Thermal proteome profiling (TPP) allows for the unbiased detection of drug – target protein engagements in vivo. Traditionally, one cell type is used for TPP studies, with the risk of missing important differentially expressed target proteins. The use of whole organisms would circumvent this problem. Zebrafish embryos are amenable to such an approach. Here, we used TPP on whole zebrafish embryo lysate to identify protein targets of napabucasin, a compound that may affect Signal transducer and activator of transcription 3 (Stat3) signaling through an ill-understood mechanism. In zebrafish embryos, napabucasin induced developmental defects consistent with inhibition of Stat3 signaling. TPP profiling showed no distinct shift in Stat3 upon napabucasin treatment, but effects were detected on the oxidoreductase, Pora, which might explain effects on Stat3 signaling. Interestingly, thermal stability of several aldehyde dehydrogenases (Aldhs) was affected. Moreover, napabucasin activated ALDH enzymatic activity in vitro. Aldhs have crucial roles in retinoic acid metabolism and functionally we validated napabucasin-mediated activation of the retinoic acid pathway in zebrafish in vivo. We conclude that TPP profiling in whole zebrafish embryo lysate is feasible and facilitates direct correlation of in vivo effects of small molecule drugs with their protein targets.

The Rhizobium-legume symbiosis is a beneficial interaction in which the bacterium converts atmospheric nitrogen into ammonia and delivers it to the plant in exchange for carbon compounds. This symbiosis implies the adaptation of bacteria to live inside host plant cells. In this work we apply RP-LC-MS/MS and  iTRAQ techniques to study the proteomic profile of endosymbiotic cells (bacteroids) induced by Rhizobium leguminosarum bv viciae strain UPM791 in legume nodules. Nitrogenase subunits, tricarboxylic acid cycle enzymes, and stress response proteins are amongst the most abundant from over one thousand rhizobial proteins identified in pea (Pisum sativum) bacteroids. Comparative analysis of bacteroids induced in pea and in lentil (Lens culinaris)nodules revealed the existence of a significant host-specific differential response affecting dozens of bacterial proteins, including stress-related proteins, transcriptional regulators, and proteins involved in the carbon and nitrogen metabolisms. A mutant affected in one of these proteins, homologous to a GntR-like transcriptional regulator, showed a symbiotic performance significantly  impaired in symbiosis with pea, but not with lentil plants. Analysis of the proteomes of bacteroids isolated from both hosts also revealed the presence of different sets of plant-derived nodule-specific cysteine rich (NCR) peptides, indicating that the endosymbiotic bacteria find a host-specific cocktail of chemical stressors inside the nodule. By studying variations of the bacterial response to different plant cell environments we will be able to identify specific limitations imposed by the host that might give us clues for the improvement of rhizobial performance.

Aspergillus flavus (A. flavus), a pathogenic fungus, can produce carcinogenic and toxic aflatoxins that are a serious agricultural and medical threat worldwide. Attempts to decipher the aflatoxin biosynthetic pathway have been hampered by the lack of a high-quality genome annotation for A. flavus. To address this gap, we performed a comprehensive proteogenomic analysis using high-accuracy mass spectrometry data for this pathogen. The resulting high-quality dataset confirmed the translation of 8,724 previously-predicted genes, and identified 732 novel proteins, 269 splice variants, 447 single amino acid variants, 188 revised genes. A subset of novel proteins was experimentally validated by RT-PCR and synthetic peptides. Further functional annotation suggested that a number of the identified novel proteins may play roles in aflatoxin biosynthesis and stress responses in A. flavus. This comprehensive strategy also identified a wide range of post-translational modifications (PTMs), including 3,461 modification sites from 1,765 proteins. Functional analysis suggested the involvement of these modified proteins in the regulation of cellular metabolic and aflatoxin biosynthetic pathways. Together, we provided a high quality annotation of A. flavus genome and revealed novel insights into the mechanisms of aflatoxin production and pathogenicity in this pathogen.

Open searching has proven to be an effective strategy for identifying both known and unknown modifications in shotgun proteomics experiments. Rather than being limited to a small set of user-specified modifications, open searches identify peptides with any mass shift that may correspond to a single modification or a combination of several modifications. Here we present PTM-Shepherd, a bioinformatics tool that automates characterization of PTM profiles detected in open searches based on attributes such as amino acid localization, fragmentation spectra similarity, retention time shifts, and relative modification rates. PTM-Shepherd can also perform multi-experiment comparisons for studying changes in modification profiles, e.g. in data generated in different laboratories or under different conditions. We demonstrate how PTM-Shepherd improves the analysis of data from formalin-fixed paraffin-embedded samples, detects extreme underalkylation of cysteine in some datasets, discovers an artefactual modification introduced during peptide synthesis, and uncovers site-specific biases in sample preparation artifacts in a multi-center proteomics profiling study.

Gonadal soma-derived factor (gsdf) has been demonstrated to be essential for testicular differentiation in medaka (Oryzias latipes). To understand the protein dynamics of Gsdf in spermatogenesis regulation, we used a His-tag "pull-down" assay coupled with shotgun LC-MS/MS to identify a group of potential interacting partners for Gsdf, which included cytoplasmic dynein light chain 2, eukaryotic polypeptide elongation factor 1 alpha (eEF1α), and actin filaments in mature medaka testis. As for the interaction with TGFβ-dynein being critical for spermatogonial division in Drosophila melanogaster, the physical interactions of Gsdf-dynein and Gsdf-eEF1α were identified through a yeast 2-hybrid (Y2H) screening of an adult testis cDNA library using Gsdf as bait, which were verified by a paired Y2H assay. Co-immunoprecipitation of Gsdf and eEF1α was defined in adult testes as supporting the requirement of a Gsdf and eEF1α interaction in testis development. Proteomics analysis (data are available via ProteomeXchange with identifier PXD022153) and ultrastrutural observations showed that Gsdf deficiency activated eEF1α-mediated protein synthesis and ribosomal biogenesis, which in turn led to the differentiation of undifferentiated germ cells. Thus, our results provide a framework and new insight into the coordination of a Gsdf (TGFβ and eEF1α complex in the basic processes of germ cell proliferation, transcriptional and translational control of sexual RNA which may be fundamentally conserved across phyla during sexual differentiation.

Staphylococcus aureus is a major cause of infections worldwide and infection results in a variety of diseases. As of no surprise, protein phosphorylation is an important game player in signaling cascades and has been shown to be involved in S. aureus virulence. Albeit long neglected, eukaryotic-type serine/threonine kinases in S. aureus have been implicated in this complex signaling cascades. Due to the sub-stoichiometric nature of protein phosphorylation and a lack of suitable analysis tools, the knowledge of these cascades is however, to date, still limited.

Here, were apply an optimized protocol for efficient phosphopeptide enrichment via Fe3+-IMAC followed by LC-MS/MS to get a better understanding of the impact of protein phosphorylation on the complex signaling networks involved in pathogenicity. By profiling a serine/threonine kinase and phosphatase mutant from a methicillin-resistant S. aureus mutant library, we generated the most comprehensive phosphoproteome dataset of S. aureus to date, aiding a better understanding of signaling in bacteria. With the identification of 3800 class I p-sites we were able to increase the number of identifications by more than 21 times compared to recent literature. In addition, we were able to identify 74 downstream targets of the only reported eukaryotic-type Ser/Thr kinase of the S. aureus strain USA300, Stk1. This work allowed an extensive analysis of the bacterial phosphoproteome and indicates that Ser/Thr kinase signaling is far more abundant than previously anticipated in S. aureus.

Sporozoites are a motile form of malaria-causing Plasmodium falciparum parasites that migrate from the site of transmission in the dermis through the bloodstream to invade hepatocytes. Sporozoites interact with many cells within the host, but the molecular identity of these interactions and their role in the pathology of malaria is poorly understood. Parasite proteins that are secreted and embedded within membranes are known to be important for these interactions, but our understanding of how they interact with each other to form functional complexes is largely unknown. Here, we compile a library of recombinant proteins representing the repertoire of cell surface and secreted proteins from the P. falciparum sporozoite and use an assay designed to detect extracellular interactions to systematically identify complexes. We identify three protein complexes including an interaction between two components of the p24 complex that is involved in the trafficking of glycosylphosphatidylinositol (GPI)-anchored proteins through the secretory pathway. Plasmodium parasites lacking either gene are strongly inhibited in the establishment of liver stage infections. These findings reveal an important role for the p24 complex in malaria pathogenesis and show that the library of recombinant proteins represents a valuable resource to investigate P. falciparum sporozoite biology.

China's Regions in an Era of Globalization Book sysadmin 14 May 2018

The rise of China has been shaped and driven by its engagement with the global economy. This engagement cannot be understood at the level of national policymaking alone, but requires analysis of the differences in participation in the global economy across China’s regions.

China is a continent-sized economy and society with substantial diversity across its different regions. This book traces the evolution of regional policy in China and its implications in a global context.

Detailed chapters examine the trajectory of what is now becoming known as the Greater Bay Area in southern China, the inland mega-city of Chongqing, and the role of China’s regions in the globally focused Belt and Road Initiative launched by the Chinese government in late 2013.

It will be of interest to practitioners and scholars engaging with contemporary China’s political economy and international relations.

This book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for China’s Regions in an Era of Globalization

About the author

Tim Summers works on the political economy and international relations of contemporary China. He is a Lecturer at the Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a (non-resident) Senior Consulting Fellow on the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House. He was British consul general in Chongqing from 2004 to 2007.

This book is published in collaboration with Routledge.

Purchase

• Worldwide (via Routledge)
• Students (via Browns Books)

AI-driven Personalization in Digital Media: Political and Societal Implications Research paper sysadmin 2 December 2019

The fallout from disinformation and online manipulation strategies have alerted Western democracies to the novel, nuanced vulnerabilities of our information society. This paper outlines the implications of the adoption of AI by the the legacy media, as well as by the new media, focusing on personalization.

