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This powerful, quiet, exhaust-free generator is almost 55% off ahead of Black Friday




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Shocking Murray looks to Africa

Reggae artiste and TikToker Shocking Murray says he is both eager and excited about the prospect of touring Africa early next year to promote his recently released EP, Unchained. "I'll never forget the first time I toured Africa; it was in 2022...




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Malawi’s Re-Run Election is Lesson for African Opposition

1 July 2020

Fergus Kell

Projects Assistant, Africa Programme
The overturning of the result in the fresh presidential contest sets a bold precedent for the continent, as a process built upon the resilience of democratic institutions and the collective spirit of opposition.

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Lazarus Chakwera, leader of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) arriving at the Mtandire suburb of the capital Lilongwe for an election rally. Photo by AMOS GUMULIRA/AFP via Getty Images.

Malawi is only the second African country to annul a presidential election, after Kenya in 2017. It is the first in which the opposition has won the re-run.

The initial May 2019 vote had narrowly returned incumbent Peter Mutharika to the presidency. But in February 2020 a landmark ruling by Malawi’s constitutional court annulled the result citing ‘widespread, systematic and grave’ irregularities, including the now-infamous use of corrective fluid in vote tallying, and the Malawi Electoral Commission’s (MEC) failure to address complaints before announcing results. New elections were ordered within 150 days.

In a decisive contrast with the previous year, the fresh polls on 23 June saw the coming together of Lazarus Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and running mate Saulos Chilima of the United Transformation Movement (UTM) to head a coalition of nine opposition parties - having fiercely competed as the leading challengers previously.

The constitutional court ruling had also changed Malawi’s electoral system, replacing a first-past-the-post model with one demanding an outright majority, which further encouraged the regional power bases of Malawi’s opposition to cast ego aside and work in alliance with each other.

In tandem with a slick digital campaign, the new alliance travelled widely to hold rallies across what is one of the world’s youngest countries, while the elderly Mutharika remained largely confined to the capital. It would be a strategy that ultimately delivered Chakwera to the presidency, polling 58 per cent of votes to Mutharika’s 39.

Political opposition elsewhere in Africa should take note from Malawi’s coalition - dialogue, not division, can offer a genuine path to change, especially in those countries with less favourable institutional conditions. Neighbouring Zambia would certainly do well to heed this example ahead of a pivotal election of its own in 2021.

A victory built on institutional precedent

Yet the story here is not only about throwing out an incumbent: Malawians had already done so twice before, rejecting sitting presidents at the polls in 1994 and 2014. It is also not unfamiliar to see public opinion and the judiciary work in parallel to uphold the constitution: former president Bakili Muluzi was twice blocked from abolishing term limits by popular demonstration during his second term, and again prevented from running for a third time in 2009 by the constitutional court.

The new result did not arise as the foregone conclusion of a judicial miracle. Rather, throughout the re-run process Malawi has had to repeatedly draw upon the strength of its broad-based institutional foundations. The image of the constitutional court judges arriving to deliver their annulment verdict in February wearing bulletproof vests under their robes was a stark reminder that this was never the easy route to take.

In contrast to many other African states, Mutharika was unable to call upon military support as the Malawi Defence Forces (MDF) had moved to shield protesting citizens and protect the judiciary since the 2019 election. The MDF also had previous form in this respect, having defended then-vice president Joyce Banda’s constitutional right to assume the presidency after the incumbent’s death in 2012.

And this institutional resilience from the army would facilitate a smooth and mostly peaceful election process during the re-run, despite Mutharika attempts to intervene by replacing the MDF’s commander and his deputy in March 2020.

Just ten days before the fresh vote the Mutharika government switched focus back to the country’s legal system by attempting to enforce the premature retirement of Malawi’s chief justice, only to be blocked by the high court. Even as unofficial tallies trickled in, Mutharika’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) demanded the MEC annul the result: claiming their monitors were intimidated in MCP strongholds, and requesting unlawful access to scrutinise null and void votes.

Headed by a new chairperson, this time the MEC displayed enormous patience in the verification process and openly tackled complaints, now mainly from the DPP. On social media, Malawians celebrated the contrast between images of tally sheets from 2019 and the re-run.

Writing a new chapter

There are lessons here too for international partners. UK diplomacy played a subtle role in encouraging Mutharika to accept the legal process - he was invited to appear at the UK-Africa Investment Summit in January - while also helping promoting early dialogue among opposition parties.

At a time of pressure for UK engagement to offer clear strategic value, the impact of less easily quantifiable forms of influence should not be overlooked, especially as international observer missions effectively went missing in the discredited 2019 election. Preliminary statements back then from the Commonwealth, European Union, African Union and Southern African Development Community (SADC) struck a mostly congratulatory tone and were non-committal on the issues that would prove decisive in the court ruling. None went on to release their final reports.

Malawi must now start to move beyond election mode. Though COVID-19 cases remain low by global standards, a budget already heavily dependent on foreign aid and hampered by 18 months of political uncertainty will be slashed further by the pandemic’s impact. The IMF has predicted GDP growth of just 1% in 2020, down from a pre-coronavirus projection of 5%.

As it inherits a major balance of payments crisis, mounting debt and with no tourism revenue to fall back on, the new government will need to use its political capital to push for immediate reform. But it must not forget the core tenet of its campaign. The coalition that defeated Mutharika united the MCP’s rural support base with the middle-class urban following of the UTM. This spirit of unity and inclusion must be expanded and focus on long-term recovery. On this undertaking – unlike the polls – there will be no opportunity for a re-run.




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Chatham House History: Five Key Moments on Africa

9 July 2020

Christopher Vandome

Research Fellow, Africa Programme
To mark the centenary of Chatham House, the Africa programme curated an exhibition of archive material which charts how the institute has been both a major forum for discussion on Africa, and an important platform for African leaders to engage in international affairs.

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President Nelson Mandela of South Africa addresses an audience at an event co-hosted by Chatham House, the CBI and COSAT on July 10, 1996.

As with any history, Chatham House has a long and complex one. Progress has come in fits and starts, sometimes driven by wider social change, but often led by individuals within the institute. When examining the institute's work on Africa, five seminal moments from the history really stood out.

The Founders

Lionel Curtis is credited as the founder of the institute, having proposed the idea at a meeting at the Hotel Majestic while attending the Treaty of Versailles talks.

Curtis served in South Africa during the Second Boer war and subsequent period of unification. He was one of the cohort of officials that served under Lord Milner, later dubbed ‘Milner’s Kindergarten’. Several of this group were involved in the foundation of the institute.

A Century of Supporting African Engagement in International Affairs

A short presentation highlighting how Chatham House has been both a major forum for discussion on Africa, and an important platform for African leaders.

His experiences in South Africa undoubtedly informed his political philosophy - a strong belief in liberal imperialism. This is captured in the emblems of empire inlaid into the roundtable which is still in the Chatham House library, given to Curtis as a wedding gift.

But more importantly than his political philosophy, Curtis was an astute social networker and fundraiser who unlocked the finance required to establish the institute. Curtis’s papers in the Chatham House archives depict his almost obsessive following of the career of the South African diamond tycoon Sir Abe Bailey that eventually led to the first significant endowment to the institute - after the building. South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, a friend of Curtis and early champion of the institute, spoke at a dinner in honour of Bailey’s contribution.

Curtis’s connections meant much of the early finance came from South Africa, including from Otto Beit and Percy Molteno, who was also an early financer of the African National Congress (ANC).

Hailey’s Africa Survey

In 1938, Chatham House published Lord Hailey’s monumental Africa Survey. Its detailed 1,837 pages of study came to represent a seismic shift in attitudes towards the continent. Lord Lothian’s foreword emphasises that it grew from an idea of Smuts from 1929, although these origins remain disputed.

What is known is that Oxford University had submitted a proposal for a study of the continent to an American foundation which rejected it on the grounds that they didn’t want American money to be used to expand Smut’s doctrine of dominion. The group then merged their own plan into an emerging study by progressive missionary Joseph Oldham.

Curtis brought in his friend Lord Hailey to lead the initiative. Hailey was a distinguished civil servant who served in India but never in Africa. The project moved to Chatham House and received a substantial grant from the Carnegie Foundation. Having been originally conceived as a study to reinforce segregationist ideas, the final survey was groundbreaking. Its underlying assumption of basic racial equality debunked the premises of segregation and re-set British attitudes towards Africa.

This shift in mindset was hugely significant at the time, but the work would later be criticized for not including any African voices. And, despite carrying his name, Lord Lothian wrote very little of the text. He fell ill, in part due to the pressure of the four-year project, and the work was largely written by notable Africanists Lucy Mair, Charlotte Leubuscher, and Margery Perham. The Africa Survey was updated and reprinted in 1956, including a pull-out map depicting newly-independent Sudan. A sign of real change.

Independence and National Liberation

The 1960s was a decade of transformation both on the continent and at Chatham House. The institute became an important conduit for newly-independent African states to engage in international affairs, hosting several independence presidents, including Prime Minister Modibo Keita of Mali, President Léopold Senghor of Senegal, and President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Many of these speeches were republished in the Institute’s journal, International Affairs.

In January 1962, the Nigerian government invited Chatham House to host a conference in Lagos on the external international relations of the newly-independent African states. But it wasn’t just presidents that were offered a platform. Liberation leaders were also invited to speak as well as conduct research.

African Liberation – The Historical and Contemporary Significance of Re-discovered Nationalist Speeches at Chatham House of Dr Eduardo Mondlane and Oliver Tambo

Two speeches at Chatham House in 1968 and 1985 by African nationalist leaders Dr Eduardo Mondlane and Oliver Tambo at key moments of their liberation struggle for majority rule are re-examined for their significance.

Dr Bernard Chidzero, a later finance minister in independent Zimbabwe, wrote on African nationalism in International Affairs in 1960, and conducted a multi-year study at the institute resulting in the publication of a book. In 1968, Eduardo Mondlane, founding president of FRELIMO, made an important speech on the nationalist fight for independence in Mozambique.

In 1961, Kenneth Younger, a new director of the institute, increased its research capacity on Africa through significant new hires. Catherine Hoskyns’s 1965 book on the Congo crisis became the seminal study on the topic. Dennis Austin, who had experience in West Africa, wrote the definitive work on Ghana’s transition to independence in 1964.

African Institutes

Chatham House has also been involved in the establishment of think-tanks across the world, including three in Africa.

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) was founded in 1934, in response to proposals made by Chatham House the previous year at the inaugural British Commonwealth Relations Conference. An East African Institute of International Affairs was also established in Nairobi but did not survive. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) was formed in 1961 in Lagos. Its founding director general Dr L A Fabunmi, said ‘the main task of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs will be to create, develop, and sustain an African perspective in world affairs’.

Chatham House has maintained a good working relationship with its sister institutes. In 2005 a special edition of International Affairs was launched at NIIA, the first time in the journal’s history it was launched outside the UK. And SAIIA staff and leaders are regular contributors to Chatham House events and research, including a partnership on the study of Central and Eastern European relations with Africa.

The Africa Programme

Created in 2002. this was the first time Chatham House had a dedicated research team working on Africa, producing a sustained and balanced assessment of events on the continent. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, work on Africa had been conducted by regionally-focused study groups, and the personal interests of the director for studies, Dr Jack Spence – a leading authority on South African foreign policy. An earlier attempt to create a more formal programme in the late 1990s fell victim to staff turnover.

In 1998, the British Angola Forum (BAF) was formed and found a home at Chatham House. It marked a departure from the institute’s focus on post-colonial 'Anglophone Africa'. At the end of Angola's civil war in 2002, under the leadership of Dr Alex Vines, the BAF morphed into a continent-wide programme.

Since then, the Africa Programme has produced more than 160 original research publications, and organizes between 120-140 events on Africa every year. The Africa Programme is marking the centenary of the institute with a major research theme on Foreign Relations and African Agency in International Relations.

Chatham House’s work on Africa has its roots in the liberal imperialism of the post war leaders. But throughout the last 100 years, it has been a platform for progress, playing a vital role in informing policymakers and facilitating debate on African affairs, as well as highlighting African perspectives on global issues.

The exhibition on the History of Africa at Chatham House was first displayed at the world-renowned fine art auctioneers and valuers Bonham’s in London for a reception in February 2020 marking the centenary of the Institute. It was curated by Christopher Vandome with the assistance of the Chatham House Library, and digitized with the help of the Institute’s communications department. Please contact the Library team for further information regarding the archive.

Chatham House Centenary:
Throughout our centenary year in 2020, Chatham House marks a century of influence, independent analysis and trusted dialogue with a number of exciting initiatives. Throughout the year, we explore key political moments from the institute's history and reflect on how Chatham House and other think-tanks should approach the future.




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Africa Aware: Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan

Africa Aware: Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan Audio bhorton.drupal 9 April 2022

This episode of Africa Aware examines the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ahmed Soliman provides an overview of the Africa Programme’s work on cross-border conflict as part of the XCEPT project.

First, we speak to Kholood Khair on the steady deterioration in relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Then Abel Abate Demissie discusses how recent political developments in Ethiopia and Sudan have impacted relations between the two countries.

This podcast was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) project, funded by UK Aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.

It is also part of a series of outputs on Ethiopia’s political transition.




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Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for urban energy solutions and job creation

Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for urban energy solutions and job creation 9 June 2022 — 7:30AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 May 2022 Nairobi and online

This event explores the major openings and potential impediments to the development of a just transition policy in Africa.

Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should also align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities. In particular, the need for decent and fair job creation and the establishment of sufficient, resilient and sustainable power supply, accessible to all, and efficient energy use.

Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. Ahead of the ‘African COP27’ set to take place in Egypt in November 2022, there is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

Sustainable urban energy solutions represent a critical zone of opportunity for the development of new and more reliable green finance pathways. Africa’s rapidly expanding cities present a significant economic opportunity and source of growth. However, urban centres are also where income and energy inequalities are at their starkest. The acceleration of sustainable energy generation and use could have a transformative impact on SMEs and livelihoods across value chains.

At this event, participants will discuss the major openings and potential impediments to the development of a credible ‘just transition’ policy in Africa towards net zero goals, with a particular focus on establishing and enhancing links between green financing innovation, employment creation, sustainable power supply and generation, and sustainable energy usage and consumption in an urban environment.

This event is held in partnership with the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA). It is part of a series on Towards Just Transition: Connecting Green Financing and Sustainable Job Creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator.

This event will be held in English and French with simultaneous interpretation.

 




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War in Ukraine: The world reaction - Brazil and Africa

War in Ukraine: The world reaction - Brazil and Africa Audio NCapeling 9 June 2022

The ninth episode of our podcast mini-series examines perspectives from Brazil and the Africa region and the impact on their relations with Russia.

How have Brazil and Africa reacted to the war in Ukraine? With impending elections in Brazil, how is President Bolsonaro’s relationship with Putin received by the public? How will food insecurity affect African nations’ response to the war?

This episode was produced by David Dargahi and Anouk Millet of Earshot Strategies on behalf of Chatham House.




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How is the war in Ukraine affecting perceptions of Russia in Africa?

How is the war in Ukraine affecting perceptions of Russia in Africa? Explainer Video NCapeling 10 June 2022

Aanu Adeoye outlines how the invasion of Ukraine is affecting perceptions of Russia across the Africa region.

He says the voting patterns at the United Nations (UN) shows that the majority of African countries are unhappy about Russia’s actions, but there is not a united voice as there is in the European Union (EU) and North America.

Certain countries are heavily influenced by historical ties with Russia going back to the Soviet era and their own struggles for liberation, while others tend to remain non-aligned whenever possible.




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Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for nature-based solutions and rural resilience

Towards just transition in Africa: Green financing for nature-based solutions and rural resilience 21 July 2022 — 9:30AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 June 2022 Libreville and online

This hybrid event in Libreville explores just transition policy and green financing for nature-based solutions, with a particular focus on the integration of job creation priorities in conservation and rural resilience.

Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities – in particular, the need for decent and fair job creation, as well as resilient and sustainable land, environment, and ecosystem management policies.

Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. Ahead of the ‘African COP27’ set to take place in Egypt in November 2022, there is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

Preservation of biodiversity and nature is not only critical in the global fight against climate change but is also vital for conservation-based economic development. Natural capital stocks, such as terrestrial and marine ecosystems and biodiversity, produce benefits that support societal and individual well-being and economic prosperity, such as clean air, fresh water, regulation of water flows and pollination of crops – while also acting as important carbon sinks. Financing environmental protection must go beyond compensation and contribute to creating fair social and economic conditions for incentivizing conservation.

