Climate finance and conflict dynamics on the road to COP27 21 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2022 Online

Stakeholders discuss the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity in climate finance and action.

With climate change, fragility and conflict challenges worsening, the role of international climate finance is more urgent than ever.

From the implementation of climate finance and who it reaches to the rush for renewable energy, the inclusion of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity principles often remain absent from climate finance discussions and planning.

With COP27 around the corner and for the occasion of International Peace Day, stakeholders ranging from government representatives to climate activists discuss their perspectives on the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity as part of climate finance and action.

This event was organized in partnership with International Alert.

Food system transformation: A blind spot for climate and biodiversity action? 20 October 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can COP27 and COP15 accelerate the agenda for sustainable food systems and land use?

Tackling the dual crises of climate change and biodiversity loss requires extraordinary levels of action at an unprecedented speed. Agriculture is the biggest user of land, the biggest source of methane emissions, a major contributor to total greenhouse gas emissions and the leading driver of biodiversity loss.

Anything short of a food system transformation puts climate and biodiversity objectives in peril. However, governments have not yet produced credible pathways and strong policies for tackling our growing ‘foodprint’ – the negative impacts of what we grow and eat.

In advance of COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh for climate and COP15 in Montreal for biodiversity, Chatham House has published a new briefing paper which examines aligning food systems with climate and biodiversity targets.

The paper reviews the climate and biodiversity policy landscape to 2030, with a focus on land-based aspects and the inclusion of food and agriculture. The paper highlights serious conflicts between the impacts of the food system and goals to protect and restore biodiversity and mitigate climate change.

In light of this, opportunities for joined-up action on food, climate and biodiversity are identified, including three key steps for countries to take this decade to produce suitably ambitious and effective policies across the climate–biodiversity–food nexus.

This event brings together leading voices from the international policy arenas for climate and biodiversity to react to the briefing paper and discuss how COP27 and COP15 can accelerate the agenda for sustainable food systems and land use.

What happened at COP27? 23 November 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 November 2022 Online

Is the world getting back on track for staying within a 1.5°C temperature rise?

The COP27 summit closes out another year marked by record-breaking floods, deadly heatwaves and other extreme weather events, on top of global energy and food shortages and a cost-of-living crisis.

Remarkable geopolitical shifts including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have weakened commitments to climate goals and led many to worry that governments are backtracking on their climate pledges.

UN officials have urged countries to show up to COP27 with greater ambition but instead of new pledges, the focus is expected to be on whether countries are following through on commitments made at COP26.

This event explored whether COP27 has met the challenge of truly moving the needle, and whether the world is getting back on track for staying within the 1.5°C temperature rise, or for loss and damage and climate justice.

Our expert panel discusses the summit’s overall success and impact on delivering in key areas: climate finance, mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, nature and biodiversity and the just transition.

This event is part of the Waddesdon Club Webinar Series. The Waddesdon Club is a Chatham House initiative to encourage climate leadership in financial and economic policymaking. Since 2016, it has proved a highly successful forum for convening senior policymakers and leading climate scientists with future leaders in finance ministries, central banks and other public sector economic and financial organizations from around the world.

The initiative is supported by Ikea Foundation, KR Foundation and the Rothschild Foundation.

An Attack on the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Principle in Hong Kong Expert comment sysadmin 11 January 2016

The disappearance of publisher Lee Bo may mark the beginning of the end of Beijing’s commitment to uphold the framework that provides the territory with a high degree of autonomy.

The disappearance of a publisher in Hong Kong, Lee Bo, who owns a well-known bookshop that sells books critical of Chinese leaders, is a landmark event and potentially a historical turning point for Hong Kong. It is not clear if this happened at the behest of the senior Chinese leadership. But if those responsible for the disappearing of Lee are not punished, it will be clear that their acts are condoned by the authorities.

This is deeply worrying as it gravely undermines the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, which provides Hong Kong with high degree of autonomy from Beijing. Under the Sino-British Agreement of 1984 and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which govern relations between Hong Kong and China, the rights of Hong Kong citizens are meant to be protected within the territory. Mainland Chinese authorities do not have the legal power to arrest or detain an individual in, or remove anyone from, Hong Kong.

The Chinese know the limit of their legal authority in Hong Kong. Hence, Lee was quietly disappeared, rather than openly arrested. But that it happened at all may mark the beginning of the end of Beijing’s commitment to uphold the ‘one country, two systems’ framework – a relationship that requires Beijing to tolerate, if not respect, the judicial integrity and the way of life in Hong Kong.

Do we know for sure that Lee was ‘disappeared’ by China’s security apparatus? Before he disappeared, Lee said in an interview that he knew he had been watched and that his emails were accessed by Chinese agents, and that he would not travel to the mainland as a result. And we know that Lee’s travel documents are all in his home; yet he is now supposedly in China ‘assisting the authorities in an investigation’ into something unspecified. This explanation comes from a fax sent to Lee’s wife, probably intended by the Chinese authorities to put an end to speculation. But why would Chinese authorities work with Lee, a British citizen who carries no travel documents and would thus have broken the law by entering China? The circumstantial evidence is strong enough to show that whether he was taken by Chinese officers or someone else, his removal from Hong Kong to China must have received official endorsement.

Should the rest of the world be concerned about this? Hong Kong is a major financial center that services the world economy, and it can do so largely because it enjoys judicial independence and the high degree of autonomy under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. It is also a shining example of how the rights and scope of development for individuals can be respected in a Chinese community. Should the ‘one country, two systems’ framework be undermined, Hong Kong as we know it will be no more.

Beijing’s quick response in requiring Lee to fax his family may come across as ham-fisted and callous, but it also demonstrates that it had not expected the strong backlash to Lee’s disappearance. A strong and well-articulated international response that brings the matter to Xi’s attention may persuade him that it is in China’s best interest to put a stop to this process of undermining the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. Given Hong Kong’s importance to the global economy, this should be a priority for the international community.

This article was originally published in the Diplomat.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Taiwan Charts a New Course After Elections Expert comment sysadmin 19 January 2016

The resounding victory for the opposition marks a decisive break with the past and could make life much more difficult for Beijing.

A victory for Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential election on Saturday had been widely predicted. But the margin of victory, and the crushing defeat suffered by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in the concurrent legislative elections, could mean a conclusive shift in both the country’s domestic politics and its important relationship with Beijing.

Why the DPP won

President elect Tsai Ing-wen’s victory was no close run thing nor was it a result of a split in the opposition vote as was claimed for her predecessor. The KMT ran a disastrously inept presidential campaign. The farcical way in which they first chose then unseated a totally unsuitable candidate simply underlined their lack of cohesion or purpose. This came on top of an unconvincing record in administration that showed the party to be increasingly tired, self-destructive and out of touch. Eric Chu, the eventual replacement choice, had neither the time nor the charisma to put things right.

Moreover, on the key issue of mainland policy, the KMT had come to be seen as serving more a party interest than a national one. It now appears that a majority in Taiwan believe that the DPP will more effectively champion and promote their interests in relation to China than the KMT. The coup de theatre of the meeting of the presidents of China and Taiwan in November had no discernible electoral impact. More widely, the view of the national identity as a Taiwanese one rather than a Chinese or hybrid Chinese/Taiwanese one has taken firm hold. The DPP responded more effectively to this new political climate.

What it means for relations with Beijing

Relations between Taiwan and the mainland can only become more difficult now, but quite how that works out in practical terms remains to be seen. It seems unlikely that China will choose, initially at least, to row back from the agreements reached with the outgoing administration, but further progress will be problematic. A new basis needs to be worked out for political negotiations, and neither side will wish to compromise its position. It is likely that there will be increasingly hard line and even bellicose rhetoric emanating from some quarters in China, but it will remain more measured on the official side. The reality of China’s military and economic power remains there for all to see.

