The goal of clinical proteomics is to identify, quantify, and characterize proteins in body fluids or tissue to assist diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of patients. In this way, it is similar to more mature omics technologies, such as genomics, that are increasingly applied in biomedicine. We argue that, similar to those fields, proteomics also faces ethical issues related to the kinds of information that is inherently obtained through sample measurement, although their acquisition was not the primary purpose. Specifically, we demonstrate the potential to identify individuals both by their characteristic, individual-specific protein levels and by variant peptides reporting on coding single nucleotide polymorphisms. Furthermore, it is in the nature of blood plasma proteomics profiling that it broadly reports on the health status of an individual – beyond the disease under investigation. Finally, we show that private and potentially sensitive information, such as ethnicity and pregnancy status, can increasingly be derived from proteomics data. Although this is potentially valuable not only to the individual, but also for biomedical research, it raises ethical questions similar to the incidental findings obtained through other omics technologies. We here introduce the necessity of - and argue for the desirability for - ethical and human rights-related issues to be discussed within the proteomics community. Those thoughts are more fully developed in our accompanying manuscript. Appreciation and discussion of ethical aspects of proteomic research will allow for deeper, better-informed, more diverse, and, most importantly, wiser guidelines for clinical proteomics.

To identify novel autoantibodies of Takayasu arteritis (TAK) using HuProt array-based approach. A two-phase approach was adopted. In Phase I, serum samples collected from 40 TAK patients, 15 autoimmune disease patients, and 20 healthy subjects were screened to identify TAK-specific autoantibodies using human protein (HuProt) arrays. In Phase II, the identified candidate autoantibodies were validated with TAK-focused arrays using an additional cohort comprised of 109 TAK patients, 110 autoimmune disease patients, and 96 healthy subjects. Subsequently, the TAK-specific autoantibodies validated in Phase II were further confirmed using Western blot analysis. We identified and validated eight autoantibodies as potential TAK-specific diagnostic biomarkers, including anti-SPATA7, -QDPR, -SLC25A2, -PRH2, -DIXDC1, -IL17RB, -ZFAND4, and -NOLC1 antibodies, with AUC of 0.803, 0.801, 0.780, 0.696, 0.695, 0.678, 0.635 and 0.613, respectively. SPATA7 could distinguish TAK from healthy and disease controls with 73.4% sensitivity at 85.4% specificity, while QDPR showed 71.6% sensitivity at 86.4% specificity. SLC25A22 showed the highest sensitivity of 80.7%, but at lower specificity of 67.0%. In addition, PRH2, IL17RB and NOLC1 showed good specificities of 88.3%, 85.9% and 86.9%, respectively, but at lower sensitivities (<50%). Finally, DIXDC1 and ZFAND4 showed moderate performance as compared with the other autoantibodies. Using a decision tree model, we could reach a specificity of 94.2% with AUC of 0.843, a significantly improved performance as compared to that by each individual biomarker. The performance of three autoantibodies, namely anti-SPATA7, -QDPR and -PRH2, were successfully confirmed with Western blot analysis. Using this two-phase strategy, we identified and validated eight novel autoantibodies as TAK–specific biomarker candidates, three of which could be readily adopted in a clinical setting.

Urinary proteomics studies have primarily focused on identifying markers of chronic kidney disease (CKD) progression. Here, we aimed to determine urinary markers of CKD renal parenchymal injury through proteomics analysis in animal kidney tissues and cells and in the urine of patients with CKD. Label-free quantitative proteomics analysis based on liquid chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry was performed on urine samples obtained from 6 normal controls and 9, 11, and 10 patients with CKD stages 1, 3, and 5, respectively, and on kidney tissue samples from a rat CKD model by 5/6 nephrectomy. Tandem mass tag-based quantitative proteomics analysis was performed for primary cultured glomerular endothelial cells (GECs) and proximal tubular epithelial cells (PTECs) before and after inducing 24-h hypoxia injury. Upon hierarchical clustering, out of 858 differentially expressed proteins (DEPs) in the urine of CKD patients, the levels of 416 decreased and 403 increased sequentially according to the disease stage, respectively. Among 2965 DEPs across 5/6 nephrectomized and sham-operated rat kidney tissues, 86 DEPs showed same expression patterns in the urine and kidney tissue. After cross-validation with two external animal proteome datasets, 38 DEPs were organized; only 10 DEPs, including serotransferrin, gelsolin, poly ADP-ribose polymerase 1, neuroblast differentiation-associated protein AHNAK, microtubule-associated protein 4, galectin-1, protein S, thymosin beta-4, myristoylated alanine-rich C-kinase substrate, and vimentin were finalized by screening human GECs and PTECs data. Among these ten potential candidates for universal CKD marker, validation analyses for protein S and galectin-1 were conducted. Galectin-1 was observed to have a significant inverse correlation with renal function as well as higher expression in glomerulus with chronic injury than protein S. This constitutes the first multi-sample proteomics study for identifying key renal-expressed proteins associated with CKD progression. The discovered proteins represent potential markers of chronic renal cell and tissue damage and candidate contributors to CKD pathophysiology.

Sporozoites are a motile form of malaria-causing Plasmodium falciparum parasites that migrate from the site of transmission in the dermis through the bloodstream to invade hepatocytes. Sporozoites interact with many cells within the host, but the molecular identity of these interactions and their role in the pathology of malaria is poorly understood. Parasite proteins that are secreted and embedded within membranes are known to be important for these interactions, but our understanding of how they interact with each other to form functional complexes is largely unknown. Here, we compile a library of recombinant proteins representing the repertoire of cell surface and secreted proteins from the P. falciparum sporozoite and use an assay designed to detect extracellular interactions to systematically identify complexes. We identify three protein complexes including an interaction between two components of the p24 complex that is involved in the trafficking of glycosylphosphatidylinositol (GPI)-anchored proteins through the secretory pathway. Plasmodium parasites lacking either gene are strongly inhibited in the establishment of liver stage infections. These findings reveal an important role for the p24 complex in malaria pathogenesis and show that the library of recombinant proteins represents a valuable resource to investigate P. falciparum sporozoite biology.

Deep proteome coverage in bottom-up proteomics requires peptide-level fractionation to simplify the complex peptide mixture before analysis by tandem mass spectrometry. By decreasing the number of co-eluting precursor peptide ions, fractionation effectively reduces the complexity of the sample leading to higher sample coverage and reduced bias towards high abundance precursors that are preferentially identified in data-dependent acquisition strategies. To achieve this goal, we report a bead-based off-line peptide fractionation method termed CIF or Carboxylate modified magnetic bead-based isopropanol gradient peptide fractionation. CIF is an extension of the SP3 (single-pot solid-phase-enhanced sample preparation) strategy and provides an effective but complementary approach to other commonly used fractionation methods including strong cation exchange (SCX) and reversed phase (RP)-based chromatography. We demonstrate that CIF is an effective offline separation strategy capable of increasing the depth of peptide analyte coverage both when used alone or as a second dimension of peptide fractionation in conjunction with high pH RP. These features make it ideally suited for a wide range of proteomic applications including the affinity purification of low abundance bait proteins.

Data independent acquisition (DIA) is now an emerging method in bottom-up proteomics and capable of achieving deep proteome coverage and accurate label-free quantification. However, for post-translational modifications (PTM), such as glycosylation, DIA methodology is still in the early stage of development. The full characterization of glycoproteins requires site specific glycan identification as well as subsequent quantification of glycan structures at each site. The tremendous complexity of glycosylation represents a significant analytical challenge in glycoproteomics. This review focuses on the development and perspectives of DIA methodology for N- and O- glycoproteomics and posits that DIA-based glycoproteomics could be a method of choice to address some of the challenging aspects of glycoproteomics. First, the current challenges in glycoproteomics and the basic principles of DIA is briefly introduced. DIA based glycoproteomics is then summarized and described into four aspects based on the actual samples. Lastly, we discussed the important challenges and future perspectives in the field. We believe that DIA can significantly facilitate glycoproteomic studies and contribute to the development of future advanced tools and approaches in the field of glycoproteomics.

The F-box protein MORE AXILLARY GROWTH 2 (MAX2) is a central component in the signaling cascade of strigolactones (SLs) as well as of the smoke derived karrikins (KARs) and the so far unknown endogenous KAI2 ligand (KL). The two groups of molecules are involved in overlapping and unique developmental processes, and signal-specific outcomes are attributed to perception by the paralogous α/β-hydrolases DWARF14 (D14) for SL and KARRIKIN INSENSITIVE 2/ HYPOSENSITIVE TO LIGHT (KAI2/HTL) for KAR/KL. Additionally, depending on which receptor is activated, specific members of the SUPPRESSOR OF MAX2 1 (SMAX1) – LIKE (SMXL) family control KAR/KL and SL responses. As proteins that function in the same signal transduction pathway often occur in large protein complexes, we aimed at discovering new players of the MAX2, D14 and KAI2 protein network by tandem affinity purification using Arabidopsis cell cultures. When using MAX2 as a bait, various proteins were co-purified among which general components of the Skp1-Cullin-F-box complex and members of the CONSTITUTIVE PHOTOMORPHOGENIC 9 signalosome. Here, we report the identification of a novel interactor of MAX2, a type 5 serine/threonine protein phosphatase, designated PHYTOCHROME-ASSOCIATED PROTEIN PHOSPHATASE 5 (PAPP5). Quantitative affinity purification pointed at PAPP5 as being more present in KAI2 rather than D14 protein complexes. In agreement, mutant analysis suggests that PAPP5 modulates KAR/KL-dependent seed germination in suboptimal conditions and seedling development. Additionally, a phosphopeptide enrichment experiment revealed that PAPP5 might dephosphorylate MAX2 in vivo independently of the synthetic strigolactone analog, rac-GR24. Together, by analyzing the protein complexes to which MAX2, D14 and KAI2 belong, we revealed a new MAX2 interactor, PAPP5, that might act through dephosphorylation of MAX2 to control mainly KAR/KL- related phenotypes and, hence, provide another link with the light pathway.

