How to Explain Turkey's Early Elections 14 June 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 May 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

On 24 June 2018 Turkey will go to the polls to vote in early presidential and parliamentary elections. Following a constitutional referendum last spring and against the backdrop of Turkey’s continued intervention in Syria and rising economic problems, President Erdogan has argued that an early election would help reduce uncertainty and set the country on a course to greater prosperity. The elections, likely to be held under the state of emergency in place since the attempted coup in July 2016, will also mark the country’s transformation from a parliamentary democracy to one with a powerful executive presidency.

In this session, the speaker will discuss what other factors led President Erdogan to call for an early election, what the state of the opposition is and what we can expect from Turkey should Erdogan win another term.

Turkey Is on the Road to a Severe Economic Crisis Expert comment sysadmin 12 July 2018

The deteriorating state of the economy is President Erdoğan’s Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

Fifteen days after Turkey’s parliamentary and presidential elections, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appointed a new government under radically enhanced executive powers granted by the constitution. He chose 16 loyalists and partisan figures to ensure that he remains front and centre in decision-making and policy formation.

Most notably, Erdoğan sacrificed the former deputy prime minister and ex-Merrill Lynch chief economist Mehmet Şimşek in favour of his inexperienced son-in-law Berat Albayrak as finance and treasury minister to manage the fragile economy. Whether he has the competence to placate jittery financial markets and foreign investors is debatable.

Erdoğan will prioritize short-term growth at all costs to the detriment of macroeconomic and financial stability. That entails foregoing interest rate hikes needed to contain runaway double-digit inflation and to support a plummeting lira that depreciated nearly 20 per cent this year. It also means loosening the purse strings, flooding the markets with cheap credit and sponsoring rampant construction and mega-infrastructure projects.

True to his promise, he has appropriated to himself, by presidential decree, the right to hire the central bank governor, deputies and monetary policy committee members for a four-year term. This completes the politicization of the once-respected and independent central bank and is in line with his unorthodox monetary views that higher interest rates equates with higher inflation.

Erdoğan associates progress with gleaming high-rise buildings, gargantuan infrastructure show-pieces and elevated growth rates. He is spiking the fuel to boost the speed of the sputtering mid-sized Audi-style Turkish economy to achieve superior Ferrari growth rates. As any mechanic knows, these tactics are unsustainable in the long term. Eventually, the engine will burn out.

He does not seem to appreciate that Turkey’s growth model requires an overhaul to join the league of rich economies. It is too reliant on consumer spending and government-sponsored infrastructure and construction projects funded by speculative financial flows rather than on sustained private investment and exports.

Net result: the corporate sector’s foreign-exchange liabilities have climbed to a record $328 billion as of the end of 2017. When netted against foreign-exchange assets, it is still a worrying $214 billion. Its US dollar and euro debt pile has more than doubled since 2008, 80 per cent of which is held by domestic banks. Given these acute balance-of-payments conditions, it is not farfetched that Turkey may impose capital controls in the short-to-medium term to restrict the outflow of foreign assets. At $50 billion, the current account deficit – defined as the sum of the trade balance and financial flows – is not even covered by the central bank’s net international reserves at nearly $45 billion.

Unsurprisingly, some major Turkish companies are negotiating with their bondholders to restructure their sizeable foreign loan obligations as lira devaluation increases the financial burden. Should a significant number of Turkish corporates default on their foreign obligations, this would reverberate across the Turkish economy, cause mass consumer panic, shake the confidence of international financial markets and potentially lead to a crisis within the Turkish financial system and to a deep and prolonged economic recession.

Revealingly, Erdoğan’s nationalist allies, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), refused to join his government. Perhaps Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP leader, learned the lessons of the 2001 financial crisis as a member of a three-party government. So he is opting to project influence from the outside, rather than risk being tainted with responsibility for an economic downturn.

Turkey’s president is doubling down on his singular approach to governance irrespective of the fallout. Notwithstanding his current political dominance, the deteriorating state of the economy is his Achilles’ heel and the biggest threat to his currently unrivalled leadership.

