Russia–China defence and security relations: Insights from the expert community 13 September 2022 — 3:00PM TO 4:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 August 2022 Online

Experts share insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations. 

In the defence and security realms, Russia–China relations resemble more pragmatic cooperation based on shared, calculated interests than an alliance.

This event presents and discusses key findings from a recent expert survey conducted by Chatham House with the aim to gather insights on Russia–China military, defence, and security relations.

Survey responses helped identify areas of bilateral cooperation but also crucial friction points and obstacles that prevent the relationship from developing further, as well as policy pathways for the West.

Russia-China Defence and Security Relations

This project explores the military and security linkages between Russia and China.

The project seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of Russia-China relations in the defence and security realms.

It also seeks to understand Russian political and security perceptions regarding Chinese inroads into what Russia considers its ‘near abroad’, as well as other sources of irritation and tension in the bilateral relationship. It offers recommendations to guide NATO policy responses.

How can young people in MENA thrive despite economic and political insecurity? 24 September 2024 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 30 August 2024 Online

Experts share insights on how young people navigate challenges and find opportunities in a changing domestic and regional landscape.

Across the Middle East and North Africa young people between the ages of 15 and 29 comprise around 24 per cent of the population in the region. As the complex regional geopolitical developments unfold, the majority of these young people are living in a time of economic and political insecurity, with many, such as Iraqis and Libyans, also growing up during conflict and uncertainty.

Enhanced education and employment programs are key opportunities for development and stability in the region. Despite this, limited resources and competing priorities have meant that governments often struggle to deliver competitive educational and employment opportunities and lack the capacity and funding for education reform and active labour market policy development. Key tensions that pit modernity and autonomy against tradition and control continue to frame the education and skills development landscape.

This webinar will address:

• The challenges young people within the MENA region face in different contexts;
• The role education and employment play in developing skills for 21st century challenges;
• Spaces for young people to practice citizenship and participate in political processes;
• Youth’s economic prospects while navigating the tumultuous backdrop of enduring conflict and authoritarianism. 

Security and defence 2025 6 March 2025 — 8:00AM TO 6:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 September 2024 Chatham House and Online

Join senior policymakers, business leaders and international security experts at Chatham House for a day of thought-provoking discussions exploring the tools needed to equip military forces with for an increasingly insecure future.

You will receive further instructions regarding your registration soon.

Future-proofing a fracturing world

The security and defence landscape is characterised by rapid change and evolving threats to global stability. The uncertainties of a complex geopolitical environment, with war on multiple fronts, are exacerbated by the array of threats presented across the domains of conflict - from land, sea and air through to space and technology. From drone swarm attacks in the Donbas, utilising the latest battlefield technology to gain advantages on the land and in the air, through to the battle for primacy in the space domain above the strategically important, yet inhospitable Arctic shipping lanes, the domains of conflict are becoming increasingly intertwined. A holistic strategy fit to tackle the threats of a fracturing world will rely on effective collaboration between the public and private sectors.

The 2025 Security and Defence conference brings together global policymakers, senior military and armed forces figures, business leaders and civil society experts. An insightful day of keynotes, high-level panel dialogues, and ‘under-the-Rule’ spotlights will explore how advanced technology is shaping the battlefield, examine how security architectures can be redesigned to support the end goal of peace, and address the future of arms control measures. Discussions will also unpack how forward-thinking defence actors might unlock fresh opportunities alongside current challenges. Forging stronger ties with partners to future-proof institutions and develop the architecture that will sustain security and defence ecosystems into the future will be crucial to ensuring that fighting forces are equipped, not just for the conflicts of today, but the security challenges of tomorrow.

Why attend?

• Learn more about the areas that leaders across the security and defence ecosystem are prioritizing and how they aim to counter emerging threats in order to foster resilience in this environment.
• Gain an understanding of the array of threats that are present, both across the domains of conflict and also the different regions of the world.
• In-person networking opportunities with senior leaders from across the government, international militaries and global business, as well as access to exclusive ‘under-the-Rule’ sessions.

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

The near death and uncertain future of the US National Security Council 27 January 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 January 2023 Chatham House

What role should the US National Security Council play in an era of great power competition?

Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00 GMT

Over the last three years, the US National Security Council (NSC) has gone from being neglected to necessary again, in Washington.

After former US President Donald Trump ignored and then tried to dismantle the NSC, current US President Joe Biden has restored the body but chosen not to reform it.

Born in the days before the Cold War and empowered during the War on Terror, what role should the NSC play in an era of great power competition?

Plus, how must it, and the rest of Washington, evolve to meet the challenges and opportunities that remain in the 21st century?

National security and transatlantic unity top Biden’s agenda Expert comment NCapeling 1 February 2023

The timing of the State of the Union address is significant as Joe Biden tries to maintain focus on Ukraine and China while navigating partisanship at home.

Although primarily a domestic affair, the president’s remarks in the annual State of the Union (SOTU) telegraph the US’s foreign policy priorities to the rest of the world. They reveal the prism through which the US understands its national security and its role in the world.

