Cinque Terre is one of the most picturesque regions in Italy. These steep, colorful fishing villages perched on seaside cliffs of the Italian Riviera will take your breath away! There are 5 towns of Cinque Terre: Monterosso al Mare, Vernazza, Corniglia, Manarola, and Riomaggiore. Here you’ll find my recommendations for all five towns, plus the […]

The post Guide to the 5 Towns of Cinque Terre, Italy appeared first on Adventurous Kate.

When he first showed up, he was echoing the Jan-6-threat-to-democracy talking point. By the time he left, he had other considerations to chew over.

The post WATCH: Vivek Puts On A Clinic… Flips Bro From Kamala To MAGA In Just A Few Questions (VIDEO) appeared first on Clash Daily.

Claims that FEMA specifically skipped homes with Trump signs were blown off as 'hoaxes'... until they were proven true. Now the fallout of that story is spreading FAR beyond the official responsible.

The post FEMA FAIL: The Claim, The Lie, & The Consequences appeared first on Clash Daily.

Americans will only achieve healthy public discourse when we agree on basic principles and start telling the truth. As it stands, however, too many elected officials engage in hypocrisy by […]

The post Dem Lawmaker Says the Quiet Part Out Loud as She Suddenly Changes Her Tune on the Senate Filibuster appeared first on The Western Journal.

New York Judge Juan Merchan — who is overseeing President-elect Donald Trump’s business records case — agreed to freeze the case until Nov. 19. There was to be a hearing […]

The post Judge Juan Merchan Grants Request from Trump's Legal Team and DA in NY Hush Money Case appeared first on The Western Journal.

Rassie Erasmus' 7-1 variation of the Bomb Squad used against Scotland on Sunday set off a few tremors in the north, with Times writer Stephen Jones the latest to criticise the "dangerous" and "arrogant" tactic.

Nonphotochemical quenching (NPQ) is a mechanism of regulating light harvesting that protects the photosynthetic apparatus from photodamage by dissipating excess absorbed excitation energy as heat. In higher plants, the major light-harvesting antenna complex (LHCII) of photosystem (PS) II is directly involved in NPQ. The aggregation of LHCII is proposed to be involved in quenching. However, the lack of success in isolating native LHCII aggregates has limited the direct interrogation of this process. The isolation of LHCII in its native state from thylakoid membranes has been problematic because of the use of detergent, which tends to dissociate loosely bound proteins, and the abundance of pigment–protein complexes (e.g. PSI and PSII) embedded in the photosynthetic membrane, which hinders the preparation of aggregated LHCII. Here, we used a novel purification method employing detergent and amphipols to entrap LHCII in its natural states. To enrich the photosynthetic membrane with the major LHCII, we used Arabidopsis thaliana plants lacking the PSII minor antenna complexes (NoM), treated with lincomycin to inhibit the synthesis of PSI and PSII core proteins. Using sucrose density gradients, we succeeded in isolating the trimeric and aggregated forms of LHCII antenna. Violaxanthin- and zeaxanthin-enriched complexes were investigated in dark-adapted, NPQ, and dark recovery states. Zeaxanthin-enriched antenna complexes showed the greatest amount of aggregated LHCII. Notably, the amount of aggregated LHCII decreased upon relaxation of NPQ. Employing this novel preparative method, we obtained a direct evidence for the role of in vivo LHCII aggregation in NPQ.

India-China relations: Is the Quad the answer? Interview NCapeling 28 March 2023

The threat of China’s military aggression is being felt across the world, but this is a phenomenon India has been contending with for decades.

India’s border with China became the site of tense conflict in 2020, which led to India reinvesting in the Quad. Arzan Tarapore discusses key issues from his International Affairs article, such as how India is responding to increased aggression at the border and how a reinvigorated Quad may hold answers to balancing China in the Indo-Pacific.

What have India-China relations been like in the past?

Relations between India and China have varied over the decades. In the years following World War Two there was some hope they would find common cause in their international outlooks but that was quite quickly extinguished with their border war of 1962.

