Rising wage inequality and stagnant real wages have contributed to inequality in family incomes during the past three decades. While the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) have helped mitigate the impact on low-income families (Bitler and Hoynes 2010), federal minimum wage policy has not contributed to the solution. The federal minimum wage has failed to keep pace with both the cost of living and the median wage in the labor market. As a consequence, working full-time at the minimum wage does not allow many families to escape poverty, or to attain economic self-sufficiency.

State and local governments can set minimum wages in excess of the statutory federal minimum wage. Indeed, state and local governments have played an important role in establishing minimum wages across the country; as a result, thirty-seven states had state minimum wages exceeding the federal level in 2007 prior to the most recent federal increase. Cities, too, have begun setting higher minimum wages, as evidenced by city-level wage minimums in Albuquerque, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Fe, Seattle, and Washington, DC; other cities are actively exploring possibilities of raising minimum wages. 

In this policy memo, I propose a framework for effective state and local minimum wage policy. First, I propose using half the local-area median wage as an important gauge for setting an appropriate level of the minimum wage. Second, I propose that state and local governments take into account the local cost of living as a relevant consideration in setting a minimum wage, and I provide estimates of how state minimum wages would vary if they reflected cost-of-living differences. I also recommend the use of regional consumer price indexes (CPIs) to index the local minimum wage. Finally, I propose that cities and counties coordinate regional wage setting to mitigate possible negative effects of local mandates. 

The implementation of the state and local framework does not override the need for reform at the federal level. Thoughtful reforms to the federal minimum wage can help reduce poverty and mitigate inequality. The federal minimum wage has been the focus of substantial debate by academics and policymakers; this proposal focuses on state and local reforms that have received substantially less attention. These state and local reforms can be an important part of the policy portfolio for reducing the incidence of poverty and for helping low-income families support themselves as they strive toward the middle class. In particular, although the federal minimum wage serves as a floor in the labor market, there is some room for additional increases in higher-wage areas.

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• Designing Thoughtful Minimum Wage Policy at the State and Local Levels - Full Text

"It is fortunate that a major feature of American social policy is a series of programs, often referred to as the safety net, that are designed to provide people with cash and other benefits when they fall on hard times—which they are more likely to do during a recession," write the authors of a new report on the response of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program—the major federal welfare program that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1996—to the Great Recession that lasted from December 2007 to June 2009.

In their report, "The Responsiveness of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program during the Great Recession," Ron Haskins, Vicky Albert, and Kimberly Howard write that "All in all, we conclude that the American system of balancing work requirements and welfare benefits worked fairly well, even during the most severe recession since the Depression of the 1930s."

Their report is based on three studies: (1) an examination of the changes in the TANF rolls compared to changes in AFDC rolls during previous recessions, plus changes in TANF rolls in relation to rising unemployment state-by-state; (2) a review of data on single mothers' likelihood to receive TANF benefits during the 2001 and 2007 recessions, their receipt of other program benefits, and what actions single mothers took to deal with the recession; and (3) interviews with 44 directors of state TANF programs to determine their state's response.

"An important question" noted by the authors at the outset "is whether the response of the nation's safety net program in general and the TANF program in particular was commensurate with the challenge posed by the huge level of unemployment during and following the Great Recession."

Some Results of the TANF Study

Haskins, Albert, and Howard arrived at a number of conclusions from the TANF/AFDC study, including:

• TANF rolls increased more in the 2001 recession and the 2007 Great Recession than did AFDC during previous, pre-welfare reform (1996) recessions.
• The increase in TANF rolls was greater during the period of rising unemployment in each state, which did not coincide exactly with the dates of the Great Recession, than during the official recession period nationally.
• The "nation's safety net as a whole performed well during the Great Recession and prevented millions of people from falling into poverty."

"The nation experienced 51 different recessions and 51 different responses by the TANF program to the recession,” they write. "But the key point is that measuring the rise of the TANF caseload in response to the unique increase in unemployment in each state reveals TANF to have been more responsive to the recession."

