Celebrating Black History Month at Chatham House 24 October 2024 — 6:00PM TO 8:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 2 October 2024 Chatham House

Join us for the ‘Beyond expectations: The impact and legacy of migration exhibition 2024’ exhibition and drinks reception.

About the Photographer  

Neil Kenlock, a photographer and media professional, has lived in London since arriving from Jamaica in 1963 to join his parents. He spent the early years of his career as a professional photographer, specialising in fashion, beauty, celebrities, and the cultural lifestyles of Black people in the UK. In the late 1960s and 1970s, he captured images of the UK Black Panther movement and documented demonstrations and anti-racism protests across the country.

“Neil Kenlock helps us to better understand the story of London’s Black communities and to appreciate the huge artistic and cultural impact they have had on all our lives. He is a significant photographer whose work documents a key chapter in London’s post-war history.” — Mike Seaborne, former curator of photographs at the Museum of London.

About the exhibition

This exhibition unveils a collection of photographs by Neil Kenlock, capturing Black British individuals who migrated from their homelands and settled in the UK. Curated by his daughter Emelia Kenlock, the series explores the theme of ‘expectations’ and its enduring legacy, featuring African and Caribbean subjects who brought their skills, passions, and dreams—contributions that have profoundly shaped British culture today.

Reflecting on the work, Kenlock stated: “Over 50 years since the concept of ‘black excellence’ first manifested, and more than 70 years since the Windrush, I truly hope this exhibition will add to the national cultural narrative and resonate with new audiences.” 

China Needs to Make the Belt and Road Initiative More Transparent and Predictable Expert comment sysadmin 29 April 2019

The global infrastructure project must move beyond mish-mash of opaque bilateral deals

As China welcomes dozens of world leaders to Beijing for its second Belt and Road forum, it has one simple aim: relaunching President Xi Jinping’s controversial global infrastructure drive.

Since it began five years ago, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has sunk hundreds of billions into port, railway and power projects stretching from south-east Asia to central Europe. But its path has been bumpy, drawing sharp criticism over the ruinous debts that some countries have racked up amid Chinese largesse.

Xi will stress sustainable financing and transparency this week, amid the usual talk of ‘win win’ cooperation. Yet BRI’s problems are structural, not presentational. For any pledges to be meaningful, China must move beyond its present mish-mash of opaque, bilateral deals.

After bad headlines last year, BRI has in fact enjoyed a good run in recent weeks. Malaysia announced it would resume a previously cancelled high-speed rail project, while Italy’s decision to join up last month marked a further European incursion. Indeed, if attendance is any guide to success, BRI looks in fine fettle. The first forum in 2017 attracted 29 world leaders. China says 37 will turn up this week. Phillip Hammond, UK chancellor, arrives hunting deals too, just a day after news that Chinese technology group Huawei will be allowed to help build 5G networks in Britain.

Even so, three interlinked problems remain at the heart of President Xi’s pet project, all of which must be addressed if BRI is to move beyond the pitfalls that have damaged its reputation.

The first and most obvious is debt. Critics allege that China ‘traps’ its BRI partners financially, often pointing to a debt-for-equity deal that handed China control of a port in Sri Lanka. These claims are exaggerated — few other projects have ended up this way. Yet poorer nations from Laos to Tajikistan are still signing up to vastly expensive Chinese schemes that offer poor value for money while straining their public finances.

The second problem is transparency. Despite its grand scale there is still no reliable list of BRI projects, no disclosure of the lending standards China follows, nor even the amount China has invested. Beijing claims more than $1 trillion; independent estimates suggest perhaps a few hundred billion. Either way, it will be hard for China to convince doubters on debts until it is open about the criteria it uses in deciding who to lend to and why.

BRI’s third and most important challenge is its muddled organization. Despite BRI’s image as a centrally run mega-project, China has allowed many deals to be struck locally, via a mix of state-backed companies, public sector banks and freewheeling regional governments. And it is here that the problems began.

Infrastructure deals are notoriously complex, especially for transnational projects like high-speed rail. Renegotiations are common, even for experienced bodies like the World Bank. Yet BRI has repeatedly seen terms negotiated behind closed doors, in countries such as Malaysia and Pakistan, come unstuck in the face of public outcry.

