Report 68 published by the Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE) in November 2014. This report will help readers to understand the Learning Together methodology.

SCLD brings together some of the most respected practitioners and thinkers from across the learning disability sector who work alongside people who have learning disabilities and their families and carers.The team at SCLD is focused on delivering real change through influencing policy, identifying and sharing evidence and good practice and challenging public attitudes. SCLD aims to be a knowledge hub – offering support, information and new ideas about learning disability in Scotland.

British Institute of Learning Disabilities services help develop the organisations who provide services, and the people who give support.

Evaluation report for the inter-authority learning exchange between Shetland Islands, Falkirk and Glasgow Councils throughcare and aftercare teams. In February 2014 a member of the Throughcare and Aftercare team from Shetland, spent two weeks in each host authority as a means of developing and sharing practice, experience and learning. The report describes the planning process, in-situ experience, and post-exchange learning of participants, it also report highlights the positive learning outcomes and benefits achieved for all participating local authorities. The report identifies ideas for future applications of such a learning and practice exchange model to improve practice for looked after young people and care leavers.

Did you know that advanced threat actors can infiltrate the identity systems of major organizations and extract sensitive data within days? It’s a chilling reality, becoming more common and concerning by the day. These attackers exploit vulnerabilities in SaaS and cloud environments, using compromised identities to move laterally within networks, causing widespread damage. Cybersecurity and IT

Let’s face it—traditional security training can feel as thrilling as reading the fine print on a software update. It’s routine, predictable, and, let’s be honest, often forgotten the moment it's over. Now, imagine cybersecurity training that’s as unforgettable as your favorite show. Remember how "Hamilton" made history come alive, or how "The Office" taught us CPR (Staying Alive beat, anyone?)?

Come one, come all! nycdevops does its first virtual meetup! All are invited!

• Speaker: Adarsh Shah
• Topic: "Continuous Delivery for Machine Learning"
• Time: Thursday, September 17, 2020, 5-630 PM
• Link: https://www.meetup.com/nycdevops/events/272914068/

Hope to see you there!

November's nycdevops meetup speaker is John Allspaw, who will give a talk titled "Findings From the Field: 2 Years of Learning From Incidents".

The talk starts at 5pm sharp! (NY is in US/Eastern)

Please RSVP! See you there!

https://www.meetup.com/nycdevops/events/273826675/

(This is a virtual meetup. Everyone in the world is invited!)

Don't forget!

November's nycdevops meetup speaker is John Allspaw, who will give a talk titled "Findings From the Field: 2 Years of Learning From Incidents".

The talk starts at 5pm sharp! (NY is in US/Eastern)

Please RSVP! See you there!

https://www.meetup.com/nycdevops/events/273826675/

(This is a virtual meetup. Everyone in the world is invited!)

“Close Encounters: Facing the Bomb in a New Nuclear Age” is on display at SPIA’s Bernstein Gallery through Oct. 25. 

NASA scientists used a neural network called ExoMiner to examine data from Kepler, increasing the total tally of confirmed exoplanets in the universe.

Kids at a tribal school in Arizona are preparing for their own election to determine their favorite school lunch: pizza or chicken nuggets? And they're learning about democracy along the way.

In Louisiana, more than 100,000 students are using an AI tutor that is helping to raise reading scores.

What a crazy, wild ride it has been.  As much as I dislike politics and, particularly the rhetoric, lies and deceit of the “swamp,” as publisher of Wisconsin Christian News, a radio commentator and TV host, I must follow the news every day and then decipher it all for you, and this past election cycle consumed much …

The UK's nuclear waste needs a permanent home - but finding a community willing to take it is tricky.

The Northern Taurids are at their peak on 11-12 November - but will the clouds part to let us see them?

How to say the Welsh names for the mountain formerly known as Snowdon - and the park where it sits.

President Trump tweeted a second video update from Walter Reed Medical Center on Sunday, stating his personal positive diagnosis have been a “very interesting journey,” and that he learned a lot about COVID-19. pic.twitter.com/0Bm9W2u1x7 — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) October 4, 2020 “So it’s been a very interesting journey. I learned a lot about COVID. […]

The post Trump In Second Video Update Says He ‘Learned A Lot’ About Covid Since Being Diagnosed appeared first on Hispolitica.

velocityconf: Free webcast from our friends at @citrix 5/29 http://t.co/IOeY4U0wUP Learn to consolidate 40 load balancers and ADCs into single platform

Kevin McCloskey delivers fascinating information in digestible, user-friendly formats, which appeal to not only young readers but experienced ones as well.