Since then, the two countries have oscillated between detente and tension. It took decades for them to normalize their relations and slowly build trust through several confidence-building agreements.

More recently it seemed the two countries were both willing to set aside their border dispute in order to profit from their burgeoning economic relationship – as, for both, there is no question development and economic growth is the primary national objective.

The question has been the extent to which their unresolved sovereignty and security issues undermine those goals as, at the same time, they both began paying more attention to the security of their territorial claims.

China in particular matched its explosive economic growth with startling military modernization and assertiveness. Its long-standing military doctrine and terrain advantages means it relies heavily on quality military infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau and it has accelerated the pace of those infrastructure upgrades and expansion.

In the 2010s, India belatedly began to improve its own transport infrastructure near the border, which threatened to reduce China’s military advantages. The earlier quiet on the border began to crack and China began launching border incursions with increasing frequency and scale.

This was a dynamic, iterative process, with incursions prompting India to accelerate its infrastructure development, which in turn probably prompted more incursions by China.

What happened around 2020 to change their relationship?

The cycle of competitive security policies on the border reached a tipping point in 2020 with Chinese incursions at multiple points simultaneously in Ladakh, apparently designed to establish a new status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating Indian and Chinese-controlled territory.

The Indian political leadership played down the incursions but both Indian and Chinese militaries rushed to reinforce their positions near the border. They held multiple rounds of military talks which made halting progress.

On 15 June 2020, a skirmish resulted in the loss of 20 Indian troops, and an unknown number of Chinese troops. In the weeks that followed, both sides further reinforced their positions in a scramble to gain positional advantage.

How has India responded to China’s increasing military might?

The Indian government’s response to the Chinese landgrab was to threaten the entire bilateral relationship. In a reversal of decades of policy, it argued China had demolished the painstakingly constructed confidence-building measures on the border, and so the relationship could not continue as normal until the border crisis was resolved.

It imposed new restrictions on Chinese investment in India – even as overall trade continued to increase – and adopted a more assertive diplomatic posture.

Strategically, the 2020 border crisis had two major effects. First, it reinforced the Indian proclivity to see its northern borders as the primary threat to Indian national security.

India has heavily reinforced the border, reassigning some major formations and making numerous new investments in military capability to manage the threat. The significance of this however is that, in the context of budget scarcity, these military improvements come at the cost of potential increases in India’s capability in the Indian Ocean region – ultimately a more consequential zone of competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The Indian government may yet change course and reallocate resources for power projection but, at this stage, I see no evidence of that.

The second major strategic effect of the crisis was to unleash Indian cooperation with its partners, especially the US and the reinvigorated Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US.

India has generally avoided formal international alliances, and the Quad was in hiatus for years – why has India invested in it now?

India had always been mindful not to embrace external partners too closely so as to maintain its freedom of action and to not provoke a Chinese reaction. But since the Ladakh crisis, New Delhi has a newfound willingness to work more closely with the US, Japan, and Australia – because it calculates correctly that these partnerships enhance its freedom to act, and that China has already adopted the aggressive posture India feared.

It is important to note however that the border crisis was not the only driver of India’s strategic adjustment. The crisis coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic which highlighted to India the ineffectiveness of existing international institutional arrangements.

For New Delhi, then, the twin crises of Ladakh and the pandemic stressed the need for new international arrangements, and the Quad offered the best combination of agility and capability to meet the most pressing challenges of the Indo-Pacific region.

What do the Quad partners hope to achieve in their renewed partnership?

Beginning in 2021, the Quad assumed far greater significance. The first national leader summits happened – which have since continued at regular intervals – and its members have all agreed to a continually expanding agenda of work.

It seeks to provide international public goods, and everything from climate action to telecommunications regulations. Critically, it has limited its security role to some niche and relatively unprovocative areas, such as humanitarian assistance and maritime domain awareness – issues which benefit the Indo-Pacific as a whole and do not intensify security competition. It has certainly eschewed military cooperation.

