems on the Korean Peninsula and in the Balkans. Chinese state media speculate that this year’s China-Russia joint naval exercises, held annually since 2005, will likely be led by the South China Sea Fleet, reinforcing a general perception in China and elsewhere that U.S. policies are pushing Chinese leaders to consolidate ties with Russia.

On July 26, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted a discussion on the U.S.-China-Russia trilateral relationship, the shape and scope of which carries far-reaching consequences for international order and global economic growth. Brookings President Strobe Talbott, who served as deputy secretary of state and ambassador-at-large on the new independent states following the Soviet breakup, provided an introduction. A panel of experts—J. Stapleton Roy, Fiona Hill, Yun Sun, and Cheng Li—discussed the current and historical dynamics at play, including expectations and recommendations for the future.

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• Is the United States losing China to Russia?

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• Is the United States losing China to Russia?

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• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

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• 20160726_china_russia_us_transcript

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On August 7, the White House announced cancellation of the planned Moscow summit in early September between Presidents Obama and Putin, saying there were no prospects for significant progress on key issues at the meeting.  The White House also said cooperation with Russia remains a priority, and on August 9 Secretaries Kerry and Hagel met with their Russian counterparts, Ministers Lavrov and Shoigu.  While President Obama intends to travel to St Petersburg for the G20 summit on September 6 and 7, there has been no word on whether there will be a bilateral meeting with President Putin on the margins of the summit.  Clearly, U.S.-Russian relations have entered troubled times.

On August 28, the Center on the United States and Europe hosted a panel discussion to address these developments and future prospects for the bilateral relationship between Washington and Moscow.  Brookings Senior Fellows Clifford Gaddy, Steven Pifer and Angela Stent will take part.  Brookings Visiting Fellow Jeremy Shapiro moderated.   Following opening comments, the panelists took questions from the audience.

Watch full video from the event at C-SPAN.org »

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• What the U.S. Does in Syria Will Be Costly for Russia
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• The U.S.-Russia Relationship: What's Next?

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In August, the White House announced the cancellation of the Moscow summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin, while still saying that U.S. relations with Russia remain a priority. By all accounts, the Snowden case appears to have further complicated already strained U.S.-Russia relations. With President Obama headed to St. Petersburg, Russia for the G20 summit on September 6 and 7, the likelihood of an Obama-Putin bilateral meeting remains unanswered and unlikely.

With an eye toward a possible bilateral meeting in St. Petersburg, Brookings experts Steven Pifer, Clifford Gaddy and Angela Stent address these developments and future prospects for the U.S.-Russia cooperation on issues like Syria and arms control.

Steven Pifer:

“I think people now see the reset as a failure. I actually think the reset succeeded, because the goal was not to get us to Nirvana with Russia, but to lift us out of the hole that we found ourselves in in 2008.”

Clifford Gaddy:

“Steve has said that the relations are not as bad, are at their worst since, you know, the fall of communism. I would probably say they probably are as bad.”

Angela Stent:

“It's not clear what the U.S.-Russian agenda is going forward. The things we would like to accomplish — more arms control, an agreement on missile defense, even, you know, more U.S. investment in Russia — the Russians don't seem to be interesting in responding. We do need to work together — and we will, still, on post-2014 Afghanistan, on Iran — but it's really unclear what an agenda would be going forward.”

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The tenth anniversary meeting of the “Valdai International Discussion Club” –a forum that brings together foreign Russia experts with top Russian officials, politicians, journalists and academics—conveyed two strong messages from the Kremlin: Russia is fully back on the world stage seeking a leadership role; and Russia offers the world an alternative value system to that of the West, which has lost its moral compass. No one made these points more vigorously than Vladimir Putin himself, who has dined with the group for the past decade. He was in top form, exuding self-confidence and decisiveness. Yet the forum itself, though Kremlin-sponsored, also had discordant voices, including several vocal critics of the way Putin’s Russia is run.

The meeting this year took place in a picturesque resort on Lake Valdai, 250 miles from Moscow. It was the largest ever, with more than 200 participants. The official theme was “Russia’s Diversity for the Modern World” and focused on how Russia should define its national identity. In some ways, every Valdai meeting—and I have attended all ten—has had as its underlying theme the “whither Russia question”, even at the session in Siberia when we were discussing whether Russia was indeed an energy superpower. But this year the question of Russia’s uniqueness and its place in the world was the main focus.

Sergei Karaganov, one of the meeting’s co-organizers, was hardly upbeat. He began the forum on a cautionary note, saying that Russia had wasted the last twenty years and that the only idea that still unites Russians is their victory in World War Two.