Pandemic academic recovery in both reading and math is lagging notably behind pre-COVID achievement trends for students in grades 4-8 during the 2022-23 school year, according to a new report by NWEA analyzing MAP Growth test scores of 6.7 million students across 20,000 public schools. Third-graders were the only group who saw improvements, and they were slight, according to NWEA, an educational research organization recently acquired by learning technology company HMH.

Philadelphia and other cities are quietly building installations like the “Urban Thinkscape” to layer on learning where families already spend time. On a tiny triangular lot in the city’s Belmont neighborhood, kids waiting with their parents for the No. 40 bus can also work on their executive functioning skills, playing a hopscotch variation designed to train their brains. In Chicago, a wooden game mounted on the wall of a laundromat teaches children, in two languages, how to find color patterns in a lineup of detergent bottle tops.

Billions of dollars were funneled to school districts across the U.S. to help them make up for learning loss from the pandemic. But new research shows that even with that extra money, school districts are still struggling to close the gaps in reading, writing and math. Stephanie Sy discussed the findings with Karyn Lewis of the Center for School and Student Progress and a lead researcher at NWEA.

I’m writing this for all the parents out there: Don’t leave your child’s reading success to chance. I’m embarrassed to admit this, but I was one of those parents. Sure, my wife and I read to our son every night, and we had plenty of books, newspapers and magazines around the house. Our local public school spent a lot of time on literacy too, but I cringe now as I look back on how they did it. They taught kids to guess the meaning of unfamiliar words using pictures, the first letter or other context clues.

A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, like American carriers, would be a major jump for China, giving its navy a global reach.

Marilyn Chinitz has worked with celebs like Tom Cruise, Michael Douglas, and Wendy Williams. She has been happily married for 38 years.

The ARJ21 is now to be known as the C909. The renaming plays into COMAC's ambition to enter the global market.

    New workshop in London / remote Link - Enterprise AI workshop – Sep 2018 – in London or remote     AI / Deep Learning applications course/ mentoring program – hands-on experience with limited spaces I am pleased to announce a new course on AI Applications The course combines elements of teaching, coaching and [...]

We are launching an AI lab. The goal is to learn unsupervised learning through Robotics (Cobots) Long seen as a poor cousin to supervised learning -  with Variational autoencoders, Reinforcement learning and  Generative-Adversarial networks , unsupervised learning techniques have moved beyond the limitations of autoencoders. From Oct 2018 to March 2019 , we are running a [...]

  What if you could learn AI and Data Science based on knowledge you already know? You have an opportunity to accelerate your learning of AI in a unique way through this limited, early bird offer Here is a simple observation: The mathematical foundations of Data Science rest on four elements i.e. Linear Algebra, Probability [...]

Coding for #AI and #machinelearning – online course/workshop We are exploring a new way to learning how to code for AI and Machine Learning by applying ideas of  deliberate practise Starting Oct 2018 – the workshop has limited places Please contact info@futuretext.com if you want to sign up for our online workshop (300 USD)   [...]

Google is investing in the development of the next generation of nuclear power, backing a company that’s building small modular reactors and agreeing to purchase energy once the sites start supplying US grids.

While the DA may have found that George Deputy Mayor Raybin Figland had no criminal liability for allegedly sexting a teenage pupil – the Public Protector's office could still probe him for misconduct.

A feminist and postcolonial approach to nuclear politics Expert comment NCapeling 20 July 2022

The July issue of International Affairs includes eight articles on the global nuclear order and eight more covering Chinese lending, abortion rights, and global security.

Disarmament and arms control has been a consistent area of debate in this journal for the past century, as underscored in our recent archive collection of research on a century of war and conflict.

The July edition moves this debate forward with a collection of papers guest-edited by Shine Choi and Catherine Eschle. The section ‘Feminist interrogations of global nuclear politics’ includes work by nine authors exploring seven global case-studies that help rethink nuclear politics and feminism.

As the guest editors note in their introduction, the section brings together research on nuclear power and nuclear weaponry to ‘begin the process of decentring 1980s white, western experiences of the global nuclear order in feminist IR’.

The articles speak to three core themes: they provide evidence of the ongoing destructive nature of nuclear technologies, extend understanding of the gendered, racialized, and colonial dimensions of nuclear discourses, and unearth the impact of colonialism on the global nuclear order.

Global nuclear politics

Anne Sisson Runyan examines the gendered effects of uranium mining and nuclear waste dumping on North American Indigenous women, showing how the nuclear cycle tends to have a disproportionate effect on certain communities but also that the area of disposal remains problematic.

This is a global problem – for example, the Royal Navy has yet to successfully dispose of a single redundant nuclear-powered submarine and is rapidly running out of space to store further vessels.

