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Chatham House welcomes 2024 interns

Chatham House welcomes 2024 interns News release jon.wallace

An internship at Chatham House offers an invaluable learning experience through a six-month placement in one of our teams.

Chatham House is excited to welcome the 2024 cohort to the Molchanov Sustainability Internship Programme

Introduced in January 2021, the programme has been made possible following the gift of Pavel Molchanov, to support the next generation of leaders in sustainability. 

The internships grant practical learning opportunities at a world-famous think-tank, helping a new generation of policymakers understand how to shape policy, influence debate, and create meaningful change towards a sustainable future. 

This autumn, Chatham House staff in six departments are delighted to welcome interns to their teams: 

Aisha Abdirahman will work with the Environment and Society Centre, Kendall Spence with the Africa Programme, Matthew Harris with the International Affairs journal, Noor Elgallal with the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Phoebe Hardingham with the Russia and Eurasia Programme, and Thomas Maddock with the Europe Programme.

For more information about the internships, please contact the Academy team.




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The UK needs to address growth and debt problems if it is to match resources to ambitions on international priorities

The UK needs to address growth and debt problems if it is to match resources to ambitions on international priorities Expert comment LJefferson

The budget marks the lowest amount in decades the country has spent on development, and it is struggling to fund other international priorities too.

The UK’s Chancellor Rachel Reeves unveiled her much-anticipated budget last week, the first of the new Labour government. Labour is in a difficult place. There are numerous calls on the public purse and public services are not performing well. Meanwhile, public debt remains close to 100 per cent of GDP, and there has been a long run of sluggish growth.
 
Reeves argues with some justification that the previous government left her a challenging inheritance – gaps in this year’s spending plans, and persistent debt questions left unresolved. More importantly, there are longer-term concerns about the sustainability of UK public spending – the country’s Office for Budget Responsibility has warned public debt could triple by the 2070s due to an ageing population, the climate crisis, and security risks. The focus has understandably been on kitchen table questions about tax rises and funding public services.
 
But this picture also has longstanding implications for international policy – on whether the UK can afford to invest in its foreign policy. The Chancellor did announce an increase of £2.9bn for defence. But the question of whether the UK can get on a sustainable path to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence is still being worked through in the ongoing Strategic Review, and remains challenging despite increasingly urgent warnings from parliamentary committees about the UK’s defence readiness.

The budget also marks one of the lowest amounts in recent years the UK will spend on development overseas, despite setting an ambition to reset relations with the Global South and recover the UK’s role as a leader in international development.
  
The UK needs to either match resources to ambition, spend much more efficiently, or, in the case of the aid budget, it could seek to focus on priorities that are less dependent on spending. But even this will still require consistent resources, alongside significant diplomatic attention, intellectual leadership, and focus.

Longer-term, the UK may need to consider larger questions: addressing broader problems with its lack of growth and productivity will be critical to fund an expansive international role.

With this budget, UK aid spent overseas is at a historic low

In 2020 the UK government cut its goal for spending on international development to 0.5 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), ending a longstanding policy of spending 0.7 per cent. Labour have echoed this, promising to only return to previous levels when fiscal circumstances allow.
 
But this masks a bigger issue. Since 2022, significant amounts of the UK’s aid budget have been spent on accommodation for asylum seekers in the UK. This is within the rules governing aid, but reduces the amount spent on reducing poverty overseas. In 2023 this spending was 28 per cent of the £15.4bn aid budget. In 2016, it was 3.2 per cent

Previous Chancellor Jeremy Hunt quietly allowed a top-up of aid spending over the last two fiscal years to offset how much is being spent at home on asylum seeker accommodation. That provided an additional £2.5 billion for 2022–23 and 2023–24.

But Rachel Reeves declined to provide extra funding this time, meaning the amount being spent overseas is likely the lowest its been since 2007 – an effective cut – under a Labour government.

The Minister for Development, Anneliese Dodds, speaking at Chatham House last month, said the government is working on clearing the backlog of asylum claims, which should free up more to spend overseas.

But beyond this there has been little clarity on plans to address the issue. And costs for asylum seeker accommodation have increased significantly – the UK appears to spend much more than comparator countries per head, according to the Center for Global Development, raising questions about how this spending is managed.

Development is not just about money – but money is important

The UK debate about development has often focused on the 0.7 per cent figure, which can distract from larger questions about what development policy is intended to achieve. As many experts have argued, development aid is about more than spending, and the wider, complex process by which the UK contributes to broad-based growth and stability for poorer countries is not about hitting a specific number.
 
There are things the UK can do that aren’t about spending more directly. This might include focusing on priorities like reforming multilateral development banks so they provide more low-cost public finance, and more flexible and agile loans to poorer countries – a priority echoed by Dodds. It might also incorporate focusing more broadly on helping developing countries attract more investment to bolster growth. 

The UK debate about development has often focused on the 0.7 per cent figure, which can distract from larger questions about what development policy is intended to achieve. 

There is also the issue of developing country debt, much of which is held by the private sector. Dodds previously said, when she was shadow chancellor, she might consider changing the law to address this issue. However,  she declined to recommit to this when questioned at Chatham House. 

None of this can be done unilaterally – on debt, for example, the UK has spearheaded some creative policies. Its UK Export Finance body developed climate-resilient debt clauses – agreements that countries can pause debt repayments in the event of a climate shock – but the UK holds limited amounts of developing country debt. Impact will only come by galvanizing and coordinating others to adopt similar approaches.




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Addressing illegal gold mining: International policy priorities

Addressing illegal gold mining: International policy priorities 18 November 2024 — 11:30AM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) Chatham House and Online

Held in partnership with the World Gold Council, this panel of experts examines the global Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) landscape and propose policy priorities essential for fostering sector formalization.

In this panel discussion, held in partnership with the World Gold Council, experts will examine the global Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) landscape and propose policy priorities essential for fostering sector formalization.

An estimated twenty million people worldwide are involved in the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM) sector, which now accounts for around 20 percent of global gold output. However, 85 percent of this production occurs outside formal legal frameworks. While many in ASGM operate within informal economies or seek pathways to formalization, a significant portion is also vulnerable to criminal exploitation, involving organized crime and armed groups.

In Ethiopia, the sector’s informality is tied to the nation’s volatile security dynamics, with illicit gold mining proliferating as non-state actors compete for control in conflict-prone regions such as Tigray. Additionally, gold is increasingly trafficked through transnational illicit networks in the Sahel and Sudan fuelling instability. South America is also impacted, for example in Peru where the government’s response to illegal ASGM initially saw success in 2019 but has faced sustainability challenges, and environmental impact.

ASGM growth is driven by the rising value of gold, youth unemployment, weak law enforcement, climate impacts, and conflict. While formalization offers significant economic potential, robust international cooperation and industry commitment is required to address the human toll, environmental impact and support sustainable practices.

In this panel discussion, experts will focus on addressing the expansion of illicit control and exploitation within ASGM, highlighting the pathways for governments and large-scale mining companies to drive meaningful change.

This event is hosted in partnership with the World Gold Council. There will be a reception with light refreshments hosted at Chatham House following the event.

This event will be livestreamed via the Africa Programme Facebook page.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.




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Undercurrents: Episode 6 - Tribes of Europe, and the International Women's Rights Agenda at the UN




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Undercurrents: Episode 10 - Artificial Intelligence in International Affairs, and Women Drivers in Saudi Arabia




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Trump’s America: Domestic and International Public Opinion




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International Security Institutions: A Closer Look




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Can Europe Save the Liberal International Order?




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International Law Podcast: Starvation in Armed Conflict




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China and the Future of the International Order - The Belt and Road Initiative




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The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams vs International Realities




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China and the Future of the International Order – Peace and Security




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Cybersecurity Series: Exploring Methods of Internet Censorship and Control




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Undercurrents: Bonus Episode - How Technology is Changing International Affairs




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Zimbabwe’s International Engagement




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Podcast: International Law, Security and Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific




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Who Runs the Internet: Internet Consolidation and Control




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Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law




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The regional and international implications of restrictions to online freedom of expression in Asia

The regional and international implications of restrictions to online freedom of expression in Asia 25 March 2021 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 March 2021 Online

Panellists discuss the latest developments affecting online freedom of expression in the Asia region.

Please note this is an online event. Please register using the link below to finalize your registration.

In recent years, state-led clampdowns on online freedom of expression have become widespread in several countries across Asia, further intensified by the COVID-19 crisis.

The reasons for this are complex and diverse – drawing upon history, culture and politics, in addition to external influences. Across the region, governments have been accused of silencing online criticism and failing to uphold rights to free speech.

Individuals have been arrested, fined or attacked for the alleged spread of ‘fake news’, raising concern among human rights organizations. In some countries, this has culminated in the imposition of new social media rules, which could require social media companies to censor posts and share decrypted messages.