Summary

• Machine learning (ML)-driven personalization is fast expanding from social media to the wider information space, encompassing legacy media, multinational conglomerates and digital-native publishers: however, this is happening within a regulatory and oversight vacuum that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.
• Mass-scale adoption of personalization in communication has serious implications for human rights, societal resilience and political security. Data protection, privacy and wrongful discrimination, as well as freedom of opinion and of expression, are some of the areas impacted by this technological transformation.
• Artificial intelligence (AI) and its ML subset are novel technologies that demand novel ways of approaching oversight, monitoring and analysis. Policymakers, regulators, media professionals and engineers need to be able to conceptualize issues in an interdisciplinary way that is appropriate for sociotechnical systems.
• Funding needs to be allocated to research into human–computer interaction in information environments, data infrastructure, technology market trends, and the broader impact of ML systems within the communication sector.
• Although global, high-level ethical frameworks for AI are welcome, they are no substitute for domain- and context-specific codes of ethics. Legacy media and digital-native publishers need to overhaul their editorial codes to make them fit for purpose in a digital ecosystem transformed by ML. Journalistic principles need to be reformulated and refined in the current informational context in order to efficiently inform the ML models built for personalized communication.
• Codes of ethics will not by themselves be enough, so current regulatory and legislative frameworks as they relate to media need to be reassessed. Media regulators need to develop their in-house capacity for thorough research and monitoring into ML systems, and – when appropriate –proportionate sanctions for actors found to be employing such systems towards malign ends. Collaboration with data protection authorities, competition authorities and national electoral commissions is paramount for preserving the integrity of elections and of a political discourse grounded on democratic principles.
• Upskilling senior managers and editorial teams is fundamental if media professionals are to be able to engage meaningfully and effectively with data scientists and AI engineers.

DNA polymerase from bacteriophage T7 undergoes large, substrate-induced conformational changes that are thought to account for high replication fidelity, but prior studies were adversely affected by mutations required to construct a Cys-lite variant needed for site-specific fluorescence labeling. Here we have optimized the direct incorporation of a fluorescent un-natural amino acid, (7-hydroxy-4-coumarin-yl)-ethylglycine, using orthogonal amber suppression machinery in Escherichia coli. MS methods verify that the unnatural amino acid is only incorporated at one position with minimal background. We show that the single fluorophore provides a signal to detect nucleotide-induced conformational changes through equilibrium and stopped-flow kinetic measurements of correct nucleotide binding and incorporation. Pre-steady-state chemical quench methods show that the kinetics and fidelity of DNA replication catalyzed by the labeled enzyme are largely unaffected by the unnatural amino acid. These advances enable rigorous analysis to establish the kinetic and mechanistic basis for high-fidelity DNA replication.

In eukaryotic DNA replication, DNA polymerase ε (Polε) is responsible for leading strand synthesis, whereas DNA polymerases α and δ synthesize the lagging strand. The human Polε (hPolε) holoenzyme is comprised of the catalytic p261 subunit and the noncatalytic p59, p17, and p12 small subunits. So far, the contribution of the noncatalytic subunits to hPolε function is not well understood. Using pre-steady-state kinetic methods, we established a minimal kinetic mechanism for DNA polymerization and editing catalyzed by the hPolε holoenzyme. Compared with the 140-kDa N-terminal catalytic fragment of p261 (p261N), which we kinetically characterized in our earlier studies, the presence of the p261 C-terminal domain (p261C) and the three small subunits increased the DNA binding affinity and the base substitution fidelity. Although the small subunits enhanced correct nucleotide incorporation efficiency, there was a wide range of rate constants when incorporating a correct nucleotide over a single-base mismatch. Surprisingly, the 3'→5' exonuclease activity of the hPolε holoenzyme was significantly slower than that of p261N when editing both matched and mismatched DNA substrates. This suggests that the presence of p261C and the three small subunits regulates the 3'→5' exonuclease activity of the hPolε holoenzyme. Together, the 3'→5' exonuclease activity and the variable mismatch extension activity modulate the overall fidelity of the hPolε holoenzyme by up to 3 orders of magnitude. Thus, the presence of p261C and the three noncatalytic subunits optimizes the dual enzymatic activities of the catalytic p261 subunit and makes the hPolε holoenzyme an efficient and faithful replicative DNA polymerase.

Faithful replication of the mitochondrial genome is carried out by a set of key nuclear-encoded proteins. DNA polymerase γ is a core component of the mtDNA replisome and the only replicative DNA polymerase localized to mitochondria. The asynchronous mechanism of mtDNA replication predicts that the replication machinery encounters dsDNA and unique physical barriers such as structured genes, G-quadruplexes, and other obstacles. In vitro experiments here provide evidence that the polymerase γ heterotrimer is well-adapted to efficiently synthesize DNA, despite the presence of many naturally occurring roadblocks. However, we identified a specific G-quadruplex–forming sequence at the heavy-strand promoter (HSP1) that has the potential to cause significant stalling of mtDNA replication. Furthermore, this structured region of DNA corresponds to the break site for a large (3,895 bp) deletion observed in mitochondrial disease patients. The presence of this deletion in humans correlates with UV exposure, and we have found that efficiency of polymerase γ DNA synthesis is reduced after this quadruplex is exposed to UV in vitro.

The Phillies continued to bolster their infield depth on Friday by signing versatile veteran Sean Rodriguez to a Minor League contract with an invite to big league Spring Training, MLB.com has learned.

Cesar Hernandez scored 91 runs last season, the Phillies' highest mark since Rollins scored 102 in 2012. Now the luster is no longer there for players who score 100 runs or post 100 RBIs, but Hernandez should score at least 100 runs this season, if he stays healthy and if the Phillies' offense improves as expected.

After undergoing surgery in late June to repair a torn left labrum in his left shoulder that required nine anchors to be inserted to keep everything in place, Zack Cozart is healthy and looking for a bounce-back season with the Angels.

VOLUME 289 (2014) PAGES 6604–6618In Fig. 4G, in the foxi1 panel, the images in Fig. 4G, i and l, corresponding to “smad1 MO” and “smad5 MO + samd1/9 mRNA” samples, respectively, were inadvertently reused during figure preparation. This error has now been corrected using images pertaining to each treatment and sample. This correction does not affect the results or conclusions of the work.jbc;295/52/18650/F4F1F4Figure 4G.

Political Opposition and Policy Alternatives in Zambia 31 October 2017 — 10:30AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 October 2017 Chatham House, London

In Zambia’s 2016 national election, the Patriotic Front (PF) was re-elected by a narrow margin. The PF’s Edgar Lungu secured 50.35 per cent of the vote according to the Electoral Commission of Zambia, narrowly avoiding a second round, while his main rival, Hakainde Hichilema, won 47.67 per cent. The UPND, led by Mr Hichilema, alleges electoral fraud and has challenged the result in the courts and through direct protests. Mr Hichilema was imprisoned for 100 days.

At this meeting, Hakainde Hichilema will discuss his UPND priorities, how to strengthen opposition parties and their role in Zambia’s democratic future.

Read transcript

POSTPONED: Zimbabwe Futures 2025: Financial Sector Expansion and Policy Priorities 15 November 2017 — 9:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2017 Harare, Zimbabwe 

This roundtable will draw on current best practice and senior level expertise to identify policy options for financial stability and sector growth. A depoliticized analysis of the development agenda will highlight requisite conditions and prospective policies for a business-driven roadmap to the economic recovery of Zimbabwe, with a specific focus on the financial sector.

Participants will discuss macro-economic policy and stability, retail banking products and services, fintech, mobilizing domestic finance for national infrastructure and balancing consumer price index and inflation.

This event is being held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club.

PLEASE NOTE, THIS EVENT HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

How Influential Is China in Zimbabwe? Expert comment sysadmin 20 November 2017

A trip to Beijing by Zimbabwe’s military chief was a ‘normal military exchange’, China’s foreign ministry said after the army seized power in Harare. Alex Vines examines the extent of China’s influence in Zimbabwe.

The news that General Constantino Chiwenga had visited China only a few days before the military takeover in Zimbabwe was a coincidence that did not go unnoticed. There was also speculation after China said it was closely watching developments, but stopped short of condemning President Robert Mugabe’s apparent removal from power.

China is Zimbabwe’s fourth-largest trading partner and its largest source of investment - with stakes worth many billions of pounds in everything from agriculture to construction. Zimbabwe is the dependent partner - with China providing the largest market for its exports and much needed support to its fragile economy.

China’s relations with Zimbabwe are deep, starting during the Rhodesian Bush War. Robert Mugabe failed in 1979 to get Soviet backing, so turned to China, which provided his guerrilla fighters with weapons and training. Both countries formally established diplomatic relations at Zimbabwean independence in 1980 and Mugabe visited Beijing as prime minister the following year. He has been a regular visitor since.

For years, Zimbabwe’s officials have tried to play off China against the West, advocating the country’s ‘Look East’ strategy, particularly following the introduction of EU sanctions in 2002. Indeed, a decade ago, Mugabe told a packed rally at the Chinese-built national sports stadium in Harare: ‘We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west, where the sun sets.’

China’s military engagement also deepened during Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ era. Significant purchases were made, including Hongdu JL-8 jet aircraft, JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, vehicles, radar and weapons. However, following a controversy about a shipment of arms in 2008, Beijing decided to list Zimbabwe for ‘limited level’ military trading.

Despite Zimbabwe’s efforts, the ‘Look East’ strategy did not bring the investment flood hoped for and a decade later, in August 2015, Mugabe openly asked for Western re-engagement in his ‘state of the nation’ address.

Now, the reality is that increasingly Chinese and Western interests - particularly those of the UK - have become aligned. Not far from each other in the outer suburbs of Harare, two of the biggest embassies in Zimbabwe are the British and the Chinese. As other embassies scaled down or closed, Beijing’s expanded. Whereas British diplomats were well connected with business, civil society and opposition figures, the Chinese invested in ‘technical support’ of the party of government Zanu-PF, including state security and the presidency. When it came to Zanu-PF politics and factionalism, Chinese diplomats were well connected and insightful and, like their Western colleagues, concerned about stability, a better investment climate and adherence to the rule of law.

