N. R. Ikonomov and S. P. Suetin
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 33-54.
Abstract, references and article information

A. P. Starovoitov and N. V. Ryabchenko
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 15-31.
Abstract, references and article information

M. A. Stepanova
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 1-13.
Abstract, references and article information

Minerals and Metals for a Low-Carbon Future: Implications for Developing Countries 30 October 2017 — 5:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 October 2017 Chatham House, London

This roundtable will explore two sides of minerals and metals for a low-carbon future - the growing demand for metals required for low-carbon technology and the technological and policy innovations that will be required to manage the carbon footprint of the mining sector and its wider energy and industrial linkages. Based around a presentation and scenarios developed by the World Bank, this roundtable discussion will assess which strategic metals will likely rise in demand in order to deliver a low-carbon future, before exploring the possible implications for resource-rich developing countries. In particular, what does a growing demand of minerals for a clean energy future mean for governments and industry, and how might developing countries benefit from this trend? What impact might growth of the mining sector have on a sustainable and climate-smart development? Can renewable energy and other clean tech innovations in the mining industry help reduce the carbon footprint of the sector and related industries, and under what circumstances? And how fit-for-purpose are current donor approaches to the mining sector in an increasingly carbon-constrained world?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Mining and the Circular Economy: Implications for the Minerals and Metals Industries 6 November 2017 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 October 2017 Chatham House, London

Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable: Forecasting Forum 2018 12 February 2018 — 2:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 December 2017 Chatham House, London

This forum will present the latest thinking from senior researchers on the dynamics that will affect fossil fuels investment and markets in the year ahead. The first session will assess the various factors keeping oil and gas prices from bouncing back and will consider conditions and political developments that could influence markets in the year ahead. The second session will assess the future of the power sector and what this means for the fossil fuels industry.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Visualizing the Data: The Evolution of Trade Tensions in Metals and Minerals Markets 18 January 2018 — 4:30PM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 19 December 2017 Chatham House, London

Over the past decade, producer countries such as South Africa, Zambia, Indonesia, the DRC and, most recently, Tanzania have restricted exports of unprocessed precious metals, copper, nickel, cobalt and other minerals in an attempt to support, or create, downstream processing industries and jobs or increase revenues. These moves have invariably created tensions with trading partners. Research suggests that export restrictions are not the best way to achieve such policy objectives and can instead harm the producer country’s economy and undermine the functioning of international metals and minerals.

Drawing on OECD and Chatham House research on resource trade, the speaker will present analysis and data visualizations exploring the drivers of past export restrictions and their political and economic impacts. They will also consider how the drivers of ‘resource nationalist measures’ are changing, whether and where export restrictions might present strategic and economic risks in the current context, and the extent to which producer and consumer governments and international governance mechanisms are prepared to address them.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable: How Solar is Shaping the Energy Transition 1 June 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 22 May 2018 Chatham House, London

As global temperatures rise and extreme weather events multiply, doubts over the reality and imminence of climate change have dissipated. Despite this, there is a clear lack of urgency by governments to the approaching crisis. At this event, Prem Shankar Jha will set out what he believes are the three main causes for this inaction.

Furthermore, he will argue that catastrophic climate change is imminent, but even if it weren’t, the risk is too great to ignore. Only a complete shift from fossil fuels by 2070 at the latest would provide reasonable certainty of avoiding irreversible consequences. This transition is not only possible but the technologies to enable it were harnessed four to nine decades ago – and all of them draw their primary energy from the sun. These technologies are already capable of delivering electricity, transport fuels, and petrochemicals at prices that are competitive with the current delivered cost of electricity in the US and Western Europe. So what is holding up the energy shift?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

A New Era for China: Implications for the Global Mining and Metals Industries 18 June 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 8 June 2018 Chatham House, London

Since the turn of the century, China’s demand for resources has dominated global headlines. It’s rapid demand growth through the early 2000s sparked the beginning of the commodities ‘super cycle’, and encouraged a growing Chinese presence in international mining, and in global metals and minerals markets. More recently, its transition toward the ‘new normal’ of slower but higher quality growth has underpinned the sudden slowdown in global commodities demand.

Drawing on China’s domestic ambitions, as set out in the 19th party congress, and on its wider strategic ambitions through the Belt and Road Initiative, the speaker will set out his thoughts on China’s next era of growth, and its likely implications for international mining investment and global metals and minerals markets.

Flexible Distribution Systems: New Services, Actors and Technologies 4 September 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 31 July 2018 Chatham House, London

The pace of the energy transition is accelerating. Solar and wind are dramatically falling in cost and displacing fossil fuel generators. Simultaneously, the rapid uptake of electric vehicles and battery storage systems are beginning to send shock-waves through the electricity sector.

As the proportion of distributed energy resources (DERs) connected to the distribution network grows, a significant opportunity is beginning to present itself. What if the concerns of renewable integration and associated costs could be solved by the smart integration of these DERs?

By properly valuing the services DERs can provide, actively managing the distribution system and creating new market places, might a truly renewable electricity system capable of supporting the electrification of heat and transport be possible?

During this roundtable, Andrew Scobie, CEO of Faraday Grid, will provide an overview of the challenges and opportunities faced within the distribution network and explain why the current system is no longer fit for purpose.

This is the inaugural event in the Energy Transitions Roundtable (ETR) series.

Korea's New Energy Policy and Implications for LNG Imports 3 October 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 17 September 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The new energy policy of Moon Jae-In’s administration aims to swing radically from coal and nuclear towards renewables and LNG for power generation. During the last 12 months the priority given to the expansion of renewable energy has been overwhelming and the support for the expansion of gas not as strong as many observers had expected. The 13th gas supply and demand plan announced in Spring 2018 confirmed the trend. Based on this projection, Professor K. Paik will discuss how this new energy policy will affect Korea’s LNG imports strategy and what are the implications of Korea’s northern policy towards this LNG supply strategy and pipeline gas imports to the Korean Peninsula.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Realizing the Potential of Extractives for Industrial and Economic Development 18 October 2018 — 5:30PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 3 October 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Over the past two decades, the extractives industries have risen in importance for many low- and middle- income countries their prospects for economic development and poverty reduction. During a period of rising commodities prices, the development of extractives became increasingly attractive to both governments and companies. There was - and remains - much discussion about their potential to support inclusive development.

However, there are also risks and uncertainties associated with the extractives industries and many things can, and do, go wrong. Fluctuations in commodity prices can be hard to manage and can lead to considerable fiscal pressures. In the longer-term, climate change and the various policy responses to this, will profoundly affect the extractives sector as renewables replace fossil fuels in the global energy mix.

Managing the extractives sectors will therefore remain highly challenging especially in low-income countries where institutions are often weak. This roundtable will bring together some of the foremost academics and practitioners working in the extractives industries and also in economic development to discuss a major new UNU-WIDER study Extractive Industries: The Management of Resources as a Driver of Sustainable Development.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Decarbonizing Heat: A New Frontier for Technologies and Business Models 27 February 2019 — 8:15AM TO 9:45AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Building space and water heating accounts for over 35 percent of global energy consumption - nearly double that of transport. However, there has been limited progress in decarbonizing the sector to date. International cooperation is required to ensure harmonized policies drag low carbon heating technologies down the cost curve to the extent that low carbon heating is cost competitive and affordable. The initial presentations and discussion focus on:

• Demand reduction technologies and policies that speed up transformation of the sector.
• The different challenges for energy efficiency of retrofitting as opposed to new build.
• The impact of electrification on GHG emissions and the power sector.
• The comparative role of national and city level initiatives.

The meeting concludes by looking at the challenges and risks in accelerating the transformation of heating and the lessons that can be learned from other sectors.

The Electric Vehicle Revolution: Impacts on Oil Economies and Industry 24 January 2019 — 8:15AM TO 9:45AM Anonymous (not verified) 3 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Electric vehicle (EV) deployment is gathering pace: the Norwegian government thinks that EV subsidies will be unnecessary by 2025 as they reach parity with diesel and petrol vehicles.

China has stipulated that EVs comprise 12 per cent of vehicle sales by 2020 while more governments are committing to banning diesel and petrol vehicles.

These developments are expected to be replicated as urban air pollution rises up the political agenda while technological developments and falling costs have given rise to ambitious forecasts on the increase in the deployment of EVs and the demise of the internal combustion engine.

Considering this, the presentations and initial discussion focus on:

• The influence of new technologies on the automotive landscape, including autonomous vehicles.
• How the automotive and oil companies are adjusting their business models to accommodate and encourage the rise in EVs.
• The risks and opportunities for the deployment of EVs for incumbents and new market actors.
• The role of government for example in public procurement and infrastructure development.
• The potential for modal shift and its impact on oil demand.

The discussion then seeks to explore the need for benchmarks of change including data and metrics to understand the changing risk landscape and the implications for different actors.

Finally, the discussion focuses on the speed of transformation and what this means for existing and new market actors.

