A file system data is divided into two or more data blocks. A unique encryption key is assigned to each data block with the encryption key assigned to each data block being distinct from other encryption keys used to encrypt the other data blocks and each of the data blocks is encrypted using its assigned encryption key. One of the data blocks within the file system is then selected and decrypted using the distinct encryption key assigned to the selected data block and a new encryption key, distinct for the previously assigned encryption key, is assigned to the selected data block and the selected data block is re-encrypted using the new encryption key. This process is then repeated for each data block on a sequential/cyclic and continually rotating basis.

Computationally implemented methods and systems are described herein that are designed to, among other things, receiving a level-one encrypted output of a surveillance device; encrypting at least a part of the level-one encrypted output of the surveillance device with a level-two encryption key whose decryption key is inaccessible by a level-two encryption entity; and transmitting a level-two encrypted output of the surveillance device.

A method and apparatus is disclosed for managing encryption keys in a computer system in which in response to the change of a system key the old key and new key are both maintained for subsequent use.

A request to render content associated with a first super distributed content file is detected by a content rendering device. At least one portion of the content associated with the first super distributed content file is determined to be missing from the first super distributed content file. A second file including the at least one portion of the content missing from the first super distributed content file is obtained from a server. The at least one portion of the content of the second file includes partial encrypted portions of the content associated with an encryption system of the content rendering device. A content output stream including decrypted partial encrypted portions of the content of the second file and the content associated with the first super distributed content file is generated. This abstract is not to be considered limiting, since other embodiments may deviate from the features described in this abstract.

A method and system of providing conditional access to encrypted content includes receiving unsolicited multiply encrypted video content and first decryption data over a broadcast network. Partially decrypted video content is obtained by decrypting a first layer of encryption of the encrypted video content using the first decryption data. The partially decrypted video content is stored. A request for viewing the encrypted video content is transmitted and second decryption data is received. A second layer of encryption of the encrypted video content is decrypted using the second decryption data.

An enhanced encryption keypad (100) capable of preventing illegal disassembly for an automated teller machine comprises a key panel (101) and a main control board (102). A removal detection protection circuit is disposed inside a main chip of the main control board (102), and at least one pin of the removal detection protection circuit is guided out from a surface (1021) of a side of the main control board (102) near the key panel to form a removal detection point (1022). The removal detection point (1022) has two opened signal contact points. The two opened signal contact points are conducted by a conductive adhesive (103) to activate the removal detection protection circuit. A conductive protection ring (1023) isolated from the removal detection point is disposed at the periphery of the removal detection point. The conductive protection ring (1023) is connected to the removal detection protection circuit inside the main control chip. A protection circle (1024) is disposed at the periphery of the conductive protection ring and the corresponding conductive adhesive. The present application effectively protects the encryption keypad from illegal attacks on the removal detection point from the side.

A semiconductor structure including a device configured to receive an input data-word. The device including a logic structure configured to generate an encrypted data-word by encrypting the input data-word through an encrypting operation. The device further including an eFuse storage device configured to store the encrypted data-word as eFuse data by blowing fuses in accordance with the encrypted data-word.

The Trump administration has revived the debate over "end-to-end encryption" — systems so secure that the tech companies themselves aren't able to read the messages, even when police present them with a warrant. "It is hard to overstate how perilous this is," U.S. Attorney General William Barr said in a speech last fall. "By enabling dangerous criminals to cloak their communications and activities behind an essentially impenetrable digital shield, the deployment of warrant-proof encryption is already imposing huge costs on society." Barr has been concerned about this for years, but he has become more vocal recently as encryption goes mainstream. It's now built into popular services such as Skype and WhatsApp, and even Facebook may soon be encrypted . Republican senator and Trump ally Lindsey Graham recently floated legislation that would strip tech companies of their liability protection under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act unless they comply with as-of-yet undefined

One of the key points we've been making concerning Attorney General William Barr and his DOJ's eager support for the terrible EARN-IT Act, is that much of it really seems to be to cover up the DOJ's own failings in fighting child porn and child exploitation. The premise behind the EARN IT Act is that there's a lot of child exploitation/child abuse material found on social media... and that social media companies should do more to block that content. Of course, if you step back and think about it, you'd quickly realize that this is a form of sweeping the problem under the rug. Rather than actually tracking down and arresting those exploiting and abusing children, it's demanding private companies just hide the evidence of those horrific acts.

