Egypt needs a new inclusive and equitable economic growth model. Unemployment has spiked since the 2011 revolution, clearing over 12 percent, a figure which is not expected to decrease for several years at least and the situation is even more dire for the country’s youth. While the likely IMF program will offer the macroeconomy a measure of relief, it cannot reverse decades of mismanagement. Egypt’s private sector may therefore not experience a recovery in the near future. The government’s situation looks similarly stressed as its gross debt is projected to rise from 73 percent of GDP in 2010 to 79 percent this year. Combined with the confusion surrounding the government’s structure and organization, it is unlikely that the public sector can fill the jobs gap or provide the needed high quality and affordable goods and services. However, the legal limbo surrounding inclusive business models (IBs) as well as intermediary support organizations (ISOs), which are supposed to provide the needed support to IBs, has unnecessarily shrunk this sector of the economy and disabled it from playing its necessary role.

In his inaugural speech, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi portrayed himself as a president for all Egyptians, including the menial and underprivileged rickshaw drivers. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Al-Nahda Program emphasizes social justice and a consensus vision across all groups in society. The new leadership is committed to social innovation with “a national strategy to develop mechanisms to support innovation dealing with community issues.”

Although the constitution has not yet been drafted and there is currently no parliament, this moment in time contains a golden opportunity for the government of Egypt to capture the energy, civic engagement and entrepreneurial spirit in the country. Under Mubarak, Egypt’s economic growth and business policy reforms helped foster the private sector, but 85 percent of the population continued to live under $5/day and this ratio did not change during the decade of growth prior to 2008. Safeguards against abuse and incentives for inclusiveness were missing, and the economy became dominated by crony capitalism with wealth concentrated in the hands of a few. People’s perception of inequity and dissatisfaction with public services increased. The governance indicators of “Voice & Accountability” and “Control of Corruption” deteriorated from 2000 to 2010, even though there was a steady improvement in “Regulatory Quality.”

Egypt needs an enabling legal framework to promote a more equitable growth model. Such a framework should encourage forms of inclusive businesses (such as cooperatives) and ISOs that could help micro and small enterprises. These firms (with less than 50 employees) represent nearly 99 percent of all non-public sector, non-agricultural firms and provide about 80 percent of employment in Egypt. But their expansion has been restricted because of the weakness of the ecosystem of incubators, angel investor networks, microfinance institutions (MFIs) and impact investors necessary to allow young entrepreneurs to start up and grow. This policy paper argues that legal and regulatory reforms that encourage ISOs and allow new forms of inclusive business to register and operate are a necessary first step towards a new inclusive growth model.

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SUMMARY

Replacing inefficient kerosene lighting with electric lighting or other clean alternatives can rapidly achieve development and energy access goals, save money and reduce climate warming. Many of the 250 million households that lack reliable access to electricity rely on inefficient and dangerous simple wick lamps and other kerosene-fueled light sources, using 4 to 25 billion liters of kerosene annually to meet basic lighting needs. Kerosene costs can be a significant household expense and subsidies are expensive. New information on kerosene lamp emissions reveals that their climate impacts are substantial. Eliminating current annual black carbon emissions would provide a climate benefit equivalent to 5 gigatons of carbon dioxide reductions over the next 20 years. Robust and low-cost technologies for supplanting simple wick and other kerosene-fueled lamps exist and are easily distributed and scalable. Improving household lighting offers a low-cost opportunity to improve development, cool the climate and reduce costs.

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INTRODUCTION

If you are one of those government officials, finance experts, development professionals or NGO members whose eyes glaze over when you see an article on procurement, you are the audience I want to address. Procurement is the purchase of works, goods and services by individuals or firms, or government entities in the case of public procurement. We all make procurement decisions in our everyday lives. We pride ourselves on making good decisions and being able to apply discretion and judgment. Now imagine if you were improving your home and were constrained by pages and pages of legal and technical regulations that take away that discretion. You would soon question whether those regulations were relevant and whether they provide any value or simply delayed and jeopardized good decision-making. Worse yet, imagine if you had to follow rules that someone else outside your family, your community or your country set for you. While public procurement requires a higher standard of governance than personal procurement, developing countries and other stakeholders are raising these questions regarding the policies set by multilateral aid institutions.