Rather than seeking to trap others with debt, China’s central government more often has to step in to fix dubious projects agreed by underlings lower down the chain.

These negotiations go one of two ways. Either China’s partners complain and win terms, as was true in Malaysia and in Myanmar over a multibillion-dollar deep-sea port. Or, as in the case of Sri Lanka, the renegotiations go in China’s favour, but at the cost of accusations of debt trickery. In both cases China looks bad.

Speaking last year, Xi responded to criticism of BRI by describing it as ‘an open platform for cooperation’. Yet, so far, he has proved resistant to the step that would deliver on that vision — namely turning BRI into an institution with open standards and international partners.

The reasons for his reluctance are obvious. Ending BRI’s reliance on loose bilateral deals would limit Beijing’s room for geopolitical manoeuvre. Yet what might be lost in political flexibility could easily be gained in economic credibility, while avoiding some of the painful renegotiations that have dogged many BRI projects.

At a time when China’s economy is slowing and its current account surplus is shrinking, formalising and institutionalising, BRI could also help avoid wasting scarce public resources on white elephant projects. China even has an easy template in the form of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Beijing-based institution that has won plaudits for its project quality and openness since it started in 2016.

Whichever model is chosen, a dose of Chinese-style central planning is called for, along with more openness. Without it, the oddly chaotic and decentralised model pioneered in BRI’s first five years is unlikely to help the project thrive over the next five.

This article was originally published in the Financial Times.

Virtual Roundtable: The Economic Implications of COVID-19 on Asia 2 April 2020 — 11:00AM TO 12:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 27 March 2020 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a damaging economic impact on Asia, potentially the most serious since the financial crisis two decades ago. While early estimates suggest that a recession is inevitable, differing countries in Asia are generally deploying modest fiscal and monetary measures. This is true even in China, compared with the ‘whatever it takes’ approach pursued by Europe and America.

How effective will these measures be in reviving growth and in easing the pain, particularly on the poor in developing countries in Asia? Is Asia witnessing a sudden but temporary halt in economic activity rather than a prolonged slowdown? At this virtual roundtable, the speakers will consider the likelihood of a recovery for trade in the region and will explore what lessons can be learned from countries like Singapore, who seem to be successfully managing the health and economic aspects of COVID-19.

This event is online only. After registering, you will receive a follow-up confirmation email with details of how to join the webinar.

Hasmik Keshishian
Dec 1, 2007; 6:2212-2229
Research

Alexey I. Nesvizhskii
Oct 1, 2005; 4:1419-1440
Tutorial

Shao-En Ong
May 1, 2002; 1:376-386
Research

It sounds like an oxymoron: “How to keep blood-sports interesting?” You’ve got blood and you’ve got sports, the term does its own advertising! And yet, fighting promotions rise and fall, where Pride and Strikeforce once reigned, now stand One and Bellator, but one promotion stands above all its competitors. The world of MMA knows one promotion which has clawed its way to the international top and established itself as the gold standard upon whose hallowed surface skulls are crushed and blood is poured. I’m talking about none other than the UFC.

Having established itself over the years as a beacon of both quality matches and consistent drama, the UFC attracts the lion’s share of international talent in the MMA world, and with it the eyes and ears of MMA fans everywhere. Having well and truly stroked the ego of the promotion, you might be wondering what on earth any of this has to do with writing or fantasy?

Well, does your world happen to feature prizefighting, ritual combat, or the eternally popular fantasy fixture called the gladiatorial arena? If so, there are a lot of writing and worldbuilding lessons you can learn from observing the biggest promotion in the biggest modern blood-sport of the world.

Continue reading Lessons from the UFC: How to Keep Blood-Sports Interesting at Mythic Scribes.

Robin Niblett awarded knighthood in Queen's Birthday Honours News release NCapeling 1 June 2022

Chatham House director Dr Robin Niblett CMG receives a knighthood for services to international relations and to British foreign policy.

Chatham House Council and staff congratulate the institute’s director Robin Niblett, who has been appointed as a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG) by HM The Queen in her Birthday Honours list.

The citation for the KCMG, awarded at the recommendation of the UK foreign secretary, recognizes Dr Niblett’s ‘outstanding personal contribution to British soft power and influence in his role as director of Chatham House over the last 15 years’.