Some Results of the Single Mothers Study

• Compared with the 1990 recession before welfare reform, "single mothers were less likely to receive benefits from the TANF program during the 2001 and 2007 recessions."
• Single mothers were more likely to receive other "safety net" help such as Unemployment Compensation, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly food stamps), Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and child care, school lunch and breakfast, and other benefits for their children.
• In all the 1990, 2001, and 2007 recessions, "single mothers took action on their own" by finding jobs, living with family, and other ways to "weather the recession."
• Based on income, "poverty among single mothers and their children was lower during the Great Recession than during the recession of 1990."

Given the array of available benefits, the authors conclude that:

a mother with two children earning even as little as $11,000 per year could and still can escape poverty, as measured by income that includes non-cash benefits and tax credits, because of the generosity of these benefits. In our view, the combination of strong work requirements and generous work support benefits is a reasonable policy, despite the fact that fewer mothers receive TANF now than in the past.

Some Results of the TANF Directors Study

"Arguably the people who know the most about the goals and operation of state TANF programs and how the programs responded to the recession are the state TANF directors," write Haskins, Albert, and Howard. "They were, after all, the point persons for state TANF programs before and during the Great Recession. Interviews with TANF directors can provide an insider's view of the TANF issues that we have so far analyzed from the outside." Some of their conclusions from these interviews include:

• Most states did not struggle to pay for growing TANF rolls during the Great Recession.
• Most state directors considered their state's response to the recession "as adequate or better."
• The directors had suggestions for improving the TANF program, including having more flexibility in work participation rates, gaining access to the Contingency Fund, and placing greater emphasis on job training.

Some Policy Recommendations

Although the authors believe that the TANF program worked well, especially in conjunction with other safety net programs, they suggest some potential reforms:

• TANF allows vocational training to count toward states fulfilling their work requirement, but only a maximum of 30 percent of the work requirement can be fulfilled by TANF recipients in education or training. In times of high unemployment, Congress could raise the percentage limit from 30 to 40 or even 50 percent when unemployment reaches some specified level in the state, given that most experts believe the unemployed should expand their skills through job training during recessions.
• Congress should consider changing the 12-week limit on job search during periods of high unemployment to as much as six months, given that the average period of search before finding a job increases sharply during periods of high unemployment.

Download and read the full report for complete methodology, analysis, and data.

At 77 years of age, the federal minimum wage deserves a respite from the day-to-day combat of political life. Today, protestors around the country are demanding a $15 minimum. But few observers think this level is economically desirable: even fewer think that it is likely.

Democrats want a higher minimum, and say so loudly. Republicans of a free-market persuasion mostly do not—but tend to stay silent because they know that swing voters look positively at raising the wages of low-earners.

The minimum wage is lagging…

Congressional political stalemate has meant the U.S. wage floor has lagged behind median earnings. In contrast wage growth in other OECD countries has performed much better, as this graph produced by the Hamilton Project shows:

Advanced nations have de-politicized minimum wage decisions

The federal minimum wage is an established piece of the U.S. policy furniture—and one that is quite dated. It now makes sense to consider taking some of the power and responsibility for setting the wage rate out of the hands of politicians—just as interest rates are set by the Federal Reserve.

This is not a novel proposal in international terms. In most advanced economies, minimum wage decisions are not purely political. Out of 66 countries studied by Tito Boeri in 2009, 24 delegate the determination the minimum wage level to a tripartite body; 26 countries set the minimum wage after taking advice following formal consultation between the Government and representatives of employers and workers; and just 16 countries (including the U.S.) set the minimum wage through a simple legislative vote.

Over in the U.K., the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron just jacked up the national minimum wage by 3% up to £6.70, with barely a squeak of protest from employers or the right wing of his own party. Why? Because, like his two predecessors, he simply followed the advice of the Low Pay Commission, which is comprised of nine commissioners—three each from trade unions, employer organizations and academia.

Two options for taking the political heat out of the U.S. minimum wage

Can the U.S. follow suit? And if it can, what might the new system look like? Two options at least are worth considering.