The last DPP administration saw heightened tensions in US/China/Taiwan relations. The US will no doubt be arguing for calm and caution with both sides. All the official pronouncements so far from the DPP have been moderate. There is no desire for a confrontational policy from Taiwan, but equally Tsai made it clear that she was determined that ‘our democratic system, national identity, and international space must be respected. Any form of suppression will harm the stability of cross strait relations.’

A new era

President elect Tsai will be able to form and run an administration free from the shackles of a hostile legislature that made life so difficult for the first DPP administration under Chen Shui-bian, and her party can now claim a convincing popular mandate. She won by a margin of twelve percentage points over her rivals.

But the new administration faces real challenges, even beyond mainland policy. Taiwan’s economy has been relatively stagnant. There are increasing demands for new style politics. In her victory speech Tsai spoke of her wish to respond to the desire of the people for a government that is more willing to listen and one that is more transparent and accountable. She will want to escape from the shadow of the corruption that blighted the last DPP administration.

The DPP now has full control of Taiwan’s political processes for the first time ever, but equally significantly the pretensions of the KMT to be the natural ruling party in Taiwan have been dealt a devastating blow. Taiwan’s democracy has moved into a new era.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Populism Comes to South Korea Expert comment sysadmin 20 December 2016

Public disgust with the embattled president reflects not only the unedifying details of her impeachment but a wider distrust of the political system.

For South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye, the jury is quite literally still out. Impeached by the country’s National Assembly on 9 December over claims of corruption, cronyism and influence peddling, she defiantly rejected – in a detailed statement – all of the charges levelled at her by an independent prosecutor. Any resolution of the issue must now await the ruling of the country’s Constitutional Court on the legitimacy of the impeachment vote – a decision that most likely will come early in the new year.

For the special prosecutor’s office, which is due to start its formal investigation on 21 December, the challenge is to find unambiguous evidence of the president’s direct responsibility for any of the corruption that may have taken place. The president, for her part, can claim, with some credibility that so far she has been tried only in the court of public opinion; that in South Korea’s rumour-prone, scandal-hungry media environment in which prosecutors have been known in the past to leak information to skew public debate, she has been denied natural justice and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Long shadows

But for the more than three-quarters of the Korean public calling for Park’s resignation, the president is symptomatic of Korean society’s wider flaws, including a pattern of corruption, privilege and hypocrisy endemic to the country’s political, economic and social elites. At a time of anemic economic growth (the country’s growth rate is predicted to slow to 2.1% next year), widening wealth and income disparities and reduced employment opportunities for a highly educated workforce, there is a growing mood of populist disaffection with the entire social and political system – for its lack of fairness and transparency and its perceived regulatory inefficiencies. This has been highlighted dramatically by disasters such as the Sewol ferry sinking that claimed the lives of some 300 school-children in August 2014 – at which time the president was castigated for being absent from her office at the time of a grave national crisis.

Complicating the current stand-off is the long-shadow of identity politics and unresolved disagreements about the country’s postwar historical narrative. As the daughter of the man responsible for the Korean economic ‘miracle’ who protected the country from the external communist threat in the North and radical subversion from within, Park’s political lineage is, for the older generation of voters in their sixties and above, a powerful reason to back the beleaguered president.

Already there are signs that this constituency is beginning to rally behind Park, with 30,000 demonstrating on 17 December against the impeachment decision, and with the governing Saenuri party showing signs of a consolidation of power around pro-Park legislators. The president, who has a reputation for stubbornness, may be calculating that this core support may allow her to defy the much larger calls for her resignation. She may also be hoping that the constitutional court, in which the majority of justices are politically conservative, will rule in her favour, allowing her to see out the remainder of her time in office, set to end in February 2018.

A pro-Park ruling by the court seems unlikely given the weight of the circumstantial evidence. Leading opposition politicians, including Moon Jae-in, former head of the Democratic Party and the current front runner in any post-impeachment presidential contest, has warned of a popular ‘revolution’ if the impeachment vote is not upheld. Moreover, the appetite for street protests against the president remains undimmed, and even conservative politicians appear to be positioning themselves for a post-Park era. Ban Ki-moon, the outgoing UN secretary general and long considered a likely Saenuri party candidate for the presidency, has been publicly distancing himself from Park. With 20.5% support, behind Moon on 23.7%, he has compelling reasons to align himself with the popular mood.

Lessons

At an individual level, the experience of President Park combines both political failure and personal tragedy. She has demonstrably failed to live up to her early commitments to represent all Koreans and to bridge the deep divisions between left and right in Korean society. She has also remained deeply isolated from the professional politicians and democratic polity she purports to lead. This is perhaps not so surprising given her authoritarian heritage and the experience of seeing both her parents assassinated in space of five years in the 1970s. The trauma of this experience reportedly made her distrustful of government officials and overly inclined to rely on the guidance of personal friends of dubious reliability, the font of her current troubles. There is also a profound irony that a politician who came to power vowing to place ‘trust-politik’ at the heart of her policy towards North Korea has seen her political position undermined, perhaps fatally, by a near complete collapse in public confidence in her administration.

More widely, the Park saga reveals an important and potentially seismic shift in public attitudes in South Korea, perhaps spurred by a growing populist trend evident elsewhere, whether in the US, Europe or parts of Southeast Asia. Koreans appear to have lost patience with their political system. This new climate of dissent – emboldened by the signs that protest can potentially lead to radical political change – is likely to prove a challenge to any future Korean leader hoping to secure the trust and legitimacy needed to govern.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

What to Know About Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Expert comment sysadmin 27 March 2017

Tim Summers looks at what we know about Carrie Lam, the territory’s new leader, and where Hong Kong politics goes from here.

Carrie Lam, formerly number two in the Hong Kong government, was selected as the Special Administrative Region’s new chief executive on 26 March. What does the process and her selection say about Hong Kong’s political future?

1. Elections for Hong Kong’s top job are still within Beijing’s control. Due to the failure of political reform proposals in 2015, Lam was elected on the basis of 777 votes from the 1,194 members of the Chief Executive Election Committee. This ‘small-circle’ process was essentially the same as that used since 1997 (the only change being the expansion of the committee from its initial size of 800). The design of the process favours Beijing, and indeed Lam was the favoured candidate of the central government and many of its supporters in Hong Kong.
2. But the influence of the central government has limits. The second-ranked candidate, former finance minister John Tsang (365 votes), had not been encouraged to stand by Beijing, and a fourth candidate, Regina Ip (who did not obtain enough nominations to join the vote), reportedly also rejected suggestions from Beijing that she should not put herself forward. The Committee itself contained 325 individuals affiliated to or sympathetic to opposition parties and around 100 establishment figures who did not support Lam – most of whom voted for Tsang. Although Lam gained more votes than her predecessor, CY Leung, in 2012 (he obtained 689 votes after a controversial campaign when scandals undermined his main opponent), Beijing appears to have expended substantial political capital in securing her victory.
3. Despite the closed process, public opinion matters. The campaign saw all the candidates actively seek not only the votes of committee members, but also wider popular support. This highlights the need for broader legitimacy, and the fact that public participation and media debate are central factors in Hong Kong’s open political culture. A number of opinion polls showed Lam to have notably lower levels of popular support than Tsang. This will constrain her ability to govern effectively and she will not be cut much slack by the Hong Kong population. There were protests at the election venue calling for ‘genuine universal suffrage’.
4. The new chief executive is an economic interventionist. The two main candidates – Lam and Tsang – have different policy approaches. Tsang’s was a more liberal ‘laissez faire’ one. Lam is likely to continue the somewhat more interventionist approach of CY Leung, who intervened more than previous governments to try to stabilize property prices and make more land available for housing, as well as reinstating policies targeting poverty and agreeing measures to limit the social impact of rising numbers of visitors and money from mainland China.
5. Political reform seems very far off. The third candidate, former judge Woo Kwok-hing, had the clearest position on the thorny issue of political reform. Many of the government’s critics see less prospect for progress here under Lam, who fronted the government’s consultation processes during the 2013–15 debates over political reform. Lam gave some conflicting signals during the campaign, and it remains to be seen whether she tries to restart the process. But given rising populism, the growing fragmentation and polarization of Hong Kong politics, and entrenched positions from both Beijing and the opposition, it will be even more difficult to obtain consensus on a way forward than when the last failed attempt at reform took place – a key indicator will be whether all political parties are willing to discuss compromises.
6. July’s anniversary will be contentious. Following formal appointment by the central government, Lam’s term will begin on 1 July. This will also mark the 20th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, which will coincide with a planned visit by President Xi Jinping. This will no doubt spark protests; for many, the 20th anniversary of the handover will therefore be less a time for celebration than an opportunity for many to highlight concerns about the future of the former British colony.

