financial

Florida Hospital System Agrees to Pay the Government $85 Million to Settle Allegations of Improper Financial Relationships with Referring Physicians

Halifax Hospital Medical Center and Halifax Staffing Inc. (Halifax), a hospital system based in the Daytona Beach, Fla., area, have agreed to pay $85 million to resolve allegations that they violated the False Claims Act by submitting claims to the Medicare program that violated the Physician Self-Referral Law, commonly known as the Stark Law.



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

Justice Department Announces Criminal Charge Against Toyota Motor Corporation and Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $1.2 Billion Financial Penalty

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Anthony Foxx, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara, Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation Calvin L. Scovel, III, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Acting Administrator David Friedman, and FBI Deputy Assistant Director Joe Campbell announced a criminal wire fraud charge against Toyota Motor Corporation, an automotive company headquartered in Toyota City, Japan, that designs, manufactures, assembles, and sells Toyota and Lexus brand vehicles.



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

Former Army Contracting Officials Sentenced for Filing False Tax Returns and Filing False Financial Ethics Disclosure Forms

Velma I. Salinas-Nix and Kenneth H. Nix, of Boerne, Texas, were sentenced today to serve 20 months in prison and 30 months in prison, respectively, for filing false tax returns and making false statements to the U.S. Army by filing false financial ethics disclosure forms.



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

Former Utah Certified Public Accountant Convicted of Filing False Claims for Tax Refunds Totaling More Than $8 Million and Presenting a $300 Million Fictitious Financial Instrument

Dick Reid Jenkins, of Heber City, Utah, was convicted today, in U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, of eighteen counts of filing false claims for income tax refunds and one count of presenting a fictitious financial instrument, the Justice Department and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced.



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

Justice Department and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Reach $169 Million Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Credit Card Lending Discrimination by GE Capital Retail Bank

The Department of Justice and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) today announced a settlement to resolve allegations that GE Capital Retail Bank, known as of this month as Synchrony Bank, engaged in a nationwide pattern or practice of discrimination by excluding Hispanic borrowers from two of its credit card debt-repayment programs



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay $8.9 Billion for Illegally Processing Financial Transactions for Countries Subject to U.S. Economic Sanctions

According to court documents submitted today, BNP Paribas S.A. (BNPP), a global financial institution headquartered in Paris, agreed to enter a guilty plea to conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) by processing billions of dollars of transactions through the U.S. financial system on behalf of Sudanese, Iranian, and Cuban entities subject to U.S. economic sanctions



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

Attorney General Holder Speaks at Press Conference Announcing Major Financial Fraud

"Citi is not the first financial institution to be held accountable by this Justice Department, and it will certainly not be the last. In the investigations that remain open, we will continue to move forward – guided by the facts and the law – to achieve justice for those affected by the financial crisis."




financial

Texas Resident Charged with Tax Fraud and Financial Institution Fraud

A Texas woman who was the manager of a North Carolina tax preparation business was indicted today for multiple tax crimes and making false statements to banks on loan applications, the Justice Department and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial Crisis

Attorney General Eric Holder and Associate Attorney General Tony West announced today that the Department of Justice has reached a $16.65 billion settlement with Bank of America Corporation – the largest civil settlement with a single entity in American history ­— to resolve federal and state claims against Bank of America and its former and current subsidiaries, including Countrywide Financial Corporation and Merrill Lynch. As part of this global resolution, the bank has agreed to pay a $5 billion penalty



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

Attorney General Holder Delivers Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Major Financial Fraud

"We are here to announce a historic step forward in our ongoing effort to protect the American people from financial fraud – and to hold accountable those whose actions threatened the integrity of our financial markets and undermined the stability of our economy."




financial

Associate Attorney General West Delivers Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Major Financial Fraud

"Yet in addition to accountability, this historic resolution is also significant for what it achieves in terms of restoration: it requires those we are holding accountable to shoulder some of the responsibility for repairing the damage caused by their conduct."




financial

Attorney General Holder Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law

Thank you, Professor [Jennifer] Arlen, for those kind words – and thank you all for being here. It’s a privilege to be at New York University this afternoon




financial

Justice Department and State Partners Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis

Attorney General Eric Holder announced today that the Department of Justice and 19 states and the District of Columbia have entered into a $1.375 billion settlement agreement with the rating agency Standard &s Financial Services LLC, along with its parent corporation McGraw Hill Financial Inc., to resolve allegations that S&s 2013 lawsuit against S& true credit risks. Other allegations assert that S&s business relationships with the investment banks that issued the securities.