President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe in 2015 and President Mugabe visited Beijing in January 2017. In public, the Chinese leader said his country is willing to encourage capable companies to invest in Zimbabwe. But in private, the message was that there would be no more loans until Zimbabwe stabilized its economy.

In 2016 trade between the two countries amounted to $1.1 billion, with China the biggest buyer of Zimbabwean tobacco and also importing cotton and various minerals. In return Zimbabwe imported electronics, clothing and other finished products. Chinese state construction firms have also been active, building infrastructure including Zimbabwe’s $100 million National Defence College. And last year China agreed to finance a new 650-seat parliament in Harare.

But Chinese diplomats and many businesses are waiting for better days in Zimbabwe. Some companies have found the investment climate challenging - being burned on diamonds, for example - and have looked for alternative markets. A couple of weeks ago I was in China, attending a meeting on China-Africa relations and Zimbabwe was not mentioned once. Unlike Ethiopia, Sudan, or Angola that are strategic partners, or big markets like Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, Zimbabwe is far from being Beijing’s new priority.

So, Beijing’s interest is in a better investment climate in Zimbabwe. A clear transitional arrangement resulting in elections for a legitimate government in Harare is as much in Beijing’s interest as London’s.

The ‘Look East’ and the ‘Re-engagement with the West’ strategies have not brought about the confidence and investment that Zimbabwe needs. What Zimbabwe requires is stable and accountable government - then investors from Asia, America and Europe will seriously consider that Zimbabwe has an investment future. This was the message that Mugabe received in Beijing in January. And the one which Zimbabwe’s military chief also was given last week.

This article was originally published by BBC News.

Mugabe’s Departure Ushers in a Heady New Era for Zimbabwe Expert comment sysadmin 23 November 2017

The country is experiencing an almost unprecedented convergence, with traditional political, economic and social fault lines bridged as Zimbabweans make common cause for change.

The ecstatic scenes said it all – Zimbabweans around the world are celebrating the resignation of Robert Mugabe as president. In January 1980, hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans thronged Zimbabwe Grounds stadium in Highfields township, Harare, to welcome Mugabe back from exile. In March 1980, with reggae icon Bob Marley and Britain’s Prince Charles in attendance, thousands filled Rufaro Stadium to witness the handover from Rhodesia to the new nation of Zimbabwe. Thirty-seven years later, the largest crowds Harare has ever witnessed flooded the streets once again; not to welcome Mugabe in, but to see him out. One simple, taut phrase summed up the day’s events: ‘This is our second independence day.’

How did it come to this?

History has been put on fast-forward, and left Zimbabwe – and the world – shaken. Just two weeks ago, it seemed to be the height of folly to think that Mugabe would leave office on any but his own terms. Emmerson Mnangagwa had been sacked as vice president, and his followers had been purged. Grace Mugabe, with ringing endorsements from the women’s and youth leagues, looked set to be elevated to the vice presidency at the ZANU-PF congress in less than a month’s time.

Mugabe was expected to stay until the 2018 elections, after which he would hand over the presidency to his wife. It was the prospect of Grace Mugabe becoming Zimbabwe’s next president which brought in the military. Aware that they had three weeks or less to prevent a dynastic succession and a looming purge of the military itself, Zimbabwe’s military chose, not the audacity of hope, but the hope of audacity, and launched Operation Restore Legacy to stop the rot.

What has happened in Zimbabwe is not a people’s revolution in the traditional sense. The Bourbons in France, the Romanov dynasty in Russia, the Shah of Iran, and the autocrats of north Africa’s Arab Spring were all felled by continuous street protests which ultimately received the support of the military.

In Zimbabwe it has been the military who have been the drivers of revolutionary change. What has happened is that an internal party-factional power struggle has inadvertently led to a military-guided popular revolution and the ousting of the Mugabes. Zimbabwe’s military, often seen as the guardians of the state, became instead the guardians of the people. They are seen, for now at least, as liberators, and national heroes. This has been a very Zimbabwean revolution.

So what next?

These are heady days. Zimbabwe is experiencing an almost unprecedented national convergence, with traditional political, economic and social fault lines bridged as Zimbabweans make common cause for change. It is not quite a ‘Zimbabwe Spring’, but it is perhaps a ‘Zimbabwe Sunrise’.

Parliament, which on Tuesday had met to impeach Robert Mugabe, is now installing, through constitutional procedures, Emmerson Mnangagwa as president, who will be given the mandate to form an interim government. Mnangagwa will be further ratified at the ZANU-PF Congress in December where he will be named and acclaimed as ZANU-PF’s candidate for the next general elections, which constitutionally are due by mid-2018 (although it is unclear whether this will indeed be the case).

Mnangagwa has a full in-tray. He needs to form a government quickly and has to balance the need for inclusivity and consultation, with the undoubted pressure to reward his followers. With Zimbabwe’s economy nearing paralysis, Zimbabwe’s new president will be under pressure to deliver. Although many are nervous about his history as Mugabe’s ally and his reputation for toughness, Mnangagwa is also an astute political survivor, and has been pro-business and supportive of Zimbabwe’s ongoing re-engagement with the global community.

Zimbabwe has become a cashless society not by design, but by default; with formal unemployment at 80 per cent and with a largely informalized economy in which much of Zimbabwe’s citizenry have been reduced to penury and classic short-termism, there is plenty for Zimbabwe’s next president to think about. Activists wonder whether he will try to introduce systemic change, or merely go through the motions. He may well face a binary choice between government or governance.

And yet there are also positives. Zimbabwe’s institutions have proven to be resilient, and there is still a reservoir of dedicated and competent professionals in both public and private sectors. Although still laggardly, Zimbabwe had begun to progress in ‘ease of doing business’ indices. There is a large diaspora who have continued to engage with Zimbabwe; and Zimbabwe’s recent ‘Look East’ and de facto ‘Look West’ re-engagement policies can be built upon.

Many are urging caution and saying that Zimbabwe needs a second, truly democratic revolution. Perhaps. But right now, Mnangagwa should be given a chance. Farai, a friend of mine in Harare, said this: ‘Yes we know this euphoria may be short-lived. But even if it turns out that we were only happy for a day, let’s make it a brilliant day. Rega tifare nhasi (Let us be happy today).’

A version of this article was first published by the Guardian.

Rebuilding Zimbabwe's Economy: Emmerson Mnangagwa’s Immediate Priorities Expert comment sysadmin 13 December 2017

Zimbabwe cannot expect to rebuild in the same economic model that brought previous prosperity.

Returning to Harare as Zimbabwe’s president-designate Emmerson Mnangagwa declared, ‘We want to grow our economy, we want peace, we want jobs, jobs, jobs.’

Robert Mugabe leaves a legacy of an independent Zimbabwe in a deep economic crisis. Much remains uncertain as to what a new government in Zimbabwe will look like, and there is sure to be continuity as well as considerable change.

What is clear is that a new administration under Mnangagwa will need to turn the economy around to garner support and legitimacy from the Zimbabwean people. Zimbabwe’s economic output halved over the period 1997–2008, and it has not recovered. With more than 80 per cent of Zimbabweans in the informal economy, and with social and economic resilience undermined by previous crises and decades of mismanagement, the stakes for the new leader are very high.

Reform will be difficult particularly because politically connected elites have acquired businesses through uncompetitive means. They will be reluctant to see significantly more competition. But they will also want an improved economic environment. And there is scope for the people of Zimbabwe to benefit from this.

An important change will be in the prioritization of economic stability. Mugabe demonstrated that he was willing to make political decisions irrespective of the economic consequences. Mnangagwa is thought to be less ideological and more of a pragmatist. For him, delivering economic recovery will be crucial to building political support.

The most pressing fiscal priority is the public wage bill. Employment costs account for over 80 per cent of government expenditure, crowding out spending on social programmes, health and education. But the fragility of the economy means that reform cannot be fast-tracked. The public wage bill accounts for over 20 per cent of GDP and is an essential driver of demand. Public sector workers are also politically influential. Another further priority is the reform of state-owned enterprises that are pressuring the fiscus.

A new administration will need to rebuild confidence. Policymakers have been operating in a low-confidence environment for a long time, but for any meaningful change to take root there has to be trust between the government, businesses and the people of Zimbabwe. Businesses and citizens will want to see a plan of action for remonetizing the economy. Zimbabwe faces an acute liquidity crisis. A shortage of US dollars and a lack of confidence in government-issued bond notes are testing resilience.

The financial system has recovered from a crisis of nonperforming loans – triggered by high debt amassed during the post-dollarization boom, and weak corporate governance. But the system remains highly fragile and swamped with government debt. Hard cash US dollar deposits fell from 49 per cent ($582 million) in 2009 to just six per cent ($269 million) in 2016. In 2015, industrial utilization stood at just 34.3 per cent of installed capacity, and it was estimated that just five per cent of the country’s businesses were viable.

The crux of the Zimbabwean economy is the linkage between agriculture and manufacturing. Commercial agriculture contributes approximately 12 per cent of the country’s GDP, and more than 60 per cent of inputs into the manufacturing sector. Tobacco in particular is a vital earner of much needed foreign exchange. Policies to support mid-scale farmers will have multiplier effects. They drive agricultural growth and generate jobs throughout the supply chain.

Zimbabwe also has world-class natural resource endowments including ferrochrome, gold, copper, iron ore, lithium, diamonds and platinum group metals. But longer investment-gestation periods and industry risk adversity will mean that payoffs from fresh investments in this sector will take longer to materialize.

Domestic finance will need to be mobilized to generate recovery, and this will need to be supported by international investment. But international investors entering the country must be cognizant of Zimbabwean’s expectations and also historical perceptions – especially around the scepticism of neoliberal economics as a result of failed structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s.

Zimbabweans have high social expectations for international investors. Educated, tech-savvy, internationally connected youth are at the core of the consumer class that investors will be targeting, to both sell products to but also to staff offices in country. But this cohort also has a greater expectation of international companies to adhere to the norms and standards that they abide by at home and not take advantage of weak governance or poor regulation to exploit citizens.

