President Barack Obama will travel to Mexico and then to the 5th Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad, beginning on April 16th. He would do well to remember Ronald Reagan's seemingly obvious but fundamentally important comment on returning from his first trip to South America as President: "These Latin American countries are all very different from each other."

It's crucially important for the new U.S. government at its senior levels to take seriously the oft-repeated advice of regional experts to disaggregate "Latin America" -- to understand its complex diversity. Emphasizing this is now more important than ever.

During the past 20 years, under administrations of both parties, Washington has tended to underline the supposed convergence within the region: toward democratic governance, market-oriented economies, regional economic integration and policies of macroeconomic and fiscal balance. These convergent trends were real, though never universal, and they have been significant, though never as fully consolidated as Washington liked to claim.

Key differences persist among the many countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Some of the differences are growing, not shrinking. And U.S. policy should focus on how different countries of the Americas cluster along five separate dimensions.

The first is the degree of demographic and economic interdependence with the United States: highest and still growing in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean: lowest and likely to remain low in South America, and especially in the Southern Cone. Countries such as Mexico, El Salvador, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and others, which have significant fractions of their population living and working in the United States, pose "intermestic" issues -- combining international and domestic facets -- from immigration to medical insurance, pensions to drivers licenses, remittances to youth gangs.

A second dimension is the extent to which the countries have opened their economies to international competition: by far most fully in Chile; a great deal in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Panama and some Central American nations; and less so in other countries. A key challenge in the current world economic crisis will be to shore up the trend toward open economies by resisting domestic pressure for protectionism in our own case.

A third distinguishing dimension is the relative advance of democratic governance (checks and balances, accountability, and the rule of law): historically strong in Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica; increasingly, if quite unevenly, robust in Brazil; gaining ground in Mexico over the past twenty years but with ups and downs, hard struggle and major recent setbacks; arguably declining, or at least at risk, in Argentina; under great strain in Venezuela, most of the Andean nations, much of Central America and Paraguay; and exceptionally weak in Haiti. The Obama administration can make an important positive difference on these issues by respecting the rule of law at home and internationally, and by nurturing democratic governance abroad with patience, restraint and skill, mainly through nongovernmental organizations.

A fourth dimension is the relative effectiveness of civic and political institutions beyond the state (the press, trade unions, religious organizations, and nongovernmental entities): strongest in Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and perhaps Argentina; growing but still severely challenged in Brazil and Mexico; slowly regaining stature but still quite problematic in Colombia; weak in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, most of Central America and Haiti. Washington can help strengthen nongovernmental institutions, but it should do so as much as possible through multilateral organizations, and in strict accordance with each country's laws.

Finally, countries differ regarding the extent to which traditionally excluded populations are incorporated: this includes more than 30 million marginalized, disadvantaged, and increasingly politically mobilized indigenous people -- especially in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, the Peruvian highlands, and southern Mexico -- and Afro-Latin Americans in countries where they are still the object of racial discrimination. The very fact of President Obama's rise to the presidency has probably done more to affect this issue than years of more direct policies, but enhanced U.S. support for poverty alleviation targeted at excluded populations would also be helpful.

Hemisphere-wide summit conferences like the meeting in Trinidad have their place as a way of building communication and rapport, and they offer mutually convenient photo opportunities. But major progress on substantive issues can only be achieved with clusters of countries with comparable or complementary issues and concerns. Recognizing this reality should be the starting point for reframing U.S. policies in the Americas.

President Obama ought to be pleased. At the Summit of the Americas he walked into a skeptical audience and charmed his way around. He struck the right notes and, as anyone who has attended these events knows, it is the tone that matters, much more than the substance. Obama was eloquent, accessible, and modest yet firm, with no discernible sign of the “ugly American” sobriquet that so clearly bedeviled his predecessor. Daniel Ortega’s rants notwithstanding, when the President is on top form, as he was in Trinidad, he is very difficult to antagonize.

The concrete results of the Summit were meager at best. Then again, this was never about results. For Latin America it was all about gauging Obama. The messenger was the message. The President clearly understood that modesty would go a long way in a region that combines growing self-confidence with a deep historical resentment towards the U.S. The latter attitude owes much to the U.S. constant meddling in the region’s politics throughout the 20th Century, but also to a simmering inferiority complex on the Latin American side rooted in the unflattering comparison between the U.S. phenomenal historical success and Latin America’s fitful journey towards development. Increasingly autonomous from its powerful neighbor, whose sight and mind are set elsewhere these days, Latin American countries were not really expecting Obama to show up with anything concrete at the Summit, least of all money. Like the young Aretha Franklin, all they wanted was respect. And they got it.

To be sure, the U.S. commitment of $100 million for a fund to support small entrepreneurs in the Hemisphere is an interesting measure. At a minimum it reinforces another key message that Obama delivered: that poverty, inequality, and lack of opportunities for the youth are key issues for Latin America. Obama gave clear hints that he understands that prosperity in the Hemisphere demands more than free trade and foreign investment, crucial as both can be. It also requires support for more robust social policies, an area in which most Latin American governments have made genuine strides in the past decade, in ways both moderate and radical. To hear that the U.S. President grasps the really substantive development issues in Latin America and exhibits a more nuanced view of progress does come as a relief to the region.

Despite the dearth of immediate results, this mutation in tone will lead in due course to concrete changes in the relationship. It is already setting in motion unexpected diplomatic moves. Hugo Chavez has already announced that his government is appointing a new Ambassador to the U.S. This is a sign of civility from someone who thrives in conflict.

