Independent Thinking: Consequences of the Iraq war Audio NCapeling 23 March 2023

Episode 20 of our weekly podcast marks 20 years since the invasion of Iraq, with special guest Clare Short who resigned from the UK government over the issue.

Launched amid fears that Saddam Hussein was acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq war changed the Middle East and inflicted huge damage with effects that persist today.

This week’s panel examines the war from the perspective of those in power in London when the decision was made to commit UK forces to the invasion, and with those in Iraq who lived with the consequences.   

Joining Bronwen Maddox is special guest Clare Short, former Secretary of State for International Development, who served in the UK cabinet and resigned after the invasion began, becoming one of the best-known critics of prime minister Tony Blair’s approach to the war.

On the panel from Chatham House is Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme, and three members of the Middle East and North Africa programme; the director Dr Lina Khatib, senior research fellow Dr Renad Mansour who is also project director of the Iraq Initiative, and research associate Hayder Al-Shakeri.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

Accumulation of the microtubule-associated protein tau is associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD). In AD brain, tau is abnormally phosphorylated at many sites, and phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 plays critical roles in tau accumulation and toxicity. Microtubule affinity–regulating kinase 4 (MARK4) phosphorylates tau at those sites, and a double de novo mutation in the linker region of MARK4, ΔG316E317D, is associated with an elevated risk of AD. However, it remains unclear how this mutation affects phosphorylation, aggregation, and accumulation of tau and tau-induced neurodegeneration. Here, we report that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases the abundance of highly phosphorylated, insoluble tau species and exacerbates neurodegeneration via Ser-262/356–dependent and –independent mechanisms. Using transgenic Drosophila expressing human MARK4 (MARK4wt) or a mutant version of MARK4 (MARK4ΔG316E317D), we found that coexpression of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased total tau levels and enhanced tau-induced neurodegeneration and that MARK4ΔG316E317D had more potent effects than MARK4wt. Interestingly, the in vitro kinase activities of MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D were similar. When tau phosphorylation at Ser-262 and Ser-356 was blocked by alanine substitutions, MARK4wt did not promote tau accumulation or exacerbate neurodegeneration, whereas coexpression of MARK4ΔG316E317D did. Both MARK4wt and MARK4ΔG316E317D increased the levels of oligomeric forms of tau; however, only MARK4ΔG316E317D further increased the detergent insolubility of tau in vivo. Together, these findings suggest that MARK4ΔG316E317D increases tau levels and exacerbates tau toxicity via a novel gain-of-function mechanism and that modification in this region of MARK4 may affect disease pathogenesis.

Synapse loss is associated with motor and cognitive decline in multiple neurodegenerative disorders, and the cellular redistribution of tau is related to synaptic impairment in tauopathies, such as Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia. Here, we examined the cellular distribution of tau protein species in human tau overexpressing line 66 mice, a transgenic mouse model akin to genetic variants of frontotemporal dementia. Line 66 mice express intracellular tau aggregates in multiple brain regions and exhibit sensorimotor and motor learning deficiencies. Using a series of anti-tau antibodies, we observed, histologically, that nonphosphorylated transgenic human tau is enriched in synapses, whereas phosphorylated tau accumulates predominantly in cell bodies and axons. Subcellular fractionation confirmed that human tau is highly enriched in insoluble cytosolic and synaptosomal fractions, whereas endogenous mouse tau is virtually absent from synapses. Cytosolic tau was resistant to solubilization with urea and Triton X-100, indicating the formation of larger tau aggregates. By contrast, synaptic tau was partially soluble after Triton X-100 treatment and most likely represents aggregates of smaller size. MS corroborated that synaptosomal tau is nonphosphorylated. Tau enriched in the synapse of line 66 mice, therefore, appears to be in an oligomeric and nonphosphorylated state, and one that could have a direct impact on cognitive function.

Alzheimer's disease (AD) is characterized by neuronal loss and accumulation of β-amyloid-protein (Aβ) in the brain parenchyma. Sleep impairment is associated with AD and affects about 25–40% of patients in the mild-to-moderate stages of the disease. Sleep deprivation leads to increased Aβ production; however, its mechanism remains largely unknown. We hypothesized that the increase in core body temperature induced by sleep deprivation may promote Aβ production. Here, we report temperature-dependent regulation of Aβ production. We found that an increase in temperature, from 37 °C to 39 °C, significantly increased Aβ production in amyloid precursor protein-overexpressing cells. We also found that high temperature (39 °C) significantly increased the expression levels of heat shock protein 90 (Hsp90) and the C-terminal fragment of presenilin 1 (PS1-CTF) and promoted γ-secretase complex formation. Interestingly, Hsp90 was associated with the components of the premature γ-secretase complex, anterior pharynx-defective-1 (APH-1), and nicastrin (NCT) but was not associated with PS1-CTF or presenilin enhancer-2. Hsp90 knockdown abolished the increased level of Aβ production and the increased formation of the γ-secretase complex at high temperature in culture. Furthermore, with in vivo experiments, we observed increases in the levels of Hsp90, PS1-CTF, NCT, and the γ-secretase complex in the cortex of mice housed at higher room temperature (30 °C) compared with those housed at standard room temperature (23 °C). Our results suggest that high temperature regulates Aβ production by modulating γ-secretase complex formation through the binding of Hsp90 to NCT/APH-1.

How modular renewables can reduce the costs of relying on carbon capture Expert comment LToremark 10 October 2024

COP29 must raise countries’ ambitions to deploy vastly more low-cost modular renewable technologies to help meet the tripling of renewables target set at COP28 and reduce our reliance on expensive carbon capture systems.

The most important international climate conference is around the corner. COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan will be especially important because next year countries will submit their five-yearly national climate plans – or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – as set out under the Paris Agreement.

At COP28 in Dubai last year, the final text was heralded as a last-minute success as – somewhat surprisingly – it was the first ever COP to commit to ‘transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner’. To support this, over 200 countries also committed to triple renewable capacity by 2030.

Under current NDCs, even if all countries achieve their most ambitious decarbonization plans, the world would still fall 30 per cent short of tripling renewable capacity by 2030. 

At COP29 in November, hosted by a petrostate, additional agreement is needed to operationalize the removal of fossil fuels from the global energy system and set the ambition for those crucial NDCs in 2025. Failing to do so means the opportunity to triple renewables by 2030 will slip away. But the actions of oil producing nations, international oil companies, their associated supply chains and networks of lobbyists have in recent years done their best to disrupt and slow down the energy transition and water down key negotiations during COPs and elsewhere. 

During the final days of COP28, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sent private letters to its 13 members – including COP28 host the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – urging them to ‘proactively reject any text or formula that targets energy, i.e. fossil fuels, rather than emissions’. OPEC members own 80 per cent of global oil reserves.

Due to the startling decline in the cost of renewables and electric vehicles, fossil fuel producers are increasingly concerned. To fight back they are turning to carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and carbon removal options, which would enable the continued burning of fossil fuels – and protect their assets and business models.

A key battle ground for oil and gas producers is the difference between abated and unabated fossil fuels.

Abatement is the process of capturing CO₂ as fossil fuels are burnt to prevent a proportion of those CO₂ emissions from entering the atmosphere, either by using that CO₂ in products or storing it in geological formations deep underground in near perpetuity, commonly referred to as CCS.

After COP28 there was optimism that the final agreement was significant and covered all fossil fuels without ambiguity around whether they are unabated or abated. 

But the definition of unabated has not actually been agreed within the COP process. During the 2021 COP26 summit, the Glasgow Climate Pact mentioned unabated in reference to coal. Could a gas power station capturing 51 per cent of the emitted CO₂ be considered abated?

And what about the so-called downstream emissions? Downstream emissions from cars, planes, tanker ships and diesel generators etc make up 50–80 per cent of the total emissions from oil – and there are no plans to attach mini-CCS systems to cars.

CCS and engineered carbon removals are also likely to be expensive. Analysis by the Oxford Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment has shown that high CCS pathways to net zero emissions in 2050 would cost at least $30 trillion more than a low CCS pathway with more renewables – roughly $1 trillion more per year.

The costs of CCS have also remained the same for the past 40 years, while the costs of renewables like solar, wind and lithium-ion batteries have dropped radically. Solar costs have declined by 90 per cent in the last decade. 

The rapid cost reductions of solar, wind and batteries are due to their modular nature. Around 70 billion solar cells will be manufactured this year, the majority in China. It is the repetitive modular manufacturing process that has led to rapid efficiency improvements and cost reductions. Each Tesla has around 7,000 lithium-ion battery cells, and the price of these modular batteries fell 14 per cent between 2022 and 2023 alone. 

The modular criteria can help define the technology winners of the future, technologies we should selectively support and accelerate over the coming years. 

While huge industrial power stations, oil rigs and refineries have their benefits, they are not modular in the same way. Their economy of scale is in the large size of each asset. CCS is bolted on to fossil fuel infrastructure but there are less than 50,000 fossil fuel producing assets globally. By contrast, there were 1.5 billion solar panels produced in 2022. The cost of deploying CCS is therefore unlikely to benefit from the rapid cost reductions of modular renewables. Nuclear even less so. There are 440 nuclear power stations in operation today, they take many years to build and remain hugely expensive. 

In conversation with the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds 17 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The Minister of State for Development discusses the new government’s international development priorities.

Following its election victory in July 2024, the new government has set out an ambition to reset its relationships with countries in the Global South. Its stated mission is to modernise the UK’s approach to international development, helping to create ‘a world free from poverty on a liveable planet’.

Where can the UK make a meaningful difference in a more volatile and insecure world? The government is looking to address priorities including unsustainable debt, empowering women and girls, conflict prevention, and unlocking climate finance. But it does this with a much-reduced Official Development Assistance budget, in a world where progress to meet the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals is off track. And while the UK has been debating its own approach to development, the landscape has been changing, with non-allied states vying for influence in the Global South, and developing countries themselves becoming more vocal on climate, debt, and global institutional reform. What kind of role can the government set out for the UK in this context?

In this discussion, the Rt Hon Anneliese Dodds, Minister of State for Development in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, will lay out her priorities for meeting international development goals over the coming parliament.

Individual membership provides you with the complete Chatham House experience, connecting you with a unique global policy community. Find out more about membership.

European Hub for Contemporary China

The European Hub for Contemporary China is a three-year project focused on original research on China.

The European Hub for Contemporary China (EuroHub4Sino) is a three-year project, which began in October 2023, to produce original research on China. It also seeks to create an online platform that pools a wide array of European knowledge and expertise on contemporary China in one publicly accessible research platform. The project is run by a consortium of eight partners across six European states.

Find out more by visiting the project website.

EuroHub4Sino is co-funded by the European Union. UK participants in Horizon Europe Project European Hub for Contemporary China are supported by UKRI grant numbers 10108183 and 10108749.

What the US election means for trade policy Expert comment LJefferson 10 October 2024

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump could not be more different when it comes to trade, despite a changed economic landscape.

Trade policy is playing a relatively subdued role in this autumn’s US election. Yes, former president Trump has proposed tariffs of anywhere from 20 per cent to 100 per cent, asserting the revenue could fund policy areas from deficit reduction to childcare, all while growing US employment and promoting world peace.
  
But unlike 2020, or even more 2016, the international trade architecture has not been a lively part of this year’s campaign. The two parties now start from a shared expectation of an international economic landscape shaped more by competition and industrial policy than by continued liberalization. However, the two presidential candidates’ views of which trade tools to use, and whether to proceed with allies and partners or unilaterally, could not be more different.

New set of trade expectations

A large part of the relative calm has to do with the emergence of a new set of expectations on trade that are shared across Republicans and Democrats, and that are unlikely to shift in the next four years regardless of who occupies the White House.

First, neither party can field the support to pass a traditional comprehensive free trade agreement through Congress. While each party still has a wing of elected officials who would like to see the US return to negotiating deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or attempt expansive new deals with Europe or in the Western Hemisphere, they are unlikely to reach critical mass in the immediate future, regardless of who holds the White House – or who controls Congress.

This shift in perception of the relative value of such deals – and their potential to cause political blowback for legislators – also means that the cost to any administration that wanted to propose such a deal would be high.

Second, there is broad bipartisan support to continue measures aimed at promoting US security in the face of high-technology challenges from Beijing that have both military and security applications. This means continued US activism in export controls and other more innovative measures.

Less divergence on clean energy

While there is also cross-party enthusiasm for approaches to building up US manufacturing that fall under the rubric of industrial policy, the parties diverge significantly when it comes to specific content. However, around clean energy that divergence will be less than the campaign trail rhetoric suggests.

Because clean energy generation is spread so broadly across the United States – with a great deal of wind and solar generation in Republican-governed ‘red states,’ and investment from the Inflation Reduction Act flowing to red states as much or more than blue ones – such incentives, and their effects on trade policy, are here to stay. Despite this, a Republican presidency or Congress will certainly seek to water down or eliminate parts of the Inflation Reduction Act that focus specifically on transition away from fossil fuels.
 
Coupled with this commitment to making America a clean energy superpower, there is considerable cross-party interest in trade initiatives that promote clean energy and manufacturing – whether from a climate perspective or a pure economic competitiveness perspective. A wide range of creative proposals are buzzing around Congress and think-tanks – from a carbon border measure, to resuscitating the Global Steel Arrangement, to critical mineral-focused deals. Though the topic is often overlooked in overviews of trade policy, it is the one where we are most likely to see classic trade tools used.

A vast difference between the two candidates

Beyond those broad strokes of an emerging ‘new Washington consensus,’ as former US trade representative and current head of the Council on Foreign Relations Michael Froman describes it: who wins the presidency will make a vast difference in what Washington does on trade – and how it aims to achieve its goals.

A Harris administration will aim to develop shared economic security agendas with allies and partners – quite possibly expanding beyond the Biden Administration’s G7 focus to pursue more deals with a broader range of partners. Trump, on the other hand, has explicitly said he will pursue US economic interests at the expense of allies and partners. ‘Under my leadership,’ he said in a speech in Georgia last month, ‘we’re going to take other countries’ jobs,’ specifically citing allies Germany and South Korea as targets.

While Vice-President Harris has criticized Trump’s tariff proposals, and noted their likely negative effects on consumers, she has not signalled that she would make changes to the tariffs on China first imposed by President Trump and then adjusted by President Biden. 
A Trump administration would use tariffs aggressively, but it remains absolutely unclear how. 

Space security 2025 5 March 2025 — 8:00AM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Join senior policymakers, space security experts and industry leaders for this unique conference, examining how space actors are tackling conflict and competition and enhancing cooperation in a fracturing world.

We’re pleased to offer you a 30% discount for our Security and Defence Conference on 6 March 2025. Simply use code SECDEF25SAVER at checkout.

Conflict, competition and cooperation in outer space

Space is a crucial domain of conflict, competition and cooperation. Recent years have seen the emergence of new actors in the ecosystem, as more countries seek to grow their presence in outer space, accompanied by the explosive growth of the space industry. Extraterrestrial exploration offers great opportunities, from the benefits of the space economy and technological developments to national security advantages. But with increasing activity and the diverging interests of state actors, governments, international organizations and the private sector are confronting fierce competition and the potential for conflict in space.

Alongside intensified competition, stakeholders are managing the growing role that space plays in modern military and defence strategies. Increased extraterrestrial activity has also created sustainability issues with serious security implications, demanding long-term solutions. At the same time, a fracturing global order poses major challenges to cooperation on space governance efforts and attempts to uphold international law.  

The 2025 Space Security Conference convenes policymakers and leaders from the private sector, multilateral organizations, academia and NGOs for a day of high-level interactive discussions examining conflict, competition and cooperation in outer space. Ahead of the 2025 Chatham House Security and Defence Conference, this event explores how the public and private sectors are addressing space security challenges and fostering a secure environment whilst harnessing the benefits of space for defence and economic growth.

Why attend?

• Gain unique insights into the many and varied threats to space security and how governments, international organizations and the private sector are tackling them.  
• Understand how key leaders in the domain are viewing the 21st century space race and what countries and space organizations are doing to mitigate conflict whilst keeping up in this competitive landscape.
• Network with senior leaders from across government, international organizations and industry in-person at Chatham House and access exclusive ‘under the Rule’ discussions. 