In China, the government’s restrictive online regime has relied on a combination of legal, technical and manipulation tactics to manage control of the internet, and now includes attempts at censorship beyond its borders.

Panellists will discuss the latest regional developments affecting online freedom of expression in the Asia region, and will consider the broader regional and international implications for technology governance.

This webinar launches the publication Restrictions on online freedom of expression in China: The domestic, regional and international implications of China’s policies and practices.




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Influence of soft law grows in international governance

Influence of soft law grows in international governance Expert comment NCapeling 17 June 2021

Soft law is increasingly being used by policymakers to enable greater cooperation and inclusivity, and its role is here to stay in creating effective regimes.

As the UK government’s recent Integrated Review points out, international law-making in a fragmented international order is becoming increasingly difficult.

Geopolitical tensions, and the length of time required to agree multilateral treaties – typically decades – make it challenging to reach binding agreements in complex and fast-evolving policy areas such as climate change and technology governance.

As a result, the regulation of international behaviour through soft law – meaning non-binding instruments such as principles, codes of conduct or declarations – is starting to assume greater significance. And states increasingly find soft law-making attractive because there are relatively fewer decision costs involved.

Soft law also lays the ground for the possibility of transforming into hard law if, over time, its principles become widely accepted and it is evident states are treating them as legal obligations. And the emergence of a hybrid of both soft and hard law components in treaties has started to develop in recent years, such as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

Opening access to global governance

A major attraction of soft law-making is that it provides for non-traditional, non-state actors to take part in the process of global governance. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), social movements, corporate sector, and individuals are more easily drawn into soft law-making compared to treaties, to which only states can be party.

States increasingly find soft law-making attractive because there are relatively fewer decision costs involved

This holds out the promise for greater inclusiveness in global rulemaking and governance, but soft law processes also pose many challenges. Soft law provides an avenue for states to avoid legal obligations on important subjects and developing rules in such an informal manner can lead to fragmentation and a lack of coherence in the international system.

As noted in dialogues held under Chatham House’s Inclusive Governance Initiative, some areas of international interaction require hard law, such as economic competition, certain international security issues, and aspects of the global commons. In these areas, soft law is just not appropriate or enough.

Soft law measures such as codes of conduct may be useful in rapidly developing areas such as technology, as they are more flexible and adaptable than hard law. And they may be particularly effective if used in conjunction with binding regulation, and subject to monitoring and enforcement by a regulator, as in recent proposals by the European Union (EU) for a Digital Services Act.

The Chatham House Inclusive Governance Initiative report highlights that the proliferation of soft law does not necessarily have to compete with the existing system of hard law, so long as soft law solutions do not conflict with, or undermine, hard law such as existing treaty provisions.

Case study: Business and human rights

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) are an interesting example of both the promise of soft law-making, and its challenges. Officially adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2011, the UNGPs set out the global standard of what is expected of companies as regards human rights due diligence (HRDD) to prevent and address business-related human rights harms.

The sections on HRDD in the UNGPs have been constructed as a non-binding ‘social’ standard of conduct, though with the expectation that this would eventually be reinforced through a “smart mix” of both soft law and hard law initiatives. Arguments in favour of the predominantly soft law approach at the time – subsequently borne out in practice – were that this would encourage a higher level of participation, by states and businesses in particular, and better foster creativity and innovation in a still-developing field.

The UNGPs recognize and reinforce the importance of meaningful and inclusive stakeholder engagement for both the credibility and legitimacy of processes, and for the quality of substantive outcomes. The Ruggie process which led to the UNGPs, drew extensively from a wide range of stakeholder engagement processes covering many different jurisdictions and all UN regional groupings. The importance of deep and inclusive stakeholder engagement is also recognized in the mandate of the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights.

The annual UN Forum on Business and Human Rights is one of the largest and most vibrant multi-stakeholder events in the UN calendar. Now in its tenth year, the forum provides an opportunity for an annual review by stakeholders – government, business and civil society – of past achievements in implementing the UNGPs and knowledge sharing on ways to address more persistent, underlying challenges.

The sluggish responses of many companies, coupled with revulsion at reports of serious abuses in the value chains of many well-known brands, have prompted some governments to seek ways of translating some aspects of HRDD methodologies into binding legal standards

Its relatively informal approach to agenda setting has, year on year, enabled an increasingly diverse array of stakeholder-organized sessions, supporting a ‘bottom up’ approach which raises awareness of under-reported issues and undervalued solutions.

In addition, while the UNGPs provide the substantive framework for discussion, flexible governance arrangements allow for rapid reorientation to respond to present and emerging crises, such as COVID-19 pandemic and climate change.

However, the sluggish responses of many companies, coupled with revulsion at reports of serious abuses in the value chains of many well-known brands, have prompted some governments to seek ways of translating some aspects of HRDD methodologies into binding legal standards. France passed a Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law in 2017 and Germany adopted a new law on supply chain due diligence in June 2021 which is to enter into effect on 1 January 2023. The European Commission is also working up proposals for an EU-wide regime to be unveiled in mid-2021.

Soft law versus hard law

At the international level, there are signs of divergence between those states which see value in persevering with the soft law route towards better regulation and corporate standards, and those which want to move as rapidly as possible to a hard law framework for business and human rights, enshrined in treaty, to improve domestic-level regulation and access to effective remedies.

Ultimately, the most effective domestic regimes are likely to be a mix of hard law standards supported by more flexible standards and guidance

Those supporting the hard law route – largely less industrialized states – received a boost in 2016 when the UN Human Rights Council mandated an Intergovernmental Working Group to explore options for a new treaty on business and human rights.

This initiative, known as the ‘treaty process’, has completed six rounds of negotiations. Despite the necessarily greater formality, these treaty negotiation sessions continue to emphasize the importance of stakeholder consultation. NGOs with ECOSOC status are invited to contribute views on the framing and content of draft treaty provisions immediately following the interventions by states, intergovernmental organizations and national human rights institutions, in that order.

The key question is whether this dynamism and inclusivity can be preserved as the transition is made from soft law to more binding approaches. Translating soft law standards into binding regimes inevitably means making hard choices, and different stakeholder groups have different views as to where legal lines should be drawn, how key concepts should be defined, and where the balance between legal certainty and flexibility should be struck.

The negotiations needed to strike an effective balance between competing objectives and needs can be challenging and time-consuming, as experiences with the treaty process have shown. But stakeholder demand for inclusive processes to help shape the law remains strong. Stakeholder groups clearly want a say in how the new EU-wide regime for ‘mandatory human rights due diligence’ will work in practice. A recent online ‘stakeholder survey’ garnered more than 400,000 responses.

Ultimately, the most effective domestic regimes are likely to be a mix of hard law standards supported by more flexible standards and guidance. Civil society organizations and trade unions will continue to have a multi-faceted role to play. Not only are they vital sources of expertise on human rights challenges connected to business activities, at home and abroad, they can also act as private enforcers of standards and advocates for affected people and communities.




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Chatham House welcomes 2022 interns

Chatham House welcomes 2022 interns News release jon.wallace 11 May 2022

Internships provide learning opportunities about shaping policy, influencing debate and creating real change.

Chatham House is excited to welcome the second cohort to the Molchanov Sustainability Internship Programme.

Introduced in January 2021, the programme has been made possible following the gift of Pavel Molchanov, to support the next generation of leaders in sustainability.

The internships grant invaluable, practical learning opportunities about shaping policy, influencing debate and creating real change towards a sustainable future.

Alis Martin, Internships and Outreach Manager at Chatham House, said:

‘We are delighted to welcome the second cohort to the Molchanov Sustainability Internship Programme. This cohort brings a diversity of new and invaluable perspectives and ideas to the work of our programmes.

‘Over the course of 12 weeks, interns will be working alongside internationally respected experts in Chatham House programmes, exploring issues of sustainability through the lenses of climate change, the circular economy, conflict prevention, emerging technology, global health, governance, human rights, security policy, sustainable cities and sustainable finance.

‘Fostering sustainable and equitable growth and engaging the next generation of policy leaders is central to Chatham House’s vision. We are committed to providing the best experience and opportunities to our interns who share an interest in pursuing a career in the field of sustainability.

‘It is crucial that we incorporate the views and knowledge of those who will be affected most in the future and I very much look forward to seeing the innovative and impactful ideas that will undoubtedly result from their work.’

Mr Molchanov said:

‘Recent headlines around the world underscore the importance of taking the broadest possible perspective on sustainability. Energy supply concerns, rising food prices, and continued pandemic pressure are all interconnected with climate issues. I look forward to hearing about the work in which this year’s internship participants engage.’

Jerome Puri, intern, Middle East and North Africa Programme, said:

‘I applied for this internship to gain a holistic insight into the coordination of a policy institute and to understand how Chatham House promotes international cooperation and accountable governance around the world.  Chatham House offers an unparalleled opportunity to contribute to projects on frontier issues facing the MENA region and develop a diverse range of skills ranging from project management and communications to policy-oriented research skills.’