At this hybrid event in Libreville, participants will discuss green financing for nature-based solutions, particularly the integration of plans for job creation in conservation and rural resilience within just transition planning.

This event is part of a series on Towards Just Transition: Connecting Green Financing and Sustainable Job Creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator.

This event will be held in French and English with simultaneous interpretation.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.




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Will Africans’ calls for better democracy be met?

Will Africans’ calls for better democracy be met? The World Today mhiggins.drupal 29 July 2022

Voters want the continent’s ageing leaders to step aside to usher in a new age of political engagement and robust democracy, say the experts of Afrobarometer.

Across Africa, recent years have been marked by both encouraging democratic highs and troubling anti-democratic lows. Notable advances from last year include the Gambia’s successful presidential election, a ruling-party transition in Zambia and the first democratic transfer of power in Niger. In the lead up to this, add Malawi’s retake of its flawed presidential election in 2020 and an earlier succession of oustings of long-serving autocrats in Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Gambia. 

Contrast these gains, though, with setbacks elsewhere, including increasing restrictions on opposition parties in Benin, Senegal and Tanzania; the use of violence and intimidation during elections in Côte d’Ivoire and Uganda; and military coups, with the latest in Burkina Faso this year and last year in Chad, Mali, Sudan and Guinea.


These contradictory developments join dire warnings from experts that democracy is losing ground on the continent. But what can we learn about the state of democracy on the continent from Africans themselves?

Afrobarometer, a pan-African, non-partisan research network, has been surveying people about their views on democracy, governance and quality of life for more than 20 years. After interviewing nearly 50,000 citizens across 34 countries during Afrobarometer Round 8, which spans 2019-2021, we find that despite the efforts of some leaders to undermine democratic norms, Africans remain committed to democracy and democratic institutions.

They believe that the military should stay out of politics, that political parties should freely compete for power, that elections are an imperfect but essential tool for choosing their leaders, and that it is time for the old men who cling to power to step aside.

But their political reality falls short of these expectations. The perception of widespread and worsening corruption is particularly corrosive, leaving people increasingly dissatisfied with political systems that are yet to deliver on their aspirations to live in societies that are democratically and accountably governed. And although citizens find myriad ways to voice their concerns, they feel that their governments are not listening.

Simply put, Africans want more democratic and accountable governance than they think they are getting.

Africans’ democratic aspirations

Over the past decade, democracy watchers have been alarmed by declining trends in Africa. Concerns have been exacerbated in the past two years as some governments have taken advantage of the Covid pandemic to limit freedoms, restrict fair campaigning or postpone elections. Activists fear that supposedly temporary rollbacks in hard-won governance reforms could become permanent.

But for the most part, African citizens remain committed to democracy and democratic institutions. Across 30 countries that Afrobarometer has surveyed consistently since Round 5 (2011–2013), most indicators are strong and quite steady.


For example, seven in 10 Africans say that ‘democracy is preferable to any other kind of government’. While this is down modestly from 73 per cent a decade ago, more specific indicators seem to affirm popular commitment to democracy. Large and steady majorities consistently reject authoritarian alternatives, including one-person or ‘strongman’ rule (82 per cent), one-party rule (77 per cent) and military rule (75 per cent), which is clearly rejected even in many of the countries rocked by recent military coups.

Africans also express strong support for a limit to presidential terms, a feature of democratic governance that researchers and activists argue nurtures political participation, demonstrates that change via the ballot box is possible, and reduces the risk of personality cults, authoritarianism, corruption and coups. Across 34 countries, an average of 76 per cent favour limiting their presidents to two terms, including a majority (54 per cent) who ‘strongly’ support this rule. Term limits enjoy majority support in every surveyed country. 

The public’s democratic commitment is undergirded by strong and in some cases growing support for core democratic institutions. Support for multiparty competition and parliamentary oversight of leaders remains steady, while expectations that governments should be accountable to the courts have increased significantly over the past decade.

In addition, growing numbers of people say it is more important to have a government that is accountable to the people rather than one that just ‘gets things done’, an especially strong indicator of deepening commitment to democratic norms among citizens. 

Trouble at the polling booth

Elections remain a central, though controversial, institution of democracy for Africans. They have served as the foundation for real change, as in Zambia last year. But in other cases, such as Uganda’s January 2021 poll, they have been marred by violence and human rights abuses, as well as the weaponization of Covid to justify restrictions on campaigning.

The public is also sceptical about the capacity of elections to bring about real change: fully 50 per cent say they do not think elections are effective in enabling voters ‘to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want’.

At the same time, large majorities report positively on their country’s election environment. Asked about their most recent election, at least eight in 10 say they did not observe intimidation (87 per cent) or interference (81 per cent) by security forces and did not fear violence (80 per cent).

We must keep in mind that these encouraging averages can obscure deep problems in some countries. For example, while only 3 per cent of Namibians say votes are ‘often’ not counted fairly, between a quarter and one-third cite inaccurate counts as a frequent problem in Zimbabwe, Sudan and Gabon. 


In addition, confidence in the fairness of the media environment is drastically lower, on average just 36 per cent.

But perhaps most importantly, almost nine in 10 Africans (87 per cent) say they are free to vote as they choose, including sizeable majorities in every surveyed country. And a solid majority of 63 per cent rate their most recent election as completely or mostly free and fair. 

All of this may help to explain still-strong support for competitive elections as the best system for selecting leaders. A robust three-quarters confirm their commitment to elections, though this has fallen slightly over the past decade, probably reflecting disillusionment with electoral processes that are too often torn by violence and produce contested results. 

A growing number of people may also be recognizing that elections, especially poor-quality ones, are not enough to guarantee democracy and better governance, and that a healthy democracy must include such other features as government accountability, respect for the rule of law, responsiveness and citizen participation.

The ‘democratic disappointment’ gap

To what extent does political reality align with Africans’ democratic aspirations? Our findings suggest that it is falling well short of expectations.

While a slim majority has steadily reported that their country is a ‘full democracy’ or one ‘with minor problems’ over the past decade, satisfaction, however, has dropped to 43 per cent in that time. 

What explains this growing dissatisfaction? Other indicators of democratic supply offer some clues. While ratings of election quality have held steady, favourable public assessments of presidential accountability to parliament and to the courts have both declined.

The rising scourge of corruption

But one of the most significant driving factors may be burgeoning corruption, a trend that appears to parallel declining democratic satisfaction. On average across 34 countries, around six in 10 say both that corruption in their country increased over the past year, and that their government is doing a poor job of controlling it.

These perceptions matter. Over time, when perceptions of corruption rise or fall, levels of dissatisfaction with democracy tend to follow suit. 

In South Africa, dissatisfaction with democracy grew steadily alongside scandals involving President Jacob Zuma, and has continued to rise under his successor, Cyril Ramaphosa, whose office has been tainted by ‘Farmgate’ and a major Covid-relief scandal. The ‘Fishrot’ scandal in Namibia has had similar consequences.

Are governments listening?

African citizens are raising their voices, calling on their governments to fulfil their democratic aspirations. Since April 2017, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has recorded more than 70 episodes in 35 African countries of protests focused on issues ranging from demands for democracy in eSwatini to resisting police brutality, presidential third-term attempts and Covid restrictions. 

Citizen participation and government responsiveness are cornerstones of democracy. But are governments listening?

Voting is the most obvious and popular way for citizens to express themselves, and Africans take advantage of this opportunity. Two-thirds said they voted in their most recent national election. But elections occur only occasionally, and they force individuals to compress a wide array of views into very few choices. How do Africans find their voice during the long intervals between elections?

Many invest in personal efforts to act as agents of change. In fact, nearly half say they joined with others to raise an issue at least once in the past year, and a third contacted a political leader. A quarter report they acted with others to request government action. Less common but still important modes of engagement include asking for help from or lodging a complaint with government, contacting the media, and joining a demonstration.


These robust levels of citizen engagement suggest that people feel they can make a difference. Unfortunately, decision-makers aren’t always receptive or responsive to citizen voices. Less than a quarter of people think local government officials listen to them – and even fewer think their members of parliament do. 

What is more troubling is that fully two-thirds say they are at risk of retaliation or some form of negative consequences if they take action by reporting incidents of corruption. 

Lack of government responsiveness and respect for popular voices may have direct implications for both citizen engagement and citizen satisfaction. For example, we find that people are more likely to contact leaders or take other actions to solve problems if they believe that government officials respect and listen to them; that they will get a response if they raise an issue; and if they do not need to fear retaliation. 

Similarly, when we compare country averages for government responsiveness to the percentage of citizens who are satisfied with democracy, we again find positive associations. 

When governments are responsive, citizens are more likely to engage in addressing community needs and to be satisfied with their political system and optimistic about the future. Respectful and responsive governance has the potential to spur citizen action to solve critical development challenges – and may be the cure for what ails democracy.




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Now is the moment to launch an African vaccine industry

Now is the moment to launch an African vaccine industry The World Today mhiggins.drupal 31 July 2022

The continent plans to make 60 per cent of its vaccines by 2040. After the failure of the world to help in the pandemic, it’s high time, says Ngozi Erondu.

The lack of an African vaccine industry has been a glaring concern for decades. Before the pandemic, 99 per cent of Africa’s vaccines were manufactured outside the continent. As well as endangering the lives of millions, this situation has inhibited social and economic progress on the continent.

In response, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has undertaken an ambitious plan, outlined in the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) Framework for Action, to develop the nascent African vaccine manufacturing sector into an end-to-end industry by 2040. The framework aims to raise the share of African-manufactured vaccines used across the continent to 60 per cent by 2040, or the equivalent to up to 1.7 billion doses annually.

Seven of every 10 vaccines used in Africa are currently donated through Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Most are administered within childhood immunization programmes and are largely manufactured either in India, or by  multinational vaccine manufacturers in North America or Japan.

Vaccine donations have inhibited the development in Africa of vaccines and other countermeasures against diseases.


Though the Ebola virus was discovered in Central Africa in 1976, vaccine development was not adequately funded until it emerged in Europe in 2014. Human monkeypox resurfaced in Nigeria in 2017, yet the global Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations only targeted it for vaccine development in July this year.

The pandemic highlighted Africa’s fatal dependency on imported vaccines. Only 20 per cent of Africans are fully vaccinated against Covid-19, due to the failure of countries in the Global North to ensure the equitable distribution of vaccines via the COVAX facility to 40 per cent of the world’s most vulnerable people. 

The pandemic also confirmed that Africa could not rely on fellow states of the Global South. At the height of the Delta variant outbreak in early 2021, India halted vaccine exports to Africa, where only 1.5 per cent of the population had at that time received any vaccine doses.

After decades of discussions, there are signs that Africa could soon succeed in creating its own vaccine industry. First, the 55-member African Union is in the process of establishing the African Medicines Agency, a regional regulatory body. 
 

‘The new public health order’

Additionally, the African Export-Import Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB) have established a foundation to provide financial and strategic support for the development of the pharmaceutical industry and the consolidation of regional vaccination programmes in Africa (the foundation would potentially negotiate intellectual property rights and licensing issues but that remains to be seen).

Second, studies show there is an emerging middle class in Africa. In a 2011 report by the AfDB, this was estimated at some 56 million households. Potentially, this means many people will be able to buy vaccines and medicines made in Africa.

About a third of African countries currently pay for their vaccine needs. According to PAVM forecasts, the value of the total African market could reach between $3 billion and $17 billion by 2040.

The recent entry into effect of the African Continental Free Trade Area should also prove conducive to African vaccine development. Through economic integration, free movement and harmonized regional standards, countries that invest in their biopharmaceutical and medical technology sectors may attract employees, regional and international businesses, and investment. Further, the pandemic has encouraged people to relocate to countries with, or planning for, universal healthcare.

Building an African pharmaceutical industry from the ground up could take much longer than two decades and cost tens of billions of dollars. Nevertheless, the moment seems ripe, and timely support has been forthcoming from influential regional actors, including Rwandan President Paul Kagame, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, and private sector business executives, including the Zimbabwean-born billionaire Strive Masiyiwa.

With a pandemic treaty embedding equity in prevention, preparedness and response some way off, and given the limitations surrounding the recent World Trade Organization compromise on the TRIPS waiver – which temporarily waives Covid-19 vaccine patent protections for poorer countries – it is doubly important for Africa to build up its own pharmaceutical industry and emergency systems. 

With a pandemic treaty some way off, it is important for Africa to build up its own pharmaceutical industry 


In 2021, John Nkengasong, then director of Africa CDC, wrote of the necessity of a post-pandemic ‘new public health order’ for Africa. Such a change may threaten the global health organizations, industries and institutes who derive payment from ‘saving Africa’ during emergencies. Additionally, through strengthening Africa CDC, other actors such as the World Health Organization may find that they have a diminished strategic role on the continent.
 
While Africa should not dismiss these valuable and long-standing partnerships, it must take the opportunity to advance its interests and to assume leadership in this important area.




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A booming tech sector can unleash pan-African trade

A booming tech sector can unleash pan-African trade The World Today mhiggins.drupal 31 July 2022

The new African Continental Free Trade Area must embrace hyperscale data centres, cross-border digital payments and other innovations to realise its potential.

The Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) not only lays the groundwork for a single market across the continent, it can act as a driving force to unleash the full potential of the technology revolution that is under way across the African continent. 

To help achieve this, the AfCFTA must go beyond simply lowering barriers to the movement of goods and services, to what the World Bank calls an ‘FDI [foreign direct investment] deep scenario’. This requires harmonizing policies on investment, competition, intellectual property rights and e-commerce to encourage FDI at a greater scale. 


The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA could increase income across the continent by 7 per cent by 2035 (an additional $445 billion), mainly by boosting intra-regional trade in manufactured goods and lifting approximately 40 million people from extreme poverty. Under an FDI deep scenario, the projected income growth jumps to 9 per cent by 2035, supporting 50 million people out of extreme poverty. 

The initial focus of the AfCFTA is on movement of goods and services and the associated financial flows through the establishment of the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), a technology that enables instant local currency payment across Africa without first converting to a hard currency. In addition, harmonizing policies and easing the movement of data could enable technology to accelerate the anticipated AfCFTA income growth.

Global venture capital is pouring in

There is no doubt the African tech industry is growing. In 2021, 681 African technology companies raised $5.2 billion in equity venture funding, up from $2 billion in 2019, according to Partech Partners’ annual Africa Tech Venture Capital report. 

It is understandable why the industry has attracted global venture capital. While tech businesses are often initially focused on meeting needs in their home markets, most have a strong desire to tap into the pan-African market, with its 1.3 billion consumers across 54 countries and a combined GDP of $3.4 trillion. This in turn should attract global venture capital to invest in Africa. 


Regulatory constraints mean African data centres are less competitive than those in America and China


The AfCFTA has created a framework for technology-led companies to scale across the continent in a way that will impact digital infrastructure, logistics, energy and much else. For example, Africa’s hyperscale data centre capacity would benefit from the ability to locate centres in the lowest cost jurisdiction with the best energy availability and to use that to power cloud storage across the continent.

Yet various regulatory constraints, including the desire for each state to own its population’s data on local servers, prevent that. As a result, African data centres are less competitive than those in America and China. 

Similarly, logistics and other sectors would be transformed if the information on goods in transit, such as digital customs documentation, could move easily across borders while being tracked across all 54 countries. Financial services would also benefit from the ability to pay across borders in a low-cost, frictionless way.

Fintech companies should be encouraged to build technology solutions linking to PAPSS and other initiatives to accelerate the adoption-of-use cases that PAPSS supports – such as intra-Africa instant payment, embedded finance and remittances services.

AfCFTA may also unlock mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity among African and international firms. Technology companies are using M&A to enter new markets, as the international payments platform Stripe did when it acquired the Nigerian business Paystack, and the payments business MFS Africa did when it took over the fintech start-up Baxi. 

Governments and regulators must support innovation

Given the difficulty of a country-by-country organic growth strategy across Africa, M&A is likely to increase in various technology sectors over the next few years. With the anticipated ease of doing business that the AfCFTA could facilitate, we are likely to witness further welcome consolidation, creating larger corporates that create more jobs and increase tax revenues. 