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

The UK must focus on how the Chagos decision is implemented to gain its benefits and minimize risks Expert comment jon.wallace 11 October 2024

The UK decision was welcomed by India and the US, and shows a capacity for fresh thinking. But the transfer of sovereignty must be handled carefully.

The UK announced on 3 October that it would cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius.

There are potential strategic and reputation-related upsides for the UK from the decision – but these can only be realized if the deal is implemented in ways that meet the UK’s stated goals.

First, the UK aims to safeguard the utility and security of the joint US–UK base on Diego Garcia. It also intends for the decision to benefit the Chagossians, who were displaced by the British decision in 1965 to separate the Archipelago from Mauritius as part of a deal to grant Mauritian independence.

The decision has already proved deeply controversial in the UK, provoking sustained criticism from former Conservative government ministers and commentary that has branded it naive, dangerous, and a blow to British prestige.

Part of the reason for the welter of criticism may be the apparent suddenness of the announcement. The impression that this was a hasty decision is likely because it came just three months after the Labour government came to office. But this belies the far longer gestation period around the decision.

World opinion

In fact, the previous Conservative UK government decided to begin negotiations over sovereignty of Chagos – following Mauritius bringing the matter to the International Court of Justice. In 2019, the court issued a non-binding opinion in favour of Mauritius.

The same year the UN General Assembly voted 116 in favour to 6 against, and with 56 abstentions, for a resolution ‘welcoming a 25 February 2019 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legal consequences of separating the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, demanding that the UK unconditionally withdraw its colonial administration from the area within six months’ to ‘enable Mauritius to complete the decolonization of its territory.’

But returning the islands will not necessarily boost the UK’s international standing. Issues relating to the Archipelago are complex, and it will take work to convince interested international parties that the UK is acting fairly against a colonized and displaced population.

Mauritius has no pre-colonial history of controlling the Chagos islands, which are located some 1,500 miles away from Mauritius across a vast sprawl of the Indian Ocean. It is true that the Chagos Islands were a colonial remnant, but to ensure that UK is seen by global audiences to be acting fairly, the handover of sovereignty must be carefully handled. Perhaps the greatest reputational risk will come from failing to adequately account for the rights of Chagossians.  

The more pertinent historical injustice has been to them. And reporting by the BBC has shown that at least some Chagossians were dismayed by not having been consulted in negotiations between the UK and Mauritius.

The UK government announcement on the deal did state that that ‘the welfare of Chagossians’ will be paramount and that ‘the UK will capitalize a new trust fund, as well as separately provide other support, for the benefit of Chagossians’. But for the Chagossians, there will be a clamour to see this realized in full.

Strategic interests

On the strategic question, the utility of the joint US–UK military base on Diego Garcia has been guaranteed in a 99-year lease. As the UK negotiator Jonathan Powell has explained, this deal was reached in close consultation with US officials and puts the base on legally safe ground for the first time in decades. 

Indeed, Powell has explained that Joe Biden was keen to reach agreement ahead of the US elections so that US military access to Diego Garcia was safeguarded against any possible contrary decision by a possible returning Trump presidency.

There are understandable concerns that, as a result of the decision, China may develop commercial ports in the region and seek to compete with India for economic and strategic relationships. But this is a long-term matter of concern to monitor, regardless of the UK’s decision on Chagos.

Chinese naval influence in the Indian Ocean is currently limited, compared to its assertiveness in the South China Sea, where it is building artificial islands, or in the South Pacific where it is pursuing policing assistance deals like that secured with the Solomon Islands.

And the strategic situations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are not at all alike. Indeed, the Chagos Islands are far closer to India and its economic influence than they are to any other major economic power. 

The fact that India has welcomed the UK’s decision over Chagos sovereignty is noteworthy, given the UK’s separate attempts to modernize and expand its bilateral relations with New Delhi.

In the long run, it is likely that India will play a leading role in Indian Ocean security, and the UK will want to be well-placed to explore how to play a role as an effectively partner.

The more pertinent immediate concern is the implications for other overseas UK territorial responsibilities. There are legitimate questions to be raised over setting a precedent that could undermine RAF Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus, which remained sovereign UK bases after Cyprus’s independence in 1960.

Grassroots to global: Young changemakers against violence 24 October 2024 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 October 2024 Chatham House

As part of Black History Month, this event will look at how youth activism against violence can influence change.

To address the alarming increase knife crime, a 10% rise in knife-related homicides between April 2022 and March 2023, the UK government launched a coalition of community leaders, campaigners and policy makers to tackle this tragic loss of life.

With people under 25 disproportionately affected, the ‘knife crime epidemic’ represents an example of how youth activist groups are central to tackling the problem. Organisations for and operated by young people form a key part of the strategy to ensure people are better protected from violent crime.

Around the world, a network of youth groups are similarly striving to make a difference and build a better life for future generations. Operating in different political and economic conditions, there are learnings to be found in groups working across the world.

This session will discuss how grassroot activism and youth organisations can influence governments to prevent young people falling into crime, the role of race and religion, and whether organisations are improving in their effectiveness around the world.

This event is a collaboration with Integrate UK.

India–Russia relations Explainer LToremark 14 October 2024

Explaining the history and current state of the relationship between India and Russia, its geopolitical significance, the importance of trade and defence cooperation, and the impact of the war in Ukraine.

What is the history of India’s relationship with Russia? 

The two countries established diplomatic relations in April 1947, shortly before India gained independence. India was on a quest to achieve economic self-sufficiency, so the then-Soviet Union was an important partner in terms of providing support for the country’s heavy industry, with investment in mining, energy and steel production. India’s economic planning model was also based on the Soviet five-year plan.

There is a high degree of historical affinity towards Russia in India, particularly among the older generation of policy elites. This is because the Soviet Union supported India during the Cold War, notably during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, in which the US and China sided with Pakistan. This was arguably the peak of the Indo–Soviet relationship and also the year that the two countries signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation.

But even before that, the Soviet Union had supported India. During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the USSR played a mediating role and hosted the so-called Tashkent summit in 1966 where a peace treaty was signed.

The Soviet Union also used its UN Security Council veto several times in support of India, half a dozen times between 1957 and 1971. This was usually on the issue of Kashmir and once with respect to India’s military intervention in Goa to end Portuguese rule. It was also routine for the Indian prime minister to stop over in Moscow on the way back from Washington.

The relationship has continued into the post-Cold War period. Annual summits have been held since 2000, when a strategic partnership was signed (and subsequently upgraded in 2010). India and Russia have also been holding so-called 2+2 meetings – joint meetings with foreign and defence ministers – since 2021.

India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has referred to the India–Russia relationship as the one constant in global politics over the last half century.

What is the current relationship between India and Russia? 

Russia remains a key strategic partner for India for both practical and ideological reasons. On the practical side, India benefits significantly from access to discounted Russian crude oil, which has increased from less than 2 per cent of India’s total imports before the Russian invasion of Ukraine to over 40 per cent in June 2024. Indian companies have also benefitted from exporting refined Russian oil products, some of which have found their way onto Western markets.

But energy cooperation is not confined to oil. It also includes cooperation in the nuclear space, where there is a strong historical foundation. When India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, the Soviet Union did not shun cooperation with India – unlike the US. Compared to the US, Russia has also been able to better navigate India’s civil nuclear liability law, which was put in place in 2010. In February 2024, India and Russia upgraded an agreement to build six civil nuclear power plants in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

The other area of practical cooperation is defence. Russia accounts for over 50 per cent of India’s in-service military platforms. India is also the largest recipient of Russian arms exports, including the S400 missile defence system. There has been joint production of several platforms, such as the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has been exported to third countries, starting with the Philippines. 

Russia has been a preferred arms supplier for India for many years because it provides arms at reasonable prices without end user constraints, and is often able to supply sensitive technologies, which other countries are not.

There is also a long-standing economic relationship. India and Russia aim to increase bilateral trade from $68 billion to $100 billion by the end of this decade. Connectivity initiatives include the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor and the International North-South Transport Corridor.

There are regular interactions between the leaders of the two countries. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin have met 17 times in the last decade and have held annual summits since 2000, with a few exceptions – and a notable gap following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

There is also a push to try and negotiate bilateral visa free access for Indians to increase people-to-people and tourism exchanges between the two countries.

There is also an ideological component to the relationship, which is often overlooked. One aspect is that India has a long-standing commitment to strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, which means engaging all major poles of influence in the international system – including Russia. There is also the aforementioned historical affinity due to Soviet support for India during the Cold War.

But the relationship is undergoing a managed decline. It does not have the same level of strategic importance as it did during the Cold War.

Although India still depends on Russia for a large proportion of its military hardware, since the 1990s there has been a push to diversify. As part of the ‘Make in India’ campaign, there is an attempt to strengthen domestic defence production as well as diversify to other countries. Between 2009 and 2013, 76 per cent of India’s arms imports were from Russia, but this has dropped to 36 per cent between 2019 and 2023 according to SIPRI.

While this trend predates the war in Ukraine, it has been accelerated by the war. There has been a delay in the delivery of several defence platforms, most notably the S400 missile defence system, as well as spare parts for fighter jets. The prolonged war of attrition in Ukraine has also undermined Indian confidence in some Russian military hardware.

There is decline on the ideological side too. India is trying to project a world view that is non-Western but not explicitly anti-Western. This puts it out of sync with Russia’s world view, and that of countries like China and Iran. 

India is increasingly aloof or estranged from forums where Russia plays a prominent role, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Modi did not attend the July 2024 SCO summit. When India held the presidency of the SCO in 2023 it was a low-profile presidency and there was a virtual summit. In contrast, India’s high-profile G20 presidency in 2023 was framed as the country’s ‘coming out party’.

While Modi and Putin met in July 2024, it was the first time that they had met since September 2022, a significant gap.

What is more, their economic interactions are highly skewed. There is roughly $68 billion in trade between the two countries but $60 billion of that is oil imports. India’s large share of Russian crude imports also means that Russia holds a surplus of Indian rupees, which has caused some friction in terms of rouble-rupee trade.

On the Indian side, there have also been concerns about a number of Indian nationals that have been duped into fighting for Russia in the Ukraine conflict.

But although the relationship is not what it once was, Russia will remain a key strategic partner for India for the foreseeable future.

Does India support Russia’s war on Ukraine? 

India has neither condoned nor condemned Russia’s actions. The Indian government has been vocal in expressing its displeasure of the war and Modi has said that now is ‘not an era of war’. He has also expressed sorrow for the bombing of a children’s hospital, hit by Russian airstrikes in July 2024. During his August 2024 visit to Ukraine, Modi said that India’s position is not neutral, but that it stands on the side of peace.

But there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. India in fact maintains quite a neutral position. It has abstained in UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. It did not endorse the joint communique produced at a peace conference in Switzerland in June 2024, which Modi also did not attend. And the G20 leaders’ declaration that was concluded under India’s G20 presidency had no mention of Russian actions in Ukraine.

India has also emerged as the second-biggest supplier of restricted critical technologies to Russia (behind China), helping to fuel Russia’s war machine.

This reflects India’s practical or pragmatic considerations, including its dependence on Russian military hardware and access to discounted Russian crude. But there is also a degree of sympathy in New Delhi for the Russian narrative of the war, that Moscow’s actions were sparked by NATO expansion into Russia’s self-perceived sphere of influence.

In theory, India is well positioned to play the role of a potential mediator. It maintains close ties with both Moscow and Washington, unlike other countries that have close relations with Russia, such as China, Iran or North Korea. The West has been understanding of India’s strategic constraints in terms of its dependence on Russian military hardware and its energy needs. But so far, India’s actions have been largely driven by self-interest. Despite its statements, it has not made any peace proposals like those of Turkey or China.

Indian symbolism over substance was also clear in Modi’s summer 2024 meetings with Putin and Zelenskyy.

Modi visited Putin in July 2024 – a visit that coincided with Russian airstrikes in Ukraine. Zelenskyy called the meeting a devastating blow to peace efforts. And the optics of Modi hugging Putin while a Ukrainian children’s hospital was bombed prompted a degree of damage control by New Delhi, leading to Modi’s visit to Ukraine in August 2024.

His visit to Ukraine was an attempt to reaffirm India’s position of neutrality on the war and its long-standing position of strategic autonomy. It was also an attempt at a course correction in India’s relationship with Ukraine. Modi was the first Indian prime minister to visit Ukraine since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1993.

How does China impact India–Russia relations? 

China is an important consideration in terms of India’s strategic calculations towards Russia. One of the reasons New Delhi is eager to maintain engagement with Russia is fears that Moscow is becoming increasingly beholden to Beijing following its invasion of Ukraine. India wants to provide Russia with strategic options as it becomes increasingly isolated and wants to deter it from becoming a client state of China. In parts of the West, that is already seen as a foregone conclusion, but Russia is not yet seen as a lost cause in India.

The other point to keep in mind is that China and India largely see eye to eye on the Ukraine war. Neither see their close relationship with Moscow as translating into overt support for Russian actions in Ukraine. Both countries believe they are playing a constructive role through their purchase of discounted Russian crude, which is helping to control global energy prices.

But a key watch point is what would Russia’s position be on possible future hostilities between China and India. Historically, Moscow has played a relatively neutral position and has occasionally offered to play a mediating role. It has even leaned in India’s favour on occasion and has provided it with more advanced military platforms than it has provided China. 

The fear in New Delhi is that this could be shifting and in the future Moscow could side with China in a potential conflict or tensions with India. That would be a game changer for India and would prompt it to rethink its relationship with Russia.

China’s economic policy pendulum has swung towards stimulus – but keep expectations low Expert comment jon.wallace 14 October 2024

Beijing historically swings between stimulus and frugality. But Xi Jinping’s ambition for self-reliance will constrain any new efforts to boost the economy.

Policymakers in Beijing have spent the past three weeks trying to convince the world that they are determined to deliver meaningful support to China’s sagging economy. 

Since late September statements have come from the central bank, which promised to cut interest rates, release liquidity, and provide funding to securities firms; from the politburo, which said it wanted to stabilize the real estate market, boost the capital market and shift towards looser fiscal and monetary policy; from the government’s main planning body, which promised a package of policies to support domestic demand; and from the finance minister himself, who at the weekend committed to issue more debt to recapitalize banks, support local governments and aid unhappy consumers.

Though details have been scant, the Chinese stock market has responded enthusiastically to this flurry of rhetoric. But the bigger question for the global economy is whether a boost in Chinese demand can return the country to its former status as a reliable destination for global exports and capital.

With that measure of success in mind, it is worth keeping expectations low. For the past 15 years, Chinese authorities have been wrestling with two conflicting objectives: to grow the economy, and to minimize the risk of financial instability. Those goals sit uneasily with each other because the effort to boost growth has relied on borrowing; and yet a rise in debt can increase the risk of a debt crisis.  

Chinese policymaking has responded to this dilemma by taking on a pendulum-like quality. Sometimes the authorities boost the economy by funding more investment spending. At other times that stimulus gets reined back as policymakers worry about the economy’s indebtedness.

In the aftermath of the great financial crisis of 2008, for example, Beijing’s over-riding priority was to protect the Chinese economy from the risk of recession by implementing a huge credit-financed stimulus to spur investment in infrastructure and real estate. 

By 2012, though, concerns about over-indebtedness began to dominate, and a withdrawal of stimulus saw the Chinese economy sag. In late 2015,a new round of stimulus measures emerged, only to be withdrawn again around 2018.

With that pendulum in mind, the optimistic take on what policymakers have said in recent weeks is that we are now back in stimulus mode. That’s true in part, but three factors suggest that this time is a little different.

Different times

First, China’s rising debt burden increases authorities’ worries about financial stability. Data from the BIS show that China’s private sector debt almost doubled in the past 15 years to 200 per cent of GDP at the end of 2023. The comparable debt stock for the US and the Eurozone was much lower, at 150 per cent each.