Investors in Zimbabwe must also recognize that behind the controversial Mugabe policies of land reform and indigenization – the empowerment of local citizens through shared ownership – was a popular desire for postcolonial economic transformation. This sentiment remains. Working in partnership with local entities and communicating the economic contribution made to society will be necessary to build a long-term presence in Zimbabwe, and reap the dividend of what many hope to be a new start for the country.

Fresh thinking is required from domestic policymakers and international partners. A skilled population and estimated 3-5 million-strong diaspora will bring international experience and make a considerable contribution to this process. Some of this thinking has been done. The Lima process of re-engagement with international financial institutions that was agreed at the end of 2015 has laid some of the groundwork, especially around international expectations regarding both economic and governance reform – the substance of which was analysed in a 2016 Chatham House paper. The implementation of recommendations of the well-regarded auditor-general’s report on SOE reform will also be a key prerequisite for long-term reform.

Zimbabweans are not alone in processing what has happened and how to react. Investors have long been poised to capitalize on what is perceived to be one of the continent’s best long-term prospects. A lot will remain unchanged following the transition. But significantly, for the first time in decades, there is a real opportunity to effect positive change and improve the livelihoods of millions of Zimbabweans.

This article was originally published at the Huffington Post.

Zimbabwe Ahead of the Elections: Political and Economic Challenges 8 May 2018 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 May 2018 Chatham House, London

The upcoming elections in Zimbabwe will be the first since 2000 in which former president Robert Mugabe and long-time opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai are not on the ballot paper. A key electoral issue for many voters will be the economy: recent years have been marked by high unemployment rates, chronic cash shortages and mounting public debt. Although this has traditionally been a strong campaigning issue for the opposition, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has fast-tracked comprehensive economic reforms.

At this event, Nelson Chamisa, MDC Alliance presidential candidate, will discuss his efforts to build a united opposition coalition with a strong message, the steps needed to ensure a free and fair election can take place, and the role that international partners can play in Zimbabwe’s democratic process.

Afonso Dhlakama’s Death Changes the Calculation for Peace Prospects in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 May 2018

If politicians continue to act in good faith, the death of the opposition leader may be a significant opportunity to finally draw a line under Mozambique’s long war.

The unexpected death of opposition and ex-rebel leader Afonso Dhlakama on 3 May is a game changer for Mozambique’s politics and an almost-completed peace process. The 65-year old Dhlakama, who died of a heart attack, had led Renamo for 38 years and had totally dominated his party. Dhlakama regularly boasted that he was Mozambique’s ‘father of democracy’, despite not allowing competition within his own party, and he leaves a legacy of more than 30 years of struggle, through both armed action and peaceful politics.

A long war

Originally Renamo had been a tool for the white minority regimes of Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa to challenge the socialist Frelimo political party that took power in Mozambique in 1975. But under Dhlakama’s command, by the late 1980s Renamo had become increasingly independent and rooted in Mozambique. After Renamo’s long war with Frelimo ground to a hurting stalemate, a transition led to Mozambique’s first multiparty elections in 1994, and the creation of a new joint army. A ‘pay and scatter’ programme successfully dispersed and reintegrated many thousands of ex-combatants.

But early post-election gains did not translate to lasting peace. Disarmament was a time-limited, technical process, and devoted declining resources and attention to clusters of ex-combatants that failed to disperse. In addition, Dhlakama was allowed to maintain an armed militia under the guise of a presidential guard.

Mounting economic inequality, notably in opposition strongholds such as central Mozambique, saw Renamo made political gains and Dhlakama nearly won the 1999 presidential elections. (Some believe he did.) The result focused Frelimo’s attention on the threat that Renamo posed and, ultimately, a strategy of pursuing total Frelimo domination across the country, culminating in a crushing Frelimo victory at the 2009 elections.

This humiliated and marginalized former Renamo rebels, resulting in Dhlakama ordering their return to targeted armed violence in 2013. Frelimo’s new leader, President Filipe Nyusi, took power in 2015 and sought direct dialogue with Dhlakama. Five rounds of internationally mediated peace talks took place from July to December. Finally, in late December 2016, Dhlakama announced a unilateral truce, which was extended twice and subsequently made indefinite.

New peace talks also started and, in August 2017 and February 2018, President Nyusi and Dhlakama showed the courage to meet in person, near Renamo’s base in central Mozambique, to build up mutual trust and discuss the details of the emerging peace deal – including the demobilization or integration into government security forces for Renamo’s now mostly middle-aged gunmen.

Dhlakama the ‘Big Man’

Dhlakama’s sudden death has fundamentally changed the negotiation dynamics. He never allowed for any serious succession planning, and ensured all key decisions were his and his alone. Renamo had already decided that he would be its presidential candidate for the 2019 national elections.

His party is significantly weakened by his death and unlikely able to fully recover – but needs to try and reach consensus quickly on a successor, as it will also compete in municipal elections in October and was expecting significant gains. There will be a number of contenders to succeed him including from the parliamentary wing, led by his niece Ivone Soares, its secretary general, Manuel Bissopo, and a few others.

But Renamo’s key leverage for now remains some 1,000 middle-aged gunmen in central Mozambique who have been stoically loyal to Dhlakama since the 1980s and who have little respect for the younger generation of professional politicians based in Maputo. Some may be bought off by government offers, others integrated into localised organized crime groups and others into internal Renamo sectarianism. The risk of fragmentation is real.

Renamo’s weakness could also embolden Frelimo hardliners to seek a return to unilateral domination of Mozambique’s political landscape, and to undermine the peace process. That would be a serious tactical mistake by Frelimo, as a lasting deal is close and the death of Dhlakama could actually assist in making this settlement lasting. Dhlakama was quixotic and prone to changing his mind, often influenced by the last person he spoke to – his death potentially introduces greater predictability in negotiations and in any post-deal implementation.

President Nyusi is clearly aware of this as he hailed on state television TVM that Dhlakama was ‘a citizen who has always worked for Mozambique’ and said he was distraught at the news of his death. He stated, ‘I hope that we as Mozambicans can continue to do everything so things do not go down.’ He also addressed Renamo’s support base by saying that ‘[Dhlakama] did everything so that there would be peace. The last time he spoke to me, he said he was not going to miss out anything in peace negotiations.’

Renamo’s gunmen are fatigued and want to retire with dignity but are vulnerable to manipulation and political miscalculation by Mozambican’s positioning politicians. International partners and investors can engage, by emphasizing that sustainable peace is the only pathway to poverty reduction and inclusive economic development.

This includes assisting development and reconciliation projects in areas impacted by the renewed conflict since 2013. Long-term investment for development in Renamo’s key constituencies could help avoid fragmentation at a critical time – faith groups and NGOs may also have a key role to play.

If Mozambique’s politicians continue to act in good faith, the death of Dhlakama may constitute a significant opportunity to finally draw a line under Mozambique’s long war.

Improving Economic Management for Sustainable Growth in Zambia 13 July 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 June 2018 Chatham House, London

THIS EVENT IS POSTPONED.

High levels of infrastructure investment funded by commercial loans, against a backdrop of subdued economic growth, resulted in an increase in Zambia’s public external debt from $8.7 billion in 2017 to $9.3 billion in March 2018.

In June 2018 Zambia’s Ministry of Finance announced new austerity measures aimed at reducing the country’s debt burden, as part of an ongoing reform agenda that is hoped to stabilise the economy.

In the meantime Zambia grapples with severe social and development challenges. Decreased spending in health, education and social protection, and poor access in rural areas, have already left Zambia ranked 139th out of 188 countries in the UNDP’s 2016 human development index.

At this meeting Margaret Mwanakatwe, minister of finance, discusses the government’s financial reform agenda, its engagement with creditors and IFIs, and plans for generating sustainable growth and job creation.

Zimbabwe's Elections Were Meant to Start a New Era Expert comment sysadmin 14 August 2018

Emmerson Mnangagwa has been declared president of Zimbabwe amid protests and violence but Zimbabweans are now in a post-political, economy-first mood, writes Knox Chitiyo.

Before Zimbabwe’s general election on 30 July, there was a lot of talk about there being ‘landmark change’ and ‘credibility.’ But in many ways it was déjà vu. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ruling ZANU-PF party won the parliamentary vote, taking a majority 144 seats out of 210. The opposition MDC Alliance, a seven-party coalition led by Nelson Chamisa, won 64 seats—an improvement on their 2013 showing of 44 seats, but still falling far short of expectations.

The presidential results were much closer. After clashes on Wednesday, the incumbent Mnangagwa was declared winner early Friday morning, taking 50.8 per cent of the vote against Chamisa’s 44.3 per cent. The 21 other independent presidential candidates polled less than 5 per cent between them.

The polls didn’t quite live up to the hype. There was much that was positive: the prelude and election day were peaceful, with a minimal military presence. Opposition candidates were able to hold nationwide rallies (including in ZANU-PF’s rural heartland) without interference—an electoral first. ZANU-PF leaders and the military called for a peaceful process. Four women candidates contested the presidential vote, another first. More than 5 million Zimbabweans registered out of an eligible voting population of 7.2 million, and there was a near record 75 per cent turnout on voting day. Zimbabwe invited official observers from 46 countries and 15 international organizations, and, for the first time since 2002, observers from the EU, the Commonwealth and the US were present.

But shortcomings included late public access to the imperfect biometric voters roll and controversies about the ballot papers. There were also misogynistic social media attacks and threats against female candidates and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) chair Justice Priscilla Chigumba.

The three-day wait for presidential results saw a further decline in public trust in the ZEC, and the opposition’s premature announcement of a Chamisa victory only fanned the political flames.

On Wednesday, six unarmed civilians were shot dead by soldiers in Harare, with dozens more assaulted. A Joint International Observer Mission statement promptly condemned the violence and called for restraint.

