President Barack Obama will travel to Mexico and then to the 5th Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad, beginning on April 16th. He would do well to remember Ronald Reagan's seemingly obvious but fundamentally important comment on returning from his first trip to South America as President: "These Latin American countries are all very different from each other."

It's crucially important for the new U.S. government at its senior levels to take seriously the oft-repeated advice of regional experts to disaggregate "Latin America" -- to understand its complex diversity. Emphasizing this is now more important than ever.

During the past 20 years, under administrations of both parties, Washington has tended to underline the supposed convergence within the region: toward democratic governance, market-oriented economies, regional economic integration and policies of macroeconomic and fiscal balance. These convergent trends were real, though never universal, and they have been significant, though never as fully consolidated as Washington liked to claim.

Key differences persist among the many countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Some of the differences are growing, not shrinking. And U.S. policy should focus on how different countries of the Americas cluster along five separate dimensions.

The first is the degree of demographic and economic interdependence with the United States: highest and still growing in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean: lowest and likely to remain low in South America, and especially in the Southern Cone. Countries such as Mexico, El Salvador, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and others, which have significant fractions of their population living and working in the United States, pose "intermestic" issues -- combining international and domestic facets -- from immigration to medical insurance, pensions to drivers licenses, remittances to youth gangs.

A second dimension is the extent to which the countries have opened their economies to international competition: by far most fully in Chile; a great deal in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Panama and some Central American nations; and less so in other countries. A key challenge in the current world economic crisis will be to shore up the trend toward open economies by resisting domestic pressure for protectionism in our own case.

A third distinguishing dimension is the relative advance of democratic governance (checks and balances, accountability, and the rule of law): historically strong in Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica; increasingly, if quite unevenly, robust in Brazil; gaining ground in Mexico over the past twenty years but with ups and downs, hard struggle and major recent setbacks; arguably declining, or at least at risk, in Argentina; under great strain in Venezuela, most of the Andean nations, much of Central America and Paraguay; and exceptionally weak in Haiti. The Obama administration can make an important positive difference on these issues by respecting the rule of law at home and internationally, and by nurturing democratic governance abroad with patience, restraint and skill, mainly through nongovernmental organizations.

A fourth dimension is the relative effectiveness of civic and political institutions beyond the state (the press, trade unions, religious organizations, and nongovernmental entities): strongest in Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and perhaps Argentina; growing but still severely challenged in Brazil and Mexico; slowly regaining stature but still quite problematic in Colombia; weak in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, most of Central America and Haiti. Washington can help strengthen nongovernmental institutions, but it should do so as much as possible through multilateral organizations, and in strict accordance with each country's laws.

Finally, countries differ regarding the extent to which traditionally excluded populations are incorporated: this includes more than 30 million marginalized, disadvantaged, and increasingly politically mobilized indigenous people -- especially in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, the Peruvian highlands, and southern Mexico -- and Afro-Latin Americans in countries where they are still the object of racial discrimination. The very fact of President Obama's rise to the presidency has probably done more to affect this issue than years of more direct policies, but enhanced U.S. support for poverty alleviation targeted at excluded populations would also be helpful.

Hemisphere-wide summit conferences like the meeting in Trinidad have their place as a way of building communication and rapport, and they offer mutually convenient photo opportunities. But major progress on substantive issues can only be achieved with clusters of countries with comparable or complementary issues and concerns. Recognizing this reality should be the starting point for reframing U.S. policies in the Americas.

President Obama ought to be pleased. At the Summit of the Americas he walked into a skeptical audience and charmed his way around. He struck the right notes and, as anyone who has attended these events knows, it is the tone that matters, much more than the substance. Obama was eloquent, accessible, and modest yet firm, with no discernible sign of the “ugly American” sobriquet that so clearly bedeviled his predecessor. Daniel Ortega’s rants notwithstanding, when the President is on top form, as he was in Trinidad, he is very difficult to antagonize.

The concrete results of the Summit were meager at best. Then again, this was never about results. For Latin America it was all about gauging Obama. The messenger was the message. The President clearly understood that modesty would go a long way in a region that combines growing self-confidence with a deep historical resentment towards the U.S. The latter attitude owes much to the U.S. constant meddling in the region’s politics throughout the 20th Century, but also to a simmering inferiority complex on the Latin American side rooted in the unflattering comparison between the U.S. phenomenal historical success and Latin America’s fitful journey towards development. Increasingly autonomous from its powerful neighbor, whose sight and mind are set elsewhere these days, Latin American countries were not really expecting Obama to show up with anything concrete at the Summit, least of all money. Like the young Aretha Franklin, all they wanted was respect. And they got it.

To be sure, the U.S. commitment of $100 million for a fund to support small entrepreneurs in the Hemisphere is an interesting measure. At a minimum it reinforces another key message that Obama delivered: that poverty, inequality, and lack of opportunities for the youth are key issues for Latin America. Obama gave clear hints that he understands that prosperity in the Hemisphere demands more than free trade and foreign investment, crucial as both can be. It also requires support for more robust social policies, an area in which most Latin American governments have made genuine strides in the past decade, in ways both moderate and radical. To hear that the U.S. President grasps the really substantive development issues in Latin America and exhibits a more nuanced view of progress does come as a relief to the region.

Despite the dearth of immediate results, this mutation in tone will lead in due course to concrete changes in the relationship. It is already setting in motion unexpected diplomatic moves. Hugo Chavez has already announced that his government is appointing a new Ambassador to the U.S. This is a sign of civility from someone who thrives in conflict.

And then there is Cuba. On this, the ball is now firmly on the Cubans’ turf, even more so than before the Summit. Building on the rather modest announcements made by President Obama prior to the Summit, tepidly received in Latin America, U.S. diplomats did a superb job of putting the Cubans under the spotlight. Despite the rhetorical harshness of the past few days, most reasonable people in the Hemisphere expect them to reciprocate with something tangible, even a small step. It will be interesting to see, for instance, if the Cubans allow U.S. telecommunications investment in the island, which in order to be effective requires, of course, licenses and permits issued by the Cuban government. Gestures of that kind would lead to a tit-for-tat dynamics that could develop into more substantive steps, probably very rapidly.

Should one of the early steps be the re-admission of Cuba to the Organization of American States (OAS), an idea floated repeatedly during the Summit? No, and the U.S. was right to receive it with deafening silence. On this, the U.S. is right to draw a line and act conservatively. The OAS is a community of democracies, defined by, amongst other things, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, a document approved on a meaningful day for freedom and democracy – September 11, 2001. Moreover, Latin America’s single biggest achievement of the past generation has been to leave behind a long authoritarian night. No other region in the developing world can say as much. As Ted Piccone, a Brookings scholar, has forcefully argued, it would be a pity to give away that legacy for nothing. While it would be good to open the possibility of Cuba approaching eventually the Inter-American System, granting it immediate membership without pre-conditions would send an ominous signal, not just to Cuba but to other countries in the region that are teetering on the verge of authoritarianism, such as Venezuela and Nicaragua. Cuba does not deserve to be punished with a U.S. embargo for being what it is, but neither should it be rewarded with membership in a club of nations that defend values that are negated on a daily basis in the island. Obama’s silence on this was right too.

All things considered, the Summit was a success for the President and for the U.S. Despite the usual chorus of U.S. conservative voices that see weakness in any sign of humility, American interests and security in the Hemisphere are far better served by Obama’s demeanor at the Summit, than by any amount of chest-thumping. Today, no nation in Latin America poses any significant strategic threat to U.S. security demanding confrontation or containment. Without exception, the challenges that will define the future of Hemispheric relations –ranging from energy security to climate change, from immigration to organized crime— call for collective responses. They are common assignments that are to be solved through dialogue and cooperation across the Hemisphere. As the old Spanish saying has it, “courtesy detracts not from bravery.” In the Western Hemisphere a little modesty, civility, and respect can also be stupendous foreign policy.

In advance of President Obama’s trip to Panama later this week, Brookings experts Richard Feinberg, Ted Piccone, and Harold Trinkunas discuss expectations for the Seventh Summit of the Americas. Obama will arrive holding a strong hand given recent policy changes that have addressed historic obstacles, such as relations with Cuba. However, a slowing regional economy and U.S.-Venezuela tensions may yet cast a shadow over the proceedings.

Read the transcript » (PDF)

Improved United States-Latin America relations

“The United States is going into this next Summit of the Americas in a somewhat improved position compared to the summits in both Cartagena in 2012 and in Trinidad in 2009, where there was a considerable amount of friction among the countries on issues related to Cuba, to counter narcotics policy, to immigration policy. Broadly speaking, I think the Obama administration has done something incredible on each of these fronts, which the countries will recognize and which will help clear the air.”  —Harold Trinkunas

Friction with Venezuela?

“There are 35 countries. At any given time, there's going to be some friction. At the last summit, the Argentines raised the Malvinas issue.  At previous summits, the Bolivians raised the outlets of the sea issue. So there's always a little bit of this. But whether or not [Venezuela] dominates the summit is an issue largely for the Latin Americans to decide. And my guess is the Latin Americans in general will not want to follow Maduro over the cliff. I don't even think that the Cubans will want Maduro to take the summit over the cliff. So therefore, I think we have this sort of tremendous irony in which the country that adds -- that dampens the dissident voices of ALBA will actually be Cuba, because Cuba wanted to demonstrate that it can be a constructive voice in regional diplomacy, that they're not just the force of disruption and therefore, the U.S. all these years was right to keep them out because they would just be disruptive if you let them in. They've already demonstrated they're a mature country that can engage constructively.”  —Richard Feinberg

Dialogue with Cuba

“It's in our interest, U.S. national interest, to have this dialogue process with our close neighbor, Cuba. And to, frankly, bring them back towards the inter-American community, where they've been missing for all these years. [The U.S. rapprochement with Cuba] is also going to raise the question of shifting attention to the role of the rest of the region vis-à-vis Cuba; that it's not just the United States. It's actually the other countries in the hemisphere that could help Cuba come along, as I said, modernize, update its economy, and hopefully at some point, engage more formally in the inter-American system.”  —Ted Piccone

Sub-regional groupings

“This is a much more diverse hemisphere than we saw 20 years ago... In fact, we may see that there's sort of a broad agreement on general themes and then much more sub-regional groupings that work on issues like the Northern Triangle, for example, or Caribbean Energy Security, which was an initiative of the vice president last year.”  —Harold Trinkunas

Summit side events with the private sector and civil society

“You have the leaders representing the executive branches of their governments, but you also have the CEO Summit. Seven hundred corporate executives will be there. There will be interaction between the leaders and the corporate executives...It's indicative of the rise of the private sector and the corporate sector in Latin America as part of a dynamic growing region economically.

Throughout the hemisphere, the acceptance of Civil Society as a concept, as an actor, adds depth to democracy. Democracy is not just elections or that's important, but an active, vibrant Civil Society. And that's what you'll see at the Civil Society meeting. And President Obama personally we're told will interact with Civil Society leaders, as will other leaders present there.”  —Richard Feinberg

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On April 10 and 11, 2015, the Seventh Summit of the Americas will bring together the heads of state and government of every country in the Western Hemisphere for the first time. Recent efforts by the United States to reform immigration policy, re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, and reform our approach to drug policies at home and abroad have generated greater optimism about the future of inter-American relations. This Summit provides an opportunity to spark greater collaboration on development, social inclusion, democracy, education, and energy security.

However, this Summit of the Americas is also convening at a time when the hemisphere is characterized by competing visions for economic development, democracy and human rights, and regional cooperation through various institutions such as the Organization of American States, the Union of South American Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

On Friday, April 3, the Latin America Initiative at Brookings hosted Assistant Secretary of State Roberta S. Jacobson for a discussion on the Seventh Summit of the Americas and what it portends for the future of hemispheric relations.

Join the conversation on Twitter using #VIISummit

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On April 10th and 11th, the heads of state and government from nearly every state in the Americas will meet in Panama City for the Seventh Summit of the Americas. The leaders present in Panama preside over a region that has advanced far and fast on key political and economic indicators since the first of these meetings was held in Miami in 1994. At the Miami Summit, the legacy of the Cold War was very much present, and the specter of war, military dictatorship, armed revolution, financial crises, and political instability still hung in the air. 

