In conversation with Ehud Barak 27 March 2023 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

The former prime minister of Israel discusses his country’s political outlook and foreign policy priorities.

On the eve of its 75th independence anniversary, Israel is at a critical crossroads. Weeks of long, intense protests surrounding judicial reforms pursued by the current government have widened the debate over the role played by the, so far independent, judiciary, notably the Supreme Court.

Supporters on both sides of the argument are fighting over different visions of Israel – a true liberal-democracy, or a much-reduced version of a democratic system. Whichever side of the argument people fall, the debate symbolizes tension in Israel’s society and decline in trust of its political and constitutional institutions.

Abroad, the situation remains intricate. Israel-Iran relations remain on a knife edge while the Abraham Accords normalized relations with parts of the Gulf. Then there are the continual issues surrounding relations with the Palestinians and their right to self-determination and statehood.

Old international challenges are now rubbing up against the new. Israel is part of a changing power dynamic in the Middle East, the result of a much-reduced US footprint. Furthermore, it must now contend with the other global superpower in China and continue to work on its response to the war in Ukraine.

Amid its domestic struggle to maintain its democratic character, fast-moving regional and international developments are in need of addressing. Friends and allies are deeply concerned with the country’s constitutional crisis, potentially re-evaluating their relations with the Jewish state.

Former prime minister of Israel Ehud Barak lays out his views on the complexities of domestic and international challenges facing Israel today.

Questions covered include:

• What are the main root causes of the current constitutional crisis, and how could it be best resolved?
• Could the current situation lead to a breakdown of the political system, even widespread violence?
• How could the current circumstances in Israel and Palestine affect relations between the two and any prospect for peace negotiations?
• How will US-Israel relations stand up against China’s influence in the region?
• What is Israel’s interpretation of the war in Ukraine and how is the country affected?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Russia’s aggression and a crisis for multilateralism 30 March 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 March 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, about how multilateral organizations struggle to respond adequately to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia pursues this war in defiance of the umbrella organization’s multiple resolutions condemning the invasion, along with its war crimes, annexation of territory, deliberate targeting of civilian nuclear infrastructure, cultural extermination, and global disinformation campaign. 

This event explores the following questions: 

• How should the response of the UN to Russian aggression be assessed? 
• What can be done to uphold the guiding principles of the UN Charter? 
• Is there a ‘UN problem’ or a ‘Russia problem’? 
• How can trust and the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation be restored in times of strategic rivalry and rising global tensions?
• Who can drive such an effort? 
• Is post-Soviet transfer of the UN Security Council seat to Russia a cause of current impunity? 

This event features a live in-person audience in Kyiv as well as in London and online.

Chatham House exhibition - In conversation with the future 19 April 2023 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 March 2023 Chatham House

Hear from the innovative leaders and companies driving change towards a more sustainable future.

This event is an opportunity to hear from the innovative leaders and companies driving change towards a more sustainable future.

The evening begins with a panel discussion then, over sustainably sourced drinks and canapés, you are invited to walk through Chatham House and explore the innovative and experimental ideas enabling radical shifts to allow us to prosper without exhausting our planet’s resources.

Our exhibiting partners include Earthshot Prize winner NotPla, Hawkins Brown, Polymateria, and BEEN London. 

Bronwen Maddox, director of Chatham House, opens the evening at 6pm and introduces our panel of experts, chaired by Ana Yang, head of Chatham House’s Sustainability Accelerator. 

Please note that this event is operating a ballot for in-person attendance. Your place will be confirmed by Wednesday 12 April if you are successful.

Turkey at a crossroads 4 May 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

What is at stake in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections?

Turkey is heading towards a fateful presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023. These elections are taking place against the background of a deepening economic downturn and a devastating earthquake. The elections will bear a major impact on the future of Turkish democracy, economy and foreign policy. At stake is the nature of Turkey’s political system, its geopolitical identity and the health of its democracy.

To unpack the significance and implications of this election, this event aims to address the following questions:

• What kind of political visions do the main presidential candidates offer for the country?
• How do they differ on the main domestic and foreign policy issues?
• How do the presidential candidates feature in public surveys?
• What does this election mean for Turkey’s foreign policy?
• What is the likely impact of the election on Turkey’s place in the transatlantic alliance and its relations with Europe?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Can rhetoric match reality? Britain’s international development future 27 April 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Andrew Mitchell, minister of state, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 

Last month’s updated Integrated Review positioned international development as a key pillar of British foreign policy which sets out the importance of the UK’s efforts to shape the ‘global strategic environment’.

Focusing heavily on Africa and the Indo-Pacific, international development will be central to the ambition of a ‘Global Britain’.

The Integrated Review outlines seven priority areas to revitalize the drive to meet the Global Goals, with a climate security strategy at its heart, while seeking to go beyond official development assistance (ODA).

However, there are major challenges ahead. Since 2021, the UK’s ODA has been cut from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent gross national income (GNI). Some are concerned that since being subsumed by the UK Foreign Office, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has diluted the effectiveness of UK international development. Then there is the question of the strength of British public support for development assistance at a time of domestic economic hardship.

Can rhetoric match reality?

This event tackles questions including:

• What does the UK’s vision for international development mean in practice?
• Will aid and development help push Britain’s influence around the world?
• Can policymakers and politicians garner domestic support for international aid in times of economic uncertainty, and if so, how?
• Can the UK rebuild its reputation in the world while it doesn’t meet its 0.7 per cent GNI target?

This event will be balloted for in-person attendance. Register your interest to join and a confirmation email will be sent to you on Tuesday 25 May at 12:00 BST to confirm your place at the event.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

A coffee reception will immediately follow this event.

The role of think tanks amid political uncertainty 9 May 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

Think tank leaders discuss how persistent and new forms of political uncertainty impact on their work and what can they do to counter it.  

Think tanks play a crucial role in supporting better public policy to address the most pressing global and local challenges. However, the recent rise in political turbulence poses a significant challenge to this work. Not only must the work of think tanks help counter political uncertainty but that uncertainty often threatens their ability to work effectively, and in some cases, their survival.

Polarized elections, regional instability, the rise of populism, shrinking civic space, eroding democracies, weakened institutions and public distrust are just some of the tricky contexts and issues raised by think tank leaders in the latest think tank state of the sector report. 

This event is being held in collaboration with On Think Tanks ahead of the On Think Tanks Conference.

Join us for a thought-provoking discussion at Chatham House on the major sources and consequences of political uncertainty in the world today and the critical role of think tanks in responding to and countering it. 

Key questions to be addressed during this discussion include:

• How does political uncertainty look like today?
• What can think tanks do to operate within uncertain contexts? 
• What are their roles: should they build the middle ground, support political parties, rally behind social demands?  
• Will think tanks be able to maintain their reliability and credibility in an increasingly polarized political environment?
• What can think tanks do to contribute to greater political stability?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

A drinks reception will immediately follow this event.

General practice leaders in Wales have voted unanimously to reject the Welsh government’s GP contract offer for 2024-25.The BMA’s ​General Practitioners Committee Wales said the government’s general medical services contract offer for the current financial year “fails to provide a credible and sustainable future” for general practice.GPs in Wales will now vote on whether to accept or reject the contract in a referendum that will open later this month.Gareth Oelmann, chair of the committee, said, “The decision to disregard the serious concerns and valuable contribution of general practice in Wales is beyond insulting, it is dangerous, leaving more surgeries and their patients in peril. We are concerned that this offer will leave more practices with no option but to close. GPs are being denied the resources they need to deliver vital services to the population.”The BMA said it was not yet able to disclose any details on the offer, and...

An employment judge has cleared the way for Farah Jameel, a former chair of the BMA’s General Practitioners Committee for England (GPCE), to go ahead with claims of discrimination and unfair dismissal against the association over her removal from the post during maternity leave.Jameel, who was elected the first female chair in November 2021, was put on temporary suspension in 2022 after complaints by BMA staff. The BMA told her in August 2023 that her contract was being terminated.The contract described her as a contractor providing consultancy services rather than an employee. But in a preliminary ruling the employment judge Natasha Joffe has held that Jameel was in reality an office holder and an employee, opening the way for her claims to proceed to a full hearing by an employment tribunal.The GPCE passed a vote of no confidence in Jameel in July 2023, as a means of electing a new...

The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has recommended that all women with suspected endometriosis be offered an early transvaginal ultrasound scan, even if the pelvic or abdominal examination is normal.In its updated guideline1 on the diagnosis and management of endometriosis, NICE recommends specialist ultrasound as an alternative to magnetic resonance imaging for investigating suspected cases of the condition in secondary care.The updated guideline follows recent reports from both the National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death2 and Endometriosis UK which highlighted problems with delayed diagnoses, partly owing to a lack of awareness among healthcare professionals of the condition and how it presents. Such delays can result in prolonged suffering, ill health, and risks to fertility, the reports warned.Other new and updated recommendations include asking women with suspected endometriosis if any first degree relatives have a history of the condition, and considering neurodiversity when taking into account...

I’m often asked if I miss working in the House of Commons. Of course I do; it’s one of the most amazing places in the world and remains the cockpit of our nation.There are obviously days I miss it more than others, usually around the big national moments. Whatever your view of Kim Leadbeater’s private member’s bill—the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill—its second reading this month will be one of those big moments.Kim is a friend of mine, and we spoke before she decided to put her bill forward after it topped the private members’ ballot at the start of the new parliament. My advice was to proceed with great care, to remember that this will take over your career in many ways, and to read the report produced earlier this year by the Health and Social Care Committee, which I chaired, on the subject of assisted dying/assisted...

Concerns are mounting over whether the NHS can meet key performance targets this winter, NHS Providers has said, after a survey of trust leaders highlighted pressure on hospitals, ambulance services, and community and mental health teams.1Over nine in 10 of the leaders who responded (96%) said that they were extremely or moderately concerned about the effect of winter pressures on their trust and local area. The most common reasons for concerns related to financial constraints and staffing provision. The top three greatest risks to the provision of high quality patient care over winter were identified as delayed discharge (57%), social care capacity (49%), and acute care bed capacity (43%).NHS Providers surveyed 171 trust leaders from 118 trusts in September and October, accounting for 56% of the provider sector.Most trust leaders (79%) were worried or very worried about whether their trusts had capacity to meet demand for services over the next...

At a recent clinical meeting, I heard that GPs local to me are about to lose the ability to request magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans for patients presenting with musculoskeletal symptoms. We’re instead advised to refer our patients to a musculoskeletal clinical assessment and triage service (CATS)—staffed largely by musculoskeletal advanced practitioners, who will assess our patients and determine whether imaging is warranted.The hope is that fewer patients will have unnecessary imaging and that this will reduce the potential harms of overdiagnosis. Radiologists rarely report musculoskeletal MRI scans as entirely normal, and it can be hard to know what to do with abnormal findings on an MRI. More often than not, patients with abnormal scans are referred to orthopaedic teams, even though there may not necessarily be a surgical target.At a population level, this is problematic on two fronts. Firstly, MRI scans are expensive and need to be used judiciously....

The World in Brief: European Court of Justice The World Today Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2021

EU brings members into line over fundamental rights

The European Union has had a challenging start to the summer trying to uphold the rule of law and avoid democratic regression in its member states.

On July 14, the Polish constitutional court ruled that the country did not have to comply with the measures imposed by the European Court of Justice against its controversial judicial reforms, citing that these measures were not in line with the Polish constitution.

The ruling Law and Justice Party, known as PiS, has introduced extensive changes to the judiciary since coming to power six years ago. In 2018, the government appointed new judges and set up a disciplinary chamber for the Supreme Court, which was given a temporary suspension by the European Court of Justice in an interim decision last year.

PiS reasoned that the changes were necessary to eliminate corruption stemming from the communist era, but critics say it merely allows the government to punish judges it regards as disloyal. Under the disciplinary system, Polish judges can have sanctions imposed on them for their judgments in the lower courts or if they refer cases to EU courts for preliminary rulings.

In the day following the Polish top court’s decision, the stand-off worsened when the European Court of Justice ruled that the disciplinary chamber undermines judicial independence and violates EU law. It ordered its immediate suspension and reiterated that the EU has primacy over national law – a vital condition countries agree to when joining the EU.

Didier Reynders, the European justice commissioner, sent a letter to Warsaw with an August 16 deadline for an answer on whether Poland would comply with the ruling. If the EU does not receive a satisfactory answer, it will impose financial sanctions on the state.

The former communist country, which joined the EU in 2004, is one of the bloc’s success stories. Its economy has boomed, and most people hold favourable views about the union – less than a handful of other member states have greater support for EU membership.

A recent survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung showed that ‘although only 35 per cent of Poles are satisfied with the democracy in their own country, a full 70 per cent express positive views on the state of democracy in the EU’. These figures feed into a larger picture of many Europeans welcoming the EU as a supervisory agent that is capable of intervening when individual states falter.

Recently, however, the EU has had to step up its efforts as members express anger over the gradual dismantling of fundamental rights under populist governments, not only in Poland.

The persistent backsliding in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has led to concerns in the EU parliament, which is putting pressure on the European Commission to do more to protect the EU’s values and legal order.

In a simultaneous battle in July, the commission launched legal action against Poland and Hungary, challenging anti-LGBTQ laws in those countries. It was triggered by a decision of more than 100 Polish regions to pass resolutions declaring themselves free of ‘LGBTQ ideology’, and a recently adopted law in Hungary banning any depiction of LGBTQ people on television or in books for under-18s.

An annual report on the rule of law in the union, released by the commission in July, singled out the two countries for their non-compliance. The report, the second of its kind, is a new tool to address concerns that the union was not scrutinizing democratic backsliding within its own bloc. Critics were quick to point out, however, that there is no mention of enforcement actions.

At the start of the year the EU vowed to be tougher in upholding democracy with a new regulation that lets it withhold money from member states that breach the rule of law. The EU has already delayed approving spending plans for Hungary and Poland as part of the €800 billion pandemic recovery fund.

As the European Parliament calls for the commission to reduce budget allocations to those that undermine democratic rights, Poland and Hungary could see the new mechanism put to the test this autumn.

Russia and 9/11: Roads not taken Expert comment NCapeling 9 September 2021

Many Russia watchers recall the fleeting moment 20 years ago when the country could have moved away from a path of confrontation with the US.

On 12 September 2001, Russian president Vladimir Putin was the first foreign leader to call George W. Bush to express his condolences – and to offer him support.

Just the previous year, Putin had said Russia joining NATO was a possibility and it suited Russia to draw parallels between the terrorist attacks on the US and its own ‘anti-terrorist’ campaign in Chechnya at the time.

Even though much of the Russian commentary about 9/11 professed empathy rather than sympathy, in their eyes the US was both a victim – as Russia likes to see itself – and ‘had it coming’ while Russia was blameless.

At that time, many in the West were still tempted by the idea Putin’s Russia might develop in a liberal direction, and Putin himself wanted to be seen as constructive especially after Chechnya. He may also have also assumed that, if Russia joined the international alliance, it would be as a co-leader with the US.

An offer which was never stated

Whether he was sincere in his condolences or not, Putin was of course not offering something for nothing – but then few countries ever do. Although less than one-tenth into his time in control of Russia (so far), Putin was still feeling his way but was not a naive president having already been through the controversial sinking of the Kursk submarine.

His first move was to facilitate access to bases in Central Asia for the US campaign in Afghanistan – vital initially but less so later. Apparently, this offer was against the wishes of many of his senior military commanders – although the extent to which it was in his gift to grant such access is questionable.

The quid pro quo, unstated and only dawning on Washington much later, was for the US to keep out of what Russia saw – and still sees – as its backyard. Putin probably misjudged that the US would have neither the inclination nor the capacity to be in that region for anything other than supply chain purposes. And he hoped America now needed Russia after the humiliations of the 1990s.

Common interests could once have been the basis of a partnership with Russia; but to Moscow that meant a partnership of equals which recognized the Kremlin’s self-declared right to conduct out-of-area operations. But the US took a different view and, with nothing written down and no memorandum ever signed, the ensuing disappointment for Russia was gradual but inexorable.

A purely practical reason for declining the ‘offer’ was that, despite its own illusions, Russia had little to bring to the table which was useful and could be offered on acceptable terms. Subsequent initiatives – from specific joint terrorism initiatives to a ‘grand reset’ – could not narrow differences to the point where the character of the relationship changed.

The Northern Distribution Network for supplying US forces in Afghanistan – Russia’s most practical contribution to the notional common cause – took almost a decade to be established and was plagued by problems which often come with a dependence on Russian goodwill.

The Kremlin also had the pleasure of watching US hubris lead to failure in Iraq. And, although knowing the US intervention in Afghanistan would never end well, even Russia could not have foreseen the scale of the defeat and humiliation of chaotic withdrawal.

US achievements with Russia’s neighbours

When it comes to Russia’s post 9/11 ‘offer’ and subsequent expectations, many of the other newly independent countries might never have achieved what they have over the past 20 years if the US had agreed – tacitly or otherwise – to sit back and accept Moscow’s droit de regard over them.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, these states were Russia’s ‘kith and kin’ but it underestimated US willingness to support smaller states over a ‘great power’ – especially as George H.W. Bush pleaded to those states not to go too far too fast. Albeit uneven, most have benefitted from US support for their own independence as well as practical assistance to strengthen their institutions and diversify external relationships.

The three Baltic states consolidated their democracies while their economies, which severed many ties with Russia early, are flourishing and prosperous in contrast to those still in the Russian orbit. They are not only members of NATO and the European Union (EU) but have on occasion been moral leaders as in the case of Lithuania facing down both Belarus and China.

Ukraine has undergone two revolutions in attempting to follow the paths of the Baltic states that continues today. After many false starts Moldova has undergone a similar change recently but at the ballot box not on the streets, to give itself another shot at the prize of true democracy and international acceptance.