Interestingly, the four Quad countries have also separately accelerated their military cooperation, bilaterally, trilaterally, and even quadrilaterally. But that cooperation lies outside the formal mechanisms of the Quad.

What impact will these Quad actions have on Chinese aggression and the Indo-Pacific region?

This Quad approach, which I call ‘zone balancing’ in my article, is specifically designed to build the capacity and resilience of regional states, and to not inflame dyadic security competition.

The relatively uncompetitive character of these activities helps to deflate Chinese claims that the Quad is an antagonistic new bloc, and to ameliorate southeast Asian states’ concerns over the potential intensification of strategic competition.

But the Quad’s agenda is not fixed and not bounded. It has expanded year on year and may continue to extend into new areas. This gives it a degree of flexibility and coercive leverage as Beijing cannot be confident about the Quad’s future direction.

This slate of activities has a lot of utility in building the Quad’s regional legitimacy and habits of cooperation among its members. But it conspicuously does not address the region’s most pressing security challenges.

It is not, in its current form, equipped to manage the challenge of territorial disputes or aggression. So the Quad will not address India’s unresolved border dispute with China, potential crises over Taiwan, or the South China Sea.

I would argue, however, that the four members of the Quad have unparalleled advantages of capacity and geography. With further military cooperation, even outside the formal structures of the Quad, they have the potential to deter Chinese aggression, but that remains subject to their political preferences.

Will other countries in different parts of the world adopt similar balancing strategies?

Zone balancing could be an attractive strategy for other countries which want to either avoid the costs of hard military balancing, or to not provoke their rivals.

It has been used in the past – such as the Marshall Plan during the early Cold War – and I would not be surprised if other countries competing with China, or even China itself, use it.

The QT interval is a recording of cardiac electrical activity. Previous genome-wide association studies identified genetic variants that modify the QT interval upstream of LITAF (lipopolysaccharide-induced tumor necrosis factor-α factor), a protein encoding a regulator of endosomal trafficking. However, it was not clear how LITAF might impact cardiac excitation. We investigated the effect of LITAF on the voltage-gated sodium channel Nav1.5, which is critical for cardiac depolarization. We show that overexpressed LITAF resulted in a significant increase in the density of Nav1.5-generated voltage-gated sodium current INa and Nav1.5 surface protein levels in rabbit cardiomyocytes and in HEK cells stably expressing Nav1.5. Proximity ligation assays showed co-localization of endogenous LITAF and Nav1.5 in cardiomyocytes, whereas co-immunoprecipitations confirmed they are in the same complex when overexpressed in HEK cells. In vitro data suggest that LITAF interacts with the ubiquitin ligase NEDD4-2, a regulator of Nav1.5. LITAF overexpression down-regulated NEDD4-2 in cardiomyocytes and HEK cells. In HEK cells, LITAF increased ubiquitination and proteasomal degradation of co-expressed NEDD4-2 and significantly blunted the negative effect of NEDD4-2 on INa. We conclude that LITAF controls cardiac excitability by promoting degradation of NEDD4-2, which is essential for removal of surface Nav1.5. LITAF-knockout zebrafish showed increased variation in and a nonsignificant 15% prolongation of action potential duration. Computer simulations using a rabbit-cardiomyocyte model demonstrated that changes in Ca2+ and Na+ homeostasis are responsible for the surprisingly modest action potential duration shortening. These computational data thus corroborate findings from several genome-wide association studies that associated LITAF with QT interval variation.

Member’s question time: Is Russia losing the South Caucasus? 22 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 September 2024 Online

Join us and ask Chatham House Senior Research Fellow, Natalie Sabanadze anything about the situation in the Caucasus. Submit your questions in advance.

Whilst Russia focuses on its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the situation at its southern border is evolving. Relations between the three states in the South Caucasus and Moscow have never been easy as Russia tried to maintain its dominance by leveraging vulnerabilities, playing one side against another to keep conflicts simmering and even engaging in open military aggression.  Although the violence seen in the 1990s and early 2000s has abated, the war in Ukraine has had an indirect impact on the region, bringing a change to the status quo.