And then there is Cuba. On this, the ball is now firmly on the Cubans’ turf, even more so than before the Summit. Building on the rather modest announcements made by President Obama prior to the Summit, tepidly received in Latin America, U.S. diplomats did a superb job of putting the Cubans under the spotlight. Despite the rhetorical harshness of the past few days, most reasonable people in the Hemisphere expect them to reciprocate with something tangible, even a small step. It will be interesting to see, for instance, if the Cubans allow U.S. telecommunications investment in the island, which in order to be effective requires, of course, licenses and permits issued by the Cuban government. Gestures of that kind would lead to a tit-for-tat dynamics that could develop into more substantive steps, probably very rapidly.

Should one of the early steps be the re-admission of Cuba to the Organization of American States (OAS), an idea floated repeatedly during the Summit? No, and the U.S. was right to receive it with deafening silence. On this, the U.S. is right to draw a line and act conservatively. The OAS is a community of democracies, defined by, amongst other things, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, a document approved on a meaningful day for freedom and democracy – September 11, 2001. Moreover, Latin America’s single biggest achievement of the past generation has been to leave behind a long authoritarian night. No other region in the developing world can say as much. As Ted Piccone, a Brookings scholar, has forcefully argued, it would be a pity to give away that legacy for nothing. While it would be good to open the possibility of Cuba approaching eventually the Inter-American System, granting it immediate membership without pre-conditions would send an ominous signal, not just to Cuba but to other countries in the region that are teetering on the verge of authoritarianism, such as Venezuela and Nicaragua. Cuba does not deserve to be punished with a U.S. embargo for being what it is, but neither should it be rewarded with membership in a club of nations that defend values that are negated on a daily basis in the island. Obama’s silence on this was right too.

All things considered, the Summit was a success for the President and for the U.S. Despite the usual chorus of U.S. conservative voices that see weakness in any sign of humility, American interests and security in the Hemisphere are far better served by Obama’s demeanor at the Summit, than by any amount of chest-thumping. Today, no nation in Latin America poses any significant strategic threat to U.S. security demanding confrontation or containment. Without exception, the challenges that will define the future of Hemispheric relations –ranging from energy security to climate change, from immigration to organized crime— call for collective responses. They are common assignments that are to be solved through dialogue and cooperation across the Hemisphere. As the old Spanish saying has it, “courtesy detracts not from bravery.” In the Western Hemisphere a little modesty, civility, and respect can also be stupendous foreign policy.

In advance of President Obama’s trip to Panama later this week, Brookings experts Richard Feinberg, Ted Piccone, and Harold Trinkunas discuss expectations for the Seventh Summit of the Americas. Obama will arrive holding a strong hand given recent policy changes that have addressed historic obstacles, such as relations with Cuba. However, a slowing regional economy and U.S.-Venezuela tensions may yet cast a shadow over the proceedings.

Read the transcript » (PDF)

Improved United States-Latin America relations

“The United States is going into this next Summit of the Americas in a somewhat improved position compared to the summits in both Cartagena in 2012 and in Trinidad in 2009, where there was a considerable amount of friction among the countries on issues related to Cuba, to counter narcotics policy, to immigration policy. Broadly speaking, I think the Obama administration has done something incredible on each of these fronts, which the countries will recognize and which will help clear the air.”  —Harold Trinkunas

Friction with Venezuela?

“There are 35 countries. At any given time, there's going to be some friction. At the last summit, the Argentines raised the Malvinas issue.  At previous summits, the Bolivians raised the outlets of the sea issue. So there's always a little bit of this. But whether or not [Venezuela] dominates the summit is an issue largely for the Latin Americans to decide. And my guess is the Latin Americans in general will not want to follow Maduro over the cliff. I don't even think that the Cubans will want Maduro to take the summit over the cliff. So therefore, I think we have this sort of tremendous irony in which the country that adds -- that dampens the dissident voices of ALBA will actually be Cuba, because Cuba wanted to demonstrate that it can be a constructive voice in regional diplomacy, that they're not just the force of disruption and therefore, the U.S. all these years was right to keep them out because they would just be disruptive if you let them in. They've already demonstrated they're a mature country that can engage constructively.”  —Richard Feinberg

Dialogue with Cuba

“It's in our interest, U.S. national interest, to have this dialogue process with our close neighbor, Cuba. And to, frankly, bring them back towards the inter-American community, where they've been missing for all these years. [The U.S. rapprochement with Cuba] is also going to raise the question of shifting attention to the role of the rest of the region vis-à-vis Cuba; that it's not just the United States. It's actually the other countries in the hemisphere that could help Cuba come along, as I said, modernize, update its economy, and hopefully at some point, engage more formally in the inter-American system.”  —Ted Piccone

Sub-regional groupings

“This is a much more diverse hemisphere than we saw 20 years ago... In fact, we may see that there's sort of a broad agreement on general themes and then much more sub-regional groupings that work on issues like the Northern Triangle, for example, or Caribbean Energy Security, which was an initiative of the vice president last year.”  —Harold Trinkunas

Summit side events with the private sector and civil society

“You have the leaders representing the executive branches of their governments, but you also have the CEO Summit. Seven hundred corporate executives will be there. There will be interaction between the leaders and the corporate executives...It's indicative of the rise of the private sector and the corporate sector in Latin America as part of a dynamic growing region economically.