Power Sector Transformation, New Market Dynamics and Geopolitical Implications 7 November 2018 — 8:00AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 December 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The global electricity sector is experiencing profound change due to a confluence of technological innovation, environmental policies and regulatory reform. The effect is most obvious in the EU28, Australia and parts of North America.

However, this is just the beginning and the success of the next phase of electricity sector transformations hinges on enhancing system flexibility to facilitate unhindered low-cost deployment of renewables. It remains to be seen how utilities will seek to navigate this second phase of electricity transformations.

This session starts with a presentation and discussion that focuses on:

• Public and private sector risks of the transformation of the power sector, changes in generation mix and their implications for supply chain, employments and investment patterns.
• The role of government and the regulatory framework in light of changing market structure, new entrants and big data.
• Wider geopolitical issues including the implication for fossil fuel producers and the rise in demand for new materials and changes in land use.
• The possible implications on the power sector on the electrification of heat and transport.

The discussion then moves to the speed of transformation and what this means for existing and new market actors.

The Global Implications of China's Energy Revolution 4 March 2019 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 7 February 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Ten years ago, it would have been difficult to believe that China – the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter – would be one of the global leaders in some elements of clean energy development and deployment. With increasing air pollution and predominantly coal-fired power generation fueled by a booming economy and population, China has had to rethink its approach to environmental protection and climate mitigation.

Strong government signalling and national policies have led to the construction of the world’s largest fleets, wind farms and solar photovoltaic arrays in an effort to reduce national GDP intensities of energy and CO2 emissions. How has the availability of large amounts of capital, and the number of state-owned companies with soft budgetary constraints, helped contribute to this?

Against this backdrop, this event will consider how China must re-evaluate its approach to energy security – coal made up the majority of the country’s energy in 2016, followed by oil, of which 65 per cent had to be imported – despite the country being one of the pioneers of renewable energy. This event will look at how, in delivering on its clean energy objectives, China could redefine the traditional energy security paradox and in fact become more resilient to previously overlooked vulnerabilities.

Plant-based 'Meat' and Cultured Meat: Revolutionizing the Livestock Sector 10 April 2019 — 4:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 March 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Consensus is building across the scientific, environmental and public health communities that a radical shift away from excessive meat-eating patterns is urgently needed to tackle the unsustainability of the livestock sector. Recognizing the scale of the challenge ahead, public policymakers, civil society and innovators have increasingly sought to prompt shifts in consumer food choices – away from the most resource-intensive meat products and towards more sustainable alternatives.

Meat analogues – plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat also known as ‘lab-grown’ meat – mark a departure from traditional meat alternatives. Both are intended to be indistinguishable from – and in the case of cultured meat biologically equivalent to – animal-derived meat and are marketed principally at meat-eaters. Innovation and investment in meat analogues have increased significantly, but the direction and pace of growth in the meat analogue industry will depend upon a multitude of factors, including public acceptance, civil society support and incumbent industry responses.

This event will explore the challenges of scaling up production and generating demand for meat alternatives. It will also look at the ways policymakers in the UK and EU can impact the direction of the industry while examining what factors will influence consumer acceptance of plant-based ‘meat’ and cultured meat as substitutes for animal-derived meat.

Mining, Minerals and Metals Expert Roundtable: Forest-Smart Mining Report Launch 10 May 2019 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Driven to Extraction: Can Sand Mining be Sustainable? 5 June 2019 — 1:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Nuclear Energy in a Post-Brexit Europe 11 October 2019 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 18 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Brexit will significantly change the balance within the EU in relation to nuclear energy. Apart from France and Finland, both of whose nuclear development programmes are behind schedule, the UK is the only member state in northern or western Europe currently investing in new nuclear capacity. Brexit will therefore leave the supporters of nuclear energy within the EU27 and the European Commission in a weaker position.

The speaker will argue that at a time when the energy industry needs to accelerate its shift away from fossil fuels, and when the electricity generation industry must cut its carbon emissions faster than it has ever managed to do in the past, this change is unhelpful.

The workshop will also address the need for additional interconnector capacity and the future of carbon-trading outside the EU emission trading system and how this relates to potential nuclear energy capacity.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

The EU’s Un-Common Agricultural Policy 21 October 2019 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 27 September 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Sino-Russian Gas Cooperation: Power of Siberia I and II and Implications for Global LNG Supplies 27 November 2019 — 8:30AM TO 9:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 19 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

In a new event in the Sustainable Transitions series, the speaker will present an update of Sino-Russian gas cooperation.

To give a comprehensive account of their impact on global liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies, he will discuss the following points:

• Gas is scheduled to start flowing from the Power of Siberia I (POS) on 2 December 2019. But what is the background of development of POS 1 and what is its current status and prospects?
• What are the chances of exporting gas through the proposed Altai pipeline? Why is the Mongolia export route so significant? And how will it affect the Central Asian Republics and in particular Turkmenistan’s gas export to China?
• What are the implications of both POS I and Altai gas via Mongolia route in the context of global LNG supply?
• What are the prospects for multilateral pipeline gas cooperation in northeast Asia?
• What are the implications for other Arctic onshore LNG supply, in particular, for Novatek’s Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 1 and 2 to China on top of POS 1 and Altai gas?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Net Zero and Beyond: What Role for Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage? 23 January 2020 — 8:30AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 6 January 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

In the context of the feasibility of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to net zero, policymakers are beginning to pay more attention to options for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. A wide range of potential carbon dioxide removal (CDR) options are currently being discussed and modelled though the most prominent among them are bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation and reforestation.

There are many reasons to question the reliance on BECCS assumed in the models including the carbon balances achievable, its substantial needs for land, water and other inputs and technically and economically viable carbon capture and storage technologies.

This meeting will examine the potentials and challenges of BECCS in the context of other CDR and emissions abatement options. It will discuss the requisite policy and regulatory frameworks to minimize sustainability and socio-political risks of CDR approaches while also avoiding overshooting climate goals.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Environmental Change and Emerging Diseases 28 October 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 13 October 2020 Online

Understanding how environmental changes are directly and indirectly affecting the emergence and spread of disease has assumed global importance.

There is growing awareness that deforestation and land-use conversion, urbanization, human migration, international commerce, and climate change are having significant impacts on human health, but their impact on increasing infectious disease risks has only become more evident with the coronavirus pandemic.

With climate change, and environmental change more generally, disrupting ecologies, and people interacting with wildlife in new ways, it creates the conditions for new diseases to emerge: a better understanding of the health dimensions of environmental change will be critical to managing pandemic risks in future. 

Our event will examine the relationship between environmental change and disease, how these linkages have manifested in historical outbreaks and in the coronavirus pandemic, and the role of environmental policies in minimizing the risk of future emerging diseases.  What can be done to ensure equitable action? What can we learn from our responses to previous pandemics? And will the growing recognition of the diverse risks arising from climate change motivate more climate action?

This event will launch the Energy, Environment and Resources (EER) Programme’s Environment and Society Discussion Series. This series aims to provide a platform to promote interdisciplinary knowledge sharing and policy dialogue to mitigate and adapt to the impacts that climate change, biodiversity loss and natural resource depletion are having on people and communities globally, and on geopolitics, security and international development.

Sign up to find out about more events in this series here. 

Impact of the US Election on Global Climate Politics 25 November 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 November 2020 Online

Panellists discuss how Joe Biden’s victory will impact international efforts to tackle climate change. Will climate finally become a common area for global cooperation?

Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump is already having a positive impact on international efforts to tackle climate change. Leaders from across the world, including the UK, Canada, Australia and Fiji, have used their first messages to the President-elect to draw attention to the climate crisis.

Biden has promised to re-join the global community in its commitment to the Paris Agreement – but this could be the easy part. More difficult will be whether and how Biden is able to deliver his ambitious climate plan, and how effectively he is able to integrate climate change into foreign policy efforts and national security strategies.

Global climate action has also moved forward in the last four years. The European Union recently pledged to become climate neutral by 2050, and China, Japan and South Korea have committed to achieving carbon neutral economies.

How will the US re-enter this global landscape of distributed leadership and what difficulties does it face? Will the US be willing to work within a competitive partnership with the EU and China? How will Biden’s win change the dynamic of COP26 next year? 

Moving Food up the Political Agenda 14 December 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 December 2020 Online

How can food system transformation be woven into high level biodiversity, nutrition and climate forums in 2021?

Adverse impacts on food security are expected to worsen as global temperatures continue to rise. As well as feeling the impacts of climate change, food systems drive it in a number of ways. Not only do food systems contribute more to greenhouse gas emissions than any other parts of our lives, they are also the leading driver of biodiversity loss, the largest cause of deforestation and occupy the most land globally.

On our current trajectory, 1.5°C of warming could become a reality in the next 5-10 years. Transforming food systems to meet climate, biodiversity and food security goals is crucial. If left to continue, food alone could take us over 1.5°C this century – even with maximum efforts in the energy sector.