The 2023 address comes as the first anniversary of the Ukraine invasion rapidly approaches, and the US is also trying to build international support for tough economic measures towards China. Domestically, Republican control of the House of Representatives will exert new pressure on US foreign policy choices. Electoral pressures are also around the corner and Joe Biden should announce soon whether he plans to run for president in 2024.

Alliances and partnerships are a driving force for Biden. As pressure to end the war in Ukraine intensifies, maintaining transatlantic unity on Ukraine will be a key priority for the president. And as US electoral politics rise to the fore, ensuring the visibility of Europe’s role as a security provider in its own backyard will be essential.

For a US president who sees China and the Indo-Pacific as America’s most significant long-term geopolitical challenge – and the only peer competitor to the US – transatlantic unity on China will also come under pressure.

Ukraine, China, and controlling domestic division

Republican leaders who now chair key committees in the House of Representatives continue to signal support for Ukraine, and polling shows a majority of US public opinion (54 per cent) favours sending either weapons or air defence systems.

But recent polls also reveal a growing gap between Democrat and Republican supporters with a slight majority of Republicans (52 per cent) now opposing further support for Ukraine.

Biden’s ability to demonstrate that America and its European partners remain unified in their policy towards Ukraine and Russia will help him ward off partisanship at home. Congressional approval of $45 billion for Ukraine in its end of year spending budget will help the president remain above the fray of partisan politics for now. But if there is an absence of clear signs Ukraine is succeeding in its war aims, the challenge of maintaining domestic support could become more difficult.

A greater US focus on China, India, and on the Indo-Pacific in 2023 is also likely. Bipartisanship is strong on China, Republicans are more singular and hawkish in their approach to China than the US president, and the public support tough measures. At a time of war in Europe, the president will place great emphasis on the need to maintain transatlantic unity and to work with a broader coalition of partners in the Indo-Pacific.

The groundwork for focus on China has already been laid. Throughout 2022, the Biden administration worked steadily, but quietly, to set out its China policy. Just before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US released its new US-Indo Pacific Strategy stressing regional partnerships – especially the Quad and ASEAN – and it’s determination to shape essential norms for the region.

It stated boldly – albeit in a document which was largely unnoticed – that the objective is not to change China but to ‘shape the strategic environment in which it operates’, a policy which signifies a clear departure from the more ideological approach pursued by the US during Donald Trump’s final year in office. And in May, the US announced its economic strategy for the region, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

Now the terrain for competition with China and alignment with US partners and allies is heavily focused on technology and the daylight between national security and economic strategy in US China policy is rapidly disappearing. Biden’s policy focus of ‘invest (at home), align (with allies and partners), and compete (with China)’ has overshadowed earlier talk of cooperation between the US and China.

But as China opens its doors and Europe looks to bolster its economies, the US will have to work far harder to maintain transatlantic unity. Japan and the Netherlands embracing the US adoption of export controls on semiconductor chips is a positive sign, but the US’s economic strategy towards China may present harder choices to come for Europe. If China leans into its diplomacy, the pressure on transatlantic unity will also grow.

The new US Congress will only sharpen the president’s tough stance on China. Some Republican leaders still deny climate change and have demonstrated little interest in cooperating with China on debt relief for developing countries. The prospects for addressing critical global challenges appear dim without China’s collaboration, and the UK and Europe should work with the US president and Congress to correct this.

President Biden has clearly recognized that diplomacy will be critical in the months ahead. At a time of growing tensions, the potential for misperceptions or misunderstandings to create conflict will also increase, and so a US – and also European – commitment to broadening and deepening diplomacy with China is urgent but it also needs to be patient and sustained.

A new American industrial policy?

Those listening carefully to the State of the Union and who have followed US policy will also note the unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism is rapidly vanishing. The American state appeared to be disturbingly absent in the early months of the US pandemic response – but now it is back and, in a surprising turn of events, is being cast as a solution not a problem.

US and Europe Strategic Security Cooperation: The View from Washington 27 March 2023 — 9:00AM TO 10:00AM Anonymous (not verified) 9 March 2023 Chatham House

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership?

Thank you for your interest in joining our event. Please plan to arrive at Chatham House from 08:45 GMT as the event will begin promptly at 09:00.

The Biden administration’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the rise of a globally assertive China, as articulated in the 2022 US national strategy, is to ‘constrain Russia and out-compete China’. It needs Europe as a partner and ally for both – yet Europe is also an object and a battleground in this era of strategic competition.

As the US prepares to enter the next presidential election cycle, can the transatlantic alliance stay the course, especially against a deepening Russia-China partnership? Can Europeans, in particular, move from deepening dependency to greater agency and self-reliance? What is the role for Germany – and for the UK?

Space security 2025 5 March 2025 — 8:00AM TO 5:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 10 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

Join senior policymakers, space security experts and industry leaders for this unique conference, examining how space actors are tackling conflict and competition and enhancing cooperation in a fracturing world.

We’re pleased to offer you a 30% discount for our Security and Defence Conference on 6 March 2025. Simply use code SECDEF25SAVER at checkout.