Georgia conducted the most radical governance reforms seen in the region after its own revolution although it has taken a few steps backwards of late. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have strengthened their independence since then and adjusted their modus vivendi with Russia to their advantage. Putin would hardly be able to give the same assurances about use of bases there today – and indeed reportedly brushed off a request by Biden to use them in the current withdrawal.

Only a minority of formerly Soviet republics have made no progress whatsoever at the governmental level – Belarus and Turkmenistan for sure, perhaps Azerbaijan and Tajikistan too depending on the criteria.

The roads not taken

America’s failure was not so much rejecting Russia’s offer of partnership but failing to pay sufficient attention to it because Russia was still regarded as weak despite being relatively strong in its immediate neighbourhood.

The question of whether it was worth alienating Russia is a moral one. Refusing to sign the Paris Charter – which recognizes the right of independent states to form their own alliances – would have been a further betrayal of people who have long been subjected to their future being decided by stronger powers around them. But Russia may have chosen a path of confrontation anyway as, for the Kremlin, suzerainty over its former republics is considered an entitlement which comes with being a great power.

Although impossible to conclusively prove, all previous frameworks of Russian assumptions and habits of Russian behaviour indicate Moscow would have pocketed the deal and simply moved on anyway. It certainly seems likely that Russia’s other outrages and offenses over the years – from the murders of Litvinenko and Skripal in the UK to the manipulation of information and elections – would still have occurred even if a shabby deal had been made over the heads of the new states on Russia’s borders.

The atrocity of 9/11 was really an opportunity for Russia, a genuine potential turning point and a chance to create a new relationship with the outside world – but its expectations were unrealistic. Russia blew it with demands at the time that could not be met – and rightly were not met. The US rarely receives credit for withstanding Russian blandishments at a moment when its own aura of strength had been so cruelly and effectively punctured by the most brazen of attacks.

Europe's strategic choices 2021 4 November 2021 TO 5 November 2021 — 8:00AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Ritz Carlton Berlin

The 2021 conference will consider how Europe can navigate its political, economic and security challenges, in the context of the lasting effects of the coronavirus pandemic and an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

Registration is a two step process and you will receive a link to register on the conference virtually in advance. Please email if you wish to attend in-person.

The Eighth Annual Europe’s Strategic Choices conference, jointly developed and hosted by Chatham House, the Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, aims to understand the complex set of challenges facing Europe in the areas of security, economic competitiveness, trade, technology, and global influence.

Set against the backdrop of a Europe emerging gradually from the COVID-19 pandemic, this annual forum brings together policymakers, and representatives from business, civil society and academia, to explore how European countries can best respond, individually and collectively to their common challenges in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

The conference will be hosted in hybrid format to enable speakers and participants to join in person and allow others to engage virtually via the Conference Plus digital platform. This format ensures we can connect with a geographically diverse audience whilst incorporating important elements of in person engagement in accordance with German Federal government guidelines.

Memory politics: the challenge of commemoration in post-Soviet Eastern Europe and the Caucasus 5 October 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 September 2021 Online

This event explores how to address memory and commemoration in the former Soviet states, considering their role in political processes and violent conflict. 

How the past is remembered and commemorated plays a large role – perhaps too large – in contemporary political debates and in how conflicts are negotiated.

Perceptions of history influence people’s actions and are used to judge or dismiss the actions of others. Nowhere is this more so than in the political, territorial and social debates and disputes across the former Soviet Union.
 
This event examines how to address the problems caused by entrenched memory debates – and proposes a framework for ‘ethical political commemoration’ for use across historical enquiry, political processes, and conflict transformation initiatives.

The speakers explore the topic through the context of Turkey and the Armenian genocide, as well as more broadly through their own experiences in conflict transformation and peace processes.

Q&A: Maria Kolesnikova The World Today rescobales.drupal 29 September 2021

The jailed Belarusian opposition activist says: ‘It’s worth it’

Earlier this month, the Belarusian opposition activists, Maria Kolesnikova and Maxim Znak, were sentenced to long prison terms on charges of conspiring to seize power and crimes against national security. Both Kolesnikova, a prominent musician, and Znak, a lawyer, are supporters of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who ran against President Alexander Lukashenka in last year’s election and is now in exile in Lithuania. European Union countries have called for all political detainees, including Kolesnikova, to be released, but so far these calls have fallen on deaf ears. Alistair Burnett interviewed Maria Kolesnikova.

What is your response to the verdict and the 11-year sentence handed down to you?

My conscience is clear. We didn’t break the law. We followed the law at all the stages of the electoral campaign.

After the verdict, we applauded when the judges left the courtroom. They fulfilled their despicable role in this historical process – now this decision is on their conscience.

It is impossible to take the court and the verdict in any way seriously. This is not a verdict on Maxim and me but on the authorities themselves, on the system itself.

It is evidence not only of a legal default, but of a system-wide default. I feel sorry for those who did not understand what happened and did not learn history’s lessons.

Your trial was held behind closed doors and you were charged with conspiring to seize power and crimes against national security. What can you tell us about the prosecution’s case against you?

If there had been any evidence against us, the trial would have been open.

The very existence of accusations like this denies people the potential to participate in election campaigning and in political activity generally. It also prohibits public criticism of the authorities.

Such a judgment and verdict is a Pandora’s box with far-reaching negative consequences.

After the crackdown over last year’s protests and now your sentencing, what is the state of the opposition within Belarus?

I am in prison, so it is hard for me to judge objectively people’s attempts to fight for their freedom and basic human rights. According to what I see on TV, as well as the mood of those few people I have had a chance to talk to, I can say that the authorities are scared by the people’s activism.

They understand that though they can put down protests, they can’t change people’s mindsets. I see the fear in their eyes. I also believe that even those outside of Belarus can do a lot, and it’s important to continue opposition activity both inside and outside the country.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has been visiting European countries and the United States to maintain their support. Has international pressure, including from human rights groups, had any effect on the Lukashenka government?

I will use this opportunity to say hi to Sviatlana: ‘You are amazing. Keep it up.’

I’m sure Lukashenka is scared. He turned from a person who meets presidents to talk about Ukraine into an outcast no one wants to shake hands with.

It is traumatic for him, but the fear will pass. He will get used to it.

That is why it’s important to think about the next step, to understand what American and European partners are ready to offer Lukashenka in return for him to change course. If they aren’t ready to offer him anything – it’s important to know how long they are ready to maintain the pressure.

It concerns Russia as well. Maybe they simply don’t understand that Lukashenka and his government are in a bad way.

To what extent do you believe the futures of the Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin are now intertwined?

Lukashenka is a famous manipulator. Almost 30 years in power has made his self-preservation instincts automatic. It’s a tactical choice. There’s nothing behind it besides the willingness to stay in power till he dies.

But a trapped person is a dangerous and unreliable partner. It won’t remain like this for a long time. His partners will sooner or later face unpleasant surprises.

What can the international community do?

Hundreds of political prisoners, thousands in exile, tens of thousands arrested, fined, subjected to violence, and the media and businesses are being destroyed. The authorities are at war with their own people and leading the country into an abyss.

The support of the international community is very important for Belarusians. We need to look for an opportunity to start a dialogue, both within the country and with international partners.

Why did last year’s protests last as long as they did? Was it the relative youth of the protesters; the use of social media; the prominence of women; and did COVID restrictions play any part?

For me, the protests aren’t the main thing. The transformation of Belarusian society is the most important thing.

Most Belarusians decided what they want to see in their county: Belarus as a free, democratic, sovereign country. And the current authorities aren’t able to provide that.

Regarding new technology, of course, it gives more opportunities for people to organize, however, social media users are still the minority in Belarus. Everything happened on a deeper level after being built up over time through people’s real-life experience.

Throughout the campaign, I have been surprised by the fact that most of the activists are middle-aged people from different professions. There were plenty of women who expressed their objection first.

Through the situation with COVID, we gained a new experience of solidarity and mutual assistance, so when the government turned against the people, we realized then how many we were.

Looking back now at the protests, would you do anything differently and have you learned lessons for the future?

We definitely have more appreciation for what we already have. We appreciate our amazing journalists, our civil society, and private businesses. And, of course, our upcoming victory.

What could we have done differently? We could have been more consistent in terms of our willingness to resolve the crisis quickly and painlessly for the country. We were calling for dialogue in August, and then we had this unfortunate period of ultimatums that damaged both sides.

The situation is different now, and everything is more complicated. The moment has gone, and I don’t think that negotiation or national dialogue in the form we expected a year ago is possible anymore.

We had to make very hard choices many times, but the most important thing is that we never deviated from our principles and values - the fairness of the law, kindness, respect and love. I believe it is the only right way.

How can you now achieve your goal of removing President Lukashenka from power?

To be a politician in Belarus nowadays means to be in prison. In this way, I can contribute to the common endeavor. It’s not our objective, though.

Our objective is a country free of current and future forms of authoritarianism.

How to free the country? On the one hand, we all have to maintain our effort, cohesion and solidarity. We should try not to lose that. On the other hand, we should focus on limiting the political space for the government. We should show that the system will have to deal with us, the Belarusians.

Thirdly, we have to think about the future of Belarus. We have to dream about it, believe in it and stay active. Everything is up to us.

You were a musician before becoming active in politics. Has music shaped your approach to political activism and have you had the chance to continue playing in detention?

The artistic path shapes the personality. Of course, teamwork, looking for unusual solutions, and the ability to stay concentrated and work for a long time in critical situations, as well as performing in public, is what I’ve been learning my whole life as a musician.

Management of contemporary art projects and partnerships with businesses, like with Viktar Babaryka, the former presidential candidate, for example, gave me even more experience.

I miss music a lot, but in Belarusian prisons, even books aren’t really allowed. I don’t have an opportunity to play.

Do you have any regrets about your decision to become involved in opposition politics?

I consider my decision to participate in the campaign the most important and responsible one of my life. I knew it would be hard, but the future of the nation is at stake. So it’s worth it. My love for Belarus and Belarusian people didn’t allow me to stay aloof.

Director’s breakfast briefing: Shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11 14 October 2021 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2021 Chatham House

Former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

Former MI6 chief Sir Alex Younger, discusses shifts in European foreign policy since 9/11.

The dramatic events surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrates a profound shift in European security priorities since the beginning of the ‘war on terror’. Against the backdrop of the 20th anniversary of 9/11, former MI6 chief, Sir Alex Younger, discusses recent shifts in European foreign policy.

How has the focus on counterterrorism changed over the last two decades particularly in light of new and evolving strategic challenges? Why were many long-term objectives in Afghanistan left unachieved? Has the threat of terrorism changed across Europe? How has cooperation between security and intelligence services across the world changed particularly across the Atlantic? And, 20 years on, is the ‘war on terror’ really over?

This event is only open to Chatham House Partners and Major Corporate Members as well as selected giving circles of Chatham House. If you would like to attend, please RSVP to Linda Bedford at RSVP@chathamhouse.org.

Undercurrents: Europe's far-right educational institutions Audio bhorton.drupal 8 October 2021

In Hungary, France and Spain, new political movements from the far-right are attempting to reshape their education systems.

Under the supportive eye of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the recently established National University of Public Service seeks to embed nationalist illiberal values in a new generation of Hungarian students. Meanwhile in France and Spain, far-right public figure Marion Maréchal has turned away from the electoral politics of the Front Nationale to set up a new conservative research institute, ISSEP.

Both of these developments represent a challenge to the liberal values which underpin the existing international order. To find out more, Ben spoke with Professor Dorit Geva and Dr Felipe Santos, whose recent article in International Affairs considers the implications of this illiberal educational turn. 

Why Europe must end limbo for Afghans seeking asylum Expert comment Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2021

With a focus on evacuations from Afghanistan, the situation in Europe is often forgotten as thousands of asylum seekers continue to wait for their cases to be settled.

Following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, European leaders shared messages to welcome those evacuated, but the reality of European responses to displacement in Afghanistan paints a more contentious picture. 

As of July 2021, 33,325 cases of Afghan asylum applicants were pending in Germany, in France 18,410 people were waiting on a decision, while in Greece the numbers were 13,660. 

Arguably, such numbers are manageable given European states’ size and their functioning asylum systems but, while 56 per cent of Afghans in Europe receive protection status, a large proportion is still in limbo in differing European countries’ asylum systems. 

Europe hosts fewer than ten per cent of the three million UN-registered displaced Afghans globally, as neighbouring countries carry the burden of Afghanistan’s forced displacement: Iran hosts almost one million Afghan refugees and Pakistan 1.5 million, and these numbers double when adding undocumented or Afghan passport holders.
 
But despite these manageable numbers, national authorities in Europe often leave people waiting for months or even years to receive an asylum decision. Deportations to Afghanistan were halted only after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and even then there was resistance to this from certain European countries, while Austria suggested setting up ‘deportation centres’ in countries neighbouring Afghanistan. 

Europe remains a fortress

The European Commission’s Draft Action Plan responding to the events in Afghanistan confirmed the willingness of the European Union (EU) to continue returns to non-European ‘third countries’. So Europe remains a fortress, despite pledging support for ‘the safe and orderly departure of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to leave the country’. 

The wall by Greece at its border with Turkey and Poland’s treatment of Afghan asylum seekers trapped at its border with Belarus illustrate this hardline stance. The president of the European Council Charles Michel and EU Home Affairs Chief Ylva Johansson both confirm the priority is to secure European borders. 

This is further backed up by the European Council’s latest set of Conclusions on Afghanistan which focuses on security and ‘preventing illegal migration’ while avoiding reference to any domestic asylum efforts or the establishment of protection pathways for Afghans. 

This disconnect is not new. At the national level, reports of illegal pushbacks on European land and sea borders alarmingly intensified in 2020 as authorities intercepted and sent migrants back to neighbouring countries without assessing asylum claims. 

At the EU level, development aid to countries such as Afghanistan has long been conditional on their governments’ adherence to the bloc’s migration objectives of preventing asylum seekers from reaching European borders and facilitating the repatriation of those refused asylum in Europe. 

But this latest displacement crisis from Afghanistan exposes clear inconsistencies in European approaches to asylum and humanitarianism. Migration remains a divisive issue in European politics, but European governments must act promptly to support Afghans already residing in their territories alongside establishing robust international commitments.

Time for concrete action

European countries should firstly improve the treatment of those Afghans currently in limbo within their respective asylum systems by expediting pending Afghan asylum applications and family reunification cases, re-examining rejected asylum applications, and facilitating integration.

Secondly, national authorities should not return asylum seekers to Afghanistan or any third countries deemed ‘safe’. For Europe to coordinate evacuations from Afghanistan while simultaneously deporting asylum seekers undermines the international refugee regime and threaten Europe’s global credibility. 

The law as a tool for EU integration could be ending Expert comment NCapeling 15 October 2021

Poland is not the only EU member state challenging the supremacy of European law, as historic change is happening in how European integration functions.

The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling that several articles of the European treaties are incompatible with the Polish constitution is prompting much debate, especially in terms of both the similarities and differences between it and rulings by the German constitutional court which have also challenged the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Pro-Europeans are keen to draw a sharp distinction between the reasoning deployed by the two courts. They see the Polish court’s challenge as an exceptional case which the European Union (EU) cannot ‘tolerate’ because it would lead to the ‘demolition of the EU’s legal order from within’ and argue the EU must take a tough approach to Poland by re-asserting the supremacy of EU law.

But this view misses a bigger long-term shift in the EU. Both the German and Polish cases illustrate some of the basic conflicts within the EU’s legal system for decades. What is being challenged increasingly openly – even since the UK left the EU – is the idea of the EU as a de facto federation in which non-majoritarian institutions such as the ECJ have final say about the quality of democracy in member states.

ECJ’s quiet revolution

Historically ‘integration through law’ was central to the European project and the ECJ was a key institution driving forward integration – usually benefiting from what Erik Stein called ‘benign neglect by the powers that be and the mass media’. Even when European integration in the form of treaties stalled in the 1960s and 1970s, ‘judicial integration’ through the ECJ continued, including its notable 1964 decision that EU law was supreme.

This self-empowerment of the ECJ – what another scholar of European constitutionalism Joseph Weiler calls ‘a quiet revolution’ – was possible because there was a ‘permissive consensus’ in member states which allowed judicial integration to continue largely unchallenged. But this has now changed as both politicians and national courts are more willing to challenge what they see as judicial overreach.

There are important differences between the approach of the German and the Polish constitutional courts. The Law and Justice Party has politicized the Polish court, packing it with judges sympathetic to that party, whereas the German court is more independent.

In addition, whereas the German court made qualified and subdued objections to measures taken in response to the euro crisis during the past decade and, in particular, the steps towards the mutualization of eurozone debt – but often backed down with ‘all bark and no bite’ as Christoph Schmid put it – the Polish court is driven by political considerations and has challenged the supremacy of EU law in a more direct and general way.

However, the German court has made it clear it is the guardian of the German constitution and seeks to impose limits on the ECJ’s self-empowerment by arguing Europe is not a federation. According to the German court’s theory of ‘constitutional pluralism’, there is in effect a constant dialogue and accommodation between the national and EU level rather than a simple primacy of EU law over national law.

The court sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of whether steps in European integration are consistent with the German constitution, and is likely to challenge any further steps in fiscal integration even if the ECJ deems them in accordance with the treaties – as it did with the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme.

Supremacy of EU law is under pressure

Right across Europe, courts and politicians are increasingly challenging the ECJ and questioning the supremacy of EU law. Michel Barnier called for France to regain ‘legal sovereignty’ and should no longer be subject to the judgments of the ECJ – an extraordinary demand from the EU Brexit negotiator who regularly lectured the UK about the sanctity of the EU’s legal order.

Other possible French presidential candidates such as Valérie Pécresse and Eric Zemmour are also openly challenging the primacy of EU law. The UK, of course, is fighting its own battle with the EU about the ECJ’s role in the Northern Ireland Protocol.