Obioma Egemonye, intern, Africa Programme, said:

‘I was particularly interested in joining the Africa Programme at Chatham House after learning an immeasurable amount from their work on the Social Norms and Accountable Governance (SNAG) research for my undergraduate dissertation. I am most looking forward to attending the variety of events held by Chatham House and the Africa programme specifically.’

Valdone Sniukaite, intern, Europe Programme, said:

‘I am excited to be joining the Europe Programme team and getting exposure to the inner workings of a policy and research think tank. I’m mostly looking forward to building my organizational skill set by working on the Belvedere Forum and using the opportunity of being around experts in the field of international affairs to broaden my knowledge.’

Lucile de Laforcade, intern, Queen Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs, said:

‘As part of the Academy, I am able to work at the crossroads of research, leadership, international affairs and personal development. This makes the Academy a place of constant challenge to find innovative, sustainable solutions, and emulate new ideas. As an aspiring academic, this is particularly empowering! I am hoping to gain new skills, further develop independent thinking, and cultivate my own research interests in the vibrant environment of a leading policy institute.’

Katie McCann, intern, Communications and Publishing, said:

‘I’m really interested in youth engagement in international politics so I’m very excited to be working on the Common Futures Conversations platform which brings young people across Europe and Africa into the debate on the pressing global issues of our time. I hope my time at Chatham House will expose me to people of different backgrounds and beliefs which will encourage me to engage even more critically with international affairs.’

Rachael Mullally, intern, International Law Programme, said:

‘What I admire most about the International Law Programme here is its position as a dependable yet experimental source on global governance debates. I am especially excited to get working on the Human Rights Pathways Project, focusing on tangible ideas as to how the human rights framework can evolve to meet power shifts between states and non-state actors.’

Elia Duran-Smith, intern, International Security Programme, said:

‘I was particularly drawn to this internship because of the thematic focuses of the programme around nuclear security and emerging technologies in the sector, which are fundamental to understanding the future of the global security environment. I am looking forward to learning more about these topics while developing and expanding my research and writing skills, as well as gaining an understanding of project management and how Chatham House engages with stakeholders on policy.’

Rory Selvey, intern, Sustainability Accelerator, said:

‘For me, speeding up the transition towards a fairer, low-carbon society is one of most important global challenges. I’m really excited to be an intern at the Sustainability Accelerator, collaborating with different teams and exploring innovation solutions to this challenge. Chatham House will help me develop vital knowledge and skills, acting as a fantastic springboard for a potential career in sustainable finance, macroeconomics, or international development.’

Bruna Miguel, intern, Environment and Society Programme, said:

‘Being an intern in the Environment and Society Programme will give me the opportunity to further investigate how these issues relate and how we can achieve true sustainability. I look forward to learning from the experts in the area that I will meet (and hopefully find a dissertation topic!).’

Ritvij Singh, intern, Global Health Programme, said:

‘My view of healthcare delivery is from the frontlines as a medical doctor. I applied to this internship to widen my perspective and get an insight into the institutions that will help facilitate universal health. I will use this experience to pursue a career in global health.’

For more information about the internships, please contact Alis Martin.

 




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China Paves Its Way in New Areas of International Law

China Paves Its Way in New Areas of International Law Expert comment sysadmin 31 March 2017

China is looking to increase its capacity and influence in international legal matters – and it is particularly in frontier areas of the law that China is likely to take a proactive stance.

Xi Jinping at the UN European headquarters in Geneva. Photo: Getty Images.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi called China a staunch defender and builder of the international rule of law in his speech to the UN General Assembly in October 2014. He promised that as China grew stronger, it would make a greater contribution to the maintenance and promotion of international rule of law, and would work with other countries to build a fairer and more reasonable international political and economic order.

For many in China, that time has now come: there is a sense that China deserves a much stronger and more respected voice in discussions surrounding the future of the international system. The recent speeches of Xi Jinping in Davos and Geneva in January 2017 suggest that China is now seizing the initiative and fighting for a voice and influence commensurate with its status and power as the number two economy in the world.

But there is an interesting divide in the areas in which China chooses to assert itself. In traditional areas of international law – such as the law of the sea and international human rights law – China continues to harbour reservations about the fairness of the existing international order. Its misgivings are fuelled by a perception that it did not play a significant part in the creation of the post-Second World War international order, and that those rules operate mainly in the interests of Western powers.

There is also a sense that traditional areas of international law do not offer a level playing field for China, since Western states have far more experience at operating in those. We know from Chinese experts that in the South China Sea case, one background issue that played into China’s refusal to engage in litigation with the Philippines and other interested states (which were represented by leading Western international lawyers) was a lack of experience before international courts and tribunals.

Contrast this with newer areas of international law– such as the regimes governing cyber, space, climate change and deep sea mining issues. In these areas, the rules are still in the process of being developed and tested, and the influence of the existing powers is not so firmly established or accepted, so there is more opportunity for China’s voice to be heard and heeded.

On climate change, China has become a champion of the Paris Agreement, which it worked hard with the Obama administration to secure. China is also active in some of the processes related to cyber rule-making, both as a member of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on cyber issues and through bilateral dialogues with a number of states. China has taken a keen interest in the regime applicable to the mining of the international seabed, making submissions to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea about the procedure for settling disputes. In international economic law, another relatively new area, China has been assiduously cultivating expertise, and is a major player in the negotiation of the ‘mega regional’ trade deal, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

In time, the development of China’s much heralded Belt and Road Initiative may provide an opportunity for China to be further involved in international norm-setting, through the creation of a system of economic and political interaction that is built and run more along Chinese determined lines. The emergence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may offer an early indicator of China’s attempts to shape global governance, although in this context China has so far scrupulously observed international standards and has made no open attempt to challenge them.

So far, China’s practical input to international norm-setting has been limited. While China is prone to making wide-ranging statements of principle, it finds it more challenging to engage in the nitty gritty of specific rule making. But as is clear from its membership of the WTO, China can adapt quickly. While initially it was a reluctant adherent to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, China is now adept at making active and effective use of its rules to promote China’s interests, including launching a legal challenge regarding the contested issue of its non-market economy status. Overall, there is strong leadership backing for a more activist approach to its engagement with the international legal system.

China sees international law as an important instrument in the “toolbox” of international diplomacy. It will increasingly be seeking to leverage international law to promote its own interests, particularly in newer areas, as it seeks to strengthen its wider soft power and influence.




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12th International Forum on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

12th International Forum on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 18 May 2020 TO 22 May 2020 — 2:00PM TO 3:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 September 2019

The Chatham House 12th International Forum on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing took place over the week of 18–22 May 2020.

Due to COVID-19, it took the form of a series of daily webinars. The digital conference, which comprised six sessions and three keynote speeches, brought together more than 750 representatives of international organizations, governments, civil society organizations, businesses and academia – from 87 different countries – to discuss the latest initiatives, regulations and research in the areas of fisheries governance and trade in illegal fish products.




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West Bank Annexation: International Rhetoric vs. Action

14 July 2020

Reni Zhelyazkova

Programme Coordinator, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Senior Consulting Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Israel may have delayed announcing its plans to annex West Bank lands but the international community now needs to transform its rhetoric into action if there is to be a lasting solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, argue Reni Zhelyazkova and Yossi Mekelberg.

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Houses are pictured in the Maale Adumim settlement in the West Bank east of Jerusalem. The Israeli government has delayed plans to annex Jewish settlements in the West Bank and in the Jordan Valley. Photo: Getty Images

Observers of the Israel-Palestine conflict have been anticipating Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s, announcement to annex parts of the West Bank. It has been a tumultuous year for Israeli politics which has seen three inconclusive elections and resulted in a sharing of power between Netanyahu and Benny Gantz of the Blue and White party. However, since the coalition government was sworn in, Netanyahu has appeared to not lose any time in moving forward with his plans.

Annexation has long been Netanyahu’s political aspiration and was part of his recent re-election platform but the anticipated announcement from the Israeli government didn’t come straight away. The determining factor in the delay was the inability to reach an agreement with Washington about the scope of the annexation while divisions within the Israeli government itself, in addition to international condemnation from the region and beyond, has also played a part.

Discussions around annexation have so far yielded one major outcome: it has introduced a different rhetoric by the Trump-Netanyahu axis even though things on the ground don’t necessarily follow. Ever since President Donald Trump took office in 2016, there has been a marked change in Washington’s language around the Israel-Palestine conflict. It has shifted towards legitimizing Israel’s expansionist ambitions in the West Bank while marginalizing, and considerably weakening, the Palestinian Authority (PA) through a series of punitive measures.

This has further damaged relations between Israel and Palestine and has resulted in a fundamental change in the public discourse around the conflict, from emphasizing a just solution based on self-determination for both sides, to focusing on a de-facto one-state solution.