Conflict, competition and cooperation in outer space

Space is a crucial domain of conflict, competition and cooperation. Recent years have seen the emergence of new actors in the ecosystem, as more countries seek to grow their presence in outer space, accompanied by the explosive growth of the space industry. Extraterrestrial exploration offers great opportunities, from the benefits of the space economy and technological developments to national security advantages. But with increasing activity and the diverging interests of state actors, governments, international organizations and the private sector are confronting fierce competition and the potential for conflict in space.

Alongside intensified competition, stakeholders are managing the growing role that space plays in modern military and defence strategies. Increased extraterrestrial activity has also created sustainability issues with serious security implications, demanding long-term solutions. At the same time, a fracturing global order poses major challenges to cooperation on space governance efforts and attempts to uphold international law.  

The 2025 Space Security Conference convenes policymakers and leaders from the private sector, multilateral organizations, academia and NGOs for a day of high-level interactive discussions examining conflict, competition and cooperation in outer space. Ahead of the 2025 Chatham House Security and Defence Conference, this event explores how the public and private sectors are addressing space security challenges and fostering a secure environment whilst harnessing the benefits of space for defence and economic growth.

Why attend?

• Gain unique insights into the many and varied threats to space security and how governments, international organizations and the private sector are tackling them.  
• Understand how key leaders in the domain are viewing the 21st century space race and what countries and space organizations are doing to mitigate conflict whilst keeping up in this competitive landscape.
• Network with senior leaders from across government, international organizations and industry in-person at Chatham House and access exclusive ‘under the Rule’ discussions. 

The institute occupies a position of respect and trust, and is committed to fostering inclusive dialogue at all events. Event attendees are expected to uphold this by adhering to our code of conduct.

Chatham House appoints Rob Yates as the new head of the Centre on Global Health Security News Release sysadmin 27 June 2019

Chatham House is pleased to announce that Rob Yates has been appointed as head of the Centre on Global Health Security.

COVID-19 and food security in southern Africa 16 July 2021 — 10:00AM TO 11:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 10 June 2021 Online

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa.

Developing climate smart agri-food systems in sub-Saharan Africa is a precondition for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Over the years household food security has been affected by different shocks including climate change and the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

The impact on rural households in southern Africa, in particular, has been significant due to the structure of food systems in the region.

This event aims to take a deeper look at the interlinking issues of food security, nutrition, climate change and food systems in southern Africa and consider how practitioners and policymakers can build more equitable, resilient and better food systems. 

The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security 13 April 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 April 2022 Online

What are the potential impacts on food and energy markets emerging from the situation in Ukraine?

Russia and Ukraine are key players in global energy, food, fertilizer and mineral markets. In the first few days after Russia’s invasion, both the threat and reality of resource flows being reduced drove up global prices, and has impacted the day-to-day life of people and businesses around the world.

Developing and nutrition-fragile countries across Africa and the Middle East will be hit the hardest – Somalia, for example, is reliant on Russia and Ukraine for 100 per cent of its wheat imports and is currently experiencing its worst drought in years.

The potential scale of disruption to food and energy markets increases with every week the war continues. This event launches the Environment and Society programme’s latest briefing paper The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security: Cascading risks from rising prices and supply disruptions.

The panel discusses:

• The political, socio-economic and resource pressures already faced by the international community prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Direct and cascading impacts on the complex and interconnected energy, minerals, food and fertilizer markets, and policy or market responses that may exacerbate these impacts.
• Geopolitical ramifications that will affect the evolution of the conflict, as well as longer-term international cooperation and security.
• Measures that governments can take to build resilience, both to the ongoing impacts of the situation in Ukraine and to future risks of market disruption and geopolitical upheaval.

The Climate Briefing: The nexus of water security and climate policy Audio NCapeling 22 August 2022

Examining the crossover between water security and climate change with the next two COPs taking place in regions with a history of being water stressed.

What should policymakers and negotiators from the Middle East and Africa working on water security focus on at COP27?

What does it mean to achieve water security? What are the main barriers or challenges? How is water security relevant to climate change?

This podcast was produced in collaboration with the UK Aid-funded Knowledge, Evidence and Learning for Development (K4D) programme which facilitates the use of evidence and learning in international development policy and programming.

On October 24 and 25, SophosAI presents ideas on how to use models large and small—and defend against malignant ones.

Webinar: Finding Solutions to Insecurity in Cabo Delgado 16 June 2020 — 3:00PM TO 4:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 9 June 2020

South Africa’s foreign policy: Reflections on the United Nations Security Council and the African Union 20 January 2021 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 8 January 2021 Online

HE Dr Naledi Pandor, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, discusses South Africa’s role in pursuing its regional and global goals.

To receive joining instructions, please finalise your registration by clicking the link below. Once you have registered you will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which will include the unique joining link you will need to attend.

In 2019-2020, South Africa served its third term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, seeking to strengthen its role as a bridge-builder and further justify a more permanent role for the country and continent on the body.

In February 2021, South Africa will also conclude its time as Chair of the African Union, having used its tenure to promote peace and security issues, including closer cooperation with the UNSC, and advance regional economic integration.