  • OPA Press Releases

financial

APEC Finance Ministers Call for Economic Resilience and Financial Inclusion

Ministers address developments in the global economy and take action to safeguard the region’s growth.




financial

Presentation Materials of Financial Results for 3rd Quarter of Fiscal Year 2019 (Slides & Notes)




financial

Acharya committee formed to examine desirability & feasibility of new financial year

The committee will examine the merits and demerits of various dates for the commencement of the its report by 31 December 2016.




financial

This physicist-turned-economist is modelling the pandemic’s financial fallout




financial

A Financial Sanctions Dilemma

Over the last two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the popularity of financial sanctions as an instrument of US foreign policy to address security threats ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism to human rights violations and transnational crime. Washington’s policymakers have prized these tools for their ability to rapidly apply pressure against foreign targets with few perceived repercussions against American business interests. The problem, however, is that Washington is ignoring a growing tension between financial sanctions designed to support economic statecraft (with non-financial goals) and those designed to protect the international financial system. Confusing the two sends mixed signals to adversaries as well as allies and undermines US credibility and commitment to upholding international banking rules and norms. If Washington cannot reconcile these competing processes, it is unlikely that future administrations will enjoy the same foreign policy levers, leaving the United States at a significant disadvantage.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Coronavirus poses serious financial risks to US universities

Universities around the country are dealing with health concerns as their first priority, and keeping instruction going—even if imperfectly—as the second priority. After dealing with these immediate issues, the next concern is fear of collapsing revenue. Health and instruction deserve every bit of effort going into them. The extent of worry about collapsing revenue isn’t…

       




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

Factoring Pandemic Risks into Financial Modelling

Today’s economic crisis leaves us with an unsettling and perplexing regret. Why weren’t financial portfolios already adjusted for risks that stem from health events such as pandemics? After all, financial portfolios are adjusted for liquidity risks, market risks, credit risks, and even operational and political risks.




financial

How to increase financial support during COVID-19 by investing in worker training

It took just two weeks to exhaust one of the largest bailout packages in American history. Even the most generous financial support has limits in a recession. However, I am optimistic that a pandemic-fueled recession and mass underemployment could be an important opportunity to upskill the American workforce through loans for vocational training. Financially supporting…

       




financial

What is a financial transaction tax?

The Vitals Democratic presidential candidates are proposing using a financial transaction tax (FTT), a tax on buying and selling a stock, bond, or other financial contract like options and derivatives. Taxing stock trading is not new. In fact, America already has an FTT, albeit extremely small: currently set at roughly 2 cents per $1,000 traded.…

       




financial

Financial well-being: Measuring financial perceptions and experiences in low- and moderate-income households

Thirty-nine percent of U.S. adults reported lacking sufficient liquidity to cover even a modest $400 emergency without borrowing or selling an asset, and 60 percent reported experiencing a financial shock (e.g., loss of income or car repair) in the prior year. While facing precarious financial situations may leave households unable to manage essential expenses and…

       




financial

How to increase financial support during COVID-19 by investing in worker training

It took just two weeks to exhaust one of the largest bailout packages in American history. Even the most generous financial support has limits in a recession. However, I am optimistic that a pandemic-fueled recession and mass underemployment could be an important opportunity to upskill the American workforce through loans for vocational training. Financially supporting…

       




financial

The Origins of the Financial Crisis

SUMMARY

The financial crisis that has been wreaking havoc in markets in the U.S. and across the world since August 2007 had its origins in an asset price bubble that interacted with new kinds of financial innovations that masked risk; with companies that failed to follow their own risk management procedures; and with regulators and supervisors that failed to restrain excessive risk taking.

A bubble formed in the housing markets as home prices across the country increased each year from the mid 1990s to 2006, moving out of line with fundamentals like household income. Like traditional asset price bubbles, expectations of future price increases developed and were a significant factor in inflating house prices. As individuals witnessed rising prices in their neighborhood and across the country, they began to expect those prices to continue to rise, even in the late years of the bubble when it had nearly peaked.