In 2015, the region is by and large more democratic, economically prosperous, free from war, and the last insurgency in the region—Colombia’s—is winding down as peace is discussed between the government and its opponents at talks hosted by Havana. The beginning of a rapprochement between the United States and Cuba in December 2014 broke down one of the last remaining obstacles to an event that is truly inclusive of every country in the Western Hemisphere. 

In comparison to the rest of the world—where in the past year we have witnessed terrorist attacks in Paris, war in Ukraine, insurgency in Yemen, and saber-rattling around the South China Sea—the Western Hemisphere appears to be relatively better off. While there are a small number of countries that face challenging circumstances, especially among the fragile states of the Caribbean basin, these problems mostly threaten local rather than regional order. Given this picture, what lessons can we learn from the Western Hemisphere, and from U.S. policy towards the region, as we contemplate how best to improve global order?

Drawing the right lessons from history

The Americas have a long history of developing regional norms that promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Since the founding of the Panamerican Union in 1890, which transformed into the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948, the countries of the hemisphere have embedded these norms of peace into their multilateral institutions. While frequently criticized, it is important to remember that the OAS has presided over the elimination of inter-state conflict in the Americas. 

Today, Latin American states resolve territorial disputes at the International Court of Justice rather than on the battlefield. The last war in the region, between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, occurred two decades ago. Given how rare militarized disputes are at home, Latin American soldiers frequently serve as peacekeepers in United Nations missions around the world. Latin Americans have become good at peacemaking and peacekeeping, something that other regions of the world would do well to emulate.

When it comes to domestic politics, most leaders in the region now understand the political and economic principles that contribute to stability. Governments have become much better about economic governance, which means that as South America’s economy cools off this year, fiscal problems will be manageable and localized rather than region-wide and existential, a sharp contrast with the 1980s and 1990s. 

Leaders in the region have learned that promoting polarization for short-term political advantage is all too likely to produce instability, coups, and revolution. To minimize the risk that domestic political violence might reoccur in the future, states in the region have self-consciously examined the legacy of their authoritarian pasts, using innovative processes such as truth and reconciliation commissions—initially in Argentina in 1983—but also drawing on traditional courts to prosecute perpetrators of past abuses.  

In the 21st century, successful coups d’état have become rare, and when they do occur, as was the case in Honduras in 2009, the region collaborates to ensure a return to democracy. Here again is an area where Latin America has led the way through policies that reduce the likelihood of domestic conflicts that threaten internal stability or global order.

The importance of revisiting unworkable U.S. policies 

At this Summit in Panama, President Barack Obama will be able to credibly claim that he has listened to his Latin American counterparts and has begun to change policies that had become obstacles to improving regional order. At the 2009 and 2012 Summits (they occur every three years), U.S. policies on drugs, immigration, and Cuba had made President Obama the target of growing criticism from other leaders. In fact, many governments had made it clear that they would not attend the 2015 Summit if Cuba was not invited. 

Since 2012, the Obama administration has taken steps to address these concerns. It has taken executive action to reform immigration policy, signaled greater openness to drug policy liberalization by states such as Uruguay, and initiated a historic normalization of relations with Cuba. In each of these areas, the United States has shifted from policies that were largely unilateral towards its neighbors to policies that emphasize collaboration and partnership. This reflects U.S. learning that unilateralism produces blowback, strengthens its political adversaries in the region, and undermines its interests in the long run. This is a lesson worth considering as we think about our policies towards troubled regions of the world.

The risk of forgetting lessons learned

Yet not all countries and all politicians have remembered these lessons, and some of them have learned the wrong ones. In Argentina, macroeconomic stability is at risk due to a feud between the government and its international creditors. The result is a country cut off from international capital markets at a time when its economy is suffering the effect of declining commodity prices. Venezuela faces a deep crisis that has at its heart the highly polarizing politics practiced by the governing party and an unreasoning attachment to an unworkable economic model. Key countries such as Brazil have lost interest in hemisphere-wide institutions, as indicated by their refusal to appoint an ambassador to the OAS or pay their membership dues. And the region as a whole has become so attached to multilateralism and politics by consensus that is has forgotten how to work together when individual member states deviate from regional norms of democracy and human rights, as is occurring today in Venezuela.

So while the recent history of the Americas offers insights into policies that contribute to a peaceful and stable regional order, it also illustrates that these achievements are not irreversible. Let us hope that future generations do not have the relearn these lessons anew. At this and future Summits, there must be a commitment to preserving the gains made in peace, democracy, human rights, and economic prosperity, but also a new emphasis on developing workable mechanisms to address deviations from the norms and practices that have contributed to making the Americas a relative safe and orderly region of the world.

For more information, check out Emily Miller's post on U.S. priorities at the Seventh Summit of the Americas.

On Friday, April 3, the Brookings Latin America Initiative hosted Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson to discuss the state of inter-American relations and expectations for the Seventh Summit of the Americas to be held on April 10 to 11 in Panama City, Panama. With Cuba in attendance for the first time, this summit will be a chance for the entire region to have a robust conversation on hemispheric challenges and opportunities.

The event began with a keynote address by Assistant Secretary Jacobson, and was followed with a discussion moderated by Richard Feinberg—dubbed the “godfather” of the Summit process for his role in the first Miami Summit of the Americas in 1994—and Harold Trinkunas. This event also launched a new Brookings policy brief by Richard Feinberg, Emily Miller, and Harold Trinkunas, entitled "Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations." 

Assistant Secretary Jacobson began her remarks by highlighting the areas where her own thinking coincides with the arguments in this new policy brief. Principally, she argued that developments in the hemisphere over the past few decades have largely been positive for U.S. interests. Although this does not mean Latin America and the United States will agree on everything, she noted that there are many areas of mutual interests on which the United States can work together with Latin America countries as equal partners.

Jacobson explained that this desire to forge equal partnerships based on common values and interests was precisely the notion expressed by President Obama at the 2009 Summit in Trinidad. The upcoming Summit is a chance to showcase this updated architecture for cooperation and partnership, which includes the CEO Summit of the Americas (initiated in 2012) and the Civil Society and Social Actors Forum (new this year).

Key issues for the U.S. at the Summit of the Americas

Assistant Secretary Jacobson outlined the four priorities for the United States going into the Summit:

• Democracy and human rights: Jacobson stated that the United States “applauds governments around the hemisphere that have supported a more robust civil society role.” The civil society side event provides a critical feedback loop that is one way for leaders to be held accountable by their citizens. Jacobson noted, however, that there remain very real challenges to democracy in Venezuela. While this is something that should concern the entire hemisphere, it is ultimately up to the Venezuelans to resolve.

• Global competitiveness: The focus of the United States will be on small businesses, which are important job creators but do not always receive the support they need in terms of access to credit or support in job training. The Small Business Network of the Americas has fostered over 4,000 small business development centers, and in Colombia alone has created nearly 6,000 jobs.

• Social development: Latin America remains the most unequal region of the world. There have been important reductions in poverty and growth of the middle class, but sustained improvements will require economic diversification and targeted efforts to reach vulnerable populations. To address the education deficit in the region, Jacobson highlighted the 100,000 Strong in the Americas program which connects institutions to institutions and seeks to provide students with actionable and employable skills. 

• Energy and climate change: The high cost of energy prevents some countries from realizing their full potential and feeds migration, poverty, and violence. Sharing in the enormous energy wealth of other nations must be done responsibly and sustainably, noted Jacobson. The Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas and Connecting the Americas 2022 aim to “promote renewable energy efficiency, cleaner fossil fuels, resilient infrastructure, and interconnection.”

U.S. rationale behind targeted sanctions on Venezuela

When asked about flashpoints or problems areas for the United States in the upcoming summit, Jacobson pointed to the sanctions on seven Venezuelan officials and the concern they have generated. However, she was careful to clarify that the executive order used standard language and was in no way a prelude to invasion or a forced regime change. Moreover, she noted that the legislation had been pending in Congress for two years, during which a dialogue between the opposition and government facilitated by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was attempted but stalled. Jacobson explained that it is important to remember that these sanctions are very targeted and do not intend to harm the Venezuelan people or even the Venezuelan government as a whole.

Engagement with Cuba and Brazil

In Jacobson’s view, there are no large systemic issues that stand to block progress at the Summit. She explained that the Obama administration’s greater flexibility on counter-narcotics policies, reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Cuba, and focus on the Trans-Pacific Partnership have removed many historic obstacles.

There remains work to be done, however. Jacobson stated that while interaction at the Summit between President Obama and Raúl Castro will serve to further the relationship and continue momentum for the normalization process, the engagement with Cuba will not deter the United States from speaking out on human rights violations. The administration’s view is that the human rights situation in Cuba is inadequate. Jacobson reiterated the need to respect international norms of human rights and that the United States will continue to support those who peacefully fight for that space to be open.

Finally, she recognized the importance of U.S. engagement with Brazil. According to Jacobson, the United States sees Brazil as a leader on social inclusion, and even on economic competitiveness as it openly debates how to restart economic growth. Though the United States and Brazil do not see eye-to-eye on issues of climate change, she recognized that working with Brazil will be crucial in this area as well.

A desire for cooperation

With a desire to focus on pragmatic approaches rather than ideology, Jacobson expressed an openness to cooperation: “We’re willing to engage with every country in the hemisphere, every country in the hemisphere, any country that wants to partner with us. Because they’re in all of our interests. And that’s the way partnerships should be based, on mutual interests…that’s what makes them durable.”

For more information, check out Latin America Initiative Director and Senior Fellow Harold Trinkunas's blog on the lessons in global governance the hemisphere has to offer.

At the previous Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012, President Barack Obama was badly roughed up by his Latin American counterparts (and embarrassed by his Secret Service for entertaining sex workers). Happily, the president and his entourage did much better at last week’s Summit in Panama, but the United States still has a way to go before the Summits once again become the productive vehicle for U.S. foreign policy that they once were, at their founding in Miami in 1994.

In Cartagena, leader after leader criticized the United States for allegedly heavy-handed counter-narcotics policies; oppressive treatment of immigrants; a weak response to crime and poverty in Central America; and monetary policies that supposedly harmed their economies. Most pointedly, speakers denounced the decades-old economic sanctions against Cuba. But given the upcoming Congressional elections, Obama and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton did not want to do anything to endanger their Democratic Party’s chances. Obama was reduced to affirming, uncharacteristically, “I am here to listen, but our policies will not change.”

Once the November 2012 mid-term elections were over, policies did, in fact, change as the United States took a more relaxed approach to counternarcotics; the administration announced immigration policy reforms, including negotiating agreements with Central American nations to reduce the outflow of children and promote economic growth and jobs at home; and Vice President Joseph Biden met repeatedly with Central American leaders, and offered $1 billion in economic and security assistance.

In Cartagena, the Latin Americans threatened to boycott the Panama Summit if Cuba was not invited. But last December 17, President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro announced their agreement to negotiate the normalization of diplomatic relations, and in one blow, the United States transformed a thorn in relations with Latin America into a triumph of inter-American diplomacy that significantly enhanced U.S. prestige in the region.

So in Panama, most of the Latin American and Caribbean leaders, rather than berate the U.S. president, praised him for his courage and generally treated him with courtesy and respect. The three leaders of Central America’s Northern Tier (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—whose president is a former guerrilla commander) were effusive in their praise. The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, who in Cartagena had sharply criticized U.S. monetary policies and had cancelled a visit to the White House to protest NSA spying, was pleased to announce that her visit had been rescheduled for this June. 

Obama’s own performance was more spirited than it had been in Cartagena. In response to a harsh polemic by Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, Obama shot back: “The U.S. may be a handy excuse for diverting attention from domestic political problems, but it won’t solve those problems.” After listening politely through Raúl Castro’s extended remarks—during which Castro praised him as a man of honesty and authenticity—Obama departed to avoid having to sit through the predictable harangues of Argentine President Cristina Kirchner and Bolivian leader Evo Morales. Few could blame him.