Cells continually degrade and replace damaged proteins. However, the high energetic demand of protein turnover generates reactive oxygen species (ROS) that compromise the long-term health of the proteome. Thus, the relationship between aging, protein turnover and energetic demand remains unclear. Here, we used a proteomic approach to measure rates of protein turnover within primary fibroblasts isolated from a number of species with diverse lifespans including the longest-lived mammal, the bowhead whale. We show that organismal lifespan is negatively correlated with turnover rates of highly abundant proteins. In comparison to mice, cells from long-lived naked mole rats have slower rates of protein turnover, lower levels of ATP production and reduced ROS levels. Despite having slower rates of protein turnover, naked mole rat cells tolerate protein misfolding stress more effectively than mouse cells. We suggest that in lieu of rapid constitutive turnover, long-lived species may have evolved more energetically efficient mechanisms for selective detection and clearance of damaged proteins.

High performance liquid chromatography has been employed for decades to enhance detection sensitivity and quantification of complex analytes within biological mixtures. Among these analytes, glycans released from glycoproteins and glycolipids have been characterized as underivatized or fluorescently tagged derivatives by HPLC coupled to various detection methods. These approaches have proven extremely useful for profiling the structural diversity of glycoprotein and glycolipid glycosylation but require the availability of glycan standards and secondary orthogonal degradation strategies to validate structural assignments. A robust method for HPLC separation of glycans as their permethylated derivatives, coupled with in-line MSn fragmentation to assign structural features independent of standards, would significantly enhance the depth of knowledge obtainable from biological samples. Here, we report an optimized workflow for LC-MS analysis of permethylated glycans that includes sample preparation, mobile phase optimization, and MSn method development to resolve structural isomers on-the-fly. We report baseline separation and MSn fragmentation of isomeric N- and O-glycan structures, aided by supplementing mobile phases with Li+, which simplifies adduct heterogeneity and facilitates cross-ring fragmentation to obtain valuable monosaccharide linkage information. Our workflow has been adapted from standard proteomics-based workflows and, therefore, provides opportunities for laboratories with expertise in proteomics to acquire glycomic data with minimal deviation from existing buffer systems, chromatography media, and instrument configurations. Furthermore, our workflow does not require a mass spectrometer with high-resolution/accurate mass capabilities. The rapidly evolving appreciation of the biological significance of glycans for human health and disease requires the implementation of high-throughput methods to identify and quantify glycans harvested from sample sets of sufficient size to achieve appropriately powered statistical significance. The LC-MSn approach we report generates glycan isomeric separations, robust structural characterization, and is amenable to auto-sampling with associated throughput enhancements.

Alpha-1-acid glycoprotein (AGP) is an acute phase glycoprotein in blood, which is primarily synthetized in the liver and whose biological role is not completely understood. It consists of 45% carbohydrates that are present in the form of five N-linked complex glycans. AGP N-glycosylation was shown to be changed in many different diseases and some changes appear to be disease-specific, thus it has a great diagnostic and prognostic potential. However, AGP glycosylation was mainly analyzed in small cohorts and without detailed site-specific glycan information. Here, we developed a cost-effective method for a high-throughput and site-specific N-glycosylation LC-MS analysis of AGP which can be applied on large cohorts, aid in search for novel disease biomarkers and enable better understanding of AGP’s role and function in health and disease. The method does not require isolation of AGP with antibodies and affinity chromatography, but AGP is enriched by acid precipitation from 5 μl of bloodplasma in a 96 well format. After trypsinization, AGP glycopeptides are purified using a hydrophilic interaction chromatography based solid-phase extraction and analyzed by RP-LC-ESI-MS. We used our method to show for the first time that AGP N-glycan profile is stable in healthy individuals (14 individuals in 3 time points), which is a requirement for evaluation of its diagnostic potential. Furthermore, we tested our method on a population including individuals with registered hyperglycemia in critical illness (59 cases and 49 controls), which represents a significantly increased risk of developing type 2 diabetes. Individuals at higher risk of diabetes presented increased N-glycan branching on AGP’s second glycosylation site and lower sialylation of N-glycans on AGP’s third and AGP1’s fourth glycosylation site. Although this should be confirmed on a larger prospective cohort, it indicates that site-specific AGP N-glycan profile could help distinguish individuals who are at risk of type 2 diabetes.

Giardia lamblia (G. lamblia) disease is a zoonosis with a-infection rate affecting the general population of the world. Despite the constant possibility of damage due to their own metabolism, G. lamblia have survived and evolved to adapt to various environments. However, research on energy-metabolism conversion in G. lamblia is limited. This study aimed to reveal the dynamic metabolism-conversion mechanism in G. lamblia under sugar starvation by detecting global lysine acetylation and 2-hydroxyisobutyrylation sites combined with quantitative proteome analyses. A total of 2999 acetylation sites on 956 proteins and 8877 2-hydroxyisobutyryl sites on 1546 proteins were quantified under sugar starvation. Integrated Kac and Khib data revealed that modified proteins were associated with arginine biosynthesis, glycolysis/gluconeogenesis, and alanine, aspartate, and glutamate metabolism. These findings suggested that lysine acetylation and 2-hydroxyisobutyrylation were ubiquitous and provided deep insight into the metabolism-conversion mechanism in G. lamblia under sugar starvation. Overall, these results can help understand the biology of G. lamblia infections and reveal the evolution rule from prokaryote to eukaryote.

Recent advances in MS-based proteomics have vastly increased the quality and scope of biological information that can be derived from human samples. These advances have rendered current workflows increasingly applicable in biomedical and clinical contexts. As proteomics is poised to take an important role in the clinic, associated ethical responsibilities increase in tandem with the impact on the health, privacy, and well-being of individuals. Here we conducted and report a systematic literature review of ethical issues in clinical proteomics. We add our perspectives from a background of bioethics, the results of our accompanying paper extracting individual-sensitive results from patient samples, and the literature addressing similar issues in genomics. The spectrum of potential issues ranges from patient re-identification to incidental findings of clinical significance. The latter can be divided into actionable and unactionable findings. Some of these have the potential to be employed in discriminatory or privacy-infringing ways. However, incidental findings may also have great positive potential. A plasma proteome profile, for instance, could inform on the general health or disease status of an individual regardless of the narrow diagnostic question that prompted it. We suggest that early discussion of ethical issues in clinical proteomics is important to ensure that eventual regulations reflect the considered judgment of the community as well as to anticipate opportunities and problems that may arise as the technology matures further.

Nuclear Disarmament and the Protection of Cultural Heritage Research paper sysadmin 6 October 2017

States possessing nuclear weapons should be called upon to consider and publish the risks posed to cultural heritage, and their mitigation strategies, in their nuclear-weapons doctrines and policies.

Summary

• Renewed risk assessments for nuclear weapons and policies are taking place around the world in light of nuclear modernization and the changing geostrategic environment that is making the use of nuclear weapons more likely. As such the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons and tests have received increased attention. However, the effect on cultural heritage has so far been neglected.
• The potential for armed conflict to destroy cultural heritage has been recognized in international law since 1954. There is significant evidence on the impact of nuclear weapons on cultural heritage including the consequences of their use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the effect of nuclear-testing programmes in places of cultural significance since 1945. States that possess nuclear weapons have increased liabilities and responsibilities to protect cultural heritage and cultural rights. The need to protect cultural heritage should strengthen the case for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.
• Failure to take into account the protection of heritage in the development of nuclear weapons policies – including disarmament, non-proliferation and arms-control negotiations – significantly undermines states’ existing commitments to protecting heritage threatened by conflict.
• Risk assessments of the impact of nuclear weapons on cultural heritage and important cultural artefacts – and methods of preventing such catastrophic damage – should be part of protecting cultural heritage in every country and the subject of informed public debate. A new body of knowledge on the full range of nuclear weapons impacts would introduce a fresh perspective to inform decision-makers, international organizations and the public in thinking about nuclear weapons policies and practices.
• Risk and resilience frameworks, which provide sets of solutions for risk assessments, would allow assessments of nuclear weapons threats to heritage and highlight vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Such frameworks would provide a basis for policymakers to identify the world’s cultural heritage most at risk and help develop mitigation strategies to ensure that it is protected. In particular, states possessing nuclear weapons should be called upon to consider and publish the risks posed to cultural heritage, and their mitigation strategies, in their nuclear weapons doctrines and policies, as a contribution to transparency and confidence-building, and as a responsibility to the world’s shared heritage. International organizations, such as the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), have a role to play in bridging security perspectives with protecting cultural heritage.

Gender-smart Procurement: Policies for Driving Change Research paper sysadmin 14 December 2017

Governments should use public procurement policy as a strategic lever to accelerate gender-inclusive economic growth through the application of state spending power.

• Governments need to rethink public procurement policy. They need to use it as a strategic lever to accelerate gender-inclusive economic growth through the application of state spending power, while maintaining rigorous governance standards. Reform of public procurement to make it more gender-inclusive could create a ‘diversity dividend’ through increased job creation and economic growth. Gender-smart procurement policies could also mitigate economic and business risk by rendering supply chains more diverse.
• In 2014, G20 members agreed to reduce the gender gap in the labour market by 25 per cent by 2025. Procurement policy is one of the most powerful tools governments have to achieve this goal. All G20 members, regardless of the differences in their legal frameworks, can implement measures that will increase the ability of women to benefit from procurement policy.
• Public procurement accounts for around one-fifth of global gross domestic product (GDP). It is estimated that women entrepreneurs supply only 1 per cent of this market. Women’s businesses face considerable barriers to accessing procurement tenders and winning procurement contracts. The inadequate design of many procurement processes prevents more inclusive gender outcomes for citizens. Governments should redefine procurement policies to make explicit the requirement that increasing women’s workforce participation, through greater use of female suppliers, is a key objective when selecting bids for procurement contracts.
• Through the use of policy and spending levers, governments can play four primary roles in encouraging procurement from enterprises owned by women, or from businesses committed to promoting female labour participation. These roles are:
  - To direct reforms of government procurement – reviewing procurement policies and practices to ensure sustainable and inclusive procurement;
  - To reduce barriers to women’s participation in the economy – creating the support mechanisms to ensure an environment in which businesses owned by women can flourish;
  - To help scale up gender-smart procurement in the private sector – expanding government’s role in encouraging private companies to spend more of their procurement budgets with women’s businesses; and
  - To encourage increased transparency on the issues – creating and sharing procurement databases and lessons learned, especially at the regional level.
• Companies can also benefit from having more diverse supply chains and volunteering for accreditation schemes. They can start conversations with government about national regulation that encourages diversity in procurement, leading by example.
• The G20 should set measurable and time-bound targets in the area of gender-smart procurement, to build on the momentum of UN reforms and incorporate good practice in supply chain management.