But how has the discourse shifted so dramatically in less than four years? First came the announcement of the US embassy move to Jerusalem, and with it, recognition of the city as Israel’s capital. In his statement, President Trump avoided recognizing Palestinian claims over Jerusalem and did not acknowledge their historical connection with the city. When the PA rejected the move, the US administration then retaliated by cutting aid and development funding and closing the PLO mission in Washington stating: ‘We have permitted the PLO office to conduct operations that support the objective of achieving a lasting...peace between Israelis and the Palestinians … However, the PLO has not taken steps to advance the start of...meaningful negotiations with Israel.’

On the question of Israel’s settlements in the West Bank, the current US administration has shied away from calling them ‘illegal’ despite being deemed illegitimate under international law and condemned on numerous occasions by the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, the EU, the Arab League and the Palestinians themselves. US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has even gone as far as saying that the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is not inconsistent with international law.

The culmination of US discourse in recent months has been the unveiling of the ‘Peace to Prosperity’ plan. The language of the proposal, once again, has shown partiality towards Israel by not mentioning the illegality of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, or that of settlements, and entirely ignoring previous Palestinian positions or acknowledging their sensitivities. There is little doubt that the current US administration understands the power of rhetoric and has been using it to change the trajectory of discussions away from a two-state solution towards an outcome that would only serve Israeli interests.

Indeed, US rhetoric has empowered Netanyahu immensely too, ushering in a new reality that has rendered a Palestinian state nothing more than a hypothetical option. The language, combined with a multitude of unilateral actions, is helping to dismantle any efforts towards a two-state solution and the upholding of previous international agreements.

Many European and regional governments have condemned any move towards annexation. Indeed, 1,000 European parliamentarians from across political lines have urged Israel to abandon its plans. This has notably included, German Foreign Minister, Heiko Mass, whose first overseas visit during the coronavirus crisis was to Israel to reinforce Germany’s position against unilateral action.

But actions speak louder than words, and in the case of the US, its rhetoric has been matched by action unlike its EU counterparts whose statements of condemnation have rarely been followed by concrete action. For instance, the EU ratified a landmark aviation agreement with Israel just days before 1 July and economic, technological and scientific cooperation between Israel and Europe has never been stronger casting doubt on the strength of political will among EU countries to take action against Israel.

In the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates has been the most vociferous in disapproving Israel’s annexation plans. However, again, it is important to look beyond the rhetoric. Cooperation between the UAE and Israel has in fact increased in recent years mainly due to common opposition to Iran’s regional influence but also due to shared interests. In May, for instance, the first publicly acknowledged commercial flight between the UAE and Israel landed at Ben Gurion airport carrying aid aimed at mitigating the effects of COVID-19 in the Palestinian territories. But, to many, it looked like a stepping-stone towards a normalization of relations between Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem.

Similarly, Jordan and Egypt have also expressed their concern but it is difficult to imagine a scenario where either country would go as far as abrogating peace agreements that they currently have in place with Israel.

In spite of this, the global response has overwhelmingly been critical of Israel’s plans to annex parts of the West Bank. This has demonstrated some level of unity among world leaders which has not been seen for some time and may have played a significant role in delaying the Israeli government’s plans. In parallel, united international condemnation has also prevented the US from dominating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict entirely.

While the US approach has played a key role in the Israel-Palestine conflict so far, it remains to be seen how the international community will translate its voice into action to prevent the annexation of occupied Palestinian land.




intern

EU Budget Battle Could Undermine its International Ambitions

17 July 2020

Alice Billon-Galland

Research Associate, Europe Programme

Vassilis Ntousas

Stavros Niarchos Foundation Academy Fellow, Europe Programme
EU’s heated budget negotiations risk producing a compromise at the expense of its longer-term international agenda.

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German Chancellor Angela Merkel (L) talks with French President Emmanuel Macron (C) and President of European Council Charles Michel (R) during an EU summit on 17 July 2020 in Brussels, Belgium. Photo by Thierry Monasse/Getty Images.

With all EU economies still reeling from COVID-19, the ongoing heated deliberations on the bloc’s next budget, which will determine the amount of money matching its priorities for the next seven years, have taken on an urgency rarely felt in Brussels.

Relying in part on an unprecedentedly large volume of jointly issued debt, the European Commission’s plan for a €750 billion coronavirus recovery instrument is embedded within a revamped proposal for the EU’s long-term budget, of €1.1 trillion for the 2021-27 period. 

Now the ball is in the member states’ court. All seem to agree that getting the EU budget right is crucial to fostering an economic recovery and ensuring the Union is on the right track towards its long-term pre-COVID objectives, from increasing its strategic autonomy to reaching climate neutrality by 2050. However, stark differences persist as to what that means in practice.

Most of the core divisions predate the pandemic’s outbreak. In a special European Council meeting in February, leaders failed to find common ground on the Union’s first post-Brexit budget. Net contributor countries, such as Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands — the so-called ‘Frugal Four’— refused to agree to higher overall spending and instead advocated for cuts in the Common Agricultural Policy or cohesion funds, meeting the resistance of states like France and Portugal.

These early divisions foreshadowed the risk of a budget compromise that would leave little space for new policy priorities. The COVID-induced economic crisis has made a traditionally fraught political process even more difficult, putting the squeeze on what were previously priority areas of funding.

The Frugal Four agree on the need for the coronavirus recovery plan but vehemently oppose the volume of grants or the issuance of too much common debt in the proposed instrument, reflecting the unpopularity of these proposals with their domestic audiences. Hungary has also threatened to derail progress on the EU’s rescue plan if rule of law criteria are weaved into mechanisms for the allocation of EU funding.

As European leaders reconvene at the 17-18 July Council meeting, EU Council President Michel proposed a revised 'negotiating box' in preparation for the discussions. The document, which tries to bridge these intra-bloc divisions, bolts the demands for short-term recovery onto the EU’s longer-term ambitions. For instance, it sets an increased target of 30 per cent of funding to go toward climate-related projects, which is necessary for the Union’s green transformation. It also retains the link between the rule of law and EU funding — despite Budapest’s opposition — which is critical for the bloc’s internal accountability and transparency, and external credibility. Furthermore, it proposes a set of new mechanisms through which the EU can sustainably raise its own revenue, including a plastics levy as well as more controversial carbon border tax and digital levy.

Yet in several other critical ways, Michel’s proposals fall short. This is particularly true for some of the more ‘geopolitical’ goals of the Union, as previously expressed by Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, or the repeated calls by the Union’s high representative that the EU should learn to use the language of power.

For all the rhetoric around the EU’s need to boost its ability to act more autonomously in the field of security and defence, reductions in important thematic programmes in this domain could result in a critical loss of momentum, if confirmed. For instance, in Michel’s proposals, flagship defence initiatives such as the European defence fund and the military mobility plan are facing cuts of about 39 per cent and 74 per cent respectively (to some €7 billion for the former and €1.5 billion for the latter) compared with the initial Commission proposal of 2018.

Moreover, the tragic developments at the Greece-Turkey border in the beginning of the year might have brought migration back to the forefront of the EU’s attention, but the overall funding for migration and border management is also significantly lower compared to initial proposals. This serves as another example of a discrepancy between the figures on the table today and those that the EU commission had previously regarded as necessary to address the challenges the bloc faces.

Similarly, under the Council president’s latest proposal, the combined funding allocated for the EU’s external action (under the ‘Neighbourhood and the World’ heading) is lower than the figures in the Commission’s May announcements – from €118.2 billion to €113.9 billion overall. This represents an increase compared to the previous EU budget, but it is not in line with the elevated ambitions recognized by the Commission in May, which have only been made more compelling by the pandemic.

Brokering a deal in EU budget negotiations has always been a brutal affair, requiring sacrifices and compromise under the pressure of a ticking clock. 2020 was never likely to be an exception to this rule; but the pandemic has complicated the politics and raised the stakes.

The risk is that the budget negotiations lead to a compromise which, while delivering a historic coronavirus package, does not adequately support some of the key elements of the Union’s long-term agenda, especially its international ambitions.




intern

International Donors Can End Lebanon's Corruption

10 August 2020

Dr Lina Khatib

Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme
Change must come from within Lebanon, but Emmanuel Macron and others can help by ending their patronage of a disastrous regime.

2020-08-10-Lebanon-Beirut-Corruption-Protest

An anti-government protester in Beirut puts up a poster accusing corruption in Lebanon's state judiciary. Photo by Sam Tarling/Getty Images.

In the aftermath of the devastating Beirut port explosion last week, it is not just the role of the Lebanese political class that has come under scrutiny, but that of their international peers too.

Sunday’s international donor conference led by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, raised €253m (£228m) in relief funds, but it also signalled an important change in rhetoric. For the first time, donors affirmed that relief funds would directly go to the Lebanese people, and that longer-term economic assistance would be dependent on Lebanon implementing structural reforms.