South Africa took up these roles at a time of global and regional upheaval. As COVID-19 tested countries’ commitment to cooperation over isolation, South Africa coordinated regional responses to address the challenges of stressed public health systems, vaccine strategies, and economic stimulus and debt support across Africa.

Its leadership has been further tested by ongoing and emerging insecurity in the Sahel, and in Cabo Delgado in neighbouring Mozambique. The crux of its regional strategy remains squaring the circle between promoting regional economic cooperation while protecting its own domestic economic priorities.

At this event, HE Dr Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa, reflects on the country’s two years on the UNSC and one year of chairing the AU, and discuss South Africa’s role in pursuing regional and global goals.

This event will also be broadcast live on the Chatham House Africa Programme’s Facebook page.

Read event transcript. 

Nigeria's 2023 elections: Security, economic and foreign policy imperatives 5 December 2022 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 November 2022 Chatham House and Online

Bola Ahmed Tinubu, presidential candidate for the All-Progressives Congress, discusses his vision and recently-unveiled manifesto for ‘renewing hope’ in Nigeria.

Nigeria is scheduled to hold presidential and national assembly elections on 25 February 2023 as well as governorship and other subnational elections on 11 March 2023.

The elections will end President Muhammadu Buhari’s two terms in office since his election in 2015 and will mark the first time that he is not engaging in a presidential poll since Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999 – an important marker in Nigeria’s trajectory of democratic consolidation.

Nigeria’s recently enacted Electoral Act has contributed to improved hope around the election process, reflected in the addition of 12.29 million new voters in Nigeria’s voter registration exercise across the federation’s 36 states and 1,491 constituencies.

Yet Nigeria stands at a critical juncture, having suffered from two recessions in the past six years, unprecedented levels of food insecurity, persistent fuel scarcity and high levels of crude oil theft.

Civic fatigue also remains an important challenge and President Muhammadu Buhari’s three main policy pillars of security, economy and corruption continue to be defining issues for citizens.

At this event, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, presidential candidate for the All-Progressives Congress, discusses his vision and recently unveiled manifesto for ‘renewing hope’ in Nigeria including his policy proposals for economic reform and revival and how to deliver secure and inclusive job opportunities for Nigerian citizens.

Download a transcript

This event is a members and Africa programme event and is part of a series of events and outputs examining Nigeria’s 2023 elections and political developments.

As with all Chatham House member events, questions from members drive the conversation.

The security gap 7 March 2023 — 6:00PM TO 7:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 24 February 2023 Chatham House and Online

With the increasingly significant role that women play in national defence, will perceptions change or are current attitudes towards women in uniform here to stay? 

Women have been part of armed conflicts for all of human history, serving alongside men, as well as in their own distinctive units.

More recently, scores of women are involving themselves in Kurdish resistance fighting, being deployed in Syria as fighter pilots for Israel’s Armed Forces and serving on Ukrainian frontlines.

Women have been integrated into militaries around the world including in the Canadian, Swedish and Norwegian armies to name a few.

This discussion aims to tackle some of the following questions:

• What are some of the challenges that more inclusive militaries bring and can these challenges be overcome?
• Can more inclusive militaries help solve the human resources problems that many modern militaries face?
• Are attitudes changing as more women serve in combat? 
• What are the opportunities for women in militaries and in wider defence efforts?

As with all member events, questions from the audience drive the conversation.

Belarus-EU border crisis reveals wider security threat Expert comment NCapeling 8 December 2021

By engineering a crisis at the Belarus border, Lukashenka is attempting to exacerbate vulnerabilities within the EU. Securitizing migration is not the answer.

When thousands of migrants began freezing to death in the forests on the Belarus border with Poland, Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka was forcing the European Union (EU) into a tough choice – either give in to blackmail and welcome migrants whose attempts to trespass the EU border were a result of his policy of luring them to Belarus to put pressure on the EU, or keep the borders closed and declare solidarity with Poland despite its known mistreatment and illegal pushbacks of potential asylum-seekers.

Lukashenka’s action was aptly exploiting three key pressure points of the EU – as a normative power where the human dignity of migrants is overlooked while the European border and coastguard agency Frontex stands by, as a geopolitical actor seeking to externalize its migration problem by signing readmission agreements with transit countries, and as a community of values with the EU-Poland dispute over rule of law.

His approach is typical ‘dictaplomacy’ and democracies which have confronted such a ‘continuation of war by other means’ in their past dealings with dictatorships know that blackmail mostly serves to divert attention away from a rogue leader’s misdemeanours towards his own population. But if this had been game of chess the EU would have been in check.

Thankfully checkmate was avoided – so far – as a compromise was found following weeks of heightened diplomatic efforts. Lukashenka was forced to back-pedal and take care of the migrants, and no humanitarian corridor was needed as the EU sent funds and took measures to support organizations providing shelter for the migrants in Belarus, while airlines and governments in the source countries were pressured to restrict flights to Minsk and started repatriating part of the migrants.