The rapid rise of lending to subprime borrowers helped inflate the housing price bubble. Before 2000, subprime lending was virtually non-existent, but thereafter it took off exponentially. The sustained rise in house prices, along with new financial innovations, suddenly made subprime borrowers — previously shut out of the mortgage markets — attractive customers for mortgage lenders. Lenders devised innovative Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) — with low "teaser rates," no down-payments, and some even allowing the borrower to postpone some of the interest due each month and add it to the principal of the loan — which were predicated on the expectation that home prices would continue to rise.

But innovation in mortgage design alone would not have enabled so many subprime borrowers to access credit without other innovations in the so-called process of "securitizing" mortgages — or the pooling of mortgages into packages and then selling securities backed by those packages to investors who receive pro rata payments of principal and interest by the borrowers. The two main government-sponsored enterprises devoted to mortgage lending, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, developed this financing technique in the 1970s, adding their guarantees to these "mortgage-backed securities" (MBS) to ensure their marketability. For roughly three decades, Fannie and Freddie confined their guarantees to "prime" borrowers who took out "conforming" loans, or loans with a principal below a certain dollar threshold and to borrowers with a credit score above a certain limit. Along the way, the private sector developed MBS backed by non-conforming loans that had other means of "credit enhancement," but this market stayed relatively small until the late 1990s. In this fashion, Wall Street investors effectively financed homebuyers on Main Street. Banks, thrifts, and a new industry of mortgage brokers originated the loans but did not keep them, which was the "old" way of financing home ownership.

Over the past decade, private sector commercial and investment banks developed new ways of securitizing subprime mortgages: by packaging them into "Collateralized Debt Obligations" (sometimes with other asset-backed securities), and then dividing the cash flows into different "tranches" to appeal to different classes of investors with different tolerances for risk. By ordering the rights to the cash flows, the developers of CDOs (and subsequently other securities built on this model), were able to convince the credit rating agencies to assign their highest ratings to the securities in the highest tranche, or risk class. In some cases, so-called "monoline" bond insurers (which had previously concentrated on insuring municipal bonds) sold protection insurance to CDO investors that would pay off in the event that loans went into default. In other cases, especially more recently, insurance companies, investment banks and other parties did the near equivalent by selling "credit default swaps" (CDS), which were similar to monocline insurance in principle but different in risk, as CDS sellers put up very little capital to back their transactions.

These new innovations enabled Wall Street to do for subprime mortgages what it had already done for conforming mortgages, and they facilitated the boom in subprime lending that occurred after 2000. By channeling funds of institutional investors to support the origination of subprime mortgages, many households previously unable to qualify for mortgage credit became eligible for loans. This new group of eligible borrowers increased housing demand and helped inflate home prices.

These new financial innovations thrived in an environment of easy monetary policy by the Federal Reserve and poor regulatory oversight. With interest rates so low and with regulators turning a blind eye, financial institutions borrowed more and more money (i.e. increased their leverage) to finance their purchases of mortgage-related securities. Banks created off-balance sheet affiliated entities such as Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) to purchase mortgage-related assets that were not subject to regulatory capital requirements Financial institutions also turned to short-term "collateralized borrowing" like repurchase agreements, so much so that by 2006 investment banks were on average rolling over a quarter of their balance sheet every night. During the years of rising asset prices, this short-term debt could be rolled over like clockwork. This tenuous situation shut down once panic hit in 2007, however, as sudden uncertainty over asset prices caused lenders to abruptly refuse to rollover their debts, and over-leveraged banks found themselves exposed to falling asset prices with very little capital.

While ex post we can certainly say that the system-wide increase in borrowed money was irresponsible and bound for catastrophe, it is not shocking that consumers, would-be homeowners, and profit-maximizing banks will borrow more money when asset prices are rising; indeed, it is quite intuitive. What is especially shocking, though, is how institutions along each link of the securitization chain failed so grossly to perform adequate risk assessment on the mortgage-related assets they held and traded. From the mortgage originator, to the loan servicer, to the mortgage-backed security issuer, to the CDO issuer, to the CDS protection seller, to the credit rating agencies, and to the holders of all those securities, at no point did any institution stop the party or question the little-understood computer risk models, or the blatantly unsustainable deterioration of the loan terms of the underlying mortgages.