Second, ideology is playing a growing role in shaping Chinese economic policy. The most visible effect has been to prioritize Chinese state-owned enterprises, at the expense of the private sector. This became especially visible in 2021 with a campaign against the ‘unrestrained expansion of capital’ – Beijing’s way of expressing its anxiety that China’s corporate sector was behaving in a manner inconsistent with Chinese Communist Party goals. 

Although that phrase is no longer current, entrepreneurs’ animal spirits remain in the doldrums. They are likely to stay there as long as President Xi Jinping’s preference is for ‘bigger, better, stronger’ state-owned enterprises, which use capital much less efficiently than private firms.

Third, today Chinese policy is shaped by Beijing’s perception of geopolitical risks that it faces. Those risks became starkly apparent in February 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when essentially every country that prints a reserve currency joined to freeze Russia’s access to its foreign exchange reserves. That enveloped the Russian economy in a network of sanctions that sharply constrained its access to a whole range of imports.

It is not difficult to consider a similar scenario confronting China. Beijing’s approach to economic policy is therefore heavily influenced by the need to insulate itself from that kind of risk (though Chinese policy had in any case been tilting in this direction for years).

‘Asymmetric decoupling’

This policy can be described as ‘asymmetric decoupling’: a simultaneous effort on the one hand to reduce China’s reliance on the rest of the world by substituting imports with domestic production; and, on the other hand, to increase the rest of the world’s reliance on China by establishing itself as a ‘zhizao qiangguo’, or manufacturing powerhouse.

This is the right context in which to understand a central economic goal of the authorities, which is to reduce the economy’s dependence on real estate investment. 

The intention is to allow capital and credit resources to migrate to new sectors of the economy that will help to build that manufacturing powerhouse: high-tech and green energy, in particular. What that means in practice is that any forthcoming support for the real estate sector will be rather limited.

What are the top economic priorities for the new US President? 19 November 2024 — 8:00AM TO 9:15AM Anonymous (not verified) 15 October 2024 Chatham House

A post-US election discussion on the outlook for US economic policy and implications for the global economy.

A fortnight on from the US Presidential and Congressional elections, this expert panel, organised by Chatham House’s Global Economy and Finance Programme in collaboration with the Society of Professional Economists, will consider the outlook for US economic policy and implications for the global economy.

Questions for discussion will include:

• What will the economic priorities of the new President be? What will be the role of industrial strategy/green transition, regulation, trade, migration and fiscal policy?
• How far will the President be constrained by other branches of the US government, including Congress, the courts and state governments?
• What will the implications be for the global economy broadly and through the specific channels of trade, investment, monetary policy and debt?
• How will the new President handle economic and financial relations with the US’s traditional G7 allies, China and the Global South?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

How Beijing is closing surveillance gaps in the South China Sea The World Today iallan.drupal 15 October 2024

The discovery of a new radar system on China’s Triton Island military base shows that Beijing is rapidly developing its intelligence capacities in contested waters, write John Pollock and Damien Symon.

New satellite images reveal how the Chinese military is dramatically expanding its capabilities on Triton Island, which looks set to become a one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea.

Once completed, the radar system would significantly increase China’s signals intercept and electronic warfare capabilities across the disputed Paracel Islands archipelago and add to a wider surveillance network spanning much of the South China Sea.

The enhanced facility on Triton is likely to offer a challenge to China’s competitors in the region and internationally.

China seized control of the Paracels from Vietnam in a 1974 naval battle, and competition for access to it waters has intensified since the recent discovery of oil and gas reserves. Chinese and Vietnamese maritime militia clashed off the coast of Triton in 2014.

In addition, American, British and Australian naval forces have for the past decade patrolled the waters to collectively challenge China’s contested ‘nine-dash-line’ claim to large stretches of the South China Sea. 

Overlapping anti-stealth network

A year after work was first identified on Triton, satellite images from Maxar have helped build a clearer picture of Beijing’s efforts to defend this strategic waterway.

The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations centre.

Once completed, the radar on Triton will form what is believed to be a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars built across Chinese bases in the South China Sea over the past decade, including on Hainan Island, home to several Chinese naval bases. 

The positioning of the radar on Triton, 320km south of Hainan, is telling, says J. Michael Dahm, Senior Resident Fellow for Aerospace and China Studies at the Mitchell Institute. 

‘SIAR radars cannot see over the curve of the Earth, which means there is a gap in China’s air surveillance coverage between Subi Reef and Hainan Island. The Triton Island site will help close that gap’, said Dahm.

The aim, he suggests, is to give China contiguous counter-stealth radar coverage of the South China Sea.

More construction underway

The satellite images reveal other building projects on Triton. One is a large pad at the end of the road network which will probably be used as a launching point for a mobile anti-ship missile battery. The building at the northeast end of the road is probably a storage building for missile transport vehicles. 

Diminishing Vietnam’s options

The development of a new counter-stealth radar system and other suspected signals intercept structures on Triton represents a notable increase in China’s intelligence capabilities in the Paracels. The Chinese Communist Party has not disclosed the purpose of the building work on Triton, but its effects on regional and global competitors are likely to be wide ranging.

For Vietnam, which is rapidly expanding its own bases in the South China Sea, the intelligence structures on Triton would significantly diminish its capacity to operate undetected in the area. Alongside existing radar on Triton which can detect sea-going vessels, Beijing now has the potential to track Vietnamese air movements and gain forewarning of Hanoi’s manoeuvres in the area, including efforts to access oil and gas deposits.

The desire to strengthen control over these resources may explain why China is fortifying Triton Island, says Bill Hayton, Associate Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House. ‘The developments might be a warning that China is planning to mount another drilling expedition’, he suggests.

The US election could create the need for a G7 alternative – without American representation Expert comment jon.wallace 15 October 2024

Traditional allies of the US need to find a way to work together on some global policy issues even when the US itself is not engaged. A ‘G6 plus’ group could provide an answer.

When Jamaica pulled out of the nascent West Indies Federation in 1961, Trinidad and Tobago’s then prime minister, Dr Eric Williams, famously said ‘One from ten leaves nought’. In the run up to the US elections on 5 November, the US’s longstanding allies need to ask themselves if the same logic must apply to the G7. 

A Donald Trump victory will result in stark differences between the US and its closest partners on key global economic issues. US allies would no doubt try and persuade the new president to moderate his position, but experience suggests that this will have little, if any, effect.  

They may then want to work around the US, or on a parallel track. But doing so will be very hard unless they have a framework for discussing and developing ideas collectively. Could some form of ‘G6 plus’ forum help?

The role of the G7 today

The G7 no longer acts as a steering group for the global economy. However, it remains a critical forum for the US and its allies to coordinate their efforts to help solve global problems, to defend common Western interests, to resolve internal disputes and to underpin information exchange. 

In the past two years, the G7 has come to be seen by the US and other members as one of the most effective international mechanisms. It has played a critical role coordinating Western efforts to recover from the last pandemic and prepare for future ones.  

It has been pivotal in weakening Russia’s economy following the attack on Ukraine and has acted to strengthen Western economic security and resilience more broadly.  

The G7 has also responded to ‘Global South’ calls for help in dealing with the pandemic aftermath and the Ukraine war. 

Trump’s approach to the G7

The problem is that the G7’s effectiveness depends critically on full US engagement, sometimes as a leader of initiatives (such as the decision to impose an ‘oil price cap’ on Russia in autumn 2022) or as an essential partner. 

If elected, former President Trump is likely to abandon the G7 as an instrument of international economic policy. This is effectively what happened during his first presidency and there are reasons to expect this to be repeated. 

Many of Trump’s international economic policies are highly controversial with US allies, including his apparent determination to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, impose across the board 10-20 per cent tariffs and even punish countries for not using the dollar. His domestic policies, including mass deportation of undocumented immigrants and aggressive deregulation and fiscal easing could lead to further sharp disagreements.  

Furthermore, Trump demonstrates general antipathy towards multilateralism. Under his presidency, US representatives in the G7 and G20 sought to weaken core values and policies that have underpinned international economic cooperation for decades – including the importance of a rules based international system, the IMF’s global safety net role, and the responsibility of the advanced world to assist the poorest countries financially.  

Other G7 and G20 countries tried to preserve as much as possible of the previous consensus. But in the case of climate change, the only solution was to have a separate text for the US. Critically, such efforts diverted time and attention from the enormous challenges facing the world at the time. 

Trump went through four different G7/G20 Sherpas during his presidency and disowned the final declaration of the 2018 Canadian G7 summit after hundreds of hours of negotiation, and despite previously signing off on the text. The US failed to host a final leaders’ summit, even virtually, during his administration’s G7 presidency.  

Of course, how far Trump carries through his most radical policies will depend, among other things, on the outcome of the Congressional elections and the stance taken by US courts. 

He may also have second thoughts if elected. His first administration sometimes supported significant multilateral economic initiatives, notably the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative and ‘Common Framework’ for debt rescheduling. 

But, in the event of a second Trump administration, the most likely scenario for the G7 is a repeat of the paralysis of 2017-20, which would be even more costly today.

Should Vice President Kamala Harris win on 5 November, the situation should in theory be very different. She will likely continue with President Joe Biden’s collaborative approach to the G7.

Nonetheless, major issues may still arise where America’s allies want to take a fundamentally different approach and need a mechanism to do so. These could include policy on the WTO, de-risking the economic relationship with China, restricting carbon leakage, and regulating US-dominated big tech.  

How should US allies respond?

No US ally will want to be seen to be leading development of a new ‘G6’ that excludes the US. The top priority will be securing the best possible relationship with the incoming president. Political weakness and/or new governments in France, Germany, the UK and Japan will add to this hesitancy.

Any new forum will therefore need to be as low profile as possible. The concept should initially be discussed in private by sherpas from each participating country. Once established, officials should as far as possible meet online. Leaders should only meet online, at least initially.  

Participants should be fully transparent about the forum’s existence and avoid any grand ‘framing’ along the lines of the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’. Instead, it should be described as a practical, largely technocratic forum intended to coordinate activity among Western economic powers in those areas where the US chooses not to engage. A suitably innocuous name – such as the ‘the sustainable growth club’ could help.

Topics should be limited to those requiring urgent collective global action, such as climate, health, tech governance, development finance and trade – and where the US federal government is not an ‘essential’ partner. Such a forum should not therefore address defence.  

Moldova and Georgia face crucial elections – and diverging paths Expert comment LToremark 16 October 2024

The two countries face unusually consequential elections where their populations must choose between moving unambiguously towards the West – or towards closer ties with Russia.

Moldova and Georgia both go to the polls at the end of October; Moldova for presidential elections on the 20^th and Georgia for parliamentary elections on the 26^th. The two countries share a number of similarities – beyond their justified reputation as world-class wine producers. They are both small, low- to middle-income countries that have struggled to consolidate their democracies and have experienced oligarchic political influence. Both are candidate countries for EU membership, with Moldova a step ahead having been invited to start negotiations. 

For both countries these elections represent a fork in the road: either move unambiguously into the Western world, or step back from it and become more closely tied to Russia again and its way of governance. However, the second option has caused yet-to-be-resolved territorial conflicts in both countries – Transnistria for Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia.

Some would say it should not be such a ‘zero sum’ choice. Why must a nation choose between Russia and the West? While that may be a fair statement for countries like India or South Africa, it does not work for Russia’s former colonies, which Moscow wishes to control. 

Moldova and Georgia’s final similarity is that they face Russian interference and attempts to manipulate votes in their elections. In Moldova this has been especially brazen with the uncovering in September of a $15 million vote-buying scheme, including instructions on who to vote for distributed to over 130,000 citizens. Russian interference in Georgia’s election is less overt but at the same time more endemic considering its government has in effect been captured by pro-Russia forces.

Diverging paths

But this is where the similarities end and the contrasts become clear.

Moldova has a young, pro-Western and equality-conscious government, and 44 of the 100 MPs in its parliament are women. In this election, Maia Sandu is seeking her second and final term as president. The election is combined with a referendum asking the people if they wish to embed Moldova’s EU aspirations into the country’s constitution. The results of both the presidential election and the EU referendum will be close, reflecting a genuine split in attitudes (and debate) in the country. 

Georgia’s EU aspirations, meanwhile, are already embedded in its constitution – but that has not prevented Tbilisi from pivoting away from the West. Polls show   that around 80 per cent of Georgia’s population desires EU (and NATO) membership – rising to 90 per cent among the under 30s – but its government seems determined to deny them that future. 

Its new ‘foreign agents’ law is seemingly copy-pasted from Russia – and incompatible with EU membership. The election can be seen as a de facto referendum on the EU too. Georgia’s accession is suspended until its political crisis is resolved. 

Georgia faces other challenges to its democracy. Due to the country’s limited presidential powers, Georgia is in effect run by the unelected Bidzina Ivanishvili – founder of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party – whose relationship with Russia is murky at best. Judging by his recent speeches, Ivanishvili now blames the Western world not just for igniting the war in Ukraine, but also for the war in Georgia 16 years ago which resulted in the loss of 20 per cent of its territory at the hands of Russia. This extraordinary position is both factually incorrect and out of step with the Georgian people.

Both countries are now at a critical point. Whatever the outcome in Moldova, the election will pass off peacefully and competently. Its problems (Russia aside) are demographic and economic, and the country’s pro-Russian opposition is relatively weak.

Georgia’s election looks like it is going to be messy. Ivanishvili’s party will likely manipulate the election to a win. There is still a chance that Georgia’s pro-Western but also weak opposition will regain power and return the country to its European path. But if the manipulation by the incumbency is heavy, people will likely take to the streets in protest, as in April this year – and in the 2003 Rose Revolution.

Regime change via popular revolution shows political immaturity but the Georgian people may feel it is the only way they can have their views represented and their ambitions realised. 

Can the world avoid a new nuclear arms race? 18 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

Leading experts discuss how states are expanding nuclear arsenals amid rising geopolitical challenges.

The Doomsday Clock stands at 90 seconds to midnight – the closest to global catastrophe it has ever been. As geopolitical competition intensifies, nuclear risks are resurging at an alarming rate. The collapse of key arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has removed crucial safeguards against arms races. Efforts to extend or replace existing treaties face significant hurdles in the current geopolitical climate.

Nuclear rhetoric has become more aggressive, as evidenced by Russian and North Korean nuclear threats. Several nuclear-armed states are also engaging in extensive modernization programmes of their nuclear arsenals, potentially fuelling a new arms race.

Despite these pressures, the number of nuclear possessor states has held steady so far. The ongoing Iranian efforts to build nuclear weapons is the closest attempt by a new state to acquire nuclear weapons. As the global security environment becomes more and more tense, existing nuclear possessor states increasingly rely on their nuclear weapons. This might threaten the global consensus against nuclear proliferation.

This session examines these competing pressures and propose strategies to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons use and proliferation. Our expert panel explores diplomatic initiatives, technical measures, and policy innovations to address these critical challenges.

This expert panel discusses key questions including:

• Are we already in the middle of a global nuclear arms race?
• How can international arms control treaties be negotiated in the current geopolitical environment?
• Does a new US president change the nuclear calculus? Is the US still able to reassure allies of its ‘extended deterrence’?
• How can we reduce the risk of additional proliferation? Which states might want to acquire nuclear weapons and what can we do about it?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Resetting Africa-Europe relations: From self-deception to economic transformation 28 October 2024 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts assess the status of ties between Africa and Europe in a rapidly changing world, launching a new book that explores how misconceptions in the relationship can harm Africa’s economic agenda.

The relationship between Africa and Europe has long been shaped by colonial legacies, power imbalance and shifting geopolitical interests.

Almost three years on from the last EU-AU summit in Brussels in February 2022, questions remain over the delivery of headline commitments under the continent-to-continent partnership – ranging from the EU’s Global Gateway infrastructure strategy to wider climate financing promises.

As Africa seeks to strengthen its standing on the global stage, marked by the African Union’s upcoming debut at the G20 summit in November, a critical reassessment of these dynamics is needed to examine whether the continent’s relationship with Europe can overcome stigmatized narratives in search of genuine economic benefit.

At this event, which launches a new book by Professor Carlos Lopes: The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dimensions of Charity Dependency within Africa-Europe Relations, speakers assess the prospects for a transformative shift towards a more equitable and mutually beneficial Africa-Europe partnership.

Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering

This project examines the nature of the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Iran in relation to Middle Eastern countries and in the context of broader regional dynamics.

The 2016–21 period in Turkish–Iranian relations, which was marked by both sides’ structured cooperation through the Astana Process and Sochi summits on conflict management in Syria, and their largely shared opposition to US policy in Syria and at the broader regional level, to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum, and to the blockade of Qatar, has run its course. 

However, the new shape of these bilateral relations remains undefined, and understanding them is essential to effective policymaking in the region. How they will evolve will have direct ramifications for Iraq, Syria, regional Kurdish geopolitics, and the process of regional reordering and connectivity in the Middle East and South Caucasus. They will also have direct implications for US and European policymaking and role in the region. 

This project studies the evolving nature of Turkish–Iranian relations through Iraq, Syria and regional Kurdish politics. It examines how Turkey and Iran approach regional connectivity projects and major regional initiatives, and how ongoing regional developments, including the war in Gaza, have and may impact Turkey–Iran relations and EU, US and UK security considerations and policy towards the two countries.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey. 

Evolving Turkey–Iran Relations and Implications for Regional Reordering is a project of the CATS Network.

What is COP29 and why is it important? Explainer jon.wallace 17 October 2024

The COP29 summit will see negotiators try to agree how to finance the climate action the world urgently needs.

COP29, the 29th UN annual conference on climate change, takes place in Baku, Azerbaijan from 11–22 November 2024.

Every COP conference is an important opportunity for international collaboration on climate change. COP29 will have a particular focus on how to make finance available to developing countries for climate action.

COP29 is already contentious, because Azerbaijan’s economy is highly dependent on fossil fuels, the main cause of climate change. That means that Azerbaijan’s government, which will preside over the summit, has a strong incentive to avoid rapid multilateral progress towards phasing out fossil fuels. 

It’s urgent that progress is made at COP29. Climate action lags far behind both what has been promised by countries, and what scientists agree is needed. The impacts of climate change are also rapidly escalating, while backlash against government policies to reduce fossil fuel use is being seen in many places around the world. 

What is a ‘COP’?

The ‘Conference of the Parties’ or ‘COP’ is an annual event that brings together the governments which have signed up to environmental action under the United Nations (UN). 

Governments or ‘parties’ attend the climate change COP if they are part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or the international environmental treaties the Kyoto Protocol (1997) or the landmark and legally binding Paris Agreement (2015).

World leaders, ministers, and negotiators convene at the COP to negotiate and rubber stamp plans to jointly address climate change and its impacts. 

Civil society, businesses, international organizations and the media normally ‘observe’ proceedings to bring transparency, accountability and wider perspectives to the process.

‘Mission 1.5°C’ 

COP28, the 2023 climate conference held in Dubai, was the first of three consecutive COP summits intended to ‘reset’ global climate action – what the UN calls the ‘Roadmap to Mission 1.5°C’ – the ambition to keep global temperatures from rising more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. 

To support continuity and progress across the three COPs, the UAE (COP28), Azerbaijan (COP29) and Brazil (COP30) have formed a COP presidential ‘Troika’ or group of three.

In 2023 the first ‘global stocktake’ of international action to address climate change indicated that the world was far off track for targets set by the Paris Agreement. The ‘UAE Consensus’ agreement, which formed the main output of COP28, set out how parties should respond. 

COP29, the second of the three COPs, is intended to get the finance in place to enable this response. COP30, to be held in Brazil in 2025, will then try to agree how a new round of nationally determined climate plans or ‘contributions’ to global climate efforts (NDCs) should be put into action.

COP29 will be the third consecutive COP held in an authoritarian state, and the second consecutive COP hosted by a petro-state. Taken together, the ‘Troika’ hosts make up the world’s 4th largest oil producer, after the United States, Russia and Saudi Arabia. 

This presents both an opportunity and a risk: the countries are well placed to understand and tackle the core issue of fossil fuel extraction and use. But they also have strong incentives to stall, distract and deflect the negotiations away from phasing out fossil fuels.

Key issues at COP29

Finance – money on the table, and a New Collective Quantified Goal

COP29 has a remit to secure funding for a ‘course correction’ on global climate action. Countries’ revised climate plans (NDCs) are due in February 2025. For developing countries to deliver new ambitious NDCs, however, COP29 must first make clear what finance will be available to help them.

Climate finance is one of the thorniest issues in the negotiations. The previous climate finance goal, of $100 billion per year from developed to developing countries between 2020-25, was symbolic (being a fraction of the sum actually needed) and contentious (developed countries did not meet the target until 2022, and then only with accusations of double-counting). 

A New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQGs), to be agreed at COP29, will need to reflect developing countries’ needs and priorities. Estimates vary, but it is accepted that the scale will be trillions, not billions. To bridge this enormous gap, private finance will need to be mobilized and broader reforms made to global financial architecture. Issues such as subsidies, fossil fuel profits and ‘solidarity levies’ will also need to be on the table. 

Little progress has been made in the run-up to COP29. Parties disagree on who should pay, how much should be paid, what forms the funding should take (loans or grants) and how the funds should be accessed. 

Also up for debate is how funds should be directed – towards mitigating the impacts of climate change (preventing climate change becoming worse), adapting to its effects, or supporting countries to manage loss and damage (climate impacts that have already happened or cannot be avoided).  

In discussions of the NCQG to date, developed countries have consistently called for higher income developing countries, such as China and India, to contribute. 

Such countries have pushed back forcefully against this. For a new goal to be agreed, such divisions will need to be resolved.

Enhanced transparency?

COPs act as showcases for international agreement, but many processes rumble on behind the scenes. COP29 will be an important moment for transparency under the Paris Agreement, as the Parties’ first Biennial Enhanced Transparency Reports (BTRs) are due in December 2024. 

BTRs are an important tool in the Paris Agreement, requiring countries to provide a snapshot of their progress in cutting emissions, setting climate policies, and providing resources for national and international climate action. 

BTRs are meant to build the evidence base for strong NDCs, build trust and promote ambitious climate action. They are also meant to help developing countries showcase achievements and attract climate finance. 

The COP29 presidency has launched the Baku Global Climate Transparency Platform to encourage participation, and support countries in finalising their BTRs. The Platform is meant to provide space for collaboration between government, NGO and private sector stakeholders. 

This is one of the areas in which COP29 host, Azerbaijan, runs into criticism. The country ranks highly on indexes of corruption, and has repeatedly restricted space for NGOs and wider civil society actors through a series of escalating government crackdowns, including imprisonment of environmental activists, in the run-up to the conference.

Will the next US president invest in Middle East stability or walk away? Expert comment LToremark 17 October 2024

Harris and Trump look set to continue US deprioritization of the region, but they would do better to enlist the support of their partners.

When stability in the Middle East feels so distant, it is much to the dismay of America’s partners that conflict management in the region has fallen down the list of US priorities. As Israel’s war in Gaza has reached its tragic one-year milestone, a new front has opened in Lebanon and further direct escalation between Israel and Iran seems imminent, it is hoped that the next US president will take a bolder role.

Namely, leaders in the UK, Europe and the Middle East are looking to whoever is in the White House to do more to restrain Israel, deliver self-determination – if not a peace process – for Palestine, and contain Iran’s interventionist regional role and nuclear programme.

While it is naive to expect either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump to prioritize conflict management in the Middle East above immigration, the economy, the war in Ukraine or competition with China, the past year has shown the danger of ignoring or sidestepping cascading and glaring regional challenges. 

For Harris or Trump to have a more sustainable impact in the region, they must enlist the support of European, British and Middle Eastern partners and work collectively to build multilateral processes that can set a stronger foundation for regional stability.

Repercussions of deprioritization

The Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, led many to believe that a new era of integration was possible in the Middle East. To some, it also vindicated the US decision to deprioritize the region that had started with Barack Obama’s presidency and his drawing down from ‘forever wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan. Presidents Trump and Biden continued that approach, encouraging America’s partners in the Middle East to assume greater responsibility for regional stability. Notably, neither renewed negotiations with Iran despite both committing to deliver a stronger deal with Tehran.

The shock of the 7 October attacks shattered that view, and the longer overhang of the US decision to deprioritize the region has visibly played out over the past twelve months. 

While the Biden administration marshalled full political and military support for Israel and there is not – yet – a direct regional war with Iran, the US has been unsuccessful in multiple areas: delivering a ceasefire agreement, securing the release of hostages, maintaining regular humanitarian relief and producing a so-called ‘day after’ plan of action.  

Moreover, the US temporary arrangement with Iran to prevent nuclear acceleration in exchange for marginal sanctions relief has also shown the limits of compartmentalization when managing a portfolio of issues with Tehran.  

No new approach

Trump and Harris’s policy approaches to conflict in the region further show their limited intent to change course on the Middle East. Both leaders are aware that Middle East politics, particularly on Israel–Palestine and Iran – the key issues requiring urgent attention – has become a US partisan minefield that could alienate voters. Despite their different plans, with Trump inclined to be more unilateral, they will both continue the trend of gradually deprioritizing conflict management in favour of greater burden sharing by those in the region.  

President Trump has promised a tougher approach aimed at curtailing conflict and advancing US interests. On Iran, Trump has made clear that he would return to a policy of maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic, perhaps to come to new agreement with Tehran or alternatively to constrain Iran even further.  He has championed his administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. Trump has argued that this approach put economic strain on Iran and reduced its ability to fund proxy groups. 

His advisers have also indicated that they would extend this pressure campaign and provide maximum support to the Iranian opposition and activists. Yet without clear goals or a willingness to negotiate with Tehran to contain further nuclear advancements, the result may well be another round of instability.  

Should he return to office, Trump has indicated that he would immediately put an end to the war in Gaza, though how remains unclear. More broadly, he would likely double down on the agreements to promote Israeli–Saudi normalization and attempt to bypass the Palestinian leadership, focusing on broader regional normalization. But sidestepping Palestinian self-determination, which since 7 October has been the condition for broader Arab normalization, will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to sell to its broader, now politicized, public.  

Many Middle East leaders, including those from the Arabian peninsula, might welcome the return of a Trump presidency, but Trump’s ‘America First’ policy did not provide Arab Gulf leaders, especially Riyadh, with protection from Iran’s attack on Saudi oil facilities seen in September 2019.  

Trump also promised without success to deliver a bigger, better Iran deal that would extend the JCPOA and include compromises on Tehran’s support for proxy groups and constraints on its missile programme. Rather than imposing his previous strategy, a second Trump presidency would be more effective if it worked collaboratively with transatlantic and regional partners on regional security issues pertaining to Israel–Palestine and Iran.  

Continuation and reinforcement?

Despite her recent tough talk on Iran, it is expected that Harris will reinforce the current wave of diplomatic efforts to deescalate and manage tensions with Tehran, rather than advocate for ‘maximum pressure’.  

Harris would likely build on efforts to revive a new paradigm that could contain Iran’s nuclear programme. She is expected to emphasize a strategy of engagement combined with pressure to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, while addressing its regional activities.   

Now that Iran has provided missiles and drones to Russia, it is clear that Tehran’s transfer of lethal aid needs an urgent response beyond continued reliance on sanctions. Harris’s team would be wise to pursue a multilateral negotiation process bringing together Europe and the UK, who are already discussing these issues, to collectively engage Tehran on a broader deal.

Moreover, winning support from Israel and the Gulf is a necessary condition to build a more sustainable Iranian agreement. 

Addressing Russia’s use of forced displacement in Ukraine 7 November 2024 — 12:30PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Experts consider the role international law could play in responding to Russia’s forcible movement of people during its war against Ukraine.

In the two and a half years since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, evidence has emerged of Russia’s use of forced deportation and forcible transfer. Russia has also employed arbitrary detention as a tool of war and occupation.

Much attention has been on the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and his children’s commissioner Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. These warrants were issued in relation to the alleged war crimes concerning the unlawful deportation of children from Ukraine to Russia and the unlawful transfer of thousands of children from occupied areas of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian citizens are being arrested and sent to Russia to serve prison sentences. They are often detained without charge and conviction.

This panel discussion explores:

• What evidence is emerging of Russia using unlawful deportation and transfer of children, and the arbitrary detention of civilians?
• What is the role and significance of international law on these issues?
• What challenges might these practices create for later peace negotiations, as well as the securing of justice?
• What is the process of releasing illegally detained Ukrainians, and Ukrainian children in particular, and reuniting them with their families? How do Russian volunteers inside Russia cooperate with Ukrainian NGOs to facilitate family reunification?

The event includes a screening of part of the documentary After the Rain: Putin’s Stolen Children. 

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Independent Thinking: How can France survive its budget crisis? Audio john.pollock 17 October 2024

Sophie Pedder and Shahin Vallée join the podcast to discuss France’s contentious budget and political drama, and the potential impact on Europe and beyond.

On this episode

France is facing political turmoil. The survival of Michel Barnier’s new government rests on whether he can pass a controversial budget intended to rescue the country from its huge fiscal deficit. Bronwen Maddox is joined by Sophie Pedder, the Paris bureau chief of The Economist, Shahin Vallée, a former adviser to Emmanuel Macron and Armida van Rij, the head of our Europe Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Egypt’s purchase of a Chinese fighter jet is a reminder Cold War tactics are back in the Middle East Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2024

The Egyptian army is a formidable force lacking air superiority capabilities to match its size and ambitions. China understood this predicament and offered to help.

The reported agreement for Egypt to buy the Chinese Chengdu J-10C 4.5 generation fighter jets is part of a broader shift from focusing on modernizing ground troops to bolstering the air force. The details of the deal have not yet been published. Nonetheless, it reveals Egypt has two motivations beyond backing its arsenal with another fighter jet.

Elusive Western technology

The most important motivation for Egypt’s military diversification strategy (and the biggest source of frustration) is the perceived Western technology starvation.
   
A quick examination of the map around Egypt shows that the most significant perceived threats to its national security are located in remote places where Egypt doesn’t traditionally enjoy ground troops’ presence. These include Ethiopia, the Southern Red Sea, Libya and the vulnerability a potential Israel–Iran regional war would create. From the generals’ perspective in Cairo, this list is more than a catalyst to build a modern and capable long arm.

The race started in 2015 after the Obama administration paused an arms transfer to Cairo in 2013 that included four F-16C Block 52 fighter jets amid toppling the Muslim Brotherhood government. The psychological effect of Washington’s decision in Cairo increased Egypt’s risk tolerance towards challenging its military ties with the US by diversifying away from it. 

Egypt ordered the MiG-29M2 fighter jets from Russia and the French Rafales this same year. In 2018, Egypt negotiated a $2 billion deal with Russia to purchase the Su-35 fighter jet, seen in Washington as crossing a red line and triggering a warning to Egypt that it would impose sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This caused the deal to collapse.

The main factor of the US military sales in the Middle East is the upholding of the Israel Military Qualitative Edge principle over its neighbours. This principle requires the US to ensure Israel is superior over other regional countries’ strategic military capabilities, especially in air power.

For Egypt, this has long been a strategic vulnerability. The US turned down multiple requests by Egypt to purchase the active radar long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM fire-and-forget missile that can be launched from the F-16 fighter jets, the main striking force in Egypt’s arsenal. 

Unlike the Gulf and other states (such as Jordan and Turkey), Egypt was only allowed the old AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are shorter in range and technologically inferior. Israel also allegedly pressured the Trump administration to refuse Egypt’s request to buy the F-35 stealth fight jets in 2019.

The US and Israel reportedly pressured France to not sell to Egypt the MBDA’s Meteor 100 km air-to-air missile with the Rafale fighters. Instead, Egypt received the 80 km MICA missile as part of the deal to buy 30 Rafales in 2021. Acquiring this advanced radar system and long-range missiles was likely behind Cairo’s deal to purchase 24 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Italy in 2022. However, it is unlikely that they will come with the full package.

Egypt thought the Chinese J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighter may solve this predicament. The Chinese fighter has a beyond-visual range AESA radar and can carry the PL-15 200 km air-to-air missile, similar to the Rafale’s Meteor. The J-10C’s price tag is attractive for Egypt at $40-50 million, much less than the F-16 and Rafales.