And why might the DOJ and others be so supportive of sweeping evidence under the rug and hiding it? Perhaps because the DOJ and Congress have literally failed to live up to their mandates under existing laws to actually fight child exploitation. Barr's DOJ has been required under law to produce reports showing data about internet crimes against children, and come up with goals to fight those crimes. It has produced only two out of the six reports that were mandated over a decade ago. At the same time, Congress has only allocated a very small budget to state and local law enforcement for fighting internet child abuse. While the laws Congress passed say that Congress should give $60 million to local law enforcement, it has actually allocated only about half of that. Oh, and Homeland Security took nearly half of its "cybercrimes" budget and diverted it to immigration enforcement, rather than fighting internet crimes such as child exploitation.

So... maybe we should recognize that the problem isn't social media platforms, but the fact that Congress and law enforcement -- from local and state up to the DOJ -- have literally failed to do their job.

At least some elected officials have decided to call the DOJ's bluff on why we need the EARN IT Act. Led by Senator Ron Wyden (of course), Senators Kirsten Gillbrand, Bob Casey, Sherrod Brown and Rep. Anna Eshoo have introduced a new bill to actually fight child sex abuse online. Called the Invest in Child Safety Act, it would basically make law enforcement do its job regarding this stuff.

The Invest in Child Safety Act would direct $5 billion in mandatory funding to investigate and target the pedophiles and abusers who create and share child sexual abuse material online. And it would create a new White House office to coordinate efforts across federal agencies, after DOJ refused to comply with a 2008 law requiring coordination and reporting of those efforts. It also directs substantial new funding for community-based efforts to prevent children from becoming victims in the first place.

Basically, the bill would do a bunch of things to make sure that law enforcement is actually dealing with the very real problem of child exploitation, rather than demanding that internet companies (1) sweep evidence under the rug, and (2) break encryption:

• Quadruple the number of prosecutors and agents in DOJ’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section from 30 FTEs to 120 FTEs;
• Add 100 new agents and investigators for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Innocent Images National Initiative, Crimes Against Children Unit, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Teams, and Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Forces;
• Fund 65 new NCMEC analysts, engineers, and mental health counselors, as well as a major upgrade to NCMEC’s technology platform to enable the organization to more effectively evaluate and process CSAM reports from tech companies;
• Double funding for the state Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Forces;
• Double funding for the National Criminal Justice Training Center, to administer crucial Internet Crimes Against Children and Missing and Exploited Children training programs;
• Increase funding for evidence-based programs, local governments and non-federal entities to detect, prevent and support victims of child sexual abuse, including school-based mental health services and prevention programs like the Children’s Advocacy Centers and the HHS’ Street Outreach Program;
• Require tech companies to increase the time that they hold evidence of CSAM, in a secure database, to enable law enforcement agencies to prosecute older cases;
• Establish an Office to Enforce and Protect Against Child Sexual Exploitation, within the Executive Office of the President, to direct and streamline the federal government’s efforts to prevent, investigate and prosecute the scourge of child exploitation;
• Require the Office to develop an enforcement and protection strategy, in coordination with HHS and GAO; and
• Require the Office to submit annual monitoring reports, subject to mandatory Congressional testimony to ensure timely execution.

As there have been countless cases of Zoombombing in the recent weeks, the security in the video conferencing platform Zoom has been doubted by its users. In response to this, Zoom finally announced on Thursday that they will be implementing and offering end-to-end encryption.

With the acquisition of Keybase, a New York-based startup specializing in encrypted messaging and cloud services, Zoom will finally be able to make good on its claims of offering end-to-end encryption.

“We are excited to integrate Keybase’s team into the Zoom family to help us build end-to-end encryption that can reach current Zoom scalability,” CEO Eric Yuan said in a Zoom blog post on Thursday.