China Paves Its Way in New Areas of International Law Expert comment sysadmin 31 March 2017

China is looking to increase its capacity and influence in international legal matters – and it is particularly in frontier areas of the law that China is likely to take a proactive stance.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi called China a staunch defender and builder of the international rule of law in his speech to the UN General Assembly in October 2014. He promised that as China grew stronger, it would make a greater contribution to the maintenance and promotion of international rule of law, and would work with other countries to build a fairer and more reasonable international political and economic order.

For many in China, that time has now come: there is a sense that China deserves a much stronger and more respected voice in discussions surrounding the future of the international system. The recent speeches of Xi Jinping in Davos and Geneva in January 2017 suggest that China is now seizing the initiative and fighting for a voice and influence commensurate with its status and power as the number two economy in the world.

But there is an interesting divide in the areas in which China chooses to assert itself. In traditional areas of international law – such as the law of the sea and international human rights law – China continues to harbour reservations about the fairness of the existing international order. Its misgivings are fuelled by a perception that it did not play a significant part in the creation of the post-Second World War international order, and that those rules operate mainly in the interests of Western powers.

There is also a sense that traditional areas of international law do not offer a level playing field for China, since Western states have far more experience at operating in those. We know from Chinese experts that in the South China Sea case, one background issue that played into China’s refusal to engage in litigation with the Philippines and other interested states (which were represented by leading Western international lawyers) was a lack of experience before international courts and tribunals.

Contrast this with newer areas of international law– such as the regimes governing cyber, space, climate change and deep sea mining issues. In these areas, the rules are still in the process of being developed and tested, and the influence of the existing powers is not so firmly established or accepted, so there is more opportunity for China’s voice to be heard and heeded.

On climate change, China has become a champion of the Paris Agreement, which it worked hard with the Obama administration to secure. China is also active in some of the processes related to cyber rule-making, both as a member of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on cyber issues and through bilateral dialogues with a number of states. China has taken a keen interest in the regime applicable to the mining of the international seabed, making submissions to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea about the procedure for settling disputes. In international economic law, another relatively new area, China has been assiduously cultivating expertise, and is a major player in the negotiation of the ‘mega regional’ trade deal, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

In time, the development of China’s much heralded Belt and Road Initiative may provide an opportunity for China to be further involved in international norm-setting, through the creation of a system of economic and political interaction that is built and run more along Chinese determined lines. The emergence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may offer an early indicator of China’s attempts to shape global governance, although in this context China has so far scrupulously observed international standards and has made no open attempt to challenge them.

So far, China’s practical input to international norm-setting has been limited. While China is prone to making wide-ranging statements of principle, it finds it more challenging to engage in the nitty gritty of specific rule making. But as is clear from its membership of the WTO, China can adapt quickly. While initially it was a reluctant adherent to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, China is now adept at making active and effective use of its rules to promote China’s interests, including launching a legal challenge regarding the contested issue of its non-market economy status. Overall, there is strong leadership backing for a more activist approach to its engagement with the international legal system.

China sees international law as an important instrument in the “toolbox” of international diplomacy. It will increasingly be seeking to leverage international law to promote its own interests, particularly in newer areas, as it seeks to strengthen its wider soft power and influence.

Twenty Years After Hong Kong Handover, Does ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Still Work? Expert comment sysadmin 28 June 2017

This unique constitutional framework can endure – if Hong Kong society can reconcile its different visions of the future.

Twenty years after the handover of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty, the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement – the main aim of which was to guarantee the continuity of Hong Kong’s open society and way of life – can be said to have worked well. Street protests remain a regular feature of Hong Kong’s political culture. Freedom of information and expression are alive and well. Hong Kong retains its ‘capitalist way of life’, its legal system based on common law and independent judiciary, and its status as an international financial centre. As a result the city remains one of the most open economies across Asia, with robust institutions and transparency which are hard to find anywhere else in the region.

Yet the 79-day ‘occupy’ protests of autumn 2014 showed that something is not quite right in the city of Hong Kong.

The protests themselves had a number of causes. Partly they reflected socioeconomic concerns, especially the rise in income inequality and lack of affordable housing. These might have been dealt with to some extent by better governance over the years, but they are also a feature of many societies in the current phase of globalization – a case, perhaps, of too much ‘capitalist way of life’.

Politically, the desire expressed by many in 2014 was for a form of ‘genuine universal suffrage’ for the selection of Hong Kong’s chief executive which went beyond a provision of Hong Kong’s mini constitution, the Basic Law, that candidates should be put forward by a ‘nominating committee’. It was on this point that the possibility of constitutional reform foundered in 2015, leaving Hong Kong no further ahead in its ‘gradual progress’ towards democracy.

But this episode also brought to the surface the tension between different visions for Hong Kong’s future. In particular, many in Hong Kong are still uncomfortable with the ‘one country’ part of the deal, rejected by some (especially young people) in the ways that they conceptualize Hong Kong identity – according to one recent survey, as little as 3.1% of Hong Kong youths identify themselves as ‘Chinese’. These issues are likely to constrain political development for some time to come.

At their sharpest, some of these visions are for some form of self-determination, or even independence, for Hong Kong. This is not just anathema to the national authorities in Beijing, but contradicts a basic tenet of Hong Kong’s handover in 1997, the return to Chinese sovereignty. This is not just something on which Beijing will never compromise, but will seek to challenge.

It is this which explains the sense in Hong Kong that the central government has been looking to become politically more involved since 2014. But the challenge of influencing Hong Kong society is great, and other than strengthening relations with the establishment camp, Beijing has not been able to tighten its grip. If anything, the centre of gravity of Hong Kong politics has continued to drift away from Beijing, not towards it.

How this will play out remains to be seen. Some amelioration of social tensions could help. But the fundamental divergence in visions of Hong Kong’s future will not be resolved so easily.

Looking forward therefore, the key to the continued success of ‘one country, two systems’ lies in Hong Kong society. If mainstream acceptance of the compromises involved can return, then this unique constitutional framework can still work for years to come.

‘Hong Kong is now in the hands of its people – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now.’ Expert comment sysadmin 29 June 2017

Kerry Brown on ‘one country, two systems’, the UK’s diminishing influence and the territory’s future, 20 years after the handover.