At the parallel CEO Summit of business executives, Obama delivered thoughtful responses to questions posed by several entrepreneurs including Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, distinguishing himself from the facile rhetorical answers of the other presidents on the panel. At a Civil Society Forum where delegates affiliated with Cuban government organizations engaged in disruptive tactics, Obama lectured firmly on the virtues of civility and tolerance. Together with two other presidents (Tabaré Vasquez of Uruguay and Guillermo Solis of Costa Rica), Obama met privately with a dozen leaders of nongovernmental organizations, took notes, and incorporated at least one of their suggestions into his later public remarks.

But Obama’s Panama experience was marred by an inexplicable misstep by his White House aides a month earlier—the very public sanctioning of seven Venezuelan officials for alleged human rights violation and corruption, and the declaration that Venezuela was a “threat to U.S. national security.” To Latin American ears, that language recalled Cold War-era justifications for CIA plots and military coups. The State Department claims it warned the White House against Latin American blowback, but perhaps not forcefully enough. Once Latin American anger become apparent, the White House tried to walk the “national security” language back, saying it was just a formality required by U.S. legislation, but the damage was done. Speaker after speaker condemned the “unilateral sanctions” and called for their repeal.

The ill-timed sanctions announcement provided Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his populist allies with a ready stick to beat the United States. For whileObama’s diplomacy had managed to peel off most of the Central Americans and win over or at least diminish the antagonism of other leaders, it had not found a way to tranquilize the rejectionist states (Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Argentina) tied to Venezuela in an “anti-imperialist” alliance. Although a relatively small minority, these spoilers seriously disrupt plenary meetings with long and vituperative monologues, and small minorities of “veto” players can block the signing of otherwise consensus documents such that in Panama, as in Cartagena, no consensus declaration was issued; rather the host leader signed brief “mandates for action” that lacked full legitimacy.

The problem of the rejectionist minority will be partially alleviated when Kirchner is shortly replaced, likely by a more moderate government in Argentina, and political turnover will eventually come in Venezuela, but the hemisphere needs new rules that protect majority rights to get things done. Some simple procedural innovations, such as a more forceful chair, or even the simple system of red-yellow-green lights that alert speakers to their time limits, would help.

Notwithstanding the misstep on Venezuela sanctions and the disruptive tactics of the rejectionist minority, the overall mood in Panama was upbeat, even celebratory. Leaders made reference to the xenophobic violence and religious intolerance plaguing other continents, and remarked with some pride that, in comparison, Latin America was a zone of peace that was also making progress, however inadequate, on human rights, poverty alleviation, and clean energy. With some procedural fixes, favorable political winds, and continued progress on concrete issues of mutual interest, inter-American relations could well continue their upward trajectory.

Read more about the Summit with Richard Feinberg's post on Cuba's multi-level strategy at the Seventh Summit of the Americas.

President Obama arrived in Panama for the seventh Summit of the Americas with a clear mission: restore the feel-good atmosphere of his first regional summit in Trinidad. There he received plaudits as the first African-American president, a post-unilateralist leader for a more multipolar world. Six years later, and with a complicated record to defend, he had to work harder for the ovations. But his administration’s efforts paid off, and he left Panama a winner. The President’s decision to remove Cuba from the dreaded U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism is further demonstration that Obama is convinced that U.S. interests in Cuba are best served through constructive engagement and not onerous sanctions. Now he must persuade Congress.

First and foremost, the Panama Summit will be remembered for cementing the historic process of normalization of ties between the United States and Cuba launched by Presidents Obama and Raúl Castro on December 17. The Panama meeting offered a chance not only for the rest of the region to ratify Obama’s overture to Castro, but to close the books on the Cold War and open a new chapter in inter-American relations. Bill Clinton led the way on this track in the 1990s, but the train got derailed in the 2000s under George W. Bush. The ghosts of Washington’s heavy-handed past, on matters such as the war on drugs, immigration, counter-terrorism, and the hangover of the “Washington consensus,” returned to haunt Obama’s second summit in Cartagena in 2012. The White House was determined to re-set course before sitting through another series of harangues against the sins of the past by delivering important progress on several policy fronts in the months leading up to Panama. 

No issue was more representative of U.S. bullying in the region than the decades-old embargo against Cuba. When the region’s presidents said they would not come to Panama unless Cuba was invited as a full participant, the White House was forced to fish or cut bait. Correctly, President Obama chose to fish. The breakthrough of December 17 was rewarded with widespread praise by his counterparts and by publics in both the United States and Cuba. The president’s main task for Panama, then, was to deliver a winning message for the first face-to-face meeting in over five decades of hostilities.

Source: REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

No image better captures the competing narratives of the deep historical differences between the United States and Cuba than the one above. The elder Raúl Castro, who does not have to worry about his state-controlled media, plugs his ears to drown out the clamor of journalists asking questions after the two leaders’ first meeting, while the younger Obama is ready to engage the press, a customary stance for leaders in a democracy.

The contrast between old and new continued in the plenary where Obama gave a focused presentation  about moving beyond “the old grievances that had too often trapped us in the past” to a future based on shared responsibility and mutual respect. “We’re looking to the future and to policies that improve the lives of the Cuban people.”

Castro, on the other hand, multiplied his allotted eight minutes of remarks to 48 (to make up for the six summits Cuba was not invited to, he joked) to recount a long litany of transgressions by previous U.S. governments dating back to 1800. He reminded the audience of Washington’s overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Guatemala in 1954 as the precursor to Cuba’s own popular revolution and invoked his brother Fidel in blaming global poverty on the aggressions of colonial and imperialist powers. Remarkably, however, Castro specifically absolved President Obama from any responsibility for such actions, an important gesture that opens the door for more progress. “President Obama is an honest man…I admire his humble origins,” Castro said, and urged others to support his efforts to eliminate the embargo. Castro also said Cuba was prepared to work with the United States on such issues as climate change, terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and poverty eradication.

With the removal of Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the last-minute softening of U.S. rhetoric toward Cuba’s chief ally, Venezuela, the Americas may be entering an unprecedented era of peace and cooperation. That leaves respect for democracy and human rights as the chief area of conflict between the United States and Cuba (and a few other countries).

Here again, the contrast between the behavior of pro- and anti-government Cuban activists emerged in sharp relief in Panama. Highly aggressive actions by “official” Cuban nongovernmental organizationss against dissidents from Cuba and Miami, including physical and verbal insults and attacks, were completely out of tune with the modern era of inclusion and respect of independent civil society voices at such meetings. Their orchestrated disruptions of what should have been a robust but civil debate laid bare the real threat Cuba’s rulers face—from its own public tired of the regime’s broken economic system and closed politics—and the heavy challenge they face in opening economically while maintaining political control. President Obama spoke to this issue when he told the press: “On Cuba, we are not in the business of regime change. We are in the business of making sure the Cuban people have freedom and the ability to…shape their own destiny.” The primary way to do this, Obama added, is through “persuasion” and not sanctions. Cuba’s behavior “does not implicate our national security in a direct way,” foreshadowing this week’s decision to de-list Cuba from the terrorism sponsor category.

Cuban officials claim they are practicing a form of popular democracy that is just as legitimate as representative democracy. But few honestly believe this can be squared with core universal norms like free speech and association. For his part, Castro acknowledged that “[w]e could be persuaded of some things; of others we might not be persuaded.” Patience, he added, is needed, signaling yet again that progress toward normalizing relations will be slow. He then proceeded to instruct his closest assistants to “follow the instructions of both Presidents,” a telling reminder of the continued resistance to change from his own bureaucracy. Obama will now have to persuade his colleagues in Congress that Cuba is no longer the threat it was in the past.

David Caprara, a Brookings nonresident fellow and expert on volunteering, says that John F. Kennedy’s call to service a half-century ago led to the founding of dozens of international aid organizations, and leaves a legacy of programs aimed at improving health, nutrition, education, living standards and peaceful cooperation around the globe.

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Baltimore police officer Edward Nero, one of six being tried separately in relation to the arrest and death of Freddie Gray, has been acquitted on all counts. The outcome for officer Nero was widely expected, but officials are nonetheless aware of the level of frustration and anger that remains in the city. Mayor Stephanie Rawlings Blake said: "We once again ask the citizens to be patient and to allow the entire process to come to a conclusion."

Since Baltimore came to national attention, Brookings scholars have probed the city’s challenges and opportunities, as well addressing broader questions of place, race and opportunity.

• In this podcast, Jennifer Vey describes how, for parts of Baltimore, economic growth has been largely a spectator sport: "1/5 people in Baltimore lives in a neighborhood of extreme poverty, and yet these communities are located in a relatively affluent metro area, in a city with many vibrant and growing neighborhoods."
• Vey and her colleague Alan Berube, in this piece on the "Two Baltimores," reinforce the point about the distribution of economic opportunity and resources in the city:
  

  In 2013, 40,000 Baltimore households earned at least $100,000. Compare that to Milwaukee, a similar-sized city where only half as many households have such high incomes. As our analysis uncovered, jobs in Baltimore pay about $7,000 more on average than those nationally. The increasing presence of high-earning households and good jobs in Baltimore City helps explain why, as the piece itself notes, the city’s bond rating has improved and property values are rising at a healthy clip."

• Groundbreaking work by Raj Chetty, which we summarized here, shows that Baltimore City is the worst place for a boy to grow up in the U.S. in terms of their likely adult earnings:

• Here Amy Liu offered some advice to the new mayor of the city: "I commend the much-needed focus on equity but…the mayoral candidates should not lose sight of another critical piece of the equity equation: economic growth."
• Following an event focused on race, place and opportunity, in this piece I drew out "Six policies to improve social mobility," including better targeting of housing vouchers, more incentives to build affordable homes in better-off neighborhoods, and looser zoning restrictions.
• Frederick C. Harris assessed President Obama’s initiative to help young men of color, "My Brother’s Keeper," praising many policy shifts and calling for a renewed focus on social capital and educational access. But Harris also warned that rhetoric counts and that a priority for policymakers is to "challenge some misconceptions about the shortcomings of black men, which have become a part of the negative public discourse."
• Malcolm Sparrow has a Brookings book on policing reform, "Handcuffed: What Holds Policing Back, and the Keys to Reform" (there is a selection here on Medium). Sparrow writes:
  

  Citizens of any mature democracy can expect and should demand police services that are responsive to their needs, tolerant of diversity, and skillful in unraveling and tackling crime and other community problems. They should expect and demand that police officers are decent, courteous, humane, sparing and skillful in the use of force, respectful of citizens’ rights, disciplined, and professional. These are ordinary, reasonable expectations."

Five more police officers await their verdicts. But the city of Baltimore should not have to wait much longer for stronger governance, and more inclusive growth.

"Happiness." "Contentment." "Subjective well-being." Can we measure how happy people are and if so, what can we do with this information? In this podcast, Carol Graham, the Leo Pasvolsky Senior Fellow and author of The Pursuit of Happiness: An Economy of Well-Being, explains how happiness/well-being research works and why it matters for public policy in the U.S. and globally.

In the podcast, Graham explains two dimensions of understanding well-being, the "Benthamite/hedonic" and the "Aristotelian/eudemonic." She explained them in this earlier publication:

Those of us involved focus on two distinct dimensions: hedonic well-being, a daily experience component; and evaluative well-being, the way in which people think about their lives as a whole, including purpose or meaning. Jeremy Bentham focused on the former and proposed increasing the happiness and contentment of the greatest number of individuals possible in a society as the goal of public policy. Aristotle, meanwhile, thought of happiness as eudemonia, a concept that combined two Greek words: "eu" meaning abundance and "daimon" meaning the power controlling an individual’s destiny.

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Show notes:

• "Why Aging and Working Makes us Happy in 4 Charts," Carol Graham
• Happiness Around the World, Carol Graham
• "The Decade of Public Protest and Frustration with Lack of Social Mobility," Carol Graham
• "Evidence for a midlife crisis in great apes consistent with the U-shape in human well-being," Andrew Oswald and others
• "You Can’t Be Happier than Your Wife: Happiness Gaps and Divorce," Cahit Guven and others
• Aristotle's definition of happiness
• The life of philosopher Jeremy Bentham
• Gallup World Poll

See more charts like this in Carol Graham's newest post on the relationship among work, age and happiness.

President Obama is right to keep at it in Afghanistan, argues a new policy brief by Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research for the Brookings Foreign Policy program.