Unprecedented levels of action to transform food systems is required over the next decade. The coming year is described as a ‘super year’ given the numerous high-level global events taking place that cover climate, biodiversity and food security. The year ahead has also been identified as the final opportunity to bring global commitments in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

What can be achieved in the super year? How can food system transformation be woven into high level biodiversity, nutrition and climate forums during the super year? How can momentum from the super year be built upon, to ensure meaningful action is taken over the next decade?

What's next for environmental peacebuilding? Lessons learned and opportunities from conflict-affected states 17 February 2021 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 February 2021 Online

 This event explores lessons and opportunities from conflict-affected states.

In the field of peacebuilding, scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of environmental restoration, afforestation and infrastructural renewal for creating the sustainable livelihoods necessary for successful peacebuilding efforts.

Featuring academics writing for International Affairs on environmental peacebuilding in Colombia, Yemen and the Sahel, this webinar discusses the policy implications of the turn to environmental peacebuilding.

This event is part of the Chatham House’s Environment and Society Discussion Series in which the Energy Environment and Resources Programme brings together leading academics and policymakers to discuss key issues in environmental policy.

In particular, this event focuses on the role of environmental peacebuilding in creating sustainable livelihoods. From the impact the destruction of infrastructure can have on poverty as a driver of conflict, to the role environmental peacebuilding can play in bringing communities together by creating sustainable shared spaces of employment, the importance of the environmental livelihood creation is difficult to overstate.

Panellists focus on how policymakers can best encourage inclusive and sustainable livelihood creation and on addressing the key challenges such approaches face in the context of environmental peacebuilding efforts.

Climate action and gender equality: Can we close the gap on one without the other? 8 March 2021 — 2:30PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 15 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the COP26 presidency, policymakers and experts examine the interrelationship between gender equality and climate action, and highlight innovative examples of policy and practice from around the world.

Marking International Women’s Day, this event organized by the COP26 presidency in partnership with Chatham House, will explore how gender equality and climate action go hand-in-hand. The agreement of the Gender Action Plan (GAP) at COP25 sent the message that the time for gender-responsive climate action is now.

This will be a unique opportunity to hear from policymakers and civil society leaders discussing whether enough is being done, as well as highlighting cutting-edge work around the world and suggesting what the future could hold.

The event will be livestreamed on this event page.

Sand: Monitoring and management for a sustainable future 2 March 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the Global Sand Observatory Initiative, this event outlines the sand challenge, what actions are currently underway to address it, and what else needs to be done.

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

After water, sand is the raw material that the world consumes in the greatest quantity. It is no exaggeration to say that fine sand and coarser materials – the medium-to-coarse-grained pebbles, gravel and rock fragments used in construction – are the building blocks of the modern world.

When bound with cement, sand becomes concrete; when mixed with bitumen, it becomes asphalt; and when heated, it becomes glass. Without sand, we would have no highways, high-rises or high-speed trains. Yet sand – which is used here as shorthand for sand, gravel and crushed rock together – is a resource that is both abundant and finite.

In global terms, it is abundant, especially when compared with many other raw materials, albeit often not available close to where it is needed. It is finite in that the rate at which we are using it far exceeds the natural rate at which it is being replenished by the weathering of rocks by wind and water.

Industrialization, population growth and urbanization have fuelled explosive growth in the demand for sand. Precise data on sand extraction are hard to come by and the lack of data compounds the challenge of managing the resource sustainably.

However, the UN estimates that overall extraction could be in the region of 40 billion tonnes per year, driven primarily by construction sector demand. That equates to 18 kilograms of sand each day for every person on the planet and signals how strategically important these resources are for future sustainable development. Post-COVID-19 recovery investment in infrastructure, digital technologies, tourism and other economic activities are dependent on sand resources.

Current efforts to improve the management of sand resources at local, national and global levels are uneven. This is partly due to unique geological features and geography, but also differences in local manifestations of the ‘sand challenge’, national and regional demand for sand resources, as well as capacities to enforce or implement best practice assessment procedures, extractive practices, environmental management and restoration requirements.

We must put stronger conditions in place for a rapid, just and scaled transition to sustainable sand management. But where to focus our efforts for the greatest positive impact?

Youth voices on climate action 22 April 2021 — 12:30PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 March 2021 Online

To celebrate Earth Day, youth activists, local change-makers, innovators and entrepreneurs discuss opportunities and challenges for youth-led climate activism.

Young people will bear the brunt of the intensifying impacts of climate change over time. Facing this challenge, youth around the world have emerged at the forefront of climate activism at an unprecedented scale.

School strikes, marches, and declarations complement youth engagement in diplomacy, technology, science, and law. Providing a platform for young people involved in climate action at the local, national and global levels is essential to promote collaboration, generate new policy ideas, and demand accountability from political and business leaders.

Panellists engage in critical conversation about COP26; global leadership in climate mitigation, adaptation, and finance; and how to develop the full potential of youth-led global initiatives going forward.

From local to global: A roadmap for US climate action 14 April 2021 — 6:30PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 28 March 2021 Online

Ahead of Biden’s Earth Day Summit, panellists discuss a range of climate issues, from city-level climate management to the international security implications of climate deals.

On their first day in office, the Biden-Harris administration sent a strong message to Americans and allies by rejoining the Paris Agreement. Experienced climate and environmental leaders were appointed to senior leadership roles as part of a ‘whole of government approach’ to climate action.

Although decisive action is welcomed by many Americans and international partners, the divided domestic perspectives on climate and a changed international landscape pose significant challenges.

Ahead of the Earth Day Summit on April 22, an event hosted by Joe Biden to mark America’s formal return to global climate talks, panellists discuss a range of climate issues, from city-level climate management to the international security implications of climate deals.

• How will post-COVID domestic priorities and policy influence the international approach of the US to climate action?
• How will US policy, both foreign and domestic, need to respond to the security and geopolitical elements posed by climate change?
• What actions are needed during the upcoming Earth Day Summit for the US to establish credibility as a climate leader?
• What shape are key debates taking on US-China climate relations ahead of COP 26, and how might climate issues be approached in relation to wider geopolitical tensions?

Prioritizing equity and justice in climate action 30 June 2021 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

London Climate Action Week event: Why understanding equity and justice is essential to the ability to meaningfully inform climate politics.

Citizen-led climate activism is demonstrating the need to think about climate change ‘not just as a problem for science to solve’ but also as a problem of equity, human rights and justice.

The disproportionate impacts of climate change on the poor and the marginalized across the world means that understanding equity and justice is essential for the ability to meaningfully inform climate politics.

Excluding these issues risks ignoring, or intentionally omitting, the consequences of policies, tools and frameworks on those who are most likely to face the severe costs of any climate action or inaction.

In a pivotal year for climate decision-making, this event explores the necessity of equity and justice in climate action and how the world can move the political conversation to one that is more inclusive.

The speakers explore how communities themselves articulate the justice dimensions of climate change and how fairness can create a greener future for current and future generations.

This event is being hosted as a part of Strengthening Climate Diplomacy, a series of events from Chatham House during London Climate Action Week 2021.

Cities as climate leaders: Progress and ambition 1 December 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 16 November 2021 Online

This panel discusses the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally.

Cities are critical to tackling the pressing environmental challenges of our time. While they now account for an estimated 75 per cent of global CO2 emissions, cities also offer a unique opportunity for devolved leadership on climate action. At the recent COP26, some significant progress was made in elevating cities’ position on climate action with a flurry of announcements and commitments.

For example, more than 1,000 cities are now committed to the Cities Race to Zero and C40’s Clean Construction Declaration saw multiple cities committing to at least halving emissions from initial construction of buildings by 2030. A raft of financing commitments were also made to improve urban resilience in the face of climate change.

This builds on existing momentum before COP26. Over 50 world cities are now on track to meet Paris Agreement and the Marrakech Partnership is further enabling collaboration between governments and cities within the UNFCCC processes.

Therefore, how we design, build, govern and use our urban places will be a key factor for decarbonization and climate change adaptation.

On the back of COP26, this panel brings together leaders from across urban development sectors to discuss the progress cities have already made, whether progress at COP26 was enough, and what more needs to be done to scale action and ambition internationally. 

Loss and damage: Where are we now and what happens next? 25 January 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 January 2022 Online

This event discusses the progress of the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations. 

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation.

While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June.

The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date. This first event outlines the key debates and discuss what progress has been made on advancing the loss and damage agenda within climate negotiations to date.

The second event focuses on solutions and possible ways forward, looking ahead to the COP27 negotiations in Egypt later in 2022, where loss and damage is expected to be a high-profile agenda item.

Nuclear, gas and green finance taxonomies in the EU and UK 23 February 2022 — 10:00AM TO 11:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 20 January 2022 Online

Experts discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives on green taxonomy.