Taking Stock of Turkey's Trade Policy 11 September 2018 — 5:00PM TO 6:15PM Anonymous (not verified) 23 August 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

As the only large economy outside of the EU with a customs union agreement, Turkey has a unique trade policy. Amid domestic economic challenges, Turkey’s trade minister, Ruhsar Pekcan, will discuss prospects for upgrading the EU-Turkey customs union. She will also discuss relations between the UK and Turkey and outline strategies for post-Brexit trade.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

EU-Turkey Customs Union: Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit 12 December 2018 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 26 November 2018 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey and the EU have been in a customs union since 1995. Both sides recognize that the current agreement is in need of modernization and have agreed to open negotiations to expand its scope to include services, public procurement, agriculture and other elements that would help bring it into the 21st century.

At the same time, the UK Parliament is debating whether to approve the agreement on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It includes a backstop which – if triggered – would keep the UK and the EU in a single customs territory which would limit the disruption of withdrawal but hamper Britain’s ability to pursue an independent trade policy. The political declaration proposes building on this customs arrangement as the basis for the future relationship.

In this context, the speaker will discuss the current EU-Turkey customs union arrangement and its shortcomings, examine the prospects for its modernization and share his insights on the lessons for the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU.

The event will launch the briefing paper ‘EU-Turkey Customs Union: Prospects for Modernization and Lessons for Brexit’.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Middle East 14 May 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 29 April 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey is cooperating closely with Russia to secure its border with Syria and to encourage a long-term political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Its efforts have staved off a humanitarian catastrophe in the northern Syrian province of Idlib and initiated the trilateral ‘Astana Process’ with Russia and Iran as the primary framework to settle the future of Syria.

By contrast, Turkey and the US disagree on a range of important issues including Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S-400 air missile defence systems and American support for the PKK-affiliated Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG) in Syria.

In this session, the speaker will outline Turkey’s foreign policy priorities in the Middle East and share his country’s perspectives on the US and Russian policies in that region.

Attendance at this event is by invitation only.

Turkey in 2020 and Beyond: What Lies Ahead for Turkish Politics? 25 November 2019 — 12:30PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 6 November 2019 Chatham House | 10 St James's Square | London | SW1Y 4LE

Turkey witnessed some major developments over the last year. In August 2018, the dramatic Lira devaluation caused the Turkish economy to go into recession. In the 2019 local elections, which took place during the economic downturn, the Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) mayoral candidates took control of Ankara and Istanbul after 25 years of dominance by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The election results might lead to a rethink of the AKP leadership and consequences on Turkish politics will depend on Erdoğan’s interpretation of this reversal of his political fortune.

Will this affect the long-standing alliance between AKP and MHP that has characterised Turkish foreign policy for the past few years? What impact will this have on both the domestic and international level? Finally, will Turkey’s recent incursion into Syria have lasting effect on the country’s alliances with other powers and its standing?

In this context, the speaker will analyse the significance of these changes and the future trajectory of Turkish politics, economics and foreign policy.

Turkey

Research includes Turkey’s domestic politics, its borders with the Middle East region, especially Syria, the future of the Turkish economy, and its role on the international stage.

Democracy and stability remain major issues following the attempted coup of 2016 and the devastating 2023 earthquake, as is the country’s role in the ongoing Syria crisis which affects its borders.

Turkey is also pushing for a stronger voice in multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU). It is pushing to be included in future EU free trade agreements, and to simplify procedures for Turkish goods vehicles at its borders with Bulgaria and Greece, and when transiting between EU states.

The country also needs to restore fiscal and monetary prudence, deal with foreign debt in the private sector and focus on productivity-improving economic and institutional reforms to gain the confidence of global financial markets.

A Credit-fuelled Economic Recovery Stores Up Trouble for Turkey Expert comment sysadmin 17 February 2020

Turkey is repeating the mistakes that led to the 2018 lira crisis and another freefall for the currency may not be far off.

Since the 2018 economic crisis, when the value of the lira plummeted and borrowing costs soared, Turkey’s economy has achieved a miraculous ‘V-shaped’ economic recovery from a recession lasting three quarters to a return back to quarterly growth above 1 per cent in the first three months of 2019.

But this quick turnaround has been built on vast amounts of cheap credit used to re-stimulate a consumption and construction boom. This so-called ‘triple C’ economy generated a rapid growth spurt akin to a modestly able professional sprinter injected with steroids.