Hebatalla Taha goes back to the early years of nuclear development and, using Egypt as a case-study, her article argues the early visualizations of the atomic age were fluid and ambivalent. She concludes – perhaps controversially – that feminizing nuclear politics and nuclear images will not lead to disarmament but rather reinforce the nuclearized world. The piece is a welcome addition to the emerging field of visuality within international relations.

Anand Sreekumar brings together feminist and Gandhian thinking to suggest a way for Narendra Modi’s government to move beyond the possession of nuclear weapons as symbols of power. In doing so, he also critiques the binary labels of ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ that often frame our understanding of the world.

Lorraine Bayard de Volo revisits the Cuban missile crisis – a point in time where nuclear war looked likely. She compares the actions of Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy and finds the pursuit of masculinity led to the rejection of approaches considered more feminine, such as diplomacy and negotiation – the crisis was exacerbated by what might be referred to now as toxic masculinity.

Sweden’s and Finland’s recent application to join the nuclear alliance NATO lends a particular urgency to Emma Rosengren’s article on the original Swedish decision to renounce the development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Her article concludes much of the emphasis on power in international relations has contributed to a gendered and racialized nuclear order.

Similarly, Laura Rose Brown and Laura Considine’s article on the Non-Proliferation Treaty finds that ‘gender-sensitive’ approaches focus almost exclusively on women’s inclusion as opposed to feminist policy analysis. They end by making recommendations for future policymaking.

Finally, Rebecca Hogue and Anais Maurer look at the anti-nuclear poetry of Pacific women. This article raises fundamental questions about what is currently considered to constitute evidence. They point to the role of oral history in many communities and the tendency of policymakers and social scientists to ignore this source of understanding.

National politics with international implications

This edition’s ‘Editor’s Choice’ is Jeffrey A. Friedman’s article which questions whether US grand strategy is dead in a post-Trump world. Running counter to much of the existing literature, he suggests there is a strong bilateral commitment to existing partnerships and alliances within the US political establishment.

Following the US Supreme Court decision over Roe vs Wade, it is important to note the issue of abortion rights can have an international dimension. Megan Daigle, Deirdre N. Duffy, and Diana López Castañeda reveal that, although Colombia now has the most progressive legal framework for abortion in Latin America, intense backlash persists as legacies of the civil war overshadow the issue and lead to barriers to safe abortion care.

China

Ric Neo and Chen Xiang look at Chinese public opinion and finds that citizens can be upset by foreign policies of other states even when they have no impact on their daily lives. It reminds us of the potency of nationalism and the importance of who controls the prevailing narrative.

Deborah Brautigam examines China’s role in creating Zambia’s debt crisis, arguing this has not been brought about by a centralized master plan which would give China control over Zambia. Instead, the crisis has been caused by the failure of Chinese bureaucracy with too many state organs offering funding in an uncoordinated fashion.

Security and defence

Using Iran as a case-study, Henrik Stålhane Hiim argues the development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is a key indicator when looking for potential nuclear proliferators.

Eray Alim demonstrates the impact of an external great power interacting with local states. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian civil war has allowed it – sometimes through restrictive and punitive measures – to ensure Turkey and Israel do not harm its interests in the region.

Nina Wilén draws on fieldwork in Niger to study how Security Force Assistance (SFA) impacts on Niger’s security sector and compares this to global trends in security. She finds these developments contribute to blurred borders and confusion regarding labour division in the security sector and points to wider questions for intervenors in developing local units.

The new geopolitics of nuclear power The World Today mhiggins.drupal 27 September 2022

States may be looking to build or restore nuclear plants, but they will need to bypass Chinese and Russian sector dominance, says Sung-Mi Kim.

Against the backdrop of a worldwide energy crisis, the global nuclear market may be seeing a renaissance with growing interest in nuclear energy.

Sceptics are being compelled to rethink the trade-off calculus of nuclear power for the first time since the 2011 Fukushima disaster, which prompted countries to postpone or phase out nuclear power. The nuclear option is again being seen as a way of boosting a nation’s energy autonomy and its ability to weather the volatility caused by unpredictable Russian gas supplies.

Adoption or expansion of nuclear energy capability will not allow a country to be free of Russian influence entirely given its dominant presence in the global nuclear sector. Rosatom, Russia’s state-controlled power corporation, and its subsidiaries, make Russia the leading exporter of nuclear power plants. Russia also supplies more than a third of the global fuel-related services, namely uranium conversion and enrichment. Notably, Russia has been capable of building these into an attractive financial package for importing countries, backed by generous state support.

Like Russia, Chinese government-owned nuclear corporations have started to make forays into export markets as part of its Belt and Road Initiative and ‘Go Out’ policy, which encourages companies to invest overseas. Both China and Russia have a strong comparative advantage in offering competitive state-backed financing schemes for nuclear products and services.