The citation also states: ‘With exceptional energy and talent, he has greatly enhanced the research reputation of the Institute, strengthened its international convening power, finances and staffing, and modernised its premises, image and diverse outreach’.

Dr Niblett is standing down in the summer and will be replaced by Bronwen Maddox, who joins from the Institute for Government.

Dr Niblett says: ‘I am deeply honoured by this award, which is as much a recognition of the tireless and selfless work of my colleagues at Chatham House throughout my tenure as director.

‘Together, and through challenging times, we have offered a vital source of independent debate and analysis. And, with the engagement of our supporters and a new generation of thinkers and actors, I know the institute will continue to provide creative ideas for a better future.’

Independent Thinking: Biden and the Republicans, AUKUS Audio NCapeling 9 February 2023

Episode 14 of our weekly podcast examines the Chinese balloon saga, the State of the Union address, and updates on the AUKUS deal 18 months after it was signed.

This week saw US president Joe Biden address an unruly joint session of Congress, during which he discussed America’s place in the world, China, Ukraine, and the state of the US economy.

As a new presidential cycle begins at the mid-point of Biden’s presidency, the panel analyses how Biden is doing and the challenges that lie ahead for him.

Also it is now 18 months since the announcement of the AUKUS partnership between the UK, US and Australia to develop nuclear hunter killer submarines. What does AUKUS mean for Australia, non-proliferation, and the Indo-Pacific more broadly?

Finally, the panel discusses China’s balloon over Montana in the US. Was it a signal from Beijing and what was it trying to photograph?

Joining guest host John Kampfner this week from Chatham House are Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the US and the Americas programme and Dr Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security programme. They are joined by Dr Euan Graham, Shangri-La Dialogue senior fellow for defence and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

About Independent Thinking

A weekly podcast hosted by Chatham House director Bronwen Maddox, in conversation with leading policymakers, journalists, and Chatham House experts providing insight on the latest international issues.

How modular renewables can reduce the costs of relying on carbon capture Expert comment LToremark 10 October 2024

COP29 must raise countries’ ambitions to deploy vastly more low-cost modular renewable technologies to help meet the tripling of renewables target set at COP28 and reduce our reliance on expensive carbon capture systems.

The most important international climate conference is around the corner. COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan will be especially important because next year countries will submit their five-yearly national climate plans – or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) – as set out under the Paris Agreement.

At COP28 in Dubai last year, the final text was heralded as a last-minute success as – somewhat surprisingly – it was the first ever COP to commit to ‘transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner’. To support this, over 200 countries also committed to triple renewable capacity by 2030.

Under current NDCs, even if all countries achieve their most ambitious decarbonization plans, the world would still fall 30 per cent short of tripling renewable capacity by 2030. 

At COP29 in November, hosted by a petrostate, additional agreement is needed to operationalize the removal of fossil fuels from the global energy system and set the ambition for those crucial NDCs in 2025. Failing to do so means the opportunity to triple renewables by 2030 will slip away. But the actions of oil producing nations, international oil companies, their associated supply chains and networks of lobbyists have in recent years done their best to disrupt and slow down the energy transition and water down key negotiations during COPs and elsewhere. 

During the final days of COP28, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sent private letters to its 13 members – including COP28 host the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – urging them to ‘proactively reject any text or formula that targets energy, i.e. fossil fuels, rather than emissions’. OPEC members own 80 per cent of global oil reserves.

Due to the startling decline in the cost of renewables and electric vehicles, fossil fuel producers are increasingly concerned. To fight back they are turning to carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies and carbon removal options, which would enable the continued burning of fossil fuels – and protect their assets and business models.

A key battle ground for oil and gas producers is the difference between abated and unabated fossil fuels.

Abatement is the process of capturing CO₂ as fossil fuels are burnt to prevent a proportion of those CO₂ emissions from entering the atmosphere, either by using that CO₂ in products or storing it in geological formations deep underground in near perpetuity, commonly referred to as CCS.

After COP28 there was optimism that the final agreement was significant and covered all fossil fuels without ambiguity around whether they are unabated or abated. 

But the definition of unabated has not actually been agreed within the COP process. During the 2021 COP26 summit, the Glasgow Climate Pact mentioned unabated in reference to coal. Could a gas power station capturing 51 per cent of the emitted CO₂ be considered abated?