It was not the current Polish government but the people of France and the Netherlands who blocked the attempt at explicit constitutionalisation of the EU in a referendum just one year after the 2004 enlargement. Whereas the Constitutional Treaty ‘would have codified the doctrine of EU legal supremacy’, that provision was dropped from its successor the Lisbon Treaty, again indicating consensus on EU legal supremacy is not as strong as is often claimed.

How do Eurasian kleptocracies earn and use their money? 9 November 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2021 Chatham House and Online

This event explores the presence of corrupt funds from Eurasia in Western democracies, what they are used for, and how they can be constrained.

The Pandora Papers once again shone the spotlight on the UK being home to corrupt funds from kleptocracies, where the ruling elite abuse their political power for private gain.

In recent years much focus has been placed on this term, and the possible effects such money could have on Western democracies.

• How do such states create this wealth in the first place?
• How do these funds make their way to the UK?
• Is the term kleptocracy appropriate for the majority of countries in Eurasia?
• What evidence is there that such funds are ‘weaponized’ to achieve foreign policy goals?

This event discusses the term, how it can be applied, and the differences between how ’grey’ funds are used by various countries. It also highlights how the UK and the wider international community can counteract these flows, both from a legal point of view, and via other methods.

Here we go again: Russia’s energy ‘diplomacy’ in Moldova Expert comment LJefferson 6 December 2021

The gas crisis shows that while the new Moldovan government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

In October, Moldova came under the spotlight when Russia, its primary provider of gas, slashed supplies by a third and refused to extend the existing contract.

The crisis was resolved at the end of October when Russia and Moldova signed a new contract, in which Moscow has used Moldova’s gas dependence to extract geopolitical concessions, weaken the new pro-western Chisinau government and drive a wedge between the EU and Moldova.

A chronic failure to reform

Moldova became a classic case of state capture when political elites – including nominally pro-European political elites – engaged in massive rent-extraction.

Up until 2020, when pro-reform forces came to power, Moldovan politics offered rapid route to riches for both the nominally pro-European parties and the pro-Russian Socialist Party; each was responsible for playing up ethnic and geopolitical cleavages in the country to mobilize votes and shore up legitimacy.

These predatory elites hollowed out Moldova economically and politically by a chronic failure to reform, in particular the energy sector which became a major source of rent.

However, this started to change when the pro-reform forces came to power as a result of the 2020 presidential and then 2021 parliament elections. The pro-reformist Maia Sandu defeated the incumbent president Igor Dodon (58 per cent to 42 per cent) in November of that year. And then her party got 58 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections which followed in July 2021.

Her Party of Action’s (PAS) winning formula was to focus on corruption and domestic reforms – rather than playing the ‘geopolitical’ card, a favourite strategy of their predecessors. As Sandu put it, the elections marked ‘the end of the reign of thieves in Moldova’.

A gas crisis is initiated  

Russia’s response to these results was to initiate a gas crisis. Up until the victory of the pro-reform forces, Russia had annually renewed a gas contract signed in 2007. However, in September 2021, Russia refused to renew the contract as it had done many times before and instead insisted on a new contract, which allowed Russia to create linkages between energy prices, debt settlement, a halt on energy market reforms and, it can be logically inferred, further integration with the EU.

Moldova’s national energy company, Moldovgaz, is 63.5 per cent de facto owned by Gazprom with the Moldovan government owning the remaining 35.5 per cent. (Moldova was forced to give Gazprom a controlling stake when faced with a cut in supplies in January 2006). It is therefore hardly surprising that no efforts were made to de-monopolise the sector and diversify energy supplies.

This lack of modernization can be explained by the somewhat surreal fact that in any negotiations and planning, Moldovagaz – majority owned by Gazprom – represents the Moldovan side in negotiations with Gazprom. So, when it came to signing of the new five-year contract in October 2021, Russia, through Gazprom, was able to institute a contract which made gas prices conditional on various geopolitical conditions.

It is noteworthy that Moldova’s original 2007 gas contract had been renewed annually despite the supposed accrual of debt. However, the very nature of this debt is suspect. While Moldova’s debt is said to be approximately $700 million, the debt of the much smaller breakaway Transnistria was around $7.3 billion.

The exact level and source of the debt remain murky. Russia appears to be making Moldova liable to repay at least some of Transnistria’s debt while only demanding the debt settlement with Moldova, but not with Transnistria.

High stakes for Moscow

Moreover, the contract is used to derail liberalisation of the energy market in line with EU’s energy market rules (through the so-called unbundling of supplies and distribution) which Moldova had committed itself to since the country joined the Energy Community in 2010.

Referring to ‘the non-application of forced reorganization and sanctions against Moldovagaz’, the new gas contract forces Moldova to postpone implementing the unbundling of supplies and distribution by making it conditional on resolving the energy debt.

Furthermore, Moldova ominously agreed to create an ‘intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation’ with Russia, which effectively blocks Moldova’s economic integration with the EU. (This demand is hardly new as Russia previously requested, and was granted, a seat at the negotiating table on a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine. The trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia negotiations have made it clear that Russia is seeking a veto over European integration of all neighbouring countries.)  

Targeting Moldova’s new reformist government reflects high personal stakes for Moscow. Moldova’s caretaker (kurator) in the Kremlin is Dimitrii Kozak, who in 2003 masterminded the so-called ‘Kozak Memorandum’. This sought to reintegrate breakaway Transnistria into a Moldova-Transnistria federation.

It was thwarted at the last minute but the Russian leadership has not given up on its plan. Now using his position as the deputy head of Presidential Administration, Kozak is masterminding Russia’s rehashed policy towards Moldova and has attempted to bring back his Memorandum as a political blueprint for a ‘settlement’.

Russia’s heavy-handed energy ‘diplomacy’

The new Moldovan government is caught in a crossfire of domestic expectations and Russian geopolitical demands. The gas crisis shows that while the new government may wish for geopolitics to go away, they are a weapon Russia will deploy at will.

The Moldovan government is brand new so it has relatively little experience of dealing with Russia’s heavy-handed ‘energy diplomacy’. But the EU has been on the receiving end of this before – this is a direct replica of Russia’s strategy toward Armenia and Ukraine – and neither ended well for the target countries or for the EU.

So, Russia’s plans for Moldova are likely to have similar consequences for the EU’s latest attempts to be a convincing foreign policy actor. 

Belarus-EU border crisis reveals wider security threat Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2021

By engineering a crisis at the Belarus border, Lukashenka is attempting to exacerbate vulnerabilities within the EU. Securitizing migration is not the answer.

When thousands of migrants began freezing to death in the forests on the Belarus border with Poland, Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka was forcing the European Union (EU) into a tough choice – either give in to blackmail and welcome migrants whose attempts to trespass the EU border were a result of his policy of luring them to Belarus to put pressure on the EU, or keep the borders closed and declare solidarity with Poland despite its known mistreatment and illegal pushbacks of potential asylum-seekers.

Lukashenka’s action was aptly exploiting three key pressure points of the EU – as a normative power where the human dignity of migrants is overlooked while the European border and coastguard agency Frontex stands by, as a geopolitical actor seeking to externalize its migration problem by signing readmission agreements with transit countries, and as a community of values with the EU-Poland dispute over rule of law.

His approach is typical ‘dictaplomacy’ and democracies which have confronted such a ‘continuation of war by other means’ in their past dealings with dictatorships know that blackmail mostly serves to divert attention away from a rogue leader’s misdemeanours towards his own population. But if this had been game of chess the EU would have been in check.

Thankfully checkmate was avoided – so far – as a compromise was found following weeks of heightened diplomatic efforts. Lukashenka was forced to back-pedal and take care of the migrants, and no humanitarian corridor was needed as the EU sent funds and took measures to support organizations providing shelter for the migrants in Belarus, while airlines and governments in the source countries were pressured to restrict flights to Minsk and started repatriating part of the migrants.

Causing a nuisance

‘Operation Gateway’ – the outline of which was allegedly drawn several years ago and tested by Russia in 2016 at its own borders with Norway and Finland – certainly caused a nuisance, but it ultimately backfired as Lukashenka now has to manage the remaining 2,000-5,000 migrants who refused to be flown back, as well as facing increased international sanctions. However, the fact that Angela Merkel had to personally call him made it look as if Lukashenka did not back down for nothing.

The EU and NATO, including the UK, only reacted collectively to this crisis once it was already out of hand, leaving questions over whether this experience of Lukashenka’s dictaplomacy is a wake-up call to boost resilience against rogue warfare, and to upgrade strategic assessments of the ‘Lukashenka problem’ too.

Back in June, the Belarus ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) announced its withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership and the visa facilitation and readmission agreement with the EU, while Lithuania sent early warnings about a ‘hybrid attack’ at its own border with Belarus. In August, Der Spiegel reported details of an alleged smuggling scheme whereby Tsentr Kurort – a company closely linked to the Administration of the President of Belarus with offices in the Middle East – was handling the shipping, accommodation, and relocation of migrants.

The smuggling of migrants was entirely predictable as Lukashenka has hinted many times Belarus could stop ‘protecting the EU from armed migrants’ seeking to enter it illegally. He has upped his rhetoric beyond notions of hybrid warfare by saying he needs Russian nuclear-capable bombers to ‘help him navigate the migrant crisis’, even hinting Belarus could station both Russian nuclear weapons and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. This shows Lukashenka is feeling increasingly cornered – which could lead to more unpredictable security crises.

Russia and Belarus are deepening relations

Although there is no smoking gun pointing to direct Russian involvement in orchestrating the hybrid attack at the EU’s borders, a new step in the military rapprochement between the two countries came when Putin and Lukashenka approved a new Military Doctrine of the Union-State of Russia and Belarus – a non-public document including a joint concept of migration policy. Lukashenka has also come off the fence over Crimea by openly accepting the legality of the peninsula’s integration with Russia.

Given Russia is also sabre-rattling over Ukraine, the risk of an accidental escalation into armed conflict is increasing in what feels like a return to classic Cold War logic, with the difference that the East is now offensively using the South for confronting the West. In recognition of the threat, the UK has joined the US, Canada, and the EU in the fresh sanctions on Belarus.

How European security is changing Expert comment LJefferson 10 January 2022

Although migration, economic, health, tech and climate policy are increasingly thought of in terms of security, different issues are taking place in each of these policy areas.

Since the end of the Cold War, debates about security among both academics and policymakers have shifted away from traditional military or state security towards a broader conception of what security is – including, for example, ideas such as ‘human security’.

More recently, there has been a widespread perception of a ‘return of great power competition’ and even renewed fears about great power war – in other words, a resurgence of traditional security debates that many hoped and believed were a thing of the past. At the same time, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, the concept of ‘security’ has also been increasingly applied to other areas like economic and health policies.

These complex and parallel developments raise a number of difficult questions. First, does the changing way in which the concept of ‘security’ is used – and in particular the way people now increasingly speak of ‘economic security’ and ‘health security’ – reflect a changing reality or rather simply a changing perception of reality? Second, are these changes in the way we think about security helpful or not? In other words, is the redefinition of security that seems to be taking place leading to good policy responses and making citizens more secure, or is it rather unhelpfully ‘securitizing’ policy areas and possibly undermining democracy in the process?

Part of the reason that these questions are difficult to answer is that there are different developments taking place in different policy areas. This article briefly analyses developments in five policy areas: migration policy, economic and trade policy, health policy, technology policy, and climate policy.

The authors argue there are at least three separate developments taking place, though it is often quite difficult to disentangle them – and more than one development may be taking place in each policy area. The analysis focuses on developments in Europe – defined broadly as including countries such as the UK which are outside the European Union (EU) – which may be different from those taking place elsewhere.

Five policy areas, three trends

In migration policy, the clearest development that is taking place, in particular since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, is the militarization of borders in Europe – in particular, the militarization of the EU’s external border.

The removal of borders within Europe was once seen by some as a step towards a borderless world, but since 2015 the EU seems to have concluded that the internal removal of borders requires a much harder external border than was previously the case.

In particular, since the ‘refugee crisis’, the EU has massively invested in Frontex, its border agency, which describes itself as ‘Europe’s first uniformed service’ that ‘helps guarantee free movement without internal borders checks that many of us take for granted’. In short, we are seeing an application to migration policy of military tools, including armed border guards.

Something different seems to be taking place in economic policy. For the last three or four decades since the end of the Cold War, economic policy has been dominated by (neo-)liberal assumptions. But these are now increasingly being challenged and a shift may be taking place away from this macroeconomic paradigm.

The reasons for this are complex – in part, a domestic backlash against this paradigm, particularly from the ‘losers’ or ‘left behind’ (in other words those who have suffered from the distributional consequences of the economic and especially trade policies of the last 30-40 years going back to the ‘neoliberal turn’), and in part a sense among analysts and policymakers that a different set of more protectionist policies are required in order to compete with China as a ‘systemic rival’.

These two different drivers of an economic paradigm shift have become even more tightly connected since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020. The pandemic led to both an increased demand for a new economic paradigm and a sense of intensified competition with China and, in the EU, to a lesser extent with the United States.

However, because the set of rules governing economic and in particular trade policy was set during the earlier period of (neo-)liberal hegemony, they restricted the ability of states to pursue what were seen as protectionist policies in order to redistribute and created exceptions only for security reasons. This has created a structural pressure on nation states to present economic policies in terms of security.

Here, however, the EU may be an outlier. During the last few decades, the EU has gone even further than the rest of the world has in creating rules around economic policy – at least internally. In particular, the EU’s fiscal rules may prevent its member states from borrowing to invest and its state aid rules may prevent them from experimenting with new kinds of industrial policy.

Therefore, the EU may be structurally constrained from making the kind of paradigm shift in economic policy that many now think is necessary. In particular, despite the rhetoric about a more ‘geopolitical’ EU, it may be limited in the extent to which it can think of economic policy in terms of security – sometimes to the regret of security establishments, as is the case for debates around 5G, for example.

In health policy, something similar may be happening as in economic policy. During the last three or four decades, health policy has been approached in a rather liberal way. Across Europe, though to different degrees and in different ways, market principles have been introduced into health systems.

In many cases such as the UK, this has involved privatizing what were previously state functions in healthcare. But since the pandemic, there has been a renewed focus on renationalizing or, in the case of the EU, ‘re-regionalizing’ supply chains, in particular for personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccines, which is presented in terms of ‘health security’. COVID-19 has also reinforced the need to better include pandemic preparedness in national security planning.

A similar trend seems to be taking place in technology policy, which as with health policy is now increasingly viewed in a defensive, protectionist way rather than the liberal way it was previously seen. For example, the production of semiconductors was previously viewed in economic liberal terms – in other words, they should be produced wherever they can be produced most efficiently.

But analysts and policymakers increasingly see technology as central to the competition between China and the United States – or even more broadly between authoritarian states and democracies. As in health policy, there is an increasing focus on a shared approach among allies and on the ‘resilience’ of supply chains for technology. A similar shift is taking place on the management of data flows and the need to think harder – and maybe, be less naive – about the security impact of our online life.

Finally, in climate policy, something different seems to be taking place. Here, there is neither an attempt to apply military tools (notwithstanding the fact some national European militaries as well as NATO are increasingly interested in climate security, for instance regarding the ability to train and fight in altered weather conditions, notably extreme heat) nor a paradigm shift away from liberalism – although some, especially on the left, do question whether it is possible to prevent catastrophic climate change unless we abandon economic liberalism and much of the debate about green investment is closely connected to debates about an economic paradigm shift.

Rather, what is striking is the increasing talk of a ‘climate emergency’ – with its implication of the need to suspend normal democratic decision-making – and of the need to take extraordinary measures to prevent catastrophic climate change. However, for the time being, such rhetoric on climate change is not matched by relevant extraordinary emergency measures.

Across these five policy areas, in other words, there seem to be at least three developments taking place that are reshaping how we think about security in Europe. The difficult question is whether each of these developments is a ‘good’ thing or not, i.e. whether they actually make European citizens more secure in an appropriate way.

In other words, is it a good idea to militarize the EU’s borders, to shift away from the earlier liberal paradigm in economic, health and technology policy and frame the shift in terms of ‘security’, or to invoke an emergency in order to be able to take more drastic measures to prevent climate change?

The limits of securitization theory

One way of thinking about these issues is what academics call ‘securitization’ – the situation when something is identified in rhetoric as an existential threat to some object, specifying a point of no return, that legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures and pushes the issue higher on the political and policy agenda.

The response to COVID-19 can be seen as an example of securitization – the existential threat to human beings but also healthcare systems was used to legitimize lockdowns and social distancing requirements.

The West must face down Putin The World Today MVieira 1 February 2022

If Russia’s ambitions are not checked, the implications will be global, warns James Nixey

After seven years of invasions, annexations, assassinations, abuses and now the current crisis in European security over the fate of Ukraine, one thing has been laid bare: the true nature of the Russian state.

Moscow made its ambition clear in mid-December with the unprecedented and public issuing of ultimatums in the form of draft treaty proposals.

Portrayed by Russia as an attempt to end Nato’s expansion eastwards, the Kremlin is in fact demanding that the United States and western institutions roll back their security guarantees to Eastern Europe. 

These are not two sides of the same coin if one believes and accepts the principles of the Helsinki Accords that the successor states to the Soviet Union are just as independent and sovereign as Russia.

Russia’s demands laid bare equate to giving it a free hand in Eastern Europe. This should not be reduced to simplistic labels such as ‘territorial expansionism’ or a ‘return to the Soviet Union’, both of which can be picked at for a lack of accuracy.

But it is, in Russia’s own words, the most explicit statement yet of its long-standing desire to return to a former age, where great powers directed their respective spheres of influence – a yearning for a time of empire and a disregard for the flow of history.

The intense diplomatic and media focus since then suggests there is a consensus that Russia has gone beyond being an awkward player at the negotiation table or a bully who can be dealt with further down the line.

But this has not as yet led to the operational conclusion that Russia must be challenged and ultimately faced down, no matter how unpalatable.