Some have criticized the president’s decision to maintain a significant troop presence there (5,500 troops), instead of following through on the planned military withdrawal. But Afghanistan remains very important to American security, O’Hanlon contends, and the situation in the country is far from hopeless in spite of recent setbacks. We should reinvigorate American efforts in Afghanistan, he argues—not returning to levels seen in previous years, but ramping up somewhat from our current posture.

O’Hanlon calls Obama’s resolve in Afghanistan commendable, but writes that he and his administration are still making mistakes on U.S. policy toward the war-torn country. He advises that Washington make two specific changes to its military strategy in Afghanistan:

1. Allow U.S. and NATO airpower to target the Islamic State and the Taliban (currently, they can only fight those groups if directly attacked). The narrow rules of engagement constraining foreign forces were intended to push Afghan armed forces to defend their territory themselves. While a worthy goal, O’Hanlon says, these rules often prevent us from attacking ISIS (though the targeting strategy towards the group may be changing) as well as the Taliban. They also impose unrealistically high demands on Afghan forces and make too fine a distinction between an array of aligned extremist groups operating in the country.
2. Expand U.S. force presence from the current 5,500 troops to around 12,000 for a few years. In O’Hanlon’s opinion, our current numbers are not enough to work with fielded Afghan forces, and skimping on ground forces has contributed to security challenges in places like Helmand, for instance, which experienced new setbacks in 2015. More broadly, leaders in Washington and Brussels should stress the value of a long-term NATO-Afghanistan partnership, rather than emphasizing an exit strategy. This will signal Western resolve to the Taliban and other groups. While the next commander in chief should set the United States on a gradual path toward downsizing American troops in Afghanistan, he believes it would be a mistake for Obama to do so in the short term.

The long haul

O’Hanlon also argues that the United States needs to take a longer-term perspective on key political and economic issues in Afghanistan. On the economic front, there seems to be little thinking about an agricultural development plan for Afghanistan, associated infrastructure support, and land reform, among other challenges. On the political front, conversations often tend to focus on shorter-term issues like organizing parliamentary elections, reforming the Independent Election Commission, or modifying the current power-sharing arrangement. In the process, conversations about foundational political strategy focusing on Afghan institutions and the health of its democracy get short-changed. The parliament is in need of reforms, for instance, as is the political party system (which should encourage Afghans to group around ideas and policy platforms, rather than tribes and patronage networks).

O’Hanlon concludes that the situation in Afghanistan today, while fraught, is understandable given the Taliban’s resilience and NATO’s gradual withdrawal of 125,000 troops. We should not be despondent, he writes—rather, we should identify specific strategies that can help improve the situation. At the end of the day, Afghans must make the big decisions about the future of their country. But as long as the United States and its partners are still providing tremendous resources—and as long as security threats emanating from South Asia continue to threaten the United States—leaders in Washington should use their influence wisely.

Keeping with tradition, we start the year with a compendium of forecasts for 2016 from our guest bloggers and ourselves.  At the end of the year, we will assess how we did (for last year’s forecasting performance, click here).

The prevailing sentiment about economic developments during 2016 is decidedly mixed. There are positive and negative views, sometimes from the same source. Here is a sampling:

On the negative side, “emerging economies will continue to disappoint;” “ODA will be squeezed by refugee costs (and climate change financing commitments);” “geopolitical tensions will remain;” “the dollar will be stronger with a severe impact on emerging economies;” and a range of idiosyncratic, political risks: weak governance and terrorist threats in Kenya; declining investor confidence and rising social strife in South Africa; corruption scandals in Brazil; and low oil prices coupled with domestic and geopolitical tensions in Russia.

On the positive side, “oil prices will remain low;” “the Islamic State will be defeated;” “the effect of monetary policy normalization will be very limited;” “food prices will remain low or fall, helping reduce global hunger;” “African countries will improve cereal yields;” “OECD countries will accept a record number of refugees and migrants;” “oil exporters will reform their economies;” and “peace agreements to end the wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen will be signed.”

An emerging theme is whether the disappointments in developing country growth in 2015 stem from idiosyncratic factors in specific countries—especially the BRICS, Turkey, and Indonesia—or whether those idiosyncratic factors, often associated with domestic political developments, are symptomatic of a broader issue of a slowing down of global convergence. Indeed, this theme of whether convergence remains a strong force that will continue to dominate developing country prospects, or a weak force that is all too easily offset by other factors, will likely remain one of the critical unknowns of 2016.

In summary, it is fair to say that with views as diverse as those we received, the picture for 2016 is complicated to say the least.

There is no analytical clarity in the global economy, despite forecasts from most major organizations (e.g., the IMF) that growth will be better in 2016 than in 2015 in every region except perhaps East Asia (although Asia will still probably record higher growth than anywhere else).

The fears generated by a slowing of one of the main engines of the global economy over the past decade, namely China, are palpable. The big story of 2016 is perhaps that it is an emerging economy, China, which is the major source of uncertainty over this year’s global outlook. While prospects for the major advanced economies—the USA, Europe, and Japan—are relatively stable, it is the developing world where there is the least clarity over the short- term outlook. Certainly, the volatility in global stock markets in the first days of the year suggests that volatility, risk aversion, and differences of views over short-term developments are all high as 2016 begins.

But there is at least one bright note. Almost certainly, prospects will improve for almost 200 million people who were living in countries that last year remained outside the scope of a normally functioning global economy. In Myanmar, Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran, economic conditions will improve as a result of recent political developments. In addition, in 2016 there will probably be at least 100 million more people joining the global middle class—those living in households with incomes of $10-100 a day (2005 PPP). Good news for them but a reminder that the task of moving towards a world with sustainable consumption and production patterns remains huge.

There was one consensus thread among our bloggers—all the Europeans appear consumed by the Euro 2016 soccer event (“Spain, France, or Germany will win”), while only one blogger dared to comment on the Olympics (that Brazil would do twice as well as in 2012). It seems that sports will be less complicated than economics in 2016.

Louisville/Jefferson County is the principal city of America’s 42nd largest metropolitan area, a 13-county, bi-state region with a 2006 population estimated at 1.2 million. It is the largest city by far in Kentucky, but it is neither Kentucky’s capital nor its center of political power.

The consolidated city, authorized by voter referendum in 2000 and implemented in 2003, is home to 701,500 residents within its 399 square miles, with a population density of 4,124.8 per square mile.² It is either the nation’s 16th or its 26th largest incorporated place, depending on whether the residents of smaller municipalities within its borders, who are eligible to vote in its elections, are counted (as local officials desire and U.S. Census Bureau officials resist). The remainder of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) population is split between four Indiana counties (241,193) and eight Kentucky counties (279,523). Although several of those counties are growing rapidly, the new Louisville metro area remains the MSA's central hub, with 57 percent of the population and almost 70 percent of the job base.

Centrally located on the southern banks of the Ohio River, amid an agriculturally productive, mineral rich, and energy producing region, Louisville is commonly described as the northernmost city of the American South. Closer to Toronto than to New Orleans, and even slightly closer to Chicago than to Atlanta, it remains within a day’s drive of two-thirds of the American population living east of the Rocky Mountains.

This location has been the dominant influence on Louisville’s history as a regional center of trade, commerce and manufacture. The city, now the all-points international hub of United Parcel Service (UPS), consistently ranks among the nation’s top logistics centers. Its manufacturing sector, though much diminished, still ranks among the strongest in the Southeast. The many cultural assets developed during the city’s reign as a regional economic center rank it highly in various measures of quality of life and “best places.”

Despite these strengths, Louisville’s competitiveness and regional prominence declined during much of the last half of the 20th Century, and precipitously so during the economic upheavals of the 1970s and ‘80s. Not only did it lose tens of thousands of manufacturing jobs and many of its historic businesses to deindustrialization and corporate consolidation, it also confronted significant barriers to entry into the growing knowledge-based economy because of its poorly-educated workforce, lack of R&D capacity, and risk-averse business culture.

In response, Louisville began a turbulent, two-decade process of civic and economic renewal, during which it succeeded both in restoring growth in its traditional areas of strength, most notably from the large impact of the UPS hub, and in laying groundwork for 21st century competitiveness, most notably by substantially ramping up university-based research and entrepreneurship supports. Doing so required it to overhaul nearly every aspect of its outmoded economic development strategies, civic relationships, and habits of mind, creating a new culture of collaboration.

Each of the three major partners in economic development radically transformed themselves and their relationships with one another. The often-paralyzing city-suburban divide of local governance yielded to consolidation. The business community reconstituted itself as a credible champion of broad-based regional progress, and it joined with the public sector to create a new chamber of commerce that is the region’s full-service, public-private economic development agency recognized as among the best in the nation. The Commonwealth of Kentucky embraced sweeping education reforms, including major support for expanded research at the University of Louisville, and a “New Economy” agenda emphasizing the commercialization of research-generated knowledge. Creative public-private partnerships have become the norm, propelling, for instance, the dramatic resurgence of downtown.

The initial successes of all these efforts have been encouraging, but not yet sufficient for the transformation to innovation-based prosperity that is the goal. This report details those successes, and the leadership, partnerships, and strategies that helped create them. It begins by describing Louisville’s history and development and the factors that made its economy grow and thrive. It then explains why the city faltered during the latter part of the 20th century and how it has begun to reverse course. In doing so, the study offers important lessons for other cities that are striving to compete in a very new economic era. 

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Chattanooga a few years ago faced what many smaller cities are struggling with today—a sudden decline after years of prosperity in the "old" economy. This case study offers a roadmap for these cities by chronicling Chattanooga's demise and rebirth.

Chattanooga is located in the southern end of the Tennessee Valley where the Tennessee River cuts through the Smoky Mountains and the Cumberland Plateau. The city’s location, particularly its proximity to the Tennessee River, has been one of its greatest assets. Today, several major interstates (I-24, I-59, and I-75) run through Chattanooga, making it a hub of transportation business. The city borders North Georgia and is less than an hour away from both Alabama and North Carolina. Atlanta, Nashville, and Birmingham are all within two hours travel time by car.

Chattanooga is Tennessee’s fourth largest city, with a population in 2000 of 155,554, and it covers an area of 143.2 square miles. Among the 200 most populous cities in the United States, Chattanooga—with 1,086.5 persons per square mile—ranks 190th in population density.2 It is the most populous of 10 municipalities in Hamilton County, which has a population of 307,896, covers an area of 575.7 square miles, and has a population density of 534.8 persons per square mile.

With its extensive railroads and river access, Chattanooga was at one time the “Dynamo of Dixie”—a bustling, midsized, industrial city in the heart of the South. By 1940, Chattanooga’s population was centered around a vibrant downtown and it was one of the largest cities in the United States. Just 50 years later, however, it was in deep decline. Manufacturing jobs continued to leave. The city’s white population had fled to the suburbs and downtown was a place to be avoided, rather than the economic center of the region. The city lost almost 10 percent of its population during the 1960s, and another 10 percent between 1980 and 1990. It would have lost more residents had it not been for annexation of outlying suburban areas.

The tide began to turn in the 1990s, with strategic investments by developing public-private partnerships—dubbed the “Chattanooga way.” These investments spurred a dramatic turnaround. The city’s population has since stabilized and begun to grow, downtown has been transformed, and it is once again poised to prosper in the new economy as it had in the old.

This report describes how Chattanooga has turned its economy around. It begins with a summary of how the city grew and developed during its first 150 years before describing the factors driving its decline. The report concludes by examining the partnerships and planning that helped spur Chattanooga’s current revitalization and providing valuable lessons to other older industrial cities trying to ignite their own economic recovery. 

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Part of the larger Northeast Ohio regional economy, the Akron metropolitan area is composed of two counties (Summit and Portage) with a population of just over 700,000, and is surrounded by three other metropolitan areas. Akron is located approximately 40 miles south of Cleveland, 50 miles west of Youngstown, and 23 miles north of Canton. The Cleveland metro area is a five-county region with a population of 2.1 million. The Youngstown metro area includes three counties, extending into Pennsylvania, and has a population of 587,000. Canton is part of a two-county metropolitan area with a population of 410,000.