1 July marks the 20th anniversary of the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China. Kerry Brown speaks with Jason Naselli about what the future holds for the territory.

How sustainable is the ‘one country, two systems’ framework? Will the arrangement last the full 50 years (until 2047) as originally envisioned?

It is questionable whether the arrangement that exists today was the one envisioned in 1997 when the handover happened. It was always a very abstract, flexible system, granting Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, meaning it could maintain its capitalist system. Of course, in the lead up to 1997 all these things were broadly seen as being in Beijing’s interests to preserve.

But these days, the one thing that few said in 1997 has come to pass – the People’s Republic has maintained one-party rule as a political system, but become one of the world’s great economies. It has been so far a huge success.

Hong Kong therefore has diminished in importance over the years to the point that maintaining at least some semblance of one country, two systems is almost like an act of charity. It has been nibbled at, compromised and seems to grow weaker by the day. Most in Hong Kong would say there is a system: one country, one system. That’s the deal.

The central government’s deepening involvement in the territory’s politics is a subject of growing controversy in Hong Kong. Does the Chinese government need to alter its approach?

Not particularly. It doesn’t want to see Hong Kong fail as an economy. That doesn’t suit its interests at all. But nor does it want a truculent, disobedient polity that is meant to be part of its sovereign territory.

So it has increasingly set political parameters. Hong Kong can have its unique system – as long as it is obedient. And on the whole, that is the deal that all of the city’s chief executives until now have internally understood perfectly.

As part of the 1997 handover, the UK has ‘a continuing moral and political obligation’ to Hong Kong. How will this relationship play out as Brexit shifts Britain’s place in the world?

The Foreign Office offers a six-monthly report to Parliament, updating on how the handover deal is going. As the years go on, however, it becomes increasingly illusive how the UK has any real locus to say much about the situation on Hong Kong. It did say, rightly, that the detainment of one of the booksellers taken in in 2015 was a violation of the treaty because he was British. This was the strongest wording that has ever appeared from an official British source. But with dependence on creating a new kind of relationship with China now foremost in people’s minds because of Brexit and other economic pressures, it is not surprising that the priority increasingly lies elsewhere.

With direct management of Hong Kong gone, the UK was always going to be more and more irrelevant. That has happened. And in any case, relations with China have had to become more complex and multifaceted. Hong Kong was always the tail wagging the dog for the UK relations with China. Now there has been a rebalancing, the calculation always has to be how much unilaterally supporting Hong Kong will damage relations with Beijing. This has become an increasingly asymmetrical question: in a playoff, preserving links with Beijing will always prevail. That’s just the reality of the new world we are seeing come into being.

Hong Kong has played an important financial role for China over the past 20 years, but where will it fit as markets and financial institutions on the mainland mature?

It maintains is role as a major RMB hub, and as a finance centre. But it is surrounded by competition. Singapore, and Sydney, and other places in the region have RMB deals. Shanghai and Tianjin aspire to be portals for entry to the domestic Chinese market. Hong Kong every day has to think of new ways to maintain its relevance and beat back competition. So far, it has done well. But this is an issue it can never be complacent about.

What has been the most significant change in Hong Kong society since 1997?

The rising cultural and linguistic influence of the mainland on Hong Kong. Hong Kong has maintained its difference – but it has had to change. It is clear that Hong Kong is now in the hands of Hong Kongese – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now. The culture, identity and future of the territory are in their hands. In that sense, they have autonomy.

China, Liu Xiaobo and the New Reality of Human Rights Expert comment sysadmin 18 July 2017

Liu Xiaobo, Chinese Nobel laureate and human rights campaigner, died on 13 July while serving an 11-year prison sentence for ‘subversion’. Steve Tsang tells Jason Naselli that the reaction to Liu’s death reflects the growing confidence of the Chinese government that it can ignore Western criticism.

What does the Communist Party’s handling of the case of Liu Xiaobo tell us about its approach to dissidents and freedom of speech in the Xi era?

What it tells us is the party is tightening control much more than before. The Liu Xiaobo case shows that the party is not comfortable with people asking for the constitution of the People’s Republic of China to be enforced. Charter 08, for which Liu Xiaobo was jailed, ultimately amounts to asking for the rights of Chinese citizens, as articulated in the constitution, to be fully implemented. That resulted in Liu Xiaobo being incarcerated.

But what is really important isn’t so much that the party is tightening its control – that is happening anyway. What is more important is that the party is not that worried about how the Liu Xiaobo case affects international opinion.

If that’s the case, what lessons should countries looking to trade with China but concerned about human rights abuses take from Liu’s case?

We haven’t seen any major Western country come out to strongly and clearly hold the Chinese government to account over Liu Xiaobo’s human rights situation. A few leading governments have asked for Liu Xiaobo’s widow to be allowed to choose to stay or leave China. But so far there is no indication of any government backing that up with anything concrete.

That is very weak support for human rights in China. And it reflects a new reality: of the unwillingness of leading democracies to challenge the Chinese government on human rights matters, and the confidence on the part of the Chinese government to simply ignore what the rest of the world may think about it.

Given that there has been much discussion of China taking a larger global leadership role in the wake of an inward political turn in the US, what are the implications of Liu’s case for China’s global standing?

The implications are really small. There is a stronger expectation and desire to see China playing a global role because Donald Trump has damaged the standing of the United States as a global leader. It is not because of something that the Chinese government has done; it’s because of Trump.

That wider context hasn’t changed. So the Chinese government’s calculation is that the negative international reaction to Liu Xiaobo’s death will blow over in a matter of days – at worst, a couple of weeks – and then things will get back to normal.

There is no serious reason to believe that the Chinese government is wrong in their calculation. At the moment, the major Western countries are focusing on the economic relationship, and doing what they have to do pro forma about human rights issues in China. No major Western government is going to say that they are going to reconsider a major trade deal with China because of how Liu Xiaobo or his family has been treated. The Chinese government knows that and they act accordingly.

Moving on from the international reaction, how does Liu’s situation resonate within China?

Most Chinese don’t even know who Liu Xiaobo is. Within China, you cannot even search Liu Xiaobo’s name, or any permutation of Liu Xiaobo’s name, or the English initials of Liu Xiaobo. Anything potentially about or related to Liu Xiaobo is being censored.

Some things still get through; the ingenuity of a lot of bloggers is infinite. But most Chinese don’t even know what happened to Liu Xiaobo, or if they do, they mostly see him as a shill of the Western world trying to infiltrate and destabilize China.

If Western governments won’t engage China over human rights, what implications does that have for the global treatment of human rights as China becomes a bigger global player?

You can ‘engage’ in the sense of raising the issue with the Chinese authorities, as indeed the UK government and the German government have done, for example. But they haven’t actually taken any concrete steps.

The type of engagement where Western governments would get the Chinese government to demonstrate that something concrete was being done to improve the human rights situation – that era has gone. It is not going to come back in the foreseeable future. And therefore, the situation in terms of human rights in China will not be improving in the foreseeable future.

But what is more significant is how the Chinese government is asserting itself and dealing with domestic and international challenges, including on human rights issues. For many other countries around the world, China is showing an example for how to deal with the West. They don’t see it as being negative; they see it in positive terms.

There are still more countries in the world that abuse human rights than respect human rights. Most of those governments are pleased to see what the Chinese government has done in terms of how it handles the West.

Root Causes of Rohingya Crisis Must Not be Ignored Expert comment sysadmin 28 September 2017

The focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis in Myanmar, whether at the global or regional level.

Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent speech on the Rohingya crisis was - at best - light on details on how the current situation could be remedied and - at worst - full of easily disproven assertions.