Russia abandoned its long-standing support for Armenia, allowing for the collapse of Nagorny-Karabakh and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with the backing of Turkey. As a result, Azerbaijan has emerged as a dominant regional player with Baku recently declaring its interest to join BRICS.  Turkey’s influence has grown, while Armenia frustrated by Russia’s change of heart has been turning cautiously towards the EU and the US.

In Georgia, meanwhile, the ruling party has been consolidating its grasp on power, rolling back democratic reforms and pivoting away from the West. Georgia’s long-awaited European integration process has been suspended, following the adoption of the Russian-style foreign agents legislation.

Join us as our Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme answers your questions in this quick-fire session assessing the extent to which the Russian influence has changed since the start of the invasion of Ukraine and who is there to fill the vacuum; how geopolitical contestation in the region is going to impact aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; and much more.

Submit your questions to Natalie Sabanadze in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

The 2024 US Election: Global Consequences 26 September 2024 — 5:30PM TO 6:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 September 2024 Online

This webinar explores what is at stake for US policy in key regions around the globe.

In the lead up to the 2024 US presidential election, Chatham House experts discuss:

• What is at stake for US policy towards China, Europe, and Latin America and what challenges will confront the next US president?

• Can the US lead when its partners and allies are continually dissatisfied by the new turn in its trade and economic policy?

• What are the core humanitarian challenges and how can they be addressed?

Iraq Initiative Conference 2024 20 November 2024 — 9:30AM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Our sixth annual Iraq Initiative conference will convene Iraqi and international policymakers, experts and civil society in London to discuss the critical questions for Iraq’s future, and the country’s trajectory in the year ahead.

Over two decades following regime change, Iraq appears to be on a path to recovery and growth. With the support of high oil prices, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s government is implementing an ambitious plan to develop critical infrastructure, enhance ties with neighbouring countries, and renegotiate relationships with international partners like the US and UN. The political system has rebounded from a series of shocks and is in the process of consolidating and centralising power in Baghdad under the governing Shia Coordination Framework.

However, underlying political, economic, security, and regional challenges, if not addressed, threaten this apparent stability and frustrate longer-term hope for a better future. Despite the country’s wealth, many young Iraqis struggle to find jobs while the space for civic activism shrinks. Meanwhile, the escalation of violence across the region threatens to engulf Iraq in further conflict. With the 2025 parliamentary election approaching, infighting within the governing coalition also suggests political turmoil in the year ahead.

The key questions explored through each session include:

• How can the Sudani government tackle the roots of these obstacles to ensure that development can be sustained over time?
• What are the key steps to coherent and effective state-building?
• And how can regional and international actors support this process?

This conference is part of Chatham House’s Iraq Initiative.

This year’s conference features RE-PLAY – a video art exhibition curated by Dr Tamara Chalabi of the Ruya Foundation. The artists featured in this exhibition, spanning multiple generations both within Iraq and in the Iraqi diaspora, use their work to grapple with complex notions of Iraqi identity through the thematic issues of heritage, exile, disconnection, freedom of expression, and other persistent issues explored in this show.

Simultaneous English-Arabic interpretation will be available for all conference sessions. This event is part of Chatham House’s Iraq Initiative.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

The cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) is a plasma membrane anion channel that plays a key role in controlling transepithelial fluid movement. Excessive activation results in intestinal fluid loss during secretory diarrheas, whereas CFTR mutations underlie cystic fibrosis (CF). Anion permeability depends both on how well CFTR channels work (permeation/gating) and on how many are present at the membrane. Recently, treatments with two drug classes targeting CFTR—one boosting ion-channel function (potentiators) and the other increasing plasma membrane density (correctors)—have provided significant health benefits to CF patients. Here, we present an image-based fluorescence assay that can rapidly and simultaneously estimate both CFTR ion-channel function and the protein's proximity to the membrane. We monitor F508del-CFTR, the most common CF-causing variant, and confirm rescue by low temperature, CFTR-targeting drugs and second-site revertant mutation R1070W. In addition, we characterize a panel of 62 CF-causing mutations. Our measurements correlate well with published data (electrophysiology and biochemistry), further confirming validity of the assay. Finally, we profile effects of acute treatment with approved potentiator drug VX-770 on the rare-mutation panel. Mapping the potentiation profile on CFTR structures raises mechanistic hypotheses on drug action, suggesting that VX-770 might allow an open-channel conformation with an alternative arrangement of domain interfaces. The assay is a valuable tool for investigation of CFTR molecular mechanisms, allowing accurate inferences on gating/permeation. In addition, by providing a two-dimensional characterization of the CFTR protein, it could better inform development of single-drug and precision therapies addressing the root cause of CF disease.

IQGAP1 is a key scaffold protein that regulates numerous cellular processes and signaling pathways. Analogous to many other cellular proteins, IQGAP1 undergoes post-translational modifications, including phosphorylation. Nevertheless, very little is known about the specific sites of phosphorylation or the effects on IQGAP1 function. Here, using several approaches, including MS, site-directed mutagenesis, siRNA-mediated gene silencing, and chemical inhibitors, we identified the specific tyrosine residues that are phosphorylated on IQGAP1 and evaluated the effect on function. Tyr-172, Tyr-654, Tyr-855, and Tyr-1510 were phosphorylated on IQGAP1 when phosphotyrosine phosphatase activity was inhibited in cells. IQGAP1 was phosphorylated exclusively on Tyr-1510 under conditions with enhanced MET or c-Src signaling, including in human lung cancer cell lines. This phosphorylation was significantly reduced by chemical inhibitors of MET or c-Src or by siRNA-mediated knockdown of MET. To investigate the biological sequelae of phosphorylation, we generated a nonphosphorylatable IQGAP1 construct by replacing Tyr-1510 with alanine. The ability of hepatocyte growth factor, the ligand for MET, to promote AKT activation and cell migration was significantly greater when IQGAP1-null cells were reconstituted with IQGAP1 Y1510A than when cells were reconstituted with WT IQGAP1. Collectively, our data suggest that phosphorylation of Tyr-1510 of IQGAP1 alters cell function. Because increased MET signaling is implicated in the development and progression of several types of carcinoma, IQGAP1 may be a potential therapeutic target in selected malignancies.

Reflections on Iraq since 2003 6 March 2023 — 11:00AM TO 12:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 20 February 2023 Chatham House

This event reflects on the legacy of the invasion and occupation for Iraq, the Middle East, and the West.

When a US-led coalition invaded Iraq and overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime 20 years ago, many Iraqis hoped that a more democratic, prosperous future lay ahead.

But in reality, their lives have been marred by different forms of violent conflict, fuelled by a corrupt system through which a new class of leaders gutted state finances and enriched themselves at the expense of the people.

Today, almost two-thirds of the Iraqi population are under 25 and have no memory of life under Saddam Hussein. For many, the legacy of the war is only a failed political system that kills every day by means of corruption and neglect.

At this roundtable, part of the Iraq Initiative, Chatham House welcomes journalist and author Ghaith Abdul-Ahad to discuss his book on this subject, called A Stranger in Your Own City: Travels in the Middle East’s Long War, alongside a panel of experts who will explore the profound legacy of the war for the Iraqi people.

This marks the first in a series of Chatham House Iraq Initiative events and analysis reflecting on the legacy of the invasion and occupation for Iraq, the Middle East and the West.

The interconnected impacts of the Iraq war Expert comment LJefferson 22 March 2023

Relying on weak intelligence for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility with several consequences that persist to this day.