The adjacency of the Akron and Cleveland Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) is an important factor in the economic performance of the Akron region. The interdependence of economies of the two MSAs is evidenced by the strong economic growth of the northern part of Summit County adjacent to the core county of the Cleveland metropolitan area. This part of Summit County beyond the city of Akron provides available land, access to the labor pools of the two metropolitan areas, and proximity to the region’s extensive transportation network.

Although affected by economic activity in the larger region, the fate and future of Akron and its wider region are not solely determined by events in these adjacent areas. While sharing broad economic trends with its neighbors, the Akron metro area has been impacted by a different set of events and has shown different patterns of growth from other areas in Northeast Ohio.

This study provides an in-depth look at Akron’s economy over the past century. It begins by tracing the industrial history of the Akron region, describing the growth of the rubber industry from the late 1800s through much of following century, to its precipitous decline beginning in the 1970s. It then discusses how the “bottoming out” of this dominant industry gave rise to the industrial restructuring of the area. The paper explores the nature of this restructuring, and the steps and activities the city’s business, civic, and government leaders have undertaken to help spur its recovery and redevelopment. In doing so, it provides a series of lessons to other older industrial regions working to find their own economic niche in a changing global economy. 

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Now that the 2010 Census is concluded, states will begin the process of reapportionment—re-drawing voting district lines to account for population shifts. Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael McDonald says redistricting has been fraught with controversy and corruption since the nation’s early days, when the first “gerrymandered” district was drawn. Two states—Arizona and California—have instituted redistricting commissions intended to insulate the process from political shenanigans, but politicians everywhere will continue to work the system to gain electoral advantage and the best chance of re-election for themselves and their parties.

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Every decade since 1790, a census of the entire U.S. population is used by state governments to apportion representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives. But the redrawing of congressional districts that follows the census is an exercise in pure politics, says expert Thomas Mann. With the power to redistrict in the hands of incumbents in state legislatures, coupled with powerful mapping technologies, a state’s representation in Congress often bears little relation to the actual partisan makeup of its population, he says.

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When Iran and the P5+1 signed a deal over Tehran’s nuclear program last July, members of Congress, Middle East analysts, and Arab Gulf governments all warned that the agreement would prompt Iran’s rivals in the region to race for the bomb.

In a report that Bob Einhorn and I released this week, we assessed this risk of a so-called proliferation cascade. We look at four states in particular—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Turkey—and Bob briefly explores each case in another blog post out today. In the paper, we argue that although the likelihood of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East is fairly low, and certainly lower than a number of critics of the Iran deal would have you believe, it is not zero. Given that, here are eight steps that leaders in Washington should take to head off that possibility:

1. Ensure that the JCPOA is rigorously monitored, strictly enforced, and faithfully implemented;
2. Strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on Iranian proliferation-related activities and intelligence-sharing on those activities with key partners;
3. Deter a future Iranian decision to produce nuclear weapons;
4. Seek to incorporate key monitoring and verification provisions of the JCPOA into routine IAEA safeguards as applied elsewhere in the Middle East and in the global nonproliferation regime;
5. Pursue U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with Middle East governments on terms that are realistic and serve U.S. nonproliferation interests;
6. Promote regional arrangements that restrain fuel cycle developments and build confidence in the peaceful use of regional nuclear programs;
7. Strengthen security assurances to U.S. partners in the Middle East; and
8. Promote a stable regional security environment.

Taken together, these steps deal with three core challenges the United States faces in shoring up the nonproliferation regime in the region.

The first is that the central test of nonproliferation in the Middle East will come from how the JCPOA is believed to be meeting its core objective of preventing Iranian nuclear weapons development and Iranian establishment of regional hegemony. It cannot be stressed enough that the decision to pursue nuclear weapons by any state, including those in the region, starts with a sense of vulnerability to core security threats and an inability to address those threats through any other means. The history of nuclear proliferation is one of tit-for-tat armament in the face of overriding security imperatives. Both finished and aborted nuclear programs bear the hallmarks of a security dilemma impelling states to make the political, economic, and security investments into nuclear weapons.

This is no less true for countries across the region than for Iran. To the extent that the overall security environment can be stabilized, there will be less impetus for any Middle Eastern state to develop nuclear weapons. The United States should focus on:

• Fully implementing and enforcing all sides of the JCPOA (nuclear restrictions, transparency, and sanctions relief);
• Creating a strong sense of deterrence toward Iran, manifest most clearly in the passage of a standing Authorization to Use Military Force if Iran is determined to be breaking out toward acquisition of a nuclear weapon;
• Providing security assurances and backing them up with the mechanisms to make them actionable like joint exercises, logistical planning, and cooperation with a range of regional and extra-regional actors; and,
• Working to promote a more stable regional environment by seeking the resolution of simmering conflicts.

But, these latter two factors also point to another resonant theme in our research: the need for the United States to be a player. After decades of involvement in the region, the United States has yet to settle upon the right balance between involvement and remove. Yet, establishing this equilibrium is essential. States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

States in the region need predictability in their affairs with the United States, including knowing the degree to which our assurances will stand the test of time.

In part for this reason, the United States should not only pursue deeper security relationships, but also civil nuclear cooperation with interested states throughout the region. Such a relationship both ensures a closer link between the United States and its partners and discourages the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology by disincentivizing countries from “going it alone.” In the Middle East, the United States would need to find a formulation that offers some flexibility (such as by building in language that would permit the United States to terminate any nuclear cooperation arrangements in the face of sensitive fuel cycle development by the other side).

The United States should also share intelligence more closely with its partners in the region. This is helpful in the short term, of course, but also helps the United States understand the mindset of and intelligence picture of its regional partners in a broader sense. It also helps leaders in Washington address concerns brought about by unfounded rumors or speculation as to Iran’s intentions or capabilities.

Changing how we do business

Even more important than how the JCPOA was negotiated will be how we transition from its restrictions and transparency mechanisms into a new world in 15 to 20 years. 

The United States seek to incorporate elements of the JCPOA into normal international monitoring practices and should negotiate new arrangements to help govern the future development of nuclear technology in the region. 

To achieve the former, the IAEA will need to make some changes to how it does business. For example, the IAEA determines how best to implement its monitoring mission, contingent on acceptance by the country being inspected. The United States and its partners should work with the IAEA (and other countries with significant nuclear activities) to make some parts of the JCPOA standard operating practice, such as online monitoring of enrichment levels. Other elements of the JCPOA may require agreements at the IAEA and beyond for how nuclear-related activities, including those that could have value for nuclear weaponization, are handled. It might be hard to get agreement, not least because there is clear language in the JCPOA that states that it will not be seen as a precedent for future nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, it should still be the ambition of the United States to make such steps part of the norm. 

A far more difficult lift would be organizing a regional approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not the same as creating a multilateral fuel cycle, though some elements that approach would be helpful. Rather, the United States should find ways to craft regional agreements or, failing that, moratoria on aspects of the fuel cycle that others in the region would find threatening. It would be easier to negotiate constraints some aspects than others. For example, spent fuel reprocessing is rare in the Middle East, with only Israel having been known to do it to a significant degree. It may therefore be an attractive first place to begin. Enrichment would be altogether more difficult, but it may be possible to convince states in the region to forego the expansion of their enrichment programs beyond their status quo. For Iran, it would continue to possess uranium enrichment but with constraints that limit the utility of this program for weapons production; its incentive would be to avoid creating the rationale for regional competition. For other countries in the region, it would involve holding off on enrichment, but also on the financial and political investment enrichment would involve—as well refraining from creating a security dilemma for Iran that could produce miscalculation in the future.

While some of these recommendations are more challenging (and may prove impossible), others are potentially easier. By taking a multifaceted approach, the United States increases the chances that no further weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the Middle East down the road. 

Editors’ Note: Richard Nephew and Bob Einhorn spoke about their new report at a recent Brookings event. You can see the video from the event here.

The Pentagon is embarking on a modernization of U.S. strategic nuclear forces that will cost hundreds of billions of dollars. Much of it makes sense, as key elements of the strategic triad age out and require replacement. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States should maintain a robust triad. However, the long-range stand-off weapon (LRSO), a new nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile, does not make sense.

The U.S. strategic triad consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. This mix gives the Pentagon the ability to hold at risk things that a potential adversary values. The inherent ability to destroy those things provides the basis for deterrence.

ICBMs can hold at risk targets 6,000 miles away. As they are based on mobile ballistic missile submarines, SLBMs can reach targets anywhere on earth. The same is true for weapons carried by the B-2 and B-52 and, in the future, the B-21. With aerial refueling, U.S. strategic bombers have global reach.

So the question arises: What unique target set could the LRSO hold at risk that cannot be threatened by ICBMs, SLBMs, or gravity bombs delivered by stealthy strategic bombers? At a recent panel discussion on the LRSO, the best answer to this question was “certain things”—but the proponent could not articulate what those “things” were. That explains much of the questioning about the LRSO. No one seems able to offer a plausible explanation for what the LRSO could do that other strategic nuclear systems cannot.

The weapon’s justification often seems to boil down to: The Pentagon is replacing other strategic systems because they are old, so it should replace the old nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as well. Does that logic hold?

The Air Force developed nuclear-armed ALCMs in the 1970s because the B-52 presented a big target on radar screens. Concern grew that the B-52 could not penetrate Soviet air defenses. A B-52 armed with ALCMs could launch its missiles from well beyond the reach of those air defenses.

Today, however, the Air Force has the stealthy B-2 bomber. It is in the process of procuring 80 to 100 B-21 bombers, which reportedly will incorporate stealth and advanced electronic warfare capabilities. The Department of Energy is already well along in the program to modernize the B61 nuclear gravity bomb. The modernized bomb will be highly accurate and have a variable yield. B-2 and B-21 bombers that can penetrate advanced air defenses and deliver B61 bombs against targets make the LRSO redundant.

Some suggest the LRSO hedges against a compromise of the B-21’s stealth. If that argument has merit, Congress ought to reexamine the wisdom of spending $60 to $80 billion—or perhaps $100 billion—on the bomber. Converted KC-46s (military refueling variants of the Boeing 767) with LRSOs would offer a far cheaper option. The Pentagon, however, seems to believe the B-21 will be capable of defeating advanced air defenses.

That being so, the case for the LRSO is weak. It will cost taxpayers $20 to $30 billion. True, that is a relatively small cost compared to what the Pentagon will pay to replace the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines or build the B-21. But it is not chump change.

Some LRSO proponents cite the relatively “small” cost to argue that the defense budget can afford it. Current Pentagon officials, however, say they have no idea how to pay for everything they want for strategic modernization. Given the rising cost of mandatory spending such as social security and Medicare, and the pressure to hold down the deficit, the budget problem will not become easier in the 2020s, when the “bow-wave” of strategic modernization spending arrives. The Air Force will likely find itself having to choose between B-21s, KC-46 tankers, F-35 fighters, and the LRSO. It also wants to buy a new ICBM then. It is hard to see how all of that will be affordable.

Funding the LRSO now contributes to a budget time-bomb that the current administration and Congress will leave to their successors. The LRSO seems a redundant weapon without a mission. Shelving the program would defuse part of that time-bomb.

Gentrification – the migration of wealthier people into poorer neighborhoods – is a contentious issue in most American cities. Many fear that even if gentrification helps a city in broad terms, for instance by improving the tax base, it will be bad news for low-income residents who are hit by rising rents or even displacement. But this received wisdom is only partially true.

A recent study published by City Observatory, an urban policy think-tank, and written by economist and former Brookings scholar Joseph Cortright with Dillon Mahmoudi , challenges this prevailing pessimism.  Examining population and income changes between 1970 and 2010 in the largest cities, they find that the poverty concentration, rather than gentrification, is the real problem for the urban poor.  

Cortright and Mahmoudi examine more than 16,000 census tracts[1] – small, relatively stable, statistical subdivisions (smaller than the zip code), of a city – within ten miles of the central business districts of the 51 largest cities. Their key findings are:

1. High-poverty neighborhoods tripled between 1970 and 2010: The number of census tracts considered “high-poverty” rose from around 1,100 in 1970 to 3,100 in 2010. Surprisingly, of these newly-impoverished areas, more than half were healthy neighborhoods in 1970, before descending into “high-poverty” status by 2010. Our Brookings colleague Elizabeth Kneebone has documented similar patterns in the concentration of poverty around large cities.
2. Poverty is persistent: Two-thirds of the census tracts defined as “high-poverty” in 1970 (with greater than 30% of residents living below the poverty line), were still “high-poverty” areas in 2010. And another one-quarter of neighborhoods escaped “high-poverty” but remained poorer than the national average (about 15% of population below FPL )
3. Few high-poverty neighborhoods escape poverty: Only about 9 percent of the census tracts that were “high-poverty” in 1970 rebounded to levels of poverty below the national average in 2010.