While she does not directly control the military, it is her government that is blocking humanitarian access to the areas affected by the violence. And the Rohingya have faced systemic persecution and discrimination for decades.

Some may argue this is simply realpolitik and that any public support for the Rohingya could mean facing a backlash from the military and a large part of her support base. But arguably, she does have moral authority (which helped her in the past to stand up to the military generals) that is now being eroded by her ambivalence in speaking out.

However, the focus on Aung San Suu Kyi masks the complete lack of an adequate response to the crisis – whether at the global or regional level.

Undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys

Since the attacks on border and military posts by the armed group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017, there has been a strong military crackdown against the Rohingya in Rakhine state: a substantial number of Rohingya villages destroyed; close to half a million people Rohingya fleeing into Bangladesh and tens of thousands internally displaced within Myanmar.

Prince bin Ra’ad , UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has called the crisis a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and tens of thousands of Rohingya are still undertaking dangerous and perilous journeys seeking sanctuary. In response, the UN and EU have focused on addressing the immediate humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh, which is already home to many formerly displaced Rohingya communities.

Within the region, Sheikh Hasina’s secular Awami League government in Bangladesh initially proposed joint military operations with Myanmar against the ARSA - in part because of concerns about the long standing relationship between Rohingya political or armed groups and the Jamaat-e-Islami, an ally of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

However, faced with massive refugee flows, Bangladesh turned its focus to the humanitarian crisis while stressing that Myanmar must allow the return of refugees. Bangladesh’s concern is partly motivated by internal security concerns. If the current situation becomes protracted, with no clear resolution in sight, frustration could create the conditions for further radicalisation within Rohingya communities.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has yet to come to grips with the situation. Despite its mandate to ensure peace and stability within the region, its policy of non-interference and consensus trumps the need to secure and maintain stability. Instead countries have responded bilaterally - for example, Indonesia sent its foreign minister to both Myanmar and Bangladesh while Malaysia has been consistently vocal about its concerns.

So this raises broader questions on the effectiveness of ASEAN. Currently celebrating its 50th anniversary, ASEAN needs to decide how to mediate and resolve issues with regional implications as its principle of non-intervention effectively blocks any constructive discussion on the Rohingyas ongoing statelessness and impact of this on the region.

However, there is also an opportunity here for ASEAN to consider how mediation and negotiation could potentially manage such crises. And there is a historical precedent: the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indo-Chinese refugees saw cooperation between recipient countries in the region and the international community on how to resettle Vietnamese refugees (although Cold War considerations did play a part in that specific crisis).

India and China have both backed Myanmar, reflecting their economic and security interests in the country but also motivated by each wanting to contain the influence of the other within Myanmar. Rakhine is important with its natural resources and coastal location and, as China is not directly affected by the refugee crisis, it has less to lose than others in standing by Aung San Suu Kyi and her government.

India is nearing completion of the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit Transport Project, connecting the Bay of Bengal with the northeast Indian state of Mizoram, and sees Myanmar as an important market for its regional ambitions. For parts of the Indian administration, the crisis plays to a domestic narrative that some of the Rohingya already settled in Jammu and Kashmir have links to armed groups in Pakistan and are an internal security concern.

So while India is providing humanitarian aid to Bangladesh, it is also threatening to deport almost 40,000 Rohingya. The case is currently being heard at the Indian Supreme Court, but given that the Rohingya lack citizenship in Myanmar, it is not clear to where they would be deported.

Myanmar, ASEAN and other affected countries need to show political will to find a solution to the Rohingya’s long-standing issue of statelessness - discrimination was legally formalised in a 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, which recognised 135 ethnicities for citizenship but excluded the Rohingya.

The root causes of this crisis – long standing discrimination, persecution and lack of citizenship – cannot be ignored. There is a need for a comprehensive peace process, which recognises the ethnic and religious diversity within Myanmar.

And incentives, such as improving infrastructure, access to services and livelihoods, may also be needed to ensure there is a lasting solution that allows the Rohingya return and thrive as part of Myanmar society.

Without such a response, it is difficult to see an end to the current impasse.

The Hard Truth Is Rohingya Refugees Are Not Going Home Expert comment sysadmin 6 October 2017

The only likely outcome of the crisis is the near-permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya along the Bangladesh border.

The harrowing scenes of human suffering on the Myanmar–Bangladesh border have provoked outpourings of sympathy and some firm statements by international politicians. At least half a million people have been brutally expelled from their homes and are now living in miserable conditions in muddy refugee camps and storm-drenched shanty towns. As the international community debates how to respond, it needs to take a clear-eyed view of the situation and recognise a brutal truth: the refugees are almost certainly not going home.

Consequently, policymakers must not hide behind the fiction that Bangladesh is only temporarily hosting the refugees in preparation for their rapid return home. Over-optimistic assumptions now will lead to worse misery in the long term. Instead, the world needs to plan on the basis that Bangladesh will be hosting a very large and permanent refugee population.

The expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State in northwestern Myanmar is the culmination of decades of discriminatory policies enacted by the country’s military rulers since 1962. In 1978, the Burmese military’s ‘Operation Dragon King’ pushed 200,000 Muslims into Bangladesh. International pressure forced the military to allow most of them to return. Then, in 1991–92, the military again expelled a quarter of a million people. Bangladesh forced some of them back over the border and eventually the military agreed to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to manage the repatriation of most of the remainder.

State-sponsored abuses of the Rohingya and ethnic violence perpetrated against them by chauvinists among the ethnic Rakhine population have continued. The abuse became dramatically worse in 2012 when tens of thousands of Rohingya were forced to flee their homes, although most remained inside the country. This year, armed attacks by self-proclaimed defenders of the Rohingya, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, gave the military an excuse to mount what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called ‘a textbook example of ethnic cleansing’.

It is tempting to believe that, as before, the Myanmar government will allow the expelled Rohingya to return after international pressure. However, recent geopolitical developments in southeast Asia and the election of a democratic government in Myanmar in 2015 make this much less likely.

Southeast Asia is now an arena of geopolitical competition between China and its rivals: mainly the United States, India and Japan. All are battling for influence. Both China and India have made public statements of support for Myanmar’s government in the current crisis. In that context, diplomatic pressure or economic sanctions imposed by Europe or the United States will only have one effect – to push Myanmar towards China.

Moreover, those in the EU and US who want to see democracy survive in Myanmar will be unwilling to push the elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi too far. There is an extraordinary degree of hostility towards the Rohingya among the majority Bamar population. This has broken out into street violence on occasions but even where the situation is calm, anti-Muslim prejudice is easily awoken. The current government is very unlikely to challenge such sentiments at a time when it is trying to preserve its position against the military’s continuing domination of political and economic life.

Myanmar is one of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations but ASEAN is unlikely to impose any meaningful pressure. Only Malaysia has been publicly critical of Myanmar’s government. Indonesia has attempted to mediate – its foreign minister Retno Marsudi has held face-to-face meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi – but without apparent effect. Both countries have sent aid and volunteers to the Rohingya refugee camps but there is absolutely no talk of sanctions or other overt pressure.

The question then is: what will happen to the refugees? One option could be resettlement, but neither Bangladesh nor any of the other states in the region are willing to take them in. Malaysia already hosts 60,000 registered Rohingya refugees and probably another 150,000 unregistered ones. Unknown thousands of Rohingya have fled to Thailand and Indonesia by boat but have often fallen victim to unscrupulous human traffickers in cahoots with local officials. Thailand has already said it will refuse to allow new ‘boat people’ to land.