The logical response to the exposure of Russia’s true intentions would be an overhaul of western policy. Yet the West persists in its article of faith that dialogue with Russia will bring about a change in its behaviour – despite all evidence to the contrary. 

Western politicians have been anxious to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. But the Kremlin is likely to see this course of action as confirmation that it can proceed unchecked. When Moscow has chosen the path of conflict, efforts at dialogue rarely bring a peaceful resolution. 

Russia is blessed with particularly talented negotiators. While it has its fair share of angry ultra-nationalists who are easily dismissed, it also has more subtle brains at official and unofficial levels with whom western politicians are eager to engage to claim morsels of intelligence or to show that the Kremlin is not beyond redemption.

Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, is an intelligent and experienced man, who is adept at dismissing the protests of most of his western counterparts. In such circumstances, and with such a pressing need to avoid a war, dialogue must be tightly contained as it has the potential to lead to compromise in areas where there should be none.

Russia’s ambitions for a land empire

Eastern European states which were part of the Soviet Union or signatories to the Warsaw Pact are geographically closer to Russia and as a result more physically at risk. But their history and close relations with Moscow in the past have allowed them to acquire experience and expertise in dealing with their more powerful neighbour.

They uphold principled stances on sovereign rights, which has led the Kremlin to brand the Baltic states, Ukraine and more recently Moldova as traitors. To the West, on the other hand, they can often be seen as awkward or getting in the way.

While the sandwiched eastern states may have much to teach us about dealing with Russia, some central European countries have a closer relationship with Moscow. Serbia’s security services have recently been exposed as being under the influence of Russia’s own FSB, the Federal Security Service, successor to the KGB, and have colluded in repressing Moscow’s political opponents. At the same time, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary continues to defy the European Union with its repressions and is one of the few states that looks to Russia as a model. 

What is at stake here is a basic grasp of the nature of relations between states in the 21st century. What Russia is insisting on is its right to a land empire which is entirely at odds with the principles of statehood that now govern Europe, and indeed much of the rest of the world.

By failing to address the real nature of Russia’s demands, Europe is avoiding critical decisions that will affect its future security for generations to come. The implications of that avoidance do not only affect Europe – they are global in importance. 

Other powers, most notably China, will watch closely how the West responds to Russia and gauge its willingness to support allies, friends and partners against aggression.

Any failure to respond firmly to Russia’s approach of demanding limits on the sovereignty of its neighbours, backed by the threat of military force, can only encourage similar strong-arm tactics elsewhere. It is notable that, from Chechnya to Syria, Russia has not yet suffered an unambiguous defeat when it has asserted its ambitions through military power. 

Resolving the incompatibility between the way Russia sees itself and what the rest of Europe views as the acceptable limits of Russian power will be a long, painful process. Facing down Russia will take skill, time, spine, money, grit and self-sacrifice. Sanctions, for example, hurt those imposing them as well as the receiver. These are attributes in short supply in what Russia considers to be the weak, decadent West. 

Since such resources are unlikely to be found, the unappetizing future for relations is most likely to involve Russia continuing to chip away at European sovereignty while its own structural flaws further weaken it to the point of irrelevance, or to push it to take ever more extreme risks.

Review: Islam's role in shaping Europe The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 1 February 2022

Maryyum Mehmood on a work that recasts the role of Muslim minorities

Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe
Emily Greble, Oxford University Press, £26.99

When discussing the historical role of Muslims in Europe, most authors focus on Muslims in the western part of the continent, many of whom arrived as immigrant settlers from Muslim-majority nations. As a result, Muslims are easily identifiable as a foreign ‘other’. 

Emily Greble takes a different trajectory. In Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe, Greble centres her analysis on south-eastern European Muslims who are native to the region and, despite this fact, have still been subject to continuous stigmatization. 

In light of the present-day political tensions and targeted attacks on Muslims in Bosnia, which has seen inter-ethnic and religious hostility at its worst in 30 years, Greble’s nuanced retelling of the region’s social and political landscape has renewed urgency. Her work serves as a refreshing intervention to the literature on various fronts. It subverts stereotypical assumptions promulgated by the ‘Eastern Question’, whereby Muslims are portrayed as a simple ethnic minority living under colonial rule. Instead, Greble shows how they are a marginalized indigenous group that is by no means a monolithic, homogeneous entity. 

By uncovering the history of the region through the lens of Muslims, Greble highlights their capabilities as agents of change. Muslims were not just passive subjects but active citizens whose engagement was vital in the framing of social norms, political, ethical and legislative structures. 

Greble’s neatly crafted thesis serves as a counterpunch to a decades-long clash-of-civilizations discourse, which pits Muslims of the region as Ottoman outsiders to be scapegoated as and when deemed necessary. 

The author offers a proposition that while secularism was the overarching aim of the new European state-project, the role of religion, especially marginalized or ‘othered’ religious communities cannot be overlooked or relegated to a simple ‘minority’ issue. 

This argument is laid out in three historical parts, beginning with the post-Ottoman transition of power (1878-1921), to the Yugoslav nation-building project (1918-1941) and finally to the political overhaul in a post-Second World War Europe (1941-1949).

Most historical analyses of the region focus on state actions towards Muslim minorities. Greble points out that such an approach is lacking because it is riddled with institutional biases from the very sources and methods used to understand them. 

Instead, the author takes Muslims, their lived realities and agency as her starting point and effectively manages to avoid such pitfalls.

What is most remarkable about this book is Greble’s self-reflective approach to confronting such a sensitive topic with great care.

Almost every chapter begins with an insightful and deeply personal historical account from a Muslim from the region which sets the scene for Greble’s assessment of key social, political and legal struggles.

With an enriching methodology, Greble explores the topic through first and second-hand accounts of how Muslims manoeuvred in both the secular realm and within religious spaces, such as madrasas (Islamic seminaries), waqfs (local community funds), muftis and ulemas (religious scholar), and the shariah courts. As a result, the reader is shown how Muslims affected change and steered the trajectory of constitutional democracies in Europe at key historical junctures. 

By taking this lens, Greble does not just offer another retelling of the significance of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, which enabled the demarcation of new territorial boundaries in a post-Ottoman world, but also conveys the story of how Muslims contributed to the emerging narratives around citizenship. 

Crucially, we are exposed to Muslim leadership as more than just a docile, homogenous grouping, but a defining entity that shaped the European citizenship project by refashioning both imperial secular norms, as well as Islamic jurisprudential rulings to suit their unique context, as opposed to a remnant of bygone Ottoman rule. 

A fundamental difference that sets this book apart from other contemporary work on the topic is that the author brings forth multiple intra-faith complexities found within Muslim groups of the region, from revivalist to reformists, and all else in between. The fluctuating relationship between the traditionalist ulema, muftis and qadis (religious scholars, clergy and judges) and the secular state powers is intricately captured across most chapters in this book. 

At times, the ulema would be seen to bandy with the state to acculturate Muslims to the emerging polities of the region. As Greble shows, muftis in 1914 travelled across southern Serbia giving dawah (missionary work) to locals to encourage them to support the Serbian state. Similarly, qadis in Montenegro in 1902 reassured local Muslims that by following the law of the land, they would be guaranteed their ‘shariah rights’, which were loosely defined by the Muslim clergy. 

This created a paradox for the states: the role of nation-building and liberalizing orthodox religious communities was given to conservative clerics who, in turn, were gatekeepers setting the boundaries and thus interpreted and applied Islam to preserve their position of power. The consequences were twofold. As Greble suggests, ‘instead of becoming more tied to secular structures of state and society – through centralized law, conscription, political representation – Muslims in formerly Ottoman lands were becoming more deeply bound to Islam’. 

Simultaneously, the rhetoric used further embedded Muslims firmly as a minority. 

Ironically in contrast, it was the liberal reformist thinkers who, sometimes, stood in opposition to the state regimes. Such internal divisions within Muslim spaces became more overtly discernible under communist rule, wherein members of the same Muslim community fought in different camps. 

For instance, the author notes how some were aligned with the communist regime, while others were fighting with the allied forces and many were still backing revivalist Islamic groups. In light of this, what is perhaps most intriguing is how the communist takeover in 1945 managed to tear down any seemingly progressive movement that benefited the region’s Muslims. And it brought them back to square one, with the scrapping of shariah law and the removal of a mufti-led judiciary. Such crackdowns caused greater frenzy among the region’s Muslims and led to resistance movements in the form of activism and insurgencies. 

Ultimately, the author offers a complex perspective not only of Balkan Muslims and their lived experiences, but also, the implications of this upon wider society and the states themselves.

Greble’s remapping of the historical underpinnings of the tale of Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe is not just a clear example of how Muslims are not a foreign entity to the region, but a call to overturn the entrenched Great Replacement theory which uses this foreign ‘othering’ to further prejudice and calls for the ousting of Muslims and other minorities from Europe, a land which has forever been their home.
 

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Limited expectations as Scholz heads to Kyiv and Moscow Expert comment NCapeling 14 February 2022

After heavy criticism for an initially timid response, the approach of Germany’s new government to the Ukraine crisis is improving as its position on Russia evolves.

Olaf Scholz is a famously quiet and cautious communicator and, as concerns mounted in Washington and London about the possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the new German chancellor remained silent.

This time his silence reflected the fact that his government was unprepared for its first major foreign policy test, with marked divisions between the SPD and the Greens on how to manage a rapidly deteriorating relationship with Russia.

When he did speak, Scholz caused dismay in several NATO capitals by defending the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline. He called it ‘a purely private economic project’ even though the company building the pipeline is a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned Gazprom.

The absence of crisis management from Berlin was a stark reminder of the gap left by Angela Merkel. Her knowledge of Russia and Ukraine, and her personal experience of dealing with Vladimir Putin, were key assets in 2014 in developing a unified western response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine.

Germany has coordinated with its allies

Scholz has prepared the ground carefully for his visits to Kyiv and Moscow, extensively coordinating with NATO allies, such as France and Poland – as part of the Weimar Triangle – and the three Baltic states. His inaugural visit to Washington helped align positions on US-EU efforts to develop an economic deterrent against further Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Scholz has also repeated Merkel’s language from 2014 to signal to Moscow that Germany and its partners are ‘united and determined’ to stand their ground. And he has spoken of Germany’s continuing double strategy of ‘clear announcements’ to Moscow of the price it would pay for further aggression accompanied by a readiness to use all possible channels of dialogue to preserve peace.

The continuation of Germany’s established policy will not surprise Moscow. But under the surface Germany’s discourse on Russia is evolving as the political class internalizes the fact that the current Russian leadership is openly threatening to use military force to impose its will on Ukraine and re-configure Europe’s security arrangements.

Despite deep concerns about Germany’s dependence on Russian gas – more than half of the gas it consumes comes from Russia – there is broad acceptance that Nord Stream 2 cannot go ahead if Russia invades Ukraine. But typically, Scholz has not yet said as much publicly, limiting himself to stating ‘all options are on the table.’

Robert Habeck, Germany’s vice-chancellor as well as economic affairs and climate action minister, says the ‘geopolitical situation’ requires Germany to diversify its gas supplies and infrastructure for importing gas. For years, a strong pro-Russian gas lobby has dominated the thinking of the Economics Ministry and one consequence is the complete absence of facilities to import liquefied natural gas.

The German debate on Russia is shifting

A public debate has also started about weapons deliveries to Ukraine, even though this runs counter to deeply embedded pacifist tendencies in German society. Some MPs, former diplomats, and experts have begun to make the case for Germany to supply weapons to Ukraine so it can exercise its right to self-defence and deter military attack.

Christoph Heusgen, a former long-standing foreign policy adviser in the Federal Chancellery, says Berlin’s decision not to deliver arms to Ukraine to avoid endangering the Minsk peace process requires revision now Moscow has abandoned the path of negotiation.

Despite its mantra that there is no alternative to the Minsk Agreements, Berlin now admits these currently offer no prospect of resolving the war in Donbas because Russia is not prepared to implement them properly.

Other taboos are also being broken inside Germany. Heavyweight left-of-centre Die Zeit published the first results of its investigation into the SPD’s links with Russia and their place in Russia’s channels of influence in Germany. And even the SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel, an outspoken champion of Nord Stream 2 during his time as a government minister, has raised the question of Germany terminating energy imports from Russia if there is a drastic deterioration of the security situation.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Ukraine crisis could trigger cascading risks globally Expert comment NCapeling 16 March 2022

The effects on the wider world from the Ukraine invasion go far beyond the waves of shock and horror being felt from this escalating conflict.

Russia and Ukraine rank 11th and 55th respectively in terms of their national economies but, for the global supply of critical resources such as energy, food, and minerals, these two countries together are far bigger hitters – and both the threat and reality of resource flows from them being reduced have already driven up global prices.

The world is already facing a cost-of-living squeeze coming out of the COVID-19 pandemic, so further price spikes or supply constraints have the potential to seriously undermine food and energy security, equitable access to basic goods and services, and social stability around the world – which can then potentially create systemic risks for economies and societies.

The global implications of the Ukraine conflict are only just beginning to be explored fully but the immediate impacts of the crisis on global markets are already well-documented. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, energy prices spiked, triggering further fertilizer price rises – as fertilizer production is highly energy intensive – which in turn is contributing to food price rises because fertilizer costs are an important factor in food production.

Interruptions to shipping in the region around Ukraine – as well as globally – have impeded the flow of goods which pushed prices up even further, while economic sanctions on cross-border flows of goods and finance are further adding to market pressures. But this is just the start – these impacts will bring ripple effects which propagate far beyond their point of origin, known as ‘cascading risks’.

Risk is a combination of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability – in terms of the Ukraine invasion, the hazard is the conflict and its immediate impacts on the societies and economies of Ukraine and Russia, while exposure relates to the degree to which other countries are likely to be affected depending on how much they are integrated into the global economy or the ‘just in time’ nature of their supply chains.

Vulnerability relates to a society’s capacity to mitigate the harmful impacts of the conflict, such as controlling borders, sourcing alternative goods from suppliers, or protecting against price or supply shocks.

Risk cascades – the second- and third-order impacts of the original hazard and of responses to that hazard – can interact across sectoral boundaries – as with energy and food, for example – and their compound effect can lead to overall systemic risks for society.

Anticipating this potential is essential to understanding the nature and scale of the global ramifications being felt from the Ukraine conflict. Recent work in the UK to assess levels of cascading risks resulting from a changing climate – the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment – provides a valuable framework for thinking about this area.

It examines key pathways for risk to cascade through global systems – when applied to the situation in Ukraine, these pathways and their interactions offer an indication of the scale of crisis that citizens face far beyond Ukraine’s and Russia’s borders.

Interruptions to the flows of goods and energy

In globalized trade networks, localized disruption to supply chains rapidly yields widespread international impacts – of particular concern is the immediate supply of food because most countries rely on lean supply chains and some may only have a few days food within their own borders.

Experience from previous food price crises indicate even small interruptions to trade can result in runs on the market and rapid price inflation. In the case of this conflict, the trade interruption will be far from small because, between them, Russia and Ukraine export around one-quarter of all traded wheat, more than three-quarters of traded sunflower oil, and one-sixth of traded maize.

Energy markets are also a concern because many countries use more energy than they produce and therefore rely on imports of energy or fuel for domestic use. Russia produces around ten per cent of the world’s commercial energy with a concentration of sales in major regions such as the European Union (EU) and China.

As with food, a shortfall in energy provision leads to market runs and rapid inflation as actors compete in a tightening space, while poorly designed policy interventions by nations trying to ensure their own security add further pressure to global supply and worsen price rises. In addition, the closely interconnected nature of energy markets means disruption to one fuel – such as gas in this case – affects global prices for other forms of energy.

The impact of moving people and money

As the last decade richly illustrates, the cross-border flows of people impact those societies absorbing them – for example, contributing to a rise in nationalism – as well as increase the costs of supplying essential resources. Given many people are understandably fleeing this conflict, other countries may struggle to cope as the cost-of-living crisis and urgent efforts to bolster national security infrastructure may squeeze available public funds.

Financial flows are crucial to the functioning of global economies, whether for inward investment or insurance and – as Russian citizens may be about to discover – restricting the global flow of money has a serious impact on households. Beyond Russia, the outflow of money from major financial centres such as London to meet insurance claims or to enable infrastructure reinvestment post-conflict may also have severe knock-on economic impacts.

The impact on governance and health

The global spikes in energy and food prices resulting from these supply chain disruptions will see many countries struggle with rising food and energy insecurity as well as increased inequality. Taken together these conditions create many issues beyond immigration pressures and the associated politics, including increased inequality and civil unrest.

This potentially destabilizes governments which has consequences for the stability of an entire region such as interrupted supply chains, the need to deploy peacekeeping forces, or significant flows of aid – all with global consequences far beyond the countries in question.

Populations may suffer mental health impacts arising from the Ukraine invasion, whether from the trauma of being forced to leave home to escape conflict, anxiety for the wellbeing and safety of families and friends caught up in it, or a more general anxiety arising from the perception of living in an unstable world.

Ukraine exposes Europe’s double standards for refugees Expert comment NCapeling 30 March 2022

As European governments provide swift protection assurances to those fleeing Ukraine, non-European asylum-seekers continue to face violence at the EU’s borders.

One month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) already faces its largest refugee crisis since World War Two, with more than ten million people having fled their homes – 6.5 million displaced within Ukraine and 3.9 million escaping to neighbouring countries.

Acting quickly and decisively, European governments have opened borders and European citizens have opened their homes in an unprecedented showing of solidarity towards refugees. But, with all eyes on Ukraine, the Greek coastguard continues to illegally push back asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey while Spanish police forcefully repel those who dare to jump the fence in Melilla.

The painful contrast exposes the double standards in the EU’s approach to refugees. With Europe’s grim history of restrictive asylum policies, it is wishful thinking that the warm welcome to Ukrainians will extend to all asylum-seekers. The EU solidarity to displaced Ukrainians illustrates the deeply politicized – and often discriminatory – nature of providing refugee protection.