The election process was a boon for democracy, but ironically the result has entrenched the two-party parliamentary system and marginalized alternative voices. Mnangagwa has been conciliatory in his post-election statements, saying that Nelson Chamisa has a ‘crucial role to play’ and calling for unity to ‘build a new Zimbabwe for all.’

But Chamisa’s MDC Alliance has refused to accept the results, calling them ‘fake’ and a ‘scandal.’ The MDC has raised genuine transparency concerns and will likely challenge the results in court, but much of this may be cosmetic—with little chance of a 2017 Kenya-style presidential re-run. There is no critical mass of opposition parties to sustain a challenge, nor is there a popular appetite for a protracted political feud.

Zimbabwe’s democracy agenda may be heading into the slow lane, and Chamisa may be pressured by his coalition partners to make a political accommodation with Mnangagwa. Nevertheless, despite setbacks, Zimbabwe’s opposition and civil society has a long history of resilience under pressure and the struggle for democracy will continue.

Mnangagwa has a full in-tray. He has to unite a fractious ZANU-PF and manage internal civil-military and generational faultlines. Beyond that, he may need a public reconciliation with Chamisa—similar to how in Kenya and Mozambique, similar incumbent-opposition quarrels were mended by public rapprochements.

But Zimbabweans are now in a post-political, economy-first mood. Resolving the cash crisis is crucial. Few Zimbabweans can withdraw more than $50 a day from banks or ATMs—and much of this is paid out in unpopular ‘bond coins.’ The formal sector has contracted to only 20 per cent of the economy, and the informal sector lacks the capacity to push an economic renewal.

Zimbabwe’s new internationalism is premised upon the 2015 Lima process economic reform pathway for debt arrears clearance. (The country has a $10 billion foreign debt.) There has been a modest increase in foreign and diaspora investment, but the big-money Chinese, Russian and other pledges are long-horizon projects. What Zimbabwe needs is a short-term economic stimulus—to support small and medium-sized businesses.

For this to happen, Mnangagwa has to stay the course on economic reform, ease of doing business and the anti-corruption agenda. The pivot from reform to transformation in Zimbabwe will require all hands on deck, including civil society, the opposition, Zimbabwe diaspora and foreign investors, in a partnership for development.

A positive global verdict on the elections could supercharge investment, but time will tell whether these polls have been a deal-maker or a deal-breaker.

Zimbabwe’s elections often split the global south and the global north, and this could be the case again. The EU will have to decide whether to continue their incremental rapprochement with Zimbabwe, or accelerate to the reciprocity-based, ‘Re-Engagement 2.0’ approach currently favoured by the UK although the US is unlikely to lift statutory sanctions anytime soon.

Zimbabwe’s possible return to the Commonwealth could also be divisive, given the broader global context of the perceived existential clash between beleaguered liberal democracy and the rise of populist—and popular—autocracies across the globe.

President Mnangagwa—along with South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, Mozambique’s Filipe Nyusi and others—belong to a pragmatic new wave of regional economic reformers nudging liberationism away from ideology. He now has an electoral mandate to lead a divided country. For sisters Chipo and Tendai, both businesswomen based in Harare who voted for Mnangagwa and Chamisa respectively, the future needs to come now. ‘There is too much talk,’ they said, ‘we live every day between hope and despair. We need cash and jobs. We are tired of being tired.’

This was originally published in TIME.

Economic Reform and Recovery in Zimbabwe 8 October 2018 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2018 Chatham House, London

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Economic Expansion 28 February 2019 — 9:00AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

This roundtable draws on current best practice and senior level expertise to identify policy options for long term economic expansion in Zimbabwe and pathways for inclusive development.

Participants discuss the necessary policies and business strategies to enable and support the effective implementation of the Transitional Stabilization Programme and longer term national development plans.

The discussions highlight requisite conditions for a business-driven and inclusive process towards Zimbabwe’s long-term economic recovery.

This event was held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Sector Priorities for Policy Implementation 4 June 2019 — 9:00AM TO 5:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: Policy Priorities for Industrialization, Agri-Business and Tourism 6 June 2019 — 9:30AM TO 1:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 June 2019 Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

Hope, Peace and Reconciliation: Pope Francis in Mozambique Expert comment sysadmin 4 September 2019

A papal visit will highlight the importance of the recently signed peace agreement between the government and opposition.

Pope Francis’ visit to Mozambique on 4–6 September comes at a critical political moment. The theme for the papal Africa trip (which also includes Madagascar and Mauritius) is ‘pilgrim of hope, peace and reconciliation’. This is especially relevant for Mozambique, as this is the first week of the official campaign for Mozambique’s sixth national elections on 15 October.

It is also the one-month anniversary of the Maputo Accords for Peace and Reconciliation between the government and the armed opposition, RENAMO (and the fifth anniversary of the previous such agreement in 2014).

What is unusual is that the pope accepted to visit Mozambique just after a peace accord and in the run-up to national elections. Something similar has happened only once, when Pope John Paul II visited Angola in June 1992 (following the Bicesse Accords) prior to the country’s first ever national elections in September. Unfortunately Pope John Paul’s preaching of reconciliation and pluralism failed and civil war resumed some months later, following rejection of the preliminary election results. Angola’s civil war only finally ended a decade later in 2002.

The last papal visit to Mozambique was also by Pope John Paul II in 1988, when civil war was still ongoing, and the country was still a single party state. Despite the war, massive congregations attended and RENAMO reached local ceasefires and agreements to maintain electricity supply to honour the visit. Some of the seeds for the Rome peace process were laid during this trip – especially as it also represented a formal reconciliation of FRELIMO, the ruling party, with the Catholic Church.

This papal visit to Mozambique is equally anticipated, as was highlighted several times during speeches at the 6 August peace agreement signing in Maputo. When I was in Maputo last month, sales of papal-pictured capulanas (a Mozambican sarong) were brisk and Mozambican television carried countdown clocks on many programmes for the touchdown of Pope Francis on national soil.

The Catholic Church has played an instrumental role in promoting peace in Mozambique over the years. The 1977–92 civil war ended through negotiations hosted at the Sant’ Egidio lay community in Rome, and the current Archbishop of Bologna, Dom Matteo Zuppi (who led the Sant’ Egido negotiations in 1992 and is soon to be made a cardinal) was an official witness to 6 August accords signing.

When targeted armed conflict resumed in 2013, faith groups once more re-engaged and in 2016 Sant’ Egidio once more co-led mediation efforts, less successfully than in 1991–92. Sant’ Egidio (including during a presidential visit to Rome in July) contributed to convincing the Vatican that this papal visit should occur before the October elections.

President Filipe Nyusi anxiously wanted this visit to occur before the elections. He is seeking re-election for his second and final term and a papal visit should help win some votes. His party, FRELIMO, is also worried about securing a majority in the national assembly, as it has been weakened by patchy delivery of services and ongoing high-level corruption scandals.

This year, President Nyusi’s priorities have been to show that he can attract international investment (such as Andarko’s recently announced final investment decision on its gas project), a peace agreement with RENAMO (the August agreements) and a papal visit, so a successful trip would complete his goals.

The pope’s ‘hope, peace and reconciliation’ message of his visit is important. Twice previously, the FRELIMO-led government and RENAMO have reached definitive agreements, in Rome (1992) and Maputo (2014), but failed to fully end bloodshed. This new August 2019 agreement is the third attempt, and if it is to last, it will require political goodwill, compromise and an acceptance of more inclusive national politics by both parties.

There are two immediate threats to this agreement. The first is the forthcoming 15 October elections and their conduct could make or break it. Accepting reconciliation and greater pluralism underpins this agreement, but RENAMO expects to increase its share of the parliamentary vote and win a majority in some provinces (and therefore indirectly elect their choice for governor).

A second threat is the ‘Military Junta’, a RENAMO splinter group that claims to be 500 strong, but probably accounts for 80 armed persons. It rejects the 6 August agreement and warns that it could disrupt the elections. This group has asked for mediation, and hopefully can be accommodated in a side deal to the main one agreed in August, which already provides for the reintegration of over 5,000 RENAMO supporters and combatants.

A recent Chatham House research paper on elite bargains in Mozambique concluded that the October elections will be the first immediate test of the August agreement. If the elections pass without significant electoral manipulation or violence and this August deal sticks on the third attempt, the domestic focus should then move onto poverty reduction, combating inequality, education and solving the new security crisis with Islamic militants in Cabo Delgado province.

Zimbabwe Futures 2030: A Vision for Inclusive Long-Term Economic Recovery 10 October 2019 — 10:00AM TO 12:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 September 2019 Harare, Zimbabwe

In its Vision 2030, the government of Zimbabwe committed itself to facilitating an open market and stable economy through strategies such as the Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP) and new industrialization policy. The private sector is pivotal to these objectives and creating an environment conducive to inclusive and job-creating economic growth. Economic growth can only be achieved with a conducive policy environment and government support to underpin markets with provision of public goods, entrepreneurial incentives and protect contract enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms.

This event will launch a new Chatham House Africa Programme publication on Zimbabwe’s Vision 2030. The paper is the culmination of an inclusive research process that has drawn on senior private sector expertise, civil society, academics, technocratic elements of government and other experts to develop policy recommendations that will support inclusive economic growth in Zimbabwe.

This event is held in partnership with the Zimbabwe Business Club and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS). It is supported by KAS and the Dulverton Trust.

Zimbabwe After Mugabe Expert comment sysadmin 12 September 2019

He was the founding father of modern Zimbabwe, but he leaves behind a contested legacy and a country at a crossroads.

Robert Mugabe’s death at age 95, after nearly 60 years at the helm of Zimbabwe’s liberation and post-independence politics, is a momentous occasion. Mugabe was the founding father of modern Zimbabwe, with all its stunning successes and grievous failures. As he moves into national legend, contestations over his legacy demonstrate that, in death as in life, the man known as Gushungo (from his family lineage) still continues to polarize opinion.

His failings are well known, including the mass murders of more than 30,000 civilians in Matabeleland during the 1980s Gukurahundi campaigns, and the killings and torture of opposition activists in the 2000s and 2010s.