Unlike in previous years, both the liberal and moderate nationalist political opposition was represented. Two of the most notable interventions were by Yevgeny Roizman, the controversial newly-elected major of Yekaterinburg and Ksenia Sobchak, daughter of Anatoly Sobchak, the liberal mayor of St. Petersburg who gave Putin his post-Soviet political start in the early 1990s. Roizman gave a spirited defense of the importance of ending politics as usual in the corrupt provinces. Sobchak made an impassioned plea for her generation of urban, educated 30 –somethings. Her message: we reject the traditional Russian political patronage model, we don’t want a president who addresses us as a father talks to his children, we want to be treated as independent adults responsible for the decisions they make and we don’t want to rely on the state. And, she added, we didn’t grow up in the USSR, we have no nostalgia for the Soviet Union, we don’t care about Russia being a great power and we reject anti-Americanism. Indeed, we like the West.

One of the eternal questions about Russia’s identity—whether Russia is European, Asian or Eurasian—was addressed in a day-long session at the Iversky monastery, founded in 1653 and elegantly restored in recent years. In a panel highlighting Russia’s role as a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional state whose inhabitants have for centuries included Orthodox Christians, Jews, Moslems and Buddhists, Metropolitan Hilarion delivered a strong message. Russian Orthodox Christians, he said, are the true harbingers of traditional Christian values, while Western Protestants have embraced liberal values on issues such as abortion, homosexual rights and gay marriage that undermine Christian morality. These views were reflected in President Putin’s prepared speech, when he reiterated that Russia supports traditional Christian morality and opposes same-sex marriage. Moreover, both Putin and the Russian clergy emphasized that Orthodox Christians and Moslems share a commitment to traditional morality, highlighting their common bonds – and differentiating them on common grounds from the West.

One of Putin’s main foreign policy projects for his third term is his proposed Eurasian Union, a topic that provoked some lively discussion. Russian speakers argued that the Kremlin had “left the imperial paradigm behind”, and that this union would be an organization of equals akin to the European Union. Moldovan and Ukrainian speakers, by contrast, discussed the growing economic and political pressure that Russia is putting on them to reject the EU in the run-up to the Vilnius summit in November. Brussels is poised to offer Ukraine and Moldova Association Agreements that Russia claims would adversely impact both countries’ continuing economic ties to Moscow. Without Ukraine, the Eurasian Union will not fulfill the Kremlin’s ambition to create a grouping of post-Soviet states as a counterbalance to the European Union.

Russia’s growing global role in the wake of its Syria initiative was the main focus of discussions with the top officials who came to Valdai—Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Ivanov. They were clearly buoyed by the fact that Russia had taken the initiative in organizing the agreement to rid Syria of its chemical weapons, and stressed that, they favor a strong, secular Syria. The Opposition, they claimed, was up to 75% controlled by Al Qaeda. There seemed to be agreement that not all of the chemical weapons would be found and destroyed, but that enough could be destroyed to accomplish Russian and American goals. And they repeated Russia’s claim that chemical weapons were used only by the Opposition and not by Assad’s own forces.

Shoigu addressed the question of military reform by quoting Russia’s pre-revolutionary Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin who said “Give us money and time, and you won’t recognize our armed forces.” He expressed concern about the situation in Afghanistan after NATO’s withdrawal next year, and questioned who would form the next generation of leaders in Kabul. He reiterated that U.S. missile defense programs were ultimately aimed at Russia, not Iran or North Korea, but also suggested developing joint U.S-Russian ABM systems. NATO, he said, is a threat to Russia. What else was NATO enlargement, if not directed against Russia? His message to the group-no more new entrants to NATO.

In previous years, President Putin has met with foreign participants only in a private setting, but for this tenth anniversary the format of the Putin meeting changed. He sat on the stage with four discussants—former German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, former French Prime Minister Francois Fillon and President of the U.S-based Center for the National Interest Dimitri Simes. They addressed foreign and Russian participants and the four-hour meeting was televised.

Putin gave a vigorous defense of Russia as the standard-bearer of traditional Christian morality, arguing that the United States and Europe had rejected the Christian roots that form the basis of Western civilization. Criticizing “excessive political correctness” he declared that the European multicultural project had failed. He also warned that attempts by un-named powers to revive the model of a unipolar world had also failed. Stressing Russia’s right to have a seat at the table on all decisions of major international importance, he invoked the times when Russia had made an important contribution to world peace—the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Yalta Conference in 1945. He warned that when Russia was excluded—for instance from the 1919 Treaty of Versailles—this led to war. His message on Syria was clear—Russia took the initiative and had helped the United States by proposing an agreement to rid Syria of its chemical weapons stockpiles. And it expects to continue to be respected as an indispensable global player.