The only likely outcome therefore is the near-permanent presence of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya along the Bangladesh border. Delaying preparations for a permanent refugee population in the hope that they will be allowed to re-cross the border back into Myanmar will only make the situation worse. Seventy years ago, another ‘temporary’ movement of people into refugee camps created decades of instability around the Middle East. The world must remember the Palestinians as it plans for the future of the Rohingya.

Artificial Intelligence Apps Risk Entrenching India’s Socio-economic Inequities Expert comment sysadmin 14 March 2018

Artificial intelligence applications will not be a panacea for addressing India’s grand challenges. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is high on the Indian government’s agenda. Some days ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Wadhwani Institute for Artificial Intelligence, reportedly India’s first research institute focused on AI solutions for social good. In the same week, Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant argued that AI could potentially add $957 billion to the economy and outlined ways in which AI could be a ‘game changer’.

During his budget speech, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced that Niti Aayog would spearhead a national programme on AI; with the near doubling of the Digital India budget, the IT ministry also announced the setting up of four committees for AI-related research. An industrial policy for AI is also in the pipeline, expected to provide incentives to businesses for creating a globally competitive Indian AI industry.

Narratives on the emerging digital economy often suffer from technological determinism — assuming that the march of technological transformation has an inner logic, independent of social choice and capable of automatically delivering positive social change. However, technological trajectories can and must be steered by social choice and aligned with societal objectives. Modi’s address hit all the right notes, as he argued that the ‘road ahead for AI depends on and will be driven by human intentions’. Emphasising the need to direct AI technologies towards solutions for the poor, he called upon students and teachers to identify ‘the grand challenges facing India’ – to ‘Make AI in India and for India’.

To do so, will undoubtedly require substantial investments in R&D, digital infrastructure and education and re-skilling. But, two other critical issues must be simultaneously addressed: data bias and access to technology gains.

While computers have been mimicking human intelligence for some decades now, a massive increase in computational power and the quantity of available data are enabling a process of ‘machine learning.’ Instead of coding software with specific instructions to accomplish a set task, machine learning involves training an algorithm on large quantities of data to enable it to self-learn; refining and improving its results through multiple iterations of the same task. The quality of data sets used to train machines is thus a critical concern in building AI applications.

Much recent research shows that applications based on machine learning reflect existing social biases and prejudice. Such bias can occur if the data set the algorithm is trained on is unrepresentative of the reality it seeks to represent. If for example, a system is trained on photos of people that are predominantly white, it will have a harder time recognizing non-white people. This is what led a recent Google application to tag black people as gorillas.

Alternatively, bias can also occur if the data set itself reflects existing discriminatory or exclusionary practices. A recent study by ProPublica found for example that software that was being used to assess the risk of recidivism in criminals in the United States was twice as likely to mistakenly flag black defendants as being at higher risk of committing future crimes.

The impact of such data bias can be seriously damaging in India, particularly at a time of growing social fragmentation. It can contribute to the entrenchment of social bias and discriminatory practices, while rendering both invisible and pervasive the processes through which discrimination occurs. Women are 34 per cent less likely to own a mobile phone than men – manifested in only 14 per cent of women in rural India owning a mobile phone, while only 30 per cent of India’s internet users are women.

Women’s participation in the labour force, currently at around 27 per cent, is also declining, and is one of the lowest in South Asia. Data sets used for machine learning are thus likely to have a marked gender bias. The same observations are likely to hold true for other marginalized groups as well.

Accorded to a 2014 report, Muslims, Dalits and tribals make up 53 per cent of all prisoners in India; National Crime Records Bureau data from 2016 shows in some states, the percentage of Muslims in the incarcerated population was almost three times the percentage of Muslims in the overall population. If AI applications for law and order are built on this data, it is not unlikely that it will be prejudiced against these groups.

(It is worth pointing out that the recently set-up national AI task force is comprised of mostly Hindu men – only two women are on the task force, and no Muslims or Christians. A recent article in the New York Times talked about AI’s ‘white guy problem’; will India suffer from a ‘Hindu male bias’?)

Yet, improving the quality, or diversity, of data sets may not be able to solve the problem. The processes of machine learning and reasoning involve a quagmire of mathematical functions, variables and permutations, the logic of which are not readily traceable or predictable. The dazzle of AI-enabled efficiency gains must not blind us to the fact that while AI systems are being integrated into key socio-economic systems, their accuracy and logic of reasoning have not been fully understood or studied.

The other big challenge stems from the distribution of AI-led technology gains. Even if estimates of AI contribution to GDP are correct, the adoption of these technologies is likely to be in niches within the organized sector. These industries are likely to be capital- rather than labour-intensive, and thus unlikely to contribute to large-scale job creation.

At the same time, AI applications can most readily replace low- to medium-skilled jobs within the organized sector. This is already being witnessed in the outsourcing sector – where basic call and chat tasks are now automated. Re-skilling will be important, but it is unlikely that those who lose their jobs will also be those who are being re-skilled – the long arch of technological change and societal adaptation is longer than that of people’s lives. The contractualization of work, already on the rise, is likely to further increase as large industries prefer to have a flexible workforce to adapt to technological change. A shift from formal employment to contractual work can imply a loss of access to formal social protection mechanisms, increasing the precariousness of work for workers.

The adoption of AI technologies is also unlikely in the short- to medium-term in the unorganized sector, which engages more than 80 per cent of India’s labor force. The cost of developing and deploying AI applications, particularly in relation to the cost of labour, will inhibit adoption. Moreover, most enterprises within the unorganized sector still have limited access to basic, older technologies – two-thirds of the workforce are employed in enterprises without electricity. Eco-system upgrades will be important but incremental. Given the high costs of developing AI-based applications, most start-ups are unlikely to be working towards creating bottom-of-the-pyramid solutions.

Access to AI-led technology gains is thus likely to be heavily differentiated – a few high-growth industries can be expected, but these will not necessarily result in the welfare of labour. Studies show that labour share of national income, especially routine labour, has been declining steadily across developing countries.

We should be clear that new technological applications themselves are not going to transform or disrupt this trend – rather, without adequate policy steering, these trends will be exacerbated.

Policy debates about AI applications in India need to take these two issues seriously. AI applications will not be a panacea for addressing ‘India’s grand challenges’. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures, even making them technologically binding.

In addition to developing AI applications and creating a skilled workforce, the government needs to prioritize research that examines the complex social, ethical and governance challenges associated with the spread of AI-driven technologies. Blind technological optimism might entrench rather than alleviate the grand Indian challenge of inequity and growth.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

The Migration-Deportation-Return Nexus 6 June 2018 — 1:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 May 2018 Chatham House, London

In 2015, the unprecedented numbers of migrants crossing borders subjected the EU to extraordinary moral and political pressure, as the number of asylum-seekers soared 122 per cent to 1.3 million people.

In response, the EU has sought to accelerate the deportation of failed asylum-seekers and migrants who arrive without proper documentation. The European Commission has recommended that “all leverage and incentives” be used to “ensure that third countries fulfil their international obligation to take back their own nationals residing irregularly in Europe.”

The Valletta Action Plan, the EU-Turkey deal, the Brussels Agreement with Afghanistan, the EU deal with Nigeria and the new “results-oriented Partnership Framework” signal more restrictive approaches and an outsourcing of the securitization of migration.

However, the EU’s attempt to reconcile its legal and humanitarian obligations with stronger measures has encountered some serious challenges.

This roundtable stimulates dialogue on the circumstances surrounding migrant youth both in Afghanistan and the Edo state in Nigeria, and identifies key questions for further research on the ground.