The Chinese fighters are also a hedge against Russia’s sanctioned fighter jets, traditionally a second choice for the Egyptian air force.

Risky manoeuvres 

This doesn’t mean Egypt is on a path to abandon its weapons purchases from its Western partners. Egyptian weapons procurement policy is not only motivated by technical considerations. It also serves political objectives. Egypt still receives $1.3 billion every year in military and economic aid from Washington. Regime security and backing are two objectives that will likely encourage Cairo to rely on Western weapons systems for decades. 

However, from Egypt’s military perspective, the time may have come to resort to the Cold War tactics of diversification and counterbalancing. Being forced to accept old technology during the significant modernization of its air force creates a technical and operational necessity to seek this technology elsewhere. 

The regional uncertainty since Hamas’s 7 October attack on Israel and the war that followed in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Israel’s intermittent confrontations with Iran makes make it imperative for the Egyptian strategic planners to take risky manoeuvres while targeting specific capabilities they seem desperate to acquire. 

The threat to deploy CAATSA sanctions against Egypt in 2019 makes the J-10C deal with China an interesting case study for all Middle Eastern allies of the West. It shows an uptick in Egypt’s risk tolerance to overcome its technological dilemma. It allows other countries considering the Chinese fighters (mainly Saudi Arabia) to gauge Washington’s reaction and design their future approach accordingly.   

Another motivation is to pressure the US, UK, and their allies to reconsider their implicit embargo on certain advanced technology by showing that Cairo now has alternatives. This tactic seems to work. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of US Central Command, said during a congressional hearing in 2022 that Washington will finally provide Egypt with the F-15 heavy-weight air superiority fighter, a longstanding demand by Cairo.

Building favours

The J-10C fighter jet ticks all the boxes: It satisfies Cairo’s diversity strategy and technological needs. It is under the sanctions threshold since it is less technologically savvy than the most controversial J-20 5th generation fighters, the equivalent to Russia’s SU-35. And it takes Egypt’s military partnership with China to a new level.

The rumour that the Chinese fighters are bought to replace the ageing versions of Egypt’s significant F-16 fleet is a source of pride for Beijing since its military technology started to be seen as a competitor to Western technology. A heavyweight military power like Egypt relying on Chinese fighters would almost certainly boost China’s share in the regional weapons market, just like Cairo’s purchase of the Rafale boosted its popularity globally.

The killing of Yahya Sinwar won’t change the course of the Gaza war Expert comment jon.wallace 18 October 2024

Israel has larger ambitions for Gaza beyond the Hamas leader’s death and the armed group is still asserting its influence despite its degradation.

After a year of being hunted as one of the most wanted men in the Middle East, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by Israeli forces on 17 October, in the city of Rafah in the Gaza Strip.

Hailing from Khan Younis refugee camp, Sinwar was imprisoned in Israel in 1989 for the abduction and killing of two Israeli soldiers. He was freed alongside 1,000 other prisoners during a major 2011 exchange, gradually building a notorious reputation as an intelligent and ruthless political figure.

As Hamas’ Gaza chief since 2017, Sinwar oversaw the consolidation of the movement’s authoritarian rule in the Strip and co-directed its military confrontations with Israel. He is regarded as a chief architect of Hamas’ deadly assault of 7 October, which killed 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, in southern communities.

Many world leaders and pundits were quick to embrace Sinwar’s death as an opportunity to press for a ceasefire in Gaza and secure the release of roughly 100 Israeli hostages still held by Hamas and other groups. It is too early to know the full repercussions of this development, but these hopes are largely misplaced – and reflect a reluctance to confront the larger obstacles and motivations that are preventing an end to the war.

Morale amid aimlessness

For Israelis, Sinwar’s death is undoubtedly a morale booster. It is a symbolic victory over a man deemed responsible for the 7 October massacres, and a tactical success that rids Israel of a formidable foe – one who was also an invested ally of Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Israeli politicians and generals will relish the news as another step towards restoring their reputations after their failure to prevent the 7 October attack.

Yet contrary to some wishful thinking, Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change Israel’s calculus in Gaza. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose popularity has been slowly recovering in recent months, described the news as ‘the beginning of the end’ but warned that ‘the task before us is not yet complete’.

The intensification of Israel’s war with Hezbollah – including a ground invasion of Lebanon, airstrikes across the country, and the displacement of over 1 million people – has shifted Israelis’ focus away from Gaza over the past month, especially as Hezbollah rockets disrupt life in Israel’s central cities as well as the north.

During that time, the Israeli army has begun a major offensive in the northern part of the Strip, implementing what appears to be the first part of the so-called ‘General’s Plan’ – an operation to besiege and force out roughly 300,000 Palestinian civilians who remain in the area. It could also pave the way for Israel’s absorption of part of the territory. (Israel’s military has denied pursuing the plan).

As such, the Israeli government has relegated the importance of the hostages. Netanyahu is eager to divert the public’s frustration with his months-long sabotage of a deal, while the military – despite its clashes with the prime minister – is seizing the chance to redraw Israel’s geopolitical environment. Even if a deal is struck in the wake of Sinwar’s death, Israel’s bombing and carving-up of Gaza and south Lebanon will likely continue.

Dynamic but degraded

For Hamas, the killing of its fiery politburo chief – just over two months after the assassination of his predecessor Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran – is certainly a blow to its leadership and internal stability. But the Islamist movement’s dynamism has not changed. Hamas’s decision-making processes are not pegged to specific individuals, and other figures, whether in Gaza or in exile, will be rotated into senior positions.

It is unclear whether Hamas will promote a leader who shares Sinwar’s hardline orientation, or drift back to a more moderate figure similar to Haniyeh. Regardless, Hamas’s core demands in any ceasefire and hostage negotiations are unlikely to shift significantly. The movement is still seeking a permanent end to the war, and Israel is still refusing to grant it.

Hamas’s military capacity has been severely degraded by the Israeli offensive, not least by the fact that much of Gaza has been made unliveable and ungovernable. But the movement is far from destroyed. Its militants continue to fight a guerrilla war to undermine Israel’s foothold in Gaza, while trying to reassert Hamas control over public order, the war economy, and the distribution of aid.

Moreover, as the history of movements like Hamas and Hezbollah shows, the devastating nature of Israel’s campaigns and occupations are planting the seeds for further militancy among Palestinians, whether organized under Hamas or smaller, decentralized groups. The war has brutally decimated Gaza’s society, and the notion that killing figures like Sinwar will dissuade future recruits to fight Israel is fanciful.

On the Palestinian political level, Hamas and Fatah are still in talks about forming a unity agreement, though negotiations have so far remained fruitless. Even if a pact is made, Israel’s relentless targeting of Hamas personnel, the perception of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) as feckless collaborators, and Palestinians’ feeling of total abandonment raise doubts about the parties’ ability to regain popular support or legitimacy – whether to lead an interim government or the wider national movement.

The gravest threat

The killing of Sinwar is a significant marker in the Gaza war, with important ramifications for the movement he led and the conflict he seismically shaped. Israel will portray his death as validation of its aggressive military approach, and a further step in the erosion of Iran’s regional influence – an agenda the US has actively supported.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s foreign policy priorities 29 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs discusses the country’s approach to regional stability and the role of international partnerships in securing economic prosperity.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss DRC’s regional diplomatic priorities and international agency, including its ambitions around global critical mineral supply chains.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces foreign policy tests as it manages a complex security crisis and regional tensions, alongside global economic and trade partnerships.

Entrenched conflict in eastern DRC continues to have wider regional implications. Troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployment are tackling a growing mandate as the UN’s peacekeeping mission prepares to withdraw. Tensions with Rwanda also remain high despite mediation efforts under the Luanda process.

As a major producer of critical minerals for the global energy transition, the DRC seeks to benefit from growing international demand without sacrificing value addition. New and existing frameworks with international partners will remain key to this vision, including for the development of regional infrastructure networks such as the Lobito Corridor.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss the DRC’s regional diplomacy and international agency, including the country’s positioning in global critical mineral supply chains.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must register interest in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Friday 25 October.

Sinwar’s death does not make Hamas–Fatah reconciliation more likely, whoever his successor may be Expert comment jon.wallace 22 October 2024

The killing may aid Hamas recruitment – but it will not make agreement with Fatah any easier to achieve.

Western political leaders were quick to argue that Israel’s killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar on 17 October presented an opportunity for a ceasefire in Gaza and the return of Israeli hostages.

US President Joe Biden immediately called on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seize the moment to negotiate, now that Israel has achieved one of its war aims.

However, that ‘moment’ has already passed. Israel’s military assault on Gaza has intensified since Sinwar was killed, leading UN Peace Process Co-ordinator Tor Wennesland to say that ‘nowhere is safe in Gaza’. It is abundantly clear Netanyahu is intent on further degrading Hamas, resetting a new ‘power balance’ and carving out a buffer zone, no matter the cost in Palestinian lives or Israeli hostages. 

But there are other implications of Sinwar’s assassination beyond the zero-sum analysis of will there or won’t there be a ceasefire.

Hamas’s ability to fight

At present, everyone has an opinion on how Sinwar’s killing will affect Hamas and its ability to resist and respond to Israel’s military. His death will have been a major blow – symbolically, operationally, and psychologically. Hamas has been downgraded and its capacity to respond compromised.

But it will recover, regenerate and retaliate in time – and Sinwar’s death will have been no surprise to Palestinians in Gaza or elsewhere. Hamas is accustomed to seeing its leaders assassinated. Since its formation in 1987, it has been ‘decapitated’ many times, only to continue with its mission to ‘liberate Palestine’.

Hamas’s portrayal of Sinwar dying in his fatigues, head wrapped in a keffiyeh and resisting until the end will persuade many young Palestinians that he died as a martyr serving the Palestinian cause. Many will be inspired to join and fortify the ranks of Hamas as a result.

The IDF’s release of drone footage showing Sinwar’s last moments will have done nothing to undermine his credibility. 

On the contrary, it will serve as a rallying call to disaffected and disenfranchised young Palestinians horrified by Israel’s bombing of civilian targets in Gaza and disaffected with Fatah’s inability to prevent Israeli settler expansion and violence in the West Bank.

Reconciliation

Some hope that if Sinwar is replaced by a more ‘moderate’ leader, his killing may smooth the path to Hamas–Fatah reconciliation – and that this could provide a foundation for a patchwork political solution when Israel and Gaza arrive at the ‘day after.’  

But the idea that a downgraded and ‘leaderless’ Hamas will be susceptible to international pressure to reconcile with Fatah is divorced from reality.  

Prospective new Hamas leaders such as Khaled al Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya are based in Qatar. 

They may be more pliable to external pressure to reconcile with Fatah in search of a political outcome, but their ability to influence events on the ground in Gaza will be limited. That was demonstrated by the Sinwar-orchestrated attacks on 7 October 2023, which took place without the blessing of the exiled leadership in Doha.

Hamas has long gone to ground in Gaza and become far more decentralized than it was before 7 October. It is now more typical of an insurgency, where Hamas cadres exercise a great degree of operational autonomy.

In other words, the disconnect between Hamas in Gaza and its political leadership in Qatar has only grown wider since this round of conflict started.

International efforts

That will undermine international efforts made by Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and others to bring about a reconciliation. Moscow and Beijing already hosted reconciliation talks in February and April early this year but made no progress in closing the chasm between the two parties. Saudi Arabia has also hosted talks.

The three Arab states, none of which have so far commented publicly on Sinwar’s killing, will likely view his death as an opportunity to bolster the political wing of Hamas – backing it with pledges of political, diplomatic and financial support.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt will have next to no influence over the succession process, but Qatar’s long-established relationship with the political wing of Hamas affords it leverage over the organization, albeit limited. They may be able to strengthen the hand of those based in Doha by promising to work harder at securing a ceasefire, guaranteeing the provision of humanitarian relief, and working towards a political solution.

How to revive Europe’s economy and unlock its potential 7 November 2024 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Enrico Letta, former prime minister of Italy, and other experts discuss how the European Union’s economy must adapt to a challenging world.

Amid a fractured geopolitical environment, global trade volatility and hardening protectionist policies in many countries, the European economy must adapt fast. The single market is a key driver of European integration, but it was designed in a very different global economic context.

Launched in April, Enrico Letta’s Much more than a market report set out how the European Union should adapt the arrangements of the single market to ensure it delivers prosperity and economic security for EU citizens in the 21st century. The report resonates with ongoing debates over the future of European competitiveness, industrial strategy and how to respond to an apparently deglobalizing world. In this event, Letta and other experts on the European economy and integration will discuss the prospect of meaningful reform of the single market, and what the incoming Commission can do to ensure the EU unlocks the potential of its economy for all its citizens.

Key questions will include:

• What dynamics are shaping the Europe’s economic landscape?
• What opportunities are there to enhance the strength and competitiveness of the single market
• How can the EU’s leaders ensure the single market is aligned with other strategic objectives such as security and enlargement?
• What political hurdles may prevent progress on single market reform? And how can these be overcome?

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

The MENA uprisings: Five years on, what role is civil society playing? 31 October 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

Panellists examine the protest movements’ legacies in different context and how civil society continues to work towards positive change.

Five years after nation-wide protests in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan demanded systemic changes and political reforms, the situation remains largely unchanged. In some cases, it has deteriorated. Sudan is facing a humanitarian catastrophe amidst an ongoing civil war. Lebanon is dealing with Israeli aggression amidst a severe economic crisis with little response from the caretaker government. In Iraq and Algeria, relative stability masks the reality of increased suppression of dissent. This preservation of the status quo supports the entrenched political structures that strive to uphold it.

The current absence of large-scale street protests in these countries should not be taken as an indication that populations are content with the status quo. The issues that ignited the initial uprisings remain and in many cases have worsened. Despite enormous challenges, activists continue to navigate their systems to survive and instigate change. In the face of increasing difficulties, they are raising awareness of their countries’ predicaments and are finding alternative economic solutions. Additionally they are mobilizing community support, and pushing to voice their disillusionment. All these efforts aim at actively participating in shaping decisions that determines their future.

This webinar explores:

• What has been the impact of the uprisings in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan?
• How are civil society and activists contributing to change within their communities?
• What is the current landscape for civic engagement within the politics, society and economy in these countries?
• What prospects are there for solidarity and cooperation among civil society actors across these regions and beyond?

Trust in US democracy is at stake in this election Expert comment rgold.drupal 23 October 2024

A narrow win for either side could make things worse. The rest of the world should be prepared for a disruptive transition.

With less than two weeks to election day in the United States, polls suggest the gap between Harris and Trump has narrowed even further in the swing states where the election will be decided. A fierce contest has ensued as each campaign seeks to drive voter turnout. In such a tight race, this will be decisive. But in an election that many Americans perceive as being existential for the country’s future, a narrow victory by either side will heighten the risk of a contested election.

Many Americans are pessimistic about the ability of democracy to deliver a reliable result. Two thirds of Republican voters continue to believe that the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump and for many of these, Biden’s inauguration may have demonstrated the weakness, not the strength, of US democracy. 

This environment has contributed to widespread anticipation of a contested election, as well as preparations for the possibility of a delayed result. Political disinformation and deep polarization across the country could mean that a narrow victory leads to more legal challenges and even political violence.  6 January, the anniversary of the assault on the US Capitol and the day Congress will certify the Electoral College has been designated a National Special Security Event. 

The issue of how quickly and reliably votes are certified has become an arena for argument. In the 2022 midterms, 22 county officials in key states voted to delay certification. Democrats have noted with alarm that this year, around 70 pro-Trump election ‘conspiracists’ are positioned to review the results in swing states.

Those nervous about the possibility of a narrow vote being overturned will be watching to see if Republicans maintain or increase their majority in the House of Representatives, since the newly elected House will shape who holds the gavel when a joint session of Congress returns to certify the US presidential election result. Republican control of the House could give the former president more ability to influence this vote. 

A resilient democracy

But there should be room for optimism. Democracy in America has been remarkably resilient. In 2016, Democrats swallowed their unease with Donald Trump. Despite rumours of Russian interference in the election, they accepted the election result.