Being poor is obviously bad, but being poor in a really poor neighborhood is even worse. The work of urban sociologists like Harvard’s Robert J. Sampson and New York University’s Patrick Sharkey  highlights how persistent, concentrated neighborhood disadvantage has damaging effects on children that continue throughout a lifetime, often stifling upward mobility across generations.  When a community experiences uniform and deep poverty, with most streets characterized by dilapidated housing, failing schools, teenage pregnancy and heavy unemployment, it appears to create a culture of despair that can permanently blight a young person’s future.

So what has been the impact of gentrification in the few places where it has occurred? There is some evidence, crisply summarized in a recent article by John Buntin in Slate, that it might not be all bad news in terms of poverty. A degree of gentrification can begin to break up the homogenous poverty of neighborhoods in ways that can be good for all residents. New wealthier residents may demand improvements in schools and crime control. Retail offerings and services may improve for all residents – and bring new jobs, too. Gentrifiers can change neighborhoods in ways that begin to counteract the effects of uniform, persistent poverty.  On the other hand, gentrification can hurt low-income households by disrupting the social fabric of neighborhoods and potentially “pricing out” families. It depends on how it’s done. We’ll turn to that tomorrow. 

Poverty is heavily concentrated in a growing number of urban neighborhoods, which as we argued yesterday, is bad news for social mobility. By breaking up semi-permanent poverty patterns, a degree of gentrification can bring in new resources, energy and opportunities.

Gentrification and poverty: A contested relationship

As we noted yesterday, work by Cortright and Mahmoudi suggests that almost 10% of high-poverty neighborhoods escaped the poverty trap between 1970 and 2010—especially in Chicago, New York, and Washington D.C. Is this good or bad news for the residents of these formerly very poor neighborhoods?

Researchers disagree: the standard fear, supported by a considerable body of qualitative research, is that low-income families will be priced out and displaced out of improving neighborhoods. But there is growing evidence in the economics literature that casts doubt on prevailing views about the risks of displacement. These neighborhoods may become mixed neighborhoods rather than switching from homogenously poor to homogenously wealthy. This could be good news for the poor households who are now living in non-poor areas.

Gentrification: It depends how you do it

Whether gentrification benefits the poor depends in part on the nature of the process. Gentrification is not all the same. Gentrification can mean “walled-up” and gated communities for the wealthy and it can sometimes create damaging disruptions in the tenuous social fabric of neighborhoods, such that there are few beneficial spillover effects of from gentrification.

So while many neighborhoods previously mired in poverty may experience positive impacts from gentrification, others may be directly hurt by it. According to an extensive literature review by the Urban Institute, the impact of living in mixed-income communities for low-income families varies quite widely. Low-income families tend to benefit from improvements in neighborhood services, but the effects on their education and economic outcomes are unclear.   

Some cities, such as Washington DC, have started using their regulatory powers to require developers to preserve or expand modest-income housing alongside higher-priced housing. It is too early to assess the impact of these programs so, but such “smart” gentrification policies may be a good strategy to turn around chronically poor neighborhoods in ways that benefit the original population.

One advantage of the migration of wealthier people into depressed neighborhoods is the restoration and use of dilapidated buildings, which can have positive spillover effects throughout the community. But there are other ways to achieve this, including investments in charter or community schools and other community institutions that then become “hubs” for a range of medical and other services, as well as improved education.

Gentrification certainly comes with attendant dangers for low-income families, which policy makers should be on guard against. But it comes with potential benefits too, so we should be careful about simply “protecting” neighborhoods from the process.  Policies and regulations that insulate impoverished neighborhoods from gentrification could end up condemning these communities to yet another generation of deep poverty and segregation. 

INTRODUCTION

If you are one of those government officials, finance experts, development professionals or NGO members whose eyes glaze over when you see an article on procurement, you are the audience I want to address. Procurement is the purchase of works, goods and services by individuals or firms, or government entities in the case of public procurement. We all make procurement decisions in our everyday lives. We pride ourselves on making good decisions and being able to apply discretion and judgment. Now imagine if you were improving your home and were constrained by pages and pages of legal and technical regulations that take away that discretion. You would soon question whether those regulations were relevant and whether they provide any value or simply delayed and jeopardized good decision-making. Worse yet, imagine if you had to follow rules that someone else outside your family, your community or your country set for you. While public procurement requires a higher standard of governance than personal procurement, developing countries and other stakeholders are raising these questions regarding the policies set by multilateral aid institutions.

In November 2013, the World Bank released the report of its first stage efforts in reforming its procurement policy as it relates to the projects it finances. As the World Bank enters the second stage in designing the actual reforms, the “development community” faces a crucial moment and opportunity to refine and reform a fundamental instrument in the development toolbox—one that has been treated for too long as a “plumbing and wiring” issue that ignores the broader public policy implications and the growing burden of conflicting objectives, regulations, incentives and political polemics. The purpose of this paper is to examine concerns regarding reform of multilateral agencies’ public procurement policies, enhance awareness of what is at stake and lay the groundwork for the reform discussions at development institutions that will take place over the next year.

I should alert you, however, that I am neither a procurement specialist, nor am I a lawyer or an engineer. I would describe myself as a development practitioner. After decades of working on infrastructure projects and on multilateral operational policy, I have maintained a deep respect for my procurement colleagues who have protected my proverbial “backside.” One quickly learns in this business that a mistake in procurement can result in serious consequences as one sits in the middle of the converging, and often conflicting, interests of governments, donors, private sector and, of course, affected communities. The procurement policies applied by the multilateral finance institutions have been responsible for enhancing competition, deepening transparency and raising the integrity of investment in developing countries, as well as opening markets for developed and developing countries’ businesses. As the world of public procurement has evolved, however, one also learns that procurement is becoming more than just getting the “plumbing and wiring” right. Indeed, the role and application of public procurement policies and practices is an essential element of design and implementation with crucial consequences for the quality of outcomes. The case set forth in this paper lays out the factors driving the need for major reform of multilateral banks’ procurement policies—rather than simply adapting existing policies. This paper also presents the major challenges to be addressed in designing the reforms and the tensions to be resolved or balanced as the World Bank enters the more detailed design stage of its reform effort.

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• Download the full paper

It is estimated that there are 95 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants worldwide, and this boom has not been lost on the developing world, where the number of mobile users has also grown at rocket speed. In fact, in recent years the information communication technology (ICT) revolution has provided opportunities leading to “death of distance,” allowing many obstacles to better livelihoods, especially for those in remote regions, to disappear. Remarkably, though, the huge proportion of poverty-stricken populations in so many of those same regions persists.

How might, then, we think differently on the relationship between these two ideas? Can and how might ICTs act as an engine for eradicating poverty and improving the quality of life in terms of better livelihoods, strong education outcomes, and quality health? Do today's communication technologies hold such potential?

In particular, the mobile phone’s accessibility and use creates and provides us with an unprecedented volume of data on social interactions, mobility, and more. So, we ask: Can this data help us better understand, characterize, and alleviate poverty?

Mapping call data records, mobility, and economic activity

The first step towards alleviating poverty is to generate poverty maps. Currently, poverty maps are created using nationally representative household surveys, which require manpower and time. Such maps are generated at a coarse regional resolution and continue to lag for countries in sub-Saharan Africa compared to the rest of the world.

As call data records (CDRs) allow a view of the communication and mobility patterns of people at an unprecedented scale, we show how this data can be used to create much more detailed poverty maps efficiently and at a finer spatial resolution. Such maps will facilitate improved diagnosis of poverty and will assist public policy planners in initiating appropriate interventions, specifically at the decentralized level, to eradicate human poverty and ensure a higher quality of life.

In order to create these detailed poverty maps, we first define the virtual network of a country as a “who-calls-whom” network. This signifies the macro-level view of connections or social ties between people, dissemination of information or knowledge, or dispersal of services. As calls are placed for a variety of reasons, including request for resources, information dissemination, personal etc., CDRs provide an interesting way to construct a virtual network for Senegal.

We start by quantifying the accessibility of mobile connectivity in Senegal, both spatially and across the population, using the CDR data. This quantification measures the amount of communication across various regions in Senegal. The result is a virtual network for Senegal, which is depicted in Figure 1. The circles in the map correspond to regional capitals, and the edges correspond to volume of mobile communication between them. Thicker edges mean higher volume of communication. Bigger circles mean heavier incoming and outgoing communication for that region.

Figure 1: Virtual network for Senegal with MPI as an overlay

Source: Author’s rendering of the virtual network of Senegal based on the dataset of CDRs provided as a part of D4D Senegal Challenge 2015

Figure 1 also shows the regional poverty index[1] as an overlay. A high poverty index corresponds to very poor regions, which are shown lighter green on the map. It is evident that regions with plenty of strong edges have lower poverty, while most poor regions appear isolated. 

Now, how can we give a more detailed look at the distribution of poverty? Using the virtual network, we extract quantitative metrics indicating the centrality of each region in Senegal. We then calculate centrality measures of all the arrondissements[2] within a region. We then correlate these regional centrality measures with the poverty index to build a regression model. Using the regression model, we predict the poverty index for each arrondissement.

Figure 2 shows the poverty map generated by our model for Senegal at an arrondissement level. It is interesting to see finer disaggregation of poverty to identify pockets of arrondissement, which are most in need of sustained growth. The poorer arrondissements are shown lighter green in color with high values for the poverty index.

Figure 2: Predicted poverty map at the arrondissement level for Senegal with MPI as an overlay

Source: Author’s rendering of the virtual network of Senegal based on the dataset of CDRs provided as a part of D4D Senegal Challenge 2015.

What is next for call data records and other Big Data in relation to eradicating poverty and improving the human development?

This investigation is only the beginning. Since poverty is a complex phenomenon, poverty maps showcasing multiple perspectives, such as ours, provide policymakers with better insights for effective responses for poverty eradication. As noted above, these maps can be used for decomposing information on deprivation of health, education, and living standards—the main indicators of human development index.

Even more particularly, we believe that this Big Data and our models can generate disaggregated poverty maps for Senegal based on gender, the urban/rural gap, or ethnic/social divisions. Such poverty maps will assist in policy planning for inclusive and sustained growth of all sections of society. Our methodology is generic and can be used to study other socio-economic indicators of the society.

Like many uses of Big Data, our model is in its nascent stages. Currently, we are working towards testing our methodology at the ground level in Senegal, so that it can be further updated based on the needs of the people and developmental interventions can be planned. The pilot project will help to "replicate" our methodology in other underdeveloped countries.

In the forthcoming post-2015 development agenda intergovernmental negotiations, the United Nations would like to ensure the “measurability, achievability of the targets” along with identification of 'technically rigorous indicators' for development. It is in this context that Big Data can be extremely helpful in tackling extreme poverty.

Note: This examination was part of the "Data for Development Senegal" Challenge, which focused on how to use Big Data for grass-root development. We took part in the Data Challenge, which was held in conjunction with NetMob 2015 at MIT from April 7-10, 2015. Our team received the National Statistics prize for our project titled, "Virtual Network and Poverty Analysis in Senegal.” This blog reflects the views of the authors only and does not reflect the views of the Africa Growth Initiative.

[1] As a measure of poverty, we have used the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which is a composite of 10 indicators across the three areas: education (years of schooling, school enrollment), health (malnutrition, child mortality), and living conditions.

[2] Senegal is divided into 14 administrative regions, which are further divided into 123 arrondissements.