Causing a nuisance

‘Operation Gateway’ – the outline of which was allegedly drawn several years ago and tested by Russia in 2016 at its own borders with Norway and Finland – certainly caused a nuisance, but it ultimately backfired as Lukashenka now has to manage the remaining 2,000-5,000 migrants who refused to be flown back, as well as facing increased international sanctions. However, the fact that Angela Merkel had to personally call him made it look as if Lukashenka did not back down for nothing.

The EU and NATO, including the UK, only reacted collectively to this crisis once it was already out of hand, leaving questions over whether this experience of Lukashenka’s dictaplomacy is a wake-up call to boost resilience against rogue warfare, and to upgrade strategic assessments of the ‘Lukashenka problem’ too.

Back in June, the Belarus ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) announced its withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership and the visa facilitation and readmission agreement with the EU, while Lithuania sent early warnings about a ‘hybrid attack’ at its own border with Belarus. In August, Der Spiegel reported details of an alleged smuggling scheme whereby Tsentr Kurort – a company closely linked to the Administration of the President of Belarus with offices in the Middle East – was handling the shipping, accommodation, and relocation of migrants.

The smuggling of migrants was entirely predictable as Lukashenka has hinted many times Belarus could stop ‘protecting the EU from armed migrants’ seeking to enter it illegally. He has upped his rhetoric beyond notions of hybrid warfare by saying he needs Russian nuclear-capable bombers to ‘help him navigate the migrant crisis’, even hinting Belarus could station both Russian nuclear weapons and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. This shows Lukashenka is feeling increasingly cornered – which could lead to more unpredictable security crises.

Russia and Belarus are deepening relations

Although there is no smoking gun pointing to direct Russian involvement in orchestrating the hybrid attack at the EU’s borders, a new step in the military rapprochement between the two countries came when Putin and Lukashenka approved a new Military Doctrine of the Union-State of Russia and Belarus – a non-public document including a joint concept of migration policy. Lukashenka has also come off the fence over Crimea by openly accepting the legality of the peninsula’s integration with Russia.

Given Russia is also sabre-rattling over Ukraine, the risk of an accidental escalation into armed conflict is increasing in what feels like a return to classic Cold War logic, with the difference that the East is now offensively using the South for confronting the West. In recognition of the threat, the UK has joined the US, Canada, and the EU in the fresh sanctions on Belarus.

How European security is changing Expert comment LJefferson 10 January 2022

Although migration, economic, health, tech and climate policy are increasingly thought of in terms of security, different issues are taking place in each of these policy areas.

Since the end of the Cold War, debates about security among both academics and policymakers have shifted away from traditional military or state security towards a broader conception of what security is – including, for example, ideas such as ‘human security’.

More recently, there has been a widespread perception of a ‘return of great power competition’ and even renewed fears about great power war – in other words, a resurgence of traditional security debates that many hoped and believed were a thing of the past. At the same time, and especially since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, the concept of ‘security’ has also been increasingly applied to other areas like economic and health policies.

These complex and parallel developments raise a number of difficult questions. First, does the changing way in which the concept of ‘security’ is used – and in particular the way people now increasingly speak of ‘economic security’ and ‘health security’ – reflect a changing reality or rather simply a changing perception of reality? Second, are these changes in the way we think about security helpful or not? In other words, is the redefinition of security that seems to be taking place leading to good policy responses and making citizens more secure, or is it rather unhelpfully ‘securitizing’ policy areas and possibly undermining democracy in the process?

Part of the reason that these questions are difficult to answer is that there are different developments taking place in different policy areas. This article briefly analyses developments in five policy areas: migration policy, economic and trade policy, health policy, technology policy, and climate policy.

The authors argue there are at least three separate developments taking place, though it is often quite difficult to disentangle them – and more than one development may be taking place in each policy area. The analysis focuses on developments in Europe – defined broadly as including countries such as the UK which are outside the European Union (EU) – which may be different from those taking place elsewhere.

Five policy areas, three trends

In migration policy, the clearest development that is taking place, in particular since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, is the militarization of borders in Europe – in particular, the militarization of the EU’s external border.

The removal of borders within Europe was once seen by some as a step towards a borderless world, but since 2015 the EU seems to have concluded that the internal removal of borders requires a much harder external border than was previously the case.

In particular, since the ‘refugee crisis’, the EU has massively invested in Frontex, its border agency, which describes itself as ‘Europe’s first uniformed service’ that ‘helps guarantee free movement without internal borders checks that many of us take for granted’. In short, we are seeing an application to migration policy of military tools, including armed border guards.

Something different seems to be taking place in economic policy. For the last three or four decades since the end of the Cold War, economic policy has been dominated by (neo-)liberal assumptions. But these are now increasingly being challenged and a shift may be taking place away from this macroeconomic paradigm.

The reasons for this are complex – in part, a domestic backlash against this paradigm, particularly from the ‘losers’ or ‘left behind’ (in other words those who have suffered from the distributional consequences of the economic and especially trade policies of the last 30-40 years going back to the ‘neoliberal turn’), and in part a sense among analysts and policymakers that a different set of more protectionist policies are required in order to compete with China as a ‘systemic rival’.