Unfortunately, not all Zoom users will benefit from the company’s new move, as the end-to-end encryption feature will only be available to users who have paid plans (which start at $14.99/month, by the way) on the video conferencing platform.

If a meeting’s host has enabled this feature, participants will be barred from joining by phone and cloud-based recording will be disabled. In Thursday’s blog post, Yuan emphasized that the feature will not store the encryption key on Zoom’s servers, so the company will not be able to see any part of the call.

What are your thoughts about this one?

(Image Credit: Zoom/ Wikimedia Commons)

Here's a ransomware story with a difference. Some of your files can be recovered without paying, while others get wiped out forever.

Six sources confirmed Apple changed its mind on end-to-end encrypted backups two years ago following an FBI complaint and concerns users could lose access to their own data.

Attorney General William Barr has a completely wrong-headed take on encryption, and he's not the only one. Adding backdoors to secure services is a terrible idea, despite its popularity with law enforcement.

I'm sending encrypted HDL to a customer who will use Cadence IES for simulation and was wondering how I should go about the encryption.

Does IES support the IEEE's P1735 and if so, where can I find Cadence's public key for performing the encryption?

Or is there an alternative solution that I can use for encryption?

Hyperion is a runtime encrypter for 32-bit and 64-bit portable executables. It is a reference implementation and bases on the paper "Hyperion: Implementation of a PE-Crypter".

Hyperion is a runtime encrypter for 32-bit and 64-bit portable executables. It is a reference implementation and bases on the paper "Hyperion: Implementation of a PE-Crypter".

Neowise CarbonFTP version 1.4 suffers from an insecure proprietary password encryption implementation. Second version of this exploit that is updated to work with Python 3.

The Mandos system allows computers to have encrypted root file systems and at the same time be capable of remote or unattended reboots. The computers run a small client program in the initial RAM disk environment which will communicate with a server over a network. All network communication is encrypted using TLS. The clients are identified by the server using an OpenPGP key that is unique to each client. The server sends the clients an encrypted password. The encrypted password is decrypted by the clients using the same OpenPGP key, and the password is then used to unlock the root file system.

TP-LINK Cloud Cameras including products NC260 and NC450 suffer from a command injection vulnerability. The issue is located in the httpSetEncryptKeyRpm method (handler for /setEncryptKey.fcgi) of the ipcamera binary, where the user-controlled EncryptKey parameter is used directly as part of a command line to be executed as root without any input sanitization.

This whitepaper goes into detail on design and implementation details for performing voice encryption on telephone networks. Written in Spanish.

Whitepaper called Blue Team vs. Red Team: How to run your encrypted binaries in memory and go undetected. This paper discusses the golden frieza project.

The Global TV Android and iOS applications send potentially sensitive information such as device model and resolution, mobile carrier, days since first use, days since last use, total number of app launches, number of app launches since upgrade, and previous app session length, unencrypted to both first (CNAME to third) and third party sites (Adobe Experience Cloud, ScorecardResearch). Global TV Android versions 2.3.2 and below and iOS versions 4.7.5 and below are affected.

The Citytv Video Android and iOS applications send potentially sensitive information such as device model and resolution, mobile carrier, days since first use, days since last use, total number of app launches, number of app launches since upgrade, and previous app session length, unencrypted to third party sites (Adobe Experience Cloud, ScorecardResearch). Citytv Video Android versions 4.08.0 and below and iOS versions 3.36 and below are affected.

The Mandos system allows computers to have encrypted root file systems and at the same time be capable of remote or unattended reboots. The computers run a small client program in the initial RAM disk environment which will communicate with a server over a network. All network communication is encrypted using TLS. The clients are identified by the server using an OpenPGP key that is unique to each client. The server sends the clients an encrypted password. The encrypted password is decrypted by the clients using the same OpenPGP key, and the password is then used to unlock the root file system.

This Metasploit module exploits a well known remote code execution exploit after establishing encrypted control communications with a Data Protector agent. This allows exploitation of Data Protector agents that have been configured to only use encrypted control communications. This exploit works by executing the payload with Microsoft PowerShell so will only work against Windows Vista or newer. Tested against Data Protector 9.0 installed on Windows Server 2008 R2.