Four years later, the US was far more polarized, trust in institutions had decreased, and challenges to the elections reflected this. The Trump campaign filed more than 60 lawsuits in 9 states challenging election processes and voter certification. In every single case, courts confirmed the results.  After the 6 January insurrection on the US Capitol, Congress returned to its chambers and, on the very same day, confirmed the electoral results. 

If fears of another contested election materialise, it will be the third time in recent history that the US has struggled to confirm a result. In 2000, the Supreme Court intervened to decide on a recount in Florida, effectively delivering victory to George W Bush – a memory alongside the 6 January Capitol riots contributing to America’s anxiety ahead of polling day. 

International response

The US’s partners and rivals may be ill-prepared for a contested election. 

If Trump or Harris, or both, claim victory before it is clearly settled, world leaders will need to decide how to react. Diplomatic protocol may dictate that leaders wait until the US confirms the results through official channels but there are concerns that not everyone will play by these rules. 

Where is Georgia now heading? 28 October 2024 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Online

After pivotal elections, experts discuss what the declared results and reactions mean for Georgia.

Following a year marked by protests over the controversial ‘Foreign Agents’ bill and broader concerns over democratic backsliding, Georgia faces pivotal parliamentary elections on 26 October. Regardless of the outcome, the results are expected to be contested as well as consequential.

In the wake of the election, experts will discuss the immediate and longer-term consequences.

Key questions:

• These were the first fully-proportional elections in Georgia. How much difference did it make
• What will the election results, as we currently understand them, mean for Georgia’s path to European integration? How will they affect Georgia’s foreign policy priorities?
• What role should the EU play? Is Georgia a test case for the EU as an aspiring geopolitical power?
• Is the oligarchic grip likely to be tightened or loosened? What role for undue influence now?
• Has Russia done all it can for now in Georgia? Or is there more it can do?

US election rhetoric on migration undermines Washington’s soft power in Latin America Expert comment jon.wallace 23 October 2024

As US public opinion hardens, the Democratic party takes a tougher stance, and Donald Trump proposes mass deportations, Latin American leaders note a lack of long-term policy.

The US’s broken immigration system has become a central theme of the 2024 election campaign. But the discussion on immigration, undocumented immigrants, and asylum seekers – increasingly lurching into dehumanizing rhetoric – extends beyond US borders. 

As one former senior director of the National Security Council told me, ‘when the president travels or meets with heads of state from Latin America what comes up –regardless of the country – isn’t US–Cuba policy or even trade. It’s immigration’. How the US talks about and treats citizens of Latin American and the Caribbean matters to elected politicians in the region. 

The roots of the US immigration debate go deep and will not be easily resolved, even with a sweeping reform of the system. 

According to a January 2024 Pew survey, 78 per cent of Americans ‘say the large number of migrants seeking to enter the country at the Mexico border is either a crisis (45 per cent) or a major problem (32 per cent)’. Worries about the border are not limited to Republican voters: 73 per cent of Democrats feel that the issue is either a crisis or major problem. 

Despite the heated popular temperature, the numbers of undocumented immigrants encountered at the US–Mexico border has actually dropped in recent months. US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) reported 301,981 encounters with irregular border crossings in December 2023; by August 2024 this had dropped to 107,473.  

Nevertheless, illegal border crossings have increased under Biden. During his administration USCBP reported 8 million encounters along the Mexico border compared to 2.5 million under Donald Trump. 

Mexico

Any attempt to address the issue promises to affect US relations with Mexico, requiring the cooperation of newly elected president Claudia Sheinbaum. Her predecessor and founder of her Morena party, leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), proved an unexpectedly cooperative partner for the previous Trump administration and Biden White House. 

But that came at a cost, particularly for Biden. In return for AMLO’s cooperation, the US soft-pedalled criticism over his failures to disrupt narcotics trafficking and criminal networks and for his steady weakening of checks on executive power. 

Mexico’s borders with other countries are also under pressure. Mexico remains the primary sending country to the US. But political repression and insecurity in countries including Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala and Venezuela has pushed their citizens to travel across Mexico to the US. Economic collapse and humanitarian crises in Cuba and Venezuela have further fuelled the flight.

Rhetoric

The Kamala Harris and Trump campaigns have struck different positions on how to stem the flow of illegal immigration. But as US public opinion shifts, both parties are talking tougher. 

Harris is continuing Biden’s hardening stance, including the controversial move to bar those who cross the border illegally from applying for asylum. 

Biden’s early ‘roots’ strategy, to provide economic and security support in countries from where migrants are travelling, has fallen by the wayside. 

The Trump campaign is taking more extreme positions. The Republican presidential candidate mentions immigration in almost every campaign speech. 

He proposes to carry out the ‘largest deportation in US history’, using ICE personnel, the National Guard and local police forces to round up undocumented immigrants, including in their workplaces. 

The campaign has also pledged to end birth-right citizenship and Biden’s programme of parole for humanitarian reasons. Trump also plans to restore his first term policies including construction of the border wall. 

Trump’s proposals provide little opportunity for a broad, bipartisan consensus on immigration. Should he win in November he is likely, as he did in his first term, to attempt to push his policies via executive action, opening up challenges in federal court. 

A Harris victory would at least create space for the resurrection of the Biden administration’s 2024 immigration enforcement bill, originally supported by moderate Republican leadership in the Senate, but defeated following pressure from Trump. 

The bill would have toughened enforcement at the border – increasing funding for detention centres, asylum hearings and for local governments and border patrols. It would also permit ICE to shut down the border when crossings surpassed an average of 5,000 per day or 8,500 on a single day.

Undermining US influence

But such legislation, while promising to address domestic US perceptions of the crisis, threatens to reduce US soft power in Latin America. That would be counterproductive at a time when the US is attempting to consolidate global support in its competition with China and conflict with Russia. 

For Latin American leaders, US rhetoric on immigration rankles. The priorities of Latin American and Caribbean leaders and their voters are long term: economic growth, improved security, and climate change. These issues require investment and commitment from an engaged and reliable US partner. Sadly, Latin Americans can see such issues are not on the domestic agenda in US politics. 

To improve regional perceptions of US intentions after the election, new policy should seek to address the root causes of migration. That will require a multi-pronged, bipartisan approach that focuses attention and resources on US neighbours south of the border.  

The US’s immigration system will need to broaden paths for legal immigration to meet US labour needs, while delivering increased support for border security, and accelerated (and humane) processes for detaining and repatriating illegal border crossers and asylum claims.  

But any sustainable answer also requires addressing the multifaceted reasons driving migrants north. Any future US administration will need to risk unpopularity with some voters at home and engage with sending countries and their neighbours. 

Safeguarding Europe: how to defeat and deter Russia 10 December 2024 — 10:00AM TO 7:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 October 2024 Chatham House

Threat assessment and practical solutions.

Nearly three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the security picture for Europe remains uncertain. Questions of European states’ own resilience and ability to counter Russia and support Ukraine have not been adequately answered by key European powers. So how can European states act proactively to support not only Ukraine but also their own security?

Key questions:

• How resilient is Europe to the challenge posed by Russia?
• What more can be done to defend EU candidate states?
• What will be the impact of the US election results?
• What deters Russia? What have we learnt from Russia’s war on Ukraine?
• Are the current approaches sufficient?

This one-day, in-person conference at Chatham House will bring together experts and policymakers from across the UK, EU and US, as well as drawing from the expertise of Russian analysts in exile. Alongside analysis of Russia’s intentions towards Europe and European strategy, there will be opportunity for in-depth conversation with experts on the geopolitical and defence tools available to European states.

This conference will be hosted in-person, with the recording of the keynote address made available on the website following the event.

Participants will be selected based on expertise. Please wait for confirmation before attending.

Corporate organisations who currently do not support the Russia-Eurasia Programme or Ukraine Forum will be subject to a fee. Your registration will be reviewed by a member of our team before it is approved.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Independent Thinking: Will debt constrain Western foreign policy? Audio john.pollock 24 October 2024

Patrick Wintour and Ranil Dissanayake join the podcast ahead of the UK Budget to discuss the high debt facing G7 economies and its impact on foreign, defence and development policies.

On this episode

Ahead of a crucial Budget by Chancellor Rachel Reeves, UK national debt is at almost 100 per cent of GDP – and it’s not alone. Many G7 economies face massive debt levels, restricting ambitions when it comes to foreign policy and global engagement. 

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Patrick Wintour, the Guardian’s diplomatic editor and Ranil Dissanayake, a senior research fellow at the Centre for Global Development. With them are Olivia O’Sullivan and David Lubin from Chatham House.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Chatham House welcomes 2024 interns News release jon.wallace 25 October 2024

An internship at Chatham House offers an invaluable learning experience through a six-month placement in one of our teams.

Chatham House is excited to welcome the 2024 cohort to the Molchanov Sustainability Internship Programme. 

Introduced in January 2021, the programme has been made possible following the gift of Pavel Molchanov, to support the next generation of leaders in sustainability. 

The internships grant practical learning opportunities at a world-famous think-tank, helping a new generation of policymakers understand how to shape policy, influence debate, and create meaningful change towards a sustainable future. 

This autumn, Chatham House staff in six departments are delighted to welcome interns to their teams: 

Aisha Abdirahman will work with the Environment and Society Centre, Kendall Spence with the Africa Programme, Matthew Harris with the International Affairs journal, Noor Elgallal with the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Phoebe Hardingham with the Russia and Eurasia Programme, and Thomas Maddock with the Europe Programme.

For more information about the internships, please contact the Academy team.

In conversation with James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology and Society at Google 12 December 2024 — 11:15AM TO 12:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

A conversation on AI’s global, societal and economic impacts.

2024 has been a landmark year for Artificial Intelligence (AI) development, deployment and use, with significant progress in AI-driven science, governance and cooperation. Looking ahead, AI continues to demonstrate economic promise and potential to expand on scientific breakthroughs in areas such as climate and health. This wave of innovation is occurring against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty and not all countries are fully able to participate. Heading into 2025, there are urgent questions about how best to maximise shared opportunities when it comes to AI and to advance global cooperation.

James Manyika, Senior Vice President of Research, Technology & Society at Google, will unpack what 2025 will bring for AI in science, economics, global governance and international cooperation. 

Key questions include:

• What will be AI’s global societal and economic impact in 2025 and beyond? 
• What are the ways AI could help increase economic growth and economy-wide productivity? What factors must be in place for this to happen?
• How best can we maximise shared opportunities and advance global cooperation when it comes to AI? Where can public-private partnerships unlock scientific breakthroughs for societal progress, combatting shared global challenges such as climate change and global health issues?  
• What are the principles of safe, responsible AI, and how should companies remain responsive to their evolution and integrate them into technology design and implementation? 
• What is the current – and ideal – role of technology companies in emerging mechanisms for global cooperation and national governance on AI?

This event is being held in partnership with Google.

You will receive notice by 13:00 on Wednesday 11 December if you have been successful in securing an in-person place.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

As the ruling party claims victory in Georgia’s disputed election, Western condemnation is no longer enough Expert comment LToremark 29 October 2024

As tens of thousands take to the streets to protest the election results, Georgia faces a familiar crisis – with a few key differences.

As the people of Georgia went to the polls on 26 October, many were hoping not only for a democratic change of government but also for an end to one-party dominance and a return to the path of European integration. The previously weak and divided opposition had grouped itself into four major electoral centres, promising a coalition government and framing these elections as a choice between Europe and Russia. 

Ahead of the election, President Salome Zourabishvili had put forward the Georgian Charter, a blueprint for a stable and democratic transition to a new style of governance and for initiating reforms to fulfil conditions for EU accession. It was signed by all pro-European and pro-Western opposition parties. 

The official election results gave the ruling Georgian Dream party a 54 per cent majority in contrast with exit polls that gave the opposition a 10 per cent lead. President Zourabishvili and the opposition parties refuse to recognize the results, beginning a long process of contestation with allegations of fraud and street protests. As the disappointment sets in and the streets once again replace the ballot box as a conduit for democratic change, there is a sense of déja vu.

Georgia has seen this before. A party sweeps to power on the tide of popular protest, initiates reforms to meet public expectations but, by the end of its second term, it takes an authoritarian turn. As it overstays its welcome, it starts manipulating elections to cling to power. People once again take to the streets and a new party wins by a landslide only to repeat the same cycle. But with each turn, the grip the ruling elites have on power gets stronger and the methods they use become more sophisticated. State security becomes equated with regime stability, leaving no space for normal democratic contestation or expressions of dissent. 

Although what is happening in Georgia fits this familiar pattern, there are some consequential differences. 

First, these were the first fully proportional elections. Previously, a mixed system of representation meant that the incumbency always had an advantage by dominating majoritarian districts. A new electoral system had created a not unreasonable expectation that these elections, if held freely, would result in a coalition government. The hope was this could help break the vicious cycle of Georgian politics, sustained by an extreme form of majoritarianism and a winner-takes-all political culture.

The Georgian Dream party was contesting its fourth consecutive term against a backdrop of falling popularity and growing societal mobilization in opposition to its authoritarian inclinations. Despite all this, it secured – some would insist manufactured – an absolute majority in elections that international observers say were marred by serious irregularities and fell short of democratic standards. 

The second important difference is that these elections were not only about saving Georgia’s democracy but also about rescuing its European perspective. Since Georgia was granted EU candidate status in December 2023, its parliament has adopted Russian-style laws on foreign agents and combating LGBTIQ+ ‘propaganda’. 

It has also adopted a strongly Eurosceptic political discourse, pushing back on international criticism and accusing EU and US officials of interference in domestic affairs and disregard for Georgia’s sovereignty. In response, the EU has suspended accession talks with Georgia indefinitely while the US has imposed targeted sanctions on high-ranking Georgian officials and judges. 

Georgia’s democratic backsliding at home and its pivot away from the West are both simultaneous and interrelated. It was widely hoped these elections would be a course correction and return Georgia to the path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The election results, if they stick, will prevent this from happening. A Georgian Dream government will not work to fulfil conditions for EU accession, viewed as a challenge to its hold on power. 

The third and final difference is that these elections took place in the context of heightened geopolitical confrontation. The Georgian Dream ‘victory’ is a win for anti-liberal, conservative forces around the world championed, among others, by Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. He was the first to congratulate Georgian Dream for its declared success and even visited Tbilisi in a show of solidarity and ideological alignment. 

The election result is also a win for Russia. It strengthens Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus, which has waned as a result of the war in Ukraine and the fall of Nagorny-Karabakh. Russian officials and propagandist were quick to congratulate Georgian Dream, wishing them success in standing up to Western pressures and offering help in case things got tough. 

From Moscow’s perspective, Georgia’s elections are part of a global hybrid war. They represent a local battle in the ongoing geopolitical contest between Russia and the West, between the rules-based global order and competitive multipolarity. 

As Georgia repeats a familiar pattern, what do the election results mean for its future? While clear predictions are difficult at this stage, it is worth bearing in mind that as the democratic resilience of the Georgian society has strengthened over time, so too has the state capacity to supress and control. 

Assessing the trajectory of the Middle East conflict 4 November 2024 — 4:00PM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 October 2024 Online

Experts examine how the conflict may develop and what we can expect from regional and international actors.

A year on, the war in Gaza has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine with escalation across the region intensifying.

Recent weeks have seen Israel deepening its military offensive on Lebanon and keeping the north of the Gaza strip under siege, while leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas have been successfully targeted by its forces. Israel also launched an unprecedented assault against Iran in response to Tehran’s missile attacks on Israeli territory earlier in October.

Against this backdrop, regional states, particularly in the Gulf, in line with their overall approach to the conflict, are prioritizing diplomacy over escalation. They maintain their neutrality on the hostility between Israel and Iran and its aligned groups from the axis of resistance.

The strength of old alliances is being tested while new alignments are uncovered that may reshape the geopolitical landscape of the region, particularly following the US presidential election.

In this webinar, experts will examine:

• What are Israel’s calculations at this stage and how have the domestic political dynamics changed over recent weeks?
• What are the impacts of the war on Iran and its aligned actors and what can we expect from Tehran and groups from the axis of resistance?
• How are the wars in Gaza and Lebanon connected and would ending one stop the other?
• What is the response from regional states, particularly in the Gulf, and what role can they play?
• What are the possible scenarios for a post-election US policy on Israel and the Middle East?