To unlock the benefits that technology will bring, governments and regulators need to play a supportive role in encouraging innovation. They will need to ensure the appropriate consumer protections are in place without stifling creativity through regulation, inefficiencies or rent-seeking. 

At the same time, governments and regulators should not permit themselves to be held to ransom by dominant incumbents, such as banks and mobile operators in the fintech space, at the expense of stifling technology companies looking to disrupt their respective industries. 

Only then will the AfCFTA allow Africa to benefit from its tech potential. 

Risana Zitha writes this article in a personal capacity




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Why Africa needs to be in space

Why Africa needs to be in space The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

From agriculture and navigation to banking and tele-education, satellite technology can have a huge impact on rapidly developing societies, says Val Munsami.

Africa’s socio-economic and environmental development is widely acknowledged as being crucial to its growth and long-term sustainability – and the prosperity of its more than one billion residents. 

Increasingly, though, attention is also turning to the contribution that the space industry can make to progress on the continent. Space-based products and services have a critical role to play in meeting national and continental priorities, as underpinned by the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 – the bloc’s strategic framework for development, democracy and peace. 

With this in the mind of policymakers, the African Union’s space policy and strategy is embedded in Agenda 2063 as one of its 15 key programmes. It guides the sector’s development and the nascent African Space Agency, to become operational later this year from its headquarters in Egypt.


The continental agency is expected to leverage the benefits of space science and technology for socio-economic and environmental development. It will lead on bridging the space divide, especially for those countries that do not have a focus on, or activities in, space science and technology – and simultaneously inject some momentum into improving capabilities of existing national space programmes.

The African Union’s commitment to space has accelerated the growth of the African space industry. More than 20 national space agencies or space-related institutions have been established on the continent over the past five or so years. 

Our modern lifestyles are intimately dependent on space products and services. Meteorological and communication satellites are placed in geostationary orbits at an altitude of 36,000km above the equator. At this point above the Earth, they complete one orbit every 24 hours in the direction of the planet’s rotation, appearing, essentially, motionless – and providing a constant gaze on the same geographic location.

They provide a wealth of information that fuels the everyday services we take for granted, but that are essential for our everyday lives, from health to education to the economy.

From their vantage point, geostationary orbit satellites provide our daily weather reports, monitor climate-related cycles and offer a platform for near-instantaneous communications across the globe to relay multimedia, live sporting events and up-to-the-minute global news. 

This lightning-fast communication is also indispensable for tele-education and tele-medicine, by which professionals in urban areas can deliver educational content and health services to rural schools and clinics, respectively. Banking transactions also rely on telecommunication satellites to communicate between an automated teller machine and the data servers located at the bank. 

How satellites can detect disease

Other satellites are placed in low Earth orbits. These complete on average one polar orbit around the Earth every 100 minutes. Because the planet rotates across the plane of the orbit, such a satellite eventually covers the whole Earth, which is immensely useful for remote sensing and navigation and positioning applications. 

Remote sensing applications provide a myriad of products and services, including monitoring the state of our natural resources, observing ship traffic in our coastal economic zones and providing information for precision farming that can help a farmer decide, for example, when to irrigate and how much fertilizer to use.

They can also detect changes that might indicate encroaching water-borne diseases, aid peacekeeping missions and help ensure public safety and security. Navigation applications are vital for aviation and marine navigation, whereas positioning applications are important for safety-of-life services. 

The rich source of information derived from satellites is vital for evidence-based decision and policymaking

Another way that positioning applications in developing countries are put to good use is the assignment of geolocation addresses to dwellings in informal settlements where postbox addresses do not exist. This then allows the overlaying of key vector data about populations on to geophysical base maps. This type of data is vital for town planning in terms of how many schools and clinics are needed to serve the population, and the extent of the road, water, sanitation and electrical infrastructure needed.

The rich source of information derived from satellites, overlaid with in-situ data, is vital for evidence-based decision and policymaking. Datasets accessed from historical archives can be used to observe the time evolution of environmental and statistical data. 

When policy decisions are taken, we can utilize the same satellite and in-situ platforms to monitor progress after their implementation. The utility of data to inform decision-making is being enhanced through the adoption of AI and big-data analytics, which is placing key information at our disposal in near real time. 

It is therefore not surprising to notice the increasing focus on space science and technology activities on the continent. However, to ensure the effective uptake and utilization of space products and services, certain building blocks are needed to establish robust national and regional space ecosystems. 

Africa’s route into space

These ecosystems must include four primary elements to function: the human capital required to establish and operate the space initiatives; a significant industry base to capitalize on the commercial aspects of the space sector; the requisite infrastructure needed to support the space value chain; and international cooperation to ensure knowledge transfer and diffusion – so that we don’t have to reinvent the wheel.

To take advantage of the space ecosystem, Africa needs strong governance and institutional architectures


The applications and problem-solving innovations provided by space products and services are endless. To take advantage of this, Africa needs strong governance and institutional architectures. 

The evolution of the space ecosystem on the continent must be premised on key instruments such as a space policy – which areas to focus on and why – and a space strategy that outlines which programmes and performance indicators to pursue. 

The conceptualization of a space ecosystem is by no means a simple endeavour and there is certainly a dearth of skills and experience on the African continent to establish effective and relevant space ecosystems. 

There are many institutions leading efforts to build space capacity and skills on the continent, such as the International Space University in France, which offers programmes that provide a holistic overview of the complex global space sector, and the African Space Leadership Institute, which has been recently created to develop capacity in space policy, law and strategy. 

With the right approach, commitment and investment, Africa can rapidly change the fate of its citizens by effectively using space science and technology to support and drive its developmental agenda.




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Review: the rise of Africa’s superwomen

Review: the rise of Africa’s superwomen The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

From foster care in England to colonialism’s legacy in Zimbabwe, this set of essays on race, feminism and identity is searingly honest, says Masiyaleti Mbewe.

Black and Female
Tsitsi Dangarembga, Faber, £9.99

The 1988 novel Nervous Conditions by the Zimbabwean author Tsitsi Dangarembga is considered one of Africa’s finest literary exports. It won the Commonwealth Writers’ Prize and alongside The Book of Not (2006) and This Mournable Body (2018), shortlisted for the 2020 Booker Prize, forms a trilogy of semi-autobiographical novels that grapple with the gendered colonial oppression of young black girls and women from Southern Rhodesia through to Zimbabwe. 

In Black and Female, Dangarembga continues the interrogation of these intersections in an unflinchingly honest and personal, if occasionally dense, collection of essays. Along the way, she examines the sheer magnitude of colonialism’s effects on African people, and how they ripple through her early childhood in England and her formative years as a writer, filmmaker and feminist activist in post-independence Zimbabwe.

‘Writing While Black and Female’

In 1961 Dangarembga’s parents relocated from Southern Rhodesia to the UK. While they worked and studied in London, they put their two-year-old daughter, her older brother and, later, her younger sister into private foster care in Dover, Kent (as many Africans did – a fact that was new to me). The first essay, ‘Writing While Black and Female’, takes a painful look at the four years she spent with her foster parents, Mummy-Gran and Daddy Henry. 

Blackness, she learned in those years, was a consequence of her non-whiteness. So Dangarembga writes of the momentary elation she felt when a stranger addressed her as a ‘lovely little piccaninny’, giving her ‘a category I could wield against the void of no longer being’. To cope with this sort of racialization and her abandonment, the young Dangarembga turned to disassociation and self-harm. 

Blackness is a condition imposed on me, rather than being an experienced identity

Tsitsi Dangarembga

As she writes: ‘Blackness is a condition imposed on me, rather than being an experienced identity.’ Instead of ‘black’ people, therefore, Dangarembga prefers the term ‘highly melanated people’. It is a resonant phrase, highlighting the inherently ridiculous nature of racism.

Dangarembga’s ‘Africanness’ shifts into focus upon her return to Rhodesia in 1965. At first, other children refused to play with her and her siblings, calling them ‘varungu’ (white people). As she describes it: ‘The dance of my identities … became frenetic’. 

In ‘Black, Female and the Superwoman Black Feminist’, the second essay, Dangarembga is adamant about the urgent necessity of a black feminist practice that is centred on action to provide real, material change. Along the way, she makes a distinction – a slightly uneasy one to my mind – between the patriarchy that western colonization imposed, based on private ownership, and the patriarchy of pre-colonial African society with its foundations in kinship that devolved power to an extent.

Dangarembga’s discussion of a more accommodating, pre-colonial patriarchy is nuanced, but it jars a little


‘Hence women could and did become rulers and warriors, and royal spirit mediums called mhondoro,’ Dangarembga writes approvingly. She is making a nuanced point; but the idea of a more accommodating sort of patriarchy jars a little nonetheless.

While independence may have arrived for Zimbabwe more than 40 years ago, Dangarembga argues strongly that the subjugation of women and feminists at the hands of the ruling Zanu-PF government continues as an extension of colonial rule. Indeed, beyond Zimbabwe, black feminists remain ‘a small, often embattled group’ across Africa, believes Dangarembga. 

Pointedly, she criticizes global feminism’s greater focus on optics than on practical activism

 

As a young black feminist who is part of this ‘small, embattled group’, I should say we have been able to foster large communities digitally and otherwise to work around the hostility we are often faced with. Despite internet shutdowns and restrictions, we resist – an act Dangarembga encourages.  

Resistance, she says, starts with establishing community despite these difficulties. At the nucleus of Dangarembga’s argument is the ‘superwoman’ of the essay’s title, the African woman who doesn’t require external factors to be inspired to action but who continuously draws on what Dangarembga calls ‘internal agency’ that derives from ‘an unrelenting fight for survival and dignity’.

Pointedly, she criticizes global feminism’s greater focus on optics than activism in the practical sense. One only has to observe the performative allyship and ‘Instagram activism’ rampant on the internet today to see her point.
 

The complexities of decolonization

In the final essay, ‘Decolonization as Revolutionary Imagining’, Dangarembga turns her gaze upon the ‘highly stratified’ European societies that outsourced their violent inequality to their empires and ‘the work of decolonization’. However, decolonial discourse is complex, and it is here that the writing occasionally gets bogged down. Fewer recommendations with more elaboration perhaps would have helped.

She herself acknowledges the difficulties of decolonization. Centuries of the Enlightenment and its logic of ‘racism, slavery, genocide and colonization’ are hard to uproot ‘whatever one’s melanin concentration’, she writes.

Nevertheless, Dangarembga concludes with the radical determination to dismantle that is evident throughout this searing yet hopeful collection: ‘The trajectory of current and future generations depends on that uprooting.’




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Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa

Culture notes: Europe's broken promises to Africa The World Today mhiggins.drupal 1 August 2022

Europe’s ‘gas grab’ in Africa is just the latest abuse of its relationship with the continent, says Catherine Fieschi.

When Emmanuel Macron made one of his first visits to Africa as France’s recently elected young president in 2017, his speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso was designed to set the tone for a new relationship between his country and African countries. 

‘There no longer is a French policy for Africa,’ he said.

This was a signal away from ‘la Françafrique’, with its post-colonial accents and the propping up of regimes friendly to France, to something that was more strategic, equitable and transparent – more partnership and less tutelage. 

And Europe seemed to be following suit. In March 2020 the European Union and Africa decided that they would redefine their relationship. The European Commission unveiled its vision for a ‘comprehensive strategy with Africa’. The roadmap would give Africa significantly more say over the nature and extent of the relationship, more choice and more political agency.

Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another when it comes to Africa

But what, today, is left of these aspirations? Despite repeated statements, Europe seems to be saying one thing and doing another. 

Earlier this year, after the long-awaited 6th annual EU-African Union summit in Brussels, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa was frank when he summed up the gap between stated ambitions and the current relationship. The pandemic-weary Global South had reason to be wary. Ramaphosa laid out missed opportunities, disappointment and the low expectations that act as self-fulfilling prophecies. 

Europe’s changing focus in Africa 

From the apparent high point of the Ouagadougou speech, Macron has now turned to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in Africa for geopolitical purposes. His primary aim is to combat the rise of Islamist militants and terrorism in the Sahel as well as to tackle the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. 

Russian inroads – via the security firm Wagner in Mali, for instance – have given France further cause to use the OIF to counter destabilization activities. Both the United Kingdom and France train African military in the Sahel, but now, with the end of France’s anti-insurgent Operation Barkhane in Mali, the subsequent withdrawal of French troops and the increasingly established presence of the Wagner group, the security situation in the region is expected to deteriorate dramatically and become increasingly impermeable to European interests and forces.

As for development aid, Britain’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy makes no bones about the fact that Asia is now a priority over Africa.

The relationship between Africa and Britain is being transformed as a result, most obviously through the cuts in development aid, with African aid cut by 66 per cent in 2021. But the nature of the relationship, which has become both more conditional and more transactional, has also changed. 

The UK is emphasizing human rights and ‘free societies’, but also pushing for free market principles rather than the kind of state involvement that some African countries often prefer as a road to accelerated and more autonomous development. 

The future of energy exports and COP27

The issue of energy exports points to what will most likely trigger the greatest disappointment in the next few years – climate and climate finance. 

Green energy deals, like the $8.5 billion COP26 package from the EU, United States and UK to South Africa, look far more problematic now in the light of Europe’s African gas-grab. Indeed, Europe is importing as much African gas as it can after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia reduced supplies. Yet African countries are still being told to curb their own use of ‘dirty’ energy. 

As an illustration, Nigeria holds 3 per cent of the world’s gas reserves, but has barely tapped them, while 40 per cent of its output is exported to Europe. In April, Italy closed deals to buy gas from Angola and the Republic of Congo, while Germany did the same with Senegal.
 

At COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, developed countries pledged an annual $100 billion in climate finance to developing countries for both adaptation and mitigation. But pledges have never really materialized. The aid agency Oxfam estimates that only about a third of the money has been delivered. Climate finance was again the main focus of COP26 – and dismissed by Greta Thunberg as more ‘blah, blah, blah’.

This series of repeated resets, pledges and disappointments tells a story – indeed, several stories. First and foremost, it is one of arrogance and betrayal. That much is obvious. But it is also a story about stories – about how the narratives elaborated by various European countries and leaders never amount to more than a sum of transactions. 

Climate change places Europe, and other rich nations, at a crossroads in its relationship with Africa: the former holds the wealth, but also some of the keys and threats to the transition. COP27, to be held in Egypt in November, will be the next chapter in the story. 




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Eight ways to build better African cities

Eight ways to build better African cities The World Today mhiggins.drupal 2 August 2022

Young professionals from across the continent tell Emmanuel Adegboye how city life could be improved: from high-speed rail to people-centred urban planning.


Ahmed Elsawy, 33, Director of Talent
Cairo, Egypt
We must amend employment law in Egypt to support individual contractors to match with the global demand for short-term and project-based assignments within the tech and service industries. While we have a new, decent education system, I think we should care more about foreign languages to have a higher rank when it comes to the global competition of skilled workers.

Iman Abubaker, 31, Urban Mobility Project Manager, WRI Africa
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Rapid urbanization and increased motorization have exacerbated the city’s urban challenges. Addis Ababa would benefit from safer street design and people-centred city planning. Urban amenities should be located within walking and cycling distances. For longer trips, the city needs to invest in improving the accessibility, safety, integration and multimodality of its public transport system. I would love to see more pockets of green spaces and parks all around the city. 

Bree, 31, Project Manager
Nairobi, Kenya
I have a love-hate relationship with Nairobi. I spent four years smack in the middle of the city while attending the University of Nairobi. Being in the middle of all the hustle and bustle made the transition to a sleepy-ish coastal town easy. I would happily trade matatus [shared taxis] for tuktuks any day. I do miss the conveniences that come with a big city like a 24-hour grocery store and delivery services on those lazy days.

Mfon Bassey, 30, Co-Founder, TalentX Africa
Lagos, Nigeria
The government should improve the road networks and public transport systems, because the common challenge most Lagosians face is commuting from point A to B without traffic. There are so many private cars on the road because the public transport system isn’t optimally efficient yet. Once you take away the commute time most workers spend just to get work done, we’ll surely have happier Lagosians.

Olga Kiconco, 32, Innovation Strategist
Kampala, Uganda
As one of Africa’s fastest-growing cities with a projected 112 per cent population growth by 2035, there are a number of critical changes that need to be made in preparation for this. Our leaders should embrace coherent policies that will catalyze socio-economic transformation. We need to hold them accountable for better infrastructure and delivery of public services, while taking personal responsibility to protect our environment against the prevalent threat of climate change.