This event will address the controversial additions to the EU green finance taxonomy, including the labelling of some nuclear and gas power sources as “green”. Hear perspectives from the UK, EU and international experts.

The UK has committed to creating a green taxonomy to provide a shared understanding of which economic activities count as sustainable. It should be robust and evidence-based, taking an objective and science-based approach to assessing sustainability.

Technical Screening Criteria (TSCs) for the climate change mitigation, and climate change adaptation objectives within the UK green taxonomy will be based on those in the EU Taxonomy. The Government is currently reviewing these and expects to consult on UK draft TSCs in the first quarter of 2022, ahead of legislating by the end of 2022.

In recent weeks the European Commission has proposed controversial additional TSCs for the EU taxonomy, most notably the inclusion of nuclear and natural gas in power generation, which are currently being discussed by Member States and the European Parliament.

The inclusion of controversial power sources not only risks affecting investment and deployment patterns in the net-zero transition, but may also be a threat to the authority of the taxonomy as a whole

Key questions for the UK now include whether and how to address these issues in its own taxonomy, and how to promote a science-based ‘race to the top’ between jurisdictions that can lead to robust international standards.

This Environment and Society Discussion Series event brings expert voices together to discuss EU, UK, and international perspectives, and is co-organized with E3G.

A deep dive into loss and damage solutions 8 February 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 January 2022 Online

This second event of our loss and damage series cuts through polarized debate by bringing together international experts to discuss innovative legal and financial approaches.

This event will focus on a deep dive into constructive solutions and progress made to address loss and damage.

Following the first event of this two-part series, ‘Loss and Damage – where are we now and what happens next’, this event focuses on a deep dive into constructive solutions and progress made to address loss and damage.

Loss and damage refers to harms and destruction caused by climate change impacts that cannot be avoided through mitigation or adaptation. While it has gained increasing recognition in international climate change negotiations, turning the concept of loss and damage into tangible action for climate-vulnerable countries has been contentious.

Loss and damage is interwoven with issues of fairness and equity. The issue is highly disputed due to its connection with the historical responsibility of developed countries in causing climate change, as well as associated calls for compensation from developing countries.

At COP26, Scotland became the first government to pledge funds for loss and damage for countries in the Global South. However, most climate-vulnerable countries left disappointed by the failure of the Glasgow Climate Pact to secure the establishment of a dedicated loss and damage financing facility.

Developing countries have made it clear that they will continue to push for a new financing facility in the Glasgow Dialogue, a set of international discussions on loss and damage kicking off in June. The Environment and Society Discussion Series is hosting two events on loss and damage ahead of that date.

This second event convenes a deep dive into the progress and potential on loss and damage solutions, while also examining the hurdles that are still to overcome to make loss and damage support a reality.

Feminist solutions to the climate crisis 8 March 2022 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 1 March 2022 Online

This International Women’s Day panel explores intersectional feminist approaches to solving the climate crisis.

Gender inequality and climate change are closely intertwined. Due to their different and unequal social roles and status, women, girls and people of marginalised genders are disproportionately affected by climate change impacts, also differentiated by factors such as age, race, ability and location.

They are also leading innovative solutions to climate change at all levels, especially in frontline communities. Yet as the Glasgow Women’s Leadership statement highlighted at COP26, there is still a lack of momentum for prioritising their knowledge, tools and leadership in climate policy and action.  

This panel considers what feminist approaches can bring to climate change communication and movement building, spotlighting a range of local and regional gender-responsive climate initiatives. It also discusses concrete examples of feminist and gender-responsive policies to address climate change, such as the Feminist Green New Deal.

The panel highlights the critically important work being carried out by diverse feminist activists and researchers, and how the audience can centre gender and social equality in their work on climate change.  

What does sustainable agriculture mean? 24 May 2022 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 May 2022 Chatham House and Online

Experts compare and contrast visions of ‘sustainable’ agriculture.

There is growing and unprecedented recognition of the adverse effects of food systems on global warming, air and water pollution, biodiversity, soil, and managing the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. At the same time, concern is rising over the role of climate change itself in compromising food security, supply-chain resilience and food price spikes.

Against this backdrop, the need for agriculture to become more ‘sustainable’ is clear. However, there is little consensus over what that means in practice. To address this, Chatham House is launching a new research paper comparing and contrasting the two most commonly articulated versions of ‘sustainable agriculture’.

The first focuses on sparing land for nature and increasing the productivity of agricultural land while minimizing environmental impacts. The second involves scaling up nature-friendly farming while emphasizing demand-side changes to reduce the overall pressure on land.

• How can we understand the arguments in support of either version and the assumptions and ideologies which underpin them?

• What are the implications of promoting one version of agriculture over the other

• How can policy transform agriculture and food systems?

• What should civil society support as ‘sustainable’ choices?

Climate finance and conflict dynamics on the road to COP27 21 September 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 September 2022 Online

Stakeholders discuss the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity in climate finance and action.

With climate change, fragility and conflict challenges worsening, the role of international climate finance is more urgent than ever.

From the implementation of climate finance and who it reaches to the rush for renewable energy, the inclusion of conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity principles often remain absent from climate finance discussions and planning.

With COP27 around the corner and for the occasion of International Peace Day, stakeholders ranging from government representatives to climate activists discuss their perspectives on the role of conflict and conflict sensitivity as part of climate finance and action.

This event was organized in partnership with International Alert.

Food system transformation: A blind spot for climate and biodiversity action? 20 October 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can COP27 and COP15 accelerate the agenda for sustainable food systems and land use?

Tackling the dual crises of climate change and biodiversity loss requires extraordinary levels of action at an unprecedented speed. Agriculture is the biggest user of land, the biggest source of methane emissions, a major contributor to total greenhouse gas emissions and the leading driver of biodiversity loss.

Anything short of a food system transformation puts climate and biodiversity objectives in peril. However, governments have not yet produced credible pathways and strong policies for tackling our growing ‘foodprint’ – the negative impacts of what we grow and eat.

In advance of COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh for climate and COP15 in Montreal for biodiversity, Chatham House has published a new briefing paper which examines aligning food systems with climate and biodiversity targets.

The paper reviews the climate and biodiversity policy landscape to 2030, with a focus on land-based aspects and the inclusion of food and agriculture. The paper highlights serious conflicts between the impacts of the food system and goals to protect and restore biodiversity and mitigate climate change.

In light of this, opportunities for joined-up action on food, climate and biodiversity are identified, including three key steps for countries to take this decade to produce suitably ambitious and effective policies across the climate–biodiversity–food nexus.

This event brings together leading voices from the international policy arenas for climate and biodiversity to react to the briefing paper and discuss how COP27 and COP15 can accelerate the agenda for sustainable food systems and land use.

An Attack on the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Principle in Hong Kong Expert comment sysadmin 11 January 2016

The disappearance of publisher Lee Bo may mark the beginning of the end of Beijing’s commitment to uphold the framework that provides the territory with a high degree of autonomy.

The disappearance of a publisher in Hong Kong, Lee Bo, who owns a well-known bookshop that sells books critical of Chinese leaders, is a landmark event and potentially a historical turning point for Hong Kong. It is not clear if this happened at the behest of the senior Chinese leadership. But if those responsible for the disappearing of Lee are not punished, it will be clear that their acts are condoned by the authorities.

This is deeply worrying as it gravely undermines the ‘one country, two systems’ framework, which provides Hong Kong with high degree of autonomy from Beijing. Under the Sino-British Agreement of 1984 and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, which govern relations between Hong Kong and China, the rights of Hong Kong citizens are meant to be protected within the territory. Mainland Chinese authorities do not have the legal power to arrest or detain an individual in, or remove anyone from, Hong Kong.

The Chinese know the limit of their legal authority in Hong Kong. Hence, Lee was quietly disappeared, rather than openly arrested. But that it happened at all may mark the beginning of the end of Beijing’s commitment to uphold the ‘one country, two systems’ framework – a relationship that requires Beijing to tolerate, if not respect, the judicial integrity and the way of life in Hong Kong.

Do we know for sure that Lee was ‘disappeared’ by China’s security apparatus? Before he disappeared, Lee said in an interview that he knew he had been watched and that his emails were accessed by Chinese agents, and that he would not travel to the mainland as a result. And we know that Lee’s travel documents are all in his home; yet he is now supposedly in China ‘assisting the authorities in an investigation’ into something unspecified. This explanation comes from a fax sent to Lee’s wife, probably intended by the Chinese authorities to put an end to speculation. But why would Chinese authorities work with Lee, a British citizen who carries no travel documents and would thus have broken the law by entering China? The circumstantial evidence is strong enough to show that whether he was taken by Chinese officers or someone else, his removal from Hong Kong to China must have received official endorsement.