The land reform process, although necessary, was handled in a haphazard way, contributing to the economic crash and 2008’s ‘year zero’, when Zimbabwe was plagued with a worthless currency, no food in the shops, unsafe drinking water and the spread of cholera and typhoid.

Nevertheless, Mugabe is genuinely mourned by millions in Zimbabwe and beyond. Partly this is for what he achieved in building Zimbabwe’s education, health and economy, and for giving land – however haphazardly – to millions of Zimbabweans.

But it was his assertion of black and African identity and pride which made Mugabe connect with millions. I grew up in Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, where being a black African was, by law, a cardinal sin and, at times, a capital offence. Mugabe helped to make being black not just acceptable but also a cause for celebration.

What now for the country?

Mugabe continues to shape Zimbabwe’s politics. Emmerson Mnangagwa’s government has tried to differentiate itself from Mugabe’s administrations, avoiding his radical and ideologically driven language and policies. But Zimbabwe’s military, which played a critical role in Mugabe’s 2017 removal, remains influential over government policy.

Mnangagwa wants to be seen as a moderate, accessible for regular meetings with private sector and international investors through the Presidential Advisory Commission, the Tripartite Negotiating Forum, investment meetings and other forums.

Politically, Zimbabwe’s bipartisan Parliamentary Portfolio Committees have emerged over the past year as key institutions able to effectively hold the government and other institutions to account. Contentious Mugabe-era legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act has been revised in line with Zimbabwe’s constitution. And the ongoing multiparty dialogue is a useful start towards a much-needed national political dialogue.

Through its Transitional Stabilization Programme, the Mnangagwa administration has outlined an ambitious economic reform agenda. There has been some progress; in January, the government reported a $113 million budget surplus, and publicly available audits of state-owned enterprises by Public Auditor Mildred Chiri have exposed the rot at the heart of institutions such as the National Social Security Authority.

The government has streamlined bureaucracy and legislation to improve Zimbabwe’s business climate; and the newly empowered Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission has begun probing some high-profile fraud cases.

Zimbabwe’s global re-engagement with international financial institutions, a process which had stalled in Mugabe’s later years, is now making some progress, with Zimbabwe joining the Staff Monitored Programme with the IMF in mid-2019. The introduction of a new currency in February was designed to end the chaos of multiple US-dollar exchange rates and the dominance of the black market, but has had limited results.

Hardship

But the Mnangagwa administration’s attempts to stabilize the Zimbabwean economy have also included deep cuts in government spending, and the resulting austerity has brought severe hardship for ordinary Zimbabweans. Massive fuel, power and water shortages and the sky-rocketing cost of living are all reminiscent of the Mugabe era, damaging the credibility of the government’s promise of an economic dividend.

Shortages have also hit tourism, which had rebounded in recent years, and the new national currency initiative has pushed inflation to an official 180%. Violent urban protests took place in 2018 and 2019.

While government is right to commit to reforms, and has taken steps, such as cost-of-living allowances, to help mitigate the worst impacts, many Zimbabweans view the official ‘austerity for prosperity’ message with deep scepticism, and the current state of the economy has encouraged more young Zimbabweans to leave the country. Government and the business community need to prioritize people over statistics, and put social protection, anti-poverty programmes and economic democracy at the forefront of economic reform.

Getting public services working again will also require a broad national economic consensus and could look to capitalize on diaspora-led initiatives in education, agriculture, health and other sectors.

But this will require the opposition Movement for Democratic Change to recognize Mnangagwa’s legitimacy in return for substantive talks between government and the opposition and strengthened outreach to Zimbabwe’s nearly 5-million strong global diaspora, many in the United Kingdom, unsure of what tomorrow will bring, and an increasingly troubled South Africa.

The future

Robert Mugabe’s funeral will bring together the great and the good, not just from Zimbabwe but from all over the world. Robert Mugabe was always a voice and never an echo, and his passing, as with those of other Zimbabwean change-makers of all races and backgrounds, is an opportunity to reflect on the legacy of the liberation era.

But more importantly, it is also an opportunity to think about what lies ahead. Zimbabweans have proved to be resilient and innovative; but it will require a collective effort and a national re-engagement to ensure that Zimbabwe’s future is not its past. And with Mugabe now gone, the Zimbabwe government must prove that it can and will do better.

Angola's Business Promise: Evaluating the Progress of Privatization and Other Economic Reforms 21 January 2020 — 2:30PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Minister Nunes Júnior will discuss the progress of the Angolan government’s economic stabilization plans and business reform agenda including the privatization of some state-owned enterprises. These reforms could expand Angola’s exports beyond oil and stimulate new industries and more inclusive economic growth.

THIS EVENT IS NOW FULL AND REGISTRATION HAS CLOSED.

Mozambique’s Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement: One Year On 6 August 2020 — 2:30PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 July 2020 Online

August 6, 2020 marks one year since the Peace and National Reconciliation Agreement was signed in Maputo. The agreement, signed by the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade, and witnessed by regional and international political and religious leaders, ended the return to conflict that started in 2013.

It also paved the way for Mozambique’s national elections in October 2019. Since the agreement, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won a landslide victory in the elections, weakening RENAMO, and a splinter group has conducted targeted armed violence in Manica and Sofala provinces. Yet, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process has made progress.

At this event, senior figures reflect on the peace agreement and the key factors of its success. The event also draws upon insights from the authors of recent publications on the latest peace agreement in the context of longer term trends of democratization and peace-building in Mozambique.

A Chatham House Africa Programme research paper published in August 2019, Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique: Third Time Lucky?, examined how the deal was achieved. The Portuguese version includes the full text of the peace accord. Read the research paper in Portuguese or English here.

Zimbabwe's Economy During the Coronavirus Pandemic and Beyond 8 September 2020 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 26 August 2020

COVID-19 has had a devastating effect on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy. Important foreign currency earning industries have virtually stopped, and across the country livelihoods are at risk and an increasing number of people are reliant on government grants.

Businesses are having to become more flexible but are constrained by a weak policy environment and lack of confidence in the economy. Since 2017, the government has been pursuing an economic reform agenda and Transitional Stabilization Programme (TSP), which was scheduled for completion by the end of 2020. The deepening challenges highlight the need to accelerate economic reform and build confidence in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

At this webinar, speakers discuss the measures that government, businesses, and individuals are adopting in response to the COVID-19 economic challenge, and the policies required for recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Zimbabwe’s Economic Governance and Regional Integration 17 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2020 Online

Panellists discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration in the context of the shocks caused by the coronavirus pandemic.

At this virtual event, panellists and participants will discuss policy and governance for long-term economic prosperity in Zimbabwe, reflecting on the role of institutional change and regional integration.

The government of Zimbabwe has emphasized its commitment to economic reform and its ambition to achieve upper-middle-income status by 2030, but there are considerable challenges to overcome.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing economic fragility. Improving the business climate to attract international private-sector investment will be contingent on clear, consistent and coherent policy and implementation, including targeting abuse and corruption.

Zimbabwe has, in recent years, successfully strengthened its regional trade integration, although some trade frictions remain. This is an important factor not only for catalysing economic growth in Zimbabwe, but for supporting regional prosperity and post-COVID recovery.

This webinar is the second in a series of events held in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic reform and recovery.

Read a meeting summary

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Inclusion, agency and influence: The role of women in Zimbabwe’s economy 8 July 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 July 2021 Online

Speakers discuss the changing role of women in Zimbabwe’s economic structures and the priorities for promoting greater economic inclusion, agency and influence of women.

Zimbabwe’s National Development Strategy of 2021-2025 highlights the importance of gender sensitivity in policymaking and of women’s economic participation in attaining the government’s Vision 2030.

However, women have been among the worst affected groups by the devastating effects that COVID-19 has had on Zimbabwe’s already floundering economy, which has exacerbated the challenges they face in economic life, such as access to credit, financial services and social security.

Leveraging existing structures such as women’s groups, micro-finance facilities, education and training, and national gender mechanisms, as well as supporting wider financial and digital inclusion in Zimbabwe, is central for the country’s sustained economic recovery.

This event also focuses on the differing impacts of COVID-19 on women’s economic activities across various sectors, as well as along rural-urban and formal-informal economy lines.

Read a meeting summary

This webinar is part of a series of events in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on Zimbabwe’s economic recovery and reform.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

Zambia’s political and economic reform and recovery 5 November 2021 — 11:30AM TO 12:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 November 2021 Chatham House and Online

At this event, HE Hakainde Hichilema, president of the Republic of Zambia, discusses his vision for Zambia’s development and long-term political and economic reform and recovery.

Zambia’s new administration, following the general elections of August 2021, faces a daunting challenge of reversing economic contraction, lowering income-eroding inflation, and addressing the unsustainable national debt.

The country has been one of the few to seek debt restructuring under the G20’s new Common Framework for Debt Treatments, and its immediate priorities include a prospective agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Young Zambians are eager for jobs and improved living standards. But the government’s ambition to create more jobs and achieve middle-income status will depend on both attracting new investment into its copper sector and pursuing a programme of economic diversification supporting growth beyond the mining industry.

Addressing these economic concerns will also need to be supported by a programme of political reform and rehabilitation of citizens’ trust in the state.

The future of global trade: Beyond ‘peak globalization’? 23 November 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 October 2022 Online

Is globalization in retreat?

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have highlighted how vulnerable international trade is. But, even before these recent shocks, rising protectionism in major economies around the world and concerns about the environment have weighed heavily on trade.

According to some key measures, the globalization trend appears to have slowed. But is ‘peak globalization’ a reality or a myth? What are the major phases of globaliszation and what might come next? The answer differs between trade in goods, services, capital, technology, data and people. And whether the future is a more integrated or fragmented world economy also depends on politics and the stability of the international order.

Key questions to be tackled at this event includes:

• How do recent shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, change globalization? 

• What are the key indicators for the global integration of major economies?

• Will there be a split between a US and China-dominated ’trading sphere of influence’?