Throughout the hemisphere, the acceptance of Civil Society as a concept, as an actor, adds depth to democracy. Democracy is not just elections or that's important, but an active, vibrant Civil Society. And that's what you'll see at the Civil Society meeting. And President Obama personally we're told will interact with Civil Society leaders, as will other leaders present there.”  —Richard Feinberg

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On April 10 and 11, 2015, the Seventh Summit of the Americas will bring together the heads of state and government of every country in the Western Hemisphere for the first time. Recent efforts by the United States to reform immigration policy, re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, and reform our approach to drug policies at home and abroad have generated greater optimism about the future of inter-American relations. This Summit provides an opportunity to spark greater collaboration on development, social inclusion, democracy, education, and energy security.

However, this Summit of the Americas is also convening at a time when the hemisphere is characterized by competing visions for economic development, democracy and human rights, and regional cooperation through various institutions such as the Organization of American States, the Union of South American Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

On Friday, April 3, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted Assistant Secretary of State Roberta S. Jacobson for a discussion on the Seventh Summit of the Americas and what it portends for the future of hemispheric relations.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #VIISummit

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On April 10th and 11th, the heads of state and government from nearly every state in the Americas will meet in Panama City for the Seventh Summit of the Americas. The leaders present in Panama preside over a region that has advanced far and fast on key political and economic indicators since the first of these meetings was held in Miami in 1994. At the Miami Summit, the legacy of the Cold War was very much present, and the specter of war, military dictatorship, armed revolution, financial crises, and political instability still hung in the air. 

In 2015, the region is by and large more democratic, economically prosperous, free from war, and the last insurgency in the region—Colombia’s—is winding down as peace is discussed between the government and its opponents at talks hosted by Havana. The beginning of a rapprochement between the United States and Cuba in December 2014 broke down one of the last remaining obstacles to an event that is truly inclusive of every country in the Western Hemisphere. 

In comparison to the rest of the world—where in the past year we have witnessed terrorist attacks in Paris, war in Ukraine, insurgency in Yemen, and saber-rattling around the South China Sea—the Western Hemisphere appears to be relatively better off. While there are a small number of countries that face challenging circumstances, especially among the fragile states of the Caribbean basin, these problems mostly threaten local rather than regional order. Given this picture, what lessons can we learn from the Western Hemisphere, and from U.S. policy towards the region, as we contemplate how best to improve global order?

Drawing the right lessons from history

The Americas have a long history of developing regional norms that promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Since the founding of the Panamerican Union in 1890, which transformed into the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948, the countries of the hemisphere have embedded these norms of peace into their multilateral institutions. While frequently criticized, it is important to remember that the OAS has presided over the elimination of inter-state conflict in the Americas. 

Today, Latin American states resolve territorial disputes at the International Court of Justice rather than on the battlefield. The last war in the region, between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, occurred two decades ago. Given how rare militarized disputes are at home, Latin American soldiers frequently serve as peacekeepers in United Nations missions around the world. Latin Americans have become good at peacemaking and peacekeeping, something that other regions of the world would do well to emulate.

When it comes to domestic politics, most leaders in the region now understand the political and economic principles that contribute to stability. Governments have become much better about economic governance, which means that as South America’s economy cools off this year, fiscal problems will be manageable and localized rather than region-wide and existential, a sharp contrast with the 1980s and 1990s. 

Leaders in the region have learned that promoting polarization for short-term political advantage is all too likely to produce instability, coups, and revolution. To minimize the risk that domestic political violence might reoccur in the future, states in the region have self-consciously examined the legacy of their authoritarian pasts, using innovative processes such as truth and reconciliation commissions—initially in Argentina in 1983—but also drawing on traditional courts to prosecute perpetrators of past abuses.  

In the 21st century, successful coups d’état have become rare, and when they do occur, as was the case in Honduras in 2009, the region collaborates to ensure a return to democracy. Here again is an area where Latin America has led the way through policies that reduce the likelihood of domestic conflicts that threaten internal stability or global order.

The importance of revisiting unworkable U.S. policies 

At this Summit in Panama, President Barack Obama will be able to credibly claim that he has listened to his Latin American counterparts and has begun to change policies that had become obstacles to improving regional order. At the 2009 and 2012 Summits (they occur every three years), U.S. policies on drugs, immigration, and Cuba had made President Obama the target of growing criticism from other leaders. In fact, many governments had made it clear that they would not attend the 2015 Summit if Cuba was not invited. 

Since 2012, the Obama administration has taken steps to address these concerns. It has taken executive action to reform immigration policy, signaled greater openness to drug policy liberalization by states such as Uruguay, and initiated a historic normalization of relations with Cuba. In each of these areas, the United States has shifted from policies that were largely unilateral towards its neighbors to policies that emphasize collaboration and partnership. This reflects U.S. learning that unilateralism produces blowback, strengthens its political adversaries in the region, and undermines its interests in the long run. This is a lesson worth considering as we think about our policies towards troubled regions of the world.

The risk of forgetting lessons learned

Yet not all countries and all politicians have remembered these lessons, and some of them have learned the wrong ones. In Argentina, macroeconomic stability is at risk due to a feud between the government and its international creditors. The result is a country cut off from international capital markets at a time when its economy is suffering the effect of declining commodity prices. Venezuela faces a deep crisis that has at its heart the highly polarizing politics practiced by the governing party and an unreasoning attachment to an unworkable economic model. Key countries such as Brazil have lost interest in hemisphere-wide institutions, as indicated by their refusal to appoint an ambassador to the OAS or pay their membership dues. And the region as a whole has become so attached to multilateralism and politics by consensus that is has forgotten how to work together when individual member states deviate from regional norms of democracy and human rights, as is occurring today in Venezuela.