Etienne Amougou, 30, Curator/Arts Project Manager
Yaounde, Cameroon
What would make Yaounde better would be a good ecosystem that provides more opportunities for young people. If it was possible, I would like to see the creation of more cultural spaces, like parks, zoos, cinemas and sport areas. Also, we could use a more effective approach to waste management – sometimes we have trash everywhere in the ’hood.

Valentino Fernandez, 23, Writer
Johannesburg, South Africa
 We need better transportation to bridge the inequality gap and allow the youth to access spaces to be inspired and create change. Apartheid spatial planning is still affecting us. People of colour were relegated to the outskirts of the city, and very little has changed. It’s virtually impossible to move out of your childhood home, which means you’re looking at a two-hour commute every morning and two more hours to get home. I would like a reliable, affordable, high-speed rail system.

Jean-Louis Mbaka, 34, Co-Founder and Director, Education at Kinshasa Digital
Kinshasa, DRC
Our youth must receive a sufficient education that is in line with the strategic requirements of their future workplaces. By 2030, more than 130 million jobs in Africa will require digital skills, according to the International Finance Corporation. To close the gap between the conventional educational system and the labour market, our organisation is providing training for digital jobs. Initiatives like ours must be supported if the current and next generations are to have the means for their economic and social advancement. Scaling up investments in vital facilities like the internet is also necessary.




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The online media changing African news

The online media changing African news The World Today mhiggins.drupal 2 August 2022

Africa’s news sites are gripping audiences with digital innovation and bold directions. Helen Fitzwilliam talks to editors at three platforms.

Lydia Namubiru
News editor of ‘The Continent’ (South Africa)

At the start of the pandemic, we realized a lot of fake news was being shared on WhatsApp. So, The Continent chose to launch on that platform to insert some real journalism in a way that could easily be shared. We now have about 100,000 readers across Africa and the rest of the world, but we had to dramatically change the way we write and edit stories: to compete with the likes of Twitter and Instagram, we try to keep stories tight at 300 words. 

There’s a real variety. We can run an investigation into corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo a week after a front page on the fashion designer who dresses Africa’s ‘big men’ [powerful leaders]. We cover feminist issues, the backlash against LGBT people in Ghana; we’ve had the Namibian first lady talking to us about misogyny. These are not the sort of topics a typical African newspaper is going to lead with.

There are refugees in camps doing data operations being paid a pittance to help create multimillion-dollar systems for US companies – that’s a future issue


With a story such as Ukraine, the war’s impact on the cost of living has been the most obvious angle for us. It has driven countries such as Malawi into crisis, forcing a devaluation of the currency.
 
As for the future, we see two issues looming. Workers’ economic rights and their treatment by multinationals will be a big story. There are refugees in camps in Kenya working in data operations and being paid a pittance to help create huge, potentially multimillion-dollar systems for US companies. 

Second, Africa has the world’s youngest population and the oldest leaders, so this will likely lead to activism and protests. The young are exposed to the global village, so they want different things and have different values. They speak a completely different language their leaders do not understand. It will be an interesting conflict, but could lead to real violence. 


John Githongo
Editor of ‘The Elephant’ (Kenya)

We set up this platform four years ago. Due to political and commercial pressures, mainstream media wasn’t doing much critical reporting. We have between 30,000 and 80,000 readers a week, the majority of them in Africa. 

The digital space reaches a completely different demographic. When The Elephant started, it was 80 per cent male and over 40, but we have gained more younger people and more women. Now it is 60 per cent men, 40 per cent women and that is something we have been working at. 

Our editorial approach is that as long as a piece has a strong argument and fits into our pan-African brief, we will publish it – even if we don’t agree with it.

The conflicts in Ethiopia and parts of the Sahel make the war in Ukraine pale in comparison. So many people have died in Ethiopia or been displaced and now we have the onset of a famine after four years of failed rain. During the 1960s and 1970s, when the Cold War found its way on to African soil, millions of people died – so there is caution about getting involved in a European fight.

Ahead of the election, we are exposing those trying to change the level of debate with reputation-laundering


There is always a lot of fake news around during elections. But people are beginning to be more sceptical. We go after those who attempt to change the level of debate with reputation-laundering and try to expose their actions. 
 
The future of democracy is going to be a big issue. When Africans were watching the attack on the US Capitol last year, they were hoping it was not a Black Lives Matter protest, which could have resulted in a ‘blackbath’. As soon as they saw the white guys wearing horns, people laughed with relief. 

There is an ongoing recalibration of Africa’s geopolitical relations with the rest of the world. A poll released in June showed China has overtaken the United States as the foreign power having the biggest positive influence in Africa in the eyes of young people across the continent. The younger generation is writing its own narrative. 


Wale Lawal
Editor of ‘The Republic’ (Nigeria)

Nigerian audiences are increasingly online and tend to read both local and international publications. They also know that the issues they care about are either under-reported or reported at lower quality levels. 

At The Republic, we provide political journalism that tends to require high levels of expertise. Yet online audiences also prioritize engagement: it is not enough for an issue to be important, it also needs to be interesting.

Some topics we have covered that Western media tend not to include how people experience blackness in different parts of the world; the waves of mostly female-led and youth-led movements rising up against autocratic governments across Africa; and relationships between countries within Africa itself. In the early days of the pandemic, we launched a Covid-19 and Africa series, having noticed a glaring lack of African expert voices in global media.
 
We also cover Africa’s evolving relations with Russia. Whenever we encounter a story like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the first thing we always ask ourselves is what missing voice can we add to the current discussion? All we were reading about after the invasion was how neighbouring countries were opening their borders and their homes to Ukrainians. Most people saw only that. 

We knew that around 15,000 Africans were studying in Ukraine when Russia invaded, but their voices were missing from the discussion


But we knew that around 15,000 Africans were studying in Ukraine, that Africans routinely face harsh treatment at international borders, and that clearly their voices were missing from the discussion.

With fake news and information gaps on social media, our usual approach is to develop expert-led columns and circulate these as widely as possible.

Our next mission is to think about the role that independent media can play in supporting democracies, such as by increasing voter turnout. During the last election in Nigeria, less than 35 per cent of those who registered to vote eventually did so.




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Not the same old African story

Not the same old African story The World Today mhiggins.drupal 2 August 2022

Nollywood studio boss Mo Abudu and author Dipo Faloyin discuss how Africans are redefining how the world sees them.

Mo Abudu
EbonyLife’s latest TV drama series, Blood Sisters, was in Netflix’s global top 10. It’s a thriller and it may be slightly melodramatic because we Nigerians are melodramatic. But it deals with universal themes. Nigerians are no different to anyone else. I want EbonyLife productions increasingly to appeal to anyone in the world, even if it’s in our language. Oloture, one of our films, was about human trafficking. It was all done in pidgin English and subtitled. I watch a lot of Korean dramas and Spanish dramas that are subtitled. A good story is a good story.

Dipo Faloyin
The influence that African countries have had on the West, from music, food and film to literature, science and technology, is something people find difficult to take seriously. So, it’s good to see Netflix and other production companies take it more seriously. How has your discussion with them changed since the early days?

Mo Abudu
I have been going to an entertainment market in Cannes called Mipcom for about 12 years, and at first no one had any interest in African content. So, we focused on doing local content for local markets. Now, different communities around the world want representation in content that speaks to them. Specific countries are also saying to streamers: ‘What’s your local content strategy?’ 

I’m not telling broadcasters to commission original African content as a charity project – they can make money from this

Mo Abudu


Netflix was the first of the streamers to come into Africa, and it now has an Africa office. Amazon has also made inroads recently. Disney is arriving. In the United States and Britain, they just need to maintain subscriber numbers, but real growth for them is going to be in Asia and Africa. 

I’m not telling broadcasters or distributors to commission original African content as a charity project – they can make money from this. Within five days of launch, Blood Sisters registered 11 million hours of viewing on Netflix around the world. It was made on a budget five times smaller than productions outside Africa. But we need to be among the gatekeepers, too. 

Moving beyond Hollywood

Dipo Faloyin
The challenge that many creatives across Africa have is that people [elsewhere] don’t necessarily feel like they relate to this continent. They see ‘Africa’ and its cultures as very distant. Instead of intricate, specific stories, simple stories of simple people have been pushed about the continent. 

I still get asked questions like, ‘But, what should we do about Africa’s problems?’ My response is, ‘Stop seeing Africa as just a problem.’ 

A still from the Nigerian film ‘Oloture’, released in 2022, which deals with issues of human trafficking.

Mo Abudu
I was speaking at the Qatar Economic Forum recently and the panel started off talking about the ‘problems of Africa’ – and I had to jump in and say, ‘I get you guys talking about the problems, I’m not an economist, I’m just an entrepreneur, but from an entrepreneurial perspective, we have resources – like cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo that’s in all of our mobile phones.’ 

The problem is, we ship out all our resources and by the time they come back to us, they are 10-times more expensive than we can afford. I keep saying that they need to know they need us as much as we need them.
 
Dipo Faloyin
There are certainly issues within the continent like there are everywhere else; but more accurate stories will help people have a better sense of the context in which so many communities and their lives have been built up. 

Mo Abudu
The West doesn’t seem to have any interest in making films about Africa unless it’s about the worst of Africa: the slave trade, the Rwandan genocide, blood diamonds. That seems to be what has defined us. 

Dipo Faloyin
If you ask most people around the world to close their eyes and picture Africa, two images will come up: safari, and poverty and strife. Until the age of 12, I grew up in Lagos, a metropolis with no wild animals running around. There are slums, of course, but also traffic, shopping centres and overpriced restaurants. 

Writers who pitch ideas to Vice.com where I work often still don’t differentiate African countries. They’ll say, ‘There’s been a coup in Mali. Why can’t Africa get its head around democracy?’, and I remind them a small minority of countries on the continent is under any form of authoritarian rule. 

It’s frustrating that this perception hasn’t changed. For us to break through we need big cultural institutions – Hollywood, museums, literature – to allow people from across the regions to tell these stories. We are rarely portrayed as protagonists and forward thinkers. But I’m excited for the future.




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Youth innovation can help shape the future of African cities

Youth innovation can help shape the future of African cities Expert comment LToremark 16 August 2022

To meet the challenges of rapid urbanization, African governments must harness the potential of young innovators to help shape the future of African cities.

It is projected that 1.3 billion people will be living in Africa’s cities by 2050, an increase of almost 1 billion from today, and largely driven by young people migrating to urban centres in search of work. As the continent’s urban population grows, cities will need to adapt by nurturing new economic ecosystems to create jobs, while managing the environmental, social and political pressures that urbanization brings.

The evolution of Africa’s cities is critical for meeting the demands of its youth population and must be co-created with them. Africa’s young innovators are already proving to be an asset in shaping the future of African cities and, if they are allowed to flourish, they could be at the forefront of finding much-needed solutions to the continent’s vast urban challenges.

Growing tech hubs

African countries are increasingly benefitting from growth in technology ecosystems, which are often clustered within cities. There are currently more than 600 tech hubs helping to incubate innovative solutions across cities in Africa. Between 2015 and 2020, the number of start-ups receiving funding grew six times faster than the global average. In 2021 alone, start-ups raised over $4billion in funding – twice as much as in 2020.

But significant challenges remain. While the number of new start-ups is an encouraging indication of the entrepreneurialism and creativity of Africa’s youth, job creation on the level required will demand that they grow and scale up to generate more and higher quality jobs. Research on scaling up in Africa is sparse but research by Endeavor suggests that in Nairobi – one of Africa’s top tech ecosystems – only 5 per cent of companies are able to sustain growth of 20 per cent or more each year, yet they created 72 per cent of new jobs in the previous three years. For Africa to fully harness the potential of digital innovation, making cities the best place for young people to launch ideas and grow them into thriving businesses must become a priority policy for African governments. 

Barriers to scale

On the most basic level, business growth needs access to the services that make cities more liveable and help both urban residents and firms become more productive, such as healthcare, transport, water and sanitation. African cities already struggle to provide their residents – in particular the poorest and most vulnerable – with equitable, reliable, affordable and quality access to these services, in a sustainable manner. And these challenges will only get more acute as urban populations rise rapidly, often without any kind of integrated planning.

For example, an estimated 70-80 per cent of municipal solid waste in Africa is recyclable, yet only about 4 per cent is currently recycled, with more than 90 per cent of waste ending up in uncontrolled dumpsites and landfills. As Africa’s urban population grows, these conditions are likely to worsen – unless there is urgent action. New technology has the potential to help by creating a positive feedback loop between innovation, service delivery and growth. For example, to bridge the waste management gap, innovators are exploring various tech-enabled circular economy models. These solutions are often ground-breaking and have the potential to leapfrog traditional waste management infrastructure. Crucially, they are also formalizing a largely informal sector and creating new jobs.

Across the continent, start-ups like Kaltani, Mr Green Africa and Freetown Waste Transformers build processing facilities to turn waste into energy or reusable products, such as construction materials. Others, like Scrapays, Regenize and Soso Care, are helping households and businesses sell off their recycled materials for cash and virtual currencies or exchange them for critical services, such as micro health insurance premiums. Such start-ups help empower informal waste pickers or agents with tech-enabled tools and target low-income urban communities that would not normally prioritize recycling.

Help or hindrance from the top?

But Africa’s young people cannot do this alone – government decision-makers must become catalysts for entrepreneurial leadership. This requires nurturing a mindset that sees young innovators as Africa’s biggest resource, not a threat. While the importance of young people to Africa’s development is acknowledged in various high-level regional treaties, patterns of inhibition and outright hostility from political ‘elites’ suggest that the disruptive nature of technology start-ups and their access to significant capital through venture capital funding models – unlike existing rent-seeking business models with government control – threatens the political establishment.

Africa’s young people cannot do this alone – government decision-makers must become catalysts for entrepreneurial leadership.

The growing use of tech solutions also leads to increased transparency and efficiency of service delivery, which in turn leads to increased demand for government accountability and pressure to adopt more liberal policies. Until there is a shift towards catalysing entrepreneurial leadership, there is a stronger incentive for political elites to leverage their powers to co-opt successful technology businesses, or otherwise try to control them for political gain, than let them flourish. This shift in mindset will be critical to unlocking the full potential of Africa’s young innovators.




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Towards just transition in Africa: Continental coordination on green financing and job creation

Towards just transition in Africa: Continental coordination on green financing and job creation 6 October 2022 — 7:00AM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 September 2022 Addis Ababa and online

At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers take stock of preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition.

At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers will take stock of policy efforts and preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition.

Global climate policies towards a ‘just transition’ under the Paris Agreement should align with and support African states’ national sustainable development priorities – in particular, the need for decent and fair job creation, as well as resilient and sustainable land, environment and ecosystem management policies.

They must also be cognizant of African nations’ urgent requirements for sustainable and accessible energy to underpin economic development. Achieving green growth requires innovative and more accessible financing models, especially as wealthy nations’ financial pledges have fallen short. It also requires clarity and cooperation to unlock investment in both renewable and transitional energy.

African countries face collective climate and employment-related challenges. However, policymaking often remains regionally siloed according to differing political, energy sector and ecological realities. There is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

At this hybrid conference in Addis Ababa, speakers will take stock of policy efforts and preparations ahead of the ‘African COP27’ in November and discuss the key priorities for streamlining continental cooperation on policy approaches to just transition, job creation and green financing.

This event is the third in a series on Towards just transition: Connecting green financing and sustainable job creation in Africa, supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator.




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A natural climate change priority for Africa

A natural climate change priority for Africa Expert comment LJefferson 28 September 2022

Nature-based solutions can protect African nations’ shared natural endowment and meet the needs of their people.

Africa’s principal climate change negotiators have long understood the important contribution of ‘nature-based solutions’ (NBS) in delivering land (and sea) based options as part of the goals of the Paris Agreement. Limiting temperature rises to only 1.5°C by 2050 will demand finding innovative ways to protect Africa’s vast natural endowment that also meets the equally acute needs of its people. Nature-based solutions may do both.

Decision-makers on the continent and across the world need to understand that ‘business as usual’ cannot be an option given the potential for loss of life, conflict and chaos.