20 years on from the fateful decision to invade Iraq, it is generally accepted that the US and UK governments overstated the evidence available for them to justify military action. The central claim to defend invading Iraq was that the country had continued its illicit nuclear weapons programme and had retained illegal stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. None of these claims supported an imminent threat justification nor could any hidden caches of WMD be found by the US Iraq Survey Group after the invasion.  

In the US, President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney hinted at additional evidence which could not be shared publicly to suggest that if only people knew what the government knew, they would agree that Iraq posed a significant threat to the West and needed to be disarmed.

In the UK, the Blair government acted similarly, focusing on a narrow interpretation of the evidence provided by the intelligence services and ignoring many of the dire warnings offered by academics and other experts. The Chilcot Inquiry found that the Blair government greatly exaggerated the threat Iraq posed to the UK, and that government arguments were based on the prime minister’s personal beliefs, as well as his promise to President Bush to support the US invasion. 

Relying on inadequate information and a biased analysis for invading Iraq has had a negative impact on US and UK credibility in the international security policy environment and domestically with ramifications that persist to this day.  

Impacts on soft power and trust

The invasion had an impact on US and UK soft power due to negative perceptions of the decision to go to war and the competence of the UK and US: public opinion polling by the Pew Center showed that perceptions of the US declined significantly as a result of the invasion of Iraq, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This is undoubtedly a challenge for the US, but arguably an even bigger challenge for the UK, which due to its size and power relies much more on diplomacy and coalition-building in order to achieve its goals within various international treaty frameworks.   

Over nearly two decades, the US and the UK no longer seemed to enjoy the same foundation of trust, even with close allies, as they did previously. This changed in February 2022.

Towards the end of 2021, both the US and the UK were sounding the alarm about an impending Russian invasion of Ukraine based on information and analysis from their intelligence services. Despite the amassing of Russian troops, tanks and artillery on the border clearly visible from the air and by satellite imagery, several allies remained unconvinced until the invasion happened.  

This was in part due to their own assessments which indicated that Russia would stop short of an invasion, and in part because allies were unwilling to take US and UK statements on faith, without being able to assess the information themselves.

US officials found this frustrating as it meant that NATO and the EU were slower off the mark with support for Ukraine than they might otherwise have been. However, the accuracy of the US/UK intelligence on Russia’s invasion, coupled with their sharing it openly, may well have restored faith in their capabilities and analysis.  

A more open approach to intelligence  

Over the last few years, there seems to have been a change in accepted practice regarding sharing and using intelligence. The UK Ministry of Defence has taken a much more open approach to intelligence in the war in Ukraine, sharing the most recent defence information publicly in order to counter Russian disinformation.  

This is a positive step to ensure that intelligence can be discussed and assessed critically. Being more open about secret intelligence may also be linked to the increasing capabilities of open-source intelligence (OSINT). Non-governmental and international organizations and the media all now have access to data from, for example, imaging satellites and can independently verify information coming from governments. 

Perceived double standards 

A reduction of trust in US and UK intelligence was not the only impact of the invasion of Iraq. Russia and China have repeatedly called out the US and UK for acting without a second UN Security Council mandate. Putin uses the decision to invade Iraq, as well as the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, to justify Russia’s actions in Crimea. He invokes parallel language to spread disinformation about a ‘responsibility to protect life’ of the (‘ethnically Russian’) Crimean population. Russia has also repeatedly used the WMD trope to create false narratives around Ukrainian biosecurity laboratories to justify Russian military actions against Ukraine.  

Deciding to invade Iraq under what turned out to be a false pretext has weakened the application of the international rule of law and has led to a perceived double standard whereby powerful states can use UN processes in their favour, or completely disregard them if they do not deliver their goals.

As the Chilcot Inquiry found, there was very little preparation for the post-invasion period either in the US or the UK. Confirmation bias led not only to trusting shaky intelligence but also to believing in a best-case scenario and a ‘relatively benign security environment’ once the invasion had prevailed. Mismanaging the country’s occupation afterwards also led to the perception that the UK and US are less competent than projected. 