Contextualising young people’s experiences within a “migration-deportation-return” nexus provides an entry point for the identification of both the commonalities and specifics of the challenges and risks that migrant youth face.

In line with UNICEF’s policy priorities related to children on the move, and initiating global debates in child rights and development, this collaboration forms part of the efforts that seek to inform global research and policy agenda for this most vulnerable of groups under the radar.

The intended outcome of this collaboration is to begin developing a set of core objectives and indicators to help guide the EU, Afghanistan and Nigeria in their treatment of youth, and to facilitate improved donor and host government understanding of the issues.

Participants include experts, researchers, academics, representatives of civil society and governmental institutions.

Attendance is by invitation-only.

The event is co-hosted with UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti and the University of Cambridge.

Climate Change and the Pacific: Impacts and Adaptation 27 November 2018 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 14 November 2018 Royal Academy of Arts

Combatting Human Trafficking: The Situation in East Asia 16 September 2019 — 10:30AM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 August 2019 Taipei, Taiwan

In 2017, there were an estimated 40.3 million victims of modern slavery worldwide. The prevalence for individuals to fall victim to forced labour practices is highest in the Asia-Pacific region where four out of every 1,000 people have been found to be victims of forced labour and labour trafficking. Many of these victims end up in the more developed economies of East Asia as destination countries of labour trafficking. Such cases are, however, often under-reported and under-detected, largely owing to a lack of a coherent response to trafficking across the sub-region.

At this roundtable, organized in partnership with the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and the University of Portsmouth, participants will discuss emerging anti-trafficking practices from a regional perspective including legal and policy frameworks and the role of business and recruitment agencies.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Putting the Hong Kong Crisis into Historical and Comparative Perspective 14 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

This roundtable will focus on current events unfolding in Hong Kong, where the territory has been convulsed with protests for several months.

The speakers will examine how class, race and poverty play into the conflict. Taking a comparative approach, they will examine the generational divide, looking at the ideological gulf between the older, more conservative and pro-Beijing population versus the younger, more pro-democracy protesters. The discussion will also draw upon the erosion of trust between police and the wider public.

While acknowledging the unique features of this wave of unrest, the speakers will draw parallels, placing the current crisis in Hong Kong beside events that have occurred in other periods and other places.

Parallels to be explored include those with Shanghai struggles of the 1910s through 1980s and upheavals and crackdowns in the former Soviet bloc during the Cold War.

Is Myanmar Running Out of Time? 17 February 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Just a few years ago the West was celebrating what appeared to be the conclusion of a quarter-century long contest between Myanmar’s democrats and a military dictatorship. Today, the country stands charged with genocide at the International Court of Justice, with Aung San Suu Kyi leading the defence. Is Myanmar a democratic transition gone awry? Or something else entirely?

The speaker will argue that Myanmar is not the simple morality tale often portrayed. It has instead become the stage for some of the world’s most pressing challenges such as climate change, explosive inequality and rising populism, the impact of social media; and the rise of China as the next global superpower.

In this context, are 20th century democratic institutions and free-market reforms the correct remedy for a country plagued by the legacies of colonialism, decades of civil war, tyranny and a predatory economic system? The speaker will offer a prognosis for Myanmar’s future, assessing the question of whether it will become Asia’s next failed state.

This event will be held off the record.

Demographics and politics

Analysing political trends based on demographics is growing as the global population changes and traditional political affiliations are replaced.

Major issues for Chatham House research include the impact of the growth of young people in the developing world, significant increases in population aging in the developed world, and the impact of increasing urbanization on political engagement.

Gender and diversity also play an important part in changing political attitudes, while predicting voting behaviour is becoming ever harder to do accurately, as the methods and technology used by younger generations to engage with politics differ hugely from more traditional approaches.

Refugees and migration

Examining the humanitarian and policy challenges in dealing with the highest global number of refugees and displaced people since the Second World War.

There are many reasons why people cannot stay in their own countries. Many flee from violence, war, hunger, extreme poverty, because of their sexual or gender orientation, or from the consequences of climate change.

But also many believe they have a better chance of finding work in another country because they have the education or capital to seek opportunities elsewhere, they may want to join relatives or friends, or want to start or finish their education.

Chatham House research helps facilitate dialogue between an increasingly diverse group of actors influencing refugee and migration policy globally, enhancing cooperation and contributing to the identification of practical solutions. 

The Moving Energy Initiative is a ground-breaking international partnership which examines the provision of sustainable energy for refugees and displaced people, giving particular consideration to the context of the displaced communities, such as their cultural traditions, collective capacities, needs, and technology available to them.

Gender and equality

Exploring empowerment in areas such as women’s rights, equality and discrimination, the sharing of unpaid work, and the role of gender in achieving the SDGs.

Many women are still excluded from economic decision-making within their own household, receive lower salaries than men, and work longer hours. They are also often excluded from the labour market, do not have access to finance, and are denied property rights.

Wider areas of interest include examining the potential for foreign policies that prioritize gender equality, the physical, cultural and practical challenges to integrating women into close combat roles in the military, and the future of women in peace and security.

Equality and diversity research work also examines why people from black and minority ethnic groups still do less well in terms of education and the jobs they do than people from other groups, and considers the rights of workers across the world. It is strongly linked with promoting human rights and freedoms, based on principles such as dignity and respect.

Asia-Pacific

Research explores geopolitics, population and migration, technology and its impact, conflict, and promoting sustainable development.

Covering the region from Afghanistan to Australia, the region is a major centre of geostrategic interest, with factories in the Far East and South East Asia exporting manufactured products, while importing energy and raw materials, and half of the world’s maritime trade passing through the Indonesian Straits of Sunda, Lombok and Malacca.

The competition to establish control and supremacy over these trade routes has seen major regional powers such as China, Japan and India try to expand their presence in the south China Sea and the Indian Ocean - in the face of a massive US military presence in the area to contain Chinese expansion.

Territorial disputes also loom large on land. In addition to the dispute between North and South Korea, the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea cause regional tension, as does a growing Australia-Japan defence relationship. 

Key issues covered include China’s influence in the region and globally, the UK and Japan’s relationship in a changing world, and the economic relationship between the EU and China over the coming decade.

Bangladesh: The Trade-Off Between Economic Prosperity and Human Rights 11 March 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 February 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Bangladesh’s recent gains in economic and social indices, set against its record of corruption and poor civil rights, has at times been termed the ‘Bangladesh Paradox’. Yet this label is overly simplistic; the current situation proves that these trends can coexist.

The Awami League government, in power since 2009, has increased political stability, delivered unprecedented economic and social advances, and adopted a counter-terrorism strategy to stamp out extremist groups. At the same time, it is criticized for curbing civil rights and failing to hold credible elections. However, as the two previous regimes have demonstrated, the rights situation is unlikely to improve even if the Awami League were replaced.

How did worsening rights become a feature of the state irrespective of its political dispensation? An unresolved contest between political and non-political state actors may hold the key to that puzzle. The perils of the current dispensation have recently manifested in weakening economic indicators, which jeopardize the very stability and social progress for which the country has garnered much praise.

Webinar: Hong Kong: Dissent in the Age of Coronavirus 17 April 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 April 2020

Street protests demanding greater autonomy and democratization in Hong Kong upended the city for seven months last year. However, with the outbreak of the coronavirus in China in late January, the protests quickly died out. What does this mean for the city’s protest movement?

The speaker will argue that, despite the lack of high-profile street rallies, protest in the city is continuing. It is building on and evolving from last year’s protest movement albeit in different forms. At the same time, the Hong Kong authorities, emboldened by a hard line from Beijing, have begun cracking down on activists and protesters in the city as they seek to put a lid on dissent ahead of important Legislative Council elections scheduled for this September.