This affirmation came hot on the heels of growing international attention on rampant corruption among Lebanon’s ruling political class, which is widely blamed for the port explosion. It sends the message to Lebanon’s rulers that, while their country desperately needs foreign assistance to stand on its feet, no one can help Lebanon if it does not also help itself.

But the communique issued following the conference glossed over the international community’s own role in sustaining Lebanon’s corrupt political class over a period of decades. At the aid conference, Macron said that Lebanon’s future is at stake. What donors need to recognise is that this future is a shared responsibility for them and Lebanon’s leaders alike.

With Lebanon’s debt greater than 170% of its GDP, and with the port explosion costing an estimated $15bn of damage, Lebanon needs foreign assistance to prevent it becoming a failed state. But what it needs even more desperately are reforms that would counter the corruption and lack of accountability that led it to this sorry state of affairs in the first place.

It is Lebanon’s existing political system – a power-sharing pact between different sects rather than a system of governance on the basis of competence – that facilitates its leaders’ reckless behaviour.

The international community is partly responsible for sustaining this system through cascading patronage. For decades, Lebanese leaders grew accustomed to neglecting the national interest and eventually being bailed out by international assistance. Dollar deposits would land in the central bank from Gulf donors, loans would be offered by European countries and foreign aid packages would flow to Lebanese state institutions – only for the majority of this money to end up lining the pockets of the country’s rulers, who frequently overcame their political differences to share state resources between them. The Lebanese state came to exist as a shell in the eyes of its citizens.

Lebanon’s rulers benefited from citizens’ low expectations from the state and the lack of measures ensuring transparency and accountability in the country. They brokered a social contract that cast the leaders as patrons and the people as clients rather than citizens. Foreign powers were well aware of this dynamic but they often turned a blind eye to it, and even nurtured it, because they believed the Lebanese political system brought stability and predictability following the tumultuous civil war.

With time the leaders’ greed grew, and with that the economic situation worsened. Leaders who behaved as de facto local authorities, granting constituents civil service jobs or minor privileges, provided them less and less. There was some international recognition that this dynamic was becoming unsustainable – international donors pledged $11bn during the CEDRE conference of 2018 on condition that Lebanon implemented structural reforms.

And in the wake of Lebanon’s recent economic deterioration, the International Monetary Fund said in April that any discussion of a loan to Lebanon would be subject to more reforms. On both occasions, Lebanon’s rulers ignored the calls for reform, counting on foreign support eventually coming in unconditionally as it used to in the past. International donor follow-up was sluggish.

The port explosion needs to be a wake-up call for any international entity seeking a stable Lebanon. The blast is ultimately the result of the decades during which political classes in Lebanon and outside it fostered the country’s dysfunctional political system. No long-term assistance should flow into Lebanon without strong conditions on transparency and accountability in how this assistance would be employed.

Foreign support is not the problem per se, but rather when it is handed on a plate unconditionally, maintaining the patronage cascade, exacerbating the weakness of state institutions, and further impoverishing Lebanese citizens.

With Lebanon’s economy almost crumbling in the aftermath of the explosion, there is an opportunity for the international community to exert leverage over Lebanese leaders – whose personal wealth grew partially from legal and illegal transactions through the devastated port – so that necessary reforms are implemented. Such leverage would not remove Lebanon’s defective political system, but would pressure its leaders to accept at least some basic reforms.

But for Lebanon to really turn a new page, it needs a new social contract and a new political system based on fairness, transparency and accountability. This is a change that can only start from within Lebanon, but it also depends on the international community abandoning their tacit support of a disastrous political status quo.

This article was originally published in The Guardian.




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Can the International Criminal Court Help Belarus?

26 August 2020

Kateryna Busol

Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme
A referral of election violence in Belarus to the International Criminal Court could enhance the support for the Belarusian people at other crucial platforms.

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A protester carries a former Belarusian flag during an opposition rally by the Minsk Hero City Obelisk. Photo by Valery SharifulinTASS via Getty Images.

Making the case

The recent election results in Belarus have triggered revolution in yet another post-Soviet country and Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s response has been devastatingly brutal. However, the Belarusian people’s resilience and Western sanctionsadopted on 14 August – have proved effective. As some of the 6,700 jailed protesters were released, accounts of horrific treatment by law enforcement emerged: overcrowded cells, no food, torture, forced confessions, severe beatings , and threats of rape.

With reports of mounting violence, Polish MEP Radosław Sikorski warned Lukashenka to expect not just sanctions but also the possible intervention of the International Criminal Court (ICC), an idea supported by the opposition-led Belarus’ National Salvation. While there are significant impediments to the Court’s involvement, the impact of such an initiative could be ground-breaking.

Legal framework

The ICC considers criminal responsibility of top civilian or military leaders for only the most serious atrocities - war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and, in certain cases, the crime of aggression. In the context of Belarus, the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes against humanity might be relevant. According to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding treaty, crimes against humanity include widespread or systematic abuses directed against a civilian population. Atrocities relevant to Belarus include arbitrary imprisonment, torture, inhuman treatment, sexual violence, and enforced disappearances.

The ICC is a last resort. It can intervene only if states are unable or unwilling to properly investigate and prosecute serious crimes themselves. Although Belarus’s Criminal Code punishes crimes against humanity, as Lukashenka himself is implicated, impartial trials in the country are impossible while he is still in power. Other countries may investigate specific atrocities in Belarus under the universal jurisdiction principle. Universal jurisdiction greenlights investigations into the most serious crimes regardless of where they are perpetrated. German, Swedish and French proceedings on Syria are illustrative examples of this. Protesters may also file individual complaints of abuse to UN bodies under the protocols of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The European Court of Human Rights is not an option for the protesters because Belarus is not a member of the Council of Europe.

As the UN mechanisms are yet to be triggered and there has not yet been any talk of universal jurisdiction proceedings, the question of recourse to the ICC remains. But as Belarus is not party to the Rome Statute, the only way to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction is a referral by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Even though it would be vetoed by Russia –  and, almost certainly, China – it could be worth pursuing.

The importance of symbolism

So far, the UNSC has referred to the ICC two situations in non-party states – Sudan and Libya. But for cases that do not end up being referred to the Court, the UNSC debates are as significant for what they manage to agree upon as they are for what they do not. Regarding Belarus, two impeded UNSC accountability initiatives are relevant: on Syria and MH17.

In 2014, Russia and China vetoed the referral of cases of violence in Syria to the ICC. In 2015, Russia was the only country to block the creation by the UNSC of a special tribunal to investigate Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, downed by a Russian missile over war-affected eastern Ukraine. In both cases, the vetoes delayed justice, but they did not prevent it. For Syria, special independent mechanisms to collect evidence for adjudication were developed. Although justice has yet to be done, except in states like Germany, the evidence is ready for any future court. For MH17, a proceeding at a domestic Dutch court became an alternative. Parallel to that, new evidence of Russia’s role in both Syria and the downing of MH17 emerged - contextualising its UNSC vetoes.

Russia’s stakes in the Belarusian elections are probably even higher: the victory of democracy in Belarus will deprive it of one of its closest and most dependent post-Soviet allies.

Even if Russia destroys any chance of Belarusian citizens using the ICC, the attempted ICC-Belarus discussion will not have been in vain. Russia’s opposition to the respective UNSC resolution would be a self-defeating validation of Lukashenka’s atrocities against his own people, unashamedly restated at one of the world’s top diplomatic negotiation tables. Similar to Syria and MH17, the UNSC would reconfirm its self-imposed impotency to defend basic human rights amid political conjuncture. This would bring more attention to the issue and catalyse action through other platforms, including the discussions across UN bodies and the consideration of Belarusians’ individual complaints of abuse, and could lead to tougher sanctions. It could also further make the case for universal jurisdiction proceedings in other countries.      

Supporting civil society

Belarusian civil society will need stronger support from democratic governments and human rights organizations in reporting and documenting the crimes. Other countries, neighbouring states in particular, should be ready to welcome Belarusian protesters through refugee schemes, so they are able to continue their activities from abroad.

When nationwide strikes enveloped Belarus, singers from the Minsk Opera supported protesters by singing Va, pensiero, the famed chorus of the Hebrew slaves from Verdi’s Nabucco – and a symbol of united Italy’s revival. The people of Belarus also want to live in a democratic state ‘where the mind is without fear and the head is held high’. And they deserve all the support they can get. The inevitable fall of Lukashenka’s regime might take time but it should not take more lives.




intern

International Metabolic Prognostic Index Is Superior to Other Metabolic Tumor Volume-Based Prognostication Methods in a Real-Life Cohort of Diffuse Large B-Cell Lymphoma

Visual Abstract




intern

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part One

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part One Other resource sysadmin 29 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) jointly organized this four-day meeting at Chatham House for international lawyers to discuss a wide range of issues related to public international law and the rights of individuals.