Problems for the international order  

The Iraq War has left many smaller and medium-sized states outside Europe and North America with the impression that powerful states are not committed to an equitable international system and instead will bend the rules to suit them while nonetheless holding other states to account. This dynamic poses a serious problem for the international system. 

It opens the door to ‘whataboutism’ in Russia’s false justifications for invading Ukraine and undermines faith in international law, destabilizing the international order in the longer term. Beyond the immediate challenges of dealing with the war in Ukraine, reforming and strengthening the international order to make it more equitable will be one of the most significant challenges the US and UK will face over the next decade. 

A trust deficit  

Domestically, for already disappointed citizens, the deceit over intelligence it is yet another piece of evidence which suggests that their government is not trustworthy and may not have their best interests at heart. This has profound implications for US and UK democracies, making it harder for governments to counter citizens’ susceptibilities to disinformation campaigns. 

Alfred C. O. Vertegaal
Dec 1, 2006; 5:2298-2310
Research

Dongmei Cheng
Jun 1, 2006; 5:1158-1170
Datasets

Ivan Matic
Jan 1, 2008; 7:132-144
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Hasmik Keshishian
Dec 1, 2007; 6:2212-2229
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Jacek R. Wiśniewski
Dec 1, 2014; 13:3497-3506
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Tamar Geiger
Mar 1, 2012; 11:M111.014050-M111.014050
Special Issue: Prospects in Space and Time

Amelia C. Peterson
Nov 1, 2012; 11:1475-1488
Technological Innovation and Resources

Roland Bruderer
May 1, 2015; 14:1400-1410
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Sebastian A. Wagner
Oct 1, 2011; 10:M111.013284-M111.013284
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Joris J. Benschop
Jul 1, 2007; 6:1198-1214
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Christian Tagwerker
Apr 1, 2006; 5:737-748
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William M. Old
Oct 1, 2005; 4:1487-1502
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Leigh Anderson
Apr 1, 2006; 5:573-588
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Ludovic C. Gillet
Jun 1, 2012; 11:O111.016717-O111.016717
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Ignat V. Shilov
Sep 1, 2007; 6:1638-1655
Technology

Albrecht Gruhler
Mar 1, 2005; 4:310-327
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Jeffrey C. Silva
Jan 1, 2006; 5:144-156
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Yasushi Ishihama
Sep 1, 2005; 4:1265-1272
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Philip L. Ross
Dec 1, 2004; 3:1154-1169
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Jürgen Cox
Sep 1, 2014; 13:2513-2526
Technological Innovation and Resources

Wisdom to my mind is a bit of a paradox. It is subjective and context-dependent, but inherently universal. I say this, because for something to be wise it ought to be applicable across time and space, yet whether the claims are appraised as being “wise” hinges on the perception of a past, present or future audience. It is beyond the self, yet dependent upon the self. So that then begs the fantasy writing question: What if the self is not human? If culture already morphs the form and substance of wisdom, what effect might a different state of being have on it?

That would be terribly dull to prescribe, but I can help get some readers’ creativity going. Below I have listed relevant questions with examples you might consider when building your setting, so you may merrily thread into your fantastic realms to shape oddities rich and strange.

I would advise readers of this article to try and let go of their own presumptions on what is wise for the sake of worldbuilding. There are few cultures in our modern, human world whose philosophers deem obtuse narcissists dressed in mink robes as being wise, but why wouldn’t a race of bobcat-folk?

Continue reading Questions for Worldbuilding the Concept of Wisdom at Mythic Scribes.

The Platinum Jubilee of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II News release NCapeling 1 June 2022

The staff, associate fellows and Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House send congratulations and warmest wishes to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II on the occasion of her momentous Platinum Jubilee.

As the Patron of the institute since her accession to the throne in 1952, HM The Queen has underpinned Chatham House’s independence for seven decades and thereby strengthened the impact of our work on the critical issues facing the world.

HM The Queen lent her personal support to the establishment of the annual Chatham House Prize in 2005 and has presented the award in person on behalf of the institute’s members on three occasions.