Should the rest of the world be concerned about this? Hong Kong is a major financial center that services the world economy, and it can do so largely because it enjoys judicial independence and the high degree of autonomy under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. It is also a shining example of how the rights and scope of development for individuals can be respected in a Chinese community. Should the ‘one country, two systems’ framework be undermined, Hong Kong as we know it will be no more.

Beijing’s quick response in requiring Lee to fax his family may come across as ham-fisted and callous, but it also demonstrates that it had not expected the strong backlash to Lee’s disappearance. A strong and well-articulated international response that brings the matter to Xi’s attention may persuade him that it is in China’s best interest to put a stop to this process of undermining the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. Given Hong Kong’s importance to the global economy, this should be a priority for the international community.

This article was originally published in the Diplomat.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Taiwan Charts a New Course After Elections Expert comment sysadmin 19 January 2016

The resounding victory for the opposition marks a decisive break with the past and could make life much more difficult for Beijing.

A victory for Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s presidential election on Saturday had been widely predicted. But the margin of victory, and the crushing defeat suffered by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in the concurrent legislative elections, could mean a conclusive shift in both the country’s domestic politics and its important relationship with Beijing.

Why the DPP won

President elect Tsai Ing-wen’s victory was no close run thing nor was it a result of a split in the opposition vote as was claimed for her predecessor. The KMT ran a disastrously inept presidential campaign. The farcical way in which they first chose then unseated a totally unsuitable candidate simply underlined their lack of cohesion or purpose. This came on top of an unconvincing record in administration that showed the party to be increasingly tired, self-destructive and out of touch. Eric Chu, the eventual replacement choice, had neither the time nor the charisma to put things right.

Moreover, on the key issue of mainland policy, the KMT had come to be seen as serving more a party interest than a national one. It now appears that a majority in Taiwan believe that the DPP will more effectively champion and promote their interests in relation to China than the KMT. The coup de theatre of the meeting of the presidents of China and Taiwan in November had no discernible electoral impact. More widely, the view of the national identity as a Taiwanese one rather than a Chinese or hybrid Chinese/Taiwanese one has taken firm hold. The DPP responded more effectively to this new political climate.

What it means for relations with Beijing

Relations between Taiwan and the mainland can only become more difficult now, but quite how that works out in practical terms remains to be seen. It seems unlikely that China will choose, initially at least, to row back from the agreements reached with the outgoing administration, but further progress will be problematic. A new basis needs to be worked out for political negotiations, and neither side will wish to compromise its position. It is likely that there will be increasingly hard line and even bellicose rhetoric emanating from some quarters in China, but it will remain more measured on the official side. The reality of China’s military and economic power remains there for all to see.

The last DPP administration saw heightened tensions in US/China/Taiwan relations. The US will no doubt be arguing for calm and caution with both sides. All the official pronouncements so far from the DPP have been moderate. There is no desire for a confrontational policy from Taiwan, but equally Tsai made it clear that she was determined that ‘our democratic system, national identity, and international space must be respected. Any form of suppression will harm the stability of cross strait relations.’

A new era

President elect Tsai will be able to form and run an administration free from the shackles of a hostile legislature that made life so difficult for the first DPP administration under Chen Shui-bian, and her party can now claim a convincing popular mandate. She won by a margin of twelve percentage points over her rivals.

But the new administration faces real challenges, even beyond mainland policy. Taiwan’s economy has been relatively stagnant. There are increasing demands for new style politics. In her victory speech Tsai spoke of her wish to respond to the desire of the people for a government that is more willing to listen and one that is more transparent and accountable. She will want to escape from the shadow of the corruption that blighted the last DPP administration.

The DPP now has full control of Taiwan’s political processes for the first time ever, but equally significantly the pretensions of the KMT to be the natural ruling party in Taiwan have been dealt a devastating blow. Taiwan’s democracy has moved into a new era.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

Duterte’s Victory Is Cry for Help From Those Left Behind in Philippines Expert comment sysadmin 12 May 2016

But large support for mainstream parties and a mature democratic system should keep the country from slipping back towards authoritarianism.

The victory of political outsider Rodrigo Duterte in the 2016 Philippines’ elections is proof that a significant minority of the country’s population feels left behind by its recent economic success and estranged from its political elite. However the results of the elections as a whole suggest that most voters opted for a continuation of the current government’s policies.

Duterte looks almost certain to be inaugurated as the next president of the Philippines on 30 June. The country’s presidential voting system – a single round, first-past-the-post election – delivered victory to a populist outsider with 39 per cent support. Two candidates advocating a continuation of the current government’s policies − the Liberal Party’s Mar Roxas and independent Grace Poe − polled a combined 45 per cent. The long-standing factionalism within Philippines elite politics split the ‘anti-Duterte’ vote.

Changing the conversation

The contrast between Duterte and Roxas could hardly be greater. Mar Roxas is the grandson of the first president of an independent Philippines, a graduate of Wharton Business School and a former investment banker in the US. Rodrigo Duterte is a political outsider with an electoral base geographically almost as far from Manila as is possible to get in the Philippines: the city of Davao on the island of Mindanao.

The story of Duterte’s victory is the story of how ‘Duterte managed to change the national conversation from poverty towards crime and corruption,’ says Marites Vitug, editor-at-large of one of the Philippines’ most popular online news sites, Rappler. In January, Duterte was running fourth in opinion polls but a strategy that positioned him as the only opponent to the Manila elite gave him victory. This is the first time a provincial official has made it to the top job.

The headline figures tell us that the Philippines’ economy has done very well under President Benigno Aquino. Between 2010 and 2014, growth averaged 6.3 per cent per year. That fell to a still-impressive 5.8 per cent last year but is expected to pick up this year and next, according to the Asian Development Bank. Growth in agriculture, however, is significantly slower and rural areas feel left behind. While economic growth is benefiting the majority, inequality is worsening and resentment rising in poor villages. The contrast between the metropolitan sophistication of the Makati district in Manila and life in faraway provinces such as Duterte’s Mindanao is widening.

Ironically the Philippines’ economic success is a part of the explanation for the defeat of the ‘mainstream’ presidential candidates. Crime and corruption may have become more important issues simply because more voters have become better off and therefore more likely to be concerned about crime and corruption than before. It’s also undeniable that Duterte has a record for getting things done. Human rights groups rightly criticize his (at best) tolerance of the extra-judicial killing of alleged criminals but his repeated re-election as mayor demonstrates that many citizens are prepared to accept that in exchange for improved personal security. A surprising number of Manila residents have actually moved to Davao because of its better quality of life.

Traditional power bases

However, the results as a whole suggest a narrow majority in favour of current policies. In the vice-presidential race, the Liberal Party candidate Leni Robredo is narrowly ahead of Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, the son of the eponymous former president. Like Duterte she is regarded as a successful mayor of a well-run city, Albay. Duterte’s running mate Alan Cayetano received just 14 per cent of the vote.

In the senate election, Liberals won five of the 12 seats being contested, with a party- backed independent winning a sixth. The opposition, even with boxing champion and national idol Manny Pacquiao running for the United Nationalist Alliance, won four.

Taken as a whole, the results show the enduring nature of traditional Philippines power bases. The country’s many islands and distinct linguistic and cultural regions are virtual fiefs in which families and big bosses can wield almost total power through control of local authorities, businesses, the courts and security forces.

Threat to democracy?

It’s easy to forget that the election of Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 was originally welcomed as a challenge to the traditional elites of Philippine politics. The same accolades are currently greeting Duterte. Could they presage a return to the Philippines’ bad old days?

This seems less likely. Philippine democracy has matured considerably since Marcos declared martial law in 1972. There is a substantial, and vocal, middle class with experience of mobilizing against ‘bad’ presidents. There will also be pressures from international investors and the Philippines’ treaty ally, the United States, for better governance.

The Philippines will chair the Association of Southeast Asian Nations next year. That will put Duterte in the international spotlight as host of several international meetings – including the East Asia Summit attended by, among others, the presidents of China, Russia and the US. Since his victory Duterte has promised to act with decorum in office and declared that his election campaign antics were just a ploy to attract attention. Some leaders in Southeast Asia will use his victory to buttress their arguments against allowing their people to freely vote. It’s up to Duterte to decide whether he wants to be an advertisement for – or an argument against – democracy.

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Populism Comes to South Korea Expert comment sysadmin 20 December 2016

Public disgust with the embattled president reflects not only the unedifying details of her impeachment but a wider distrust of the political system.

For South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye, the jury is quite literally still out. Impeached by the country’s National Assembly on 9 December over claims of corruption, cronyism and influence peddling, she defiantly rejected – in a detailed statement – all of the charges levelled at her by an independent prosecutor. Any resolution of the issue must now await the ruling of the country’s Constitutional Court on the legitimacy of the impeachment vote – a decision that most likely will come early in the new year.

For the special prosecutor’s office, which is due to start its formal investigation on 21 December, the challenge is to find unambiguous evidence of the president’s direct responsibility for any of the corruption that may have taken place. The president, for her part, can claim, with some credibility that so far she has been tried only in the court of public opinion; that in South Korea’s rumour-prone, scandal-hungry media environment in which prosecutors have been known in the past to leak information to skew public debate, she has been denied natural justice and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.