In November 2013, the World Bank released the report of its first stage efforts in reforming its procurement policy as it relates to the projects it finances. As the World Bank enters the second stage in designing the actual reforms, the “development community” faces a crucial moment and opportunity to refine and reform a fundamental instrument in the development toolbox—one that has been treated for too long as a “plumbing and wiring” issue that ignores the broader public policy implications and the growing burden of conflicting objectives, regulations, incentives and political polemics. The purpose of this paper is to examine concerns regarding reform of multilateral agencies’ public procurement policies, enhance awareness of what is at stake and lay the groundwork for the reform discussions at development institutions that will take place over the next year.

I should alert you, however, that I am neither a procurement specialist, nor am I a lawyer or an engineer. I would describe myself as a development practitioner. After decades of working on infrastructure projects and on multilateral operational policy, I have maintained a deep respect for my procurement colleagues who have protected my proverbial “backside.” One quickly learns in this business that a mistake in procurement can result in serious consequences as one sits in the middle of the converging, and often conflicting, interests of governments, donors, private sector and, of course, affected communities. The procurement policies applied by the multilateral finance institutions have been responsible for enhancing competition, deepening transparency and raising the integrity of investment in developing countries, as well as opening markets for developed and developing countries’ businesses. As the world of public procurement has evolved, however, one also learns that procurement is becoming more than just getting the “plumbing and wiring” right. Indeed, the role and application of public procurement policies and practices is an essential element of design and implementation with crucial consequences for the quality of outcomes. The case set forth in this paper lays out the factors driving the need for major reform of multilateral banks’ procurement policies—rather than simply adapting existing policies. This paper also presents the major challenges to be addressed in designing the reforms and the tensions to be resolved or balanced as the World Bank enters the more detailed design stage of its reform effort.

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In the developing world, more than 200 million children under the age of five years are at risk of not reaching their full development potential because they suffer from the negative consequences of poverty, nutritional deficiencies and inadequate learning opportunities. Overall, 165 million children (one in four) are stunted, and 90 percent of these children live in Africa and Asia. And though some progress has been made globally, child malnutrition remains a serious public health problem with enormous human and economic costs. Worldwide, only about 50 percent of children are enrolled in preprimary education, and in low-income countries a mere 17 percent. And though more and more children are going to school, millions have little to show for it. By some accounts, 250 million children of primary school age cannot read even part of a sentence. Some of these children have never been to school (58 million); but more often, they perform poorly despite having spent several years in school, which reflects not only the poor quality of many schools but also the multiple disadvantages that characterize their early life.

Ensuring that all children—regardless of their place of birth and parental income or education level—have access to opportunities that will allow them to reach their full potential requires investing early in their development. To develop their cognitive, linguistic, socioemotional and physical skills and abilities, children need good nutrition and health, opportunities for play, nurture and learning with caregivers, early stimulation and protection from violence and neglect.

The Case for Early Interventions 

The arguments for investing in children early are simple and convincing. Early investment makes sense scientifically. The brain is almost fully developed by age three, providing a prime opportunity to achieve high gains. We know that the rapid rate of development of the brain’s neural pathways is responsible for an individual’s cognitive, social and emotional development, and there is solid evidence that nutrition and stimulation during the first 1,000 days of life are linked to brain development. 

Early investment makes sense in terms of equity. The playing field has the highest chances of being leveled early on, and we know that programs have a higher impact for young children from poorer families. In the United States, for example, increasing preschool enrollment to 100 percent for low-income children would reduce disparities in school readiness by 24 percent between black and white children and by 35 percent between Hispanic and white children. We also know that equalizing initial endowments through early childhood development (ECD) programs is far more cost-effective than compensating for differences in outcomes later in life. 