Harsh geopolitical realities and historic legacies have pushed the South Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia back onto the foreign policy agendas of the United States, the European Union (EU), and Turkey, at a time when all three have pulled back from more activist roles in regional affairs. The South Caucasus states have now become, at best, second-tier issues for the West, but they remain closely connected to first-tier problems. To head off the prospect that festering crises in the Caucasus will lead to or feed into broader conflagrations, the United States, EU, and Turkey have to muster sufficient political will to re-engage to some degree in high-level regional diplomacy. In “Retracing the Caucasian Circle Considerations and Constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucasus,” authors Fiona Hill, Kemal Kirişci, and Andrew Moffatt explore the rationale and assess the options for Western reengagement with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia given the current challenges and limitations on all sides. Based on a series of study trips to the South Caucasus and Turkey in 2014 and 2015, and numerous other interviews, the authors review some of the current factors that should be considered by Western policymakers and analysts.

Constraints and considerations for U.S., EU, and Turkish engagement in the South Caucasus:

• Divergent trends in the South Caucasus
• Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus
• Regional conflicts
• The United States’ diminishing role in the South Caucasus
• Failure to integrate the South Caucasus into the EU
• Foundering relations with Turkey
• Dashed expectations in the South Caucasus of Western engagement

Despite the challenges that have beset the West’s relations with the South Caucasus and the growing disillusionment in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, giving up on engagement is not an option.

Policy options for the future:

• The United States, EU, and Turkey must work together, rather than separately
• “Under the radar” coordination on creative interim solutions and working with other mediators
• Focus on the development of “soft regionalism”
• Work with Georgia as the hub for furthering soft regionalism
• Devise adaptable policies as relations with Iran and China develop in the region

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• Retracing the Caucasian Circle: Considerations and constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish engagement in the South Caucasus

I write this as I learn of the beating death of an Azerbaijani journalist Rasim Aliyev. His “crime” was to post a Facebook item about football. What follows seems insignificant compared to his murder.

Two articles have appeared in prominent Western outlets in the past month addressing developments in the South Caucasus and the need for adjustments in U.S. (and Western) policy toward the region. The first was an excellent, in-depth Brookings report titled "Retracing the Caucasian Circle—Considerations and Constraints for U.S., EU, and Turkish Engagement in the South Caucasus"; the second was a shorter essay that Bill Courtney, Denis Corboy, and I penned for Newsweek on the need to reboot policy toward Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Both reflected the difficulty of writing about the “South Caucasus” as if the three countries had common interests and objectives. Increasingly these interests and objectives are diverging, except for a growing unhappiness with the United States and the West for not paying attention to—or doing enough to support—the region. In the case of Azerbaijan, the frustration stems from U.S. leaders paying too much attention to the appalling human rights situation in the country.

What’s making the Azerbaijanis so upset with the West?

The authors of the Brookings report point to elite cynicism over Western disinterest and policy failures in the region as sources of Azerbaijani leaders’ unhappiness. This, in their view, is causing Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—for different reasons and in different ways—to tack toward Russia.

We have a different take in our Newsweek piece. We argue that the unhappiness results from governing elites recognizing that U.S. and Western policy regarding human rights, democracy building, corruption, and conflict resolution (especially the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) threaten regime stability. Therefore, the tacking toward Russia is a conscious choice to avoid pressure and the transparency that closer association with the United States and Europe would involve.

The new orientation of these countries requires serious adjustment in Western policies. There are four new drivers prompting change (beyond the role of Russia): the regional consequences of the Iran nuclear agreement; the growing economic crisis, which is affecting the South Caucasian states in different ways; the threat of renewed military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan; and the internal security implications of suppression of human rights. While each country responds to these drivers in different ways, they are the source of a new dynamic in the South Caucasus that requires a fresh Western policy approach.

Three wild cards will shape these drivers and the Western approach to them: First, how hard will Russian President Vladimir Putin push his objective of rolling back the degree of Western influence achieved since the fall of the Soviet Union? Second, how well will Iran play the nuclear agreement card, especially regarding its reentry into global energy markets? Third, how distracting will Turkey’s military response to the Islamic State and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) be for Turkey’s interests in the South Caucasus and its objective of becoming a regional energy hub?

The shortcomings of soft regionalism

What is to be done? Faced with such a challenging situation, the default policy response is to provide more assistance (economic and military), dispatch senior officials from Western capitals to visit the region, and indulge (rather than criticize) democracy and human rights abuses, all in the name of developing a strategic partnership. In other words: Show more love.

That business-as-usual approach is inappropriate for these challenging times. In the case of Azerbaijan, it is an inappropriate response to the continued violations by the Baku regime of basic human rights and freedom of expression.

The Brookings paper suggests a multilateral approach (involving the United States, EU, and Turkey) based on soft regionalism. I do not believe that soft regionalism will work. The best we can hope for is parallel bilateral engagement on the basis of common interests (e.g. conflict prevention) and shared values (e.g. democratic evolution, observance of human rights). We need to treat the energy issue in the region as a commercial rather than geopolitical one. Changes in the global energy market have undermined the geopolitical significance of Caspian energy resources compared to two decades ago. With low energy prices likely the norm for the near future, energy no longer plays a strategic role for the region. Among other weaknesses, the soft regionalism prescription implies coordinated interests with Turkey—this will be difficult absent an opening in Turkish-Armenian relations.

Who needs who more?

The burden of choice in this relationship with the West must shift from the outside parties to the South Caucasian states themselves. The outsiders should stop talking about “strategic” partnerships, trans-Caspian pipelines and Silk Roads because this perpetuates a “you-need-us-more-than-we-need-you” starting point. Rather, the time has come for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to decide on their own where their interests coincide with those of the West. That’s where we and they can begin to develop meaningful relationships, rather than trying to invent a veneer to cover differences—as in the case of Azerbaijan’s record on human rights.

Another recent article in Newsweek, by Theodore Gerber and Jane Zavisca, raised questions about promoting democracy and human rights where populations and elites are skeptical of U.S. motivations in promoting these issues. Fairly, the article questions the effectiveness of the traditional instruments of promoting opposition political parties and local NGOs as a way of winning “hearts and minds” in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, these traditional instruments tend to emphasize the attractiveness of the “American way of life” through student and scientific exchanges. This offers a variant on the soft regionalism theme advanced in the Brookings paper. Both require a receptivity to change that both elites and populations increasingly find threatening. Developing a values-based relationship is difficult when values diverge.

To the extent our interests do not coincide, then the Western policy focus must be transactional and rest exclusively on conflict prevention and/or amelioration. It also should not shy away from pressing all three South Caucasian states on their obligations to observe international standards regarding human rights, democracy, and freedom of expression.

Campaign finance is a key issue for the quality of democracy. As we noted in a recently-published book of which we are co-authors, and which we had the honor to present in the Hall of Former Presidents of the Legislative Assembly last February 11 (El costo de la Democracia: Ensayos sobre el financiamiento político en América Latina, UNAM, Mexico City, 2015), it is important because of an inescapable fact: While democracy has no price, it does have an operating cost. The use of economic resources is an essential element for democratic competition. More than a pathology of democracy, political financing, when well-regulated, is a normal part of democratic life.

Yet it is undeniable that money is capable of introducing distortions in the democratic process. Its unequal distribution impacts, first, on the real possibilities enjoyed by the parties and the candidates to take their message to the voters. Second, having money gives individuals and social groups a differentiated possibility of participating in elections and exercizing their influence over the candidates through their contributions. This is vital for democracy. When political power is simply a reflection of economic power, the principle of “one person, one vote” loses meaning. Third, fundraising efforts offer obvious opportunities for the articulation of exchanges between donors and those who make decisions on public affairs, or at least for the continual appearance of conflicts of interest. This can be very problematic in the case of Latin America, where there is a risk of money from organized crime penetrating the campaigns.

And so it is not surprising that the issue is on the political agenda in many countries of the region, just as it has been for a long time in Costa Rica. Costa Rica introduced public financing for political parties in 1956, making it the second country in the world to do so, after Uruguay. Nonetheless, the generosity of the government contribution did not avoid a long succession of scandals associated with the issue, a history that includes figures ranging from Robert Vesco and Manuel Antonio Noriega to Carlos Hank González and the illegal donations from the government of Taiwan. 

The wounds left by each of these episodes gave way to worthy yet incomplete regulatory efforts. Most important has been the reform of the Electoral Code approved in 2009, which among many necessary changes prohibited corporate contributions to the political parties. And not only legislative action has made a difference. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court has also made a difference by lifting bank secrecy on financing, a very important decision that has been pointed to internationally.

Each of these steps has been moving the country in the right direction. This is worth underscoring: At a time when it is so easy to revile the Costa Rican political system, it should be recognized that in terms of political financing the country is, in general, better situated than it was 20 or 30 years ago. All the evidence we have indicates that private contributions today are less important in our campaigns than one generation ago. We can state with great certainty that our parties are financing more than 80% of the cost of their campaigns with the state contribution. That is good news.

However, the current regulatory framework presents problems such as:

a) It continues to be a regulatory system that is somehow upside down: It meticulously keeps tabs on the use of the state contribution by the parties, which does not give rise to conflicts of interest, while it is much less effective when it comes to verifying the truth of the information the parties provide about their private sources of financing, which do have the potential to compromise the autonomy of the political system. Correcting this imbalance, getting the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to prioritize monitoring private financing and to devote more resources to it, would not only be a way to straighten out its priorities, but frankly, all the parties would also breathe a sigh of relief.

b) The system of advances on the state contribution continues to be very limited (only 15% of the subsidy is disbursed before the presidential election and nothing in the case of municipal elections). It is time to admit that eliminating the system whereby the contributions were distributed in advance payments, which existed from 1971 to 1991 (when 50% was disbursed in advances), caused grave prejudice to the political system. The weakness of the advanced disbursement has ended up leaving the parties at the mercy of banks and lenders during the campaigns. Worse still, today the possibility of a party receiving loans during the campaign against its electoral expectations depends entirely on the fickle behavior of the opinion polls. This is unfair and risky, as the OAS electoral observation missions have noted.

c) The legal framework does little to limit parties’ spending on advertising, one of the most effective ways to reduce outlays during campaigns and to bring about fairness in electoral competition, which is one of the most important objectives in improving the current system. One must evaluate the advisability of adopting a system of advertising slots (provided free of charge by those holding concessions for the radio spectrum or purchased by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and then made available to the parties) as has been done, with a positive outcome, by other democracies in the region such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico.

d) The current regulatory framework has serious vulnerabilities at the local level. Requiring the parties to file a single financial report with the contribution they receive nationwide (the same system that exists for the presidential election) is insufficient when in practice there are 81 local elections in which each candidate raises and spends money autonomously. Let’s be clear: Relatively little is known about who finances the campaigns at the local level in Costa Rica. This would not matter much except that the experience of other countries – from Mexico to Colombia – shows that local campaigns are the preferred point of entry for organized crime to penetrate the electoral structures. Reinforcing the financial controls on municipal elections is one of the country’s most urgent tasks in relation to campaign finance.

Costa Rica has made major strides in regulating political financing. Yet there is an urgent need to address the weaknesses in the current regulatory framework. There are bills in the legislative pipeline, such as No. 18,739, introduced by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in April 2013, that incorporate almost all the reforms suggested here and that provide an excellent basis for moving this inevitable discussion forward. 

We will have to address the problems in the current regulatory framework sooner or later. The question is whether we will do so before or after the next scandal. Let’s hope that, for once, we act on time.

This piece was originally published by International IDEA. 

Editors’ Note: It is time to establish a regional reconstruction strategy for the Middle East, argues Sultan Barakat, that involves collective vision, broad participation, smart security, equality, and other key elements.This post originally appeared in Huffington Post.

The World Bank is hosting its annual Fragility Forum this week with the aim of making progress on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. This week has also seen a fragile ceasefire in Syria, potentially landmark elections in Iran, and a violent clash between Jordanian security and so-called Islamic State members. Together these developments have prompted me to reassess what needs to be done to resolve the issues of conflict and fragility in the Middle East.

For the Middle East, the starting point should be to move away from any process that reinforces the image of the West devising solutions and proposing "new" visions to the region. Such approaches are reminiscent of the Sykes-Picot agreement or the neoconservatives' "grand strategy" of the early 2000s and do not appreciate that the Middle East has changed fundamentally since 2011. The region, at all levels, now expects to be treated with dignity and to be the driving force behind its own development.