Prices, Products and Priorities: Meeting Refugees’ Energy Needs in Burkina Faso and Kenya Other resource sysadmin 24 January 2018

As the number of displaced people increases, and aid budgets come under further pressure, the imperative to identify cost-effective and sustainable solutions for delivering energy to refugees is more pressing than ever.

This paper examines the issue of energy and displacement in detail, using insights from refugees in camps in Burkina Faso and Kenya. It seeks to promote a better understanding of their energy needs, priorities and preferences, and explores how increased access to energy might help to achieve lasting impact in the two camps surveyed. The paper is based on primary research from the Goudoubo camp in Burkina Faso and the Kakuma I camp in Kenya, but the analysis and conclusions are pertinent in the wider context of camps for forcibly displaced people.

Summary points

• There is a low level of energy access in the refugee camps of Kakuma I and Goudoubo, which contributes to poverty and hampers relief and development efforts. Trying to meet basic cooking, lighting and phone-charging needs is costly for refugees, consuming a significant share of stretched monthly budgets.
• The predominant cooking solution consists of basic improved cookstoves burning wood and charcoal. The ‘three-stone fire’ method also remains commonplace. Three out of five families in Kakuma I report health problems due to smoke from cookstoves.
• Street lighting is a high priority for residents, due to concerns about security and safety in camps. In Goudoubo, 86 per cent of survey respondents said that more household members would go out after dark if there were better public lighting.
• A significant proportion of refugees would pay for cleaner and more efficient energy technologies, but many lack the financial resources required, and the development of markets for such products remains partially contingent on sustained financial support.
• There is a need for a diversity of energy technologies that give varying levels and qualities of service; a ‘one size fits all’ approach is inappropriate if universal access to sustainable energy is to be achieved.
• Clean cookstoves and fuels (LPG, ethanol, biogas, etc.) are in high demand, but require much greater investment if they are to be introduced at scale. Solid biomass and improved cookstoves will continue to be important cooking solutions in Kakuma I and Goudoubo, as well as in other refugee camps. A shift to more efficient cooking can be achieved at little or no extra cost for the significant proportion of people who still cook on three-stone fires.
• Users of quality-verified household solar products spend dramatically less on light and power than do people using inferior technologies. Strong brand recognition and a high willingness to pay indicate a large market and a significant opportunity for the solar private sector.
• Centralized electricity supply solutions – mini-grids or grid connections – are more economic than multiple standalone diesel generators. The current piecemeal and ad hoc approach, with each facility managing its own power supply, is inherently wasteful. Greater coordination among humanitarian clusters is required so that centralized solutions can be assessed, designed, financed and implemented.
• Collecting data on energy expenditure and use, as well as quantification of the wide ranging impacts of improved technologies, is necessary to build a compelling case for investment in electricity infrastructure. In addition, engaging refugees on their needs, preferences and willingness to pay can improve the sustainability and impact of energy interventions.
• Private-sector and market development approaches offer long-term, cost-effective solutions for refugees and can also benefit host communities. As the number of displaced people in the world increases, and as aid budgets come under further pressure, the imperative to identify cost-effective and sustainable solutions is more pressing than ever.

Chatham House is a part of the Moving Energy Initiative, a consortium working towards clean energy for refugees. For more information visit movingenergy.earth

Drones and the European Union: Prospects for a Common Future Research paper sysadmin 30 January 2018

The debate over the use of drones is an opportunity for states to identify elements of military practice that their publics find uncomfortable or troubling, and to explain these areas of military operations in context.

Summary

• The debate over the use of drones is an opportunity for states to identify elements of military practice that their publics find uncomfortable or troubling, and to explain these areas of military operations in context.
• Countries would benefit from working together to identify accountability gaps arising from fundamental elements of military cooperation, including the role of intelligence transfers in joint operations, and the distribution of responsibility for lethal actions in the context of coalition operations.
• Transparency in investigation procedures, as well as devoting sufficient resources towards ensuring that mistakes are identified, will improve the perception of drone use among domestic audiences.
• Identifying and communicating common standards and practices of mitigating complicity should be a priority for countries to ensure that they do not unwittingly become complicit in unlawful lethal operations.
• Although operational safety may hinder the ability of states to be completely transparent, understanding among the general public could be improved through the communication of policies and procedures regarding non-lethal assistance to partner states conducting lethal operations, both inside and outside the context of an armed conflict.

Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness Research paper sysadmin 9 April 2018

As Libya’s war economy persists, prospects for the restoration of functioning central governance become more distant.

Summary

• Libya suffers from interlinked political, security and economic crises that are weakening state institutions, damaging its economy and facilitating the continued existence of non-state armed groups. As rival authorities continue to compete for power, the resulting fragmentation and dysfunction have provided a fertile environment for the development of a pervasive war economy dependent on violence.
• This war economy is dynamic and constantly in flux. Relative to earlier problems, there were signs of progress on several fronts in 2017: a reduction in human smuggling, a tripling in oil revenues, and increased local action against fuel smuggling. Yet the dynamics that have supported the war economy’s rise remain.
• Libya’s war economy is highly damaging for the future of the state for three reasons:
  • First, it provides an enabling environment for networks of armed groups, criminal networks, corrupt businessmen and political elites to sustain their activities through illicit sales and predatory practices. Their operations are closely linked to the dispensation of violence, and are thus a spur for further conflict.
  • Second, the war economy perpetuates negative incentives for those who profit from the state’s dysfunction. Only effective governance, supported by a durable political settlement, can tackle the foundations of Libya’s war economy. But neither a return to functioning central governance nor the development of a security sector that is fit for purpose is in the interests of war economy profiteers, who are therefore motivated to act as powerful spoilers of reform.
  • Third, the political contestation and resource predation practised by those engaged in the war economy are having a disastrous impact on Libya’s formal economy, undermining what remains of its institutions. As the war economy persists, therefore, the prospects for the restoration of functioning central governance become more distant. This threatens to create a vicious cycle that accelerates further state collapse.
• Due to the limited capacity for coercion available to any actor or entity connected with the state, a strategy of co-opting networks of war economy profiteers has almost exclusively prevailed. This has failed. Drawing on the lessons from these attempts, a more successful policy must pursue targeted measures to combat the enabling structures of Libya’s war economy where possible, and to co-opt war economy profiteers only where necessary.
• In this, state authorities can do more to utilize what power they have to name and shame war economy profiteers in order to weaken the local legitimacy critical to profiteers’ survival. The state must present credible alternative livelihood opportunities to those engaged in, or benefiting from, the war economy. Progress will depend in part on the creation of positive incentives to abandon such activity. Where profiteers cannot be incentivized to move towards more legitimate economic activities, greater and more effective efforts must be made to reduce the profit margins of illicit schemes.
• The international community can do more to support Libyan efforts in countering the war economy. Cooperation over the targeting of criminal groups’ overseas assets, support for increased transparency over the dispensation of state funds, and measures to reduce the viability of illicit activities can all help to strengthen the position of state authorities.

Further reading

Discover the six things you need to know about Libya’s war economy

Exploring Transatlantic Responses to Far-right Populism in Europe: Simulation Exercise Research paper sysadmin 1 May 2018

A new paper summarizes the findings of a recent simulation exercise exploring how governments on both sides of the Atlantic might respond to a descent towards populist authoritarianism in an EU member state.

Summary

• To better understand how governments on both sides of the Atlantic might respond to a descent towards populist authoritarianism in an EU member state, Chatham House organized a simulation event involving a group of experts drawn from the public sector, academia and NGOs.
• Simulation exercises enable the testing and modelling of the responses of different actors when presented with specific situations; participants’ interactions in a given set of circumstances are explored, and patterns of negotiation are captured and analysed.
• In this simulation, European, US and multilateral representatives were given the task of managing relations with Baltia, a fictional Eastern European state on the verge of electing a far-right nationalist, Eurosceptic government. They were then challenged to manage their relationship with Baltia after it had elected such a government, which was pushing for a ‘leave’ vote in a planned referendum on the country’s continued EU membership.
• The simulation highlighted a number of issues:
  • Limited instruments are available to liberal democratic governments where there is cause for concern regarding the outcome of an election in an allied country. There are relatively few tools at the disposal of governments to support political allies, or to prevent outcomes that are perceived as threatening democratic norms. The simulation reinforced the view that interventionist moves, either from the European Commission or from individual national governments, would be more likely to come in response to an unfavourable development rather than pre-emptively.
  • The EU, and caucuses of European states, are the main international interlocutors in this type of political crisis involving an EU member state. The US opted to play a limited role in the negotiations; the same was largely true for NATO, aside from its action in sharing intelligence about a potential coup in Baltia. France and Germany formed a natural working partnership, taking meetings together and coordinating policies first before discussing them with a wider European circle, although their positions did not always align.
  • The UK’s capacity to shape the outcome of collective EU discussions appeared more restricted, while Brexit also seemed to shape the response of other EU states to the developing situation in Baltia. Although member states were undoubtedly reluctant to see another country go down this route, they were also resolute in demonstrating a unity of approach and limited flexibility in the face of the new populist government’s attempt to divide them.

China's Regions in an Era of Globalization Book sysadmin 14 May 2018

The rise of China has been shaped and driven by its engagement with the global economy. This engagement cannot be understood at the level of national policymaking alone, but requires analysis of the differences in participation in the global economy across China’s regions.

China is a continent-sized economy and society with substantial diversity across its different regions. This book traces the evolution of regional policy in China and its implications in a global context.

Detailed chapters examine the trajectory of what is now becoming known as the Greater Bay Area in southern China, the inland mega-city of Chongqing, and the role of China’s regions in the globally focused Belt and Road Initiative launched by the Chinese government in late 2013.

It will be of interest to practitioners and scholars engaging with contemporary China’s political economy and international relations.

This book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for China’s Regions in an Era of Globalization

About the author

Tim Summers works on the political economy and international relations of contemporary China. He is a Lecturer at the Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a (non-resident) Senior Consulting Fellow on the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House. He was British consul general in Chongqing from 2004 to 2007.

This book is published in collaboration with Routledge.

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Dance of the Trillions: Developing Countries and Global Finance Book sysadmin 6 July 2018

David Lubin tells the story of what makes money flow from high-income countries to lower-income ones; what makes it flow out again; and how developing countries have sought protection against the volatility of international capital flows.

Selected by the Financial Times as one of the best economics books of 2018, Dance of the Trillions traces an arc from the 1970s, when developing countries first gained access to international financial markets, to the present day.