Early investment makes sense economically. Investing early prevents higher costs down the road, and interventions yield a high return on investment. There is evidence of the benefits for the individual and for society more broadly. For instance, at the level of the individual, in Jamaica children participating in an early childhood stimulation program were found to have 25 percent higher earnings 20 years later compared with children who did not participate. At the economy-wide level, eliminating malnutrition is estimated to increase gross domestic product by 1 to 2 percentage points annually, while countries with school systems that have a 10-percentage-point advantage in the proportion of students

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The United Nations will convene a major international conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from July 13 to 16, 2015, to discuss financing for the post-2015 agenda on sustainable development. This conference, the third of its kind, will hope to replicate the success of the Monterrey conference in 2002 that has been credited with providing the glue to bind countries to the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The analogy is pertinent but should not be taken too far. The most visible part of the Monterrey Consensus was the commitment by rich countries to “make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 percent of gross national product” as official development assistance (ODA). This was anchored in a clear premise that “each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development,” which includes support for market-oriented policies that encourage the private sector. While not all of the Monterrey targets have been met, there has been a considerable increase in resources flowing to developing countries, as a central plank of efforts to achieve the MDGs.

Today, aid issues remain pivotal for a significant number of countries, but they are less relevant for an even larger number of countries. The core principles of Monterrey need to be reaffirmed again in 2015, but if the world is to follow-through on a universal sustainable development agenda, it must address the multi-layered financing priorities spanning all countries. A simple “30-30-130” mnemonic helps to illustrate the point. There are 193 U.N. member states. Of these, only around 30 are still low-income countries (33 at the latest count). These are the economies that are, and will continue to be, the most heavily dependent on aid as the world looks to how it should implement the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Conversely, there are only around 30 “donor” countries (including 28 members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, or DAC) that have made international commitments to provide more aid. For the remaining 130 or so emerging middle-income economies that have achieved higher levels of average prosperity, aid discussions risk forming a sideshow to the real issues that constrain their pursuit of sustainable development. The bottom line is that for most countries, the Financing for Development conference should unlock finance from many different sources, including but not exclusively aid, to implement the SDGs.

Addis will take place in the context of sluggish global growth, an upsurge in conflict, considerable strains in multilateral 2 political cooperation, and challenging ODA prospects in many countries.

There are other differences between Addis and Monterrey. Monterrey took place after agreement had been reached on the MDGs, while Addis will precede formal agreement on the SDGs by a few months. Monterrey was focused on a government-to-government agreement, while Addis should be relevant to a far larger number of stakeholders—including businesses, academics, civil society, scientists, and local authorities. Monterrey was held against a backdrop of general optimism about the global economy and widespread desire for intensified international collaboration following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. Meanwhile, Addis will take place in the context of sluggish global growth, an upsurge in conflict, considerable strains in multilateral political cooperation, and challenging ODA prospects in many countries. In addition, regulators are working to reduce risk-taking by large financial institutions, increasing the costs of providing long-term capital to developing countries.

Against this backdrop, an Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Finance (ICESDF) crafted a report for the United Nations on financing options for sustainable development. The report provides an excellent overview of issues and the current state of global financing, and presents over 100 recommendations. But it falls short on prescribing the most important priorities and action steps on which leaders should focus at Addis.

This paper seeks to identify such a priority list of actions, with emphasis on the near-term deliverables that could instigate critical changes in trajectories towards 2030. At the same time, the paper does not aim to describe the full range of outcomes that need to be in place by roughly 2025 in order to achieve the SDGs by their likely deadline of 2030. Addis will be a critical forum to provide political momentum to a few of the many useful efforts already underway on improving global development finance. Time is short, so there is limited ability to introduce new topics or ideas or to build consensus where none already exists.

We identify three criteria for identifying top priorities for agreement in Addis:

• Priorities should draw from, and build on, on-going work—including the ICESDF report and the outputs „„of several other international workstreams on finance that are underway.
• Agreements should have significant consequences for successful implementation of the SDGs at the coun„„try, regional or global level.
• Recommendations should be clearly actionable, with next steps in implementation that are easy to under„„stand and easy to confirm when completed.

It is not necessary (or desirable) that every important topic be resolved in Addis. In practical terms, negotiators face two groups of issues. First are those on which solutions can be negotiated in time for the July conference. Second are those for which the problems are too complex to be solved by July, but which are still crucial to be resolved over the coming year or two if the SDGs are to be achieved. For this second group of issues, the intergovernmental agreement can set specific timetables for resolving each problem at hand. There is some precedent for this, including in the 2005 U.N. World Summit, which included timetables for some commitments. What is most critical is that the moment be used to anchor and advance processes that will shift toward creating a global financing system for achieving sustainable development across all countries. Committing to timetables for action and building on reforms already undertaken could be important ways of enhancing the credibility of new agreements.