So while the recent history of the Americas offers insights into policies that contribute to a peaceful and stable regional order, it also illustrates that these achievements are not irreversible. Let us hope that future generations do not have the relearn these lessons anew. At this and future Summits, there must be a commitment to preserving the gains made in peace, democracy, human rights, and economic prosperity, but also a new emphasis on developing workable mechanisms to address deviations from the norms and practices that have contributed to making the Americas a relative safe and orderly region of the world.

For more information, check out Emily Miller's post on U.S. priorities at the Seventh Summit of the Americas.

On Friday, April 3, the Brookings Latin America Initiative hosted Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson to discuss the state of inter-American relations and expectations for the Seventh Summit of the Americas to be held on April 10 to 11 in Panama City, Panama. With Cuba in attendance for the first time, this summit will be a chance for the entire region to have a robust conversation on hemispheric challenges and opportunities.

The event began with a keynote address by Assistant Secretary Jacobson, and was followed with a discussion moderated by Richard Feinberg—dubbed the “godfather” of the Summit process for his role in the first Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994—and Harold Trinkunas. This event also launched a new Brookings policy brief by Richard Feinberg, Emily Miller, and Harold Trinkunas, entitled "Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations." 

Assistant Secretary Jacobson began her remarks by highlighting the areas where her own thinking coincides with the arguments in this new policy brief. Principally, she argued that developments in the hemisphere over the past few decades have largely been positive for U.S. interests. Although this does not mean Latin America and the United States will agree on everything, she noted that there are many areas of mutual interests on which the United States can work together with Latin America countries as equal partners.

Jacobson explained that this desire to forge equal partnerships based on common values and interests was precisely the notion expressed by President Obama at the 2009 Summit in Trinidad. The upcoming Summit is a chance to showcase this updated architecture for cooperation and partnership, which includes the CEO Summit of the Americas (initiated in 2012) and the Civil Society and Social Actors Forum (new this year).

Key issues for the U.S. at the Summit of the Americas

Assistant Secretary Jacobson outlined the four priorities for the United States going into the Summit:

• Democracy and human rights: Jacobson stated that the United States “applauds governments around the hemisphere that have supported a more robust civil society role.” The civil society side event provides a critical feedback loop that is one way for leaders to be held accountable by their citizens. Jacobson noted, however, that there remain very real challenges to democracy in Venezuela. While this is something that should concern the entire hemisphere, it is ultimately up to the Venezuelans to resolve.

• Global competitiveness: The focus of the United States will be on small businesses, which are important job creators but do not always receive the support they need in terms of access to credit or support in job training. The Small Business Network of the Americas has fostered over 4,000 small business development centers, and in Colombia alone has created nearly 6,000 jobs.

• Social development: Latin America remains the most unequal region of the world. There have been important reductions in poverty and growth of the middle class, but sustained improvements will require economic diversification and targeted efforts to reach vulnerable populations. To address the education deficit in the region, Jacobson highlighted the 100,000 Strong in the Americas program which connects institutions to institutions and seeks to provide students with actionable and employable skills. 

• Energy and climate change: The high cost of energy prevents some countries from realizing their full potential and feeds migration, poverty, and violence. Sharing in the enormous energy wealth of other nations must be done responsibly and sustainably, noted Jacobson. The Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas and Connecting the Americas 2022 aim to “promote renewable energy efficiency, cleaner fossil fuels, resilient infrastructure, and interconnection.”

U.S. rationale behind targeted sanctions on Venezuela

When asked about flashpoints or problems areas for the United States in the upcoming summit, Jacobson pointed to the sanctions on seven Venezuelan officials and the concern they have generated. However, she was careful to clarify that the executive order used standard language and was in no way a prelude to invasion or a forced regime change. Moreover, she noted that the legislation had been pending in Congress for two years, during which a dialogue between the opposition and government facilitated by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was attempted but stalled. Jacobson explained that it is important to remember that these sanctions are very targeted and do not intend to harm the Venezuelan people or even the Venezuelan government as a whole.

Engagement with Cuba and Brazil

In Jacobson’s view, there are no large systemic issues that stand to block progress at the Summit. She explained that the Obama administration’s greater flexibility on counter-narcotics policies, reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Cuba, and focus on the Trans-Pacific Partnership have removed many historic obstacles.

There remains work to be done, however. Jacobson stated that while interaction at the Summit between President Obama and Raúl Castro will serve to further the relationship and continue momentum for the normalization process, the engagement with Cuba will not deter the United States from speaking out on human rights violations. The administration’s view is that the human rights situation in Cuba is inadequate. Jacobson reiterated the need to respect international norms of human rights and that the United States will continue to support those who peacefully fight for that space to be open.

Finally, she recognized the importance of U.S. engagement with Brazil. According to Jacobson, the United States sees Brazil as a leader on social inclusion, and even on economic competitiveness as it openly debates how to restart economic growth. Though the United States and Brazil do not see eye-to-eye on issues of climate change, she recognized that working with Brazil will be crucial in this area as well.