In this webinar, the speaker will look at the current state of dissent in Hong Kong and prospects for Hong Kong’s future.

This event will be held on the record.

India's Response to COVID-19: Political and Social Implications 12 May 2020 — 12:00PM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 May 2020

On March 23rd, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi ordered the world’s largest lockdown on its population of 1.3 billion. The strict measures were praised by some for their success in slowing the spread of coronavirus but faced criticism for the lack of warning which led millions of migrant workers to return home without assistance. Recently the government has begun to lift restrictions in an attempt to revive the economy.

The Indian government has sought technological solutions to contain the pandemic and these have raised concerns around privacy, surveillance, equity and mass use. Furthermore, some low wage workers are forced to accept these solutions if they are to return to work, leaving them with little choice.

In this webinar, the speakers discuss the economic, political and healthcare implications of the coronavirus pandemic on India. Will India seek to rethink its strategy for leadership in the post-COVID-19 global order? Is it possible to develop technologies that can effectively limit the spread of the coronavirus and ensure privacy?

The speakers argue that careful consideration of the second and third-order effects of the pandemic, and the tools being used to contain it, are necessary to preserve rights, liberties, and even democracy.

Webinar: On the Front Line: The Impact of COVID-19 on Asia's Migrant Workers 21 May 2020 — 2:00PM TO 2:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 May 2020

Asia’s army of migrant workers are on the frontline in confronting the health and economic effects of COVID-19. Lacking formal safety nets, health care access, and facing social dislocation, hundreds of millions across the region are bearing the brunt of the coronavirus lockdown. Asian governments have scrambled to come up with an effective health and humanitarian response, exposing public apathy and significant shortcomings in public policy.

Is better regional coordination necessary to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 on migrant labourers? Is the private sector in Asia part of the problem or part of the solution?

In this webinar, the speakers will discuss the likely implications of lasting economic damage on the livelihoods of Asia’s migrant workers, as well as responses and measures to effectively mitigate the impact.

Webinar: Gandhi's Vision for India 15 June 2020 — 12:00PM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 June 2020

In 1931, Mahatma Gandhi visited Chatham House as part of his campaign for Indian independence. Addressing an overflowing hall, he described the poverty and the religious conflict that plagued India at the time.

Today, India is the world’s fifth largest economy and more than 270 million people have been lifted out of poverty in just a decade. But poverty in India remains widespread and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is only expected to exacerbate the situation. Meanwhile, the communal violence that erupted in Delhi earlier this year reflects intensifying religious tensions under Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

In this webinar, the speakers discuss Gandhi’s global legacy and to what extent we are seeing a re-awakening of his principles across modern India.

This event is part of a series, held in the context of the Chatham House Centenary in 2020, bringing together historians, practitioners and current policymakers to discuss contemporary problems of international relations.

The Rohingya Crisis: Three Years On 17 September 2020 — 1:30PM TO 2:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2020 Online

Speakers examine the current situation of the Rohingya people and assess the threat that COVID-19 poses to the health and human rights of refugees and displaced people.

It has been three years since a military-led crackdown forced more than 740,000 Rohingya to flee across the border into Bangladesh to escape collective punishment and violence in Myanmar.

Most refugees have sought shelter in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district, where access to clean water is limited, sanitation facilities are lacking, and due to overcrowding, social distancing is impossible.

While the number of reported COVID-19 cases has so far been relatively low, testing capacity remains limited and anecdotal reports from humanitarians suggest that COVID-19 has spread extensively through the refugee camps and the Bangladeshi host community.

The speakers also consider the different approaches taken by neighbouring states, regional and international organizations in responding to the crisis.

What can be done to address the needs of refugees in the short term and how can fundamental human rights be restored and protected during the time of COVID-19? What aid provision has been successfully delivered within Rakhine State and in what ways?

Ahead of elections in Myanmar in November, how can the international community persuade the Myanmarese government into positive action? And what would a sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis look like and what are the competing views over how such a solution should be delivered?

This event is held in partnership with The Atlantic Council.

The 2020 Inner Mongolia Language Protests: Wider Meanings for China and the Region 24 November 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 November 2020 Online

Speakers discuss the historical roots of the language issue, as well as the wider significance of the protests in China.

Please note this is an online event. Please register on Zoom using the link below to secure your registration.

In September thousands of people protested in Inner Mongolia in opposition to a government move to replace Mongolian language with Standard Mandarin in three school subjects – history, politics and Chinese language.

Announced less than a week before the start of the new school year, the policy also requires schools to use new national textbooks in Chinese, instead of regional textbooks. The mass protests and classroom walk-outs reflect ethnic Mongolian’s anxiety that their native language may be eliminated. What has the government’s response to the protests been?

Rethinking European and Afghan policy approaches to migration 9 February 2021 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2021 Online

Speakers argue for a more multidimensional approach to migration, and for a nuanced reassessment of policy.

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Afghanistan is a key country of origin for asylum seekers in Europe, and the prime global recipient of EU development assistance. It was one of the first nations to conclude a migration partnership agreement with the EU, in 2016.

Implementation has been thwarted, however, by war and violence, limited state capacity, entrenched economic deprivation, internal displacement and the unfolding impact of COVID-19.

The speakers argue for a more multidimensional approach to migration, and for a nuanced reassessment of policy. They underscore the strength of Afghanistan’s responses to migration, returns, reintegration, security and peace, and point to the need for synchronizing the EU’s policy approaches.

They argue that effective policy must consider the historical significance of mobility for Afghanistan and the need for coherent regional responses to migration.

This event launches the publication The EU and the Politics of Migration Management in Afghanistan.

Jan Goedgebeur, Jorik Jooken, On-Hei Solomon Lo, Ben Seamone and Carol T. Zamfirescu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3059-3082.
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Gurmeet K. Bakshi, Jyoti Garg and Gabriela Olteanu
Math. Comp. 93 (), 3027-3058.
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Pierre Lairez, Eric Pichon-Pharabod and Pierre Vanhove
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2985-3025.
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Torin Greenwood, Jonathan Kariv and Noah Williams
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2959-2983.
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Daniel A. Goldston, Apoorva Panidapu and Jordan Schettler
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2943-2958.
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Zhaonan Wang and Yingpu Deng
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2921-2942.
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Martin Ehler and Karlheinz Gröchenig
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2885-2919.
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Haiyong Wang
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2861-2884.
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Ran Gu and Bing Gao
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2837-2860.
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Ole Løseth Elvetun and Bjørn Fredrik Nielsen
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2811-2836.
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Thomas O. Gallouët, Andrea Natale and Gabriele Todeschi
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2769-2810.
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Zhaohui Fu, Tao Tang and Jiang Yang
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2745-2767.
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Katherine Baker, Lehel Banjai and Mariya Ptashnyk
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2711-2743.
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Selim Esedoḡlu, Jiajia Guo and David Li
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2679-2710.
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T. De Ryck and S. Mishra
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2643-2677.
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Constantin Carle and Marlis Hochbruck
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2611-2641.
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David M. Williams and Qingguo Hong
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2587-2609.
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Buyang Li, Zongze Yang and Zhi Zhou
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2557-2586.
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Algorithms can be very useful, but lately, with so much data being created and shared, and with the increase in their use in critical areas such as hiring, credit, and health care, algorithms are under intense scrutiny about their fairness. People experience the effects of an algorithm's conclusion, but the data and steps that form the basis for that conclusion are frequently hidden from them (as if inside a black box). Cathy O'Neil talks about the unfairness of most predictive algorithms.