However, the hope is this turning point in European history can at least set an important precedent for treating refugees more humanely. Undoubtedly, EU solidarity towards people fleeing the horrors of Putin’s war is critically important and the initial response is positive in its efforts to meet immense humanitarian needs.

Solidarity with Ukrainians

The EU activation of the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is a significant step towards a more humane protection regime and fairer responsibility-sharing among member states. Without the need for the examination of individual applications, those fleeing Ukraine can access harmonized rights across the EU for three years – including residence, housing, medical assistance, and access to the labour market and education.

The TPD is also a move away from the strict ‘Dublin’ rules which put the pressure of hosting refugees onto the countries of ‘first arrival’. Ironically, the fiercest opponents of intra-EU solidarity, such as Poland and Hungary, are the ones benefiting from this change now but, in the case of Ukraine, geographical proximity and shared histories must be considered when analysing Europe’s response.

Eastern European and Baltic countries share a post-Soviet history and fear of Russian aggression, and Ukrainians already enjoyed 90 days of visa-free travel in the EU – with a large diaspora, many have established networks across Europe. But even considering these distinctive connections with Ukrainian displacement, the initial response still shows that European countries have both the political will and the capacity to host refugees.

Unlike the usual – often media-fuelled – narratives of refugee ‘invasions’ into Europe, the waves of women and children leaving Ukraine prompted a surge of humanitarian action but they are also a chilling reality check of Europe’s double standards.

The EU has used agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya to prevent arrivals and outsource asylum responsibilities, while border violence, detention, and lengthy asylum procedures await the few asylum seekers who manage to enter Europe from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

These ‘fortress Europe’ legacies have even undercut the humanitarian response in Ukraine, with reports of incidents of discrimination towards people of colour at the EU borders being condemned by the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU), the media facing allegations of racist reporting, and comments from Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov providing a stark reminder of the islamophobia, racism, and history of colonization which still pervades European asylum policies.

Foreign policy also influences how EU leaders treat the right to asylum, as the geopolitics of Europe’s efforts to create a united front against Russian aggression is an undercurrent to the prompt European response to Ukrainians. But only a few months ago, non-European asylum-seekers trapped in freezing forests at the Poland-Belarus border were used as political pawns by Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka and then dehumanised as a ‘hybrid attack’ by EU leaders.

A turning point for asylum in Europe?

Despite entrenched discriminatory precedents, it is worth looking ahead at this moment of reckoning. Although policy changes remain far off, the unity shown over Ukraine can help reshape and refocus political efforts towards increased responsibility-sharing among EU member states – the perennial ‘hot potato’ of the EU asylum system.

War on Ukraine: Exploring the humanitarian response to the conflict 12 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

This event explores the implications of the humanitarian realities from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the largest ground campaign in Europe since World War Two.

Reports from humanitarian organizations working in Ukraine are dire and reveal that a humanitarian disaster on an epic scale is unfolding.

The United Nations (UN) and other organizations estimate 12 million of Ukraine’s population are in need of assistance, 4.1 million have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and 6.4 million have become internally displaced.

Gillian Triggs, the assistant secretary-general and assistant high commissioner for protection at the UNHCR, joins other experts to discuss the humanitarian situation in Ukraine.

The panel considers:

• What are the greatest needs in Ukraine now?
• How can aid agencies meet those needs?
• What are the short and long-term implications of the crisis for Ukraine and Europe?
• How do international organizations work with local NGOs to provide food, medical aid and shelter?

This event is part of a regular series of events offering insight and analysis from experts and policymakers on how the war is affecting Ukraine, the region and the world.

This event is part of Chatham House’s ongoing work on the future of conflict.

Read the transcript

New research on 21st-century conflict 25 April 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 April 2022 Online

This International Affairs webinar shares research on US special operations, urban warfare, and digital activism in recent conflicts.

Given the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, and continuing conflicts in Myanmar, Yemen, and other countries, it is important to understand the changing nature of conflict in the 21st century.

In this webinar, authors from the March 2022 issue of International Affairs share research on the transformation of Western special forces, the impact of army size in urban warfare, and the use of social media and online activism in war.

The speakers in this event drew on the following research:

• US Special Forces transformation: post-Fordism and the limits of networked warfare (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab213)
• Urban insurgency in the twenty-first century: smaller militaries and increased conflict in cities (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac007)
• Diasporas as cyberwarriors: infopolitics, participatory warfare and the 2020 Karabakh war (https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac015)

International Affairs was started at Chatham House in 1922 to communicate research to members who could not attend in person. Over the past 100 years, it has transformed into a journal that publishes academically rigorous and policy-relevant research. It is published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Read the latest issue here.

Putin’s Eurasian dream may soon become a nightmare Expert comment NCapeling 3 May 2022

The Ukraine invasion has detrimental consequences for the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, a project which has been stumbling since its inception.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – consisting of Russia with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan – represents the culmination of Russia’s pursuit of regional integration with its post-Soviet neighbours.

Officially, the Union has an ambitious economic goal – the creation of a market based on common rules for its five member states and their 180 million citizens – and Russia likes to portray the EAEU as an Eurasian replica of the European Union (EU).

But although a common market was placed at the heart of the EAEU as a way to appeal to member states, it is of marginal importance for the Russian economy. For Moscow, the EAEU is primarily a geopolitical tool to help re-assert its regional and global role.

In a world of evermore powerful trading blocs, Moscow wants to use the EAEU to establish its own economic power base in the new polycentric world order. But Russia’s limited interest in the technocratic intricacies needed for the economic union to live up to its lofty proclamations exposes the real geopolitical ambitions.

The Kremlin has no qualms about disregarding the common rules when they clash with Russia’s own foreign policy, and it soon became evident the EAEU was a means to an end rather than an equitable institution within which Russia would accept constraints on its unilateral behaviour.

A crisis in the making

Although the EAEU has enabled some internal trade liberalization as well as the movement of people and labour to the benefit of its members reliant on labour migrant remittances, it has failed to tackle institutional barriers or promote growth and development policies.

It has been hampered by weak common institutions and a lack of institutional capacity of its member states, while Russia’s dubious commitment is also problematic. The EAEU lacks the institutional features of a genuine common market and any attempts to address these shortcomings have been essentially empty promises.

EAEU membership does benefit the political elites of its member states, because its hub-and-spoke model relies on bilateral high-level political deals between Russia and each member state individually. And by using the enticement of security guarantees and both political and financial support, Moscow has succeeded in attracting new members to join.

But a member’s political survival – or defence against political and economic reform – is dependent on military, economic, financial, and political support from Russia. This has been evidenced by the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, and by Russia’s backing of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and the Tokayev government in Kazakhstan.

The design of the EAEU ties it to Russia’s own fate, and so the impact of harsh sanctions imposed on Russia for invading Ukraine are in stark evidence across its member states. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are reeling from the adverse effects on their domestic currencies and remittances, and the trade bans of key commodities.

And although the ban Russia imposed on grain export to EAEU members has softened, it shows the extent to which Russia was prepared to disregard the rules and sacrifice the EAEU to rescue its own economy. Members are incurring direct economic losses from Putin’s war against Ukraine and the fluctuation of the rouble has created a major impediment to trade with Russia.

Russia seems to increasingly view the Union as a convenient tool to bypass sanctions, with massive implications for its partner countries. And the supposed advantages of EAEU membership – enhanced trade, growth, and modernization – have simply not materialized.

Due to the rapid economic decline of Russia – a fall of 10-15 per cent is anticipated for 2022 – the EAEU is even less likely to deliver the promised economic benefits, while also putting members at risk of secondary sanctions.

The Ukraine invasion has also reignited domestic sensitivities and regional tensions. In Kazakhstan, Tokayev has failed to endorse Russia’s justification for the invasion and refuses to recognize the ‘independence’ of the separatist LNR and DNR.

Meanwhile Azerbaijan has pursued territorial gains in Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is distracted by its invasion of Ukraine, and has requested the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping from the disputed territory.

Russia is keen for partner countries to help mitigate the economic impact of sanctions by providing alternative transit routes for imports to Russia. But the EAEU faces challenges even at its most basic level because the sharing of custom duties among member states was denominated in dollars, which Russia now wants to move away from.

No easy escape

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly reduces the benefits of Eurasian integration even further than before and imposes higher cost on the partner countries than were envisaged when they joined. They have been dragged into a geopolitical calamity over which they have no control – the inability of EAEU institutions to mediate or constrain Russia’s behaviour is stark.

War in Ukraine: Can the EU survive without Russian oil and gas? Audio NCapeling 5 May 2022

The fourth episode of our podcast mini-series examines how reliant the European Union (EU) is on Russian energy.

What would an all-out ban on Russian oil look like? Which countries would be most affected? Does this offer an opportunity for renewable energy?

Clips used: Bloomberg News

This episode was produced by Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.

Africa and Europe: Cooperation on digital transitions and new technologies 26 May 2022 — 8:00AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 May 2022 Online

The 11th Africa Day International Conference takes place under the auspices of the president of the Republic of Slovenia, HE Mr Borut Pahor, and within the framework of the Bled Strategic Forum.

Slovenia’s annual high-level Africa event seeks to improve policy outcomes for citizens in Europe and Africa as a result of a mutual understanding and strengthened cooperation between the two regions.

The event is co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, the Chatham House Africa Programme and the European Commission.

Expert discussions at this year’s edition will examine collaborative links between Africa and Europe in promoting responsible innovation and governance of emerging technologies, as well as the role of technology in shaping creative and cultural economies.

The conference will be broadcast live on this website, on the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Review: One-man bandwagons The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

The ills of strongman politics are diagnosed sharply in this accessible overview – but a cure is nowhere to be found, says Natasha Lindstaedt

The Age of the Strongman: How the Cult of the Leader Threatens Democracy around the World
Gideon Rachman, Bodley Head, £20.00

For anyone reading the headlines, it should come as no surprise that democracy has regressed to where it was in 1989. The profound geopolitical and technological changes in the post-Cold World era have led to chaos, polarization, nationalist backlash and nostalgia for strong leadership in democracies. 

Countries such as Russia and China have provided a new model for leadership that has become frighteningly infectious – the strongman. 

Gideon Rachman charts this new era, offering an accessible overview of 14 examples, including Britain’s Boris Johnson, Donald Trump of the United States, Narendra Modi of India, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Viktor Orbán of Hungary, Xi Jinping of China and – the archetype – Vladmir Putin of Russia.

The idea that we are living in the age of strongman politics is not particularly novel. Scholars of authoritarian politics have noted for years that there has been a steady rise in ‘personalist’ dictatorship and personalism in democracy in general. Nearly 40 per cent of all dictatorships are personalist, meaning domination by a single person, compared with 23 per cent in 1988. Autocracies have become increasingly aggressive, using sharp power to undermine democracy, which signals a shift. 

Autocracies used to focus on their own stability and didn’t interfere with democracies.

Rachman focuses on this threat that the strongman poses to democracy while macho one-man rule spreads across the globe. He provides a well-written, clear overview of why each leader fits the strongman label, what explains their appeal and what informs their worldview. 

Where Rachman is effective is in weaving together the commonalities of these strongmen – and they are all men – and their relationship to each other. Despite their ultra-nationalism, they have created an unofficial, multilateral network of mutual support. This includes leaders whose religious convictions may appear to be in conflict – such as Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Muhammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. 

This is not just a network of dictators – autocratic-style leaders of democratic countries have been welcomed to the club. In this system, strongmen openly admire each other, revel in their disdain for liberalism and human rights, and share advice and inspiration. 

This contrasts with western European leaders who fail to build such iron-clad bonds.

Each chapter is peppered with anecdotes about Rachman’s first-hand impressions of some of these leaders and other notables in positions of power gained from his decades as a foreign correspondent and analyst. His colourful commentary complements his understanding of how they operate. 

A common theme throughout is that the strongman’s appeal appears as a breath of fresh air for democracy, liberalism or peace. They are often labelled as anti-elitist and men of the people. This honeymoon period ends when each leader shows their true colours: attacking political opponents, sometimes in ruthless purges, disregarding the rule of law, weakening the courts and vilifying or controlling the media. 

A well-placed quote from Recep Erdogan sums this up: ‘Democracy is like a tram you ride until you arrive at your destination.’

Genuine public support exists for these manoeuvres. Dislocation from unmanaged globalization and economic crises has created an audience for political entrepreneurs. Strongman leaders have earned the distinction of being relatable and telling it like it is, despite many being considered to be liars and often filthy rich. 

Their ability to tap into people’s fears of the West, crime, immigrants or other ethnic and religious groups has helped gain them a fiercely loyal following. According to Rachman, strongman politics is linked to fear that a majority group that was once dominant is being threatened – something leaders such as Donald Trump have astutely tapped into.

Unlike some of the kleptocratic regimes of the 1970s and 1980s that were the embodiment of venal opportunists – think of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Mobutu of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Jean-Claude Duvalier of Haiti – the strongmen of today have been inspired by the ideology of hyper-nationalism and anti-liberalism. 

Rachman links strongmen to the work of Carl Schmitt, a Nazi Party member, who was a vociferous critic of parliamentary democracy and cosmopolitanism, while touting the importance of illiberal norms to exercise power. Rachman argues that we are in a war of ideas, with liberalism under attack. He hones in on the perennial target George Soros, and how his support for liberal democracy has garnered the unwanted attention from the world’s right-wing ideologues and strongmen.

Social media has been usurped by these leaders and their regimes to forge closer, direct relationships with their supporters, to churn out fake news and create dangerous echo chambers. They are snake oil salesmen, making huge promises but offering very little in practice. They are never as they initially appear, and their images are carefully crafted.

Another theme emerges on the career pathway. Many served as a mayor of a cosmopolitan city. An interesting chapter on Johnson explains how he comes across like a relatable ‘good chap’, being able to handle embarrassing photo-ops. He was also a devoted Europhile, attended Eton and Oxford, and championed multi-culturalism as Mayor of London. Always the opportunist, Johnson had few qualms about campaigning for Brexit, and then later breaking the law to make it happen.

Yet there are some gaps in Rachman’s analysis.

It is never made clear why leaders such as Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and Kim Jong-un of North Korea are largely missing, or a number of other strongman dictators in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Though there is a chapter devoted to Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, along with a few paragraphs devoted to Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Meles Zenawi also of Ethiopia, Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and Jacob Zuma of South Africa, the chapter on African strongmen does not acknowledge that this is the only continent where the regional trend is not as depressing. 

Rachman only occasionally engages with data on dictatorships to verify some of the patterns that he explores in the book. And his work would benefit from an examination of the institutional factors that may explain the rise of strongman politics, such as the pre-existing weakness of parties, parliaments and courts. 

Nor does he go in depth into how strongmen interact with their institutions and what the implications of this brand of politics are for conflict and development. The failures of strongmen to address Covid-19 are mentioned, but it is never explained why they may be so poorly equipped to govern. 

So, is democracy dead? Though Rachman is largely pessimistic, he acknowledges that politics tends to go in waves. There is little advice about how the West can expedite the end of this particular wave. 

The one positive Rachman offers is that strongman rule cannot deal with succession. This is largely true, though handovers have taken place, such as with the Kim dynasty. 

But there are definitely more questions raised than answers provided. What is left after strongmen are no longer in power? What must democracies do to undermine strongmen or prevent their rise? Where will the next strongman appear? 

Rachman’s book doesn’t provide these answers, but he does offer an interesting overview of the leaders dominating the headlines.
 

Reshaping NATO for an uncertain future The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

A Chatham House expert panel outlines the challenges for delegates at the Madrid summit where the roadmap for the transatlantic alliance will be created

This year had already been earmarked as pivotal for the shape and direction of European security even before Russia, a nuclear superpower, rolled its tanks into Ukraine.

On the agenda at the NATO summit in Madrid in June is the Strategic Concept, which sets out the alliance’s direction and priorities for the next decade. There is much to discuss. From shared values to the state of the security environment, the Strategic Concept will have a direct impact on the global security landscape.

Ten years ago, the world was a very different place. The United States had just withdrawn from its bloody war in Iraq and was still embroiled in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban. In China, Xi Jinping was poised to become the next president, while refugees escaping the vicious civil war in Syria were heading towards Europe. In Africa, Islamist activity in Mali was about to spread throughout the Sahel.

Now, Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine rages on NATO’s doorstep, spurring the once neutral countries of Sweden and Finland to seek membership. How will Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine affect the western security agenda and what will be the shape of the new NATO that emerges from these talks?  To help answer these questions, The World Today convened a panel of Chatham House experts to consider what the next 10 years holds for NATO.

Here is what they said.

Alice Billon-Galland
We shouldn’t expect a revolution, but more an adaptation of reforms that have taken place at NATO for quite a long time, especially since the Wales summit in 2014. NATO allies will have to decide on the Russian threat perception and decide how they want to reinforce their deterrence and defence posture in the East, and how this affects their ability to maintain a 360-degree approach and to carry out the ambitious NATO 2030 agenda.

Patricia Lewis
We need to understand how deterrence works far better and we should have better metrics by now. Russia and NATO do not wish to engage in conventional warfare with each other, which suggests that Nato’s conventional deterrence is working. That said, Putin’s nuclear threats have not been within the framework of deterrence. But nuclear deterrence has not worked in the way strategists imagined since the end of the Cold War, and we need a much clearer hard look at these weapons once this is all over.

Had we followed through on disarmament in the 1990s, Putin would have held very little sway today. Nuclear weapons and despots are not a good mix and with these weapons there are no small mistakes. We would be foolish to imagine that rationality will hold when it comes to nuclear decision-making.

It is time to put arms control back on the agenda and strengthen our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. We need to put the elimination of these weapons back on the UN Security Council agenda.