The urgency for Africa cannot be overstated. At a Chatham House conference in Libreville, the Gabonese minister for the environment highlighted that if global warming surges by 2.5° or 3°C the impact would be at least 6°C for Africa. Decision-makers on the continent and across the world need to understand that ‘business as usual’ cannot be an option given the potential for loss of life, conflict and chaos.

Adaption, mitigation, or both?

Although adaptation to climate change has hitherto tended to be the continent’s main concern, there has also been growing recognition of the ways that Africa’s natural environments, from forests and grasslands, to peatlands and coastal and marine ecosystems, all also mitigate its impacts by sequestering carbon. The Congo Basin alone is said to store upwards of 4 per cent of global emissions annually.

Arguing that African states should slow the development of their economies in response to a crisis born of the already-industrialized world does not find a responsive audience in a continent hungry for jobs and opportunity.

These environments are under increasing pressure. Deforestation is a sad reality, caused mostly by unsustainable and extensive agricultural practices focused on cash crops for export more than food production to feed local populations. And arguing that African states and peoples should slow the development of their economies and infrastructure in response to a crisis born of the already-industrialized world does not find a responsive audience in a continent hungry for jobs and opportunity.

Nature-based solutions offer an answer to this conundrum. There is growing evidence that natural habitats both help avoid losses from climate change-related disasters and can drive economic growth. There is thus potential for NBS to tackle both adaptation and mitigation challenges at relatively low cost.

NBS – the rocky road from commitment to policy

It was logical therefore for Africa and like-minded countries to work to integrate NBS more strongly into the climate change agenda at COP26. The final Glasgow Climate Pact duly emphasized the importance of protecting ecosystems. The Global Forest Finance Pledge signed in the margins was also significant. African focus, with COP 27 in Egypt soon to take place, is now on domestic implementation and delivery of these pledges. The new African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development strategy (2022-2032) sets out many of the challenges and opportunities.

Choosing the right development pathway is tough, requiring political will and inclusive governance. Besides the challenge of securing alternative national revenue if a country moves away from fossil-intensive fuels – particularly acute for Africa’s resource-producing states – there is a dizzying array of policy decisions to be taken. African governments need to choose the most appropriate renewable energy sources, secure alternative livelihoods and continue to meet basic needs of the most vulnerable in the context of radical restructuring.  

Towards African solutions

There can be no one-size-fits-all answer to these questions – it is sadly still necessary to underline the enormous geographic, cultural and political diversity of the continent – but African experts have begun to draw together some emerging common themes from work already underway.  

Maintaining the ‘status quo’ in agricultural practices is no longer an option. Emphasis on sustainable agriculture is urgently needed andthat includes the elaboration of a ‘new deal’ between nature and people.  

Conservation also needs to be reframed as an economic opportunity, particularly in the elaboration and development of ecosystem services that deliver the true value of Africa’s forests, and that involve, value and reward local communities, respecting their rights and livelihoods.

Maintaining the ‘status quo’ in agricultural practices is no longer an option. Emphasis on sustainable agriculture is urgently needed.

Regional cooperation is likewise key, including on the management of forest, wildlife and water resources – Africa’s ecosystems do not respect arbitrary political boundaries, and accomplishing the dual feat of protecting cross-border systems at the same time as realizing their economic potential will demand effective collaboration, as well as training, education and communication at all levels.

The imperative of finance

A further imperative will be securing sufficient developed country financing – whether that be to secure value for net sequestration and effective forest management or for models of context-appropriate ‘smarter’ sustainable rural conservation and ecosystem resilience.




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A new vision for African agency in sustainable development

A new vision for African agency in sustainable development Expert comment LJefferson 18 October 2022

Change is necessary not only in global economic structures and attitudes – but in African governance too.

The conventional notion that Africa is mostly a consumer of norms and practices designed by the Global North has been repeatedly challenged and is increasingly being debunked. Increased African agency in international affairs is today a well-established and documented reality. But Africa’s influence still does not match the scale of the challenges that it faces on its pathway to sustainable development. 

Pushing for African agency in sustainable development also warrants a critical assessment of how ‘sustainable development’ should be defined, and how it can be achieved in terms of actual poverty reduction and real improvement in the lives of local poor Africans. Sustainable development has been a political catchphrase for over 30 years – but a genuine transition towards sustainability has yet to begin.

African agency today

Historically, there have been structural limitations on the agency of African stakeholders to shape development pathways. Chief among them, donor-recipient power dynamics have persistently promoted dependency and sustained institutional corruption. Many African countries are also challenged by economic incentives and infrastructure that have favoured the market demands and supply chains of former colonial powers, which largely remain reliant on natural resource extraction, and are marked by limited investment in value-addition activities and technology development.

Donor-recipient power dynamics have persistently promoted dependency and sustained institutional corruption.

Today, however, African agency is being exerted in a more assertive fashion. The African Union (AU), individual African states, civil society, the private sector and eminent and ordinary persons are all displaying Africa’s agency in steering global sustainable development priorities, namely by proposing their own development agenda, The African Union Agenda 2063, adopted in 2013. This was followed by the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030), which in many ways mirror Agenda 2063 – a clear demonstration of the influence of Africa in the global arena. 

Agenda 2063 is a strategic roadmap for Africa ‘to build an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its own citizens and development goals representing a dynamic force in the international arena’. Prepared following a broad-based participatory consultation, it advocates for inclusion and empowerment and provides an excellent vision for African countries and African people. The SDGs address several of the key shortcomings of their predecessor – the MDGs – and incorporate a broader and more transformative agenda that more adequately reflects the complex challenges of the 21st century and the need for structural reforms in the global economy and governance norms.

In international forums on sustainable development, African countries are increasingly using their collective voice to change the discourse on how development can and should be done. For instance, by championing innovative solutions for carbon markets, African policy leaders are enabling access to climate finance for development while preserving Africa’s natural wealth.

In the post-COVID era, championing investments in and leadership of Africa’s global health architecture demonstrates a desire that in the next pandemic, Africa CDC, AMA and continental manufacturers will play leading roles in determining Africa’s public health strategy and implementation.

In trade, building on the groundwork led by the regional economic commissions, the AfCFTA will catalyse and scale regional integration, trade and cooperation, leading to promising new modes of supply chain and self-sufficiency.

Encouraging signs, but persistent shortcomings

Encouraging signs that African agency is gaining momentum cannot disguise the fact that Africa has yet to move from rhetoric to implementation in the realm of sustainable development. Continental visions often fail to go beyond declarations of intent, and have only limited influence on governance systems or national structural transformation, and African states remain vulnerable to economic shocks emanating from the global system.

African agency should not be only seen as emanating from government, but also as being exerted by independent civil society organizations and committed ordinary individuals.

Change will require governance systems that are coordinated, transparent, efficient, and inclusive, as well as tools, processes, and means (material, technical, and human) for successful implementation. There is an urgent need for a new governance paradigm in Africa and internationally, dealing with long-term social change.

Notably, African agency should not be only seen as emanating from government, but also as being exerted by independent civil society organizations and committed ordinary individuals. Effective agency needs to be multi-faceted and multi-actor, and depends on the inclusiveness of African governments and their willingness to work with civil society in their strategic engagements with external partners.

Both Agenda 2063 and the SDGs hold the potential for transformation, but implementation will depend on continued advocacy to hold authorities to account and change the dominant discourse, logic and rules of engagement at global, regional, national, and local levels. There is a need for a dynamic new model of African ‘development’.

Time for a new vision

Africa’s economic landscape is changing rapidly, with new regional and local value chains, and integrated regional economic corridors to link countries, minimize the burden of high-cost production and logistics, and boost real incomes and international competitiveness. But Africa continues to face structural challenges, including the need for large investment projects – at a time when Africa remains a net exporter of capital.

Donors and development partners must reflect upon their prior modes of engagement and commit to genuine and equitable relationships with African states. Such partnerships must reflect mutual respect of ideas and accountability, and commit to making space in international forums and multi-lateral arrangements for African people and countries to realize their own visions for progress.

More resources should be channelled to actors engaging closest to communities and people, who can better understand and communicate local needs.

But African leaders and actors must also recognize that with the advent of resources and agency comes responsibility for results and outcomes, notably the need to improve governance. Gaps in accountability, widespread corruption, and lack of successful implementation and sustainability of projects must be addressed.




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Africa Aware: Drought in the Horn of Africa

Africa Aware: Drought in the Horn of Africa Audio aboudiaf.drupal 31 October 2022

This episode discusses how the Horn of Africa’s worst drought in 40 years is affecting more than 20 million people across several countries.

Abdirahman Abdishakur, Special Presidential Envoy for Drought Response for the Federal Republic of Somalia, outlines the Somali government’s planning to prevent famine.

Parvin Ngala, Regional Director at Oxfam International, highlights international efforts to respond to the drought, the importance of empowering civil society in these circumstances, and what long-term mitigation measures are necessary to avoid a return to this situation.




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Africa’s maritime agency cannot be overlooked

Africa’s maritime agency cannot be overlooked Expert comment LJefferson 3 November 2022

Increasing maritime awareness has already delivered impact, but consistency and continental leadership are needed to realize the sector’s full potential.

Africa’s 48,000 kilometres of coastline, shared among 38 coastal states, are resource rich and hold some of the world’s most strategic sea lanes, including the approaches to the Suez Canal, which carries 12 per cent of worldwide trade, and the Gulf of Guinea, a critical route for global energy. But despite the vast potential this represents, piracy and maritime insecurity have dominated the narrative of Africa’s coasts, and further propagated the image of African states as beholden to external intervention.

Yet African agency is established and evolving in the sector, with African littoral states enhancing their capacity to face collective security threats and exercising increasing autonomy in responding to the recent rush of external actors looking for port facilities and military bases. Enhanced continental coordination, consistency and leadership can help Africa’s maritime endowment become a resource that can bring sustainable benefit across the continent.  

Agency beyond piracy: the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean

Piracy became the dominant frame of reference for the East African maritime space as a result of the crisis off the coast of Somalia, which peaked between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, the UN Security Council (UNSC) took the unprecedented step of authorizing international naval operations in Somali territorial waters, contributing to a gradual reduction in attacks. There have been no successful hijackings reported since 2017.

As the immediate threat of piracy has quietened, broader geopolitical dynamics have come to the fore, notably in a surge by external actors to establish strategic ports and military bases.

But progress has not just been down to international assistance. Somalia is prioritizing increased domestic enforcement capacity – as demonstrated in the establishment of  a new specialized maritime unit and the wider region enhanced collaboration and information sharing through the Djibouti Code of Conduct of 2009, amended in 2017.

South Africa’s recent admission as a new signatory demonstrates its continued relevance. In March 2022, the UNSC authorization lapsed, following pressure from the Somali government. Although it is not yet clear whether Somali efforts will be sufficient to repress piracy in the long term, this reverse was a clear statement of Somalia’s agency at a level unthinkable during the outset of the crisis.

As the immediate threat of piracy has quietened, broader geopolitical dynamics have come to the fore, notably in a surge by external actors to establish strategic ports and military bases. Here too, African states have demonstrated enhanced agency, for better or worse. Consider Djibouti’s unilateral seizure of a container terminal from an Emirati firm, Sudan’s review of Russian and Turkish deals for maritime facilities, Tanzania’s rejection of a Chinese-led port investment, or the Seychelles withdrawing agreement for an Indian naval base.

Such examples point to a growing awareness of the value of maritime resources within African states, alongside a willingness and ability to push back against external imposition – and indeed to innovate in finding solutions beyond infrastructure and ‘hard’ security. In 2018, the Seychelles launched the world’s first sovereign blue bond to fund sustainable marine projects. That other countries are seeking to replicate this model points to the potentially global impact of African leadership on maritime issues.

Regional cooperation or competition in the Gulf of Guinea?

The Gulf of Guinea is likewise resource rich and geographically strategic, and has faced diverse maritime security threats including piracy, smuggling, illegal fishing, oil theft and pollution. Gulf of Guinea states put in place several initiatives to promote security, including the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (YCoC), signed by 25 states in 2013, that led to information-sharing and cooperation on interdiction, investigation and prosecution. But crime in the Gulf of Guinea nonetheless reached an all-time high in 2020, suffering 130 of the 135 maritime kidnappings recorded worldwide, due to the non-binding nature of the YCoC and gaps in capacity and finance.

Despite the clear impact of growing African agency in the maritime space, a long road remains towards the realization of its full potential.

Though external actors have become increasingly engaged, including the EU, US, France, Denmark, and the G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FOGG), states within the region, especially those most affected by piracy and armed robbery, have nonetheless demonstrated leadership. Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote D’Ivoire have all developed maritime security strategies; Nigeria launched its Deep Blue Project to secure Nigerian waters; Ghana has strengthened its navy; and Togo has changed its laws and judicial system to allow the arrest and prosecution of ships and persons. Maritime security incidents have consequently reduced in 2022.




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Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism

Africa-Japan relations and evolving multilateralism 23 November 2022 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2022 Online

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025.

The eighth edition of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in Tunisia from 27–28 August 2022, marked the second time that Japan’s now-triennial summit was hosted in an African country, after TICAD 6 was held in Kenya in 2016.

The summit was attended by 48 representatives of African countries and at least 20 heads of state and government and included a pledge by the Japanese government to commit $30 billion in public and private finance to Africa over the next three years.

In reaffirming the three pillars of TICAD 8 – revolving around the economy, societal resilience, and peace and stability – the newly adopted Tunis Declaration (28 August 2022) also outlined some of the key projects underpinning Japan’s pledge, including a $4 billion fund for a Green Growth Initiative with Africa (GGA).

2023 will mark 30 years since the inception of TICAD in 1993 and ten years since the African Union (AU)’s adoption of its flagship Agenda 2063, on which the Tunis Declaration placed distinct emphasis.

This panel discussion reflects on the outcomes of TICAD 8 in 2022 and looks forward to TICAD 9 in 2025, exploring wider developments in summitry, Africa-Asia relations, and modes of multilateralism.

Questions explored include:

  • How has international summitry evolved over the past three decades since the inception of TICAD in 1993, which represented the first periodic high-level summit engagement with Africa by a ‘non-traditional’ partner?
  • Looking ahead to TICAD 9 in 2025, what are the priorities for enforcing the stated tenets of TICAD – ‘African ownership, international partnership, inclusivity and openness’ – in cooperation efforts?
  • What lessons can be drawn from TICAD’s co-partnership approach (with the African Union Commission and others) – particularly given increasing calls for AU membership of the G20 and Prime Minister Kishida’s pledge at TICAD 8 to support a permanent African UNSC seat during its non-permanent membership in 2023–24? Beyond membership, what are the priorities for furthering agency?
  • How are Africa-Asia relations evolving and diverging? How are Japan and other Asian countries perceived by different African countries?

This event is the third in the Chatham House – Japan House London webinar series (2022-2023). The series is held in partnership with Japan House London. You can watch previous webinars from the series here.




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Towards just transition in Africa

Towards just transition in Africa Interview Video NCapeling 23 December 2022

Highlighting key interventions from African policymakers, business leaders, researchers, and civil society voices on green financing and implementation plans.

African countries face collective climate and employment-related challenges. However, policymaking often remains regionally siloed according to differing political, energy sector, and ecological realities.

There is a need for transformational strategic thinking and context-specific action from African governments, civil society, businesses, and financiers, in their green financing demands and national implementation plans.

This video highlights key interventions from policymakers, business leaders, researchers, and civil society voices at a series of events hosted by the Chatham House Africa programme in Nairobi, Libreville, and Addis Ababa in the lead-up to COP27.

The events series, Towards just transition: Connecting green financing and sustainable job creation in Africa, was supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator and the United Nations Development Programme.




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Africa in 2023: Continuing political and economic volatility

Africa in 2023: Continuing political and economic volatility Expert comment NCapeling 6 January 2023

Despite few African trade and financial links with Russia and Ukraine, the war in Ukraine will cause civil strife in Africa due to food and energy inflation.

Africa’s economy was recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2022 when a range of internal and external shocks struck such as adverse weather conditions, a devastating locust invasion, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – all of which worsened already rapidly-rising rates of inflation and borrowing costs.

Although the direct trade and financial linkages of Africa with Russia and Ukraine are small, the war has damaged the continent’s economies through higher commodity prices, higher food, fuel, and headline inflation.

The main impact is on the increasing likelihood of civil strife because of food and energy-fuelled inflation amid an environment of heightened political instability.