A desire for cooperation

With a desire to focus on pragmatic approaches rather than ideology, Jacobson expressed an openness to cooperation: “We’re willing to engage with every country in the hemisphere, every country in the hemisphere, any country that wants to partner with us. Because they’re in all of our interests. And that’s the way partnerships should be based, on mutual interests…that’s what makes them durable.”

For more information, check out Latin America Initiative Director and Senior Fellow Harold Trinkunas's blog on the lessons in global governance the hemisphere has to offer.

At the previous Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012, President Barack Obama was badly roughed up by his Latin American counterparts (and embarrassed by his Secret Service for entertaining sex workers). Happily, the president and his entourage did much better at last week’s Summit in Panama, but the United States still has a way to go before the Summits once again become the productive vehicle for U.S. foreign policy that they once were, at their founding in Miami in 1994.

In Cartagena, leader after leader criticized the United States for allegedly heavy-handed counter-narcotics policies; oppressive treatment of immigrants; a weak response to crime and poverty in Central America; and monetary policies that supposedly harmed their economies. Most pointedly, speakers denounced the decades-old economic sanctions against Cuba. But given the upcoming Congressional elections, Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not want to do anything to endanger their Democratic Party’s chances. Obama was reduced to affirming, uncharacteristically, “I am here to listen, but our policies will not change.”

Once the November 2012 mid-term elections were over, policies did, in fact, change as the United States took a more relaxed approach to counternarcotics; the administration announced immigration policy reforms, including negotiating agreements with Central American nations to reduce the outflow of children and promote economic growth and jobs at home; and Vice President Joseph Biden met repeatedly with Central American leaders, and offered $1 billion in economic and security assistance.

In Cartagena, the Latin Americans threatened to boycott the Panama Summit if Cuba was not invited. But last December 17, President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro announced their agreement to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations, and in one blow, the United States transformed a thorn in relations with Latin America into a triumph of inter-American diplomacy that significantly enhanced U.S. prestige in the region.

So in Panama, most of the Latin American and Caribbean leaders, rather than berate the U.S. president, praised him for his courage and generally treated him with courtesy and respect. The three leaders of Central America’s Northern Tier (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—whose president is a former guerrilla commander) were effusive in their praise. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who in Cartagena had sharply criticized U.S. monetary policies and had cancelled a visit to the White House to protest NSA spying, was pleased to announce that her visit had been rescheduled for this June. 

Obama’s own performance was more spirited than it had been in Cartagena. In response to a harsh polemic by Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, Obama shot back: “The U.S. may be a handy excuse for diverting attention from domestic political problems, but it won’t solve those problems.” After listening politely through Raúl Castro’s extended remarks—during which Castro praised him as a man of honesty and authenticity—Obama departed to avoid having to sit through the predictable harangues of Argentine President Cristina Kirchner and Bolivian leader Evo Morales. Few could blame him.

At the parallel CEO Summit of business executives, Obama delivered thoughtful responses to questions posed by several entrepreneurs including Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, distinguishing himself from the facile rhetorical answers of the other presidents on the panel. At a Civil Society Forum where delegates affiliated with Cuban government organizations engaged in disruptive tactics, Obama lectured firmly on the virtues of civility and tolerance. Together with two other presidents (Tabaré Vasquez of Uruguay and Guillermo Solis of Costa Rica), Obama met privately with a dozen leaders of nongovernmental organizations, took notes, and incorporated at least one of their suggestions into his later public remarks.

But Obama’s Panama experience was marred by an inexplicable misstep by his White House aides a month earlier—the very public sanctioning of seven Venezuelan officials for alleged human rights violation and corruption, and the declaration that Venezuela was a “threat to U.S. national security.” To Latin American ears, that language recalled Cold War-era justifications for CIA plots and military coups. The State Department claims it warned the White House against Latin American blowback, but perhaps not forcefully enough. Once Latin American anger become apparent, the White House tried to walk the “national security” language back, saying it was just a formality required by U.S. legislation, but the damage was done. Speaker after speaker condemned the “unilateral sanctions” and called for their repeal.

The ill-timed sanctions announcement provided Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his populist allies with a ready stick to beat the United States. For whileObama’s diplomacy had managed to peel off most of the Central Americans and win over or at least diminish the antagonism of other leaders, it had not found a way to tranquilize the rejectionist states (Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina) tied to Venezuela in an “anti-imperialist” alliance. Although a relatively small minority, these spoilers seriously disrupt plenary meetings with long and vituperative monologues, and small minorities of “veto” players can block the signing of otherwise consensus documents such that in Panama, as in Cartagena, no consensus declaration was issued; rather the host leader signed brief “mandates for action” that lacked full legitimacy.

The problem of the rejectionist minority will be partially alleviated when Kirchner is shortly replaced, likely by a more moderate government in Argentina, and political turnover will eventually come in Venezuela, but the hemisphere needs new rules that protect majority rights to get things done. Some simple procedural innovations, such as a more forceful chair, or even the simple system of red-yellow-green lights that alert speakers to their time limits, would help.

Notwithstanding the misstep on Venezuela sanctions and the disruptive tactics of the rejectionist minority, the overall mood in Panama was upbeat, even celebratory. Leaders made reference to the xenophobic violence and religious intolerance plaguing other continents, and remarked with some pride that, in comparison, Latin America was a zone of peace that was also making progress, however inadequate, on human rights, poverty alleviation, and clean energy. With some procedural fixes, favorable political winds, and continued progress on concrete issues of mutual interest, inter-American relations could well continue their upward trajectory.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on Cuba's multi-level strategy at the Seventh Summit of the Americas.