Long shadows

But for the more than three-quarters of the Korean public calling for Park’s resignation, the president is symptomatic of Korean society’s wider flaws, including a pattern of corruption, privilege and hypocrisy endemic to the country’s political, economic and social elites. At a time of anemic economic growth (the country’s growth rate is predicted to slow to 2.1% next year), widening wealth and income disparities and reduced employment opportunities for a highly educated workforce, there is a growing mood of populist disaffection with the entire social and political system – for its lack of fairness and transparency and its perceived regulatory inefficiencies. This has been highlighted dramatically by disasters such as the Sewol ferry sinking that claimed the lives of some 300 school-children in August 2014 – at which time the president was castigated for being absent from her office at the time of a grave national crisis.

Complicating the current stand-off is the long-shadow of identity politics and unresolved disagreements about the country’s postwar historical narrative. As the daughter of the man responsible for the Korean economic ‘miracle’ who protected the country from the external communist threat in the North and radical subversion from within, Park’s political lineage is, for the older generation of voters in their sixties and above, a powerful reason to back the beleaguered president.

Already there are signs that this constituency is beginning to rally behind Park, with 30,000 demonstrating on 17 December against the impeachment decision, and with the governing Saenuri party showing signs of a consolidation of power around pro-Park legislators. The president, who has a reputation for stubbornness, may be calculating that this core support may allow her to defy the much larger calls for her resignation. She may also be hoping that the constitutional court, in which the majority of justices are politically conservative, will rule in her favour, allowing her to see out the remainder of her time in office, set to end in February 2018.

A pro-Park ruling by the court seems unlikely given the weight of the circumstantial evidence. Leading opposition politicians, including Moon Jae-in, former head of the Democratic Party and the current front runner in any post-impeachment presidential contest, has warned of a popular ‘revolution’ if the impeachment vote is not upheld. Moreover, the appetite for street protests against the president remains undimmed, and even conservative politicians appear to be positioning themselves for a post-Park era. Ban Ki-moon, the outgoing UN secretary general and long considered a likely Saenuri party candidate for the presidency, has been publicly distancing himself from Park. With 20.5% support, behind Moon on 23.7%, he has compelling reasons to align himself with the popular mood.

Lessons

At an individual level, the experience of President Park combines both political failure and personal tragedy. She has demonstrably failed to live up to her early commitments to represent all Koreans and to bridge the deep divisions between left and right in Korean society. She has also remained deeply isolated from the professional politicians and democratic polity she purports to lead. This is perhaps not so surprising given her authoritarian heritage and the experience of seeing both her parents assassinated in space of five years in the 1970s. The trauma of this experience reportedly made her distrustful of government officials and overly inclined to rely on the guidance of personal friends of dubious reliability, the font of her current troubles. There is also a profound irony that a politician who came to power vowing to place ‘trust-politik’ at the heart of her policy towards North Korea has seen her political position undermined, perhaps fatally, by a near complete collapse in public confidence in her administration.

More widely, the Park saga reveals an important and potentially seismic shift in public attitudes in South Korea, perhaps spurred by a growing populist trend evident elsewhere, whether in the US, Europe or parts of Southeast Asia. Koreans appear to have lost patience with their political system. This new climate of dissent – emboldened by the signs that protest can potentially lead to radical political change – is likely to prove a challenge to any future Korean leader hoping to secure the trust and legitimacy needed to govern.

To comment on this article, please contact Chatham House Feedback

What to Know About Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Election Expert comment sysadmin 27 March 2017

Tim Summers looks at what we know about Carrie Lam, the territory’s new leader, and where Hong Kong politics goes from here.

Carrie Lam, formerly number two in the Hong Kong government, was selected as the Special Administrative Region’s new chief executive on 26 March. What does the process and her selection say about Hong Kong’s political future?

1. Elections for Hong Kong’s top job are still within Beijing’s control. Due to the failure of political reform proposals in 2015, Lam was elected on the basis of 777 votes from the 1,194 members of the Chief Executive Election Committee. This ‘small-circle’ process was essentially the same as that used since 1997 (the only change being the expansion of the committee from its initial size of 800). The design of the process favours Beijing, and indeed Lam was the favoured candidate of the central government and many of its supporters in Hong Kong.
2. But the influence of the central government has limits. The second-ranked candidate, former finance minister John Tsang (365 votes), had not been encouraged to stand by Beijing, and a fourth candidate, Regina Ip (who did not obtain enough nominations to join the vote), reportedly also rejected suggestions from Beijing that she should not put herself forward. The Committee itself contained 325 individuals affiliated to or sympathetic to opposition parties and around 100 establishment figures who did not support Lam – most of whom voted for Tsang. Although Lam gained more votes than her predecessor, CY Leung, in 2012 (he obtained 689 votes after a controversial campaign when scandals undermined his main opponent), Beijing appears to have expended substantial political capital in securing her victory.
3. Despite the closed process, public opinion matters. The campaign saw all the candidates actively seek not only the votes of committee members, but also wider popular support. This highlights the need for broader legitimacy, and the fact that public participation and media debate are central factors in Hong Kong’s open political culture. A number of opinion polls showed Lam to have notably lower levels of popular support than Tsang. This will constrain her ability to govern effectively and she will not be cut much slack by the Hong Kong population. There were protests at the election venue calling for ‘genuine universal suffrage’.
4. The new chief executive is an economic interventionist. The two main candidates – Lam and Tsang – have different policy approaches. Tsang’s was a more liberal ‘laissez faire’ one. Lam is likely to continue the somewhat more interventionist approach of CY Leung, who intervened more than previous governments to try to stabilize property prices and make more land available for housing, as well as reinstating policies targeting poverty and agreeing measures to limit the social impact of rising numbers of visitors and money from mainland China.
5. Political reform seems very far off. The third candidate, former judge Woo Kwok-hing, had the clearest position on the thorny issue of political reform. Many of the government’s critics see less prospect for progress here under Lam, who fronted the government’s consultation processes during the 2013–15 debates over political reform. Lam gave some conflicting signals during the campaign, and it remains to be seen whether she tries to restart the process. But given rising populism, the growing fragmentation and polarization of Hong Kong politics, and entrenched positions from both Beijing and the opposition, it will be even more difficult to obtain consensus on a way forward than when the last failed attempt at reform took place – a key indicator will be whether all political parties are willing to discuss compromises.
6. July’s anniversary will be contentious. Following formal appointment by the central government, Lam’s term will begin on 1 July. This will also mark the 20th anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, which will coincide with a planned visit by President Xi Jinping. This will no doubt spark protests; for many, the 20th anniversary of the handover will therefore be less a time for celebration than an opportunity for many to highlight concerns about the future of the former British colony.

China Paves Its Way in New Areas of International Law Expert comment sysadmin 31 March 2017

China is looking to increase its capacity and influence in international legal matters – and it is particularly in frontier areas of the law that China is likely to take a proactive stance.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi called China a staunch defender and builder of the international rule of law in his speech to the UN General Assembly in October 2014. He promised that as China grew stronger, it would make a greater contribution to the maintenance and promotion of international rule of law, and would work with other countries to build a fairer and more reasonable international political and economic order.

For many in China, that time has now come: there is a sense that China deserves a much stronger and more respected voice in discussions surrounding the future of the international system. The recent speeches of Xi Jinping in Davos and Geneva in January 2017 suggest that China is now seizing the initiative and fighting for a voice and influence commensurate with its status and power as the number two economy in the world.

But there is an interesting divide in the areas in which China chooses to assert itself. In traditional areas of international law – such as the law of the sea and international human rights law – China continues to harbour reservations about the fairness of the existing international order. Its misgivings are fuelled by a perception that it did not play a significant part in the creation of the post-Second World War international order, and that those rules operate mainly in the interests of Western powers.

There is also a sense that traditional areas of international law do not offer a level playing field for China, since Western states have far more experience at operating in those. We know from Chinese experts that in the South China Sea case, one background issue that played into China’s refusal to engage in litigation with the Philippines and other interested states (which were represented by leading Western international lawyers) was a lack of experience before international courts and tribunals.

Contrast this with newer areas of international law– such as the regimes governing cyber, space, climate change and deep sea mining issues. In these areas, the rules are still in the process of being developed and tested, and the influence of the existing powers is not so firmly established or accepted, so there is more opportunity for China’s voice to be heard and heeded.