In this paper, we lay out nine areas where we believe important progress can be made. In each area, we start from identifying a gap or issue that could present an obstacle to the successful implementation of the SDGs if left unattended. In some cases the gaps will affect all countries, in other cases only a subset of countries. But we believe that the package of actions, taken as a whole, reflects a balance of opportunities, responsibilities and benefits for all countries. We also believe that by making the discussion issue-focused, the needs for financing can be balanced with policy actions that will be required to make sure financing is effectively and efficiently deployed.

In addition to the nine areas listed below, there are other commitments already made which have not yet been met. We urge renewed efforts to meet these commitments, but also recognize that political and financial realities must be managed to make progress. Such commitments include meeting the Monterrey Consensus target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI in official development assistance (ODA), the May 2005 agreement of all EC-15 countries to reach that target by 2015, and bringing the Doha Development Round of trade talks to a successful conclusion. These remain important and relevant, but in this paper we choose to focus on new areas and fresh ideas so as to avoid treading over well-worn territory again.

Most sub-Saharan African countries have long had to rely on foreign assistance or loans from international financial institutions to supply part of their foreign currency needs and finance part of their domestic investment, given their low levels of domestic saving. But now many of them, for the first time, are able to borrow in international financial markets, selling so-called eurobonds, which are usually denominated in dollars or euros. 

The sudden surge in the demand for international sovereign bonds issued by countries in a region that contains some of the world’s poorest countries is due to a variety of factors—including rapid growth and better economic policies in the region, high commodity prices, and low global interest rates. Increased global liquidity as well as investors’ diversification needs, at a time when the correlation between many global assets has increased, has also helped increase the attractiveness of the so-called “frontier” markets, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the issuance of international sovereign bonds is part of a number of African countries’ strategies to restructure their debt, finance infrastructure investments, and establish sovereign benchmarks to help develop the sub-sovereign and corporate bond market. The development of the domestic sovereign bond market in many countries has also help strengthen the technical capacity of finance ministries and debt management offices to issue international debt.

Whether the rash of borrowing by sub-Saharan governments (as well as a handful of corporate entities in the region) is sustainable over the medium to long term, however, is open to question. The low interest rate environment is set to change at some point—both raising borrowing costs for the countries and reducing investor interest. In addition, oil prices are falling, which makes it harder for oil-producing countries to service or refinance their loans. In the medium term, heady economic growth may not continue if debt proceeds are only mostly used for current spending, and debt is not adequately managed.

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Strong Growth and Changing Composition 

External financial flows to sub-Saharan Africa (defined as the sum of gross private capital flows, official development assistance (ODA), and remittances to the region) have not only grown rapidly since 1990, but their composition has also changed significantly. The volume of external flows to the region increased from $20 billion in 1990 to above $120 billion in 2012. Most of this increase in external flows to sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to the increase in private capital flows and the growth of remittances, especially since 2005 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: External Flows (1990-2012, in USD billions)

As also displayed in Figure 1, in 1990 the composition of external flows to sub-Saharan Africa was about 62 percent ODA, 31 percent gross inflows from the private sector, and about 7 percent remittances. However, by 2012, ODA accounted for about 22 percent of external flows to Africa, a share comparable to that of remittances (24 percent) and less than half the share of gross private capital flows (54 percent). Also notably, in 1990, FDI flows were greater than ODA flows in only two countries (Liberia and Nigeria) in sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa, but 22 years later, 17 countries received more FDI than ODA in 2012—suggesting that sub-Saharan African countries are increasingly becoming less aid dependent (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: Number of Countries Where FDI is Greater than ODA (1990-2012)

But to what extent have these changes in the scale and composition of external flows to sub-Saharan Africa equally benefited countries in the region? Did the rising tide lift all boats? Is aid really dying? Are all countries attracting private capital flows and benefiting from remittances to the same degree? Finally, how does external finance compare with domestic finance? 