In the meantime, nuclear investment in advanced economies in the West have tended to remain stagnant. The International Energy Agency reports that of the 31 reactors built in the past five years, 27 are of Russian or Chinese design.

Given current market conditions and the technological complexity of the nuclear fuel cycle, new entrants will find it difficult to acquire energy autonomy through nuclear power. They will have to rely on foreign suppliers to build, operate and maintain their nuclear plants and supporting infrastructure. It typically takes a decade to build a nuclear plant and start generating electricity, and nuclear plant deals are built on a decades-long commitment of the parties to forge a political, technical, regulatory and scientific partnership that goes beyond purely commercial terms.

Nuclear export, therefore, is often a long-term, whole-of-the-government effort involving diplomatic skills and geopolitical calculations, and is subject to global oversight to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The US is building strategic nuclear partnerships

In response to the Russian and Chinese dominance of the civilian nuclear sector, American nuclear industries are asking the government to streamline the export-licensing process and provide them with support. The US government is also establishing strategic partnerships with nuclear-capable allies such as South Korea to win procurement contracts. South Korea has recently made a U-turn in its nuclear policy. Its new president Yoon Suk-yeol intends to revive the role of nuclear power to help meet the country’s climate targets and has vowed to export 10 nuclear power plants by 2030.

In Japan, where nuclear energy production was halted after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, a new policy platform was launched in 2019 to enhance public-private collaboration for nuclear research and development.

Intensifying geopolitical tensions between the US and its allies on one side, and Russia and China on the other, will inevitably affect nuclear market dynamics. Domestic economic slowdowns and international sanctions will be a stress test for the export potential of Russia and China.

For instance, in May 2022, Finland eliminated Rosatom from its consortium to build a nuclear power plant, citing delays and increased uncertainties stemming from the invasion of Ukraine. In 2020, Romania cancelled its nuclear deal with China, instead securing an agreement with the US to build two more reactors for its Cernavoda plant. The decision was seen as a move to align Romania with US intentions to sideline China.

 In March 2022, when the Czech Republic officially launched a tender to build a new reactor at the Dukovany nuclear plant, Rosatom and Chinese state-controlled nuclear exporter CGN have been excluded from the tender on security grounds.

As countries try to wean themselves off price-volatile gas and decarbonize their economies to meet climate targets, new commercial opportunities are opening up for the nuclear industry. At least 15 countries are building reactors, according to the World Nuclear Association. Some, such as China, are building more than one.

More than 30 countries are considering, planning or starting a nuclear programme. There is also a growing need for replacing or extending the lives of ageing reactors. It is in this context that the commercial, geopolitical and regulatory aspects of nuclear energy will play an increasing role in the  geopolitical contest for money and influence.

Nuclear proliferation in a fragmenting world 13 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2022 Online

Where does the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stand in 2022?

With the war in Ukraine and China–US tensions rising, the threat of a nuclear arms race has never been as high since the Cold War.

Global efforts to control the appropriation and use of nuclear weapons are strained with the war in Ukraine, US–Russia and US–China tension, Iran on the nuclear threshold, instability in Pakistan and the ongoing threat from North Korea.

The Review Conference of the NPT that took place in New York this August sought to deal with the multiple nuclear threats, but new missile technology such as hypersonic glide vehicles and torpedoes are not covered by a treaty.

Russia and the US are in a development phase for a host of new technologies and delivery systems, especially after both withdrew from various arms-control treaties in the 2000s and 2010s. Now the nuclear stockpile is growing again and major superpowers are adopting confrontational geostrategic positions.

As the world’s established orders and system fragment, there is a possibility the nine countries with confirmed nuclear weapons could grow. Events in Ukraine highlight the need for a new, modern agreement on nuclear weapons control, needed today more than ever.

The panel of experts discuss key questions including:

• What did ‘RevCon’ in New York tell us about the adoption or update to the NPT?

• Will the war in Ukraine deter or prevent any agreement between nations or does nuclear weapons control represent an area of potential multilateral harmony?

• Are we likely to see a new arms race akin to the Cold War? Where does China fit into this race?

• How has technology changed the arms control landscape?

 As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

Nuclear stability for all put at risk by Putin's speech Explainer NCapeling 22 February 2023

Explaining the risks of Russia’s decision to suspend the New START nuclear treaty with the US, and the wider implications for international relations.

Why is New START important?

Following the collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF), New START is the only remaining nuclear arms control treaty between the US and Russia.