On climate change, China has become a champion of the Paris Agreement, which it worked hard with the Obama administration to secure. China is also active in some of the processes related to cyber rule-making, both as a member of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on cyber issues and through bilateral dialogues with a number of states. China has taken a keen interest in the regime applicable to the mining of the international seabed, making submissions to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea about the procedure for settling disputes. In international economic law, another relatively new area, China has been assiduously cultivating expertise, and is a major player in the negotiation of the ‘mega regional’ trade deal, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

In time, the development of China’s much heralded Belt and Road Initiative may provide an opportunity for China to be further involved in international norm-setting, through the creation of a system of economic and political interaction that is built and run more along Chinese determined lines. The emergence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may offer an early indicator of China’s attempts to shape global governance, although in this context China has so far scrupulously observed international standards and has made no open attempt to challenge them.

So far, China’s practical input to international norm-setting has been limited. While China is prone to making wide-ranging statements of principle, it finds it more challenging to engage in the nitty gritty of specific rule making. But as is clear from its membership of the WTO, China can adapt quickly. While initially it was a reluctant adherent to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, China is now adept at making active and effective use of its rules to promote China’s interests, including launching a legal challenge regarding the contested issue of its non-market economy status. Overall, there is strong leadership backing for a more activist approach to its engagement with the international legal system.

China sees international law as an important instrument in the “toolbox” of international diplomacy. It will increasingly be seeking to leverage international law to promote its own interests, particularly in newer areas, as it seeks to strengthen its wider soft power and influence.

Twenty Years After Hong Kong Handover, Does ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Still Work? Expert comment sysadmin 28 June 2017

This unique constitutional framework can endure – if Hong Kong society can reconcile its different visions of the future.

Twenty years after the handover of Hong Kong from British to Chinese sovereignty, the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement – the main aim of which was to guarantee the continuity of Hong Kong’s open society and way of life – can be said to have worked well. Street protests remain a regular feature of Hong Kong’s political culture. Freedom of information and expression are alive and well. Hong Kong retains its ‘capitalist way of life’, its legal system based on common law and independent judiciary, and its status as an international financial centre. As a result the city remains one of the most open economies across Asia, with robust institutions and transparency which are hard to find anywhere else in the region.

Yet the 79-day ‘occupy’ protests of autumn 2014 showed that something is not quite right in the city of Hong Kong.

The protests themselves had a number of causes. Partly they reflected socioeconomic concerns, especially the rise in income inequality and lack of affordable housing. These might have been dealt with to some extent by better governance over the years, but they are also a feature of many societies in the current phase of globalization – a case, perhaps, of too much ‘capitalist way of life’.

Politically, the desire expressed by many in 2014 was for a form of ‘genuine universal suffrage’ for the selection of Hong Kong’s chief executive which went beyond a provision of Hong Kong’s mini constitution, the Basic Law, that candidates should be put forward by a ‘nominating committee’. It was on this point that the possibility of constitutional reform foundered in 2015, leaving Hong Kong no further ahead in its ‘gradual progress’ towards democracy.

But this episode also brought to the surface the tension between different visions for Hong Kong’s future. In particular, many in Hong Kong are still uncomfortable with the ‘one country’ part of the deal, rejected by some (especially young people) in the ways that they conceptualize Hong Kong identity – according to one recent survey, as little as 3.1% of Hong Kong youths identify themselves as ‘Chinese’. These issues are likely to constrain political development for some time to come.

At their sharpest, some of these visions are for some form of self-determination, or even independence, for Hong Kong. This is not just anathema to the national authorities in Beijing, but contradicts a basic tenet of Hong Kong’s handover in 1997, the return to Chinese sovereignty. This is not just something on which Beijing will never compromise, but will seek to challenge.

It is this which explains the sense in Hong Kong that the central government has been looking to become politically more involved since 2014. But the challenge of influencing Hong Kong society is great, and other than strengthening relations with the establishment camp, Beijing has not been able to tighten its grip. If anything, the centre of gravity of Hong Kong politics has continued to drift away from Beijing, not towards it.

How this will play out remains to be seen. Some amelioration of social tensions could help. But the fundamental divergence in visions of Hong Kong’s future will not be resolved so easily.

Looking forward therefore, the key to the continued success of ‘one country, two systems’ lies in Hong Kong society. If mainstream acceptance of the compromises involved can return, then this unique constitutional framework can still work for years to come.

‘Hong Kong is now in the hands of its people – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now.’ Expert comment sysadmin 29 June 2017

Kerry Brown on ‘one country, two systems’, the UK’s diminishing influence and the territory’s future, 20 years after the handover.

1 July marks the 20th anniversary of the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China. Kerry Brown speaks with Jason Naselli about what the future holds for the territory.

How sustainable is the ‘one country, two systems’ framework? Will the arrangement last the full 50 years (until 2047) as originally envisioned?

It is questionable whether the arrangement that exists today was the one envisioned in 1997 when the handover happened. It was always a very abstract, flexible system, granting Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy, meaning it could maintain its capitalist system. Of course, in the lead up to 1997 all these things were broadly seen as being in Beijing’s interests to preserve.

But these days, the one thing that few said in 1997 has come to pass – the People’s Republic has maintained one-party rule as a political system, but become one of the world’s great economies. It has been so far a huge success.

Hong Kong therefore has diminished in importance over the years to the point that maintaining at least some semblance of one country, two systems is almost like an act of charity. It has been nibbled at, compromised and seems to grow weaker by the day. Most in Hong Kong would say there is a system: one country, one system. That’s the deal.

The central government’s deepening involvement in the territory’s politics is a subject of growing controversy in Hong Kong. Does the Chinese government need to alter its approach?

Not particularly. It doesn’t want to see Hong Kong fail as an economy. That doesn’t suit its interests at all. But nor does it want a truculent, disobedient polity that is meant to be part of its sovereign territory.

So it has increasingly set political parameters. Hong Kong can have its unique system – as long as it is obedient. And on the whole, that is the deal that all of the city’s chief executives until now have internally understood perfectly.

As part of the 1997 handover, the UK has ‘a continuing moral and political obligation’ to Hong Kong. How will this relationship play out as Brexit shifts Britain’s place in the world?

The Foreign Office offers a six-monthly report to Parliament, updating on how the handover deal is going. As the years go on, however, it becomes increasingly illusive how the UK has any real locus to say much about the situation on Hong Kong. It did say, rightly, that the detainment of one of the booksellers taken in in 2015 was a violation of the treaty because he was British. This was the strongest wording that has ever appeared from an official British source. But with dependence on creating a new kind of relationship with China now foremost in people’s minds because of Brexit and other economic pressures, it is not surprising that the priority increasingly lies elsewhere.

With direct management of Hong Kong gone, the UK was always going to be more and more irrelevant. That has happened. And in any case, relations with China have had to become more complex and multifaceted. Hong Kong was always the tail wagging the dog for the UK relations with China. Now there has been a rebalancing, the calculation always has to be how much unilaterally supporting Hong Kong will damage relations with Beijing. This has become an increasingly asymmetrical question: in a playoff, preserving links with Beijing will always prevail. That’s just the reality of the new world we are seeing come into being.

Hong Kong has played an important financial role for China over the past 20 years, but where will it fit as markets and financial institutions on the mainland mature?

It maintains is role as a major RMB hub, and as a finance centre. But it is surrounded by competition. Singapore, and Sydney, and other places in the region have RMB deals. Shanghai and Tianjin aspire to be portals for entry to the domestic Chinese market. Hong Kong every day has to think of new ways to maintain its relevance and beat back competition. So far, it has done well. But this is an issue it can never be complacent about.

What has been the most significant change in Hong Kong society since 1997?

The rising cultural and linguistic influence of the mainland on Hong Kong. Hong Kong has maintained its difference – but it has had to change. It is clear that Hong Kong is now in the hands of Hong Kongese – they cannot rely on others to stick up for them now. The culture, identity and future of the territory are in their hands. In that sense, they have autonomy.

China, Liu Xiaobo and the New Reality of Human Rights Expert comment sysadmin 18 July 2017

Liu Xiaobo, Chinese Nobel laureate and human rights campaigner, died on 13 July while serving an 11-year prison sentence for ‘subversion’. Steve Tsang tells Jason Naselli that the reaction to Liu’s death reflects the growing confidence of the Chinese government that it can ignore Western criticism.

What does the Communist Party’s handling of the case of Liu Xiaobo tell us about its approach to dissidents and freedom of speech in the Xi era?

What it tells us is the party is tightening control much more than before. The Liu Xiaobo case shows that the party is not comfortable with people asking for the constitution of the People’s Republic of China to be enforced. Charter 08, for which Liu Xiaobo was jailed, ultimately amounts to asking for the rights of Chinese citizens, as articulated in the constitution, to be fully implemented. That resulted in Liu Xiaobo being incarcerated.

But what is really important isn’t so much that the party is tightening its control – that is happening anyway. What is more important is that the party is not that worried about how the Liu Xiaobo case affects international opinion.

If that’s the case, what lessons should countries looking to trade with China but concerned about human rights abuses take from Liu’s case?