And what about the so-called downstream emissions? Downstream emissions from cars, planes, tanker ships and diesel generators etc make up 50–80 per cent of the total emissions from oil – and there are no plans to attach mini-CCS systems to cars.

CCS and engineered carbon removals are also likely to be expensive. Analysis by the Oxford Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment has shown that high CCS pathways to net zero emissions in 2050 would cost at least $30 trillion more than a low CCS pathway with more renewables – roughly $1 trillion more per year.

The costs of CCS have also remained the same for the past 40 years, while the costs of renewables like solar, wind and lithium-ion batteries have dropped radically. Solar costs have declined by 90 per cent in the last decade. 

The rapid cost reductions of solar, wind and batteries are due to their modular nature. Around 70 billion solar cells will be manufactured this year, the majority in China. It is the repetitive modular manufacturing process that has led to rapid efficiency improvements and cost reductions. Each Tesla has around 7,000 lithium-ion battery cells, and the price of these modular batteries fell 14 per cent between 2022 and 2023 alone. 

The modular criteria can help define the technology winners of the future, technologies we should selectively support and accelerate over the coming years. 

While huge industrial power stations, oil rigs and refineries have their benefits, they are not modular in the same way. Their economy of scale is in the large size of each asset. CCS is bolted on to fossil fuel infrastructure but there are less than 50,000 fossil fuel producing assets globally. By contrast, there were 1.5 billion solar panels produced in 2022. The cost of deploying CCS is therefore unlikely to benefit from the rapid cost reductions of modular renewables. Nuclear even less so. There are 440 nuclear power stations in operation today, they take many years to build and remain hugely expensive. 

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s foreign policy priorities 29 October 2024 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 October 2024 Chatham House and Online

The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs discusses the country’s approach to regional stability and the role of international partnerships in securing economic prosperity.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss DRC’s regional diplomatic priorities and international agency, including its ambitions around global critical mineral supply chains.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces foreign policy tests as it manages a complex security crisis and regional tensions, alongside global economic and trade partnerships.

Entrenched conflict in eastern DRC continues to have wider regional implications. Troops from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployment are tackling a growing mandate as the UN’s peacekeeping mission prepares to withdraw. Tensions with Rwanda also remain high despite mediation efforts under the Luanda process.

As a major producer of critical minerals for the global energy transition, the DRC seeks to benefit from growing international demand without sacrificing value addition. New and existing frameworks with international partners will remain key to this vision, including for the development of regional infrastructure networks such as the Lobito Corridor.

At this event, HE Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DRC, will discuss the DRC’s regional diplomacy and international agency, including the country’s positioning in global critical mineral supply chains.

Please note that in-person attendance for this event will be balloted. Guests looking to join in-person must register interest in joining. Full confirmations to successful applicants will be sent on Friday 25 October.

The UK needs to address growth and debt problems if it is to match resources to ambitions on international priorities Expert comment LJefferson 5 November 2024

The budget marks the lowest amount in decades the country has spent on development, and it is struggling to fund other international priorities too.

The UK’s Chancellor Rachel Reeves unveiled her much-anticipated budget last week, the first of the new Labour government. Labour is in a difficult place. There are numerous calls on the public purse and public services are not performing well. Meanwhile, public debt remains close to 100 per cent of GDP, and there has been a long run of sluggish growth.
 
Reeves argues with some justification that the previous government left her a challenging inheritance – gaps in this year’s spending plans, and persistent debt questions left unresolved. More importantly, there are longer-term concerns about the sustainability of UK public spending – the country’s Office for Budget Responsibility has warned public debt could triple by the 2070s due to an ageing population, the climate crisis, and security risks. The focus has understandably been on kitchen table questions about tax rises and funding public services.
 
But this picture also has longstanding implications for international policy – on whether the UK can afford to invest in its foreign policy. The Chancellor did announce an increase of £2.9bn for defence. But the question of whether the UK can get on a sustainable path to spending 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence is still being worked through in the ongoing Strategic Review, and remains challenging despite increasingly urgent warnings from parliamentary committees about the UK’s defence readiness.

The budget also marks one of the lowest amounts in recent years the UK will spend on development overseas, despite setting an ambition to reset relations with the Global South and recover the UK’s role as a leader in international development.
  