President Obama arrived in Panama for the seventh Summit of the Americas with a clear mission: restore the feel-good atmosphere of his first regional summit in Trinidad. There he received plaudits as the first African-American president, a post-unilateralist leader for a more multipolar world. Six years later, and with a complicated record to defend, he had to work harder for the ovations. But his administration’s efforts paid off, and he left Panama a winner. The President’s decision to remove Cuba from the dreaded U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism is further demonstration that Obama is convinced that U.S. interests in Cuba are best served through constructive engagement and not onerous sanctions. Now he must persuade Congress.

First and foremost, the Panama Summit will be remembered for cementing the historic process of normalization of ties between the United States and Cuba launched by Presidents Obama and Raúl Castro on December 17. The Panama meeting offered a chance not only for the rest of the region to ratify Obama’s overture to Castro, but to close the books on the Cold War and open a new chapter in inter-American relations. Bill Clinton led the way on this track in the 1990s, but the train got derailed in the 2000s under George W. Bush. The ghosts of Washington’s heavy-handed past, on matters such as the war on drugs, immigration, counter-terrorism, and the hangover of the “Washington consensus,” returned to haunt Obama’s second summit in Cartagena in 2012. The White House was determined to re-set course before sitting through another series of harangues against the sins of the past by delivering important progress on several policy fronts in the months leading up to Panama. 

No issue was more representative of U.S. bullying in the region than the decades-old embargo against Cuba. When the region’s presidents said they would not come to Panama unless Cuba was invited as a full participant, the White House was forced to fish or cut bait. Correctly, President Obama chose to fish. The breakthrough of December 17 was rewarded with widespread praise by his counterparts and by publics in both the United States and Cuba. The president’s main task for Panama, then, was to deliver a winning message for the first face-to-face meeting in over five decades of hostilities.

Source: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

No image better captures the competing narratives of the deep historical differences between the United States and Cuba than the one above. The elder Raúl Castro, who does not have to worry about his state-controlled media, plugs his ears to drown out the clamor of journalists asking questions after the two leaders’ first meeting, while the younger Obama is ready to engage the press, a customary stance for leaders in a democracy.

The contrast between old and new continued in the plenary where Obama gave a focused presentation  about moving beyond “the old grievances that had too often trapped us in the past” to a future based on shared responsibility and mutual respect. “We’re looking to the future and to policies that improve the lives of the Cuban people.”

Castro, on the other hand, multiplied his allotted eight minutes of remarks to 48 (to make up for the six summits Cuba was not invited to, he joked) to recount a long litany of transgressions by previous U.S. governments dating back to 1800. He reminded the audience of Washington’s overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Guatemala in 1954 as the precursor to Cuba’s own popular revolution and invoked his brother Fidel in blaming global poverty on the aggressions of colonial and imperialist powers. Remarkably, however, Castro specifically absolved President Obama from any responsibility for such actions, an important gesture that opens the door for more progress. “President Obama is an honest man…I admire his humble origins,” Castro said, and urged others to support his efforts to eliminate the embargo. Castro also said Cuba was prepared to work with the United States on such issues as climate change, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and poverty eradication.

With the removal of Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the last-minute softening of U.S. rhetoric toward Cuba’s chief ally, Venezuela, the Americas may be entering an unprecedented era of peace and cooperation. That leaves respect for democracy and human rights as the chief area of conflict between the United States and Cuba (and a few other countries).

Here again, the contrast between the behavior of pro- and anti-government Cuban activists emerged in sharp relief in Panama. Highly aggressive actions by “official” Cuban nongovernmental organizationss against dissidents from Cuba and Miami, including physical and verbal insults and attacks, were completely out of tune with the modern era of inclusion and respect of independent civil society voices at such meetings. Their orchestrated disruptions of what should have been a robust but civil debate laid bare the real threat Cuba’s rulers face—from its own public tired of the regime’s broken economic system and closed politics—and the heavy challenge they face in opening economically while maintaining political control. President Obama spoke to this issue when he told the press: “On Cuba, we are not in the business of regime change. We are in the business of making sure the Cuban people have freedom and the ability to…shape their own destiny.” The primary way to do this, Obama added, is through “persuasion” and not sanctions. Cuba’s behavior “does not implicate our national security in a direct way,” foreshadowing this week’s decision to de-list Cuba from the terrorism sponsor category.

Cuban officials claim they are practicing a form of popular democracy that is just as legitimate as representative democracy. But few honestly believe this can be squared with core universal norms like free speech and association. For his part, Castro acknowledged that “[w]e could be persuaded of some things; of others we might not be persuaded.” Patience, he added, is needed, signaling yet again that progress toward normalizing relations will be slow. He then proceeded to instruct his closest assistants to “follow the instructions of both Presidents,” a telling reminder of the continued resistance to change from his own bureaucracy. Obama will now have to persuade his colleagues in Congress that Cuba is no longer the threat it was in the past.

Event Information

On April 10 and 11, 2015, the Seventh Summit of the Americas will bring together the heads of state and government of every country in the Western Hemisphere for the first time. Recent efforts by the United States to reform immigration policy, re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, and reform our approach to drug policies at home and abroad have generated greater optimism about the future of inter-American relations. This Summit provides an opportunity to spark greater collaboration on development, social inclusion, democracy, education, and energy security.