Underlying this story is a discussion of how the relationship between developing countries and global finance appears to be moving from one governed by the ‘Washington Consensus’ to one more likely to be shaped by Beijing.

This book is part of the Insights series.

Praise for Dance of the Trillions

About the author

David Lubin is managing director and head of emerging markets economics at Citi, an American bank, where he is responsible for a team of more than 30 economists in 15 locations globally.

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Tackling Illegal Wildlife Trade in Africa: Economic Incentives and Approaches Research paper sysadmin 5 October 2018

Combating illegal wildlife trade and further pursuing conservation-development models could help generate considerable economic benefits for African countries, while ensuring the long-term preservation of Africa’s wealth of natural capital.

Summary

• The illegal wildlife trade (IWT) significantly impacts African economies by destroying and corroding natural, human and social capital stocks. This hinders the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and has an impact on national budgets. Illicit financial flows from IWT deny revenue to governments where legal wildlife product trade exists and perpetuate cash externalization. IWT diverts national budgets away from social or development programmes, increases insecurity and threatens vulnerable populations.
• In expanding wildlife economies and pursuing conservation-driven development models, governments can protect their citizens, derive revenue from wildlife products, and establish world class tourism offerings. The illegal exploitation of wildlife is often due to a failure to enforce rights over those resources, where rights are unclearly defined or not fully exercised. Southern African countries have defined these rights in various ways, contributing to regional differences in conservation practices and the socio-economic benefits derived from wildlife resources. Combating IWT is an important step towards allowing legitimate business and communities to develop livelihoods that incentivize stewardship and connect people to conservation.
• The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has several framework policies for the establishment of transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs). These promote local stewardship across multiple land-use areas to conserve biodiversity and increase the welfare and socioeconomic development of rural communities. Private-sector partnerships also increase skills transfer, improve access to investment finance, and expand economic opportunities, including through the promotion of local procurement. The economic benefits of TFCAs extend beyond tourism.
• The economic value of African ecosystems is often under-recognized because they remain unquantified, partly due to the lack of available data on the broader economic costs of IWT. Improved monitoring and evaluation with key performance indicators would help governments and citizens to appreciate the economic value of combating IWT.

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part One Other resource sysadmin 29 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) jointly organized this four-day meeting at Chatham House for international lawyers to discuss a wide range of issues related to public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For China University of Political Science and Law, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The roundtable had a total of 22 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 12 non-Chinese (from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Two Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable meeting in Beijing on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Beijing was hosted by CUPL and involved 20 participants, 10 Chinese (from universities and other academic institutions in Beijing) and 10 non-Chinese (from Australia, the Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the experts network being built, the second meeting included a mix of participants from the first meeting and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars - Part Three Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and the Graduate Institute Geneva held a two-day roundtable meeting in Geneva on public international law and the rights of individuals.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting in Geneva was co-hosted by the Graduate Institute Geneva and involved 19 participants, 9 Chinese (from six research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and 11 non-Chinese (from eight research institutions in Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the third meeting included a mix of participants from the first two meetings and some new participants

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

Exploring Public International Law Issues with Chinese Scholars – Part Four Other resource sysadmin 30 October 2018

As part of a roundtable series, Chatham House and the China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) held a two-day roundtable in Beijing on emerging issues of public international law.

The specific objectives were to:

• create a platform for Chinese international law academics working on international human rights law issues to present their thinking and exchange ideas with counterparts from outside China;
• build stronger understanding within the wider international law community of intellectual debates taking place in China about the international human rights system and China’s role within it;
• support networking between Chinese and non-Chinese academics working on international human rights and related areas of international law.

The roundtable forms part of a wider Chatham House project exploring China’s impact on the international human rights system and was inspired by early discussions with a burgeoning community of Chinese academics thinking, writing (mainly in Chinese) and teaching about international human rights law.

For CUPL, one of the largest and most prestigious law schools in China and perhaps the only university in the world with an entire faculty of international law, the initiative is part of a drive to forge partnerships beyond China in the international law field.

The meeting was co-hosted with CUPL and involved 28 participants, consisting of 19 Chinese participants (from six leading research institutions in Beijing and Shanghai) and nine nonChinese participants (from eight leading research institutions in Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Canada and Singapore).

To ensure continuity while also expanding the expert network being built, the fifth meeting included a mix of participants from the previous meetings and some new participants.

All discussions were held in English under the Chatham House Rule.

New Frontiers in Gender-responsive Governance: Five Years of the W20 Research paper sysadmin 2 November 2018

After five years of the W20, women and gender equality remain at the margin of the G20. There is a real risk of the W20 representing a one-off territorial gain at a frontier that could easily be pushed back again.

Summary

• 2018 marks the fifth anniversary of the first grouping of the W20, the engagement group of the G20 that focuses on gender-inclusive economic growth and advocates for gender equality across the G20 agenda. Formally launched under the Turkish G20 presidency in 2015, the W20 is made up of women from business, international organizations, civil society, think-tanks and academia across the G20 member states.
• This paper takes stock of the critical steps in the development of the W20 over the last five years, examining its background, rationale and foundations, and identifying the areas of economic governance where it has so far contributed the most – and those where more action is needed. The W20 has filled a gap, it but needs to carefully assess its coherence with the UN agencies, the private sector, the G7 and other G20 engagement groups.
• The establishment of the W20 has contributed to defining new frontiers for economic governance and shifting the traditional approach from gender-neutral to gender-responsive. Whereas in 2013 gender in the G20 was considered a marginal issue better dealt with by ministers for equal opportunities, now gender equality and women’s economic empowerment are part of the mainstream economic dialogue. The next step is to ensure more structural and monitored policy reforms at the G20 level.
• Already, the W20 can count among its achievements the ‘25 by 25’ female labour force participation commitment adopted at the G20’s Brisbane summit in 2014, and the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi) and Business Women Leaders’ Taskforce, both agreed at the Hamburg summit in 2017.
• The W20 is constrained in its policy impact by limited engagement with the finance track and a lack of consistent resourcing levels. Addressing these issues would strengthen its role as a credible player in shifting global economic governance while contributing to good gender-responsive domestic policies.
• Progress on gender equality has been too slow and too peripheral to drive change in the relatively short term – over one generation, for example. G20 governments must therefore embrace active, credible policies to bring more women into the labour market, improve access to education and finance, close the pay gap, invest in social infrastructure – especially childcare and assistance for the elderly – and support female entrepreneurs. These domestic policies need to be internationally coordinated so that action and benefits can be widespread.
• A feminist, inclusive agenda at the G20 level should highlight the current empirical evidence of women’s exclusion from the benefit of their economic activity, both in G20 members and beyond. The W20 should also focus on efforts to remedy the lack of women’s representation in G20 processes and in economic governance as a whole.

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Civil Society Research paper sysadmin 27 November 2018

Given today’s challenging geopolitical conditions and the evolving nature of the international climate regime since Paris, civil society must now once again recalibrate its strategies to ensure continued and increasing relevance.

This is one of four background papers feeding into a synthesis paper entitled The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes.

Summary

• Following the failure of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in 2009, there was a step change in the sophistication and unity of civil society engagement on climate policy. This ensured that, subsequently, civil society was more effective in exercising multiple channels of influence around the negotiations for the Paris Agreement in 2015.
• Civil society proved to be particularly effective at harnessing the twin narratives of climate science and economics, and at leveraging an emerging multi-level governance architecture, to create political space for climate leadership.
• Given today’s challenging geopolitical conditions and the evolving nature of the international climate regime since Paris, civil society must now once again recalibrate its strategies to ensure continued and increasing relevance.
• In particular, the shift to a more ‘nationally grounded’ implementation regime focusing on individual states’ climate commitments will require civil society to become more effective at influencing domestic politics. At the same time, civil society will need to continue to seek strategic synergies at the international level.
• Civil society has a central role to play in ensuring that the first key test of the Paris ‘ratchet’ mechanism – revising countries’ pledged climate actions, or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), by 2020 – is robust, science-informed and strongly rooted in domestic politics.

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Corporate Sector Research paper sysadmin 27 November 2018

Given the challenging political contexts since 2015, the corporate sector will have a key role to play in persuading national governments how technologies and expertise have moved on since the pledges were made.

This is one of four background papers feeding into a synthesis paper entitled The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes.

Summary

• The corporate sector has traditionally engaged governments at national rather than international level in lobbying for action related to climate change. Where it has engaged at an international level, this has often been to restrain regulation and ambition, such as in air transport. Over time, many businesses have increasingly understood that there is more commercial opportunity in a strong, consistent approach to tackling climate mitigation and adaptation, and an increasing number are willing to speak up on the issue. The Paris Climate Conference in 2015 demonstrated this positive engagement.
• Businesses are more powerful when engaging directly with national governments on detailed policies – by demonstrating what is possible and indirectly influencing national governments’ international pledges. Traditional trade/industry sector associations and groups have tended to suffer from the ‘lowest common denominator’ effect of their least progressive members. Progressive business groups coalescing around climate ambition can help to counter this.
• Unlike at the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009, the business community provided a positive, supportive backdrop to the 2015 Paris talks, mindful of the public relations opportunities in taking a progressive stance and of the benefits of targets that reflected the science. The carbon market was a particular focus for corporates, which succeeded in getting emissions trading options and market mechanisms included in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
• Given the challenging political contexts since 2015, the corporate sector will have a key role to play in persuading national governments how technologies and expertise have moved on since the pledges were made. With increasing awareness of resource scarcity, businesses are pursuing ever more creative solutions.
• Wide recognition that the avoidance of future emissions is increasingly dependent on developing and emerging economies means that business voices from these countries will potentially be more influential in the next few years.

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes Research paper sysadmin 27 November 2018

In the current international political environment of rising populism, the role of sub- and non-state actors may become more important than ever.