These two different drivers of an economic paradigm shift have become even more tightly connected since the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020. The pandemic led to both an increased demand for a new economic paradigm and a sense of intensified competition with China and, in the EU, to a lesser extent with the United States.

However, because the set of rules governing economic and in particular trade policy was set during the earlier period of (neo-)liberal hegemony, they restricted the ability of states to pursue what were seen as protectionist policies in order to redistribute and created exceptions only for security reasons. This has created a structural pressure on nation states to present economic policies in terms of security.

Here, however, the EU may be an outlier. During the last few decades, the EU has gone even further than the rest of the world has in creating rules around economic policy – at least internally. In particular, the EU’s fiscal rules may prevent its member states from borrowing to invest and its state aid rules may prevent them from experimenting with new kinds of industrial policy.

Therefore, the EU may be structurally constrained from making the kind of paradigm shift in economic policy that many now think is necessary. In particular, despite the rhetoric about a more ‘geopolitical’ EU, it may be limited in the extent to which it can think of economic policy in terms of security – sometimes to the regret of security establishments, as is the case for debates around 5G, for example.

In health policy, something similar may be happening as in economic policy. During the last three or four decades, health policy has been approached in a rather liberal way. Across Europe, though to different degrees and in different ways, market principles have been introduced into health systems.

In many cases such as the UK, this has involved privatizing what were previously state functions in healthcare. But since the pandemic, there has been a renewed focus on renationalizing or, in the case of the EU, ‘re-regionalizing’ supply chains, in particular for personal protective equipment (PPE) and vaccines, which is presented in terms of ‘health security’. COVID-19 has also reinforced the need to better include pandemic preparedness in national security planning.

A similar trend seems to be taking place in technology policy, which as with health policy is now increasingly viewed in a defensive, protectionist way rather than the liberal way it was previously seen. For example, the production of semiconductors was previously viewed in economic liberal terms – in other words, they should be produced wherever they can be produced most efficiently.

But analysts and policymakers increasingly see technology as central to the competition between China and the United States – or even more broadly between authoritarian states and democracies. As in health policy, there is an increasing focus on a shared approach among allies and on the ‘resilience’ of supply chains for technology. A similar shift is taking place on the management of data flows and the need to think harder – and maybe, be less naive – about the security impact of our online life.

Finally, in climate policy, something different seems to be taking place. Here, there is neither an attempt to apply military tools (notwithstanding the fact some national European militaries as well as NATO are increasingly interested in climate security, for instance regarding the ability to train and fight in altered weather conditions, notably extreme heat) nor a paradigm shift away from liberalism – although some, especially on the left, do question whether it is possible to prevent catastrophic climate change unless we abandon economic liberalism and much of the debate about green investment is closely connected to debates about an economic paradigm shift.

Rather, what is striking is the increasing talk of a ‘climate emergency’ – with its implication of the need to suspend normal democratic decision-making – and of the need to take extraordinary measures to prevent catastrophic climate change. However, for the time being, such rhetoric on climate change is not matched by relevant extraordinary emergency measures.

Across these five policy areas, in other words, there seem to be at least three developments taking place that are reshaping how we think about security in Europe. The difficult question is whether each of these developments is a ‘good’ thing or not, i.e. whether they actually make European citizens more secure in an appropriate way.

In other words, is it a good idea to militarize the EU’s borders, to shift away from the earlier liberal paradigm in economic, health and technology policy and frame the shift in terms of ‘security’, or to invoke an emergency in order to be able to take more drastic measures to prevent climate change?

The limits of securitization theory

One way of thinking about these issues is what academics call ‘securitization’ – the situation when something is identified in rhetoric as an existential threat to some object, specifying a point of no return, that legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures and pushes the issue higher on the political and policy agenda.

The response to COVID-19 can be seen as an example of securitization – the existential threat to human beings but also healthcare systems was used to legitimize lockdowns and social distancing requirements.

Ukraine response reveals Europe’s security is changing Expert comment NCapeling 8 February 2022

Recent events regarding Ukraine show an active UK responding quickly while EU powers deliberate. But pulling ahead of the pack is not the same as leadership.

Britain’s relationship with Ukraine appears to be thriving, with Ukrainian defence journalist Illia Ponomarenko recently tweeting the ‘British are just unstoppable these days’ and that the UK finds itself ‘on the right side of history’ while one Ukrainian wine bar has started offering free drinks to British nationals.

Ponomarenko’s remarks and the wine bar offer – certainly one post-Brexit benefit of having a British passport – are down to the UK decision to send anti-tank weapons to support Ukraine’s forces against a potential Russian attack.

The UK’s quick response was praised by Ponomarenko as being ‘wise enough not to be lured into going the easiest way, which is always the fastest lane straight to hell’ and strikes a clear contrast with that of Germany, whose typically moderated approach to geopolitical tensions went down badly in Kyiv.