This has made the currency vulnerable. The lira has steadily depreciated by 11 per cent against the US dollar since the beginning of 2019 and crossed the rate of 6 lira versus the US dollar on 7 February. And there are further warning signs on the horizon.

Credit bonanza

Statistics reveal that Turkish domestic credit grew by around 13 per cent on average throughout 2019. The credit bonanza is still ongoing. Mortgage-backed home sales jumped by a record high of 600 per cent last December alone and the 2019 budget deficit catapulted by 70 per cent due to higher government spending.

Turkey’s central bank fuelled this credit expansion by cutting interest rates aggressively to below inflation and, since the start of this year, purchasing lira-denominated bonds equivalent to around one-third of total acquisitions last year to push yields lower.

Equally, it has linked bank lending to reserve requirements – the money that banks have to keep at the central bank – to boost borrowings via state and private banks. Banks with a ‘real’ loan growth (including inflation) of between 5 and 15 per cent enjoy a 2 per cent reserve ratio on most lira deposits, which authorities adjusted from an earlier band of 10-20 per cent that did not consider double-digit inflation.

Cumulatively, bond purchases (effectively quantitative easing) and reserve management policies have also contributed to eased credit conditions.

Commercial banks have also reduced deposit rates on lira accounts to less than inflation to encourage consumption over saving. Together with low lending rates, the boost to the economy has flowed via mortgages, credit card loans, vehicle leasing transactions and general business borrowings.

Accordingly, stimulus is at the forefront of the government’s economic approach, as it was in 2017 and 2018. It does not seem to be implementing structural change to re-orient growth away from consumption towards productivity.

In addition, governance is, again, a central issue. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s near total monopolization of policymaking means he guides all domestic and external policies. He forced out the previous central bank governor, Murat Cetinkaya, in July 2019 because he did not share the president’s desire for an accelerated pace of interest rate reductions.

New challenges

Despite the similarities, the expected future financial turbulence will be materially different from its 2018 predecessor in four crucial respects.

Firstly, foreign investors will only be marginally involved. Turkey has shut out foreign investors since 2018 from lira-denominated assets by restricting lira swap arrangements. Unsurprisingly, the non-resident holdings of lira bonds has plummeted from 20 per cent in 2018 to less than 10 per cent today.

Secondly, the Turkish government has recently introduced indirect domestic capital controls by constraining most commercial transactions to the lira rather than to the US dollar or euro to reduce foreign currency demand in light of short-term external debt obligations of $191 billion.

Thirdly, the Turkish state banks are intervening quite regularly to soften Lira volatility, thereby transitioning from a ‘free float’ to a ‘managed float’. So far, they have spent over $37 billion over the last two years in a futile effort to buttress the lira. This level of involvement in currency markets cannot be maintained.

Fourthly, the Turkish state is being far more interventionist in the Turkish stock exchange and bond markets to keep asset prices elevated. Government-controlled local funds have participated in the Borsa Istanbul and state banks in sovereign debt to sustain rallies or reverse a bear market.

All these measures have one running idea: exclude foreign investors and no crisis will recur. Yet, when the credit boom heads to a downturn sooner or later, Turks will probably escalate lira conversions to US dollars; 51 per cent of all Turkish bank deposits are already dollar-denominated and the figure is still rising.

If Turkey’s limited foreign reserves cannot satisfy the domestic dollar demand, the government may have to impose comprehensive capital controls and allow for a double digit depreciation in the value of the lira to from its current level, with significant repercussions on Turkey’s political stability and economic climate.

To avoid this scenario, it needs to restore fiscal and monetary prudence, deal the with the foreign debt overhang in the private sector and focus on productivity-improving economic and institutional reforms to gain the confidence of global financial markets and Turks alike.

Webinar: Turkey’s Challenging Post-COVID 19 Outlook 7 May 2020 — 1:00PM TO 2:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 April 2020

Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Perspective of the Main Opposition Party 5 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 October 2020 Online

The Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main Turkish opposition party, is becoming a serious contender for a leading role in the country’s politics.

This is an online only event.