However, this Summit of the Americas is also convening at a time when the hemisphere is characterized by competing visions for economic development, democracy and human rights, and regional cooperation through various institutions such as the Organization of American States, the Union of South American Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

On Friday, April 3, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted Assistant Secretary of State Roberta S. Jacobson for a discussion on the Seventh Summit of the Americas and what it portends for the future of hemispheric relations.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #VIISummit

Audio

• The Summit of the Americas and prospects for inter-American relations

Transcript

• Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

• 20150403_summit_americas_jacobson_transcript

Last week’s Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama will be remembered for the historic handshakes and broad smiles shared by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro—the first sit-down meeting of leaders from the two nations since Fidel Castro marched triumphantly into Havana in early 1959. But this memorable encounter was merely the most visible piece of a much broader Cuban strategy at the Panama Summit.

The large Cuban delegation took full advantage of the several forums that comprise the complex Summit process. These periodic inter-American conclaves feature meetings among heads of state and foreign ministers, a CEO Summit for corporate executives, and a Civil Society Forum for representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Cubans seized all three opportunities and fielded strong teams to advance their interests: to engage with the multi-level inter-American system, and to send clear signals back home of where government policy is headed.

Face-to-face diplomacy

In addition to the Obama-Castro encounter, foreign ministers John Kerry and Bruno Rodriguez held a lengthy bilateral. Since Obama and Castro publicly announced their intention to renew relations on December 17 of last year, negotiations have dragged on. Cuba is reluctant to grant American diplomats unrestricted travel throughout the island to engage with Cuban citizens, including political dissidents. This is the norm in international diplomacy, the United States argues, whereas the Cubans remain fearful that U.S. diplomats will provide encouragement and assistance to activists advocating for political pluralism. The Cubans want to be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, a designation which automatically invokes economic sanctions. The White House is withholding that relief as a bargaining chip in the negotiations.

In his opening plenary remarks, President Castro spoke passionately and at length, impressing the audience with his heartfelt remarks even as he came across as an elder statesman indulging in the memories and glories of his youth. Yet, Castro was also sending signals to the stalwarts in the Communist Party back home that he had not forgotten their sacrifices and was not abandoning their values. His engagement with the United States would not be allowed to endanger their tight control of Cuban society. Still, most significantly, Castro kept the door open to engagement with the United States by dramatically addressing President Obama, tossing him compliments: “President Obama is an honest man…I have read his two memoirs and I believe he is a man who has remained faithful to his humble origins.”

By lauding Obama, holding a private bilateral, and appearing with a broad smile at a press opportunity, Castro reaffirmed his commitment to improving relations with the United States. He also may have been nudging his negotiators to wrap up the talks to allow the mutual re-opening of embassies. The Cubans are aware that not all of Washington favors improved relations, and that they must consolidate the process of diplomatic normalization while Obama commands the White House.

The CEO and Civil Society Forums

Presumably, the main Cuban motivation for engaging the United States is economic: to attract more tourists, financial remittances, and eventually productive investments from the United States and the rest of the world, and to extract a relaxation of sanctions, particularly those impeding international financial transactions. Cuban Minister of Trade and Investment Rodrigo Malmierca led a commercial delegation that included top executives from state-owned enterprises, as well as leadership from the new Mariel Development Zone. At the CEO Summit, Malmierca was granted one of the few time slots for a keynote address. But rather than take advantage of this unique opportunity, the Cuban minister rushed through an uninspired text, offering nothing that could not be found in previous government press releases and official documents. More than two years after the passage of a much-heralded foreign investment law and over a year after the official opening of the Mariel Development Zone, very few new investments have earned official authorization.  

While potentially interested in Cuban markets, executives I spoke with remain cautious, skeptical that the government has yet created a sufficiently business-friendly environment to warrant the risk. They speculate as to why so few new foreign ventures are underway: is it opposition from well-placed hard-liners, bureaucratic inertia, or lack of financing or other necessary business inputs? In private conversations, Malmierca hinted at a political obstacle: many Cubans identify the revolution with nationalizations of private property, so it will be difficult to explain to them why foreign investment is now so welcome.

The Cubans also fielded a significant presence at the Civil Society Forum. The dominant group represented government-affiliated “non-governmental” organizations (GONGOS) such as the official trade union or Confederation of Cuban Women, while opposition NGOs marshalled about a dozen persons. At a pre-Summit speech in Caracas, Castro had ominously labelled these opposition NGOs “mercenaries” in the pay of foreign intelligence services. Following that lead, the government-affiliated group staged aggressive, noisy demonstrations denouncing the opposition representatives and accusing them of harboring infamous terrorists. The GONGOS threatened to boycott the Forum (although some did eventually participate), and disrupted the Forum’s working group on democratic governance. Here again, the message being telegraphed back home was clear: the Cuban government does not consider these opposition voices to be legitimate actors and loyal Cuban citizens should not associate with them.

Discernable signals

Altogether, at the three forums the Cubans demonstrated their strong interest in participating actively in hemispheric affairs and institutions. The Cubans are capable of fielding smart, disciplined delegations with well-scripted strategies and messages. Once again, the high-quality Cuban diplomacy demonstrated that it has few peers in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The messages transmitted at the Panama Summit were subtle but decodable. In the diplomatic sphere, Castro wants to move forward, to take advantage of Obama’s tenure to relax U.S.-Cuban tensions and gain some economic advantages. In the business sphere, Malmierca reaffirmed Castro’s oft-repeated admonitions that economic change on the island will be very gradual and socialist planning will not be discarded under his watch. In the political sphere, the Cuban Communist Party intends to maintain its absolute hegemony—political pluralism outside the Party is definitely not yet on the policy agenda.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on how the United States came out of the Panama Summit of the Americas.