It is high time to pull together to establish a "Regional Reconstruction Strategy" that can address all sorts of violence, not just Islamist-related conflict. The region needs an ever-evolving strategy that maintains a holistic, problem-solving outlook while drawing on various forms of intervention (e.g. community driven development, inter-regional development projects, targeted counterinsurgency operations, stabilization, statebuilding, etc.) without being straightjacketed by any one toolkit or template. Novel approaches rooted in genuine regional leadership, broad participation, youth engagement, and the utilization of technology will increasingly need to be applied. The pillars of such a strategy should be a collective regional vision, effective local participation, smart security, reconciliation and justice, equity, reconstruction and development, and capacity.

Collective Vision: With the aspirations of the Arab Spring unrealized and many countries descending into sectarianism, what is needed now is a collective vision that goes beyond national borders. This would include pooling the region's resources, specifically all the ingredients for large-scale development, such as human resources, an educated population, capital, mobility, and nature. We could then look to the day when region-wide development is synergistic and not predatory or a zero-sum game. What Morocco has achieved with solar energy is a shining example—a visionary investment has addressed regional developmental and environmental challenges, stimulated employment, and raised confidence that hi-tech and innovative sectors can thrive in the Middle East. Such a broad vision is crucial if the region is to leapfrog into the twenty-first century and not remain in a vicious cycle of conflict and failed development.

Key to an inclusive and non-adversarial vision will be both accepting and embracing Islam as a majority religion while building on human security as an area of common ground. For this to happen some real changes are required in places such as Iran and Saudi Arabia—which would enable both to exercise their regional leadership in coalescing a constructive collective vision rather than perpetuating sectarian hostility.

Broad Participation: It is important that the regional vision recognizes that development requires an active civil society, a free media, and rooting action and ideas at the local level and with popular participation. The process of engaging in a region-wide consultation where contributions are coming from schools, villages, city halls, political parties, unions, and many other civic forums can help the region start dreaming about what it wants to look like in the 50 years to come.

Smart Security: Instead of a collective vision for development we have one for defense, formed with the excuse of the Islamic State group. All appreciate that a minimum level of security is important for implementing reconstruction, but a lack of security cannot be a pretext to do nothing. Experience has shown that delaying reconstruction efforts pushes people down the slope of conflict and violence and leads to dependence on humanitarian assistance. The region needs to find ways of better understanding the granular texture of security at local and regional levels so that strategies can be developed in which localized insecurity does not hold back development in other areas. This could support "spot reconstruction" efforts that create exemplars of what a degree of stability combined with reconstruction intervention can achieve in the midst of larger instability.

Reconciliation and Justice: No long-term investment in reconstruction can be protected without genuine reconciliation across the region. Twenty years ago the main fault line was Israel-Palestine. Today, there are many additional fault lines that need to be addressed, including Muslim-Christian tensions, tensions between displaced and host communities, and tensions between Sunni and Shiite communities. The most fundamental way to initiate reconciliation is to make sure that the rule of law applies to all and that everyone has access to justice regardless of the mechanism. On this a lot can be built on local and traditional systems for achieving justice and reconciliation.

Equity: A common mistake with reconstruction is that it proceeds without sufficient regulation and monitoring to ensure that benefits are equitably distributed. This region has repeatedly seen how easily reconstruction "lords" (most of whom were previously warlords) can emerge to line their pockets at the expense of the general public, thus perpetuating that country's crisis. World Bank arguments for the private sector to take the lead in reconstruction in Afghanistan and elsewhere have done nothing but strengthen this model. Assad's efforts to liberalize Syria's economy prior to 2011 led to the further enrichment of a corrupt elite, contributing to what we see today. Going forward, reconstruction efforts must take into consideration the poorest and least capable—so that nobody is left out.

Reconstruction and Development: There is an urgent need to find new ways of inducing development through international engagement with the region. The current instability has shifted spending toward security and away from the basics of development. As a result, some of the most important development indicators—freedom of expression, women's participation, poverty, quality of education—have taken a step back. All this is happening when the region is facing financial challenges due to severely reduced oil prices. This may prove to be an opportunity as some countries needed a good wake-up call to the pernicious effects of a model of capital development in which billions of dollars are invested in the West, generating jobs and stabilizing economies thousands of miles away at the expense of the region. If the West wants to help the region it should seek to focus minds within the Arab world on the value of investment in addressing regional problems in a mutually beneficial way. Ultimately a more stable region will lead to more prosperous neighbors both in the East and the West.

Building Capacity: To do this we must invest enormous amounts in fostering sustainable capacity at regional, national, and local levels. It is essential to invest in education at all levels, in particular going beyond primary education to support the young men and women that will become leaders with the conviction and capabilities to rebuild the region. In a rush to capture development, we have focused on the hard sciences, engineering, business studies, and computer science while ignoring our own culture, languages, and history. We must correct this imbalance, and it is time we develop our ideas in our own language and not rely on translation.

For all this to happen, fragility must be addressed within a coherent regional vision, not individual national plans. It would be constructive if the international community and donors would try to view the region as a whole—as one canvas in which to facilitate cross-border mobility of population, capital, ideas, and labor—and encourage regional responsibility with different countries leading in their areas of competency. International partners can support this with new and innovative forms of funding that utilize collateral guarantees from the region, not just individual countries. If we can embrace a truly regional approach, there may be a day when we elevate human dignity and human development above petty politics and sectarianism.

Extreme poverty around the world has decreased from around 2 billion people in 1990 living under $2 per day to 700 million today. Further, nine out of 10 children are now enrolled in primary schools, an increase over the last 15 years. Progress in both areas since 2000 has been part of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which set targets for reducing extreme poverty in eight areas, and which were the guiding principles for global development from 2000 to 2015. Today, the global community, through the UN, has adopted 17 Sustainable Development Goals to continue these poverty reduction efforts. 

In this new episode of Intersections podcast, host Adrianna Pita engages Brookings scholars Laurence Chandy and Rebecca Winthrop in a discussion of how digital technologies can be harnessed to bring poverty reduction and education to the most marginalized populations.

Listen:

Chandy, a fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings, says that the trends in getting people digitally connected "are progressing at such speed that they’re starting to reach some of the poorest people in the world. Digital technology is changing what it means to be poor because it’s bringing poor people out of the margins.”

Winthrop, a senior fellow and director of the Center for Universal Education at Brookings, says that "I think [education] access is crucial. And I do think that’s almost the first wave because without it we could work on all the ed tech—fabulous apps, great language translated content—but if you do not have the access it’s not going to reach the most marginalized."

Listen to this episode above; subscribe on iTunes; and find more episodes on our website.

Chandy was a guest on the Brookings Cafeteria Podcast in 2013; Winthrop has been a guest on the Cafeteria a few times to discuss global education topics, including: access plus education; investing in girls' education; and getting millions learning in the developing world.

William Galston and E.J. Dionne, Jr. make the case for universal voting – a new electoral system in which voting would be regarded as a required, civic duty. Why not treat showing up at the polls in the same way we treat a jury summons, which compels us to present ourselves at the court? Galston and Dionne argue that universal voting would enhance the legitimacy of our governing institutions, greatly increasing turnout and the diversity of the American voter base, and ease the intense partisan polarization that weakens our governing capacity.

Citing the implementation of universal voting in Australia in 1924, the authors conclude that universal voting increases citizen participation in the political process. In the United States, they write, universal voting would promote participation among citizens who are not likely to vote—those with lower levels of income and education, young adults, and recent immigrants. By evening out disparities in the electorate, universal voting would put the state on the side of promoting broad civic participation.

In addition to expanding voter participation, universal voting would improve electoral competition and curb hyperpolarization. Galston and Dionne assert that the addition of less partisan voters in the electorate, would force candidates to shift their focus from mobilizing partisan bases to persuading moderates and less committed voters. Reducing partisan rhetoric would help ease polarization and increase prospects for compromise.. Rather than focusing on symbolic, political gestures, Washington might have an incentive to tackle serious issues and solve problems.

Galston and Dionne believe that American democracy cannot be strong if citizenship is weak. And right now, they contend citizenship is strong on rights but weak on responsibilities. Making voting universal would begin to right this balance and send an important message: we all have the duty to help shape the country that has given us so much.

Galston and Dionne recognize that the majority of Americans are far from ready to endorse universal voting. By advancing a proposal that stands outside the perimeter of what the majority of Americans are likely to support, Galston and Dionne aim to enrich public debate—in the short term, by advancing the cause of more modest reforms that would increase participation; in the long term, by expanding public understanding of institutional remedies to political dysfunction. 

Downloads

• Download the paper

Audio

• Dionne and Galston discuss their paper on universal voting

In a new research paper—The case for universal voting: Why making voting a duty would enhance our elections and improve our government—Brookings scholars E.J. Dionne, Jr. and William Galston make the case for universal voting—an electoral system in which voting would be regarded as a required, civic duty. Why not treat showing up at the polls in the same way we treat, say, a jury summons? Dionne and Galston argue that universal voting’s benefits would include enhancing the legitimacy of our governing institutions, increasing turnout and the diversity of the American voter base, and easing the intense partisan polarization that weakens our governing capacity.

What do you think of Dionne and Galston’s proposal? Specifically, if voting and registration rules were made easier, should voting in national elections be universal and mandatory for all eligible citizens?

To voice your opinion, click the image below and vote. We will share the results on social media.

President Obama is right to keep at it in Afghanistan, argues a new policy brief by Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research for the Brookings Foreign Policy program.

Some have criticized the president’s decision to maintain a significant troop presence there (5,500 troops), instead of following through on the planned military withdrawal. But Afghanistan remains very important to American security, O’Hanlon contends, and the situation in the country is far from hopeless in spite of recent setbacks. We should reinvigorate American efforts in Afghanistan, he argues—not returning to levels seen in previous years, but ramping up somewhat from our current posture.

O’Hanlon calls Obama’s resolve in Afghanistan commendable, but writes that he and his administration are still making mistakes on U.S. policy toward the war-torn country. He advises that Washington make two specific changes to its military strategy in Afghanistan:

1. Allow U.S. and NATO airpower to target the Islamic State and the Taliban (currently, they can only fight those groups if directly attacked). The narrow rules of engagement constraining foreign forces were intended to push Afghan armed forces to defend their territory themselves. While a worthy goal, O’Hanlon says, these rules often prevent us from attacking ISIS (though the targeting strategy towards the group may be changing) as well as the Taliban. They also impose unrealistically high demands on Afghan forces and make too fine a distinction between an array of aligned extremist groups operating in the country.
2. Expand U.S. force presence from the current 5,500 troops to around 12,000 for a few years. In O’Hanlon’s opinion, our current numbers are not enough to work with fielded Afghan forces, and skimping on ground forces has contributed to security challenges in places like Helmand, for instance, which experienced new setbacks in 2015. More broadly, leaders in Washington and Brussels should stress the value of a long-term NATO-Afghanistan partnership, rather than emphasizing an exit strategy. This will signal Western resolve to the Taliban and other groups. While the next commander in chief should set the United States on a gradual path toward downsizing American troops in Afghanistan, he believes it would be a mistake for Obama to do so in the short term.

The long haul

O’Hanlon also argues that the United States needs to take a longer-term perspective on key political and economic issues in Afghanistan. On the economic front, there seems to be little thinking about an agricultural development plan for Afghanistan, associated infrastructure support, and land reform, among other challenges. On the political front, conversations often tend to focus on shorter-term issues like organizing parliamentary elections, reforming the Independent Election Commission, or modifying the current power-sharing arrangement. In the process, conversations about foundational political strategy focusing on Afghan institutions and the health of its democracy get short-changed. The parliament is in need of reforms, for instance, as is the political party system (which should encourage Afghans to group around ideas and policy platforms, rather than tribes and patronage networks).

O’Hanlon concludes that the situation in Afghanistan today, while fraught, is understandable given the Taliban’s resilience and NATO’s gradual withdrawal of 125,000 troops. We should not be despondent, he writes—rather, we should identify specific strategies that can help improve the situation. At the end of the day, Afghans must make the big decisions about the future of their country. But as long as the United States and its partners are still providing tremendous resources—and as long as security threats emanating from South Asia continue to threaten the United States—leaders in Washington should use their influence wisely.