Summary

• Climate action from sub-state and non-state actors such as subnational governments, cities, corporations and NGOs has very significant potential to enhance national efforts to curb CO2 emissions, close the so-called ‘emissions gap’ – between current commitments and the action necessary to meet climate targets – and help move the world on to a ‘1.5°C pathway’ that would limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.
• In addition to their own climate action, sub-state/non-state actors can contribute to climate governance by developing new policies and business models to support emissions cuts and build resilience. Knowledge exchange and capacity-building have a role to play in helping these innovations to spread internationally.
• Politically, measures implemented by sub-state/non-state actors can help national governments to implement existing targets faster and more effectively, while helping to build political support for more ambitious climate action.
• The post-Paris climate regime of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reflects the growing importance of sub- and non-state actors, and has featured the creation of institutional structures to engage and coordinate them.
• In the current international political environment of rising populism, the role of sub- and non-state actors may become more important than ever. However, more questions about the robustness of sub- and non-state action are also likely to be raised.
• With the 2020 deadline approaching for countries to submit details of enhanced Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), long-term climate strategies and other means of raising policy ambition, the next two years are set to provide significant opportunity for sub- and non-state action. Many governments are already developing ways to engage with sub- and non-state actors to identify opportunities to strengthen action by 2020.
• Key questions in this respect include (a) whether sub- and non-state actors can mobilize across sectors; and (b) whether action can be extended beyond the ‘usual suspects’ to include contributions from less familiar sources, such as business sectors with limited opportunities for climate action or corporations in the Global South.

Proportionality in the Conduct of Hostilities: The Incidental Harm Side of the Assessment Research paper sysadmin 6 December 2018

Clarification of international humanitarian law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups is also crucial.

Summary

• Military operations are taking place with increasing frequency in densely populated areas. Such operations result in loss of life and harm to civilians, as well as damage to civilian objects, (including infrastructure providing essential services). In order to protect civilians, it is imperative that armed forces and groups comply with the rules of international humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities, including the rule of proportionality.
• The rule of proportionality prohibits attacks which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This research paper analyses the key steps that belligerents must take to give effect to the rule, with a particular focus on one side of proportionality assessments – the expected incidental harm.
• Those undertaking proportionality assessments before or during an attack must consider whether the expected harm will be caused by the attack, and whether that harm could be expected (that is, was it reasonably foreseeable).
• For the purpose of proportionality assessments, injury to civilians includes disease, and there is no reason in principle to exclude mental harm, even though it is currently challenging to identify and quantify it. Damage to civilian objects includes damage to elements of the natural environment.
• Once the incidental harm to be considered has been identified, a value or weight must be assigned to it. This is then balanced against the value or weight of the military advantage anticipated from the attack to determine whether the harm would be excessive.
• In the determination of whether the expected incidental harm would be excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage, ‘excessive’ is a wide but not indeterminate standard.
• Belligerents should develop methodologies so that those planning and deciding attacks are provided with all necessary information on expected incidental harm, and to assist them in assigning weight to the incidental harm to be considered.
• If it becomes apparent that the rule of proportionality will be contravened, the attack in question must be cancelled or suspended.
• Clarification of the law is important in ensuring compliance with the rule of proportionality, but a culture of compliance within armed forces and groups, inculcated by their leaders, is also crucial.

The Costs of Fuelling Humanitarian Aid Research paper sysadmin 7 December 2018

As humanitarian crises become more protracted and aid budgets face unprecedented scrutiny, agencies could save millions by switching from diesel and oil fuels to cleaner energy sources.

Download the accompanying toolkit

Most refugee and internal displacement camps are in remote locations, so humanitarian agencies consume large amounts of fuel on the transport of staff, equipment, and goods such as food and water.

Operations tend to rely on on-site electricity generation to power reception centres, clinics, schools, food storage, water-pumping and street lighting. Despite the essential role of energy in humanitarian action, and the UN’s stated commitment to carbon neutrality by 2020, there is no concerted effort to move away from fossil fuel to date.

Summary points

• Agencies are paying too much for the energy they consume. They are overwhelmingly dependent on oil fuel for electricity generation, even though renewable energy solutions are reducing costs for those deploying them in similar conditions. Well-below-optimum standards of efficiency in buildings, generator use and fleet management are also the norm.
• Agencies typically have few incentives to do things better. There is rarely motivation to conserve fuel, nor performance indicators for energy or fuel use. In addition, energy spending and use lacks transparency.
• Few agencies collect and report on energy use. Where numbers are available, they are usually partial and unverified. Energy costs are rarely transparent in budgets; and donors do not know how much is being spent.
• We estimate that around 5 per cent of humanitarian agencies’ expenditure goes on diesel, petrol and associated costs such as fixing generators. That would mean that the sector spent some $1.2 billion on polluting fuel in 2017.
• Based on current best-practice, the sector could save at least 10 per cent of fuel costs on ground transport, 37 per cent through behaviour change and more efficient technologies, and 60 per cent on generation – all using currently available, affordable and proven practice and technology changes.
• At current prices, this could mean operational savings of over $517 million a year for the humanitarian sector, roughly equal to 5 per cent of UNHCR’s funding gap for 2017.
• In Kenya, annual spending on diesel and petrol for the seven agencies surveyed was $6.7 million in 2017. Replacing gensets with solar systems could create significant savings due the costs of diesel, the likelihood of protracted camp situations, and the opportunities that off-grid solar would offer for extending electricity access to refugees and local populations in Garissa and Turkana counties.
• In Jordan, solar energy now powers the majority of camp facilities and many households. However, the use of grid electricity by humanitarian agencies’ large head offices in Amman remains high and expensive. Improving the energy efficiency of buildings is a priority for savings.
• In Burkina Faso’s Goudoubo camp, NGO offices are desperately short of power – they have no computers or air-conditioning. Investment in renewable forms of energy for this and other camp services such as street lighting and water pumping would enable better service provision, and could drive increased rural energy access among host populations across this area of the Sahel.

Toolkit

An accompanying toolkit, Powering Ahead: Improving How We Use and Account for Energy in Humanitarian Operations, provides practical guidance for humanitarian agencies that want to make energy cost savings and reduce their carbon and emissions footprint.

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Financial Institutions Research paper sysadmin 20 December 2018

The trillions of dollars needed to secure the sustainable, climate-compatible pathway outlined in the 2015 Paris Agreement have focused attention on private finance and investment.

This is one of four background papers feeding into a synthesis paper entitled The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes.

Summary

• The trillions of dollars needed to secure the sustainable, climate-compatible pathway outlined in the 2015 Paris Agreement have focused attention on private finance and investment, and on the role of the financial sector as a potentially powerful non-state actor in the international climate debate.
• Leading individual financial institutions reacted to the Paris Agreement by framing it in terms of what it would mean for markets – i.e. risks and opportunities – and by underlining the importance of national implementation of climate change commitments.
• Key recent developments signal that the financial sector actively supports Paris-compatible government action on climate change, as well as company-level action to understand the physical and ‘transition’ risks and opportunities associated with climate change and policy responses. Financial sector engagement is taking place through well-organized and well-supported international initiatives and platforms. A critical part of this process entails robust activity by financial institutions to embed climate change and broader sustainability factors into strategies and operations.
• At country level, attention to implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and associated sector-level policy development has been largely separate from the broader ‘sustainable finance’ dynamic. National-level action has not benefited from the same level of organized financial sector involvement evident in international action. One of the reasons for this is that, with some notable exceptions, international financial initiatives lack the capacity and resources to participate in the granular detail of national policy processes. Policymakers in turn often lack the internal capacity to consult or engage with the financial sector domestically.
• This paper includes some thoughts on further international and national climate actions. Ensuring that messages from successful international financial sector initiatives are heard in regional and non-climate forums offers one avenue for building a stronger foundation for greater climate ambition. Building the resource base for stronger national climate policy engagement, as a counter-voice to incumbent interests and to ensure that the quality of policy is ‘investment grade’, is another. This will be critical to the delivery of policy outcomes. Other key elements include the need to pool knowledge across relevant parts of the finance sector, build alliances, and shift action towards joint problem-solving with policymakers. A ‘Talanoa 2.020’-type initiative offers one potentially promising approach to advancing dialogue in this respect.

Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West Book sysadmin 17 January 2019

Keir Giles surveys Russia’s history and the present day to explain why its current leadership feels it has no choice but to challenge and attack the West. Recognising and accepting that this will not change in the near future will help the West find a way of dealing with Russia without risking a deeper conflict.

This book is for anyone that cannot understand why Russia and its leaders behave as they do.

The relationship between Russia and the West is once again deep in crisis. A major reason is that Western leaders have too often believed or hoped that Russia sees the world as they do — but things look very different from Moscow. This book shows that efforts at engagement with Russia that do not take this into account are a key reason for repeated disappointment and crisis.

In confronting the West, Russia is implementing strategic and doctrinal approaches that have been consistent for centuries. The roots of current Russian behaviour and demands can be traced not just to the Soviet era, but back into Tsarist foreign and domestic policy, and further to the structure and rules of Russian society. But this also gives the US and the West pointers for how to behave — and how not to — in order to manage the challenge of Russia effectively, based on past experience of both successful and unsuccessful engagement with Moscow.

The book recognizes the reality of confrontation and provides an essential introduction to grasping why Russia sees it as inevitable. Consequently, it offers a basis for building a less crisis-prone relationship with Russia.

This book is part of the Insights series.

Praise for Moscow Rules

About the author

Keir Giles is a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He also works with the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), a group of subject matter experts in Eurasian security with a particular focus on the wide range of security challenges coming from Russia.

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Cooking in Displacement Settings: Engaging the Private Sector in Non-wood-based Fuel Supply Research paper sysadmin 22 January 2019

In displacement settings, providing cooking solutions that reduce negative impacts on the environment and health remains a challenge for local governments, humanitarian agencies, businesses and refugees.

Summary

• Providing adequate cooking fuel and clean-burning, fuel-efficient stoves in displacement settings has long been a major challenge for local authorities, humanitarian agencies, non-governmental organizations, local communities and refugees themselves. Refugees generally have limited access to modern cooking solutions. Most either depend on insufficient humanitarian agency handouts of ‘in-kind’ firewood or have to travel long distances to collect firewood.
• There is significant potential for private-sector engagement in this context – which, though largely overlooked to date, could result in win-win scenarios for all stakeholders. Refugee camps and other displacement settings present opportunities for private-sector cooking fuel companies to expand their customer bases, with the added advantage for vendors of offering concentrated demand and scope for economies of scale.
• For the Kakuma refugee camp complex in Kenya, the Moving Energy Initiative (MEI) decided to engage with the private sector directly. The MEI requested expressions of interest from local private-sector companies for expanding sales and distribution of fuels in the complex through the concession. The winning company – National Oil Corporation of Kenya – is to receive a prize of $50,000 for its proposed concession to supply liquefied petroleum gas both to refugees in the Kakuma complex and to the surrounding host community.
• The MEI also conducted interviews with various stakeholders in other contexts and countries who are engaged in efforts to develop market-based approaches to providing clean, fuel-efficient cooking solutions to refugees.
• Based on the interviews and the concession process, the MEI recommends greater donor investment and longer-term guaranteed funding for cooking interventions. This is needed to allow sufficient time to build sustainable markets and secure the requisite engagement and investments from the private sector.
• Larger, longer-term investments by the private sector – supported through partnerships with donors and humanitarian agencies – in infrastructure and demand creation (both in and outside the refugee community) can reduce the price of alternative solutions and support a gradual transition away from subsidies.