At the previous Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012, President Barack Obama was badly roughed up by his Latin American counterparts (and embarrassed by his Secret Service for entertaining sex workers). Happily, the president and his entourage did much better at last week’s Summit in Panama, but the United States still has a way to go before the Summits once again become the productive vehicle for U.S. foreign policy that they once were, at their founding in Miami in 1994.

In Cartagena, leader after leader criticized the United States for allegedly heavy-handed counter-narcotics policies; oppressive treatment of immigrants; a weak response to crime and poverty in Central America; and monetary policies that supposedly harmed their economies. Most pointedly, speakers denounced the decades-old economic sanctions against Cuba. But given the upcoming Congressional elections, Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not want to do anything to endanger their Democratic Party’s chances. Obama was reduced to affirming, uncharacteristically, “I am here to listen, but our policies will not change.”

Once the November 2012 mid-term elections were over, policies did, in fact, change as the United States took a more relaxed approach to counternarcotics; the administration announced immigration policy reforms, including negotiating agreements with Central American nations to reduce the outflow of children and promote economic growth and jobs at home; and Vice President Joseph Biden met repeatedly with Central American leaders, and offered $1 billion in economic and security assistance.

In Cartagena, the Latin Americans threatened to boycott the Panama Summit if Cuba was not invited. But last December 17, President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro announced their agreement to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations, and in one blow, the United States transformed a thorn in relations with Latin America into a triumph of inter-American diplomacy that significantly enhanced U.S. prestige in the region.

So in Panama, most of the Latin American and Caribbean leaders, rather than berate the U.S. president, praised him for his courage and generally treated him with courtesy and respect. The three leaders of Central America’s Northern Tier (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—whose president is a former guerrilla commander) were effusive in their praise. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who in Cartagena had sharply criticized U.S. monetary policies and had cancelled a visit to the White House to protest NSA spying, was pleased to announce that her visit had been rescheduled for this June. 

Obama’s own performance was more spirited than it had been in Cartagena. In response to a harsh polemic by Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, Obama shot back: “The U.S. may be a handy excuse for diverting attention from domestic political problems, but it won’t solve those problems.” After listening politely through Raúl Castro’s extended remarks—during which Castro praised him as a man of honesty and authenticity—Obama departed to avoid having to sit through the predictable harangues of Argentine President Cristina Kirchner and Bolivian leader Evo Morales. Few could blame him.

At the parallel CEO Summit of business executives, Obama delivered thoughtful responses to questions posed by several entrepreneurs including Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, distinguishing himself from the facile rhetorical answers of the other presidents on the panel. At a Civil Society Forum where delegates affiliated with Cuban government organizations engaged in disruptive tactics, Obama lectured firmly on the virtues of civility and tolerance. Together with two other presidents (Tabaré Vasquez of Uruguay and Guillermo Solis of Costa Rica), Obama met privately with a dozen leaders of nongovernmental organizations, took notes, and incorporated at least one of their suggestions into his later public remarks.

But Obama’s Panama experience was marred by an inexplicable misstep by his White House aides a month earlier—the very public sanctioning of seven Venezuelan officials for alleged human rights violation and corruption, and the declaration that Venezuela was a “threat to U.S. national security.” To Latin American ears, that language recalled Cold War-era justifications for CIA plots and military coups. The State Department claims it warned the White House against Latin American blowback, but perhaps not forcefully enough. Once Latin American anger become apparent, the White House tried to walk the “national security” language back, saying it was just a formality required by U.S. legislation, but the damage was done. Speaker after speaker condemned the “unilateral sanctions” and called for their repeal.

The ill-timed sanctions announcement provided Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his populist allies with a ready stick to beat the United States. For whileObama’s diplomacy had managed to peel off most of the Central Americans and win over or at least diminish the antagonism of other leaders, it had not found a way to tranquilize the rejectionist states (Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina) tied to Venezuela in an “anti-imperialist” alliance. Although a relatively small minority, these spoilers seriously disrupt plenary meetings with long and vituperative monologues, and small minorities of “veto” players can block the signing of otherwise consensus documents such that in Panama, as in Cartagena, no consensus declaration was issued; rather the host leader signed brief “mandates for action” that lacked full legitimacy.

The problem of the rejectionist minority will be partially alleviated when Kirchner is shortly replaced, likely by a more moderate government in Argentina, and political turnover will eventually come in Venezuela, but the hemisphere needs new rules that protect majority rights to get things done. Some simple procedural innovations, such as a more forceful chair, or even the simple system of red-yellow-green lights that alert speakers to their time limits, would help.

Notwithstanding the misstep on Venezuela sanctions and the disruptive tactics of the rejectionist minority, the overall mood in Panama was upbeat, even celebratory. Leaders made reference to the xenophobic violence and religious intolerance plaguing other continents, and remarked with some pride that, in comparison, Latin America was a zone of peace that was also making progress, however inadequate, on human rights, poverty alleviation, and clean energy. With some procedural fixes, favorable political winds, and continued progress on concrete issues of mutual interest, inter-American relations could well continue their upward trajectory.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on Cuba's multi-level strategy at the Seventh Summit of the Americas.