This means that without it there would be no limits on numbers or the type of Russian and US deployed nuclear warheads. The limits set under New START are lower than those set under its predecessor, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

It is also important for maintaining some form of strategic arms control between Russia and the US. The treaty provides the US and Russia with mechanisms for transparency and confidence-building, for instance through regular biannual data exchanges, as well as measures for verification.

What is Russia able to do next after suspending participation?

President Vladimir Putin’s decision to suspend its participation could pave the way for Russia to increase the number of deployed warheads, delivery vehicles and launchers, potentially exceeding the limits placed on numbers under the new START.

Putin stated he would resume testing of nuclear weapons if the US resumed – Russia is a full state party to the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiated in 1996, as is the UK and France. The US has signed, as has China, but neither state has yet ratified the treaty.

Other countries required to ratify the treaty for it to enter into force include Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Although the US is modernizing its nuclear weapons forces, there is no need – or plan – for the US to test nuclear warheads, and it is the same for the UK and France.

Concerns are now rising that Russia could point to no-fissionable yield experiments – which are allowed under the treaty and which the US and other nuclear weapons possessors conduct primarily for safety purposes – and then falsely declare those to be nuclear weapons tests, thus paving the way for a narrative to justify the resumption of nuclear testing by Russia.

Conducting a nuclear weapons test would be seen clearly as a further step on the escalation scale towards nuclear use for Russia.

While inspections of nuclear weapons sites had not resumed since COVID-19, Russia’s suspension of its participation could result in the further halting of other transparency and verification measures under New START, including the regular mutual data exchanges between the US and Russia – for example on warhead numbers, locations, and technical information on weapons systems and their sites – which are conducted through the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).

What is the difference between withdrawing from New START and ‘suspending’ participation?

In his speech, Putin announced the suspension of Russian participation in New START. While this does not mean Russia has formally withdrawn from the treaty, the suspension could enable Russia to continue preventing the US from inspecting its nuclear weapons sites and halt Russia’s participation in other obligations, such as the routine reporting and data exchanges on nuclear weapons as well as meetings of the BCC.

The decision to suspend participation rather than withdraw from the treaty means Russia retains the option to return to compliance at a later point. However, it is not yet clear under what conditions Russia would opt to return to compliance with the treaty, or whether this means the US will, in turn, suspend their own obligations.

The treaty text itself does not provide for a suspension of participation by parties to the treaty. However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does address the mechanisms for suspension of participation in a treaty. Russia is a full state party to the Vienna Convention, but the US has remained a signatory without ratification since 1970.

There is a precedent of Russia suspending its membership in arms control treaties rather than withdrawing, which is when Russia suspended its participation in the original Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in 2007.

The US does not recognize Russia’s suspension of its participation in the CFE treaty, but this does not make a material difference to Russian actions.

What does the suspension mean for the wider international treaty regime?

Russia’s suspension of the New START could signal the end of strategic arms control between the two countries. There is now virtually no regular scheduled arms control communication between the two countries bilaterally – this is a dangerous position to be in, especially in times of crisis.

The suspension of New START further erodes limited recourse for communication between the two countries, by suspending information exchange and meetings of the BCC under the treaty.

This is likely to have wider implications for progress on nuclear non-proliferation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as the wider international security treaty regime.

Will this increase the nuclear threat or the likelihood of nuclear use?

New START provides both the US and Russia with a degree of transparency surrounding nuclear weapons systems. Without an avenue for regular data exchange and notification, and mechanisms for verification through mutual nuclear weapons site inspections, the risk of misperception or misunderstanding could increase and fuel uncertainty which could increases the perception of threat between Russia and the US.

What are Putin’s reasons for suspending Russia’s participation?

Putin and various members of his government have been linking the future of New START to the war in Ukraine rhetorically for several months now, threatening that Russia may not be willing to negotiate a follow-on treaty for when New START expires in Feb 2026 because of US support for Ukraine.

By announcing Russia’s suspension of the treaty in his main address on the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, Putin is sending a signal about Russia’s intent for the future.

Russia’s new hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard was already counted under New START and it is likely follow-on negotiations would have focused on some of Russia’s other hypersonic capabilities or other new nuclear systems.

Without the treaty, Russia might be less inhibited in its development of new nuclear systems.

Have both the US and Russia been compliant with the treaty until now?

Both the US and Russia have remained within the central limits of the treaty since its entry into force in 2011. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, both sides agreed to suspend in-person inspections due to restrictions on travel, and attempts to recommence in-person inspections in 2022 were unsuccessful.

In August 2022, Russia prevented US on-site inspections under New START and a November 2022 meeting of the BCC was called off by Russian officials. Russia has blamed both the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the sanctions burden on Russia as reasons for not wanting to resume inspections.