The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes: Subnational Governments Research paper sysadmin 23 January 2019

This paper looks at the role of subnational governments in influencing global climate ambition, and makes recommendations for how these actors can increase their influence in the future.

Summary

• ‘Subnational governments’ – including municipal, regional and provincial authorities – lack the formal status of negotiating parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). But they have a vital role to play in informing and helping to shape international climate action, as they are often the key delivery partners for on-the-ground policies.
• Subnational governments are often closer to climate problems than the UNFCCC parties themselves, and have experience, expertise and peer influence that can support the development of progressive policies and increased ambition.
• Many subnational governments have joined or formed various groupings to share information and experience, and to increase their collective profile and voice. Notable initiatives and collaborations include the Under2 Coalition, ICLEI, C40 and the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy.
• Subnational governments are highly diverse. In some cases, politically high-profile administrations – the US state of California being a notable example – have exploited their visibility and policy successes to engage in wider climate debates. Equally, however, subnational agendas can encounter resistance from national governments anxious to ensure the primacy of their negotiating positions in the UNFCCC system.
• One of the advantages that subnational governments enjoy, subject to resources, is their ability to join with peer groups to take a fresh approach to mitigation or adaptation policies. Groups of cities or subnational regions can, through collaborative organizations, explore new approaches that might be less attractive within a national context.
• To maintain and build on their current achievements and influence, subnational governments need, among other things, to: improve the credibility of their experience through evaluation of the success of their climate policies; use membership of appropriate international groups to share experience and boost their leverage; continue to create collaborative relationships with progressive businesses to increase influence at a national level; build on cross-regional relationships in climate adaptation and resilience; and work with other subnational actors to build momentum ahead of the first post-Paris revision of climate commitments in 2020.

Healthy Diets from Sustainable Production: Indonesia Research paper sysadmin 24 January 2019

Indonesia has an uncommon chance to bypass the negative trajectory of diets in other emerging economies and build a healthy and sustainable food system.

Summary

• Indonesia is approaching a key point on its development pathway. Rapidly declining poverty, a growing and urbanizing middle class with increased purchasing power and consumption patterns, and a diminishing contribution of agriculture to overall GDP are all set to fundamentally reorient much in society.
• Dietary change is at the heart of the public health and environmental challenges now facing Indonesia. Rates of obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as type 2 diabetes are on the increase, while high levels of childhood undernutrition persist. This double burden of malnutrition presents a critical challenge for the future of Indonesian public health.
• At the same time, shifts in diet are placing increased pressure on the environment, threatening biodiversity and species loss and rapidly increasing risks for land-use change, climate change and freshwater use. In Indonesia, these environmental impacts of agriculture are driven both by domestic consumption of food and biofuels, and by a focus on export-led agricultural growth – particularly palm oil, rubber, coffee and cocoa.
• A core political focus on achieving national self-sufficiency in five strategic commodities – soy, rice, maize, sugar and beef – which has led to some price distortion, and the growing influence of modernized retail are potentially at odds with a transition to healthy diets from sustainable production.
• The components to support an ambitious national food strategy already exist, but are either underutilized or misdirected. Indonesia’s national dietary guidelines and examples of successful food-based social services, together with the country’s potential to lead the sustainable production and consumption agenda, both regionally and internationally, and its commitments under both the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change, can all be harnessed to foster improved diets.
• There is a need to align high-level policy strategies across environment, public health and food issues. Mainstreaming the principles of a healthy diet within existing food policy and partnering with food providers and local pioneers to champion these efforts can help to ensure that healthy diets, produced sustainably, become the norm.
• Between now and 2020, when Indonesia embarks on the final five-year tranche of its National Long-Term Development Plan, there is an important window of opportunity to take decisive action that will influence the future trajectory of the population’s health and that of its environment, as well as contribute substantively to the global fight against climate change and biodiversity loss.
• 2019 will, meanwhile, be a critical election year in Indonesia, with both presidential and legislative elections due. Signals from Indonesian media and civil society organizations indicate that poverty reduction and social equity – including affordability of good food and healthcare – will be among the flagship issues for voters.
• The moment is thus ripe for a bold new vision for a sustainable food system that supports healthy diets for all. In choosing to act now, Indonesia could lay the foundations for a more resilient and equitable development pathway that prioritizes improved public health while at the same time safeguarding some of the world’s most important ecosystems for future generations.

Innovative Financing for Humanitarian Energy Interventions Research paper sysadmin 28 February 2019

This paper explores the increase in resources and funding needed to improve the access of displaced people to modern and sustainable energy services.

Summary

• In settings that host displaced and refugee communities, energy can act as an enabler for improved healthcare, education and access to clean water. More efficient sources of energy can also save money that can be reinvested in life-saving interventions. A range of challenges exist that inhibit the uptake and effective management of cleaner energy solutions in displacement settings. These are magnified by a lack of available and appropriate funding.
• The current funding gap is significant. In many cases, involving the private sector (both enterprises and investors) is viewed as a way to accelerate delivery of sustainable energy solutions, leverage additional capital, efficiency and expertise, and adopt more sustainable and market-based approaches.
• Displacement settings are an extreme example of complex and unpredictable operating environments. Traditional approaches to the financing of energy access will not be supported by the risk/return characteristics of this market opportunity, so alternative structures are needed.
• Such structures can include mechanisms such as grants, guarantees, ‘results-based financing’ and ‘impact bonds’. These blended financial instruments should aim to leverage first losses – whereby, in the case of default, the first loss is taken by the ‘impact-first’ investors, or guarantors, thereby fully or partially protecting ‘finance-first’ investors.
• Given the specific constraints of displacement settings, any financing mechanisms at present are likely to fall between the categories of providing ‘more efficient aid’ and ‘more efficient aid through markets’. They are likely to constitute a transitional step from grant-making towards the use of commercial investment vehicles.
• While a number of financial mechanisms could be applied to attract private-sector engagement, most remain theoretical, with few being implemented extensively or at scale. Where such financial mechanisms have already been used, access to relevant data is poor, especially in circumstances where the desired outcomes were not achieved.
• The Moving Energy Initiative (MEI) completed feasibility work into the concept of an energy humanitarian fund and found that, while a need for this type of facility has emerged, it sits in a difficult position between energy access, climate and humanitarian funding sources. Key donors are needed to drive forward innovative financing vehicles and further testing of these mechanisms, in order to generate market data and evidence for further iterations and additional investments.

Adopting a Market-based Approach to Boost Energy Access in Displaced Contexts Research paper sysadmin 25 March 2019

This paper evaluates the market-based approaches adopted in the MEI projects in Kenya and Burkina Faso. It articulates how such commercial strategies can be applied to the delivery of energy in displacement settings and compares this to real world examples.

• Development of long-term energy solutions in displacement settings tends to be perceived as investment that falls outside the remit of emergency responses. In addition, when emergency energy supply measures are implemented they often result in expensive, unreliable and unhealthy energy provision for those in protracted or recurrent crises.
• There is widespread agreement among humanitarian and development experts that an effective refugee response should include long-term development solutions as well as emergency relief.
• The energy access imperative is more pronounced when considering the need for effective energy distribution in practically all camp activities and basic necessities: pumping and treatment of clean water; heating and cooling for food storage and cooking; energy for livelihood activities; and provision of light for schooling, hospitals and the prevention of violence against women and children.
• Minor shifts in household energy use to basic solar lighting options and non-wood fuels would save $303 million annually on refugee fuel costs.
• Within refugee contexts in Kenya and Burkina Faso, the MEI sought to examine opportunities to use market interventions, rather than in-kind distributions, to improve clean energy access over the long-term and test the delivery of market-based approaches.

Infrastructure Management Contracts: Improving Energy Asset Management in Displacement Settings Research paper sysadmin 17 April 2019

This paper highlights a number of options for managing electricity infrastructure in refugee camps and outlines the challenges, opportunities and operational implications associated with them. It takes the Kalobeyei settlement in Kenya as a case study.

• Building and maintaining electricity infrastructure to power offices, businesses, households and other operations in displacement settings is difficult. It is especially challenging for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partner agencies, because supplying electricity is not their core business.
• Private-sector companies exist that are willing and able to develop infrastructure management contracts to provide energy as a service in displacement settings. However, institutional barriers within humanitarian agencies persist, with short budgeting cycles in particular preventing humanitarian agencies from entering into the sorts of long-term service agreements required by the private sector.
• A number of options exist to leverage the expertise of the private sector through ‘public–private partnership’ (P3) structures. Such mechanisms can promote more efficient management of infrastructure by drawing on private-sector experience and expertise, incentivizing appropriate risk-sharing and providing options to leverage private capital in project development.
• Field work from the Kalobeyei settlement in Kenya suggests that a solar/diesel hybrid mini-grid solution was the most economical option to power camp services and infrastructure there. Compared to distributed diesel generation, the annual savings in operating costs were estimated at $49,880, with the additional investment paid back within 3.6 years.
• Humanitarian agencies need to be willing to change their policies to enable long-term service agreements. Alternatively (or, more likely, in conjunction with this option), financial mechanisms such as partial risk guarantees need to be developed to offset some of the risks. This change will need high-level support from donors and humanitarian agencies.
• Once the first infrastructure management contracts can be signed and tested in displacement locations (through the use of donor funding or otherwise) and associated data collected, it will ease the way for future investments in these types of projects.

Tectonic Politics: Global Political Risk in an Age of Transformation Book sysadmin 7 May 2019

Political risk now affects more markets and countries than ever before and that risk will continue to rise. But traditional methods of managing political risk are no longer legitimate or effective.

In Tectonic Politics, Nigel Gould-Davies explores the complex, shifting landscape of political risk and how to navigate it. He analyses trends in each form of political risk: the power to destroy, seize, regulate, and tax.

He shows how each of these forms reflects a deeper transformation of the global political economy that is reordering the relationship between power, wealth, and values. In a world where everything is political, the craft of engagement is as important as the science of production and the art of the deal.