CHP’s mayoral candidates defeated the Justice and Development Party (AKP) incumbents in the 2019 local elections in Ankara and Istanbul, which held both cities for a quarter of a century. Its ascendency in Turkish politics is improving prospects for a CHP-led government after the next general election in 2023.

In this webinar, the speaker will share CHP’s stance on the country’s foreign policy towards key regional allies in Europe, as well as its take on relations with Russia, the US and Turkey’s position and role in the Middle East. Finally, the speaker will share how CHP’s external policy might differ from the ruling AKP. 

Turkey-Russia Relations: A Marriage of Convenience? 26 November 2020 — 12:00PM TO 1:30PM Anonymous (not verified) 17 November 2020 Chatham House

Speakers discuss the complex but, so far, durable ties between Putin and Erdogan and the perspectives of each leader. Other issues will include the impact of the Biden presidency and the unfolding situation in Nagorny Karabakh.

This is an online only event

Russia-Turkey relations are governed by a unique dynamic between presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They pursue contrasting objectives in Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus and Ukraine; yet they have managed to compartmentalize their differences to avoid any spill-over into diplomatic, military and economic cooperation.

Erdogan purchased the Russian S400 missile defence system at the cost of ejection from the US-led fourth generation F35 stealth fighter programme; and at the risk of sanctions by Washington. Russia is also proceeding with the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant near Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.

Turkey Needs Radical New Direction to Save the Economy Expert comment NCapeling 23 November 2020

Turkey should emulate the reformist approach it adopted after the 2001 crisis to prevent an economic and financial breakdown - but this looks highly unlikely.

Although Ankara has witnessed what appears to be an abrupt change of its top economic team with two fresh appointments to key positions – Naci Ağbal as governor of the central bank and Lütfi Elvan as finance and treasury minister – a cardinal rule of thumb in Turkish politics is that the more drama one sees, the less policy change there will actually be.

Financial markets reacted positively to the moves in the expectation they will signal a change of Turkey’s overall economic approach, but the reality is Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is simply putting loyalists into key bureaucratic positions to help ensure the primary role of these functions becomes ‘selling’ his policies more effectively, rather than altering them.

The hope from the markets – which saw the beleaguered Turkish lira appreciate against the US dollar at the news – is that Turkey adopts substantial interest rate increases as well as measures to repress liquidity expansion in order to temper its controversial so-called ‘Triple C’ approach of using cheap credit to stimulate growth with an unsustainable consumption and construction boom.

But instead, Erdoğan’s declaration after the appointments were made indicates the new restrictions in which they will now operate, saying ‘we are in a historic struggle against those who want to force Turkey into modern capitulations through the shackles of interest rates, foreign exchange rates and inflation’.

Learn from past successes

To resolve its current underlying economic problems, Turkey should actually be looking to its recent past and aiming to emulate the approach pursued by former prime minister Bülent Ecevit during the 2001 financial crisis when he recruited Kemal Derviş, a senior World Bank official with extensive experience and international contacts in economic, financial, and monetary affairs.

As economy minister with a broad mandate to spearhead a durable economic recovery plan, Dervis established independent market regulatory agencies covering banking, telecommunications, energy, and other key sectors, and strengthened the competition authority.

He also either liquidated or merged insolvent banks, granted central bank autonomy to guarantee price stability, and ensured recruitment was based on competence, expertise, and meritocracy. Crucially, his productivity-enhancing restructuring blueprint was designed in Turkey rather than being imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or another external agency.

Ecevit also turbocharged reforms motivated in part by a desire to join the EU with constitutional, political and legal modernization which widened personal freedom, significantly curtailed capital punishment, liberalized the cultural environment for Kurds, and fortified the rule of law. And one of his coalition partners in that work, the right-wing pro-Turkish National Action Party (MHP), is now allied with the current ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

His foreign minister Ismail Cem also enhanced Turkey’s relations with both Europe and the US, initiated the so-called ‘earthquake diplomacy’ with his Greek counterpart George Papandreou after twin tragedies struck both nations in 1999, and largely avoided entanglement in Middle Eastern conflicts.