World in brief: Ukraine and nuclear proliferation to dominate G7 The World Today mhiggins.drupal 28 March 2023

Following Russia’s ongoing intimidation, Japan will use its presidency of the G7 – and its history – to prioritize the dangers of nuclear threats, writes James Orr.

Two issues are expected to dominate the agenda as Japan hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima from May 19-21. Central to talks will be the conflict in Ukraine, with member states eager to highlight a message of unity and resolve in the face of Russia’s continuing aggression.

Fumio Kishida, Japan’s prime minister, made an unannounced visit to Kyiv on March 21, meeting the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy.  This coincided with a visit to Moscow by China’s leader Xi Jinping, who described Russian president Vladimir Putin as a friend and partner.

‘Absolutely unacceptable’

Hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima is significant, too, with Kishida expected to emphasize the ‘absolutely unacceptable’ threat of nuclear proliferation. Ongoing tensions between China and Taiwan, together with recent North Korean ballistic missile tests, have heightened fears of a breakdown in security in the region.

Meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin’s menacing references to the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine has raised the prospect of a potentially devastating conflict with NATO. ‘Kishida’s principal goal for the presidency of the G7 is to try to draw the world away from the path of destruction that is another nuclear conflict,’ said Duncan Bartlett, a research associate at SOAS, the School of Oriental and African Studies, in London.

‘Early last year, Putin warned of terrible consequences if NATO and the West interfered in the Ukraine conflict, and that was widely seen as being a nuclear threat. North Korea is also pursuing its nuclear weapons programme, and in February an intercontinental ballistic missile went into the sea just near the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido,’ said Bartlett.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Kishida has taken a firm position on Putin, in line with his G7 peers. President Zelenskyy has addressed the Japanese parliament via video link and Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs, was invited by his Japanese counterpart to a G7 meeting held during the Munich Security Conference earlier this year.

Kishida committed $600 million in financial support to Ukraine and his government may well announce the provision of further non-lethal assistance to Zelenskyy at the summit. The country’s constitution effectively outlaws the export of deadly weapons to foreign forces. On his visit to Kyiv, Kishida promised a further $30 million to Ukraine.

‘Kishida has revised key defence documents and is pursuing a radical and controversial expansion of Japan’s defence budget and capabilities,’ said Hugo Dobson, Professor of Japan’s International Relations at the University of Sheffield.

‘He and his G7 partners have signed historic defence agreements, pledged to strengthen ties or declared the inseparability of their security in light of actual conflict in Ukraine and potential conflict in East Asia. Kishida has linked the two by emphasizing that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,’ said Dobson.

Aside from security matters, Kishida will at the summit address issues on clean energy, climate change, global health and boosting multilateral cooperation to drive post-pandemic economic recovery.

Invitation to Nagasaki

He is understood to have invited President Joe Biden to visit Nagasaki, where the second of America’s two atomic bombs is estimated to have killed 60,000 people in August 1945. No sitting US president has ever visited the city, and Kishida, who grew up in Hiroshima, may see the visit as an opportunity to boost his flagging domestic approval ratings. It may also serve as a timely reminder to Russia and others that the G7 opposes any future nuclear weapon use.

Ilka Wittig
Jul 1, 2007; 6:1215-1225
Research

Can the world avoid a new nuclear arms race? 18 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

The Doomsday Clock stands at 90 seconds to midnight – the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been. As geopolitical competition intensifies, nuclear risks are resurging at an alarming rate. The collapse of key arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has removed crucial safeguards against arms races. Efforts to extend or replace existing treaties face significant hurdles in the current geopolitical climate.

Nuclear rhetoric has become more aggressive, as evidenced by Russian and North Korean nuclear threats. Several nuclear-armed states are also engaging in extensive modernization programmes of their nuclear arsenals, potentially fuelling a new arms race.

Despite these pressures, the number of nuclear possessor states has held steady so far. The ongoing Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons is the closest attempt by a new state to acquire nuclear weapons. As the global security environment becomes more and more tense, existing nuclear possessor states increasingly rely on their nuclear weapons. This might threaten the global consensus against nuclear proliferation.

This session examines these competing pressures and propose strategies to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use and proliferation. Our expert panel explores diplomatic initiatives, technical measures, and policy innovations to address these critical challenges.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• Are we already in the middle of a global nuclear arms race?
• How can international arms control treaties be negotiated in the current geopolitical environment?
• Does a new US president change the nuclear calculus? Is the US still able to reassure allies of its ‘extended deterrence’?
• How can we reduce the risk of additional proliferation? Which states might want to acquire nuclear weapons and what can we do about it?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Learnings must become practice as the Taliban return Expert comment NCapeling 7 September 2021

There is greater awareness of the adverse impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions on humanitarian action. It is time to apply lessons learned.