The chief of Germany’s navy was forced to resign after saying Russian president Vladimir Putin ‘deserved respect’ and that Ukraine will never win back annexed Crimea. The German government also sought an energy exception to proposed US sanctions, so that gas can continue to flow into Europe.

France’s response was somewhat stronger but rather confusing as Emmanuel Macron initially called for European Union (EU) member states to ‘conduct their own dialogue’ with Russia, seemingly as an alternative to supporting the US-led NATO response.

Risks of a ‘bullying’ Russia

Although positioning himself as the convener of a transatlantic response to the Ukraine crisis brings welcome respite for UK prime minister Boris Johnson from his domestic ‘partygate’ fiasco, he is also reported as saying some world leaders ‘may not appreciate the deteriorating picture on the Ukrainian border, or fully comprehend the risks posed by a bullying Russia’.

One particular image sums up the difference in approach between the UK and the EU, as a flight path shows a British RAF plane flying around Germany before taking a detour over Denmark on route to Ukraine.

Given that Germany later blocked the export of NATO ally Estonia’s weapons to Ukraine, this image gives ‘Global Britain’ advocates a strong symbol of apparent British reliability and resourcefulness in the face of supposed European deliberation and disunity.

But although the UK’s response to the Ukraine crisis has rightly been credited as swift and substantial, it also reveals deeper developments in the current European security landscape as EU countries had worried Britain might choose to become absent post-Brexit.

Losing one of its two main military powers would certainly have been a blow to Europe, particularly as Russia’s threat has grown in recent years, so there will be relief that the Ukraine crisis shows Britain is undoubtedly committed to the region. Now the question for leaders in Paris, Berlin, and Brussels is how to deal with an active Britain committed to Europe but under no obligation to work within EU processes.

The UK already has an interesting network of bilateral and mini-lateral relationships with European allies. Its Joint Expeditionary Force brings together ten European countries – including Scandinavian and Baltic states – and is well-placed to support NATO activities while also remaining flexible and independent. In the past year, the UK worked with Norway in the Arctic region, provided military engineers support to Poland, and worked directly with France and Germany through the E3 grouping – once again bypassing EU institutions.

The UK also brings a unique diplomatic, technology, and intelligence-sharing relationship with the US which is unavoidably important in dealing with the threat from Russia. As the US sees European security through a NATO lens – rather than an EU one – this makes Britain a leading player as one of the few countries meeting its NATO spending commitments.

UK must do more to win trust

But despite such creative partnerships transcending the constraints of Brexit, the UK must do more to win the trust of the EU’s biggest players France and Germany to be a permanent power in the region. And relations with France have deteriorated following disputes over fishing, a lack of cooperation on migrants, and the AUKUS defence technology agreement between the UK, US, and Australia.

When it comes to Germany, the UK must not use the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity for geopolitical point-scoring. There are good historical reasons for Germany’s cautious approach to military engagement, even if these do constrain the country’s response to this challenge.

In dealing with Russia, some members of Germany’s ruling SPD sincerely believe their party’s less confrontational posture was central to de-escalating conflict during the Cold War. And although some historians may dispute that belief, it is still a distinct and more noble motivation for ‘dovishness’ than pure economic self-interest.

Cooperation always requires some compromise on all sides. Germany must accept some level of economic risk if sanctions against Russia are to be meaningful and France has to accept the necessity of the UK and US’s involvement and that the most effective dialogue is unlikely to be achieved through EU institutions.

Meanwhile, the UK must accept some role for the two biggest EU players, particularly as the Normandy Format which includes Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany has proved productive in the past. And the UK needs to clamp down on its own economic ties with Russia.

Why the UK must deliver on Nordic-Baltic security Expert comment NCapeling 16 December 2022

Hard choices are needed but it is crucial the UK provides security and leadership to its European partners given the wider context of the war in Ukraine.

The UK’s role in Nordic-Baltic security has been growing over the past decade. The region is key to core British strategic interest and engagement, and UK threat assessment closely aligns with long-held regional perspectives – the 2021 Integrated Review defines Russia as ‘the most acute threat to our security’.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK’s strong stance towards Moscow and the concrete steps taken to assist Ukraine and strengthen defence and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank have been widely appreciated in the Nordic-Baltic region.

The UK is seen as a reliable partner but, for it to continue to deliver in the region, difficult choices must be made with regards to UK defence spending and military capabilities, and London’s more global ambitions.

The UK is a major contributor to NATO’s deterrence posture on the eastern flank, serving as a framework nation for NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battlegroup in Estonia, and contributing to another battlegroup in Poland.

UK remains crucial to regional security

Coupled with its contribution to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission and maritime forces in the area, the UK is a crucial security partner both in the region and in a broader arch across Europe.

Over the past decade and a half, the UK has been developing a dense network of bilateral and minilateral relations in the region which are major assets in the current security environment.

It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) which is a military cooperation format highly valued for its flexibility in responding to the needs of the participating nations – including non-NATO Sweden and Finland – and is increasingly focused on the North Atlantic, High North and wider Baltic areas. The UK has also seen increased bilateral defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Estonia, and other regional allies and partners.