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For China University of Political Science and Law, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The roundtable had a total of 22 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 12 non-Chinese (from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




intern

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Two

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Two Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable meeting in Beijing on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Beijing was hosted by CUPL and involved 20 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing) and 10 non-Chinese (from Australia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the experts network being built, the second meeting included a mix of participants from the first meeting and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




intern

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and the Graduate Institute Geneva held a two-day roundtable meeting in Geneva on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Geneva was co-hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva and involved 19 participants, 9 Chinese (from six research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 11 non-Chinese (from eight research institutions in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the third meeting included a mix of participants from the first two meetings and some new participants

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




intern

Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four

Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable in Beijing on emerging issues of public international law.

The Representative of China at the 19th Session of the Human Rights Council, Palais des Nations, Geneva. 27 February 2012. Photo: UN Photo Geneva/Violaine Martin.

The specific objectives were to:

  • create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
  • build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
  • support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting was co-hosted with CUPL and involved 28 participants, consisting of 19 Chinese participants (from six leading research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and nine nonChinese participants (from eight leading research institutions in Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Canada and Singapore).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the fifth meeting included a mix of participants from the previous meetings and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.




intern

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Civil Society

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Civil Society Research paper sysadmin 27 November 2018

Given today’s challenging geopolitical conditions and the evolving nature of the international climate regime since Paris, civil society must now once again recalibrate its strategies to ensure continued and increasing relevance.

Photo by The Climate Reality Project, ‘People’s Climate March Protest’, via Unsplash, 2017.

This is one of four background papers feeding into a synthesis paper entitled The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes.

Summary

  • Following the failure of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in 2009, there was a step change in the sophistication and unity of civil society engagement on climate policy. This ensured that, subsequently, civil society was more effective in exercising multiple channels of influence around the negotiations for the Paris Agreement in 2015.
  • Civil society proved to be particularly effective at harnessing the twin narratives of climate science and economics, and at leveraging an emerging multi-level governance architecture, to create political space for climate leadership.
  • Given today’s challenging geopolitical conditions and the evolving nature of the international climate regime since Paris, civil society must now once again recalibrate its strategies to ensure continued and increasing relevance.
  • In particular, the shift to a more ‘nationally grounded’ implementation regime focusing on individual states’ climate commitments will require civil society to become more effective at influencing domestic politics. At the same time, civil society will need to continue to seek strategic synergies at the international level.
  • Civil society has a central role to play in ensuring that the first key test of the Paris ‘ratchet’ mechanism – revising countries’ pledged climate actions, or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), by 2020 – is robust, science-informed and strongly rooted in domestic politics.




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The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Corporate Sector

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Corporate Sector Research paper sysadmin 27 November 2018

Given the challenging political contexts since 2015, the corporate sector will have a key role to play in persuading national governments how technologies and expertise have moved on since the pledges were made.

Photo by Priscilla Du Preez, ‘Climate Reality’ via Unsplash, 2017.

This is one of four background papers feeding into a synthesis paper entitled The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes.

Summary

  • The corporate sector has traditionally engaged governments at national rather than international level in lobbying for action related to climate change. Where it has engaged at an international level, this has often been to restrain regulation and ambition, such as in air transport. Over time, many businesses have increasingly understood that there is more commercial opportunity in a strong, consistent approach to tackling climate mitigation and adaptation, and an increasing number are willing to speak up on the issue. The Paris Climate Conference in 2015 demonstrated this positive engagement.
  • Businesses are more powerful when engaging directly with national governments on detailed policies – by demonstrating what is possible and indirectly influencing national governments’ international pledges. Traditional trade/industry sector associations and groups have tended to suffer from the ‘lowest common denominator’ effect of their least progressive members. Progressive business groups coalescing around climate ambition can help to counter this.
  • Unlike at the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, the business community provided a positive, supportive backdrop to the 2015 Paris talks, mindful of the public relations opportunities in taking a progressive stance and of the benefits of targets that reflected the science. The carbon market was a particular focus for corporates, which succeeded in getting emissions trading options and market mechanisms included in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
  • Given the challenging political contexts since 2015, the corporate sector will have a key role to play in persuading national governments how technologies and expertise have moved on since the pledges were made. With increasing awareness of resource scarcity, businesses are pursuing ever more creative solutions.
  • Wide recognition that the avoidance of future emissions is increasingly dependent on developing and emerging economies means that business voices from these countries will potentially be more influential in the next few years.




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The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes Research paper sysadmin 27 November 2018

In the current international political environment of rising populism, the role of sub- and non-state actors may become more important than ever.

Photo by UNclimatechange, ‘Bonn Climate Change Conference - October 2014’ via Flickr, 2014.

Summary

  • Climate action from sub-state and non-state actors such as subnational governments, cities, corporations and NGOs has very significant potential to enhance national efforts to curb CO2 emissions, close the so-called ‘emissions gap’ – between current commitments and the action necessary to meet climate targets – and help move the world on to a ‘1.5°C pathway’ that would limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.
  • In addition to their own climate action, sub-state/non-state actors can contribute to climate governance by developing new policies and business models to support emissions cuts and build resilience. Knowledge exchange and capacity-building have a role to play in helping these innovations to spread internationally.
  • Politically, measures implemented by sub-state/non-state actors can help national governments to implement existing targets faster and more effectively, while helping to build political support for more ambitious climate action.
  • The post-Paris climate regime of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reflects the growing importance of sub- and non-state actors, and has featured the creation of institutional structures to engage and coordinate them.
  • In the current international political environment of rising populism, the role of sub- and non-state actors may become more important than ever. However, more questions about the robustness of sub- and non-state action are also likely to be raised.
  • With the 2020 deadline approaching for countries to submit details of enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), long-term climate strategies and other means of raising policy ambition, the next two years are set to provide significant opportunity for sub- and non-state action. Many governments are already developing ways to engage with sub- and non-state actors to identify opportunities to strengthen action by 2020.
  • Key questions in this respect include (a) whether sub- and non-state actors can mobilize across sectors; and (b) whether action can be extended beyond the ‘usual suspects’ to include contributions from less familiar sources, such as business sectors with limited opportunities for climate action or corporations in the Global South.




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The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Financial Institutions

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Financial Institutions Research paper sysadmin 20 December 2018

The trillions of dollars needed to secure the sustainable, climate-compatible pathway outlined in the 2015 Paris Agreement have focused attention on private finance and investment.

Photo by João Barbosa, ‘The need to keep growing’, 2018.

This is one of four background papers feeding into a synthesis paper entitled The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes.

Summary

  • The trillions of dollars needed to secure the sustainable, climate-compatible pathway outlined in the 2015 Paris Agreement have focused attention on private finance and investment, and on the role of the financial sector as a potentially powerful non-state actor in the international climate debate.
  • Leading individual financial institutions reacted to the Paris Agreement by framing it in terms of what it would mean for markets – i.e. risks and opportunities – and by underlining the importance of national implementation of climate change commitments.
  • Key recent developments signal that the financial sector actively supports Paris-compatible government action on climate change, as well as company-level action to understand the physical and ‘transition’ risks and opportunities associated with climate change and policy responses. Financial sector engagement is taking place through well-organized and well-supported international initiatives and platforms. A critical part of this process entails robust activity by financial institutions to embed climate change and broader sustainability factors into strategies and operations.
  • At country level, attention to implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and associated sector-level policy development has been largely separate from the broader ‘sustainable finance’ dynamic. National-level action has not benefited from the same level of organized financial sector involvement evident in international action. One of the reasons for this is that, with some notable exceptions, international financial initiatives lack the capacity and resources to participate in the granular detail of national policy processes. Policymakers in turn often lack the internal capacity to consult or engage with the financial sector domestically.
  • This paper includes some thoughts on further international and national climate actions. Ensuring that messages from successful international financial sector initiatives are heard in regional and non-climate forums offers one avenue for building a stronger foundation for greater climate ambition. Building the resource base for stronger national climate policy engagement, as a counter-voice to incumbent interests and to ensure that the quality of policy is ‘investment grade’, is another. This will be critical to the delivery of policy outcomes. Other key elements include the need to pool knowledge across relevant parts of the finance sector, build alliances, and shift action towards joint problem-solving with policymakers. A ‘Talanoa 2.020’-type initiative offers one potentially promising approach to advancing dialogue in this respect.




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The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Subnational Governments

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Subnational Governments Research paper sysadmin 23 January 2019

This paper looks at the role of subnational governments in influencing global climate ambition, and makes recommendations for how these actors can increase their influence in the future.