The 9/11 attacks prompted the international community to adopt a wide range of counterterrorism measures. Debate continues over their compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law, and their effectiveness.

What has become clear is that some of these measures have made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to be provided to the millions of people living in areas under the control of armed groups designated as terrorist, or where such groups have a significant presence.

These include Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s Arabian peninsula, ISIL affiliates in Syria, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Hamas in Gaza, and various Al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel. The lessons painfully learned need to be applied to Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

Impeding humanitarian work

Traditionally, legal counterterrorism measures criminalized acts of violence but, in recent years, measures adopted by the UN Security Council, the European Union (EU), and some states unilaterally, have expanded to address broader forms of support for terrorist acts and to groups designated as terrorist.

When these measures apply in situations of armed conflict – and in the absence of adequate safeguards – they can impede humanitarian organizations from operating as foreseen by IHL and in accordance with humanitarian principles, which require life-saving assistance to be provided in an impartial manner. Restrictions in sanctions imposed for policy objectives other than counterterrorism create similar tensions.

Prohibitions on making funds or other assets available directly or indirectly to persons or groups designated as terrorist can capture incidental payments made during humanitarian operations and relief consignments which are diverted and end up in the hands of these designated groups.

The most extreme restrictions cover the provision of medical assistance, in violation of the foundational principle of IHL that everyone who is wounded and sick – civilian or fighter – is entitled to medical care without discrimination, and those who provide it must not be punished.

Humanitarian organizations have been highlighting these problems for more than a decade. Recent developments give cause for cautious optimism that a turning point has been reached, as the bodies imposing counterterrorism measures and sanctions internationally and domestically have begun to demand compliance with international law and IHL.

In 2019 the UN Security Council unanimously issued a binding demand to member states to ensure all counterterrorism measures they adopt comply with obligations under international law, including IHL.

Recent renewals of UN country-specific sanctions have included similar demands with regards to measures taken by member states to give effect to them. Although this still falls short of an express exception for humanitarian action, it is a significant development, and a strong encouragement to include appropriate safeguards when implementing UN measures domestically.

Similar encouraging practice is discernible at EU level, and new domestic counterterrorism laws adopted by several states include safeguards for humanitarian action.

Applying lessons learned to Afghanistan

It is too soon to know what policies the Taliban will adopt, and the measures that the international community will take to promote compliance with IHL, human rights, and counterterrorism objectives. Nonetheless, policymakers implementing sanctions – and considering their expansion – cannot ignore their potential adverse impact on humanitarian action. They must bear in mind five key lessons.

First, there must be clarity on current legal restrictions, starting from who is designated under sanctions and counterterrorism measures. The UN Security Council has never designated the Taliban per se. Instead, it has listed ‘individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban’. At present this list includes 135 individuals and five entities, four of which are ‘hawalas’ – money changers – the other being the Haqqani Network, a Sunni Islamist group.

UN financial sanctions require states to freeze the assets of designated persons and groups and ensure no funds, financial assets, or economic resources are made available to them, either directly or indirectly.

EU and UK sanctions simply replicate the restrictions and designations imposed by the UN, but the US has designated the Taliban as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ which makes the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations applicable. These prohibit US nationals from making any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to, or for, the benefit of the Taliban.

Second, while listed individuals may play a role in the forthcoming Taliban administration, sanctions do not prohibit providing resources to a government department headed by a designated person.

There is a distinction between an individual and a department, and prohibitions in counterterrorism measures or sanctions on the provision of funds or other assets apply to the designated person, not to the department they may head.

Problems may arise if a designated person appropriates resources for personal benefit or to undermine policy objectives for which the sanctions were imposed. But this does not bring the department within the scope of the designation. Instead, the issue must be addressed from a prevention of diversion perspective.

Third, sanctions and counterterrorism measures must be designed so as to minimize their adverse impact on humanitarian action. One way of doing so is designating leadership figures rather than groups. The new US administration took this approach towards the Houthi in Yemen, with the designation of the group being revoked and new designations focusing on its leaders.

The chilling effect of sanctions is far broader than the actual restrictions they impose. Commercial actors in particular limit their activities in areas they perceive as high risk. In view of this, the effect of expanding existing designations to list the Taliban, now that it is in control of Afghanistan, would be to turn targeted sanctions into comprehensive ones.

In parallel, sanctions or counterterrorism measures should include express safeguards, which exclude funds, assets, and other support provided during humanitarian action from the restrictions – ideally in the form of exceptions or, if an option, general licences.