The False Demise of ODA

A closer look at the data indicates that, clearly, ODA is not dead, though its role is changing. For instance, middle-income countries (MICs) are experiencing the sharpest decline in ODA as a share of total external flows to the region, while aid flows account for more than half of external flows in fragile as well as low-income countries (LICs) and resource-poor landlocked countries (see Figure 3 and Appendix).

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Executive Summary

Census 2000 underscores the many social, demographic, and economic challenges facing the City of Cleveland and its residents.

Between 1980 and 2000, Cleveland lost fully one-sixth of its population. Like other older cities in the nation's "Rust Belt," Cleveland's metropolitan area also lost residents over this period, although it managed to grow modestly in the 1990s.

What little growth there was in the region occurred far from the core. The city's downtown area grew, but nearly every other neighborhood in the city and its close-in suburbs lost residents. To be sure, Cleveland actually gained modest numbers of black, Hispanic, and Asian residents in the last decade. But at the same time it lost almost three times as many white residents. As a result, the number of married couples living in Cleveland dwindled, while households not traditionally associated with the suburbs—single persons and single parents—proliferated there. A similar evacuation of jobs has occurred, and today fewer than one-third of the region's workers are employed in the City of Cleveland.

The demographic and economic impacts of decentralization in the Cleveland metro area are striking. Segregation levels between blacks and whites, and blacks and Hispanics, remain among the highest in the U.S. Cleveland ranks 96th out of the 100 largest cities in the share of adults who have a bachelor's degree, and the educational attainment of each racial/ethnic group in Cleveland significantly lags that in other cities. Not coincidentally, the city's unemployment rate is the second-highest among large U.S. cities, and median household income is the third-lowest. In the 1990s, income among Cleveland households did rise, but nearly half of all families with children still lived below or near the poverty line in 2000. With such low incomes, many of Cleveland's families fail to benefit from the city's relatively affordable rental and ownership opportunities. In many city neighborhoods today, a lack of market demand leaves senior citizens as the largest group of homeowners.

Along these lines and others, then, Cleveland in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 concludes that:

• The Cleveland metro area continued to decentralize in the 1990s amid slow growth region-wide. Between 1980 and 2000, the City of Cleveland lost 17 percent of its population, although the pace of decline slowed in the last decade. Meanwhile, the region's suburbs grew modestly, but the locus of that growth occurred far from the core. In the 1990s, a few neighborhoods in downtown Cleveland gained residents, but population loss was widespread throughout the remainder of the city and most inner suburbs. The city lost households of all types: The number of married couples living in the city dropped by 16,000, and for every additional single-person household the city gained, the suburbs added more than 40. Today, only one in five residents of the Cleveland region lives in the central city, and less than one-third of the region's workers are employed there.

• Cleveland remains highly segregated and profits from little international immigration. The number of whites living in Cleveland plummeted in the 1990s, and modest gains in black, Hispanic, and Asian populations were not enough to compensate for these losses. The city's foreign-born population grew by a mere 400 persons over the decade, signaling that while modest numbers of immigrants continued to arrive in Cleveland (9,300 in the 1990s), an equivalent number of earlier arrivals left the city for the suburbs or beyond. In addition, the metro area remains highly stratified along racial and ethnic lines, with blacks confined to the city's east side and eastern suburbs, Hispanics clustered on the west side, and whites located in the downtown and southern/western suburbs.

• Cleveland lacks a young, highly-educated population. During the 1990s, the number of 25-to-34 year-olds nationwide declined by 8 percent, due to the aging of the Baby Boom generation. In Cleveland, this age group shrank nearly three times as fast. Consequently, the share of adults with a college degree grew more slowly than elsewhere in the 1990s, and Cleveland now ranks 96th out of the 100 largest cities in college degree attainment. Efforts to retain students attending its own universities may help accelerate growth in educational attainment, but since Cleveland's college-student population is one of the smallest among the Living Cities, strategies to increase educational access for existing residents may be needed. Unlike in many other cities, low educational attainment is not confined to Cleveland's minority groups—whites, blacks, and Hispanics all have below-average rates of college completion.