Key African economies such as South Africa and Nigeria were already stuck with low growth and many African governments have seen their debt burdens increase – some such as Ethiopia and Ghana now have dollar debt trading at distressed levels – and more countries will follow in 2023.

On average the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio of African countries stood at above 60 per cent in 2022. The era of Chinese state-backed big loans and mega-projects which started 20 years ago in Angola after the end of its civil war may be coming to an end but Chinese private sector investments on the continent will continue through its Belt and Road Initiative and dual circulation model of development.

Great and middle powers building influence

Geopolitical competition in Africa has intensified in 2022, particularly among great powers such as China, Russia, the US, and the EU but also by middle powers such as Turkey, Japan, and the Gulf states.

The sixth AU-EU summit held in Brussels in February 2022 agreed on the principles for a new partnership, although the Russian invasion of Ukraine which followed disrupted these ambitions. Japan’s pledge of $30 billion in aid for Africa at TICAD 8 in August 2022 was clearly made due to the $40 billion pledged at the China–Africa summit in November 2021.

The geopolitical and geoeconomic ramifications of the war in Ukraine has directly impacted the African continent by contributing to food and cooking oil inflation and humanitarian aid delivery

The US also launched a new strategy to strengthen its partnership and held a second US-Africa Leaders’ summit in Washington in December, the first since 2014. Russia’s ambition has been curtailed by its invasion of Ukraine, postponing its second summit with African states to 2023.

The imposition of international sanctions complicated its trade and investments, and military support such as that provided by Russian paramilitary group Wagner focused on Mali, Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR) has been curtailed.

The strategic importance of Africa has resulted in all the UN P5 members calling on the G20 to make the African Union (AU) its 21st member in 2023 under India’s presidency.

International competition to secure Africa’s critical and strategic minerals and energy products intensified in 2022 and, in the energy sector, European countries are seeking to diversify away from Russian oil and gas with alternative supplies, such as those from Africa.

Western mining companies and commodity traders are also increasingly seeking alternative supplies from Africa. Decarbonization is becoming a driver of resource nationalism and geopolitical competition in certain African mining markets, home to large deposits of critical ‘transition minerals’ such as copper, cobalt, graphite, lithium, or nickel.

COP27 was hosted in Egypt in November and gave African leaders an opportunity to shape climate discussions by pushing priority areas such as loss and damage, stranded assets, access to climate finance, adaptation, and desertification. Climate adaptation in Africa is a key condition to preserving economic growth and maintaining social cohesion.

The Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia, is suffering from one of the worst droughts in memory. The geopolitical and geoeconomic ramifications of the war in Ukraine has directly impacted the African continent by contributing to food and cooking oil inflation and humanitarian aid delivery.

Thoughout 2022 the AU was undergoing intensive reform and it struggled to respond to the growing number of security crises across the continent. Hotspots in 2023 will be in the western Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, eastern DRC, and northern Mozambique, all of them crossing state borders.

In Mozambique, a 2019 peace deal assisted by the United Nations (UN) will see the last ex-guerrillas from Renamo demobilized in 2023 to reintegrate into civilian life – some having been recruited in 1978.

Jihadist activity may spread further into coastal states which has resulted in international partners such as France and the UK redesigning their security assistance strategies for the region

In eastern Congo, M23 – one of around 120 armed groups – resumed its conflict against the central government. After lying dormant for several years, it took up arms again in 2021 and has been leading an offensive in eastern DRC against the Congolese army.

According to the UN, Rwanda has been supporting M23, and Kenya’s parliament approved in November the deployment of about 900 soldiers to the DRC as part of a joint military force from the East African Community (EAC) bloc – DRC joined the EAC in March.

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia saw an uneasy ceasefire agreed between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Islamist militant groups in Africa further expanded their territorial reach in 2022, particularly in the western Sahel where al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates are competing for influence and continued to make inroads.

The drawdown and exit of western forces from Mali, both the French Operation Barkane and international contributions for the UN’s MINUSMA mission there, adds new dimensions to regional security challenges.

Mali’s decision in May to withdraw from the G5 Sahel has also eroded the regional security architecture. Jihadist activity may spread further into coastal states which has resulted in international partners such as France and the UK redesigning their security assistance strategies for the region.

Coups on the increase again

Since 2020, there have been successful military coups in Burkina Faso (twice), Chad, Guinea, Mali (twice), and Sudan, and failed ones in the CAR, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, and possibly Gambia and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Three national elections illustrate the state of African democracy in 2022. In Angola’s August elections, the ruling MPLA lost its absolute majority with the opposition UNITA winning the majority in Luanda for the first time.




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Independent Thinking: China in Africa, conflicts in 2023

Independent Thinking: China in Africa, conflicts in 2023 Audio NCapeling 13 January 2023

Episode ten discusses Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent, and how the world should be responding to the major conflicts of 2023.

The first episode of 2023 examines Africa and the complex role China plays on the continent as a new Chatham House report highlights 22 African countries suffering from debt distress with Beijing a key creditor to many of them.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang is also touring several African states this week and next, with visits planned to Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, and the headquarters of the African Union (AU).

This week Chatham House also hosted Dr Comfort Ero, president of the International Crisis Group, to discuss ten conflicts to watch in 2023. The panel examines some of the key conflicts mentioned and how the world is responding to them.

Joining Bronwen Maddox on the podcast this week from Chatham House are Dr Alex Vines, director of the Africa programme, Creon Butler, director of the Global Economy and Finance programme, Dr Yu Jie, senior fellow on the Asia-Pacific programme, and Armida van Rij, research fellow with the International Security programme.

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.




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China-Africa relations

China-Africa relations Explainer jon.wallace 18 January 2023

What are China’s objectives in Africa, how valid is the concept of ‘debt trap’ diplomacy, and what are China’s military ambitions in the region?

A brief history of China-Africa relations

Africa has been crucial to China’s foreign policy since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1947. China supported several African liberation movements during the Cold War, and for every year since 1950 bar one, the foreign minister of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has first visited an African country.

China’s new foreign minister Qin Gang visited five African countries and the African Union in January 2023. Wang Yi, the former foreign minister, visited 48 African countries and premier Xi Jinping undertook 10 visits to Africa between 2014 and 2020.

China-Africa relations are the bedrock of China’s foreign policy.
 

Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang, speaking in December 2022

In 1971, the votes of African countries were instrumental in winning the PRC control of China’s seat in the UN General Assembly and Security Council – displacing representatives from Chinese nationalist forces, who had been defeated in the civil war and now governed Taiwan.

In the following decades, China’s focus in Africa switched to eliminating all remaining recognition for Taiwan’s government. Burkina Faso, Malawi, Liberia, Senegal and others all switched their recognition from Taiwan to the PRC. Eswatini is the only African nation still to recognize Taiwan’s government in 2023.

In 1999 China created its ‘Going Out’ strategy, which encouraged Chinese companies to invest beyond China.

The strategy was a statement of China’s growing economic might and created a new wave of Chinese engagement in Africa. It was also an important source of employment for Chinese citizens working on new infrastructure projects.

In November 2003 the first tri-annual Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit was held in Beijing. FOCAC was created to improve cooperation between China and African states and signalled China’s growing strategic initiative in Africa.

Chinese president Xi Jinping delivers his speech during the November 2021 China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in Dakar, Senegal, pledging to offer one billion COVID-19 vaccine doses to Africa. Photo by SEYLLOU/AFP via Getty Images.

In 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched by Xi Jinping, featuring an ambition to reinvigorate the old silk trading route along the East African coast. This should theoretically have seen Chinese investment concentrated in East Africa, but many other African states also sought opportunities through the BRI, making the initiative quickly expand in scope and ambition.

The BRI saw a huge number of signature infrastructure projects built across Asia and Africa, funded by Chinese loans whose size, nature and origin were often opaque. Some African countries became badly exposed to Chinese lending during this period. 

Chinese investment peaked around 2016. Since then, Chinese loans to African governments declined significantly, falling from $28.4 billion in 2016 to $1.9 billion in 2020 – partly due to changing priorities in domestic Chinese politics, and partly due to the apparent difficulty African countries had repaying loans.

China’s investment in Africa

China has taken a position contrary to Western governments in its African investment. It characterizes its loans as mutually beneficial cooperation between developing countries, promising not to interfere in the internal politics of those it loans to.

In this respect it presents itself in contrast to Western countries, who are accused by China and some African governments of arrogant, democratic posturing – often by former colonial powers that looted African resources during the 18th and 19th centuries.

China has learned by doing, and the reality of large-scale investments taught Chinese investors the limits of their approach. For instance, during the South Sudanese civil war, China had to deal with representatives of various forces opposed to the government to maintain the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, operated by the China National Petroleum Corporation.

China has not made significant efforts to export communist ideology in Africa since the Cold War ended.

China has not made significant efforts to export communist ideology in Africa since the Cold War ended, claiming that Chinese communism could not be replicated outside of China.

However, ideological links exist between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the rulers of a state like Ethiopia, whose Prosperity Party has origins in ‘revolutionary democracy’ and Marxist-Leninism.

China’s National People’s Congress has formal relations with 35 African parliaments and the CCP International Liaison Department (ILD) has relations with 110 political parties in 51 African countries.

Western politicians have increasingly voiced fears that China’s intentions in Africa are predatory, intended to create a network of African states that are obliged to service their debts by offering China access to resources, trade opportunities and locations for military bases.

Debt trap diplomacy

US commentators often describe Chinese policy in Africa as a ‘debt trap’, part of a deliberate strategy to loan unmanageable sums to African countries, draw them into China’s sphere of influence, and force unfair commitments upon them.

Some African nations do have extensive Chinese loans and are suffering from out-of-control debt, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine, and high interest rates. But their situations cannot be entirely blamed on Chinese loans. States including Kenya and Zambia have poorly managed their debt to all creditors, not only China.

Meanwhile, other African countries have created realistic, manageable debt arrangements with China without the tremendous risk and uncertainties that characterized some major BRI projects.

China also faces significant problems due to its extensive loans made during the BRI boom period, as it will struggle to force repayment while maintaining its image as a friend of developing nations.

BRI projects were largely uncoordinated and unplanned, with credit offered by competing Chinese lenders. This contradicts the idea of a coherent ‘debt trap’ policy by China.

However, the idea that China may use debt strategically, to expand its influence in the African content and secure access to resources, cannot be completely dismissed. China is an emerging superpower in strategic competition with the US. Building stronger economic relationships in Africa would be a logical step in its aspirations to be a global power.




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Africa’s strategic priorities and global role

Africa’s strategic priorities and global role 27 January 2023 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 January 2023 Chatham House and Online

At this hybrid event, HE John Dramani Mahama, former president of the Republic of Ghana, will discuss his ideas on the key economic and governance reforms required for economic stability and prosperity across Africa.

Ghana recently became the fourth country, after Chad, Ethiopia and Zambia, to seek debt treatment under the G20 Common Framework in January 2023 – reflecting the culmination of a series of internal and external shocks affecting the wider region, including extreme weather events, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

Prospects for economic recovery and growth, nevertheless, remain positive in many parts of the continent, with the African Development Bank (AfDB), for example, reforecasting economic growth of 5.5 per cent in East Africa in 2023. Coordinated reforms can help to deepen regional integration and promote long-term economic prosperity, particularly in light of Africa’s evolving regional economic governance structures, notably the fledgling African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) headquartered in Accra.

At this hybrid event, HE John Dramani Mahama, former president of the Republic of Ghana, will discuss his ideas on the key economic and governance reforms required for economic stability and prosperity across Africa. He will also discuss priorities for regional integration and Africa’s role and responsibilities in global economic governance.




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Building carbon markets that work for Africa

Building carbon markets that work for Africa 31 January 2023 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 January 2023 Online

At this webinar, held in partnership with UNDP, speakers share experiences on carbon market advancement in Africa, highlighting challenges and obstacles.

Carbon finance offers a major opening towards meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement but progress across regions has been uneven, with the African continent accounting for just 15 per cent of voluntary carbon credits issued globally in 2021.

Harnessing the potential of carbon markets may offer one route towards closing the significant shortfall in climate financing for Africa, as well as accelerating transition in cooking and energy solutions and limiting deforestation.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement requires significant adjustment of regulatory and policy frameworks at national level in order to align with emerging global imperatives within carbon markets. Various stakeholders, including the private sector, need to take these realities into considerations as they seek to meet commitments towards a more sustainable future.

Governments and the private sector alike need to address the obstacles that have held back Africa’s participation in carbon markets, and should explore all options including both the compliance and voluntary markets, and market-based alternatives such as emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes.

At this webinar, held in partnership with UNDP, speakers share experiences on carbon market advancement in Africa, highlighting challenges and obstacles. Speakers also explore in-country experiences and make proposals on how Africa might benefit from a functional global carbon market.




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Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030: Lessons from Mozambique

Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030: Lessons from Mozambique 17 February 2023 — 7:00AM TO 9:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2023 Addis Ababa and online

A hybrid event in Addis Ababa reflecting on Mozambique’s 2019 peace agreement and the lessons it offers for the African Union’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ agenda by 2030.

This event will explore opportunities for furthering the AU’s Silencing the Guns agenda by 2030 to assist Africa’s transformative development, highlighting lessons learnt from Mozambique’s experience.

The ‘Silencing the Guns in Africa’ agenda, a flagship initiative of the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063, aspires to end all wars and conflict, prevent genocide, and stop gender-based violence.

The 2019 peace agreement in Mozambique and the subsequent disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process supported by the United Nations (UN) but implemented by Mozambique’s government and institutions, provides experience and learning for other continental conflicts that have recently ended or resumed.

Mozambique is seeking to break from the cyclical ‘conflict trap’ where once a country experiences one civil war, it is significantly more likely to experience additional episodes of violence.

Since the end of Mozambique’s civil war in 1992, targeted armed conflict by RENAMO resumed in 2013 and ended through the new agreement in August 2019. The final reintegration into civilian life of former Mozambican combatants of opposition RENAMO will be completed in 2023.

Mozambique and Switzerland – a key supporter of successive Mozambican peace processes – have become non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for the first time in their respective histories.

At a moment when old vulnerabilities and new threats are apparent on the African continent, this seminar, held by Chatham House in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), explores opportunities to furthering the AU’s Silencing the Guns agenda by 2030 to assist Africa’s transformative development, as outlined by the UNDP in a report published in February 2022.

This hybrid event is held in partnership with the African Union Commission and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

This event will also be broadcast live via the Africa Programme Facebook page.




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Africa Aware: Towards just transition in Africa

Africa Aware: Towards just transition in Africa Audio NCapeling 1 March 2023

African countries face collective climate and job creation-related challenges, yet policymaking often remains regionally siloed.

This podcast reflects on the key policy messages from the Africa programme’s series on Towards just transition: Connecting green financing and sustainable job creation in Africa.

African countries face collective climate and job creation-related challenges. Yet policymaking often remains regionally siloed according to differing political, energy sector and ecological realities.

This output is part of a stream of work supported by the Chatham House Sustainability Accelerator and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 




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Africa Aware: Supply chains, land contestation, conflict

Africa Aware: Supply chains, land contestation, conflict Audio NCapeling 30 March 2023

This episode examines relations between Ethiopia and Sudan as part of an XCEPT project mini-series.

The war in northern Ethiopia since November 2020, and subsequent conquest of disputed farmlands in Al-Fashaga by the Sudanese army on the Ethiopia-Sudan border, has brought into focus the importance of agricultural commodities such as sesame as a potential driver of land contestation and conflict.  The panel discusses the interrelation of commodity and conflict supply chains, land contestation, and boundary disputes in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on the regions of Wolkait/Western Tigray in northwest Ethiopia and Al Fashaga in eastern Sudan. This podcast was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) project, funded by UK Aid from the UK government.




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Middle East and North Africa

Middle East and North Africa

Research on the Middle East and North Africa region focuses on changes to politics and society, economics, and security issues.

nfaulds-adams… 20 January 2020

This is a turbulent period for the region following the Arab Spring, with conflict in Syria continuing to impact its neighbours, governance in Libya under scrutiny, and increasing pressures on the Gulf monarchies, especially around human rights.   

Key research areas include the Gulf States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the future of the state, mapping the region’s war economies, the Yemen conflict, Iraq’s reconstruction, and the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran.