Independent Thinking: Why is North Korea sending troops to Russia? Audio john.pollock 31 October 2024

Orysia Lutsevych, Edward Howell and Yossi Mekelberg discuss North Korean troops fighting with Russian forces against Ukraine, as well as the issue of military conscription.

On this episode

North Korea is sending troops to Russia, but what is Kim Jong-Un hoping to get from Vladmir Putin for this military assistance against Ukraine? The panel also discuss the role military conscription plays in Israel, South Korea and Ukraine’s defence.

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Howell, the Korea Foundation fellow at Chatham House, Orysia Lutsevych, the head of our Ukraine Forum and Yossi Mekelberg, a senior consulting fellow with our Middle East and North Africa Programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Harris and Trump's shared goal masks a fundamental AI policy divide Expert comment rgold.drupal 3 November 2024

Both presidential candidates will pursue US tech dominance but differ on the means to achieve it.

There remain some differences between the US presidential candidates’ positions on the governance of artificial intelligence and other emerging technology, notably around competition. 

But under either future administration, US decision-making looks set to be heavily influenced by growing securitization, the aims of the US technology industry and broader competition with China. 

‘Safe’ AI development 

Vice President Kamala Harris attended the inaugural Global AI Safety summit in the UK in 2023, where she announced President Joe Biden’s Executive Order on AI. This significant move by the federal government sought to define national and cyber security guidelines for AI developers and outline privacy and transparency guarantees. It also committed the federal government to a review of the National Security implications of this emerging technology, which was published last week.

In her remarks at the summit, Harris was clear that her definitions of safety extended beyond catastrophic risk mitigation to societal and personal harm. She noted the corrosive effects of some algorithmic decision-making and disinformation on democracy, appealing for AI that is developed ‘in the service of the public interest’.

A number of initiatives developed during the Biden administration have attempted to steer emerging technology as it takes root in society. This includes the establishment of the US AI Safety Institute, various schemes on global AI governance and investment in Public AI projects like the National AI Research Resource (NAIRR).

The US public is largely supportive: polling by the AI Policy Institute (AIPI) points to a majority preference for safety standards governing the US effort to lead in AI, rather than pedal-to-the-metal development. Investment in public options on AI and the infrastructure required to develop and sustain it is a bold direction that the incoming administration should consider expanding.

Biden’s Executive Order on AI has come under fire by the Trump campaign. At a rally in Iowa, Trump explained that he would cancel the order ‘on day one’, echoing a Republican platform that described it as imposing ‘Radical Leftwing ideas’ . 

Trump does, however, have his own track record in technology policy. During his first presidency, his administration passed an Executive Order on AI, stressing that ‘continued American leadership in Artificial Intelligence is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States’. The tools and institutions announced as part of the order – including AI research investment, national AI research institutes and AI regulatory guidance including on federal use of AI – echo those of the current administration. 

Four years is a long time in AI, however. As the power of this technology is revealed, talk of safety may give way to talk of security. While the candidates may disagree on the role of the federal government in setting standards, there will be close alignment on the central need for US supremacy in national security. Neither administration seems likely to erect barriers to securitization of AI should it emerge as a critical strategic asset.

AI regulation at home 

American industry will remain the pivotal force shaping the US AI ecosystem, particularly as America jostles for position as the maker of the global rules governing AI. A notable aspect of Biden’s AI Executive Order was where it staked responsibility. Reports by AI and Cloud companies on the safety of their tools and infrastructure are sent to the Department of Commerce.

Under Secretary Gina Raimondo, whose star continues to rise, the department has become significantly more engaged with technology companies. In the absence of any other legal authority, AI governance has therefore sat under the purview of a secretary who herself has noted that they are ‘not a regulator’. 

The trend of industry leaders driving the government agenda on AI is replicated in other departments. There was an outcry over the composition of the new Department of Homeland Security advisory panel, the Artificial Intelligence and Security Board, with civil society groups concerned about the preponderance of industry voices: the 22-member panel includes the CEOs of OpenAI, Anthropic, NVIDIA, IBM, AWS, Adobe, Microsoft and Alphabet.

Under a Harris presidency, these trends seem likely to continue. Plus with deadlock in Congress probable, establishing new legal authorities for emerging technology will be difficult. That will likely mean emerging tech governance remains heavily influenced by the Department for Commerce. 

Like Harris, Trump has his allies in industry. While the Biden administration has courted the CEOs of AI companies who have historically spoken out in favour of regulation, Trump’s allies tend towards a more deregulatory agenda. 

Silicon Valley billionaires Elon Musk and Marc Andreessen have backed Trump’s plans to minimize AI regulation, lauding his support for ‘little tech’. They have also backed reported plans for so-called ‘Manhattan Projects’ to develop military technology, stewarded by ‘industry-led’ agencies. Trump’s aversion to strong regulatory institutions may mean an end to Biden’s anti-trust efforts, benefitting the biggest voices in the room, though his VP pick may disagree. JD Vance has somewhat surprisingly come out strongly in defence of the current chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and her anti-trust efforts targeting US big tech.

Regardless, business interests will likely shape either a Harris or Trump administration’s approach as the US grapples with balancing the ambitions of its industry with an increasingly protectionist stance towards its biggest import market, China.

Competition abroad

China looms large in the imaginations of both campaigns. 

The US has signalled to its allies that American AI standards should replace Chinese standards. Export controls on semiconductors were expanded in September this year, with key voices in the industry – notably the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea – describing the restrictions as ‘economically motivated’ despite nominally being tied to national security by the US. 

The UK needs to address growth and debt problems if it is to match resources to ambitions on international priorities Expert comment LJefferson 5 November 2024

The budget marks the lowest amount in decades the country has spent on development, and it is struggling to fund other international priorities too.

The UK’s Chancellor Rachel Reeves unveiled her much-anticipated budget last week, the first of the new Labour government. Labour is in a difficult place. There are numerous calls on the public purse and public services are not performing well. Meanwhile, public debt remains close to 100 per cent of GDP, and there has been a long run of sluggish growth.
 
Reeves argues with some justification that the previous government left her a challenging inheritance – gaps in this year’s spending plans, and persistent debt questions left unresolved. More importantly, there are longer-term concerns about the sustainability of UK public spending – the country’s Office for Budget Responsibility has warned public debt could triple by the 2070s due to an ageing population, the climate crisis, and security risks. The focus has understandably been on kitchen table questions about tax rises and funding public services.
 
But this picture also has longstanding implications for international policy – on whether the UK can afford to invest in its foreign policy. The Chancellor did announce an increase of £2.9bn for defence. But the question of whether the UK can get on a sustainable path to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence is still being worked through in the ongoing Strategic Review, and remains challenging despite increasingly urgent warnings from parliamentary committees about the UK’s defence readiness.

The budget also marks one of the lowest amounts in recent years the UK will spend on development overseas, despite setting an ambition to reset relations with the Global South and recover the UK’s role as a leader in international development.
  
The UK needs to either match resources to ambition, spend much more efficiently, or, in the case of the aid budget, it could seek to focus on priorities that are less dependent on spending. But even this will still require consistent resources, alongside significant diplomatic attention, intellectual leadership, and focus.

Longer-term, the UK may need to consider larger questions: addressing broader problems with its lack of growth and productivity will be critical to fund an expansive international role.

With this budget, UK aid spent overseas is at a historic low

In 2020 the UK government cut its goal for spending on international development to 0.5 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), ending a longstanding policy of spending 0.7 per cent. Labour have echoed this, promising to only return to previous levels when fiscal circumstances allow.
 
But this masks a bigger issue. Since 2022, significant amounts of the UK’s aid budget have been spent on accommodation for asylum seekers in the UK. This is within the rules governing aid, but reduces the amount spent on reducing poverty overseas. In 2023 this spending was 28 per cent of the £15.4bn aid budget. In 2016, it was 3.2 per cent. 

Previous Chancellor Jeremy Hunt quietly allowed a top-up of aid spending over the last two fiscal years to offset how much is being spent at home on asylum seeker accommodation. That provided an additional £2.5 billion for 2022–23 and 2023–24.

But Rachel Reeves declined to provide extra funding this time, meaning the amount being spent overseas is likely the lowest its been since 2007 – an effective cut – under a Labour government.

The Minister for Development, Anneliese Dodds, speaking at Chatham House last month, said the government is working on clearing the backlog of asylum claims, which should free up more to spend overseas.

But beyond this there has been little clarity on plans to address the issue. And costs for asylum seeker accommodation have increased significantly – the UK appears to spend much more than comparator countries per head, according to the Center for Global Development, raising questions about how this spending is managed.

Development is not just about money – but money is important

The UK debate about development has often focused on the 0.7 per cent figure, which can distract from larger questions about what development policy is intended to achieve. As many experts have argued, development aid is about more than spending, and the wider, complex process by which the UK contributes to broad-based growth and stability for poorer countries is not about hitting a specific number.
 
There are things the UK can do that aren’t about spending more directly. This might include focusing on priorities like reforming multilateral development banks so they provide more low-cost public finance, and more flexible and agile loans to poorer countries – a priority echoed by Dodds. It might also incorporate focusing more broadly on helping developing countries attract more investment to bolster growth. 

There is also the issue of developing country debt, much of which is held by the private sector. Dodds previously said, when she was shadow chancellor, she might consider changing the law to address this issue. However,  she declined to recommit to this when questioned at Chatham House. 

None of this can be done unilaterally – on debt, for example, the UK has spearheaded some creative policies. Its UK Export Finance body developed climate-resilient debt clauses – agreements that countries can pause debt repayments in the event of a climate shock – but the UK holds limited amounts of developing country debt. Impact will only come by galvanizing and coordinating others to adopt similar approaches.

Following its snap election, Japanese politics has entered uncharted waters Expert comment LToremark 5 November 2024

Prime Minister Ishiba’s election gamble has failed. Japan now faces another period of political uncertainty, which could affect its international standing.

In Japan’s snap election on 27 October, the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito lost the overwhelming majority it had held since the 2012 general election. The ruling coalition now has 215 seats, leaving it 18 seats short of a majority. 

The largest opposition party is the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), which gained 50 seats to 148. The second largest opposition party is the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), which lost six seats to 38, and the third largest opposition party is the National Democratic Party (NDP), which gained 21 seats to 28.

But the opposition is divided and there is no real appetite to form a coalition government. This will likely result in a hung parliament, which will further destabilize Japan’s government.

The election results reveal three key things  about the state of Japanese politics and what comes next.

First, that Prime Minister Ishiba’s snap election gamble has failed. The aim was for Ishiba, a non-mainstream member of the LDP, to strengthen the party base and stabilize his administration. But with the ruling coalition losing its majority, the party base has been further weakened and the Ishiba administration is now more likely to be short-lived. LDP voters as well as the public in general  had hoped that Ishiba, as the ‘opposition within the party’, would change the LDP’s structure and government policies, eliminate the uncertainty surrounding party funding and increase transparency on how MPs use public funds to finance political activities.

However, when Ishiba became LDP leader and prime minister, he abandoned his previously more critical stance and prioritized carrying on the policies of the mainstream LDP, leaving his supporters feeling betrayed.

Second, while the ruling coalition has been punished, the people of Japan still did not vote for a change of government. The opposition is divided and, despite its gains in this election, the CDP is not fully committed to take the lead and consolidate the opposition to form a coalition. The CDP also suffers from internal division. The left wing of the party would prefer a coalition with the Communist Party, while the right wing of the party does not want to form a coalition with the LDP or the Communist Party, preferring a partner such as the NDP.

Third, the NDP has become the key to future Japanese politics. By becoming the minority ruling party, the NDP is in a position to control the fate of Ishiba administration. While the CDP has no intention of cooperating with the LDP, the NDP is more willing to do so in order to implement its own policies. As the budget cannot be passed without the NDP’s cooperation, the ruling coalition will have no choice but to accept the NDP’s policy of substantial tax cuts through the expansion of tax credits. It will also likely have to accept an option for married couples to decide their family names, which requires a change of civil codes and is something it has been reluctant to do so far. 

If the NDP’s demands are rejected, a no-confidence motion will likely be submitted and passed, leaving the Ishiba cabinet with no choice but to resign or dissolve the House of Representatives (the lower house of Japan’s parliament).

But the NDP has chosen to not form a coalition with the ruling party and enter government. Why? From the NDP’s point of view, forming a coalition with the LDP, would mean getting involved in the LDP’s internal turmoil – something it wishes to avoid. In addition, elections to the House of Councillors (upper house of parliament) will be held in the summer of 2025. The NDP may have judged that it will have a better chance of implementing its policies by cooperating with the government on a case-by-case basis, rather than forming a coalition with a party that is losing public support and risk following suit.

The minority ruling system that has emerged after the election is extremely rare in Japan’s political history and is likely to make its politics even more unstable in the years ahead. The Ishiba administration will probably be able to survive until the budget is passed in March next year by cooperating with the NDP, but beyond that its prospects are unclear.

As the House of Councillors elections get closer, some in the LDP may say that they cannot fight the election with Ishiba as prime minister. If so, they may choose the option of a same-day election for the lower and the upper house. The cost of an election campaign is significant, and the LDP’s financial strength gives it an advantage in the case of a same-day election. There is also a strong possibility that the public will choose the LDP to regain stability in government. However, this election has shown that public distrust of the LDP is high, and if Ishiba continues to be pushed around by the NDP, his party’s chances of winning would be reduced.

Japanese politics has entered uncharted waters, where the patterns and customs of the past do not apply. There are now doubts both at home and abroad as to whether Ishiba, who has a weak party base, will be able to stay on and steer the government. Over the past decade, the Abe and Kishida administrations have provided Japan with political stability, which has in turn enhanced its international presence. An unstable political system, with frequent changes of government, will likely lead to a decline in Japan’s international influence.

There is also a risk that US–Japan relations  could become unstable. Although the NDP does not have a strong agenda to change the course of this relationship, Ishiba may struggle to keep the promise made by his predecessors to increase defence spending. Ishiba’s nationalist posture could also create a confrontational relationship with the United States, while his weak leadership means he may not seek to invest in strengthening the US–Japan alliance. 

Donald Trump’s win in the US presidential election could pose a further risk. Although Trump might be open to Ishiba’s demand for parity with the US, he could become irritated with Ishiba’s weak domestic position. Ishiba may not be able to make decisions – or a deal with Trump – unless the NDP agrees to it.

Is there an end to the Central Bank of Libya crisis? 14 November 2024 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2024 Online

Experts discuss implications for Libya’s economic governance.

In August this year, the Libyan Presidency Council moved to replace Libya’s longtime central bank governor, Sadiq al-Kabir. Kabir had been in position since September 2011, and in the period following the administrative division of Libya, he rose to prominence as one of the most influential figures on the Libyan political scene.

In the absence of a functioning relationship between executive and legislature, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) took on many of the competencies of the ministry of finance and became an arbiter of which payments were made and when. In October, following UN-led and parallel back-channel negotiations, a new governor was selected and the CBL board of directors reconstituted.

In this webinar, experts will examine:

• What challenges will the new CBL leadership face?
• Can we expect significant changes for Libya’s economic governance?
• What are the implications for the balance of power between Libya’s rival power centres?

This webinar is organized in partnership with the North Africa Initiative (NAI) at the Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) of the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

Addressing illegal gold mining: International policy priorities 18 November 2024 — 11:30AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2024 Chatham House and Online

Held in partnership with the World Gold Council, this panel of experts examines the global Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) landscape and propose policy priorities essential for fostering sector formalization.

In this panel discussion, held in partnership with the World Gold Council, experts will examine the global Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) landscape and propose policy priorities essential for fostering sector formalization.

An estimated twenty million people worldwide are involved in the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) sector, which now accounts for around 20 percent of global gold output. However, 85 percent of this production occurs outside formal legal frameworks. While many in ASGM operate within informal economies or seek pathways to formalization, a significant portion is also vulnerable to criminal exploitation, involving organized crime and armed groups.