1. A Federal Minimum Wage Advisory Board. This could be made up (like the U.K. version) of nine members: three representatives of employer organizations, three from labor organizations, and three independent labor economists. The Board would recommend a rate for the national minimum wage each year, which would then be enacted by Congress in the usual manner. The Board would have a strong incentive to set a rate likely to be adopted by Congress, in order to establish and maintain its reputation: there is, after all, little point in sitting on a Board that is ignored. The Board’s recommendation would not be binding and would not become the legal ‘default’ level. But because the advice is likely to be sensible, Congress would likely be inclined to follow it.

2. Wage Indexation. An alternative—favored by my Brookings colleague Gary Burtless—would be to simultaneously raise the minimum wage and introduce automatic indexing, lifting the minimum wage at the same rate as either consumer prices or the median wage—preferably the latter. In effect, this would do for the minimum wage what President Nixon did for Social Security. Congress would have the power to suspend a rise—perhaps if unemployment reached a certain threshold—but the default position would be to link changes in the minimum wage to changes in the median wage or in the broader consumer economy.

Policy commitment devices in action

These are both examples of what I have called policy commitment devices—in a new paper, Ulysses Goes to Washington—that help to overcome political myopia in order to support longer-term policy objectives. In the first case, taking advice from an independent commission, the commitment is somewhat less binding, although as James Madison knew, ‘the counsels and checks of friends’ can carry plenty of weight. Indexation would be a tighter form of binding, since inaction on the part of politicians would lead to an uprating of minimum wage, rather than the current stasis.

For both sides, there are political attractions to sub-contracting some decision-making power over the minimum wage. By accepting the advice of an independent body or allowing indexation to do its silent work, Republicans can keep their business donors and right-wing critics at bay; Democrats can do the same for unions and the political left. Sometimes the most powerful thing politicians can do is give some power away. The minimum wage is now perhaps a case in point.

Improving data in the field of workforce development is a necessary step to evaluating programs and replicating success. What does current data tell us about the populations served? What outcomes should we measure to ensure programs are meeting America’s workforce development needs?

Earlier this month, we convened an expert group of policy makers, practitioners and scholars to address this problem, along with other challenges in workforce development. Previously, we interviewed Kate Blosveren Kreamer on the need to strengthen bridges from school to work. Next up in our Q&A series is Beth Weigensberg, a researcher at Mathematica Policy Research.

A: Although there is increasingly more rigorous research to assess effectiveness of programs, I feel a missing piece is understanding how to replicate and scale-up effective strategies. Often times workforce development programs that are deemed effective in one place do not always succeed when implemented in another. Research that evaluates effectiveness of programs should assess the role of contextual factors (including organizational, leadership, community, and political factors) to identify what is needed to successfully implement, replicate, and scale successful programs.

A: The workforce development field has an unfortunate history of “creaming”—programs selectively work with individuals most likely to succeed at finding employment, leaving those “harder-to-serve” individuals struggling to find assistance. Individuals that are often considered “hard-to-serve” include those who are homeless, disabled, formerly incarcerated, older workers, non-English speakers, low-income, and youth who are disconnected from school and employment. Increasing efforts to focus on these “harder-to-serve” populations include specialized targeted programs and strategies to help address the complex needs of these individuals, which often extend beyond skill development and finding a job. These specialized programs often provide additional support services to help address their complex needs, which can serve as additional barriers to obtaining and retaining employment.

A: Intermediate measures of engagement and skill development would provide interim measures of progress, while the ultimate objectives are obviously employment and educational attainment. Ongoing evaluation on interim measures allows for earlier acknowledgment of achievement and identification of those struggling to progress. Assessing outcomes in ways that control for different populations or barriers to employment, such as using risk-adjusted methodologies, can help us evaluate workforce development programs in an equitable manner.

One of the biggest challenges in the field is ensuring we have valid and reliable data to accurately estimate outcomes. The data available to assess outcomes are usually limited by what is collected in management information systems, which are often developed to be responsive to reporting requirements of publically-funded programs. But these siloed data do not allow for comprehensive assessment of workforce development outcomes within a state, locality, or even within a community-based employment and training organization that relies on numerous funding sources. Efforts are needed to integrate data and assess standardized outcome measures across program and funding silos to allow for more comprehensive assessment of outcomes within the field.