The UK needs to either match resources to ambition, spend much more efficiently, or, in the case of the aid budget, it could seek to focus on priorities that are less dependent on spending. But even this will still require consistent resources, alongside significant diplomatic attention, intellectual leadership, and focus.

Longer-term, the UK may need to consider larger questions: addressing broader problems with its lack of growth and productivity will be critical to fund an expansive international role.

With this budget, UK aid spent overseas is at a historic low

In 2020 the UK government cut its goal for spending on international development to 0.5 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), ending a longstanding policy of spending 0.7 per cent. Labour have echoed this, promising to only return to previous levels when fiscal circumstances allow.
 
But this masks a bigger issue. Since 2022, significant amounts of the UK’s aid budget have been spent on accommodation for asylum seekers in the UK. This is within the rules governing aid, but reduces the amount spent on reducing poverty overseas. In 2023 this spending was 28 per cent of the £15.4bn aid budget. In 2016, it was 3.2 per cent. 

Previous Chancellor Jeremy Hunt quietly allowed a top-up of aid spending over the last two fiscal years to offset how much is being spent at home on asylum seeker accommodation. That provided an additional £2.5 billion for 2022–23 and 2023–24.

But Rachel Reeves declined to provide extra funding this time, meaning the amount being spent overseas is likely the lowest its been since 2007 – an effective cut – under a Labour government.

The Minister for Development, Anneliese Dodds, speaking at Chatham House last month, said the government is working on clearing the backlog of asylum claims, which should free up more to spend overseas.

But beyond this there has been little clarity on plans to address the issue. And costs for asylum seeker accommodation have increased significantly – the UK appears to spend much more than comparator countries per head, according to the Center for Global Development, raising questions about how this spending is managed.

Development is not just about money – but money is important

The UK debate about development has often focused on the 0.7 per cent figure, which can distract from larger questions about what development policy is intended to achieve. As many experts have argued, development aid is about more than spending, and the wider, complex process by which the UK contributes to broad-based growth and stability for poorer countries is not about hitting a specific number.
 
There are things the UK can do that aren’t about spending more directly. This might include focusing on priorities like reforming multilateral development banks so they provide more low-cost public finance, and more flexible and agile loans to poorer countries – a priority echoed by Dodds. It might also incorporate focusing more broadly on helping developing countries attract more investment to bolster growth. 

There is also the issue of developing country debt, much of which is held by the private sector. Dodds previously said, when she was shadow chancellor, she might consider changing the law to address this issue. However,  she declined to recommit to this when questioned at Chatham House. 

None of this can be done unilaterally – on debt, for example, the UK has spearheaded some creative policies. Its UK Export Finance body developed climate-resilient debt clauses – agreements that countries can pause debt repayments in the event of a climate shock – but the UK holds limited amounts of developing country debt. Impact will only come by galvanizing and coordinating others to adopt similar approaches.

W Gamble
Nov 1, 1978; 19:1068-1070
Articles

M el-Saadani
Apr 1, 1989; 30:627-630
Articles

Oswald Quehenberger
Nov 1, 2010; 51:3299-3305
Research Articles

M. Mahmood Hussain
Jan 1, 2003; 44:22-32
Reviews

JP Segrest
Feb 1, 1992; 33:141-166
Reviews

Chatham House awarded major centenary grant to establish Stavros Niarchos Foundation Wing News Release sysadmin 16 April 2019

Chatham House has been awarded a transformational £10m grant ahead of its upcoming 2020 centenary.

A seat at the table – why inclusivity matters in global governance 10 May 2021 — 1:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 22 April 2021 Online

Exploring the changing dynamics of global cooperation and the role inclusivity can play in building collaborative action.

Please click on the below link to confirm your participation and receive your individual joining details from Zoom for this event. You will receive a confirmation email from Zoom, which contains the option to add the event to your calendar if you so wish.

The scale of today’s global challenges demand collaborative and coordinated action. But deepening geopolitical competition is threatening multilateralism while growing inequality and social tensions continue to undermine public confidence in the ability of international institutions to deliver.

Into this challenging environment, add the complexity and sheer pace of many global challenges such as the climate crisis and the proliferation of new technologies – issues that cannot be addressed effectively by governments alone.