In Ethiopia, the sector’s informality is tied to the nation’s volatile security dynamics, with illicit gold mining proliferating as non-state actors compete for control in conflict-prone regions such as Tigray. Additionally, gold is increasingly trafficked through transnational illicit networks in the Sahel and Sudan fuelling instability. South America is also impacted, for example in Peru where the government’s response to illegal ASGM initially saw success in 2019 but has faced sustainability challenges, and environmental impact.

ASGM growth is driven by the rising value of gold, youth unemployment, weak law enforcement, climate impacts, and conflict. While formalization offers significant economic potential, robust international cooperation and industry commitment is required to address the human toll, environmental impact and support sustainable practices.

In this panel discussion, experts will focus on addressing the expansion of illicit control and exploitation within ASGM, highlighting the pathways for governments and large-scale mining companies to drive meaningful change.

This event is hosted in partnership with the World Gold Council. There will be a reception with light refreshments hosted at Chatham House following the event.

This event will be livestreamed via the Africa Programme Facebook page.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

America chooses a new role in the world Expert comment jon.wallace 6 November 2024

Donald Trump’s election victory will bring immediate costs for US allies, says Bronwen Maddox, and will remake the map of American partnership.

As a second Trump presidency became a certainty, countries around the world were racing to forge relationships with him and calculate the likely impacts – which could come within weeks of his inauguration. 

One Japanese official spoke for the mood in many capitals in saying ‘we have learned to respond to new American presidents as we would to a Christmas present – you open it, and whatever is inside, you say “That is exactly what I wanted!”’

In the case of Trump, that sentiment is most straightforward in Moscow, where President Vladimir Putin’s supporters were exultant. In Europe, especially the UK, and among the US’s Indo-Pacific allies, the calculation is more complicated. They are trying to work out their response based on remarks Trump has made, knowing that unpredictability and inconsistency were the hallmarks of his first presidency and may be of his second. 

Tariffs

The most immediate global impact is likely to come through the tariffs which Trump has vowed to impose on goods from China – and other countries too. Tariffs will not decouple the US and Chinese economies but could sharply check trade in electric vehicles and other imports. 

They could also undermine global economic growth: economists have warned – with no apparent effect on the Trump campaign – of the inflationary effect tariffs will have and the consequent upwards pressure on interest rates and the dollar.

A similar effect would apply to European countries. This will depend on the tariffs chosen and whether a Trump administration seeks actively to discourage Europe’s still relatively open economy from trade with China. 

Given that many European governments are struggling to get economic growth at all, this would be a significant new blow. 

Ukraine

In his victory speech Trump repeated a point of which he is immensely proud: that in his terms, there were ‘no new wars’ during his first administration.

He also said that while he wanted strong US armed forces, he preferred not to use them. He has publicly made much of his desire to end conflicts in Ukraine and in the Middle East and has boasted of his ability to strike ‘deals’ to that end. 

The key question is if and how Trump will push for a cessation of fighting in Ukraine. If he seeks to freeze the conflict along the current frontline, there will be little to protect Ukraine – or Europe – from further Russian aggression in the future unless the US pledges to block that. The US could offer Kyiv explicit security guarantees, although NATO membership remains a distant prospect.

A direct security pledge from Washington is more realistic, but it remains to be seen whether that would be sufficient to convince Ukraine to stop fighting. Ukrainian leadership and people regard the war as existential and any surrender of territory to Russian control, even if it were not formalized, may yet prove an impossible barrier in negotiations.

Nor is it obvious how Trump could secure an agreement with Putin worth the name. He has prided himself on his relationship with the Russian leader, and Russian disinformation campaigns appeared to weigh in on his side. But Russia has broken agreements before. 

It would be a more plausible deal if backed by China – but that would require Trump to deal with a regime he appears to regard as the US’s primary threat. 

Middle East

Trump could make the conflict in the region much worse – or just possibly, open a route to stability. He has consistently sided with Israel, but his relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been mixed. 

There is no doubt that Netanyahu hoped for a Trump victory. Were Trump to clearly side with the prime minister and those in his cabinet who have no intention of granting a state to the Palestinians, it would represent an inflammatory step. 

Elements of Israeli society would see this as the opportunity to annex the West Bank and seek control or partial reoccupation of Gaza, hoping to give Palestinians every incentive to leave those areas for neighbouring countries. Netanyahu may also be encouraged to strike further at Iran.

On the other hand, Trump appears to mean what he says about shutting down conflicts, even if only out of concern for US interests. Netanyahu may come under pressure to stop bombing southern Lebanon and to reach some deal in Gaza with Hamas, including the release of the hostages. 

A more hopeful route lies in Trump’s pride in the Abraham Accords, a signature achievement of his first term that normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco. 

The great prize still dangling in front of Israel is the possibility of normalization with Saudi Arabia. That would allow Trump to claim he had brought peace to the Middle East. But that will remain impossible for Riyadh without Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state. 

The UK

There are no grounds to believe this will be an easy relationship for the UK to manage.

Sir Keir Starmer was quick to congratulate Trump, pointedly including the phrase ‘special relationship’ and referring to cooperation on technology and security. But his new UK government, which has prioritized growth, will be acutely aware of the tariff threat. 

Foreign Secretary David Lammy has put in the air miles getting to know the Republicans around Trump, but his comments denouncing the president elect before Labour’s own election victory may well sour the mood. So too will reports of Labour supporters organizing to support Democrat campaigning.  

Chancellor Rachel Reeves is expected to visit China early in the new year. She will have to decide by then the UK’s position on whether to import cheap Chinese solar panels and electric vehicles. Trump’s victory will not make this decision easier.

Climate

Trump and Harris offered starkly different environmental visions. Trump’s commitment to pursue cheap US oil and gas is fashioned with voters at home in mind, and will remove the US further from global climate talks. 

The election shows that Trumpism is here to stay Expert comment rgold.drupal 7 November 2024

World leaders must engage with the new president’s view of America’s priorities and accept that the US has changed.

In a landslide victory, former President Donald Trump has been elected to be the 47th president of the United States. This election was laden with the expectation that a dead heat would lead to delay, legal challenge, extremism, and possible violence. It has instead passed quickly, decisively, and peacefully.  More than 67 million Americans who voted for Kamala Harris have demonstrated restraint and accepted the result. By this measure, democracy in the United States has prevailed. 

Across Asia and Latin America, leaders have been preparing for a second Trump term. They are pragmatic and resolute in their belief that they can work with the once and 

also future US president. In Europe, leaders have been less certain. They have oscillated between two approaches. The first, of ‘Trump-proofing’ – an instinct if not a strategy  that builds on the quest for strategic autonomy, championed by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron. The second, a calculation by some, not least the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, that they can present themselves as top-tier partners to the US in a new approach to transatlantic security. 

Trumpism is not an aberration

For eight years, world leaders and foreign policy experts have been debating whether President Trump was the cause of a radical change in the US, or merely a symptom of powerful trends in the American body politic: rising inequality, a loss of manufacturing jobs – a demographic defined by white male non-college-educated voters who feel left behind – a deeply engrained anti-elitism, and a society in desperate need of a new kind of political leadership. 

In Trump’s first term, many leaders acted on the basis that he was an aberration, not a symptom. That meant that foreign leaders assumed his policies might disappear with his future electoral defeat, and short-term strategies designed to ‘work around’ Trump were a good bet. 

The next US president would return to a familiar agenda (free trade, market access, strong alliances, a commitment to climate action, extended nuclear deterrence and deepening transatlantic ties) and so America’s friends could wait this out. Indeed, civil servants frequently pointed to the strength of bilateral working relations, despite an often disruptive high-level political style. 

President Joe Biden’s commitment to multilateralism, the transatlantic partnership and Ukraine seemed to confirm the view that Trump’s policies were an anomaly and that America had reverted to normal. Gradually, though, Biden’s policies began to chip away at this assumption. He continued Trump’s tariffs, executed a reckless and unilateral exit from Afghanistan with little consultation, and pushed through a transformative but also protectionist climate investment bill in the Inflation Reduction Act. 

Fast forward to this election result. A stunning – many would say shocking – victory must put to rest any assumption that Trump is an aberration. It may have started that way, but today it appears there is no going back. The world is now confronted with a president that has had time to sharpen and hone his instincts, to prioritise loyalty in appointing a close circle of advisers, and to lay the foundation for his Vice President JD Vance to carry forward his vision once his second term ends. 

First moves

What will Trump do first? Several things are in store: A sharp immigration policy including deportations is likely to be top of Team Trump’s agenda in its first 100 days. This may prove to be inflationary – deporting millions of undocumented migrants would shrink the labour supply – but that is unlikely to restrain Trump in the short-term. A 2.0 version of his so-called ‘Muslim ban’ could also feature. And immigrants will continue to take a hit rhetorically, labelled as outsiders and as criminals. 

The punishment for noncompliance could also be harsh. If Mexico does not demonstrate its willingness to cooperate, retaliation might take the form of tariffs, or a tough review or even renegotiation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in 2026. 

The return to tariffs as the front line of trade policy  is virtually certain. Trump has telegraphed this for months. China can expect far harsher tariffs. What is more difficult to discern is whether these will be a bargaining tool with conditions attached, or a ratcheting up towards a new level of protectionism. 

For Asia, there is grave uncertainty. No one can be sure what Trump’s strategy will be towards Taiwan. Investment in the latticework of mutually-reinforcing partnerships across the region may take a back seat. But how Trump will manage North Korea’s nuclear threat is unclear. So too is the question of whether under his watch, US nuclear deterrence will continue to provide enough assurance to prevent South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons. 

Still, it is Europe that is likely to face the sharpest edge of Trump’s second term. Tariffs in search of reciprocal market access and reducing America’s trade deficit with Europe are more likely than not. But it will be the existential and enduring shift in America’s commitment to Europe and its security that will hit hardest. 

Independent Thinking: What does Donald Trump’s re-election mean for the world? Audio john.pollock 8 November 2024

Edward Luce, Leslie Vinjamuri and Gerald Seib join the podcast this week to discuss Donald Trump’s victory over Kamala Harris in the US presidential election.

On this episode

Donald Trump has decisively defeated Kamala Harris in the US presidential election. What does his return to the White House mean for America and the world? 

Bronwen Maddox is joined by Edward Luce, the FT’s North America editor, Gerald Seib, the former Washington bureau chief of The Wall Street Journal and Leslie Vinjamuri, the head of our US and Americas programme.

About Independent Thinking

Independent Thinking is a weekly international affairs podcast hosted by our director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

More ways to listen: Apple Podcasts, Spotify.

Members' question time: What has COP29 achieved? 25 November 2024 — 1:00PM TO 1:45PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 November 2024 Online

Join us and ask our senior research fellow, Ruth Townend anything about the outcome from COP29. Submit your questions in advance.

As COP29 prepares to conclude in Baku, Azerbaijan, this year’s conference has taken place against a backdrop of ever worsening climate impacts and escalating financial needs for developing countries. Being hosted by Azerbaijan has been significant, a country whose economy is heavily reliant on fossil fuels. As delegates and officials prepare to leave, the urgency for global climate action intensifies.

Join us as Ruth Townend, our Senior Research Fellow for the Environment and Society Centre to provide the latest insight and analysis from COP. She will give an overview of the key developments from Baku, new global commitments that have been agreed and how this sets up COP 30 in Brazil in 2025.

Submit your questions to Ruth Townend in advance of the event. Your questions will drive the conversation.

Trump and his growing number of European allies threaten the European project Expert comment LToremark 8 November 2024

With Trump in the White House, a key challenge for Europe will be the growing transatlantic illiberal ties which risk undermining European unity.

As the US presidential election result became clear, European leaders followed a similar formula when congratulating President-elect Trump. They offered their congratulations, mentioned previous good working relations with the US (special points for a nod to long-standing relations), and – most importantly – emphasized the need for this to continue for the benefit of the citizens of both their country and the US.

The formula was a telling sign of the political bartering most European heads of state expect with Trump back in the White House. The exception, of course, were Trump’s European allies who were simply ecstatic.

Transatlantic illiberalism

Trump’s growing number of European allies and the increase of illiberalism and populism is perhaps the most worrying development for Europe. In 2016, some of Trump’s counterparts in Europe were Angela Merkel in Germany, Emmanuel Macron in France, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, and Giuseppe Conte in Italy. Regardless of their record, they were moderates.

The picture looks very different today. Anti-war extremist parties Alternative for Germany and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance are on the rise in Germany. In France, pro-Russia Marine le Pen has been able to reduce support for Ukraine from €3 billion to €2 billion in the draft French budget. In the Netherlands, the far-right Freedom Party is the biggest coalition partner. In Italy, Prime Minister Georgia Meloni hails from a neo-fascist party. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s populist and illiberal playbook is being replicated across Europe. 

Meanwhile in Poland, moderate prime minister, Donald Tusk, is experiencing the difficulties of reversing damage done by the previous populist government.

What European populist leaders have in common is a deep-seated scepticism of the EU and a desire to erode it from within. And many of these leaders also welcome the return of Trump.

It is no coincidence that Orbán scheduled the European Political Community Summit, hosted by Hungary, to take place just days after the US election. The Trump win was an added bonus. This meant European heads of state travelled to Budapest for the summit still reeling from – or rejoicing at – the election result. 

Orbán would like to position himself as Trump’s man in Europe. He has spent the past four years building ties with the president-elect and the MAGA wing of the Republican party. Trump even namechecked Orbán – a Eurosceptic Putin-supporter – during the presidential debate.

Italy’s Meloni, meanwhile, has so far worked with EU institutions and NATO rather than against them: she has supported EU and NATO resolutions for Ukraine and demonstrated opposition to Russia. But this may have been a strategic calculation. She likely looked at her country’s balance sheet and realized she needed the European Commission’s COVID-19 recovery funds. 

But with the fund coming to an end and given her history of Euroscepticism and pro-Russian views, the transatlantic illiberal ties mean she may now feel emboldened to revise her positions. She is already deploying the illiberal playbook domestically.

Policy implications for Europe of a second Trump term 

Despite some ideological similarities, Trump’s policies will not be good for his European allies. He has threatened to impose 10 to 20 per cent tariffs on all EU imports. For Italy and the Netherlands, the second and fifth largest EU exporters to the US, this would have direct negative impacts on their economies.

Increased tariffs on Chinese goods – Trump has threatened up to 60 per cent – would also have an impact on Europe’s economies. Rerouting of Chinese goods could see China dump overproduction in Europe, one of the few remaining relatively open markets, and make European products compete with cheaper Chinese goods in Europe and on the global market. 

Neither of these developments are positive for export-led European countries. In France, the EU’s fourth largest exporter to the US, Marine le Pen – previously a strong supporter of Trump – had a notably muted response to his victory due to concerns over a trade war.

Even European leaders who might have hoped for a different election outcome may seek to hedge their bets. There are two things that are clear about Trump: he is unpredictable and transactional. 

It is quite possible that some European states, in particular frontline states with genuine fears over Russia’s imperialist ambitions, will seek to buy Trump’s support through bilateral arms deals – despite their distaste for Trump’s position vis-à-vis Russia. These countries already have some of the highest defence spending in NATO, with Poland, Estonia and Latvia leading the way, so this will not irk Trump – arms deals would simply be an additional insurance premium.

Countries rushing to make bilateral deals with the US risks a similar uncoordinated race for American arms deals as during Trump’s first term. This would in turn undermine much-needed European defence industrial cooperation efforts. As the need to reduce dependencies on third countries – even for defence equipment from historically close allies – has become increasingly clear, this would be a problematic development.

The silver lining may be that it could galvanize the UK and the EU just enough to take action on UK-EU security and defence cooperation, of which the defence industrial piece is the most essential.

Europe disunited

The transatlantic link between populist, illiberal leaders should be a concern. Trump is no longer isolated in Europe, he is rapidly accumulating allies among European heads of state. These leaders agree on the perceived existential threat posed by migration, the need for so-called ‘traditional family values’ and ‘anti-wokeism’. But beyond that, they share and want to advance an illiberal view of the world, with ramifications from security and global trade to human rights – and directly threatening the European project.