• Could trade in services offer ‘globalization’ a new phase of rapid growth?

• What impact will technology continue to have on global trade and the future of globalization?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

The discussion is part of the Chatham House Global Trade Policy Forum. The Global Trade Policy Forum is supported by founding partner AIG, associate partner Boston Consulting Group and supporting partners Clifford Chance LLP, Diageo PLC and UPS.

Read the transcript. 

Built for net zero 12 December 2022 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 21 November 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can sustainable infrastructure deliver on low-carbon commitments?

Demand for sustainable infrastructure is increasing in scale and complexity as developed and developing countries seek to accelerate the transition to low-carbon economies while improving living standards for all.

Delivering on net zero will require significant public and private investment, with spending on physical assets alone requiring a yearly commitment of at least $7 trillion according to estimates by the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC).

To ensure the successful build-out of modern green infrastructure across target sectors from transport and energy to water, innovative financing and collaborative project delivery models are needed to support climate commitments, energy-efficiency, and sustainable living options.

This discussion examines how construction design and infrastructure strategies should evolve to deliver on sustainability goals, remain competitive, and maximize societal outcomes.

The discussion, supported by EY, explores these key questions: 

• What are the main drivers and restraints for governments in delivering green infrastructure?
• What is the role of investors in promoting sustainable infrastructure?
• Where should investment be targeted for maximum impact?
• Who are the key stakeholders that should be involved in infrastructure delivery and what does successful collaboration look like?
• How can civil society and local governments play a greater role in urban design to deliver safe, resilient infrastructure with positive societal outcomes?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.

The era of ‘reglobalization’ 15 June 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

How to balance international trade with efforts to enhance domestic economic resilience?

The global trade outlook remains challenging in 2023. Geopolitical tensions and national security concerns are playing a greater role in trade policy with a focus on strengthening supply chain resilience and reducing economic dependencies. In addition, the turn towards industrial policies has raised concerns about unfair trade practices and protectionism.

The debate about the future of globalization has only therefore deepened. While ‘deglobalization’ dominates the current public discourse on trade, is ‘reglobalization’ a better term to describe patterns of economic integration and fracturing across different economies and sectors?

The panel of experts discuss:

• To what extent are efforts to meet climate goals and maintain technological leadership intertwined with industrial policy and national security objectives?

• What do recent measures by the US – including the Inflation Reduction Act and a push on semiconductors – mean for cooperation with like-minded partners such as the EU?

• Are any countries resisting the protectionist trend and continuing to champion open trade?

• What steps can be taken to strengthen strategic and sensitive supply chains, for example, for critical minerals, high-capacity batteries and semiconductors?

• Is it possible to develop and advance a positive trade agenda for a reglobalized world? If so, what would it look like?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Limited expectations as Scholz heads to Kyiv and Moscow Expert comment NCapeling 14 February 2022

After heavy criticism for an initially timid response, the approach of Germany’s new government to the Ukraine crisis is improving as its position on Russia evolves.

Olaf Scholz is a famously quiet and cautious communicator and, as concerns mounted in Washington and London about the possibility of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the new German chancellor remained silent.

This time his silence reflected the fact that his government was unprepared for its first major foreign policy test, with marked divisions between the SPD and the Greens on how to manage a rapidly deteriorating relationship with Russia.

When he did speak, Scholz caused dismay in several NATO capitals by defending the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline. He called it ‘a purely private economic project’ even though the company building the pipeline is a subsidiary of Russia’s state-owned Gazprom.

The absence of crisis management from Berlin was a stark reminder of the gap left by Angela Merkel. Her knowledge of Russia and Ukraine, and her personal experience of dealing with Vladimir Putin, were key assets in 2014 in developing a unified western response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilization of south-eastern Ukraine.

Germany has coordinated with its allies

Scholz has prepared the ground carefully for his visits to Kyiv and Moscow, extensively coordinating with NATO allies, such as France and Poland – as part of the Weimar Triangle – and the three Baltic states. His inaugural visit to Washington helped align positions on US-EU efforts to develop an economic deterrent against further Russian intervention in Ukraine.

Scholz has also repeated Merkel’s language from 2014 to signal to Moscow that Germany and its partners are ‘united and determined’ to stand their ground. And he has spoken of Germany’s continuing double strategy of ‘clear announcements’ to Moscow of the price it would pay for further aggression accompanied by a readiness to use all possible channels of dialogue to preserve peace.

The continuation of Germany’s established policy will not surprise Moscow. But under the surface Germany’s discourse on Russia is evolving as the political class internalizes the fact that the current Russian leadership is openly threatening to use military force to impose its will on Ukraine and re-configure Europe’s security arrangements.

Despite deep concerns about Germany’s dependence on Russian gas – more than half of the gas it consumes comes from Russia – there is broad acceptance that Nord Stream 2 cannot go ahead if Russia invades Ukraine. But typically, Scholz has not yet said as much publicly, limiting himself to stating ‘all options are on the table.’

Robert Habeck, Germany’s vice-chancellor as well as economic affairs and climate action minister, says the ‘geopolitical situation’ requires Germany to diversify its gas supplies and infrastructure for importing gas. For years, a strong pro-Russian gas lobby has dominated the thinking of the Economics Ministry and one consequence is the complete absence of facilities to import liquefied natural gas.

The German debate on Russia is shifting

A public debate has also started about weapons deliveries to Ukraine, even though this runs counter to deeply embedded pacifist tendencies in German society. Some MPs, former diplomats, and experts have begun to make the case for Germany to supply weapons to Ukraine so it can exercise its right to self-defence and deter military attack.

Christoph Heusgen, a former long-standing foreign policy adviser in the Federal Chancellery, says Berlin’s decision not to deliver arms to Ukraine to avoid endangering the Minsk peace process requires revision now Moscow has abandoned the path of negotiation.

Despite its mantra that there is no alternative to the Minsk Agreements, Berlin now admits these currently offer no prospect of resolving the war in Donbas because Russia is not prepared to implement them properly.

Other taboos are also being broken inside Germany. Heavyweight left-of-centre Die Zeit published the first results of its investigation into the SPD’s links with Russia and their place in Russia’s channels of influence in Germany. And even the SPD’s Sigmar Gabriel, an outspoken champion of Nord Stream 2 during his time as a government minister, has raised the question of Germany terminating energy imports from Russia if there is a drastic deterioration of the security situation.

Why a no-fly zone risks escalating the Ukraine conflict Expert comment NCapeling 13 March 2022

The US rejection of Poland’s offer to send fighter jets as a boost to Ukraine’s air defence shows just how uneasy nations are about direct combat with Russia.

The Pentagon’s decision to turn down the proposal by its fellow NATO member Poland to put Russian-made MiG-29 jets at its disposal demonstrates again how keen the US and allies are to avoid risking major confrontation with Russian forces.

The US Department of Defense says the offer to locate jets at bases in Germany was ‘not tenable’ as this risks flying into contested airspace over Ukraine – a non-NATO member – raising ‘serious concerns for the entire NATO alliance’ and echoing the continuing rejection of calls to implement no-fly zones (NFZs) as a way of easing the devastation being faced by trapped Ukraine civilians.

NFZs restrict any aircraft, including drones, from flying over a pre-defined region and can be used for both military and civilian purposes. But the implementation of NFZs is difficult to enforce and – most significantly – is unlikely to achieve the intended effect on the ground.

In conflict situations, they are usually implemented under the remit of United Nations (UN) peace support operations, requiring authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. This details that if all possible methods have proven ineffective in responding to a threat, countries ‘may take such action by air, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’.

Protection but with limitations

NFZs provide both protection from attack and surveillance but do have limitations. They must be monitored and enforced which requires committing to fighter jet patrols with the explicit task of defending the area from the air by whatever means necessary.

This could mean jets firing upon Russian planes and drones so, if NATO allies and partners were to enforce a NFZ, it would represent an escalation of measures which is a step that would most likely provoke an unpredictable Vladimir Putin into further escalation – in short, it is highly likely to be seen as an act of war.

UK defence secretary Ben Wallace – among others – has repeatedly dispelled the idea, saying that enforcing NFZs would mean deploying ‘British fighter jets directly against Russian fighter jets’. In relation to moves such as the Polish jets, the Kremlin has warned that any countries offering airfields to Ukraine for attacks on Russia may be viewed as having entered the conflict.

There have only been three past instances of military NFZs. In Bosnia, as part of Operation Deny Flight from 1993-1995, a NFZ was enforced as part of a strategy which also including the provision of close air support and approved air strikes.

In Iraq, an NFZ endured for 12 years from 1991 and was succcesful in preventing Saddam Hussein from attacking Kurdish and Shia Muslim civilians. And in Libya in 2011, a NFZ was deployed to prevent the destruction of military infrastructure and the Libyan regime – although this quickly morphed into the provision of close air support.

So it is unclear just how successful NFZs are at providing protection. In Iraq and Libya, NFZ cover protection was provided but neither Saddam Hussein or Colonel Gaddafi were able to effectively target victims through their ground forces whereas, in Bosnia, Slobodan Milosevic infamously used ground troops to slaughter 8,000 Bosnian men and boys at Srebrenica.

Putin would still be able to continue to use both ground forces and artillery to assault Ukrainian cities with or without a NFZ – in fact, his sparse use of his Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been one of the surprising features of the war so far. Under a NFZ, missile attacks could also continue, there is nothing in the record of no-fly zones to suggest the provision of safe areas for non-combatants would work.

And NFZs have only been successful against vastly inferior forces such as in Iraq, Bosnia, and Libya. But Russia has an air force second only in size to the US and has a vast range of defences including the potent S-400 Triumf at its disposal. Not only would an NFZ be ineffective, it might also not be possible to enforce without risking significant losses to the peace operations force.

It is due to a combination of these reasons that NFZs have not been used more in previous conflicts. The most recent consideration for a NFZ was in Syria but President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian forces, protected by Russian air cover, could still have targeted their intended victims despite air policing so a NFZ was not used.