• How do global institutions and mechanisms need to adapt to address the demands for a fairer distribution of power between states and to engage the diverse set of actors essential today for effective solutions?
• What can be learnt from existing initiatives that bring together governments, civil society, private sector, cities, next generation leaders and other stakeholders?
• And what are the political obstacles to greater inclusivity?

This event supports the launch of a synthesis paper from Chatham House’s Inclusive Governance Initiative.

Mammalian circadian clocks are driven by transcription/translation feedback loops composed of positive transcriptional activators (BMAL1 and CLOCK) and negative repressors (CRYPTOCHROMEs (CRYs) and PERIODs (PERs)). CRYs, in complex with PERs, bind to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex and repress E-box–driven transcription of clock-associated genes. There are two individual CRYs, with CRY1 exhibiting higher affinity to the BMAL1/CLOCK complex than CRY2. It is known that this differential binding is regulated by a dynamic serine-rich loop adjacent to the secondary pocket of both CRYs, but the underlying features controlling loop dynamics are not known. Here we report that allosteric regulation of the serine-rich loop is mediated by Arg-293 of CRY1, identified as a rare CRY1 SNP in the Ensembl and 1000 Genomes databases. The p.Arg293His CRY1 variant caused a shortened circadian period in a Cry1−/−Cry2−/− double knockout mouse embryonic fibroblast cell line. Moreover, the variant displayed reduced repressor activity on BMAL1/CLOCK driven transcription, which is explained by reduced affinity to BMAL1/CLOCK in the absence of PER2 compared with CRY1. Molecular dynamics simulations revealed that the p.Arg293His CRY1 variant altered a communication pathway between Arg-293 and the serine loop by reducing its dynamicity. Collectively, this study provides direct evidence that allosterism in CRY1 is critical for the regulation of circadian rhythm.

Reactive oxygen species (ROS) are an unavoidable host environmental cue for intracellular pathogens such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis and Mycobacterium bovis; however, the signaling pathway in mycobacteria for sensing and responding to environmental stress remains largely unclear. Here, we characterize a novel CmtR-Zur-ESX3-Zn2+ regulatory pathway in M. bovis that aids mycobacterial survival under oxidative stress. We demonstrate that CmtR functions as a novel redox sensor and that its expression can be significantly induced under H2O2 stress. CmtR can physically interact with the negative regulator Zur and de-represses the expression of the esx-3 operon, which leads to Zn2+ accumulation and promotion of reactive oxygen species detoxication in mycobacterial cells. Zn2+ can also act as an effector molecule of the CmtR regulator, using which the latter can de-repress its own expression for further inducing bacterial antioxidant adaptation. Consistently, CmtR can induce the expression of EsxH, a component of esx-3 operon involved in Zn2+ transportation that has been reported earlier, and inhibit phagosome maturation in macrophages. Lastly, CmtR significantly contributes to bacterial survival in macrophages and in the lungs of infected mice. Our findings reveal the existence of an antioxidant regulatory pathway in mycobacteria and provide novel information on stress-triggered gene regulation and its association with host–pathogen interaction.

Stop codon read-through (SCR) is a process of continuation of translation beyond a stop codon. This phenomenon, which occurs only in certain mRNAs under specific conditions, leads to a longer isoform with properties different from that of the canonical isoform. MTCH2, which encodes a mitochondrial protein that regulates mitochondrial metabolism, was selected as a potential read-through candidate based on evolutionary conservation observed in the proximal region of its 3' UTR. Here, we demonstrate translational read-through across two evolutionarily conserved, in-frame stop codons of MTCH2 using luminescence- and fluorescence-based assays, and by analyzing ribosome-profiling and mass spectrometry (MS) data. This phenomenon generates two isoforms, MTCH2x and MTCH2xx (single- and double-SCR products, respectively), in addition to the canonical isoform MTCH2, from the same mRNA. Our experiments revealed that a cis-acting 12-nucleotide sequence in the proximal 3' UTR of MTCH2 is the necessary signal for SCR. Functional characterization showed that MTCH2 and MTCH2x were localized to mitochondria with a long t1/2 (>36 h). However, MTCH2xx was found predominantly in the cytoplasm. This mislocalization and its unique C terminus led to increased degradation, as shown by greatly reduced t1/2 (<1 h). MTCH2 read-through–deficient cells, generated using CRISPR-Cas9, showed increased MTCH2 expression and, consistent with this, decreased mitochondrial membrane potential. Thus, double-SCR of MTCH2 regulates its own expression levels contributing toward the maintenance of normal mitochondrial membrane potential.