Photo by Annie Spratt, ‘High in the SuperTrees’ via Unsplash, 2017

Summary

  • ‘Subnational governments’ – including municipal, regional and provincial authorities – lack the formal status of negotiating parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). But they have a vital role to play in informing and helping to shape international climate action, as they are often the key delivery partners for on-the-ground policies.
  • Subnational governments are often closer to climate problems than the UNFCCC parties themselves, and have experience, expertise and peer influence that can support the development of progressive policies and increased ambition.
  • Many subnational governments have joined or formed various groupings to share information and experience, and to increase their collective profile and voice. Notable initiatives and collaborations include the Under2 Coalition, ICLEI, C40 and the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy.
  • Subnational governments are highly diverse. In some cases, politically high-profile administrations – the US state of California being a notable example – have exploited their visibility and policy successes to engage in wider climate debates. Equally, however, subnational agendas can encounter resistance from national governments anxious to ensure the primacy of their negotiating positions in the UNFCCC system.
  • One of the advantages that subnational governments enjoy, subject to resources, is their ability to join with peer groups to take a fresh approach to mitigation or adaptation policies. Groups of cities or subnational regions can, through collaborative organizations, explore new approaches that might be less attractive within a national context.
  • To maintain and build on their current achievements and influence, subnational governments need, among other things, to: improve the credibility of their experience through evaluation of the success of their climate policies; use membership of appropriate international groups to share experience and boost their leverage; continue to create collaborative relationships with progressive businesses to increase influence at a national level; build on cross-regional relationships in climate adaptation and resilience; and work with other subnational actors to build momentum ahead of the first post-Paris revision of climate commitments in 2020.




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Delivering Sustainable Food and Land Use Systems: The Role of International Trade

Delivering Sustainable Food and Land Use Systems: The Role of International Trade Research paper sysadmin 20 September 2019

This paper explores a set of core trade-related issues affecting the food and land use system, and proposes constructive ways forward in reconfiguring the global trading system towards delivering a more sustainable and healthy diet for all.

Aerial view of containers sitting stacked at Qingdao Port in the Shandong province of China. Photo by Han Jiajun/Visual China Group via Getty Images.

  • Meeting future global food security requirements is not just about quantity; it is also about meeting growing needs in a way that safeguards human as well as planetary health. But national priorities and policies often remain out of sync with aspirations for more sustainable and healthy food systems.
  • International trade and trade policies play an ambiguous role in the current food system. With 80 per cent of the world’s population depending on imports to meet at least part of their food and nutritional requirements, trade has a unique function in offsetting imbalances between supply and demand. However, in the absence of effective regulatory frameworks or pricing frameworks that internalize environmental, social or health costs, trade can exacerbate and globalize challenges associated with food production and land use trends such as deforestation, land degradation, greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss and the shift to unhealthy diets.
  • Over the last two decades, trade in agricultural products (excluding intra-EU flows) has more than tripled in value, to reach $1.33 trillion. The geography of global food trade flows has also shifted, primarily towards South–South trade, which now accounts for roughly a quarter of total agricultural trade flows. The nature of global trade has changed drastically, with traditional exports such as wheat and coffee growing slowly at around 2 per cent per year, while products such as palm oil, fruit juice, soft drinks and other processed products have grown at 8 per cent or more annually.
  • This overall increase in trade in agricultural products raises questions about the growing utilization of resources, such as water or soil nutrients, that are embedded in those products through production and processing. Trade itself also causes negative environmental impacts, starting with greenhouse gas emissions associated with transport and storage. If the environmental cost associated with production and trade is not reflected in the final price of goods, trade may accelerate the depletion of resources or their unsustainable use.
  • It is critical to ensure that trade policy options pursued by producing and consuming countries alike will support a transition to more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. The first step in addressing trade-related food systems challenges must involve rebuilding trust among policy actors. There is a need for new spaces for informal dialogue among actors, and ‘soft’ governance mechanisms that can help rebuild consensus on the best ways forward. Meeting these challenges also requires an appreciation of the complex interactions between sectoral policies (e.g. on water, land, food, etc.) and their multiple interfaces with trade policies.
  • Conditioning the use of subsidies on their sustainability and/or health impacts encourages the delivery of essential public goods in ways that are consistent with sustainability and health goals. A first step therefore is the removal of perverse incentives (e.g. subsidies encouraging the overuse of fertilizers or pesticides or the overproduction of certain commodities, as well as certain biofuels subsidies) and replacing them with market-correcting subsidies.
  • Trade facilitation measures for fruits and vegetables that are aimed at easing transit at the border, by cutting unnecessary bureaucracy and reducing waiting times, can improve their availability, reduce costs and improve food quality and safety for consumers. Similarly, measures aimed at improving sustainable cold storage and upgrading value chains can support better diets and consumption by increasing the availability of fresh produce on markets, especially in developing countries.
  • A global food stamps programme developed through the G20 and facilitated by the UN’s food agencies could address purchasing power imbalances and tackle malnutrition in developing countries. If carefully designed, such ‘safety net’ schemes can not only contribute to improving calorific intakes but also help deliver more balanced and healthier diets. Careful attention must be given to how such a scheme would work in practice, building on experience to date with similar initiatives.
  • Integrating the notion of sustainable food and inputs trade in the post-2020 global biodiversity framework can help to deliver more sustainable and healthier food and land use systems. This could be achieved by likeminded countries introducing a set of goals or targets aimed at mitigating the role of trade in placing indirect pressure on biodiversity, and to encourage trade in biodiversity-based products including natural ingredients produced ethically and following sustainability principles and criteria.
  • An SDG-oriented agenda for agricultural trade is needed. It could be formed by countries seeking to remove perverse incentives, guaranteeing a safe harbour for market-correcting measures, clarifying existing rules and establishing plurilateral negotiations among subsets of the WTO membership, or sectoral approaches, to address specific challenges.
  • Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from trade need to be addressed. Governments could seek to achieve this through ensuring the carbon neutrality of existing and new trade deals, either by connecting carbon markets among contracting parties or by developing joint initiatives to tax international maritime and air transport emissions.




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Centenary Series: Exploring the International Affairs Archive

Centenary Series: Exploring the International Affairs Archive dora.popova 14 September 2020

International Affairs has been a central part of the institute’s history, both as a record of speeches made by dignitaries such as Mahatma Gandhi and Henry Kissinger, and as a forum for policy-relevant academic research.

Delving into the International Affairs archive brings out stories behind some of the most significant players of the last century.




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Gender, think-tanks and international affairs: A toolkit

Gender, think-tanks and international affairs: A toolkit Other resource NCapeling 9 February 2021

Encouraging a more gender-sensitive approach for think-tank activities such as convening and debate, research and analysis, and communications and publishing.

Compiled by staff at Chatham House, the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy and the British American Security Information Council, the toolkit provides think-tanks with guidance on ways of adapting organizational structures, activities and practices in order to embed greater awareness of gender issues and adopt gender-sensitive approaches throughout their work.

The toolkit is designed for all people working in international affairs think-tanks, regardless of role, experience or level of seniority. It will be particularly useful for those think-tanks that are just beginning the process of raising greater awareness of gender issues internally, as well as for those that have already begun to make changes but wish to expand this work further.

The work to develop the toolkit came as a response to the commonly gendered nature of think-tanks and their activities. The toolkit recognizes the discrimination and under-representation that women often experience within the sector, as well as the relative absence of women among executive leadership, governance structures and senior researcher positions in many think-tanks.

The toolkit’s focus on gender is a starting point for wider intersectional analysis and action within the think-tank community. Embedding inclusive research, convening and communication practices is not just ‘the right thing to do’. When diversity and inclusion initiatives succeed, organizations are more resilient, innovative and better at decision-making.

While there has already been incremental change within think-tanks, the toolkit’s authors intend that their work will build on the important body of research and practices that already exist by encouraging think-tanks to examine their own processes and develop ways of working that focus not just on women’s representation, but on the structures and systems that perpetuate biases and inequalities.




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The Justice Laboratory: International Law in Africa

The Justice Laboratory: International Law in Africa Book dora.popova 30 March 2022

The Justice Laboratory is the first major study of the institutions created to enforce international criminal justice standards in Sub-Saharan Africa, including the UN tribunal for the Rwandan genocide.

Since the Second World War, the United Nations and other international actors have created laws, treaties, and institutions to punish perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. But international criminal justice now seems to be a declining force — its energy sapped by long delays in prosecutions, lagging public attention, and a globally rising authoritarianism that disregards legal niceties.

The Justice Laboratory reviews five examples of international criminal justice as they have been applied across Africa, where brutal civil conflicts in recent decades resulted in varying degrees of global attention and action.

Written in an accessible style, the book explores the connections between politics and the doctrine of international criminal law. Highlighting little-known institutional examples and under-discussed political situations, the book contributes to a broader international understanding of African politics and international criminal justice, and the lessons African experiences can offer to other countries.

This book is part of the Insights series.

 

Praise for The Justice Laboratory

Integrating legal and political analysis, Kerstin Bree Carlson provides a highly accessible and provocative examination of the promises and pitfalls of seeking accountability in a range of contemporary international criminal justice interventions in Africa.

Victor Peskin, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona State University

About the author

Kerstin Bree Carlson is associate professor of international law at the Department of Social Science and Business, Roskilde University, where she teaches topics in law and society, global studies, international politics, and Nordic migration.