The adverse impact of the US Global Terrorism Sanctions has been limited until now, as only a small number of humanitarian actors subject to US measures operated in areas under Taliban control. This has now changed, and it is imperative the US issue a broad general licence to exclude assistance provided during humanitarian action from the sanctions.

Fourth, restrictions in funding agreements must not be more onerous than the underlying measures they aim to promote compliance with – in particular, they must not require screening or exclusion of final beneficiaries from the assistance they have been determined as requiring.

Finally, engagement with non-state armed groups for humanitarian purposes is essential for conducting operations effectively and safely, both for humanitarian organizations and the people they are trying to assist. Counterterrorism measures and sanctions do not prohibit such contact even when such groups or their members have been designated.

The past two decades have given states ample time to learn to avoid the adverse impact of sanctions and counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action. The people of Afghanistan deserve that these lessons now be applied.

Our research paper IHL and the humanitarian impact of counterterrorism measures and sanctions identifies the principal points of friction between these bodies of law, clarifies outstanding issues and misunderstandings, and offers practical recommendations for resolving tensions.

Hepatocyte nuclear factor-1β (HNF-1β) is a tissue-specific transcription factor that is required for normal kidney development and renal epithelial differentiation. Mutations of HNF-1β produce congenital kidney abnormalities and inherited renal tubulopathies. Here, we show that ablation of HNF-1β in mIMCD3 renal epithelial cells results in activation of β-catenin and increased expression of lymphoid enhancer–binding factor 1 (LEF1), a downstream effector in the canonical Wnt signaling pathway. Increased expression and nuclear localization of LEF1 are also observed in cystic kidneys from Hnf1b mutant mice. Expression of dominant-negative mutant HNF-1β in mIMCD3 cells produces hyperresponsiveness to exogenous Wnt ligands, which is inhibited by siRNA-mediated knockdown of Lef1. WT HNF-1β binds to two evolutionarily conserved sites located 94 and 30 kb from the mouse Lef1 promoter. Ablation of HNF-1β decreases H3K27 trimethylation repressive marks and increases β-catenin occupancy at a site 4 kb upstream to Lef1. Mechanistically, WT HNF-1β recruits the polycomb-repressive complex 2 that catalyzes H3K27 trimethylation. Deletion of the β-catenin–binding domain of LEF1 in HNF-1β–deficient cells abolishes the increase in Lef1 transcription and decreases the expression of downstream Wnt target genes. The canonical Wnt target gene, Axin2, is also a direct transcriptional target of HNF-1β through binding to negative regulatory elements in the gene promoter. These findings demonstrate that HNF-1β regulates canonical Wnt target genes through long-range effects on histone methylation at Wnt enhancers and reveal a new mode of active transcriptional repression by HNF-1β.

Nuclear Energy in a Post-Brexit Europe 11 October 2019 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Brexit will significantly change the balance within the EU in relation to nuclear energy. Apart from France and Finland, both of whose nuclear development programmes are behind schedule, the UK is the only member state in northern or western Europe currently investing in new nuclear capacity. Brexit will therefore leave the supporters of nuclear energy within the EU27 and the European Commission in a weaker position.

The speaker will argue that at a time when the energy industry needs to accelerate its shift away from fossil fuels, and when the electricity generation industry must cut its carbon emissions faster than it has ever managed to do in the past, this change is unhelpful.

The workshop will also address the need for additional interconnector capacity and the future of carbon-trading outside the EU emission trading system and how this relates to potential nuclear energy capacity.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

What's next for environmental peacebuilding? Lessons learned and opportunities from conflict-affected states 17 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2021 Online

 This event explores lessons and opportunities from conflict-affected states.

In the field of peacebuilding, scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of environmental restoration, afforestation and infrastructural renewal for creating the sustainable livelihoods necessary for successful peacebuilding efforts.

Featuring academics writing for International Affairs on environmental peacebuilding in Colombia, Yemen and the Sahel, this webinar discusses the policy implications of the turn to environmental peacebuilding.

This event is part of the Chatham House’s Environment and Society Discussion Series in which the Energy Environment and Resources Programme brings together leading academics and policymakers to discuss key issues in environmental policy.

In particular, this event focuses on the role of environmental peacebuilding in creating sustainable livelihoods. From the impact the destruction of infrastructure can have on poverty as a driver of conflict, to the role environmental peacebuilding can play in bringing communities together by creating sustainable shared spaces of employment, the importance of the environmental livelihood creation is difficult to overstate.

Panellists focus on how policymakers can best encourage inclusive and sustainable livelihood creation and on addressing the key challenges such approaches face in the context of environmental peacebuilding efforts.

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.

6 July 2020