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The ProteoRed MIAPE web toolkit: A user-friendly framework to connect and share proteomics standards [Technology]

The development of the HUPO-PSI's (Proteomics Standards Initiative) standard data formats and MIAPE (Minimum Information About a Proteomics Experiment) guidelines should improve proteomics data sharing within the scientific community. Proteomics journals have encouraged the use of these standards and guidelines to improve the quality of experimental reporting and ease the evaluation and publication of manuscripts. However, there is an evident lack of bioinformatics tools specifically designed to create and edit standard file formats and reports, or embed them within proteomics workflows. In this article, we describe a new web-based software suite (The ProteoRed MIAPE web toolkit) that performs several complementary roles related to proteomic data standards. Firstly, it can verify the reports fulfill the minimum information requirements of the corresponding MIAPE modules, highlighting inconsistencies or missing information. Secondly, the toolkit can convert several XML-based data standards directly into human readable MIAPE reports stored within the ProteoRed MIAPE repository. Finally, it can also perform the reverse operation, allowing users to export from MIAPE reports into XML files for computational processing, data sharing or public database submission. The toolkit is thus the first application capable of automatically linking the PSI's MIAPE modules with the corresponding XML data exchange standards, enabling bidirectional conversions. This toolkit is freely available at http://www.proteored.org/MIAPE/.




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Tackling Illegal Wildlife Trade in Africa: Economic Incentives and Approaches

Tackling Illegal Wildlife Trade in Africa: Economic Incentives and Approaches Research paper sysadmin 5 October 2018

Combating illegal wildlife trade and further pursuing conservation-development models could help generate considerable economic benefits for African countries, while ensuring the long-term preservation of Africa’s wealth of natural capital.

Field scout recording desert black rhino data, Save the Rhino Trust, Palmwag, Torra Conservancy, Damaraland, Namibia. Photo: Mint Images/Frans Lanting/Getty Images.

Summary

  • The illegal wildlife trade (IWT) significantly impacts African economies by destroying and corroding natural, human and social capital stocks. This hinders the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and has an impact on national budgets. Illicit financial flows from IWT deny revenue to governments where legal wildlife product trade exists and perpetuate cash externalization. IWT diverts national budgets away from social or development programmes, increases insecurity and threatens vulnerable populations.
  • In expanding wildlife economies and pursuing conservation-driven development models, governments can protect their citizens, derive revenue from wildlife products, and establish world class tourism offerings. The illegal exploitation of wildlife is often due to a failure to enforce rights over those resources, where rights are unclearly defined or not fully exercised. Southern African countries have defined these rights in various ways, contributing to regional differences in conservation practices and the socio-economic benefits derived from wildlife resources. Combating IWT is an important step towards allowing legitimate business and communities to develop livelihoods that incentivize stewardship and connect people to conservation.
  • The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has several framework policies for the establishment of transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs). These promote local stewardship across multiple land-use areas to conserve biodiversity and increase the welfare and socioeconomic development of rural communities. Private-sector partnerships also increase skills transfer, improve access to investment finance, and expand economic opportunities, including through the promotion of local procurement. The economic benefits of TFCAs extend beyond tourism.
  • The economic value of African ecosystems is often under-recognized because they remain unquantified, partly due to the lack of available data on the broader economic costs of IWT. Improved monitoring and evaluation with key performance indicators would help governments and citizens to appreciate the economic value of combating IWT.




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The Justice Laboratory: International Law in Africa

The Justice Laboratory: International Law in Africa Book dora.popova 30 March 2022

The Justice Laboratory is the first major study of the institutions created to enforce international criminal justice standards in Sub-Saharan Africa, including the UN tribunal for the Rwandan genocide.

Since the Second World War, the United Nations and other international actors have created laws, treaties, and institutions to punish perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. But international criminal justice now seems to be a declining force — its energy sapped by long delays in prosecutions, lagging public attention, and a globally rising authoritarianism that disregards legal niceties.

The Justice Laboratory reviews five examples of international criminal justice as they have been applied across Africa, where brutal civil conflicts in recent decades resulted in varying degrees of global attention and action.

Written in an accessible style, the book explores the connections between politics and the doctrine of international criminal law. Highlighting little-known institutional examples and under-discussed political situations, the book contributes to a broader international understanding of African politics and international criminal justice, and the lessons African experiences can offer to other countries.

This book is part of the Insights series.

 

Praise for The Justice Laboratory

Integrating legal and political analysis, Kerstin Bree Carlson provides a highly accessible and provocative examination of the promises and pitfalls of seeking accountability in a range of contemporary international criminal justice interventions in Africa.

Victor Peskin, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University

About the author

Kerstin Bree Carlson is associate professor of international law at the Department of Social Science and Business, Roskilde University, where she teaches topics in law and society, global studies, international politics, and Nordic migration.

Purchase




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First mpox vaccines arrive in Africa as officials work “blindly” to contain outbreaks




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Mpox is accelerating antimicrobial resistance in Africa, officials warn




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South Africa Needs a Strategic Vision for Its Continent

South Africa Needs a Strategic Vision for Its Continent Expert comment sysadmin 24 November 2017

South Africa has the potential to catalyse growth across its sub-region and the continent, but the government must develop a comprehensive strategy that aligns political, ideological and commercial interests.

Departure lounge at OR Tambo International Airport near Johannesburg. Photo: Getty Images.

South Africa’s status as the ‘gateway to Africa’ is under serious threat. Its companies continue to flourish, but complex relationships at home and abroad constrain government capacity to match its economic dominance with political reach and influence.

South Africa’s policies towards the rest of the continent are often accused of being inconsistent and incoherent. It has been a development partner to the region and to international donors; a moral leader, championing human rights and exporting its own model of transition; and an advocate and representative for the continent in international forums. However, it has simultaneously been accused of exploiting its economic dominance at the expense of its neighbours; handicapped by the political debts owed by the ANC to other liberation movements for their assistance in the struggle; and criticized for its arrogance in seeking to position itself as the ‘legitimate’ voice of Africa.

At the same time, reputational risks, a weakened policy environment and poor growth have taken the shine off South Africa’s ‘Gateway to Africa’ rhetoric. South Africa faces considerable domestic economic issues. Growth forecasts have fallen from 1.3 to 0.7 per cent, State owned enterprises are a huge burden on the treasury, and the forecast budget deficit is R50.8 billion (£2.7 billion), at a time when the cost of borrowing is increasing following downgrades of the country’s credit ratings.

Political risk is high, lowering investor confidence. Corruption, poor service delivery and the government’s under-delivery on citizen’s expectations are exacerbating social tensions in a country with expanded unemployment at 36.4 per cent, and one of the highest rates of inequality in the world. McKinsey, KPMG and HSBC have all become entangled in scandal relating to their dealings with government entities that have become ‘captured’ by private interests.

Despite these concerns, South Africa nonetheless remains the backbone of the regional economy, and its firms are key players across the continent. Johannesburg hosts the deepest and most sophisticated capital market on the continent, and Pretoria has one of the highest numbers of diplomatic missions in the world. ESKOM provides around 75 per cent of the electricity contribution to the Southern Africa SADC Power pool – comprising 12 countries, including those as far north as DRC and Tanzania – and South African ports facilitate over half of sub-Saharan Africa’s non-commodity trade with the rest of the world.

Post-apartheid expansion across the continent by South African companies was initially met with resistance, but these relationships have improved significantly – and South African firms retain significant advantages. South African retailers have the scale to incorporate regional producers into continental supply chains, purchasing fresh produce at a competitive price from regional agri-businesses, then re-selling further afield. For example, Zambeef supplies meat from Zambia to Shoprite stores in west Africa.

African companies in turn rely on South Africa as a significant consumer of goods, services and primary commodities. A South African government agreement with the DRC to import about half of the electricity that will be produced by a new grand-scale hydro-power project guaranteed its bankability. Mozambique is looking to maximize the potential of its world-class natural gas reserves by building a pipeline into South Africa, thus benefitting from the purchasing power of South African parastatal electricity utility firm ESKOM.

But South Africa’s status as an economic hegemon is not mirrored in its political relationships. South Africa’s GDP is five times higher than the six countries with which it shares a border, combined. But successive ANC governments have been unable to fully flex this economic muscle. Partly this is a legacy of history. It is not forgotten that the regional economic body, the Southern African Development Community, originated as the organization of Front Line States coordinating efforts to end apartheid, and ZANU-PF officials in Zimbabwe lecture their ANC counterparts on liberation.

The pan-African vision of former president Thabo Mbeki, and promotion of South Africa’s transition as a model for the continent, reflected the values that have driven ANC policy since the end of apartheid. But the coherence of South Africa’s foreign policy has been undermined by conflict and contradiction within the government. Appetite for engagement in Africa is dwindling. The country’s ability to project military influence across the continent is in critical decline. Jacob Zuma’s use of regional political bodies as a means of removing political rivals from domestic politics has corroded goodwill.

A new Africa Programme research paper argues that a fresh approach to South African engagement on the continent is both possible and necessary. South Africa can use its relative economic weight to play a stronger developmental role, leveraging the strengths of its business sector and its financial agencies. But it must match this with stronger and more cooperative political engagement, particularly through cultivating relationships with pivotal states such as Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and Angola.

In December, the ANC will elect a new leader to take the party into elections in 2019. Both leading candidates have international experience – Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was the chair of the African Union, and Cyril Ramaphosa has led regional responses to crises in South Sudan, Lesotho and Burundi. South Africa still has considerable foreign policy resources at its disposal. A new strategic vision for Africa that unites the interests of government and business, both domestically and in partner states, can deliver prosperity for both South Africa and the region – and need not contradict the values that have shaped South Africa’s aspirations for the continent in the post-apartheid era.




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Mugabe’s Fall Is a Wake-Up Call for Africa’s Leaders

Mugabe’s Fall Is a Wake-Up Call for Africa’s Leaders Expert comment sysadmin 27 November 2017

The continent’s long-standing leaders will come under increasing pressure to demonstrate their societal value. Some will become more oppressive; others may conclude that their time has expired.

Robert Mugabe is sworn in for another term in 2008. Photo: Getty Images.

The end of the Mugabe presidency in Zimbabwe – with the swearing in of Emmerson Mnangagwa in Harare on Friday – is being watched closely across Africa, and especially by its long-standing leaders.

Currently, 30 per cent of African countries are ruled by long-standing rulers, defined as heads of state that have ruled for more than 10 years. Africa is not unique in this respect (Central Asia also has its share of ageing leaders), but Africa has a long tradition, and about a fifth of all African heads of state since independence can be classified as long-standing.

A recent study, African Futures: Horizon 2025, by the European Union Institute of Security Studies (and which this writer contributed to), shows that long-standing rulers in Africa are reducing in number. President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola stepped down voluntarily in September after almost 38 years in office, and Yahya Jammeh of Gambia was forced out after 23 years in office in early 2017. Robert Mugabe was forced out as leader earlier this week after 37 years.

This still leaves a cluster of other ageing leaders: Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea (38 years); Paul Biya of Cameroon (35 years); Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (31 years); Omar al-Bashir of Sudan (28 years); and eight others.

Many of them are coming under increased internal pressure. Demonstrations against Togo’s Faure Gnassingbé in Lome over the summer resulted in him agreeing that any future president could stand for only two terms. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila is also under increased pressure to agree to elections, after 16 years in power.

Within all of this, there is a pattern of leaders in west and southern Africa adopting the principle of only serving two terms.

De-facto monarchies

Long-standing rulers still thrive in central Africa and its Great Lakes region. Presidents here have successfully changed constitutions to remain in office. They include Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. Zimbabwe will be a warning to them that they should not assume that they will be able to behave as de-facto monarchies, leaving office only after dying of natural causes and handing power over to their family.

Robert Mugabe’s intention to hand power to his wife, Grace, spectacularly backfired. As a couple of Zimbabwe military officials dryly commented: ‘Leadership is not sexually transmitted.’ Former president Hosni Mubarak in Egypt also miscalculated by trying to groom his son, although Ali Bongo Ondimba succeeded his father as president of Gabon after his father died. Equatorial Guinea is still heading for a crisis as President Obiang is grooming his deeply unpopular playboy son, Teodorin, to succeed him.

What Zimbabwe reminds us is that, with the exception of central Africa, there will be more long-standing leaders in Africa disappearing over the coming decade. This is due partly to pressure and partly to their ageing: 13 current long-standing rulers are aged between 65 and 84 years old. This means there will be more transitions taking place such as the one that occurred in Zimbabwe on Friday or the smooth one in Angola in September, when president dos Santos stepped down and handed power to João Lourenço.

This is good news for Africa, which has the most youthful and fastest-growing population in the world. It is the second-largest and second-most populated continent. More than 40 per cent of Africans are under 15, and 20 per cent are between 15 and 24. By 2050, one third of the world’s youth population will live in Africa, up from one fifth in 2012. This means a dramatic disconnect is developing between long-standing leaders and their population.

Generational politics was visible over the past week in Zimbabwe and in the end the older generation prevailed through military intervention. This is transitional politics, and there is likely to be more of it.

Increasing pressure

Other long-serving leaders like Museveni have watched closely. Museveni has already responded to shore up support of his military by giving them a significant pay rise. There is likely to be more investment in the military by Africa’s long-standing leaders in the coming months.

Change in Africa comes in fits and starts. The fall of Mugabe is a reminder that Africa is dynamic and change is occurring all the time. Africa’s long-standing leaders will come under increasing pressure to demonstrate their societal value. Some will become more oppressive; others may conclude that their time has expired and that they should welcome a transition.

This is the key lesson of Angola – where president dos Santos willingly retired after 37 years in power. Mugabe dreamed of dying in office and being succeeded by his wife – and was forced out by the military. I predict both models will be repeated in Africa in coming years.

This article was originally published in the Irish Times.




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Tsvangirai Leaves an Important Political Legacy in Southern Africa

Tsvangirai Leaves an Important Political Legacy in Southern Africa Expert comment sysadmin 21 February 2018

The story of Zimbabwe’s ‘people’s champion’ offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.

Supporters hold up a poster of Morgan Tsvangirai during a memorial service in Harare. Photo: Getty Images.

The death of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai is a loss for Zimbabwe. In nearly three decades of speaking truth to power, Tsvangirai helped to change his nation and the region.

Southern Africa’s new politics

His death marks a period of transition for regional governments and opposition parties alike. The Zuma era has ended in South Africa while Mozambique, Namibia and Angola have also seen political transitions, pushing modernization agendas to appeal to young citizenries that increasingly see politics in separate terms from the liberationist struggles of the previous generation.

Regional opposition movements also face winds of change: the longstanding opposition leader in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Etienne Tshekedi, passed away in 2017, and Mozambique’s Afonso Dhlakama and Kenya’s Raila Odinga are both aging. These movements similarly need to appeal to a younger audience or risk losing relevance.

From trade unionist to opposition leader

Tsvangirai’s career is an eloquent illustration of these challenges. Born in Buhera in rural eastern Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai worked in textiles and mining before politics – diverse experience which gave him crucial exposure to the lives of ordinary people across the country. In his early years, he also worked for ZANU-PF, before leaving to forge his own political path. He became increasingly active in mining politics, rising to the executive of the National Mineworker’s Union and, in 1989, to secretary-general of the powerful Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

In the late 1990’s, Zimbabwe was riven by questions over land, war veterans, the Congo conflict, a shrinking economy and growing doubts about ZANU-PF itself. Opposition leaders of the time could not answer them; those such as Edgar Tekere and Margaret Dongo struggled to win support beyond their local constituencies, and liberation leader Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU had been merged with ZANU-PF in the 1987 Unity Accord.

But in 2000, Zimbabwe’s ‘perfect storm’ of a divisive constitutional referendum, land redistribution and a June election made Tsvangirai and the newly minted MDC, formed in 1999, a national rival to ZANU-PF. Through subsequent national elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013, Zimbabwe remained polarized between competing visions of Zimbabwe future: ZANU-PF’s powerful black liberationist politics of identity and the opposition’s equally compelling liberal democracy agenda.

Tsvangirai’s achievement was to provide a credible alternative to liberation icon Robert Mugabe. Tsvangirai also resuscitated Zimbabwe’s tradition of urban nationalism, and was a successor to Benjamin Burombo and other mid-century Zimbabwean urban leaders. Tsvangirai would in turn be a touchstone for contemporary urban activists Evans Mawarire, Linda Masarira and others.