The net result of all these actions was that Turkey emerged from the crisis with greater resilience, a more robust regulatory framework, upgraded political and economic institutions, rapidly decreasing inflation, a credible central bank, a stronger financial system, closer relations with the EU and US, and heightened domestic and foreign investor confidence.

But now that similar woes are engulfing Turkey anew, is Erdogan and the AKP/MHP alliance able – and willing – to repeat the Ecevit recipe? Present signs indicate they are highly unlikely to as they are too committed to entrenching the Triple C model.

Although this model will likely further consolidate their power, it will also empty the civil service of qualified professionals, restrict civil liberties and freedoms, and create more ideological politics, affecting Turkey’s foreign policy.

Such a stubborn refusal to shift direction is increasing the inevitability of a deep economic and financial breakdown and so, unless Turkey undertakes a serious policy departure instead of continuing to resort to the quick fix approach, there is real likelihood it will simply accelerate towards disaster.

Turkey's foreign policy: The perspective of the İYİ Parti 25 January 2021 — 12:00PM TO 1:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 14 January 2021 Online

The centre-right İYİ Parti, the second largest opposition party in Turkey, is attracting voters from the governing alliance between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the pro-Turkish National Movement Party (MHP).

Please complete your registration on Zoom:

The İYİ Parti, which was set up in 2017, formed the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı) with the left-of-centre Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the pro-Islam Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) in the 2018 parliamentary elections winning 43 seats in the Grand National Assembly.

In the 2019 municipal elections, the İYİ Parti’s alliance alliance with the CHP played an important role in enabling the latter’s candidates to become the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara after a quarter-century dominance by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Its popularity has been rising steadily, according to recent polls. In this webinar, the speaker will outline the party’s viewpoint on the country’s foreign policy towards the European Union, as well as its perspectives on relations with Russia, the US, Iran and the Arab world. Finally, he will share the ways in which the İYİ Parti’s approach to external policy might differ from the ruling AKP.

Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy: A story of mutual creation? 1 November 2022 — 2:00PM TO 3:00PM Anonymous (not verified) 12 October 2022 Online

Panellists discuss the link between Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies under President Erdoğan.

From Turkey’s ongoing rapprochement with its erstwhile Middle Eastern antagonists to its Syria policy and earlier approach towards the West, there has been extensive discussion on the domestic drivers behind Ankara’s foreign policy.

Less discussed but no less important is how Turkish foreign affairs have shaped its internal politics. Under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s foreign and domestic policies have mutually reshaped each other.

In this webinar, launching Gönül Tol’s new book Erdoğan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria, panellists will take stock of how Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies under the leadership of President Erdoğan have influenced and shaped each other. Speakers will also discuss the internal drivers behind Turkey’s current reset in relations with the Middle East, and examine how Ankara’s foreign affairs play into the country’s political and identity fault lines.

The event will be held on the record and will be live-streamed on the MENA Programme’s Facebook page.

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Corey M. Ziemba
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Systems/Circuits

The visual world is richly adorned with texture, which can serve to delineate important elements of natural scenes. In anesthetized macaque monkeys, selectivity for the statistical features of natural texture is weak in V1, but substantial in V2, suggesting that neuronal activity in V2 might directly support texture perception. To test this, we investigated the relation between single cell activity in macaque V1 and V2 and simultaneously measured behavioral judgments of texture. We generated stimuli along a continuum between naturalistic texture and phase-randomized noise and trained two macaque monkeys to judge whether a sample texture more closely resembled one or the other extreme. Analysis of responses revealed that individual V1 and V2 neurons carried much less information about texture naturalness than behavioral reports. However, the sensitivity of V2 neurons, especially those preferring naturalistic textures, was significantly closer to that of behavior compared with V1. The firing of both V1 and V2 neurons predicted perceptual choices in response to repeated presentations of the same ambiguous stimulus in one monkey, despite low individual neural sensitivity. However, neither population predicted choice in the second monkey. We conclude that neural responses supporting texture perception likely continue to develop downstream of V2. Further, combined with neural data recorded while the same two monkeys performed an orientation discrimination task, our results demonstrate that choice-correlated neural activity in early sensory cortex is unstable across observers and tasks, untethered from neuronal sensitivity, and therefore unlikely to directly reflect the formation of perceptual decisions.

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