There are reasonable expectations that Germany or France may at some point assume a greater role in this part of Europe, building on France’s participation in the EFP in Estonia, and Germany’s lead of the EFP in Lithuania.

However, while Paris remains more focused on NATO’s southern (and south-eastern) flank and building the European Union’s defence role, Berlin often underperforms as a leading or an organizing power of collaborative efforts across Europe.

Both also have a credibility problem in the Nordic-Baltic region due to their past policies towards Russia that occasionally reappear when discussing military support to Ukraine or how to treat Russia in the post-war European security order.

By contrast, the UK offers military capability, strong political will, a long-standing tradition of engagement in the Nordic-Baltic area, and fast decision-making.

The latter is exemplified by the bilateral security guarantees provided to Sweden and Finland during their accession to NATO, and the surge of assets sent to the region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine such as an additional battlegroup and Chinook helicopters to Estonia, as well as forward-deployed elements of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to Latvia and Lithuania as part of the JEF.

Such pragmatic and resolute engagement help substantiate the UK’s post-Brexit claim that although it left the EU, it did not leave Europe. London also understands and facilitates the pivotal role that the US plays in European security – a shared perspective with the Nordic-Baltic partners.

Only the US – which has just recently decided to step up its military presence in the Baltics – has a greater appeal than the UK as a major ally. But Washington’s truly global responsibilities make it more difficult for it to play a regional leadership role.

With the context of the war in Ukraine, the centre of gravity of European security is moving east. The Nordic-Baltic region is likely to feature more prominently in the upcoming refresh of the UK’s Integrated Review, as the war in Ukraine and NATO’s new forward defence approach will focus UK attention and military capabilities on Europe for the foreseeable future.

But the UK still has limited resources and, despite the worsening security environment, there is currently no commitment by the Rishi Sunak government to increase defence spending beyond two per cent of GDP, as set out in the recently-published Autumn Statement.

This difficult fiscal reality contrasts UK ambition to also increase its footprint and engagement in the Indo-Pacific, a region highlighted by Rishi Sunak in his first foreign policy speech. London is already confronted with increasing expectations from its Nordic and Baltic partners, which are rattled by Russia’s aggression and seek more engagement and commitments from larger and more resourceful allies, and are insisting on prompt implementation of NATO’s new defence and deterrence plans.

This all comes on top of the resources that further assistance to Ukraine will require in the coming months and years. Balancing competing priorities and demands from partners is routine for a major power with global ambition but, in the current context, if the UK government fails to prioritize and increase resources, over-extension is in sight for its armed forces.

The war in Ukraine confirms that, beyond the rhetoric around the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Euro-Atlantic is – and will remain – the priority theatre of engagement for the UK. To keep delivering in the Nordic-Baltic region and remain a reliable partner, UK ambitions should be set clearly, and expectations managed with regional partners.

A good example is the recent UK-Estonia joint statement and defence roadmap, which is an attempt to reconcile London’s vision of modern deterrence with Tallinn’s preference for ‘more boots on the ground’.

The joint statement also clarifies initial misunderstandings regarding the upcoming withdrawal of the second UK battlegroup deployed to Estonia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – support Tallinn expected to continue ‘as long as necessary’ but London saw as temporary. It offsets the poor political ‘optics’ of the withdrawal while providing solid ground for deepening the common agenda in the near future.

By the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, progress on implementing the roadmap will be a crucial measure of success for the bilateral relationship, and for the UK’s broader regional role. It should serve as an opportunity for the UK to reflect on its force development priorities and balance, with Baltic partners arguing in favour of the UK rebuilding some mass in its armed forces and providing more resources to the land component.

Much to gain for the UK

The UK gains many benefits from deepening and widening its engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, and not only by showcasing its regional leadership at a time of dire need or having more weight in Europe and across the Atlantic in strategic debates about future security architecture.

Africa and Europe: Climate security for the future 20 April 2023 TO 21 April 2023 — 7:30AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 31 March 2023 Slovenia and Online

The 12th Africa Day International Conference hosted in Slovenia offers a platform for interregional exchange and policy cooperation between African and European countries on climate security.

The 12th Africa Day International Conference offers a platform for inter-regional exchange and cooperation to further contribute to progress on climate security.

The 12th Africa Day International Conference is hosted by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, in collaboration with the European Commission and the Chatham House Africa Programme. This high-level annual event seeks to improve policy outcomes for citizens in Europe and Africa on the basis of mutual understanding and cooperation between the two regions, while strengthening bilateral relations between Slovenia and African countries.

Climate change poses one of the most serious threats to global security. No individual country or region can face it alone; strong regional and international partnerships are crucial. Analysing risk and taking action can help towards achieving a number of SDGs and a more secure and sustainable future. Addressing climate security is essential for the well-being and future stability of nations and societies around the world, and for the global community as a whole.

This conference will offer a platform for interregional exchange and cooperation on the topic of climate security policy. It will bring together decision-makers and experts from Europe, Africa and across the globe to identify the key challenges and policy priorities in addressing climate security.

The conference will be broadcast live on the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage, and on the Africa Programme Facebook page.

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