We haven’t seen any major Western country come out to strongly and clearly hold the Chinese government to account over Liu Xiaobo’s human rights situation. A few leading governments have asked for Liu Xiaobo’s widow to be allowed to choose to stay or leave China. But so far there is no indication of any government backing that up with anything concrete.

That is very weak support for human rights in China. And it reflects a new reality: of the unwillingness of leading democracies to challenge the Chinese government on human rights matters, and the confidence on the part of the Chinese government to simply ignore what the rest of the world may think about it.

Given that there has been much discussion of China taking a larger global leadership role in the wake of an inward political turn in the US, what are the implications of Liu’s case for China’s global standing?

The implications are really small. There is a stronger expectation and desire to see China playing a global role because Donald Trump has damaged the standing of the United States as a global leader. It is not because of something that the Chinese government has done; it’s because of Trump.

That wider context hasn’t changed. So the Chinese government’s calculation is that the negative international reaction to Liu Xiaobo’s death will blow over in a matter of days – at worst, a couple of weeks – and then things will get back to normal.

There is no serious reason to believe that the Chinese government is wrong in their calculation. At the moment, the major Western countries are focusing on the economic relationship, and doing what they have to do pro forma about human rights issues in China. No major Western government is going to say that they are going to reconsider a major trade deal with China because of how Liu Xiaobo or his family has been treated. The Chinese government knows that and they act accordingly.

Moving on from the international reaction, how does Liu’s situation resonate within China?

Most Chinese don’t even know who Liu Xiaobo is. Within China, you cannot even search Liu Xiaobo’s name, or any permutation of Liu Xiaobo’s name, or the English initials of Liu Xiaobo. Anything potentially about or related to Liu Xiaobo is being censored.

Some things still get through; the ingenuity of a lot of bloggers is infinite. But most Chinese don’t even know what happened to Liu Xiaobo, or if they do, they mostly see him as a shill of the Western world trying to infiltrate and destabilize China.

If Western governments won’t engage China over human rights, what implications does that have for the global treatment of human rights as China becomes a bigger global player?

You can ‘engage’ in the sense of raising the issue with the Chinese authorities, as indeed the UK government and the German government have done, for example. But they haven’t actually taken any concrete steps.

The type of engagement where Western governments would get the Chinese government to demonstrate that something concrete was being done to improve the human rights situation – that era has gone. It is not going to come back in the foreseeable future. And therefore, the situation in terms of human rights in China will not be improving in the foreseeable future.

But what is more significant is how the Chinese government is asserting itself and dealing with domestic and international challenges, including on human rights issues. For many other countries around the world, China is showing an example for how to deal with the West. They don’t see it as being negative; they see it in positive terms.

There are still more countries in the world that abuse human rights than respect human rights. Most of those governments are pleased to see what the Chinese government has done in terms of how it handles the West.

Artificial Intelligence Apps Risk Entrenching India’s Socio-economic Inequities Expert comment sysadmin 14 March 2018

Artificial intelligence applications will not be a panacea for addressing India’s grand challenges. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is high on the Indian government’s agenda. Some days ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Wadhwani Institute for Artificial Intelligence, reportedly India’s first research institute focused on AI solutions for social good. In the same week, Niti Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant argued that AI could potentially add $957 billion to the economy and outlined ways in which AI could be a ‘game changer’.

During his budget speech, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced that Niti Aayog would spearhead a national programme on AI; with the near doubling of the Digital India budget, the IT ministry also announced the setting up of four committees for AI-related research. An industrial policy for AI is also in the pipeline, expected to provide incentives to businesses for creating a globally competitive Indian AI industry.

Narratives on the emerging digital economy often suffer from technological determinism — assuming that the march of technological transformation has an inner logic, independent of social choice and capable of automatically delivering positive social change. However, technological trajectories can and must be steered by social choice and aligned with societal objectives. Modi’s address hit all the right notes, as he argued that the ‘road ahead for AI depends on and will be driven by human intentions’. Emphasising the need to direct AI technologies towards solutions for the poor, he called upon students and teachers to identify ‘the grand challenges facing India’ – to ‘Make AI in India and for India’.

To do so, will undoubtedly require substantial investments in R&D, digital infrastructure and education and re-skilling. But, two other critical issues must be simultaneously addressed: data bias and access to technology gains.

While computers have been mimicking human intelligence for some decades now, a massive increase in computational power and the quantity of available data are enabling a process of ‘machine learning.’ Instead of coding software with specific instructions to accomplish a set task, machine learning involves training an algorithm on large quantities of data to enable it to self-learn; refining and improving its results through multiple iterations of the same task. The quality of data sets used to train machines is thus a critical concern in building AI applications.

Much recent research shows that applications based on machine learning reflect existing social biases and prejudice. Such bias can occur if the data set the algorithm is trained on is unrepresentative of the reality it seeks to represent. If for example, a system is trained on photos of people that are predominantly white, it will have a harder time recognizing non-white people. This is what led a recent Google application to tag black people as gorillas.

Alternatively, bias can also occur if the data set itself reflects existing discriminatory or exclusionary practices. A recent study by ProPublica found for example that software that was being used to assess the risk of recidivism in criminals in the United States was twice as likely to mistakenly flag black defendants as being at higher risk of committing future crimes.

The impact of such data bias can be seriously damaging in India, particularly at a time of growing social fragmentation. It can contribute to the entrenchment of social bias and discriminatory practices, while rendering both invisible and pervasive the processes through which discrimination occurs. Women are 34 per cent less likely to own a mobile phone than men – manifested in only 14 per cent of women in rural India owning a mobile phone, while only 30 per cent of India’s internet users are women.

Women’s participation in the labour force, currently at around 27 per cent, is also declining, and is one of the lowest in South Asia. Data sets used for machine learning are thus likely to have a marked gender bias. The same observations are likely to hold true for other marginalized groups as well.

Accorded to a 2014 report, Muslims, Dalits and tribals make up 53 per cent of all prisoners in India; National Crime Records Bureau data from 2016 shows in some states, the percentage of Muslims in the incarcerated population was almost three times the percentage of Muslims in the overall population. If AI applications for law and order are built on this data, it is not unlikely that it will be prejudiced against these groups.

(It is worth pointing out that the recently set-up national AI task force is comprised of mostly Hindu men – only two women are on the task force, and no Muslims or Christians. A recent article in the New York Times talked about AI’s ‘white guy problem’; will India suffer from a ‘Hindu male bias’?)

Yet, improving the quality, or diversity, of data sets may not be able to solve the problem. The processes of machine learning and reasoning involve a quagmire of mathematical functions, variables and permutations, the logic of which are not readily traceable or predictable. The dazzle of AI-enabled efficiency gains must not blind us to the fact that while AI systems are being integrated into key socio-economic systems, their accuracy and logic of reasoning have not been fully understood or studied.

The other big challenge stems from the distribution of AI-led technology gains. Even if estimates of AI contribution to GDP are correct, the adoption of these technologies is likely to be in niches within the organized sector. These industries are likely to be capital- rather than labour-intensive, and thus unlikely to contribute to large-scale job creation.

At the same time, AI applications can most readily replace low- to medium-skilled jobs within the organized sector. This is already being witnessed in the outsourcing sector – where basic call and chat tasks are now automated. Re-skilling will be important, but it is unlikely that those who lose their jobs will also be those who are being re-skilled – the long arch of technological change and societal adaptation is longer than that of people’s lives. The contractualization of work, already on the rise, is likely to further increase as large industries prefer to have a flexible workforce to adapt to technological change. A shift from formal employment to contractual work can imply a loss of access to formal social protection mechanisms, increasing the precariousness of work for workers.

The adoption of AI technologies is also unlikely in the short- to medium-term in the unorganized sector, which engages more than 80 per cent of India’s labor force. The cost of developing and deploying AI applications, particularly in relation to the cost of labour, will inhibit adoption. Moreover, most enterprises within the unorganized sector still have limited access to basic, older technologies – two-thirds of the workforce are employed in enterprises without electricity. Eco-system upgrades will be important but incremental. Given the high costs of developing AI-based applications, most start-ups are unlikely to be working towards creating bottom-of-the-pyramid solutions.

Access to AI-led technology gains is thus likely to be heavily differentiated – a few high-growth industries can be expected, but these will not necessarily result in the welfare of labour. Studies show that labour share of national income, especially routine labour, has been declining steadily across developing countries.

We should be clear that new technological applications themselves are not going to transform or disrupt this trend – rather, without adequate policy steering, these trends will be exacerbated.

Policy debates about AI applications in India need to take these two issues seriously. AI applications will not be a panacea for addressing ‘India’s grand challenges’. Data bias and unequal access to technology gains will entrench existing socio-economic fissures, even making them technologically binding.

In addition to developing AI applications and creating a skilled workforce, the government needs to prioritize research that examines the complex social, ethical and governance challenges associated with the spread of AI-driven technologies. Blind technological optimism might entrench rather than alleviate the grand Indian challenge of inequity and growth.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.