For anyone who has followed the Kremlin’s fraught relationship with the Opposition since the December 2011 Bolotnaya demonstrations protesting the results of the Duma elections, Putin’s interactions with representatives of the Opposition appeared to represent a shift in policy. He answered their questions about the need for political reform and more individual freedom by suggesting that these issues will be examined in the future—without committing himself to any particular course of action. The fact that these exchanges were televised live gave the impression that the Kremlin feels confident enough that the Opposition represents no real threat that it can engage in a dialogue with its more mainstream representatives. After all, there were no extreme nationalists or hard-core socialists there. Opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who won 27% of the vote in the recent Moscow mayoral elections, was also absent, having apparently turned down an invitation to participate.

Putin was evasive about his future plans. When asked if he would run for office again in 2018, he did not rule it out. He noted approvingly that Angela Merkel was about to win a third term, as he had last year. He certainly gave the impression of being fully engaged, with ambitious—albeit undefined-- plans for Russia. The Russian economy may be experiencing low growth rates, but the main Valdai message was that Putin’s Russia is eager to engage the world, offering an alternative to a troubled West that has rejected major tenets of its own civilizational heritage.

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Russia remains a priority for the United States because of its nuclear weapons arsenal, its strategic location bordering Europe and Asia and its ability to support—or thwart—American interests on issues such as the Syrian conflict. Recent U.S. presidents have attempted repeatedly to forge a strong and productive partnership with Russia only to be held hostage to the deep mistrust born of the Cold War. Why has it been so difficult to move the relationship forward and is there any prospect for change in the future?

In her new book, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton University Press, 2014), Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow and Georgetown University Professor Angela Stent calls for a fundamental reassessment of the principles and practices that drive U.S.-Russian relations and offers a path forward to meet the urgent challenges facing both countries.

On February 18, the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings hosted a discussion featuring Stent that explored U.S.-Russian relations since the Soviet collapse and the challenges ahead. CUSE Director Fiona Hill, co-author of Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Brookings Press, 2013), and Peter Baker, chief White House correspondent for The New York Times and author of Days of Fire (Doubleday, 2013), also joined the panel.

Brookings President Strobe Talbott, who previously served as U.S. deputy secretary of State and U.S. ambassador-at-large for the former Soviet Union, provided introductory remarks.

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Visiting Astana, the modernistic capital of Kazakhstan, last week, I couldn't help feeling that I was at, or at least close to, the center of the universe. 

Consider this:  On September 7, the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, having just returned from attending the G-20 Summit in St. Petersburg at the invitation of President Putin of Russia, welcomed President Xi Jinping of China for an official visit in Astana. President Xi gave a speech that day at Nazarbayev University, in which he unabashedly borrowed a turn of phrase from former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton  by proposing a “New Silk Road” to serve as an “economic belt” of Eurasia, connecting “3 million people from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea” with Kazakhstan as a key partner along the way. 

On September 10, President Nazarbayev opened the Eurasian Emerging Markets Forum in Astana, at which he addressed some 800 participants, including high-level dignitaries and representatives from 87 countries.  In his keynote speech, he laid out his plans to catapult Kazakhstan into the ranks of the top 30 developed countries in the world by 2050.  The rest of the forum was devoted to exploring the ways in which this ambitious vision could be achieved and how economic integration of the Eurasian supercontinent—i.e., Europe plus Asia, with Kazakhstan at its center—would be a driver of regional and global prosperity. 

Finally, on September 13, President Nazarbayev joined the leaders of China, Russia and the five Central Asian republics in Bishkek for a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was also attended by a number of other regional leaders with observer status, including from Afghanistan, India, Iran and Pakistan.  Besides the usual pledges of good neighborly relations within the group, the leaders weighed in with a chorus of statements about current geopolitical trouble spots, including Afghanistan, Iran and Syria, many of them directed critically at the United States.

While the president and people of Kazakhstan might have felt at the center of global action this week, there is little doubt that China and Russia are the key external actors on the Central Asian stage.  Europe and the United States are far away and hardly visible, and everybody expects that, with the imminent end of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan, their attention to Central Asia will slip even further.  In contrast, the leaders of China and Russia are clearly focused on this region.  

Central Asian leaders, while perhaps privately worried about the long-term consequences of too tight an embrace by China, welcome the low-key approach of their big neighbor...

If there had been any doubt, President Xi’s speech in Astana showed that China is now concerned with Central Asia at the highest level.  While China faces its neighbors in the Pacific region in an assertive pose designed to counter what it sees as encirclement by unfriendly countries led by the U.S., it evidently feels no threat in Central Asia and projects an image of itself as benevolent and modest senior partner.  No doubt sensing opportunities to create a stable backyard, to secure access to energy resources and to build a land bridge to European and Middle Eastern markets while also gently wresting influence away from Russia, China has a strong incentive to push westward.  The substantial energy supply deals  that President Xi signed in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan this past week and the stress Xi placed in his Astana speech on measures to open up transport links throughout Eurasia reflect China’s growing engagement in this region.  Central Asian leaders, while perhaps privately worried about the long-term consequences of too tight an embrace by China, welcome the low-key approach of their big neighbor, which promises to strengthen their own hand economically and politically at least in the short term.