The successful company must integrate that craft—the engager’s way of seeing and doing—into strategy and culture.

Drawing on a career in academia, business, and diplomacy, Gould-Davies provides corporate leaders, scholars, and engaged citizens with a groundbreaking study of the fastest-rising political risk today. ‘As tectonic plates shape the earth,’ he writes, ‘so tectonic politics forges its governance.’

The book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for Tectonic Politics

About the author

Nigel Gould-Davies was an associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House.

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The Chatham House Sustainable Laboratories Initiative: Prior Assessment Tool Other resource sysadmin 14 June 2019

Laboratories are critical for supporting effective infectious disease surveillance and outbreak response. This tool is meant to help structure a conversation between funding partners and recipient countries on how to most effectively establish or repurpose laboratories in low-resource environments.

Introduction

Laboratories are critical for supporting effective infectious disease surveillance and outbreak response, and lack of adequate laboratory capacity is a global challenge. As part of global health security initiatives, cooperative threat reduction efforts and international development programmes, sophisticated laboratories have been provided to mitigate biological threats and bolster a country’s capacity for detection, diagnosis and storage of high-consequence pathogens. Very often, these use the assumptions, standards and templates applied in high-income countries. However, it can be difficult or even impossible to sustain these facilities in low-resource environments. There can sometimes be limited local technical capacity and capability, which can result in a high reliance on imported expertise, skills, equipment and other resources. Sustainability can therefore be hard to achieve. In addition, when a funding partner withdraws, the laboratories can become disused, foundering without the trained personnel and financial resources to sustain them.

To help address this situation, a proposal gaining increasing support internationally is to adopt an approach based on a local risk assessment, whereby laboratories are appropriately and optimally tailored to the local risks and to the resources available, both in the short and longer term, without compromising biosafety and biosecurity.

A Chatham House workshop was convened in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2018 to explore what West African countries would find most appropriate in terms of building laboratory capacity, what the main challenges have been so far, and what needs to be done to improve the sustainability of laboratories in the region. It emerged that there was a need for a more structured conversation between the funding partner and recipient country early in the process – prior to embarking on the detailed planning phase for the establishment or repurposing of a laboratory. This should involve careful consideration and an assessment of existing and planned capacity, needs and contextual issues, together with proposals for how to address the issues revealed, so that any ensuing laboratory demonstrably supports the national strategy and therefore flourishes.

Artificial Intelligence Prediction and Counterterrorism Research paper sysadmin 6 August 2019

The use of AI in counterterrorism is not inherently wrong, and this paper suggests some necessary conditions for legitimate use of AI as part of a predictive approach to counterterrorism on the part of liberal democratic states.

Summary

• The use of predictive artificial intelligence (AI) in countering terrorism is often assumed to have a deleterious effect on human rights, generating spectres of ‘pre-crime’ punishment and surveillance states. However, the well-regulated use of new capabilities may enhance states’ abilities to protect citizens’ right to life, while at the same time improving adherence to principles intended to protect other human rights, such as transparency, proportionality and freedom from unfair discrimination. The same regulatory framework could also contribute to safeguarding against broader misuse of related technologies.
• Most states focus on preventing terrorist attacks, rather than reacting to them. As such, prediction is already central to effective counterterrorism. AI allows higher volumes of data to be analysed, and may perceive patterns in those data that would, for reasons of both volume and dimensionality, otherwise be beyond the capacity of human interpretation. The impact of this is that traditional methods of investigation that work outwards from known suspects may be supplemented by methods that analyse the activity of a broad section of an entire population to identify previously unknown threats.
• Developments in AI have amplified the ability to conduct surveillance without being constrained by resources. Facial recognition technology, for instance, may enable the complete automation of surveillance using CCTV in public places in the near future.
• The current way predictive AI capabilities are used presents a number of interrelated problems from both a human rights and a practical perspective. Where limitations and regulations do exist, they may have the effect of curtailing the utility of approaches that apply AI, while not necessarily safeguarding human rights to an adequate extent.
• The infringement of privacy associated with the automated analysis of certain types of public data is not wrong in principle, but the analysis must be conducted within a robust legal and policy framework that places sensible limitations on interventions based on its results.
• In future, broader access to less intrusive aspects of public data, direct regulation of how those data are used – including oversight of activities by private-sector actors – and the imposition of technical as well as regulatory safeguards may improve both operational performance and compliance with human rights legislation. It is important that any such measures proceed in a manner that is sensitive to the impact on other rights such as freedom of expression, and freedom of association and assembly.

Online Disinformation and Political Discourse: Applying a Human Rights Framework Research paper sysadmin 5 November 2019

Although some digital platforms now have an impact on more people’s lives than does any one state authority, the international community has been slow to hold to account these platforms’ activities by reference to human rights law.

This paper examines how human rights frameworks should guide digital technology.

Summary

• Online political campaigning techniques are distorting our democratic political processes. These techniques include the creation of disinformation and divisive content; exploiting digital platforms’ algorithms, and using bots, cyborgs and fake accounts to distribute this content; maximizing influence through harnessing emotional responses such as anger and disgust; and micro-targeting on the basis of collated personal data and sophisticated psychological profiling techniques. Some state authorities distort political debate by restricting, filtering, shutting down or censoring online networks.
• Such techniques have outpaced regulatory initiatives and, save in egregious cases such as shutdown of networks, there is no international consensus on how they should be tackled. Digital platforms, driven by their commercial impetus to encourage users to spend as long as possible on them and to attract advertisers, may provide an environment conducive to manipulative techniques.
• International human rights law, with its careful calibrations designed to protect individuals from abuse of power by authority, provides a normative framework that should underpin responses to online disinformation and distortion of political debate. Contrary to popular view, it does not entail that there should be no control of the online environment; rather, controls should balance the interests at stake appropriately.
• The rights to freedom of thought and opinion are critical to delimiting the appropriate boundary between legitimate influence and illegitimate manipulation. When digital platforms exploit decision-making biases in prioritizing bad news and divisive, emotion-arousing information, they may be breaching these rights. States and digital platforms should consider structural changes to digital platforms to ensure that methods of online political discourse respect personal agency and prevent the use of sophisticated manipulative techniques.
• The right to privacy includes a right to choose not to divulge your personal information, and a right to opt out of trading in and profiling on the basis of your personal data. Current practices in collecting, trading and using extensive personal data to ‘micro-target’ voters without their knowledge are not consistent with this right. Significant changes are needed.
• Data protection laws should be implemented robustly, and should not legitimate extensive harvesting of personal data on the basis of either notional ‘consent’ or the data handler’s commercial interests. The right to privacy should be embedded in technological design (such as by allowing the user to access all information held on them at the click of a button); and political parties should be transparent in their collection and use of personal data, and in their targeting of messages. Arguably, the value of personal data should be shared with the individuals from whom it derives.
• The rules on the boundaries of permissible content online should be set by states, and should be consistent with the right to freedom of expression. Digital platforms have had to rapidly develop policies on retention or removal of content, but those policies do not necessarily reflect the right to freedom of expression, and platforms are currently not well placed to take account of the public interest. Platforms should be far more transparent in their content regulation policies and decision-making, and should develop frameworks enabling efficient, fair, consistent internal complaints and content monitoring processes. Expertise on international human rights law should be integral to their systems.
• The right to participate in public affairs and to vote includes the right to engage in public debate. States and digital platforms should ensure an environment in which all can participate in debate online and are not discouraged from standing for election, from participating or from voting by online threats or abuse.

AI-driven Personalization in Digital Media: Political and Societal Implications Research paper sysadmin 2 December 2019

The fallout from disinformation and online manipulation strategies have alerted Western democracies to the novel, nuanced vulnerabilities of our information society. This paper outlines the implications of the adoption of AI by the the legacy media, as well as by the new media, focusing on personalization.

Summary

• Machine learning (ML)-driven personalization is fast expanding from social media to the wider information space, encompassing legacy media, multinational conglomerates and digital-native publishers: however, this is happening within a regulatory and oversight vacuum that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.
• Mass-scale adoption of personalization in communication has serious implications for human rights, societal resilience and political security. Data protection, privacy and wrongful discrimination, as well as freedom of opinion and of expression, are some of the areas impacted by this technological transformation.
• Artificial intelligence (AI) and its ML subset are novel technologies that demand novel ways of approaching oversight, monitoring and analysis. Policymakers, regulators, media professionals and engineers need to be able to conceptualize issues in an interdisciplinary way that is appropriate for sociotechnical systems.
• Funding needs to be allocated to research into human–computer interaction in information environments, data infrastructure, technology market trends, and the broader impact of ML systems within the communication sector.
• Although global, high-level ethical frameworks for AI are welcome, they are no substitute for domain- and context-specific codes of ethics. Legacy media and digital-native publishers need to overhaul their editorial codes to make them fit for purpose in a digital ecosystem transformed by ML. Journalistic principles need to be reformulated and refined in the current informational context in order to efficiently inform the ML models built for personalized communication.
• Codes of ethics will not by themselves be enough, so current regulatory and legislative frameworks as they relate to media need to be reassessed. Media regulators need to develop their in-house capacity for thorough research and monitoring into ML systems, and – when appropriate –proportionate sanctions for actors found to be employing such systems towards malign ends. Collaboration with data protection authorities, competition authorities and national electoral commissions is paramount for preserving the integrity of elections and of a political discourse grounded on democratic principles.
• Upskilling senior managers and editorial teams is fundamental if media professionals are to be able to engage meaningfully and effectively with data scientists and AI engineers.

Subsidies and Sustainable Agriculture: Mapping the Policy Landscape Research paper sysadmin 10 December 2019

Agricultural subsidies shape production and consumption patterns, with potentially significant effects on poverty, nutrition and other sustainability concerns. This paper maps the different types of support provided by governments to the agricultural sector, and highlights some of the complex political economy dynamics that underpin the relevant policies.