Purchase




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100 years of International Affairs

100 years of International Affairs Other resource dora.popova 1 March 2023

Charting a century of key moments in international relations and International Affairs.

International Affairs was created to be a record of speeches given by visiting dignitaries at Chatham House. Over the last 100 years, the journal has evolved into an independent academic journal publishing work of the highest quality.

On the fringes of the Paris peace conference Lionel Curtis called for an organization whose purpose would be to foster mutual understanding of and between nations. Chatham House was established in 1920 and for much of the time since, International Affairs has been a central part of the institute’s publishing output.

As such, for most of its history, contributions to the journal have reflected the prevailing attitudes of the time, both in terms of who was published and the content of their work. Perhaps the most important change over the last century has been the increasing diversity of voices and perspectives published in IA’s pages. Today, as the journal enters its second century, it publishes authors from across the globe. Yet the editorial team is all too aware there is still much to do.

Keep reading to explore the journal’s history and to find out more about our second century.

The drawings in this timeline were commissioned by the International Affairs team from Sequential Potential Comics.




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Marburg virus: First cases in Rwanda spark international alarm




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South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities

South Africa After the Elections: Balancing Domestic and International Policy Priorities 16 May 2019 — 1:30PM TO 2:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 May 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The government that emerges from the 8 May election in South Africa faces immediate domestic and international foreign policy demands. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to stimulate job growth, accelerating anti-corruption and good governance efforts are at the forefront of the new government’s agenda.

International ambitions will be upgraded such as UN security council reform, maximizing South Africa’s G20, BRICS and IBSA membership and preparing for South Africa’s chairmanship of the African Union (AU) in 2020.

At this meeting, the speakers – Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of SAIIA and author with Nobantu Mbeki of A Manifesto for Social Change: How to Save South Africa, and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, chief executive of SAIIA and currently co-editing a volume on A South African Foreign Policy for the 2020s which will be published in 2019 – will reflect on the election and discuss the new government’s domestic and international policy agenda. The meeting will be chaired by Ann Grant, former British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05) with past experience working for Oxfam, Standard Chartered Bank and Tullow Oil.




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Black perspectives on international relations

Black perspectives on international relations 27 October 2022 — 5:00PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 4 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can black perspectives help the world tackle global challenges and expand our understanding of international relations?

As social boundaries change, the viewpoints of black academics, thought leaders and policymakers have grown in both influence and strength worldwide, challenging western and institutional norms. 

However, many institutions and organizations, long established with the exclusion of black voices, have to adapt if there is to be greater inclusion and diversity of thought when tackling major global issues.

Growing reflection on the legacy of colonialism and the importance of the power of diversity may be needed for today’s problems.

The search for global racial equality has seen a growing commitment to ensuring the black experience is at the heart of geopolitical discussions.

This panel discussion looks at what changes are occurring now and how is the conversation shifting. It also examines the challenges posed by the increasing politicization of race and culture issues in the current political environment.

Key questions discussed by the panel include:

  • What is the importance of black voices in international relations and where are the main challenges to greater incorporation?

  • What are some of the leading perspectives, approaches and beliefs within Africa and across the black diaspora regarding international relations?

  • To what extent are governments, businesses and leading global institutions making efforts to include more black voices in decision-making?

  • How are black academics changing wider geopolitical conversations and to what extent can deeper conversations lead to change?

  • Will an ‘African Century’ bring black perspectives on international relations to the fore of the geopolitical agenda?

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript. 




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Crisis in the international order

Crisis in the international order 23 January 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2022 Chatham House and Online

Why societies are challenging the international order?

Major global challenges, including the climate, refugee crises and the global pandemic, are increasingly revealing shortcomings in our international system and are bringing to the forefront calls for a more just world. But what is justice? 
 
Calls for justice come in many forms and from many directions - from the fair distribution of resources to the recognition of indigenous rights. While for some there is consensus on the importance of multilateral cooperation to tackle global issues, there is a sharp North/South divide at the centre of debates on issues such as the climate crisis, racial justice, and international law. Countries from the global South are demanding more equitable and redistributive solutions, for example in the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines, while the Global North seek the status quo. 
 
North/South division slows progress on reform. Some political actors are starting to challenge the very foundations of our global order, a move that could dramatically change the global system as we know it. 

Key questions to consider include:

  • Why are there tensions between the global North and South?
  • How can these issues be addressed?
  • Does the global North ‘owe’ the global South some form of justice? Which form of justice?
  • If these issues are not addressed, what are the implications for the current international order?

This event is held in conjunction with International Affairs.

As with all members events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Read the transcript.




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Can rhetoric match reality? Britain’s international development future

Can rhetoric match reality? Britain’s international development future 27 April 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2023 Chatham House and Online

In conversation with Andrew Mitchell, minister of state, UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. 

Last month’s updated Integrated Review positioned international development as a key pillar of British foreign policy which sets out the importance of the UK’s efforts to shape the ‘global strategic environment’.

Focusing heavily on Africa and the Indo-Pacific, international development will be central to the ambition of a ‘Global Britain’.

The Integrated Review outlines seven priority areas to revitalize the drive to meet the Global Goals, with a climate security strategy at its heart, while seeking to go beyond official development assistance (ODA).

However, there are major challenges ahead. Since 2021, the UK’s ODA has been cut from 0.7 per cent to 0.5 per cent gross national income (GNI). Some are concerned that since being subsumed by the UK Foreign Office, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has diluted the effectiveness of UK international development. Then there is the question of the strength of British public support for development assistance at a time of domestic economic hardship.

Can rhetoric match reality?

This event tackles questions including:

  • What does the UK’s vision for international development mean in practice?
  • Will aid and development help push Britain’s influence around the world?
  • Can policymakers and politicians garner domestic support for international aid in times of economic uncertainty, and if so, how?
  • Can the UK rebuild its reputation in the world while it doesn’t meet its 0.7 per cent GNI target?

This event will be balloted for in-person attendance. Register your interest to join and a confirmation email will be sent to you on Tuesday 25 May at 12:00 BST to confirm your place at the event.

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

A coffee reception will immediately follow this event.




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The Emission of Internal Conversion Electrons Rather Than Auger Electrons Increased the Nucleus-Absorbed Dose for 161Tb Compared with 177Lu with a Higher Dose Response for [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 Than for [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE

Preclinical data have shown that 161Tb-labeled peptides targeting the somatostatin receptor are therapeutically more effective for peptide receptor radionuclide therapy than are their 177Lu-labeled counterparts. To further substantiate this enhanced therapeutic effect, we performed cellular dosimetry to quantify the absorbed dose to the cell nucleus and compared dose–response curves to evaluate differences in relative biological effectiveness in vitro. Methods: CA20948 cell survival was assessed after treatment with [161Tb]Tb- and [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE (agonist) and with [161Tb]Tb- and [177Lu]Lu-DOTA-LM3 (antagonist) via a clonogenic assay. Cell binding, internalization, and dissociation assays were performed up to 7 d to acquire time-integrated activity coefficients. Separate S values for each type of particle emission (Auger/internal conversion [IC] electrons and β particles) were computed via Monte Carlo simulations, while considering spheric cells. Once the absorbed dose to the cell nucleus was calculated, survival curves were fitted to the appropriate linear or linear-quadratic model and corresponding relative biological effectiveness was evaluated. Results: Although the radiopeptide uptake was independent of the radionuclide, [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 delivered a 3.6 and 3.8 times higher dose to the nucleus, respectively, than their 177Lu-labeled counterparts on saturated receptor binding. This increased nucleus-absorbed dose was mainly due to the additional emission of IC and not Auger electrons by 161Tb. When activity concentrations were considered, both [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 showed a lower survival fraction than did labeling with 177Lu. When the absorbed dose to the nucleus was considered, no significant difference could be observed between the dose–response curves for [161Tb]Tb- and [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE. [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 showed a linear-quadratic dose response, whereas [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE showed only a linear dose response within the observed dose range, suggesting additional cell membrane damage by Auger electrons. Conclusion: The IC, rather than Auger, electrons emitted by 161Tb resulted in a higher absorbed dose to the cell nucleus and lower clonogenic survival for [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE and [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 than for the 177Lu-labeled analogs. In contrast, [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE showed no higher dose response than [177Lu]Lu-DOTATATE, whereas for [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 an additional quadratic response was observed. Because of this quadratic response, potentially caused by cell membrane damage, [161Tb]Tb-DOTA-LM3 is a more effective radiopeptide than [161Tb]Tb-DOTATATE for labeling with 161Tb.




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Astronaut released from hospital after return from International Space Station

An unnamed astronaut was released from Ascension Sacred Heart Pensacola in Florida and returned to Johnson Space Center in Houston in good health Saturday, NASA reported.




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SpaceX launches resupply mission to International Space Station

SpaceX launched a rocket loaded with 6,000 pounds of supplies to the International Space Station on Monday night from the Florida coast.