Expert

Expert

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Expert

Defining discontinuous antigenic epitopes remains a substantial challenge, as exemplified by the case of lipid transfer polyproteins, which are common pollen allergens. Hydrogen/deuterium exchange monitored by NMR can be used to map epitopes onto folded protein surfaces, but only if the complex rapidly dissociates. Modifying the standard NMR-exchange measurement to detect substoichiometric complexes overcomes this time scale limitation and provides new insights into recognition of lipid transfer polyprotein by antibodies. In the future, this new and exciting development should see broad application to a range of tight macromolecular interactions.

A. B. Bogatyrev
Trans. Moscow Math. Soc. 83 (), 217-225.
Abstract, references and article information

Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable: Forecasting Forum 2018 12 February 2018 — 2:00PM TO 5:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 December 2017 Chatham House, London

This forum will present the latest thinking from senior researchers on the dynamics that will affect fossil fuels investment and markets in the year ahead. The first session will assess the various factors keeping oil and gas prices from bouncing back and will consider conditions and political developments that could influence markets in the year ahead. The second session will assess the future of the power sector and what this means for the fossil fuels industry.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Fossil Fuels Expert Roundtable: How Solar is Shaping the Energy Transition 1 June 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 22 May 2018 Chatham House, London

As global temperatures rise and extreme weather events multiply, doubts over the reality and imminence of climate change have dissipated. Despite this, there is a clear lack of urgency by governments to the approaching crisis. At this event, Prem Shankar Jha will set out what he believes are the three main causes for this inaction.

Furthermore, he will argue that catastrophic climate change is imminent, but even if it weren’t, the risk is too great to ignore. Only a complete shift from fossil fuels by 2070 at the latest would provide reasonable certainty of avoiding irreversible consequences. This transition is not only possible but the technologies to enable it were harnessed four to nine decades ago – and all of them draw their primary energy from the sun. These technologies are already capable of delivering electricity, transport fuels, and petrochemicals at prices that are competitive with the current delivered cost of electricity in the US and Western Europe. So what is holding up the energy shift?

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Flexible Distribution Systems: New Services, Actors and Technologies 4 September 2018 — 9:00AM TO 10:30AM Anonymous (not verified) 31 July 2018 Chatham House, London

The pace of the energy transition is accelerating. Solar and wind are dramatically falling in cost and displacing fossil fuel generators. Simultaneously, the rapid uptake of electric vehicles and battery storage systems are beginning to send shock-waves through the electricity sector.

As the proportion of distributed energy resources (DERs) connected to the distribution network grows, a significant opportunity is beginning to present itself. What if the concerns of renewable integration and associated costs could be solved by the smart integration of these DERs?

By properly valuing the services DERs can provide, actively managing the distribution system and creating new market places, might a truly renewable electricity system capable of supporting the electrification of heat and transport be possible?

During this roundtable, Andrew Scobie, CEO of Faraday Grid, will provide an overview of the challenges and opportunities faced within the distribution network and explain why the current system is no longer fit for purpose.

This is the inaugural event in the Energy Transitions Roundtable (ETR) series.

Mining, Minerals and Metals Expert Roundtable: Forest-Smart Mining Report Launch 10 May 2019 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Driven to Extraction: Can Sand Mining be Sustainable? 5 June 2019 — 1:30PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Sand: Monitoring and management for a sustainable future 2 March 2021 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 18 February 2021 Online

In partnership with the Global Sand Observatory Initiative, this event outlines the sand challenge, what actions are currently underway to address it, and what else needs to be done.

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

After water, sand is the raw material that the world consumes in the greatest quantity. It is no exaggeration to say that fine sand and coarser materials – the medium-to-coarse-grained pebbles, gravel and rock fragments used in construction – are the building blocks of the modern world.

When bound with cement, sand becomes concrete; when mixed with bitumen, it becomes asphalt; and when heated, it becomes glass. Without sand, we would have no highways, high-rises or high-speed trains. Yet sand – which is used here as shorthand for sand, gravel and crushed rock together – is a resource that is both abundant and finite.