From opposition to coalition

The political struggle for Zimbabwe became global, with Mugabe and Tsvangirai both winning support from rival international power blocs. In March 2007, pictures of a beaten and bloodied Tsvangirai helped to galvanize support for the MDC in the 2008 elections. But the disputed result and violent subsequent run-off between Tsvangirai and Mugabe led the regional community to push both men into a coalition government, with Tsvangirai as prime minister.

Despite continuous ructions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) held, and stabilized Zimbabwe’s collapsed economy, until 2013. Although often politically out-manoeuvred by Mugabe, Tsvangirai deserves credit for getting the opposition a share of political power and for holding his nerve against many who wanted to collapse the GNU.

Tsvangirai was no saint; his complicated love life, and tacit approval of violent attacks on party dissenters, do him no credit. More importantly, the MDC neglected its grassroots supporters during the GNU, and paid the price in its comprehensive 2013 electoral defeat. But although diminished, Tsvangirai remained Zimbabwe’s most popular opposition politician, and the MDC’s new leaders will have quite a task ahead of them, even if they have been planning since his courageous 2016 public admission of colon cancer.

The MDC after Tsvangirai

Nelson Chamisa, one of the three MDC vice presidents, has now been appointed as acting president by the party’s national committee. Chamisa inherits a fractured and fractious party, and one which has also fallen out with the Tsvangirai family. The other two vice presidents, Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri, have also set their sights on party leadership.

At 40, Chamisa, an orator with grassroots appeal, has a huge task. With general elections due by July, he has to unite the party, counter Zimbabwe’s rising ethno-politics, prove himself as leader of a broader opposition coalition and take on a resurgent President Emmerson Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF.

Electorally, the opposition’s strongest card has always been the urban vote and the economy. But Mnangagwa has fast forwarded a comprehensive economic reform and internationalist agenda. This, and Mugabe’s exit, have forced Chamisa, Joice Mujuru and other opposition leaders to play catch-up. Zimbabwe’s elections, the first since 2000 without Mugabe and Tsvangirai as contenders, will be of global interest as the country navigates the new political dynamics.

The people’s champion

Morgan Tsvangirai’s resilience earned him respect from friends and foes alike, with Zimbabwe’s President Mnangagwa and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga visiting him at home a few weeks ago. A former nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, Tsvangirai, popularly known by his totem of ‘Save’ and also called mudhara [the old man] deserves national hero status. He will certainly be remembered as the ‘people’s champion’, and a pioneer in bridging the generational and ideological fissures that have shaped Southern Africa’s politics.

With their leader now gone, the turbulent MDC will undoubtedly be hoping for a ‘remembrance vote’ in his memory to carry them through the elections. But beyond that, his story offers a powerful example to a region in need of new political compromises.




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South Africa's Land Reform Quandary: Scenarios and Policy

South Africa's Land Reform Quandary: Scenarios and Policy 10 July 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 13 June 2018 Chatham House, London

Slow delivery on expectations of land redistribution in South Africa has once again put the issue at the forefront of political debate in the country. A parliamentary public consultation process will consider whether constitutional change is required to accelerate expropriation without compensation. Policymakers face dual - often opposing - pressures due to investors’ fears of negative economic impacts as well as citizens’ frustrations over persistent inequality and hardship. State land and tribal trust land remain contentious issues for rural economic development, but with two thirds of the population now living in urban areas policy responses must be as cognizant of the country’s future as it is of its past.

At this meeting, Terence Corrigan, project manager at the South African Institute of Race Relations, will discuss the current debates on expropriation and present the institute’s latest research on future scenarios of land reform in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.




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Higher Education in South Africa: Demands for Inclusion and the Challenges of Reform

Higher Education in South Africa: Demands for Inclusion and the Challenges of Reform 17 October 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2018 Chatham House, London

South Africa’s higher education system has come to represent public controversy and intense contestation around the social justice debates that affect the whole of society. The #RhodesMustFall campaign at the University of Cape Town encapsulated national students’ concerns about institutional racism and the slow pace of transformation at all of the country’s universities. The #FeesMustFall movement that emanated from the University of Witwatersrand garnered national support for providing access for poor black students to affordable and high quality education.
South Africa’s universities and government are faced with the challenge of ensuring that all of the country’s citizens have equitable and inclusive access to higher education in a way that protects the institutions as safe spaces for debate, maintains international competitiveness and represents an efficient use of limited available resources.
At this meeting, Professor Adam Habib will reflect on the successes and failures of social protests in South Africa and the challenges they pose for advancing social justice.




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South Africa’s 2019 Election: Polling Data and Party Prospects

South Africa’s 2019 Election: Polling Data and Party Prospects 13 March 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 March 2019 Chatham House, London

On 8 May 2019, South Africans will vote in their sixth national election. Incumbent President Cyril Ramaphosa is leading his ANC party campaign, which promises inclusive economic growth and social transformation, including through a sustainable land reform programme. However, public frustrations with the party’s record of service delivery and government corruption after 25 years in power could threaten the ANC’s electoral dominance especially in urban areas.

At this meeting, Professor David Everatt, head of the Wits School of Governance and political pollster, will present polling data and discuss the prospects and strategies of the main parties and their leaders ahead of the May election.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.




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South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities

South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities 16 May 2019 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 May 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government that emerges from the 8 May election in South Africa faces immediate domestic and international foreign policy demands. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate job growth, accelerating anti-corruption and good governance efforts are at the forefront of the new government’s agenda.

International ambitions will be upgraded such as UN security council reform, maximizing South Africa’s G20, BRICS and IBSA membership and preparing for South Africa’s chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2020.

At this meeting, the speakers – Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of SAIIA and author with Nobantu Mbeki of A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of SAIIA and currently co-editing a volume on A South African Foreign Policy for the 2020s which will be published in 2019 – will reflect on the election and discuss the new government’s domestic and international policy agenda. The meeting will be chaired by Ann Grant, former British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05) with past experience working for Oxfam, Standard Chartered Bank and Tullow Oil.




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Ramaphosa Must Act Fast With New Mandate in South Africa

Ramaphosa Must Act Fast With New Mandate in South Africa Expert comment sysadmin 23 May 2019

In the wake of South Africa’s election, political constraints will ebb momentarily. The president should seize the opportunity to deliver meaningful change.

Cyril Ramaphosa addresses the crowd during an ANC election victory rally in Johannesburg. Photo via Getty Images.

On 25 May, Cyril Ramaphosa will be inaugurated as president of South Africa, having dragged the African National Congress (ANC) over the line in the 8 May election. The ANC gained a 57 per cent majority, its lowest vote since 1994, its status as national liberator deeply eroded by successive corruption scandals. Only Ramaphosa’s personal popularity stopped it haemorrhaging more support.

His sustained action against corrupt public servants and promises of job-creating economic growth has attracted support from beyond the ANC’s base, including a significant minority of white voters, and generated significant international goodwill. Ramaphosa now has a short window of opportunity to reset social democracy in South Africa before the political cycle of municipal, party and national elections from 2021 to 2024 forces his attention back to party politics.

Defining ‘Ramaphosa-ism’

But personal popularity is fickle, and goodwill alone will not turn around the ailing economy. To attract investment and keep the electorate on side, Ramaphosa’s government needs to move beyond pragmatic crisis responses and articulate a clear, shared vision for how market intervention can allow the economy to grow while simultaneously delivering social transformation.

Growth will be hard to achieve in the short term. The economy is expected to grow 1.2% in 2019 and 1.5% in 2020, according to the IMF. Consumer confidence remains subdued, and a decade of declining GDP per capita and increasing inequality has put a strain on households. A ‘fiscal stimulus’ in 2018 delivered very little new government spending, and over the past 10 years, the government wage bill has increased three times higher than the rate of inflation.

Eskom, the state electricity provider, has debts equating to the GDP of Latvia and is not the only state-owned enterprise (SOE) that has required bailing out by the government. There are plans to break up Eskom into three separate entities but calls for deeper reform – or even privatization – are growing.

The president’s responses to these challenges will go a long way to defining ‘Ramaphosa-ism’ and the role of government in pursuing equitable economy growth.

Economic expectations under Ramaphosa

Ramaphosa was a champion of the introduction of a minimum wage and a proponent of the National Development Plan, which relies on growth to drive job creation. His support for land reform is an individual conviction as much as it is a party line, although his views are softer than many in the party, with state-owned land being the initial target.

Investor uncertainty on land tenure and regulations in mining will need to be addressed through passing key pieces of legislation on land reform and the revised Mining and Petroleum Resources Development Act.

Where Ramaphosa differs from his predecessors is his links with business. Thabo Mbeki enjoyed a relationship of mutual respect with business; this disintegrated under Jacob Zuma. Ramaphosa, however, is part of South Africa’s business community, having founded the Shanduka Group, with investments in multiple sectors including retail, telecoms and extractives, and served as chairman of MTN and Bidvest. As president, he has surrounded himself with close economic advisers from business and banking.

In the short term, anti-corruption measures and competent appointments will ease investor woes. In the long term, there is a need to improve the ease of doing business, including labour market reforms, and to make South Africa a more competitive business environment by reducing the hold of large conglomerates on the economy. Ramaphosa may also make greater use of public-private partnerships for large projects.

Political constraints

Ramaphosa faces few immediate political challenges. The ANC is still deeply divided, but although Ramaphosa does not enjoy the ideological support of the entire party, his opponents are leaderless post-Zuma, and have been unable to offer a coherent alternative. ANC Secretary General Ace Magashule has fallen into the role of interim figurehead of this faction, and allegations of corruption would make it difficult for him to aspire to national leadership.

The need to avoid splits before the election meant Ramaphosa had to make concessions, and his first cabinet in February 2018 included opponents and those accused of corruption or incompetence, such as Malusi Gigaba and Bathabile Dlamini. Such concessions to political opponents are unlikely to continue after the election.

Meanwhile, opposition parties made some advances in the election, but where Zuma was an easy target, they are still grappling with how to confront Ramaphosa. The party with the biggest gains was the Economic Freedom Fighters, whose increase of just over 4 points from the last election gave it 11 per cent of the vote this time. They will likely continue to be an effective disruptor. Ramaphosa may also be challenged by trade unions on his reforms, notably over any break-up of SOEs.

But the biggest and most immediate external political challenge for Ramaphosa will be rebuilding trust between government and society, in a context where social protest has become an alternative form of political participation. A turnout of 65 per cent may be considered normal in Western democracies but is a notable drop for a country as politicized as South Africa, driven by frustration and a sense of exclusion as much as apathy. Turnout by young people was even lower.

Achieving the vision

South Africa has all the platforms it needs to project its renewal and attract vital external investment – it is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, it will take over as chair of the African Union in 2020, it is a member of BRICS and it is the only African member of the G20. But in the recent past, it has struggled to tell a coherent story about its vision for the future and offer to the world.

In the immediate wake of the election, internal and external political constraints will ebb. Ramaphosa must act fast to deliver results before the election cycle starts again. To attract much needed investment stimulus, he will not only need to articulate and market his vision for South Africa, but also outline how he plans to achieve it.




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Economic Recovery and Anticorruption in South Africa: Assessing Progress on the Reform Agenda

Economic Recovery and Anticorruption in South Africa: Assessing Progress on the Reform Agenda 4 December 2019 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 25 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

South Africa has significant economic potential based on its resource endowment, quality human capital and well-developed infrastructure compared to the region. However, the country’s economic growth rate has not topped 2 per cent since 2013, and in 2018, was below 1 per cent. This has put a strain on citizens and communities in a country that still suffers from structural inequality, poverty and high unemployment. Economic recovery and anti-corruption were the central pillars of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s 2019 electoral campaign and he has set an investment target of $100 billion. However, voters and investors alike are demanding faster and more visible progress from the country’s enigmatic leader who has a reputation for caution and calculation.

At this event, Professor Nick Binedell will discuss the progress of and opposition to the president’s economic reform agenda and the opportunities for international investment to support long term inclusive and sustainable growth in South Africa.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.




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Can Liberation Movements Really Rid Southern Africa of Corruption?

Can Liberation Movements Really Rid Southern Africa of Corruption? Expert comment sysadmin 16 December 2019

Southern Africa’s national liberation movements have survived ‘end of decade’ elections across the region. Combating corruption has been at the heart of many of the campaigns, but the question is can they succeed?

Supporters of the Namibian incumbent president and ruling party South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) presidential candidate Hage Geingob cheer and dance. Photo by GIANLUIGI GUERCIA/AFP via Getty Images.

Swapo’s victory in Namibia two weeks ago was the last in a series of recent ‘end of decade’ elections that have returned dominant parties to power across Southern Africa. However, the “enduring appeal of liberation” is wearing thin.

Experiences across the region show that if governments are to deliver on their electoral promises, they must empower institutions, actively promote a culture of accountability and transparency within their party ranks and pursue economic reforms that untangle the web of party-state-business alliances. Such actions are critical for the survival of national liberation movements as the dominant force in the politics of Southern Africa – but will be difficult to implement.

Avoid political factionalism

South Africa, Botswana, Angola and Zimbabwe all saw new presidents take over just before elections. All used the rhetoric of anti-corruption to distance themselves from the tainted image of their predecessors. But acting on this requires a shift in mind-set in parties that have always preferred to deal with their problems behind closed doors. High profile adversaries from past regimes make tempting targets but could also drive party divisions.

In Angola, the transition of power was safeguarded by an agreement that former president José Eduardo dos Santos would be immune from prosecution. But this week his son faced corruption charges before the country’s supreme court, a high-profile example of a wave of anti-corruption cases across Southern Africa, driven by dominant parties wary of their future.

The allegations against José Filemino De Sousa Dos Santos, nickname ‘Zenu’, include a $500-million fraud involving the country’s central bank. Pressure is also mounting on Zenu’s sister Isabel — once prominent in Angola, she is now absent from public life.

Other leaders have had to tread more carefully. Immunity was a luxury Cyril Ramaphosa was neither willing nor politically able to grant Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Reliant on a few close allies at the top of the party, Ramaphosa lacks foot soldiers at the grassroots level, and his campaign against corruption within the ANC has faced persistent opposition.

Rebuilding institutions and empowering authorities takes time, and with few high-profile cases to point to, people are getting restless. This is also the case in Zimbabwe, where a worsening economic situation has left policy reformers politically isolated.

Party, state, and business

Long term incumbency has blurred the distinction between the party and the state. Liberation movements have created vast party-linked business empires. Political allegiance grants access to economic resources through appointments to lucrative positions in state-owned enterprises, preferential bids for tenders and licenses, and direct access to decision makers.

In Angola, this was fuelled by oil revenues. In South Africa, state capture flourished in an environment where the ANC and its constituent elements had significant power on the panels that chose leaders for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In Namibia, an Icelandic fishing company paid backhanders to officials for fishing rights in what has become known as the ‘Fishrot’ scandal. Zanu-PF officials’ access to preferential foreign exchange rates present them with lucrative opportunities in Zimbabwe.

Ending this bureaucratic rent seeking goes beyond appointing ‘clean’ officials, which has been central to the anti-corruption campaigns in Angola and South Africa. Governments must also allow scrutiny of the state and empower those institutions designed for that role, such as the National Prosecuting Authority and the Public Protector in South Africa. Zimbabwe’s auditor general has published an in-depth report of the state of corruption in the country’s SOEs.

Companies must also be held to account for their role in aiding, and at worst directly benefitting, from state graft. International businesses have actively sought to benefit from corruption. They are now starting to face the consequences. A former Credit Suisse banker has pleaded guilty in the US over handling alleged kickbacks in Mozambique’s $2-billion “tuna bond” scandal. Global banks and consultancies continue to feel the squeeze for their complicity in state capture in South Africa.

Competition and pluralism

National liberation movements may only have a limited window within which to act. Across the region civil society campaigns and investigative journalists have shed light on some of the worst abuses of power. Anti-corruption campaigns are starting to bite. The state will continue to play a central role in Southern African economies, an important arbiter of economic transformation able to balance the region’s highly unequal and resource-dependent economies.

But opposition, civil society and the media are also critical for the progression towards democratic competition and pluralism in Southern Africa. Parliaments remain vital for holding rulers to account. Long used to unchallenged dominance, liberation movements have significant adjustments to make to rise to the challenge of a new era.

This article was originally published in the Mail and Guardian.