In the long-term, under the terms of a ceasefire agreement, it may be possible to include a NFZ under a UN or joint OSCE-UN peace terms. However, the forces involved should exclude NATO allies and partners or any states with Russian alliances to avoid further conflict.

This leaves few suitable countries with the capacity, willingness, and political stance to be called on. Two of the world’s most militarily capable states – China and India – abstained in the Uniting for Peace vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Whether another willing state with the military capability – such as a Gulf state – could be considered acceptable to all sides remains to be tested.

Notable successes with SAMs

Many military commentators also note that currently Ukrainian forces are having notable success without jets, downing Russian aircraft using sophisticated surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as Stinger and Javelin, and NATO countries continue to supply those in their thousands.

Quantification of ¹⁸F-FDG PET images is useful for accurate diagnosis and evaluation of various brain diseases, including brain tumors, epilepsy, dementia, and Parkinson disease. However, accurate quantification of ¹⁸F-FDG PET images requires matched 3-dimensional T₁ MRI scans of the same individuals to provide detailed information on brain anatomy. In this paper, we propose a transfer learning approach to adapt a pretrained deep neural network model from amyloid PET to spatially normalize ¹⁸F-FDG PET images without the need for 3-dimensional MRI. Methods: The proposed method is based on a deep learning model for automatic spatial normalization of ¹⁸F-FDG brain PET images, which was developed by fine-tuning a pretrained model for amyloid PET using only 103 ¹⁸F-FDG PET and MR images. After training, the algorithm was tested on 65 internal and 78 external test sets. All T₁ MR images with a 1-mm isotropic voxel size were processed with FreeSurfer software to provide cortical segmentation maps used to extract a ground-truth regional SUV ratio using cerebellar gray matter as a reference region. These values were compared with those from spatial normalization-based quantification methods using the proposed method and statistical parametric mapping software. Results: The proposed method showed superior spatial normalization compared with statistical parametric mapping, as evidenced by increased normalized mutual information and better size and shape matching in PET images. Quantitative evaluation revealed a consistently higher SUV ratio correlation and intraclass correlation coefficients for the proposed method across various brain regions in both internal and external datasets. The remarkably good correlation and intraclass correlation coefficient values of the proposed method for the external dataset are noteworthy, considering the dataset’s different ethnic distribution and the use of different PET scanners and image reconstruction algorithms. Conclusion: This study successfully applied transfer learning to a deep neural network for ¹⁸F-FDG PET spatial normalization, demonstrating its resource efficiency and improved performance. This highlights the efficacy of transfer learning, which requires a smaller number of datasets than does the original network training, thus increasing the potential for broader use of deep learning–based brain PET spatial normalization techniques for various clinical and research radiotracers.

To date, the imaging and diagnosis of hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC) rely on CT/MRI, which have well-known limitations. Glypican-3 (GPC3) is a cell surface receptor highly expressed by HCC but not by normal or cirrhotic liver tissue. Here we report initial clinical results of GPC3-targeted PET imaging with [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-DOTA-RYZ-GPC3 (RAYZ-8009), a peptide-based GPC3 ligand in patients with known or suspected HCC. Methods: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 was obtained after labeling the peptide precursor with ⁶⁸Ga from a ⁶⁸Ge/⁶⁸Ga generator and heating at 90°C for 10 min followed by sterile filtration. After administration of [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009, a dynamic or static PET/CT scan was acquired between 45 min and 4 h after administration. Radiotracer uptake was measured by SUVs for the following tissues: suspected or actual HCC or hepatoblastoma lesions, non–tumor-bearing liver, renal cortex, blood pool in the left ventricle, and gastric fundus. Additionally, tumor–to–healthy-liver ratios (TLRs) were calculated. Results: Twenty-four patients (5 patients in the dynamic protocol; 19 patients in the static protocol) were scanned. No adverse events occurred. Two patients had no lesion detected and did not have HCC during follow-up. In total, 50 lesions were detected and analyzed. The mean SUV_max of these lesions was 19.6 (range, 2.7–95.3), and the mean SUV_mean was 10.1 (range, 1.0–49.2) at approximately 60 min after administration. Uptake in non–tumor-bearing liver and blood pool rapidly decreased over time and became negligible 45 min after administration (mean SUV_mean, <1.6), with a continuous decline to 4 h after administration (mean SUV_mean, 1.0). The opposite was observed for HCC lesions, for which SUVs and TLRs continuously increased for up to 4 h after administration. In individual lesion analysis, TLR was the highest between 60 and 120 min after administration. Uptake in the gastric fundus gradually increased for up to 45 min (to an SUV_max of 31.3) and decreased gradually afterward. Conclusion: [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is safe and allows for high-contrast imaging of GPC3-positive HCC, with rapid clearance from most normal organs. Thereby, [⁶⁸Ga]Ga-RAYZ-8009 is promising for HCC diagnosis and staging. Further research is warranted.

Single-domain antibodies (sdAbs) demonstrate favorable pharmacokinetic profiles for molecular imaging applications. However, their renal excretion and retention are obstacles for applications in targeted radionuclide therapy (TRT). Methods: Using a click-chemistry–based pretargeting approach, we aimed to reduce kidney retention of a fibroblast activation protein α (FAP)–targeted sdAb, 4AH29, for ¹⁷⁷Lu-TRT. Key pretargeting parameters (sdAb-injected mass and lag time) were optimized in healthy mice and U87MG (FAP⁺) xenografts. A TRT study in a pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma (PDAC) patient-derived xenograft (PDX) model was performed as a pilot study for sdAb-based pretargeting applications. Results: Modification of 4AH29 with trans-cyclooctene (TCO) moieties did not modify the sdAb pharmacokinetic profile. A 200-µg injected mass of 4AH29-TCO and an 8-h lag time for the injection of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine resulted in the highest kidney therapeutic index (2.0 ± 0.4), which was 5-fold higher than that of [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29 (0.4 ± 0.1). FAP expression in the tumor microenvironment was validated in a PDAC PDX model with both immunohistochemistry and PET/CT imaging. Mice treated with the pretargeting high-activity approach (4AH29-TCO + [¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-PEG₇-tetrazine; 3 x 88 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) demonstrated prolonged survival compared with the vehicle control and conventionally treated ([¹⁷⁷Lu]Lu-DOTA-4AH29; 3 x 37 MBq, 1 injection per week for 3 wk) mice. Mesangial expansion was reported in 7 of 10 mice in the conventional cohort, suggesting treatment-related kidney morphologic changes, but was not observed in the pretargeting cohort. Conclusion: This study validates pretargeting to mitigate sdAbs’ kidney retention with no observation of morphologic changes on therapy regimen at early time points. Clinical translation of click-chemistry–based pre-TRT is warranted on the basis of its ability to alleviate toxicities related to biovectors’ intrinsic pharmacokinetic profiles. The absence of representative animal models with extensive stroma and high FAP expression on cancer-associated fibroblasts led to a low mean tumor-absorbed dose even with high injected activity and consequently to modest survival benefit in this PDAC PDX.

Tumor hypoxia, an integral biomarker to guide radiotherapy, can be imaged with ¹⁸F-fluoromisonidazole (¹⁸F-FMISO) hypoxia PET. One major obstacle to its broader application is the lack of standardized interpretation criteria. We sought to develop and validate practical interpretation criteria and a dedicated training protocol for nuclear medicine physicians to interpret ¹⁸F-FMISO hypoxia PET. Methods: We randomly selected 123 patients with human papillomavirus–positive oropharyngeal cancer enrolled in a phase II trial who underwent 123 ¹⁸F-FDG PET/CT and 134 ¹⁸F-FMISO PET/CT scans. Four independent nuclear medicine physicians with no ¹⁸F-FMISO experience read the scans. Interpretation by a fifth nuclear medicine physician with over 2 decades of ¹⁸F-FMISO experience was the reference standard. Performance was evaluated after initial instruction and subsequent dedicated training. Scans were considered positive for hypoxia by visual assessment if ¹⁸F-FMISO uptake was greater than floor-of-mouth uptake. Additionally, SUV_max was determined to evaluate whether quantitative assessment using tumor-to-background ratios could be helpful to define hypoxia positivity. Results: Visual assessment produced a mean sensitivity and specificity of 77.3% and 80.9%, with fair interreader agreement ( = 0.34), after initial instruction. After dedicated training, mean sensitivity and specificity improved to 97.6% and 86.9%, with almost perfect agreement ( = 0.86). Quantitative assessment with an estimated best SUV_max ratio threshold of more than 1.2 to define hypoxia positivity produced a mean sensitivity and specificity of 56.8% and 95.9%, respectively, with substantial interreader agreement ( = 0.66), after initial instruction. After dedicated training, mean sensitivity improved to 89.6% whereas mean specificity remained high at 95.3%, with near-perfect interreader agreement ( = 0.86). Conclusion: Nuclear medicine physicians without ¹⁸F-FMISO hypoxia PET reading experience demonstrate much improved interreader agreement with dedicated training using specific interpretation criteria.

EU-Turkey Customs Union: Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit 12 December 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 November 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey and the EU have been in a customs union since 1995. Both sides recognize that the current agreement is in need of modernization and have agreed to open negotiations to expand its scope to include services, public procurement, agriculture and other elements that would help bring it into the 21st century.

At the same time, the UK Parliament is debating whether to approve the agreement on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It includes a backstop which – if triggered – would keep the UK and the EU in a single customs territory which would limit the disruption of withdrawal but hamper Britain’s ability to pursue an independent trade policy. The political declaration proposes building on this customs arrangement as the basis for the future relationship.

In this context, the speaker will discuss the current EU-Turkey customs union arrangement and its shortcomings, examine the prospects for its modernization and share his insights on the lessons for the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU.

The event will launch the briefing paper ‘EU-Turkey Customs Union: Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit’.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Amazon Prime Air drone deliveries are underway and delivering small packages within an hour in the West Valley of the Phoenix metro area.

More than 500,000 space heaters from GoveeLife and GoveeSmart Electric are being recalled because of safety issues, according to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.