A key point in understanding this system-wide failure of risk assessment is that each link of the securitization chain is plagued by asymmetric information – that is, one party has better information than the other. In such cases, one side is usually careful in doing business with the other and makes every effort to accurately assess the risk of the other side with the information it is given. However, this sort of due diligence that is to be expected from markets with asymmetric information was essentially absent in recent years of mortgage securitization. Computer models took the place of human judgment, as originators did not adequately assess the risk of borrowers, mortgage services did not adequately assess the risk of the terms of mortgage loans they serviced, MBS issuers did not adequately assess the risk of the securities they sold, and so on.

The lack of due diligence on all fronts was partly due to the incentives in the securitization model itself. With the ability to immediately pass off the risk of an asset to someone else, institutions had little financial incentive to worry about the actual risk of the assets in question. But what about the MBS, CDO, and CDS holders who did ultimately hold the risk? The buyers of these instruments had every incentive to understand the risk of the underlying assets. What explains their failure to do so?

One part of the reason is that these investors — like everyone else — were caught up in a bubble mentality that enveloped the entire system. Others saw the large profits from subprime-mortgage related assets and wanted to get in on the action. In addition, the sheer complexity and opacity of the securitized financial system meant that many people simply did not have the information or capacity to make their own judgment on the securities they held, instead relying on rating agencies and complex but flawed computer models. In other words, poor incentives, the bubble in home prices, and lack of transparency erased the frictions inherent in markets with asymmetric information (and since the crisis hit in 2007, the extreme opposite has been the case, with asymmetric information problems having effectively frozen credit markets). In the pages that follow, we tell this story more fully.

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financial

The U.S. Financial and Economic Crisis: Where Does It Stand and Where Do We Go From Here?

INTRODUCTION

The Obama administration needs to focus on executing its existing financial rescue plans, keep the TARP focused on the banking sector, and create a contingency plan should the banking system destabilize again.

Crystal balls are dangerous, especially when it comes to economic predictions, which is why it is important for the administration to chart a path forward. Public policy must remain focused on the very real possibility that the apparent easing in the economy’s decline may be followed by little or no growth for several quarters and there could possibly be another negative turn. One of the risks is that the United States is very connected to the rest of the world, most of which is in severe recession. The global economy could be a significant drag on U.S. growth.

Cautious optimism should be the order of the day. We fear that the recent reactions of the financial markets and of some analysts carry too much of the optimism without recognizing enough of the uncertainty. There remains a lot of uncertainty and policymakers should not rest on their laurels or turn to other policies, even if they look more exciting. It is vital to follow through on the current financial rescue plans and to have well-conceived contingency plans in case there is another dip down.

We propose three recommendations for the financial rescue plans:

  • Focus on execution of existing programs. The Administration has created programs to deal with each of the key elements necessary to solve the financial crisis. All of them have significant steps remaining and some of them have not even started yet, such as the programs to deal with toxic assets. As has been demonstrated multiple times now since October 2008, these are complex programs that require a great deal of attention. It is time to execute rather than to create still more efforts.
  • Resist the temptation to allocate money from the TARP to other uses—it is essential to maintain a reserve of Congressionally-authorized funds in case they are needed for the banks. It would be difficult to overemphasize the remaining uncertainties about bank solvency as they navigate what will remain a rough year or more. The banks could easily need another $300 billion of equity capital and might need still more. It is essential that the administration have the ammunition readily available.
  • Third, make sure there is a contingency plan to deal with a major setback for the banking system. The plan needs broad support within the administration and among regulators and, ideally, from key congressional leaders. We probably won’t need it, but there is too high a chance that we will require it for us to remain without one. The country cannot afford even the appearance of the ad hoc and changing nature of the responses that were evident last fall.
We also give the administration a thumbs-up for their bank recapitalization as well as the TALF program, while they are much more skeptical of the Treasury’s approaches to toxic assets. The authors also believe it is time to focus on the truly mind-blowing budget deficits given the danger that markets will not be able to absorb the amount of government borrowing needed without triggering a rise in U.S. interest rates and perhaps an unstable decline in the value of the dollar, nor do they believe there should be a another fiscal stimulus except under extreme circumstances.

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financial

How to ensure Africa has the financial resources to address COVID-19

As countries around the world fall into a recession due to the coronavirus, what effects will this economic downturn have on Africa? Brahima S. Coulibaly joins David Dollar to explain the economic strain from falling commodity prices, remittances, and tourism, and also the consequences of a recent G-20 decision to temporarily suspend debt service payments…