Andrew Dorman
Finland and Sweden coming into NATO completely transforms the Baltic. It makes the deployment of reinforcements to the Baltic states an awful lot easier. From the Kremlin’s point of view, the last thing they want is another border with NATO. Russia is already overly committed and hasn’t got enough forces to deal with Ukraine. Its border with Finland is enormous. And NATO would be gaining two very robust, well-organized military forces. You are seeing a lot more NATO assets starting to look at the high north.

Hans Kundnani
I am actually slightly less worried about the Russian threat to NATO countries than I was before February 24. The war has demonstrated how weak the Russian military is, and so the idea that it might present a threat to Finland and Sweden seems less plausible than before. It is not even clear to me that Russia could do very much in other south-eastern European countries. It already seems pretty overstretched. This should make us more relaxed, rather than more worried, about threats to other countries and in particular to NATO countries or to Finland and Sweden.

Leslie Vinjamuri
Sweden and Finland moving forward with their requests for membership is a sign of success for the West, but it also raises important questions for the future of European security. The possibility that we lock in a division that might suit Europe and the United States now does not bode well for a Russia maybe 10 years out or with a different leader.

Alice Billon-Galland
We need to avoid mission creep, but we also need to avoid going back to a position where NATO only focuses on Russia and then set an agenda for 10 years based on that threat assessment alone. We will risk missing out on the next big challenge if we go back on something too specific. We risk being reactive, whereas the Strategic Concept is an exercise that should be proactive and provide a space for transatlantic partners to share broader common security concerns.

Patricia Lewis
NATO is open to all countries in the transatlantic area, and it is even possible that Russia could join in the future should they wish to apply. But it is important to remember that NATO is a political-military alliance, and its politics are fundamental to its cohesion, far more than that of any weapon system or a specific enemy. It will continue to address a wider range of threats as it has in, for example, Afghanistan and many of those will be directly related to the impacts of climate change.

One thing to note, in light of Russia’s nuclear threats, is that NATO’s characterization of itself as a ‘nuclear alliance’ should be revised. NATO needs to be resilient to ebbs and flows of weapon systems and not become over-reliant on one system which has recently demonstrated severe negative impacts.

Hans Kundnani
During the Cold War, what held the alliance together was a shared perception of a threat from the Soviet Union – not a set of shared values. After all, there were authoritarian states in NATO. After the end of the Cold War that overwhelming sense of a shared threat from the Soviet Union disappeared and NATO tried to reinvent itself as a community alliance of democracies with shared values.

But we now once again have authoritarian states in NATO. So it was really in danger of being pulled apart. The war in Ukraine has refocused NATO on its original, historic mission: collective security in relation to Russia. In that sense it has given NATO a lifeline.

Creon Butler
Shared values are still an awful lot stronger as an element of what ties NATO together now than they were in the past. I think you now have the threat perception coming back full force. But I still think you have that very strong element of values, indeed the extra countries that are coming in are very strong democratic countries.

The interesting question is the out-of-area stuff – the Afghanistan-related stuff and counterterrorism more generally, and how important those threats remain. I guess there is an element to that which is a global kind of threat, counterterrorism, but there is also the out-of-area activity which obviously has been transformed following the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Alice Billon-Galland
The crisis management mandate needs to be looked at again with some of the lessons learnt after Afghanistan and Libya, especially given what happened in Kabul, and all the discussion around cooperative security. The question is not only how do we work with partners and countries in the region, but how do we want to engage with China, for instance? How do we want to work on new technologies? How do we want to work with the European Union, with the United Nations?

The alliance must decide what it wants to do versus  what it wants to set aside and have other organizations do, while it refocuses on its core historic tasks.

Andrew Dorman
One of the sensitive, ongoing debates within NATO is whether it has a global role or whether it has a more transatlantic role. There are divisions within NATO about which is its focus. I think the answer, to a degree, is both. One of the real challenges for policymakers, particularly the Biden administration, is that they are going to be pushing for NATO to act as a global player.

This is one of the dilemmas that NATO faces. It could spend all its time focused purely on the short term – that is Russia –  and ignore China, and then suddenly need to think, ‘Oh heck’. What happens if , as a result of this, Russia is essentially dropped into the China camp and Putin becomes Xi Jinping’s poodle? That is a real dilemma, and why I think the US is going to focus on a global NATO.

Leslie Vinjamuri
NATO may have a role to play in Washington’s China strategy. But it won’t be the most important institution. The Biden administration is relying on multiple frameworks for engaging in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the Quad – a partnership between the US, Japan, India and Australia – is designed to secure India’s participation. Pulling India into the region where it has economic power, influence, military and security capabilities and can move the needle. It is both an intelligent and pragmatic strategy to have a number of groupings, a patchwork of overlapping partnerships, including existing alliances. That seems right to me.

Patricia Lewis
It is unlikely that the US would want to create a global NATO. The US and its allies in other regions may wish to model future alliances on NATO, that have strong relationships with it in areas such as political coherence, interoperability, and joint training and exercises and such. But political decision-making would be better suited to sit within specific regional contexts.

Washington has formal alliances in the Indo-Pacific region that commit the US to, for example, the defence of Australia through the Anzus security treaty, as well as Japan. As Washington increases its focus on the Pacific, the existing political-military relationships in the region could become more coherent. We might see a version of a Pacific-Asia Treaty Organization emerge – a Pato. All this depends on how China uses its power and how perspectives in the region evolve.

Creon Butler
I am not sure it is a problem that NATO does not have a specific focus on dealing with the China threat. It potentially has a role in dealing with those things that are seen by the membership as common threats. Which clearly is Russia now but has added terrorism in the past and may well include other things. China is not a common threat in the way that Russia is perceived to be. Of course, something could happen, not least something with Taiwan, which would change that, but that is not where NATO is at present.

Alice Billon-Galland
I think we should really avoid a false dichotomy between ‘NATO should do only Russia’ and ‘NATO should do everything’ because there are lots of activities in the middle where the alliance can bring some added value – and that is exactly what we should be discussing. The issue around China and NATO is being completely overblown. We need to be very clear that the purpose of NATO is to defend the Euro-Atlantic space, but that may include keeping an eye on ‘when China comes to us’, as NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg often says.

Hans Kundnani
None of the regional partners in Asia that you need to deal with the China challenge are in NATO – and can’t be – so it is just the wrong vehicle to deal with the Indo-Pacific. But there is also a bit of a tension here between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. People in Asia also look at the different threat perceptions in completely different ways than we do in Europe. There are a number of reasons why people in India do not support the war in the Ukraine, but one of them is that they see China, not Russia, as the real threat.

Andrew Dorman
I think so much of the debate we have had so far is about political NATO as supposed to military NATO. One of its key roles is how military forces operate, engage and conduct operations, plan operations through deterrents and so forth. NATO as the template of the West does work. That is why it is in the interest of the US to keep this going. It is one of the ways of making sure, for example, the US Pacific fleet remains compatible with the US Atlantic fleet by forcing them to operate the same system, which is the NATO system.

It is one of the things the American forces learnt out of Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a NATO way which is a global footprint. NATO’s role within the African Union is as a template for peacekeeping operations. You have got the likes of Australia and South Korea and Japan very much integrated into NATO. It doesn’t have to be a formal political NATO, but it does strike me to be in the interest of the West to have them reach forces capable of operating with one another.

Patricia Lewis
One of the most interesting developments in the past year has been the creation of Aukus, the security pact between Australia, Britain and the United States. That grew out of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership which led to the need to develop new, interoperable equipment such as nuclear-powered submarines. We will have to see how it develops, but maybe it could be the start of a PATO in the region.  

Creon Butler
In the current situation, we have a crucial partnership between NATO and the EU over Russia, in terms of the long-term future they hold out for Ukraine, but also with the G7 because that is the place to organize the financial support for Ukraine and the economic and financial sanctions against Russia. They are different memberships but the combination of the EU, G7 and NATO is an absolutely crucial alliance of different alliances, with different memberships serving different purposes but having an overall impact that can potentially be very effective.

Leslie Vinjamuri
We work with the institutions that we have, but not always with a clear recognition of their limitations. We are facing a dark moment for the UN Security Council, with one of its founder members blatantly violating the UN’s most important norm. Yet many people in the rest of the world say, ‘Yes, but in 2003, the United States violated Iraq’s sovereignty …’ Where the West sees moral clarity, and so condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is an assumption by much of the rest of the world of moral equivalence between these two invasions.

Working through the UN Security Council is going to be difficult for some time. This means that states are probably going to find different strategies for working around, rather than through, the Security Council.

How Oslo adds a touch of style to the UN The World Today rsoppelsa.drupal 25 May 2022

Seventy years ago, Norway paid for the interior of ‘the most important room in the world’. Now it’s rediscovering the soft power of its design heritage

The view from the roof terrace of Oslo’s newest museum takes in the deep blue fjord and harbour but also the recently opened Munch Museum, whose tilting tower leans over the white iceberg of the opera house. All are emblematic of the transformation of Norway’s capital, one of Europe’s fastest growing cities, into a cultural destination.  

The £500 million National Museum, which opens on June 11, is another statement building in a city which has tended to value modesty over self-promotion. Locals may call it ‘the bunker’ but Denise Hagströmer, a senior curator who compiled its design galleries, believes the museum’s monumental scale and the range of its displays mark a change in Norway’s idea of itself: ‘The country that in the past was thought of as the “little brother” of Scandinavia is now speaking with a completely different voice.’

Norway, with a population of only 5.5 million people, has a history of excelling when it comes to using cultural soft power as a tool of foreign policy, says Hagströmer. 

One of the exhibits in the design galleries is the blue and gold wallpaper used in the United Nations Security Council Chamber in New York, dubbed ‘the most important room in the world’. In here, the Security Council imposes sanctions, dispatches peacekeeping missions and authorizes the use of force.

Designed by Else Poulsson, the Norwegian textile artist, its motifs represent faith, hope and love, reflecting the aspirations of the UN.  

Norway’s decision to pay for the interior of the Security Council Chamber 70 years ago came at a time when the country was recovering from Nazi occupation, while the oil that would make it rich had yet to be discovered. Trygve Lie, the first UN Secretary-General, a Norwegian Labour politician, is said to have played a central role in pushing the project, intended to show the effectiveness of design as a cultural ambassador. 

‘Norway elevated its position on the world stage and achieved an oversized presence at the UN for such a small country,’ says Sarah Lichtman, a design historian from the Parsons School of Design in New York. Even though it doesn’t have a permanent seat on the Security Council, Norway embedded its identity in the room through the legacy of the architecture and interior design, she adds.  

While other Scandinavian architects in the UN complex went for the fashionable modernist look in the Trusteeship and Economic and Social Council chambers, Norwegian Arnstein Arneberg opted for a more classic, even conservative style. In a letter to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, he wrote: ‘This interior must represent Norway in a worthy manner.’ 

As well as Poulsson, Arneberg hired his fellow countryman Per Krohg to paint a giant mural. Krohg, who had been a prisoner of the Nazis in the Second Word War, turned his commission into an altarpiece to peace. ‘The world we abandoned cannot be erased just like that, but one can build a bridge over the adversity and from that journey to a new society,’ he said of his mural, which measures five metres by nine metres. 

The connection between design and politics is explored further in the new Oslo museum’s design galleries and in a separate exhibition, Scandinavian Design & the United States, which show how Nordic objects were charged with democratic values in the post-war period.  ‘Design plays an important role in the Cold War battles that are not just about bombs and missiles but also about lifestyle and ideology,’ says the Swedish writer, Sara Kristoffersson.  

Scandinavian design is rooted in egalitarian ideals of social democracy. Ornate decoration that valued one object above another was replaced with clean forms, craftsmanship and natural materials such as leather, wood and wool, says Astrid Skjerven, a professor at the department of product design at Oslo Metropolitan University.

Shortly after the Security Council chamber was completed, Norwegian designers participated with Danes, Swedes and Finns in the Design in Scandinavia exhibition that was hugely popular in America in the mid-1950s. 

The Norwegians, who were the least known internationally, had the most to gain from the three-year tour, with stores in Manhattan showcasing their designs. First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy and Emperor Hirohito of Japan each bought pieces by the Norwegian designer Torbjørn Afdal.

Norway’s neighbours capitalized on the international demand for Scandi style by supporting their furniture makers with state funding, promotional campaigns abroad and a national design strategy. 

Yet despite creating prize-winning, mid-century pieces, Norway ended up as ‘the underdog of Nordic design’, according to Morten Hippe, a Norwegian industrial designer, who in 2016 started a company, Eikund, to reproduce furniture from the golden era of Norwegian design. The market in Norway for these goods was tiny, and the discovery of oil in 1969 meant many craftsmen moved to more lucrative jobs. 

Across the Atlantic, Norwegian soft power had made its mark in the halls of the UN. By 2006, the Security Council Chamber and the rest of the UN complex needed renovating. The permanent members stipulated that restoration work must preserve the chamber in its original form. 

They also insisted on having the room duplicated in their temporary space elsewhere in the UN building, with a smaller photographic reproduction of the Krohg mural. The painting had become integral to the function of the room, argues Lichtman – ‘like Picasso’s Guernica or one of those paintings with a moralizing tale that reminds the people in the room of the horrors of war’. Norway gave $5 million to the restoration, which was finished in 2013.

Recently, Norwegian diplomats also realized that design could be used more broadly to communicate values and ideas. A new, minimalist passport was issued in 2020 which reflects Norway’s reputation for design excellence.

When the country’s joint consulate and UN mission in New York had to move location, it was an opportunity to create an open-plan office that reflected the non-hierarchical structure of most private and public bodies back home. 

The corner office, with the best views, has a communal table that everyone can use. The room’s design has echoes of a wooden cabin, the typical weekend bolt hole for many Norwegians. Carpets resemble a forest floor, birdsong plays in the bathrooms and futuristic ‘Extreme’ chairs designed by Terje Ekstrom are framed by views of Manhattan. Consul General Heidi Olufsen says visitors to the offices are taken aback when they find a little slice of Norwegian life.

Olufsen’s official residence is sparer and more elegant. The mid-century dining table and chairs designed by Fredrik Kayser are from Eikund and the bright velvet Bollo chairs by Andreas Engesvik, seen by many as the country’s top furniture designer. Olufsen wants the decor to make guests ‘feel they are in the modern Norway of 2022’, she says, with more to offer than just mountains and fjords. 

Yet Olufsen admits there is still a way to go: ‘We still have more to do to boost our self-confidence and demand more space for Norwegian design.’ 
 

Interview: Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya The World Today mhiggins.drupal 25 May 2022

Belarus’s exiled democratic opposition leader tells Roxanne Escobales about her unexpected political career and President Lukashenka’s wavering support for Putin

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is the face of the Belarusian democratic movement. In 2020, she stood as a presidential candidate against Aliaksandr Lukashenka after her husband, an anti-corruption campaigner and the main opposition candidate, was arrested on the campaign trail and imprisoned. Lukashenka, autocratic ruler of Belarus for more than 30 years, was re-elected. Since then, Sviatlana has lived in exile in Lithuania meeting with western leaders and calling for regime change in her native land. Her husband Sergey remains in prison serving an 18-year sentence.

You have said in the past that there will be no free Belarus without a free Ukraine. How is the fate of the two countries connected?

The Kremlin wants to drag our countries into the past, and we are looking into a future which we want to choose for ourselves. The Kremlin doesn’t recognize Ukraine or Belarus as independent countries – it sees them as part of Russia. While the current regime is in our country, there will be a constant threat of aggression from Russia. But we are absolutely independent countries with our own languages, cultures and so on.

The fate of Belarus depends a lot on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it is evident. When Ukraine wins – and they definitely will win – it will mean the Kremlin is weak and that Lukashenka is weak. Every day we create multiple points of pressure on the regime from within the country, from outside the country. For countries like Ukraine and Belarus the support of strong democracies is very important.

It is very important for European society to understand that it is not just a war between Russia and Ukraine. It is a war between democratic values and dictatorship on the territory of Ukraine. It is very important for democracy to have a strong voice at the moment.

Recently Lukashenka said the war was taking too long. Do you think he understood what he was getting into when he supported Vladimir Putin by allowing his illegal invasion to be launched from Belarus?

The support between the Kremlin and Lukashenka has always been situational – it is not a real friendship. Lukashenka got huge political and economic support in 2020 after the protests, and now he owes a debt to the Kremlin and had to show his loyalty.

And we see how his rhetoric is changing because the situation in Ukraine is changing. At the beginning Lukashenka always said that, ‘Me and Putin will take Ukraine in three days’, and when this blitzkrieg failed, now he wants to get out of the situation. Now he wants to say, ‘Look, we are for peace. We didn’t have any intention to invade Ukraine.’ He wants to act like he is a peacemaker.

He only cares about his own interest, not his country or its people. He just wants to keep his power.

You have been living in exile in Lithuania for two years, and a lot has happened in that time. What is the state of the Belarusian democratic movement now?

We have been a grassroots movement since the first day. There is no leader who says you have to do this or that. My role is to work on the political level. My task is to go to the European Union, to the United States, and ask for packages to assist civil society. With this technical assistance from our democratic partners, we have managed to build structures in exile, and people in Belarus have managed to build structures inside the country.

Another task of mine is to inspire people, and to explain to the international community what is going on and to show them that Belarus is not just Lukashenka’s regime – it is people who want change.

I communicate with Belarusian people almost every day, especially those who are in the country. We have to keep close ties. It is important to understand how dangerous it is in Belarus to communicate on different channels like Telegram or even to subscribe to some media sources. But people do this. They understand the threats and the consequences, but their energy is still so alive.

We have to keep this energy strong and to give this assurance to people that in case something happens to them, or their families, they will get help from outside. This is how it works.

This struggle has come at a very personal cost to you and your husband, Sergey, who is in prison for his political activities. How is he doing?

I communicate with my husband through his lawyer, who visits him once a week. It has to be short messages because there is no privacy. Our children can send him letters and they receive letters back from him.