At the same time, there is also a new dynamic between Central Asia and Russia.  Since Mr. Putin resumed the Russian presidency in 2012, Russia has breathed new life into a long-dormant regional grouping, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), by pushing hard to create a customs union  (and eventually an economic union) that, in Russia’s view, would encompass most of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Although only a fraction of the geographic space of continental Eurasia (Europe + Asia), the reference to “Eurasia” harks back to a long-standing Russian ideological vision.  Under this vision, Russia and its former Soviet neighbors are endowed with a unique combination of European and Asian values and, led by Russia, with a mission to dominate the land bridge between Europe and Asia. 

In the pursuit of establishing a unified economic “Eurasian” space, Russia has not only successfully pushed for the full implementation of the current customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belorussia, but is also vigorously pursuing the expansion of the union in Ukraine, Central Asia (specifically targeting the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan) and Armenia in the South Caucasus.  In the case of Armenia and Ukraine, this pursuit has taken on a decidedly anti-European Union tone, as Russia seems to spare no effort to ensure that these countries will join its own economic orbit, rather than associating with the EU.  In Central Asia, the Russian campaign of expanding the customs union has been more low key, but nonetheless persistent with the quiet support of Kazakhstan.  Interestingly, this effort to create a unified economic space has not been cast by Russia as a move to counteract the growing influence of China in Central Asia, even though it is undoubtedly one of the underlying long-term motives for Russian diplomacy in the region.  

Much more important for China will be whether the “Eurasian” economic union can create safe, low-cost and high-speed transit routes to China’s key trading partners in Europe, South Asia and the Middle East.

Indeed, for Central Asia in general and for Kazakhstan in particular, the important questions for the future will be how China and Russia shape their mutual relations overall and how they will seek to accommodate their overlapping interests in the region.  For the moment, a common geopolitical front vis-à-vis the U.S., evident in their joint positions at the U.N. Security Council and at the SCO summit last week, is an overarching priority for China and Russia.  Moreover, they share the common interest of establishing a stable and prosperous political and economic sphere in Central Asia.  For now and the foreseeable future, China’s thirst for energy is large enough to allow both Russia and Central Asian countries to pursue opportunities for major oil and gas supply deals with China without undue competition. Finally, whatever protectionist effects an expansion of the Russian-led customs union may have in limiting trade between China and Central Asia will likely be temporary and will hardly be noticed in China’s huge overall trade account.  Much more important for China will be whether the “Eurasian” economic union can create safe, low-cost and high-speed transit routes to China’s key trading partners in Europe, South Asia and the Middle East. This priority strongly resonated in President Xi’s speech, in which he not only staked out an interest in Eurasian economic integration, but also promised greater cooperation between the SCO and EurAsEC.

What does all of this mean in practical terms for Central Asia and for Kazakhstan?  As President Nazarbayev indicated in his speech at the Eurasian Emerging Markets Forum, he sees Kazakhstan as playing a key role in supporting the economic integration of larger Eurasia.  This presumably should mean: investing in regional infrastructure, such as the major East-West Highway through Kazakhstan as a link from China to Europe; assuring that the customs union pursues open, rather than protectionist, policies; and convincing the other Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, to participate in an effort to increase the region’s connectivity both internally and with the rest of the world. 

In addition, there are a number of institutional options for promoting these goals and for turning China’s and Russia’s engagement in Central Asia into a pragmatic partnership.  One option would be to have China join the Eurasian Development Bank (EADB), the financial arm of EurAsEC.  Another would be for Russia to join the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC), in which China has teamed up with Central Asian countries (now also including Afghanistan, Mongolia and Pakistan) and with six international financial organizations (including the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank) with the goal of improving regional cooperation and investment in trade, transport and energy.  Either or both of these two options could then offer SCO a financial and technical institutional platform to pursue economic integration between China, Russia and Central Asia (and, ultimately, even South Asia), a goal that has eluded SCO up until now. 

Kazakhstan is a member of EurAsEc, EADB, CAREC and SCO, and is therefore in a unique position to promote institutional changes along some or all of these lines.  One place to start would be the next ministerial conference of CAREC, to be held in Astana on October 24-25.  Of course, it is by no means clear that China and Russia will see it in their interest to dilute their lead roles in EADB and CAREC, the regional organizations that they now respectively dominate.  However, establishing a strong and meaningful institutional capacity that would support the economic integration process in Central Asia and in the larger Eurasia would be of great benefit for Kazakhstan, since it would help turn the country from being “land-locked” to being “land-linked” with the world’s largest and most dynamic economies.