Summary

• Agricultural subsidies, a mainstay of government policy, have a large part in shaping production and consumption patterns, with potentially significant effects as regards poverty, food security, nutrition, and other sustainability concerns such as climate change, land use practices and biodiversity.
• There are multiple types of direct and indirect support provided by governments to various actors in the agricultural sector; and in terms of political economy, there are complex dynamics underpinning the policies that sustain these subsidies.
• Overall, subsidies targeting producers have the most significant effect on production, and the greater trade-distorting effect. These subsidies promote domestic production and discourage imports, leading to overproduction that is largely disposed of on the international market, with the help of export subsidies. This can tend to intensify negative environmental agricultural practices, such as cultivating marginal land, unsustainable types of intensification, or incentivizing excessive pesticide and fertilizer use.
• On the other hand, producer subsidies that are not tied to output of a specific commodity (i.e. delinked) have far fewer distorting impacts and could help to deliver sustainable outcomes. For example, this type of subsidies can require crop diversification or be linked to conservation of permanent grassland.
• Subsidies that enable transfers to consumers, for example through food stamp programmes, also serve to delink production from consumption, can foster healthier diets, can play an important role in delivering food accessibility and security among low-income groups, and can represent one of the less trade-distorting subsidies.
• If subsidies are to be reformed to help promote healthier diets and encourage more sustainable production, it is essential to understand not only the type and amount of support that key countries provide, but also the domestic dynamics that can shape such policies.
• While price support, input subsidies or investment aids remain the central pillars of programmes in large developing countries such as Brazil, China or India, other economies – notably including the EU and Japan – focus on direct payments, support for general services and set-aside schemes, as well as significant border protection. The US, for its part, has tended to focus on subsidized insurance schemes and food programmes for poorer consumers.
• If subsidies are to deliver policy objectives, their design and implementation should delink production from consumption. For example, consumer subsidies designed to deliver nutrition and food security, or payments for environmental services to enable more environmentally friendly production systems, could prove to be the most effective, least trade-distorting means of achieving more sustainable and equitable agricultural production.
• The political economy of food means that the removal of subsidies is often highly sensitive, and tends to be met with significant resistance. However, reform that delinks support from production through a gradual transition process could ultimately prove successful in delivering effective subsidy schemes.
• Effective subsidy schemes must by design be truly result- and performance-based, supported by robust and objective indicators. At the same time, engaging multiple actors along key commodity value chains – including leading importing and exporting countries, traders and transporters – could lead to the development of international, commodity-specific arrangements that are able to deliver effective nutrition and sustainability goals.

Secrets and Spies: UK Intelligence Accountability After Iraq and Snowden Book sysadmin 15 January 2020

How can democratic governments hold intelligence and security agencies to account when what they do is largely secret? Jamie Gaskarth explores how intelligence professionals view accountability in the context of 21st century politics.

Using the UK as a case study, this book provides the first systematic exploration of how accountability is understood inside the secret world. It is based on new interviews with current and former UK intelligence practitioners, as well as extensive research into the performance and scrutiny of the UK intelligence machinery.

The result is the first detailed analysis of how intelligence professionals view their role, what they feel keeps them honest, and how far external overseers impact on their work.

The UK gathers material that helps inform global decisions on such issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, and breaches of international humanitarian law. On the flip side, the UK was a major contributor to the intelligence failures leading to the Iraq war in 2003, and its agencies were complicit in the widely discredited U.S. practices of torture and ‘rendition’ of terrorism suspects. UK agencies have come under greater scrutiny since those actions, but it is clear that problems remain.

Secrets and Spies is the result of a British Academy funded project (SG151249) on intelligence accountability. The book is published as part of the Insights series.

Praise for Secrets and Spies

About the author

Jamie Gaskarth is Professor of Foreign Policy and International Relations at The Open University. He was previously senior lecturer at the University of Birmingham where he taught strategy and decision-making. His research focused on the ethical dilemmas of leadership and accountability in intelligence, foreign policy, and defence. He is author/editor or co-editor of six books and served on the Academic Advisory panel for the 2015 UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.

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Centenary Series: Exploring the International Affairs Archive dora.popova 14 September 2020

International Affairs has been a central part of the institute’s history, both as a record of speeches made by dignitaries such as Mahatma Gandhi and Henry Kissinger, and as a forum for policy-relevant academic research.

Delving into the International Affairs archive brings out stories behind some of the most significant players of the last century.

War Time: Temporality and the Decline of Western Military Power Book dora.popova 22 February 2021

In War Time the Western way of war, its pace and timing, are discussed and analysed by experts who question the West’s ability to maintain its military superiority given the political and strategic failures of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In War Time, war studies experts examine the trajectory of Western military power. They discuss conflicting perceptions of time anchored within Western political and military institutions, and the Western attachment to fast-paced warfare at the expense of longer-term political solutions.

Divided into three sections, the book covers ‘civic militarism’ and the trajectory of Western power, Western perceptions of time and the international normative order, and military operations and temporality. War Time explains why the West has been overwhelmingly powerful on the battlefield and yet strategically and politically weak as exemplified by the return of the Taliban and the hasty evacuation of troops and personnel from Afghanistan.

The book identifies policies that decision-makers must adopt to stave off the decline of Western military dominance.

This book is part of the Insights series.

Watch the event

A special event was held in March 2021 to mark the launch of the book. View the event here.

Praise for War Time

About the editors

Sten Rynning is professor of war studies at the University of Southern Denmark.

Olivier Schmitt is professor with special responsibilities at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, and currently director of research and studies at the French Institute for Higher National Defence Studies.

Amelie Theussen is assistant professor at the Center for War Studies, University of 
Southern Denmark.

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Belarusians’ views on the political crisis - April 2021 Other resource NCapeling 11 June 2021

Results of a public opinion poll conducted between 20 and 30 April 2021.

Chatham House surveyed a total of 937 respondents between 20 and 30 April 2021. Our survey sample corresponds to the general structure of Belarus’s urban population and is corrected and weighted by gender, age, size of respondents’ town of residence and education level.

Summary

• After Lukashenka, the most known political figures in Belarus are pro-protest politicians: Tsikhanouskaya, Babaryka, Tsikhanouski, Kalesnikava, Tsapkala and Latushka. Viktar Babaryka is the most popular presidential candidate among Belarusian urban citizens, and Lukashenka comes second to him.
• State organizations and bodies are still mistrusted by more than half the population, while the army is slightly more popular than other bodies. Independent media, labour unions and human rights organizations are trusted far more than state ones.
• Russia leads when it comes to positive attitudes to foreign states: one in three Belarusians feel very positive about their neighbour and 79 per cent feel positive in general. 71 per cent Belarusians feel positive about China, which is the next highest indicator. Despite propaganda efforts, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland and EU states in general are still perceived positively by more than 60 per cent of Belarusians, with fewer than 20 per cent feeling negative about them.
• The position on Russian interference in the Belarusian political crisis is consolidated enough: 58 per cent think that Russia should remain neutral. The rest are almost equally divided between those who think Russia should support the protest movement (19 per cent) and those who think Russia should support Lukashenka (23 per cent).
• 40 per cent have changed their attitude to the Russian government since it supported Lukashenka in the crisis, and 73 per cent are sure that Russia is his sole support.
• While 32 per cent of Belarusians see union with Russia as the most appropriate foreign policy, 46 per cent would like to be in a union with both Russia and the EU simultaneously.
• Almost half the population thinks that Belarusian foreign policy in the event of a pro-protest government coming to power would be oriented toward friendship and cooperation with both Russia and the West, which correlates with how the majority thinks it should be. Although 42 per cent expect foreign policy would lean toward the EU in that situation, which is less acceptable: only 25 per cent think it ‘should’.
• The proportion of respondents who think Belarus should remain in the Collective Security Treaty Organization is 58 per cent, while 35 per cent would like to see Belarus not belonging to any military bloc and a small share (seven per cent) would prefer Belarus to join NATO.
• Almost half of the population considers Lukashenka to be the major obstacle for political stability and economic development and is sure he does not care about, and in fact is a threat to, independence.
• In general, most Belarusians have a consolidated opinion that the authorities should start negotiating with opponents and free all political prisoners.
• More than half of Belarusians think that Lukashenka must leave immediately or before the end of 2021, while 27 per cent think he should leave when his term ends in 2025. The opinion that Lukashenka should rule for another term beginning in 2025 is marginal – only ten per cent support this.
• Expectations are not so optimistic though: only 26 per cent believe he will leave office this year. One in three thinks he will leave in 2025; a further 19 per cent say that he will stay on for further terms in office.
• If Lukashenka doesn’t leave, people expect an increase in emigration and unemployment, the continuation of repression in all areas of life, falling exchange rates and the tightening of dependency on Russia.
• Opinion on abortions is still consolidated, with only 19 per cent thinking they should be banned in most or all cases. The same applies to Lukashenka’s infamous statement that society in Belarus is not ready to have a female president: only 20 per cent agree with the opinion.
• 52 per cent don’t think there is a problem of wage inequality between men and women in Belarus, while 37 per cent do see an issue.

Download a presentation of the survey’s main findings

Impact report 2020–21 Other resource dora.popova 14 July 2021

Explore our policy impact in the past year, including through our research, convening and next generation initiatives, in a revised format annual review.

Chair’s statement

It has been an extraordinary year of change for us all. The COVID-19 pandemic is the greatest challenge to the world for generations. Millions have lost their lives or suffered devastating impacts on their health, both from COVID-19 itself and because health systems have been unable to deliver treatments for other conditions. The pandemic has also caused the greatest shock to the global economy since the 1930s, setting back the progress of recent years in eliminating poverty, getting more children into education and improving global health.

This means Chatham House is needed more than ever. Our world-leading convening and cutting-edge research on the major challenges facing the world, from building more sustainable economic growth and tackling climate change to easing geopolitical tensions, has continued despite the challenges of lockdown. For that I pay tribute to the resilience and ingenuity of the staff who have found innovative solutions to the obstacles presented by the pandemic, all while working largely from home.

This year I am also delighted to note the exceptional gift of £10 million from the MAVA Foundation to enable us to launch the Sustainability Accelerator. This initiative builds on the Hoffmann Centre’s last five years of innovative convening and activity. And it puts sustainability at the core of the institute’s work in this critical year for addressing climate change and biodiversity.

So, as I prepare to step down from my three years as chair of the institute, I would like to thank my fellow Council members and Robin Niblett and his team for their hard work and ambition to deliver on Chatham House’s mission. I have also been especially pleased to see how we are engaging younger, more diverse audiences through the next generation initiatives, including our Panel of Young Advisers, the Common Futures Conversations project, the QEII Academy Ambassadors, our Internship Programme and the Chatham House-SNF CoLab.

I am particularly pleased about the Chatham House Summer School, where 16–18-year-olds can now engage with experts on international affairs and get an insight into careers within the charity and not-for-profit sector.

It has been an honour to lead this extraordinary institution and I look forward to continuing my involvement with Chatham House in new ways.

Lord Jim O’Neill