There are thousands of people like Sergey, and we have to take care of all of them. The treatment of political prisoners is much worse than criminals because they are like Lukashenka’s personal enemies. That is why it is so important to support human rights organizations who provide lawyers to political prisoners. It is important to fund support for them and for families of political prisoners.

You were a teacher when you took over your husband’s presidential campaign. If you could go back in time, what advice would you give yourself?

I would wish I could have had more confidence. I didn’t have any political experience – I was an ordinary woman and wife, the same as millions of other Belarusians. At the beginning, I didn’t feel confident because I didn’t know about politics. I didn’t know how to communicate with the political leaders of different countries. I was scared.

What motivated you to step into your husband’s shoes?

It was an accidental choice. It was terrible for my husband. But I saw millions of people on the streets, and when you see people standing shoulder to shoulder it inspires you. Every day thousands of people call me who want to help, and I understand that we are not alone. This motivates me.

Also, the fact that thousands of children want to see their mothers and fathers who are in jail gives me strength. When sometimes you think you can’t do this any more because it is so difficult, you think about those who haven’t seen their children for two years. It is awful.

So, every day, you find something that gives you a small energy and it doesn’t let you give up.

NATO must now transform old missions into new strategy Expert comment NCapeling 21 June 2022

As the war in Ukraine becomes prolonged and unpredictable, risks for the transatlantic alliance will increase, as will the global shockwaves of the conflict.

As a revitalized NATO alliance deals with a crisis that has major economic and humanitarian as well as military dimensions, the need for it to develop both a European and a global containment strategy grows ever more urgent.

Bolstering NATO’s defences so as to provide the capability to repel any form of Russian attack on land, at sea, in the air, or through space and cyberspace is a key aspect of this strategy as, in recent weeks, more combat forces able to defend territory have taken the form of additional troops, ships, and aircraft reinforcing the Baltic states and the Black Sea coastlines of Poland and Romania.

Ten allies have so far contributed to this effort, placing 40,000 troops under direct NATO command. Those sceptical about the future of the transatlantic security relationship have been confounded by the major role the US has played in this effort, sending parts of the 82nd Airborne Division and 3rd Armoured Division to Poland, and redeploying US Stryker brigades from Germany and Italy to the Baltic states and Romania.

Although many other allies have sent useful assets – such as French and UK aircraft to Romania or German and Netherlands Patriot batteries to Slovakia – the US contribution still surpasses all European efforts put together. The US now has 100,000 troops in Europe, the most it has deployed there since the mid-1990s.

Transitioning from temporary to permanent deployment

NATO has also mobilized its high-readiness Reaction Force for the first time and aims to establish four new multinational battalions in the Black Sea region – with France offering to lead the one in Romania, Italy in Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic in Slovakia. Most of these deployments are on a temporary basis, but the receiving allies would understandably like them to stay longer and for NATO to commit to permanent stationed forces.

Although this would oblige the alliance to break formally from the pledge it made to Moscow in 1997 not to station substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons or build military infrastructure on the territory of its new member states in eastern Europe, this was a political undertaking linked to circumstances prevailing at the time.

Given Russia’s behaviour, there is no reason why NATO should not now abandon it. There is also a question over whether NATO could also repeal the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the NATO-Russia Council, or simply leave them in suspension for a future, more cooperative, and less bellicose Russian regime.

Beyond showing the flag along its eastern flank, NATO does face longer-term issues which need to be clarified in its new Strategic Concept. First is whether to abandon its current strategy of reinforcement and military mobility across Europe – known as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the NATO jargon – in favour of the deployment of heavy armoured brigades or even divisions in fixed positions close to borders.

This will be expensive in the long-run and deprive allies of the flexibility they have enjoyed since the end of the Cold War to use their forces as and where they wish – from deployments in the Sahel or Afghanistan to fighting forest fires or building emergency hospitals for COVID-19 patients at home. The only exception is when they have put forces on rotation into the NATO high readiness forces or the European Union (EU) Battle Groups.

Germany’s commitment gives NATO more options

The decision of Germany to increase its defence spending to two per cent of GDP and to devote €100 billion to modernizing the Bundeswehr makes it technically possible for NATO to move to a Cold War-style forward, armoured defence. But it is unclear how quickly Berlin could raise its new divisions given its problems with procurement and government/industry relations in the defence sector.

It may make more sense for Germany not to launch new acquisition programmes but to buy existing off-the-shelf capabilities – as it has recently done with its decision to buy 35 US F35 aircraft – which other European countries are also acquiring, offering economies of scale and cheaper operating and maintenance costs.

But if Germany abandons ambitious defence projects with France – which prefers a ‘buy European’ approach – such as the Future European Air Combat System, the relationship with France will become strained and French plans for EU self-reliance in the military field put at risk.

As a country averse to war fighting and narrow military approaches to security, it is uncertain how much of the conventional defence burden in NATO Germany would be willing to take on, so this could be the opportunity to create more integrated European units with France, the Benelux, Poland, and Italy, even with the post-Brexit UK.

The UK has doubled the size of its forces in Estonia and sent 1,000 troops to Poland, as well as devoting a substantial portion of its army, navy, and airforce to regular NATO exercises in the Baltic region. London was also the first ally to grant Sweden and Finland a temporary security guarantee pending full integration into the alliance.

NATO will likely settle on a compromise, increasing the size of its battalions on its eastern flank – turning them into battle groups – but giving each one a larger reserve force which will remain in Germany or other European allied countries.

A NATO strategic plan is now needed

The other issue for NATO is to develop a single theatre-wide strategic plan managed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO command structure. In reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank, allies have sent forces to wherever they like and largely under national command, but this would not work in a real war.

NATO must revise its exercises to prepare and train for the new threat level, ensuring its forward deployed forces are fully integrated with local forces and the police and border guards to anticipate and respond to any Russian hybrid war tactics. It also needs to step up its joint planning and interoperability with Sweden and Finland and bring their territories into its standing defence plans.

One thing NATO has done well in this crisis is its political messaging. As Russia has become more threatening and reckless, it has been essential for NATO to be consistent and predictable. Re-affirming its core defensive purpose, calmly rejecting Putin’s nuclear posturing, and refusing to put NATO forces in Ukraine may be frustrating for some but it is vital not to play into Putin’s playbook regarding an ‘aggressive NATO’ or give him the sense he is being pushed into a corner. However, NATO strategic ambiguity can be useful when considering how to respond to a Russian escalation in Ukraine itself, such as using chemical weapons.

The key questions for NATO are:

• What should be the balance between permanently deployed and rotational forces in NATO’s new posture?
• What should be the balance of US/Canadian and European forces in this posture?
• How can the capability development programmes under EU Strategic Autonomy (such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund) be geared to support the European role and responsibility in the alliance? Air and missile defence would seem to be priorities given Russia’s reliance on long range strikes.
• How can the EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the third NATO-EU Joint Declaration be harmonized to bring the two institutions more closely together in responding to Russian hybrid operations and influence campaigns, and in assisting both Ukraine and others such as Georgia and Moldova?
• What should be the balance between forces for collective defence with heavy armour and directed artillery fire, and those for expeditionary missions beyond Europe such as counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping?

NATO is revived and refocused

Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe more generally, the multilateral system has discovered a new energy and sense of purpose as NATO has been revived and refocused on its core mission.

The EU and the US have pulled together with daily coordination of their policies and actions, and the EU is also facing up to its geo-political role, as recognizing the EU aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia as well as the countries of the western Balkans shows its responsibility for the security and economic integration of the whole of Europe.

President Maia Sandu on democracy and politics in Moldova Video jon.wallace 4 July 2022

The president covers Moldova’s challenges as it seeks closer integration with the European Union.

President Maia Sandu discusses challenges to Moldovan democracy and society during an interview at Chatham House’s 2022 London Conference.

She covers issues including corruption, the presence of Russian troops in the Transnistria region, neutrality in Moldova’s constitution, popular support for EU membership and refugees from Russian aggression in Ukraine.

America's abortion ban will hurt women everywhere The World Today mhiggins.drupal 9 August 2022

In the final part of a series on the impact of the Roe v Wade ruling, Nina van der Mark assesses the global impact of America’s reverse on reproductive rights.

In overturning the constitutional right to an abortion established by Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court of the United States placed the US alongside Poland, El Salvador and Nicaragua as countries that have restricted access to abortion in recent decades. While the Dobbs ruling is a domestic reversal, the US remains the largest funder of global health, family planning and reproductive health services. There is a lot at stake for women and girls around the world. 

Here are four potential global impacts to consider.

Millions of women will be at greater risk 

The Guttmacher Institute, a research and policy organization that aims to improve sexual and reproductive health worldwide, calculated that in 2021 American international family planning assistance saw an estimated 27.2 million women and couples receive contraceptive services, some 12 million pregnancies averted, four million unsafe abortions prevented and 19,000 maternal deaths avoided. These outcomes help to improve gender equity as well as increase women’s education and employment opportunities and boost economic growth. 

This happens despite US funding for international family planning being in decline over the past decade. It peaked during the Obama administration at $715 million in 2010 but since 2017 averaged about $607 million a year. Using US aid to directly fund abortions as a method of family planning is prohibited under the terms of the Helms Amendment of 1973.

In America, the Dobbs ruling has so far led 14 Republican-controlled states to enact anti-abortion legislation. This, in turn, has motivated pro-choice campaigners – on August 2, a referendum in the staunchly conservative state of Kansas returned a decisive vote to preserve abortion rights. That result gives hope to abortion-rights groups that the issue will cut across traditional political loyalties and bring swing voters to their cause in the mid-term congressional elections in November.  

That is important because Congress decides on the level of funding for America’s global health programmes, including family planning and reproductive health. The stakes are high. For instance, Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia, with a combined population of more than 370 million, are among the top 10 recipients of US Overseas Development Assistance, most of which goes to health programmes. Nigeria, for instance, received $794 million in such funding from America in 2019-2020. 

A sudden policy reversal affecting funding for reproductive health would lead to clinic closures, reduced access to help and shortages of essential family planning commodities. The result would be more unintended pregnancies, more unsafe abortions and a potential increase in maternal mortality. 

Women will have more unsafe abortions

The Helms Amendment, which prevents recipients of American aid directly funding abortion services, was passed by Congress in 1973 following the Roe v Wade decision. The Global Gag Rule, first enacted by Ronald Reagan in 1984, goes further, forbidding NGOs abroad in receipt of American aid from promoting or counselling abortion as a form of family planning, even when using their own funds. Since its introduction, Republican administrations have enforced the rule while Democratic administrations have rescinded it, as Biden did in January 2021.  

Restricting access to safe abortion services increases the number of unsafe abortions, whereas legalizing abortion services reduces them. During the Bush administration, the Global Gag Rule prompted a 12-per-cent increase in pregnancies in rural Ghana, which led to an additional 200,000 abortions. 

Another study found a substantial increase in abortions, a decline in contraceptive use and an increase in pregnancies in 26 countries in sub-Saharan Africa affected by the rule across three US administrations. It’s estimated that 77 per cent of abortions in the region are unsafe. In 2019 that translated into 6.2 million unsafe abortions.

The failure of America to consistently support safe abortion services contributes to the more than 35 million unsafe abortions that take place each year across 132 lower middle-income countries.  

Under the Trump administration, the Global Gag Rule was extended from family planning funding to cover all US global health assistance, increasing the level of US funding affected from around $600 million to $8.8 billion. Were a Republican administration to be elected in 2024 there is little doubt the rule would be reinstated, possibly in the most restrictive form that Trump enforced. 

Anti-abortion movements will double their efforts 

The repeal of Roe v Wade has not occurred in a silo, nor are its effects contained within the US.

News of the Dobbs ruling, which overturned Roe v Wade, prompted One of Us, a European anti-abortion platform, to mount an immediate, 20,000-strong anti-abortion demonstration in Spain, including leaders of the conservative Vox party.  On Twitter, Sara Larin, an anti-abortion activist from El Salvador, likened the Dobbs ruling to the abolition of slavery in the US, calling it ‘the beginning of the end for abortion [worldwide]’. 

Countries have based their legal protections for abortion access on Roe v Wade or cited it in their case law, which now opens them up to legal challenge domestically. A Christian anti-abortion group in Kenya is legally challenging a pro-choice ruling based on Roe v Wade. Such challenges may increase: anti-choice groups in Mexico and Peru cited the Dobbs ruling as an encouraging development. 

Many American Christian right-wing groups fund anti-abortion activities abroad. OpenDemocracy, an independent global media platform, recently reported that 28 Christian right-wing organizations spent more than $280 million internationally between 2007-2018 on anti-choice activities, targeting Europe primarily, followed by Africa and Asia.  

The American right is not afraid to take direct legal action abroad either. The European Center for Law and Justice, an offshoot of the Trump-backed American Center for Law and Justice, has made interventions in dozens of court cases on sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Court, including in the case that overturned abortion rights in Poland.   

The European parliament in its most recent motion on the topic expressed concern about the potential for the Dobbs ruling to prompt a surge in the flow of money to anti-choice groups around the world.  

America’s global standing will take a hit 

The Dobbs ruling immediately attracted criticism from many world leaders.  ‘Watching the removal of a woman’s fundamental right to make decisions over their own body is incredibly upsetting,’ said Jacinda Ardern, the New Zealand prime minister. ‘To see that principle now lost in the United States feels like a loss for women everywhere.’  

President Emmanuel Macron of France tweeted: ‘I wish to express my solidarity with the women whose liberties are being undermined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ 

The ruling is in conspicuous opposition to the Biden administration’s more progressive stance on sexual and reproductive health and rights and its advocacy abroad. It sends a clear message from the world’s most powerful democracy that these rights are not guaranteed. 

While many world leaders reacted to the Dobbs ruling with dismay, other senior figures from the conservative right welcomed it, including the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Eduardo, and Javier Milei, a potential candidate in Argentina’s presidential election next year.  

In 2020, the Trump administration co-sponsored the ‘Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family,’ declaring that there was ‘no international right to abortion.’ It was signed by more than 30 countries, including autocratic and right-wing governments in Brazil, Poland, Hungary and Saudi Arabia.  

The Biden administration withdrew from it – but its signatories are the governments who may yet take advantage of America’s self-inflicted erosion of authority on reproductive rights.  

The Dobbs ruling exposes the limitation of the American executive to act within the US legal system while opening up questions on American support of, and dedication to, fundamental rights.

Read the other two articles in this series: ‘Empowering women aids climate resilience’ and ‘Counting the cost of the abortion ban’

Russia's war: How will it shape the region's future? 1 December 2022 — 9:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 August 2022 Chatham House and Online

This conference takes a deep-dive into the implications of the war for the wider region.

You will receive an email in advance of the conference with further details on accessing the event.

The video on this page is of the opening session only. To view all the session videos, please visit the conference playlist on YouTube.

How will Russia’s war shape the region’s future?

Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine is on such a scale that it will have a seismic effect on all the countries that once formed the Soviet empire. Vladimir Putin’s decisions have accelerated trends across the region leading to unintended consequences.

Now it is more crucial than ever – not only for those concerned with the region’s economic and democratic development, but for all those with a stake in the future security of Europe.

For some states, this will mean a faster break from the legacy of the USSR and from Russia’s ‘Geopathological embrace‘ while, for others, maybe even a fresh start at democracy and good governance.

In isolated cases, the war will conceivably hasten assimilation with Russia. But the two principal combatants, Ukraine and Russia, will diverge even further. Ukraine, though fighting for its survival now, will at least get the opportunity to ‘build back better’ if it achieves some form of victory.

Whatever the course of the war, however, Russia’s aspirations to be a global power again are doomed as it is gradually deglobalized from Western structures.

This conference analyses:

• How Russia’s war will affect the broader regional economy and whether this will hasten Vladimir Putin’s exit
• What to hope for, what to fear and the key trends that will dominate the region going forward.
• Unique expertise in an independent forum on what’s at stake for Europe. 

Gorbachev's complex legacy is beyond the popular belief Expert comment NCapeling 3 September 2022

The last major figure with a decisive Cold War role, Mikhail Gorbachev was not as bad as Putin’s Russia portrays him, but also not as heroic as the West thinks.

Arguably the worst year of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis was 1983, with three major incidents which escalated East-West tensions – and any one of them could have led to a full-scale war.

The first was the Korean Airline KAL007 being shot down by an SU15 fighter aircraft for straying into Soviet airspace, killing all 269 passengers and crew. Then came the identification of signals from Soviet satellites as being incoming US intercontinental ballistic missiles – Colonel Stanislav Petrov, going against all protocols, thankfully decided to report them as a false alarm before he could be sure.

The third was perhaps the most dangerous, being the misinterpretation of a live-fire NATO exercise which was believed by some in both East Germany and Russia to be a front for an imminent attack.

All three incidents occurred in the few months following the infamous March 1983 ‘Star Wars’ speech by US president Ronald Reagan, in which he talked about nuclear arms control and laid out the US case for a ballistic missile defence programme.

At that time Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was the youngest serving member of the USSR Politburo, known to be a favourite of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, and it is highly likely he had been aware of these close calls and was part of discussions within Kremlin decision-making circles.

A changemaker both inside and outside the USSR

Following the deaths of Andropov in 1984 and his replacement Konstantin Chernenko in 1985, Gorbachev’s appointment as general secretary of the Communist Party saw him immediately begin to change the Soviet Union from within – and also change relationships with the major Western powers, especially the US, Germany, and the UK.

His policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were primarily aimed at internal reforms but translated into a major reset of international relations and international security. During his six years as leader, Gorbachev initiated many arms control negotiations which resulted in treaties and increased both the transparency and the confidence between the USSR and the US.

These included the 1986 Stockholm Accord which emanated from the Helsinki Process and allowed for the observation and inspection of large-scale military exercises, the 1985 resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks which lead to START I, and the 1987 INF Treaty in which the USSR ‘out-yessed’ the US – the most open and transparent disarmament treaty in terms of notification and verification measures ever agreed.