In global terms, it is abundant, especially when compared with many other raw materials, albeit often not available close to where it is needed. It is finite in that the rate at which we are using it far exceeds the natural rate at which it is being replenished by the weathering of rocks by wind and water.

Industrialization, population growth and urbanization have fuelled explosive growth in the demand for sand. Precise data on sand extraction are hard to come by and the lack of data compounds the challenge of managing the resource sustainably.

However, the UN estimates that overall extraction could be in the region of 40 billion tonnes per year, driven primarily by construction sector demand. That equates to 18 kilograms of sand each day for every person on the planet and signals how strategically important these resources are for future sustainable development. Post-COVID-19 recovery investment in infrastructure, digital technologies, tourism and other economic activities are dependent on sand resources.

Current efforts to improve the management of sand resources at local, national and global levels are uneven. This is partly due to unique geological features and geography, but also differences in local manifestations of the ‘sand challenge’, national and regional demand for sand resources, as well as capacities to enforce or implement best practice assessment procedures, extractive practices, environmental management and restoration requirements.

We must put stronger conditions in place for a rapid, just and scaled transition to sustainable sand management. But where to focus our efforts for the greatest positive impact?

What does sustainable agriculture mean? 24 May 2022 — 5:30PM TO 6:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 11 May 2022 Chatham House and Online

Experts compare and contrast visions of ‘sustainable’ agriculture.

There is growing and unprecedented recognition of the adverse effects of food systems on global warming, air and water pollution, biodiversity, soil, and managing the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. At the same time, concern is rising over the role of climate change itself in compromising food security, supply-chain resilience and food price spikes.

Against this backdrop, the need for agriculture to become more ‘sustainable’ is clear. However, there is little consensus over what that means in practice. To address this, Chatham House is launching a new research paper comparing and contrasting the two most commonly articulated versions of ‘sustainable agriculture’.

The first focuses on sparing land for nature and increasing the productivity of agricultural land while minimizing environmental impacts. The second involves scaling up nature-friendly farming while emphasizing demand-side changes to reduce the overall pressure on land.

• How can we understand the arguments in support of either version and the assumptions and ideologies which underpin them?

• What are the implications of promoting one version of agriculture over the other

• How can policy transform agriculture and food systems?

• What should civil society support as ‘sustainable’ choices?

Food system transformation: A blind spot for climate and biodiversity action? 20 October 2022 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 5 October 2022 Chatham House and Online

How can COP27 and COP15 accelerate the agenda for sustainable food systems and land use?

Tackling the dual crises of climate change and biodiversity loss requires extraordinary levels of action at an unprecedented speed. Agriculture is the biggest user of land, the biggest source of methane emissions, a major contributor to total greenhouse gas emissions and the leading driver of biodiversity loss.

Anything short of a food system transformation puts climate and biodiversity objectives in peril. However, governments have not yet produced credible pathways and strong policies for tackling our growing ‘foodprint’ – the negative impacts of what we grow and eat.

In advance of COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh for climate and COP15 in Montreal for biodiversity, Chatham House has published a new briefing paper which examines aligning food systems with climate and biodiversity targets.

The paper reviews the climate and biodiversity policy landscape to 2030, with a focus on land-based aspects and the inclusion of food and agriculture. The paper highlights serious conflicts between the impacts of the food system and goals to protect and restore biodiversity and mitigate climate change.

In light of this, opportunities for joined-up action on food, climate and biodiversity are identified, including three key steps for countries to take this decade to produce suitably ambitious and effective policies across the climate–biodiversity–food nexus.

This event brings together leading voices from the international policy arenas for climate and biodiversity to react to the briefing paper and discuss how COP27 and COP15 can accelerate the agenda for sustainable food systems and land use.

Ran Gu and Bing Gao
Math. Comp. 93 (), 2837-2860.
Abstract, references and article information

Algorithms can be very useful, but lately, with so much data being created and shared, and with the increase in their use in critical areas such as hiring, credit, and health care, algorithms are under intense scrutiny about their fairness. People experience the effects of an algorithm's conclusion, but the data and steps that form the basis for that conclusion are frequently hidden from them (as if inside a black box). Cathy O'Neil talks about the unfairness of most predictive algorithms.