Among her other direct engagements with Chatham House, HM The Queen has helped us engage the next generation by supporting and then attending the launch of the Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs in 2014, when she met the first intake of Academy fellows.

We are enormously grateful for her continued involvement as Patron of the institute and wish her and the Royal Family a memorable Platinum Jubilee.

Robin Niblett awarded knighthood in Queen's Birthday Honours News release NCapeling 1 June 2022

Chatham House director Dr Robin Niblett CMG receives a knighthood for services to international relations and to British foreign policy.

Chatham House Council and staff congratulate the institute’s director Robin Niblett, who has been appointed as a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG) by HM The Queen in her Birthday Honours list.

The citation for the KCMG, awarded at the recommendation of the UK foreign secretary, recognizes Dr Niblett’s ‘outstanding personal contribution to British soft power and influence in his role as director of Chatham House over the last 15 years’.

The citation also states: ‘With exceptional energy and talent, he has greatly enhanced the research reputation of the Institute, strengthened its international convening power, finances and staffing, and modernised its premises, image and diverse outreach’.

Dr Niblett is standing down in the summer and will be replaced by Bronwen Maddox, who joins from the Institute for Government.

Dr Niblett says: ‘I am deeply honoured by this award, which is as much a recognition of the tireless and selfless work of my colleagues at Chatham House throughout my tenure as director.

‘Together, and through challenging times, we have offered a vital source of independent debate and analysis. And, with the engagement of our supporters and a new generation of thinkers and actors, I know the institute will continue to provide creative ideas for a better future.’

Independent Thinking: Iran protests, Iraq's invasion legacy Audio NCapeling 17 November 2022

Episode five of our new weekly podcast has a Middle East focus with insights into what is driving the ongoing protests in Iran, and the progress of Iraq in the years since the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Since September, Iran has been swept by thousands of women-led protests, demanding an end to the morality police and the even calling for the fall of the Islamic Republic.

Meanwhile at Chatham House this week saw our Iraq Initiative conference 2022, which delved heavily into the multiple challenges facing Iraq two decades on from the invasion which toppled Saddam Hussein.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week are the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa programme deputy director Dr Sanam Vakil and senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour, who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative. They are joined by Sanya Burgess, digital investigations journalist with Sky News.

Independent Thinking: Consequences of the Iraq war Audio NCapeling 23 March 2023

Episode 20 of our weekly podcast marks 20 years since the invasion of Iraq, with special guest Clare Short who resigned from the UK government over the issue.

Launched amid fears that Saddam Hussein was acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq war changed the Middle East and inflicted huge damage with effects that persist today.

This week’s panel examines the war from the perspective of those in power in London when the decision was made to commit UK forces to the invasion, and with those in Iraq who lived with the consequences.   

Joining Bronwen Maddox is special guest Clare Short, former Secretary of State for International Development, who served in the UK cabinet and resigned after the invasion began, becoming one of the best-known critics of prime minister Tony Blair’s approach to the war.

On the panel from Chatham House is Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme, and three members of the Middle East and North Africa programme; the director Dr Lina Khatib, senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative, and research associate Hayder Al-Shakeri.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Members' question time: What has COP29 achieved? 25 November 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 November 2024 Online

Join us and ask our senior research fellow, Ruth Townend anything about the outcome from COP29. Submit your questions in advance.

As COP29 prepares to conclude in Baku, Azerbaijan, this year’s conference has taken place against a backdrop of ever worsening climate impacts and escalating financial needs for developing countries. Being hosted by Azerbaijan has been significant, a country whose economy is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. As delegates and officials prepare to leave, the urgency for global climate action intensifies.

Join us as Ruth Townend, our Senior Research Fellow for the Environment and Society Centre to provide the latest insight and analysis from COP. She will give an overview of the key developments from Baku, new global commitments that have been agreed and how this sets up COP 30 in Brazil in 2025.

Submit your questions to Ruth Townend in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.