There was also a reciprocal moratorium on nuclear weapons tests starting from 1985 – which laid the groundwork for the 1996 CTBT – the 1991 Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

The most dramatic moment of all was when Gorbachev and Reagan met at a summit in Reykjavik and came close to deciding to eliminate nuclear weapons – but the initiative failed to reach agreement, mainly because Reagan could not drop his commitment to ballistic missile defences and Gorbachev could not accept the offer of joint development.

Nonetheless, all these nuclear arms control treaties led the way for their descendants which have kept nuclear weapons in check ever since and are still in place in the form of the New START agreement.

But despite these outstanding achievements, Gorbachev had blind spots – such as enabling rather than destroying the USSR bioweapons programme, unlike the US which had dismantled its own bioweapons offensive capability by 1973.

And it is now known that, despite negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia withheld information on new chemical weapons agents – Novichoks – which have since been used to lethal effect by Russia in Salisbury and against figures opposing the current regime.

His misguided faith in a Soviet future

Gorbachev was markedly different to his predecessors as secretary general. He was neither as decrepit nor as hardline, and he understood from the outset that the Soviet Union was, by the 1980s, finally dying.

Using the intellectual abilities of Aleksandr Yakovlev, he forced through the reforms which simultaneously captured the imagination of the free world and liberated his countrymen and women.

But although he built solid relationships – even friendships – with the world’s major heads of state and improved the USSR’s human rights, releasing dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but many – especially Ukrainian dissidents – continued to languish in camps.

The greatest disappointment in Gorbachev’s legacy was he completely believed the USSR could be reformed and still survive as an entity while others, such as Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan, understood it had to be dismantled.

This shortcoming is especially uncomfortable as today’s Russia continues to insist it has a given right to control other former Soviet states, to the extent it is willing to destroy them if they do not concede.

Central and Eastern Europe become hawkish on China Expert comment LJefferson 16 September 2022

The recent withdrawal of the Baltic countries from the ‘17+1’ format displays changing perceptions of China due to its ambiguity towards the war in Ukraine.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine only confirmed Central and Eastern Europe’s views of Russia, it is also affecting their relations with China. Although the relationship was already complicated due to unfulfilled Chinese economic promises to CEE countries and growing indications of efforts to influence their domestic politics, China’s support for Russia is pushing Central and Eastern Europeans even further away.

This shift was highlighted, and formalized, recently by several countries in the region leaving the ‘17+1’ format, through which China cooperates with a group of countries from the region. The shifting attitudes towards China will also influence the relationship between the European Union as a whole and China.

A Trojan Horse that never was

When the format was launched in 2012 between 16 CEE countries at the time and China, the countries jumping on board expected a wave of Chinese investment and an opportunity to diversify mostly west-bound trade.

These hopes never fully materialized as Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in CEE has been generally lower compared to the rest of Europe and China never became an important export destination for any of the countries. The growing disillusionment and concern about Chinese security threats has led to some of the countries speaking up about the perceived perils of closer cooperation.

The first to withdraw from what had become ‘17+1’ by 2021 was Lithuania, which also took an interest in strengthening ties with Taiwan and allowed it to open a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. This triggered a breakdown in the bilateral relations with China. As a retaliatory response, China blocked Lithuanian imports and imports from other EU states containing inputs from Lithuania, leading the EU to launch an official dispute at the WTO.

War in Ukraine

Since the invasion started, CEE countries have been dealing with large numbers of Ukrainian refugees, organizing shipments of military equipment to Ukraine, and at the same time worrying whether they could be next on Russia’s list.

However, the concerns and security environment that these countries face seems to be almost entirely disregarded by China. On the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Xi and Putin signed the joint communiqué in which China backed Moscow’s demands to reverse NATO borders to the pre-1997 situation, completely disregarding CEE’s security interests.

China’s implicit support for Russia after the invasion has sowed deep mistrust of its respect for the sovereignty of other nations. The Chinese diplomatic apparatus clearly noticed this changing mood among CEE governments and sent a special envoy to eight capitals in April-May tasked with ‘eliminating misunderstandings regarding Russia-Ukraine conflict’.

However, the trip was not particularly successful. The delegation failed to secure high-level meetings, with the most prominent case being the Polish minister of foreign affairs declining to meet Huo Yuzhen, the Chinese Special Councilor for CEEC cooperation. Given that Andrzej Duda, President of Poland, was the only head of an EU state who attended the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony just before the Russian invasion in February, the change in attitudes is clear.

Following the envoy’s visit to the Czech Republic, the Czech parliament’s foreign affairs committee unanimously approved a resolution calling for the country to quit the ‘16+1’ format and the government is expected to act upon it in the near future. Meanwhile, Latvia and Estonia recently jointly announced that they would no longer be participating in the cooperation framework, turning it into ‘14+1’.

Issues to watch in 2023 The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 November 2022

From nuclear proliferation to African debt, here are the issues six of our expert contributors expect to make the news in the year ahead.

Europe’s energy outlook

Mike Bradshaw, Professor of Global Energy, Warwick Business School

There is cautious optimism that Europe will endure this winter without an energy crisis. Gas prices have fallen, storage is 95 per cent full, and the autumn was mild. High summer gas prices cut industrial demand but domestic heating demand will be critical over the winter. Already, France’s problematic nuclear fleet and lower hydroelectric output mean Europe is using more gas to generate power. 

Russian pipeline gas supply to southern Europe has fallen by 55 per cent. While Asian demand has fallen, Europe has still paid record prices to secure additional liquefied natural gas (LNG), largely from America but also Russia. European demand for LNG this winter will push prices up, and these will rise even higher if China relaxes its Zero-Covid policy and demand recovers. However, with luck, Europe will avoid power cuts in early 2023. The problem is next winter. With less Russian pipeline gas and a tight LNG market, 90 per cent winter gas storage levels will be much harder to achieve. 

NATO’s resurgence

Alice Billon-Galland, Research Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House and one of 14 NATO Young Leaders

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO adopted a new strategic concept. Member states will reinforce NATO battlegroups and bolster higher readiness forces from 40,000 troops to more than 300,000, while striving to avoid escalation with Russia. Turkey’s attempts to block Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership will preoccupy Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General, until he leaves his post next autumn.

Expect arguments on defence spending in the run-up to the July summit in Vilnius. Although only nine of its 30 members are expected to meet the 2 per cent spending target, the debate is moving towards 3 per cent, in part to reduce dependency on American assets and hedge against the uncertainty of the 2024 US presidential election. Infrastructure vulnerabilities, such as the Nord Stream pipeline sabotage in the Baltic, will also be a focus. Otherwise, NATO ’s eyes will be on China: from its relations with Russia to the threat of cyberattacks.

Universal health reforms

Robert Yates, Executive Director, Centre for Universal Health, Chatham House

In response to the perma-crisis experienced by many populations this past year, some leaders are launching or extending universal health reforms. New left-wing leaders in Chile, Colombia and Brazil have promised to rebuild their publicly financed universal health systems. In Brazil, newly elected president Lula da Silva has pledged to increase public health spending and improve access to medicines. It is hoped Malaysia’s new coalition will carry forward its predecessor’s pledge to raise health spending to 5 per cent of GDP by 2027 to provide a universal package of free health services.

In September, world leaders will discuss universal health coverage at the UN General Assembly. There, Chatham House will publish its Commission for Universal Health report, identifying countries in which crises may trigger new national health programmes. Might this be when a US presidential candidate announces a platform to create a publicly financed health system?

Weapons of mass destruction

Patricia Lewis, Director of the International Security Programme, Chatham House

Since its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia has attacked civil nuclear power stations, falsely accused Ukraine of possessing bioweapons and radiological bombs, and threatened to use nuclear weapons. In contrast, NATO has instead demonstrated that deterrence can be highly effective with conventional weaponry. In the coming year, the Kremlin’s nuclear brinkmanship will still be a focus. Washington will try to restart bilateral nuclear negotiations with Moscow and similarly try to engage Beijing.

Following the failure of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to reach consensus in August, the next review cycle will start by looking at strengthening the process. Iran’s nuclear capabilities remain a concern, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme is a growing threat. So, we are left with a question: will 2023 be the year of  nuclear conflict or the year when states get busy again on non-proliferation and disarmament?  

Africa’s mounting debt

Joseph Asunka, Chief Executive Officer, Afrobarometer

Inflation is at historic highs in several African economies. Meanwhile, many African countries including Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo will hold  elections in 2023, driving up public spending, increasing inflationary pressures and exacerbating poverty. According to Afrobarometer data, the proportion of Africans experiencing high levels of poverty has increased from 19 per cent in 2014/2015 to  26 per cent in 2021/2022.

Worse still, many of those countries holding elections are either, like Zimbabwe, in debt distress – that is unable to honour their obligations to creditors – or at high risk of debt distress, like Nigeria. This makes the elections in Zimbabwe and Nigeria critical. The expiration of the World Bank/IMF-backed debt service suspension initiative in 2021 has only amplified this risk. What are viable policy options to tackle this dire economic predicament? A debt service moratorium, debt cancellation and serious attention to fiscal discipline.

Feminist foreign policy

Daniela Philipson García, Co-founder of Internacional Feminista, and a PhD candidate, Monash University

Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) is under threat. The war in Ukraine led to strengthened military budgets and alliances at odds with FFP’s human security and peace-centred approaches. Sweden’s new right-wing government reversed its FFP. In Mexico, the first Global South country to adopt an FFP, Congress has voted to expand the military’s role to curb cartel-related violence, in contradiction of its FFP. The second anniversary of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan will be a moment to assess how foreign policy, diplomacy and women’s and girls’ rights have been affected globally. 

There is hope. Germany, whose coalition government adopted an FFP in 2021, is to publish more guidelines in the spring. The governments of Colombia and Chile have announced their own FFPs. Colombia’s first National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, to be announced at the UN General Assembly in September, is expected to set a standard for a region submerged in violence. 

Russian imperial mindset must change for real victory Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2022

The attitude of Russia’s elite – and wider population – to the states which used to constitute the USSR needs to change in order to solve the Russia challenge.

Although the reverberations of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine clearly stretch around the globe, the strongest shocks are – and will continue to be – felt by those countries Moscow used to directly rule.

These countries struggle to shrug off a Soviet legacy as, to varying degrees – linguistically, technologically, culturally, and politically – they bear psychological and physical scars of Russia’s colonial past and its present mentality.

It does not help that these countries lack an appropriate collective descriptor. Over the years there has been ‘Newly Independent States’ – hardly appropriate after 31 years – the now-defunct ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’, the ‘post-Soviet space’ and ‘Former Soviet Union’ which both reference the past, and simply ‘Eurasia’ which is hardly appropriate for either Ukraine or Turkmenistan.

Some of these former ‘colonies’ are as badly governed and as sinister – albeit not as lethal beyond their borders – as Russia itself. Others, most notably the Baltic states, are modern, liberal, affluent societies, but Moscow’s shadow still looms.

There is a strong mindset in most of Russia’s citizens that, because that it used to rule these other countries, it either still has privileged rights over them or they are not real countries at all – but instead historical aberrations to be extinguished.

What is past is gone

As historian Timothy Snyder has noted, whatever the wrongs of Putin’s ‘history-based’ assertions about the ‘return of historic lands’, all historical claims are bunkum anyway. If the past brings validity, almost no land border on earth would be beyond dispute. It is agreements which count, and Russia signed away the other successor states in 1991.

The Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House has, for the last 31 years, always taken as a starting position that these countries are as sovereign as any other. This of course this means they can choose to be in Russia’s embrace if they wish. But none do because Russia is insufficiently attractive. Some have better relationships with Moscow than others – mainly the more autocratic ones – but no former slave goes back to their master willingly.

At the recent Chatham House conference Russia’s war: How will it shape the region’s future? (note the avoidance of a specific descriptor), the overwhelming consensus was that Russia must lose, that Ukraine must be reconstructed and planning for that must start now, and that the regional economy is convulsing.

But another key view was that, in Russia, rent seeking and buying loyalty are likely to lead to the separation of the Russian people and the regime, especially as the population ages and young men being sent to die at the front. Putin may still be popular in some places in Russia, but not in others – although popularity can rise and fall fast in Russia. However, few at the conference foresaw the disintegration of Russia any time soon.

With continued skill, determination, and more weaponry, Ukraine may well vanquish Russia on the battlefield, and this remains a necessary pre-requisite for European security. But even a Ukraine victory will not erase malign intent.

The Russian imperial itch is so deeply embedded, it must be excised not just from Russian capability but from the intention and mindset of elites and in the popular imagination. That is hard to achieve when so many believe in it as fervently as a religion – even the Russian Orthodox Church invokes a messianism in Russia’s imperial ‘rights’.

The wider region is suffering

Getting Russians to look upon their neighbours as equals requires widescale self-reassessment in a post-Putin Russia. But, for now, the wider region will surely be looking to simply neuter Russia’s destructive capacities.

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security Expert comment NCapeling 16 December 2022

Hard choices are needed but it is crucial the UK provides security and leadership to its European partners given the wider context of the war in Ukraine.

The UK’s role in Nordic-Baltic security has been growing over the past decade. The region is key to core British strategic interest and engagement, and UK threat assessment closely aligns with long-held regional perspectives – the 2021 Integrated Review defines Russia as ‘the most acute threat to our security’.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK’s strong stance towards Moscow and the concrete steps taken to assist Ukraine and strengthen defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank have been widely appreciated in the Nordic-Baltic region.

The UK is seen as a reliable partner but, for it to continue to deliver in the region, difficult choices must be made with regards to UK defence spending and military capabilities, and London’s more global ambitions.

The UK is a major contributor to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia, and contributing to another battlegroup in Poland.

UK remains crucial to regional security

Coupled with its contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and maritime forces in the area, the UK is a crucial security partner both in the region and in a broader arch across Europe.

Over the past decade and a half, the UK has been developing a dense network of bilateral and minilateral relations in the region which are major assets in the current security environment.

It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) which is a military cooperation format highly valued for its flexibility in responding to the needs of the participating nations – including non-NATO Sweden and Finland – and is increasingly focused on the North Atlantic, High North and wider Baltic areas. The UK has also seen increased bilateral defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other regional allies and partners.

There are reasonable expectations that Germany or France may at some point assume a greater role in this part of Europe, building on France’s participation in the EFP in Estonia, and Germany’s lead of the EFP in Lithuania.

However, while Paris remains more focused on NATO’s southern (and south-eastern) flank and building the European Union’s defence role, Berlin often underperforms as a leading or an organizing power of collaborative efforts across Europe.

Both also have a credibility problem in the Nordic-Baltic region due to their past policies towards Russia that occasionally reappear when discussing military support to Ukraine or how to treat Russia in the post-war European security order.

By contrast, the UK offers military capability, strong political will, a long-standing tradition of engagement in the Nordic-Baltic area, and fast decision-making.

The latter is exemplified by the bilateral security guarantees provided to Sweden and Finland during their accession to NATO, and the surge of assets sent to the region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine such as an additional battlegroup and Chinook helicopters to Estonia, as well as forward-deployed elements of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to Latvia and Lithuania as part of the JEF.

Such pragmatic and resolute engagement help substantiate the UK’s post-Brexit claim that although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. London also understands and facilitates the pivotal role that the US plays in European security – a shared perspective with the Nordic-Baltic partners.

Only the US – which has just recently decided to step up its military presence in the Baltics – has a greater appeal than the UK as a major ally. But Washington’s truly global responsibilities make it more difficult for it to play a regional leadership role.

With the context of the war in Ukraine, the centre of gravity of European security is moving east. The Nordic-Baltic region is likely to feature more prominently in the upcoming refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review, as the war in Ukraine and NATO’s new forward defence approach will focus UK attention and military capabilities on Europe for the foreseeable future.

But the UK still has limited resources and, despite the worsening security environment, there is currently no commitment by the Rishi Sunak government to increase defence spending beyond two per cent of GDP, as set out in the recently-published Autumn Statement.

This difficult fiscal reality contrasts UK ambition to also increase its footprint and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region highlighted by Rishi Sunak in his first foreign policy speech. London is already confronted with increasing expectations from its Nordic and Baltic partners, which are rattled by Russia’s aggression and seek more engagement and commitments from larger and more resourceful allies, and are insisting on prompt implementation of NATO’s new defence and deterrence plans.

This all comes on top of the resources that further assistance to Ukraine will require in the coming months and years. Balancing competing priorities and demands from partners is routine for a major power with global ambition but, in the current context, if the UK government fails to prioritize and increase resources, over-extension is in sight for its armed forces.

The war in Ukraine confirms that, beyond the rhetoric around the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Euro-Atlantic is – and will remain – the priority theatre of engagement for the UK. To keep delivering in the Nordic-Baltic region and remain a reliable partner, UK ambitions should be set clearly, and expectations managed with regional partners.

A good example is the recent UK-Estonia joint statement and defence roadmap, which is an attempt to reconcile London’s vision of modern deterrence with Tallinn’s preference for ‘more boots on the ground’.

The joint statement also clarifies initial misunderstandings regarding the upcoming withdrawal of the second UK battlegroup deployed to Estonia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – support Tallinn expected to continue ‘as long as necessary’ but London saw as temporary. It offsets the poor political ‘optics’ of the withdrawal while providing solid ground for deepening the common agenda in the near future.

By the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, progress on implementing the roadmap will be a crucial measure of success for the bilateral relationship, and for the UK’s broader regional role. It should serve as an opportunity for the UK to reflect on its force development priorities and balance, with Baltic partners arguing in favour of the UK rebuilding some mass in its armed forces and providing more resources to the land component.

Much to gain for the UK

The UK gains many benefits from deepening and widening its engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, and not only by showcasing its regional leadership at a time of dire need or having more weight in Europe and across the Atlantic in strategic debates about future security architecture.