• Incomes grew in Cleveland during the 1990s, although the city remains home to a primarily low-wage workforce. As in other Midwestern cities, median household income grew at an above-average rate in Cleveland during the 1990s. However, the city's median income still ranks 98th out of the 100 largest cities. Middle-income households declined over the decade, while the ranks of moderate-income "working poor" families grew. In fact, some 62 percent of the city's households made do with incomes below $34,000 in 2000. Families with children were especially likely to earn low wages; nearly half had incomes below or near the federal poverty line.

• Homeownership increased for some groups in Cleveland, but many families face difficulties paying for housing and moving toward homeownership. About half of Cleveland's households own their own homes. That share is typical among the 23 Living Cities, but it remains low for a city with such a large stock of single-family homes. Homeownership rose for the city's Hispanic households, 41 percent of whom now own. But black households in Cleveland did not share in these homeownership gains, and were likely impeded by their low incomes, which trail those for other racial/ethnic groups. Rents in Cleveland increased by almost 10 percent in the 1990s, but remain the lowest among the Living Cities—the median unit rents for only $465. Yet even so, 40,000 Cleveland renters still pay more than 30 percent of income on rent, suggesting that most earn too little to afford even a modestly-priced unit.

By presenting indicators like these on the following pages, Cleveland in Focus: A Profile from Census 2000 seeks to give readers a better sense of where Cleveland and its residents stand in relation to their peers, and how the 1990s shaped the cities, their neighborhoods, and the entire Cleveland region. Living Cities and the Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy hope that this information will prompt a fruitful dialogue among city and community leaders about the direction Cleveland should take in the coming decade.

Cleveland Data Book Series 1
Cleveland Data Book Series 2

This presentation by Alan Berube to the Cleveland EITC Forum explains how boosting low-income families' participation in tax credits can help put the city's workers, neighborhoods, and the local economy itself on more solid financial ground.

The metro program hosts and participates in a variety of public forums. To view a complete list of these events, please visit the metro program's Speeches and Events page which provides copies of major speeches, powerpoint presentations, event transcripts, and event summaries.

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Should increasing exports be part of the solution to Greater Cleveland's -- and the nation's -- economic doldrums? Can export growth make this recovery job-filled rather than jobless?

That's a counterintuitive proposition, but one that is gaining traction in Northeast Ohio. Cleveland, Youngstown and other metros often see themselves on the losing end of globalization, as manufacturing has moved abroad and trade barriers and currency manipulations impede the entry of U.S.-made goods into foreign markets.

But exports bring tremendous benefits to workers, companies and the nation as a whole. Exporting companies tend to be more innovative. They pay higher wages across all skill levels. And they are a response to a new global reality: 95 percent of the world's customers live outside the United States.

Any successful export strategy, including the one that the Obama administration is developing, must start with where U.S. exports come from. Our major metropolitan areas are the nation's export hubs. In 2008, they produced about 64 percent of U.S. exports, including more than 62 percent of manufactured goods and 75 percent of services.

Northeast Ohio's major metros are leaders in exports, oriented toward global consumers in a way that most American regions are not. Exports contribute more than 12 percent of the gross metropolitan product in Akron, 13 percent in Cleveland, and a jaw-dropping 18 percent in Youngstown, compared to a national metro average of 10.9 percent.

Exports are also a source of much-needed jobs in these metros. As of 2008 (the most recent year for which we have data) there were 110,000 export jobs in the Cleveland metro and about 30,000 each in greater Akron and Youngstown. Every $1 billion in exports from the average metropolitan area in 2008 supported 5,800 jobs.

To leverage the powerful export activity already occurring in Cleveland and elsewhere, the Obama administration should connect its macroeconomic vision for export growth with the metro reality where the doubling will mostly occur.

For example, the president's export advisory council should include state and local leaders, and revamp export guidance and support to meet the needs of small firms, which find it hard to enter new markets.

But Northeast Ohio metros have their own work to do. The rate of export growth between 2003 and 2008 in Cleveland and Akron is lackluster when compared to the large metro average. U.S. companies dominate the global market in service exports, and the nation actually has a generous service trade surplus, but service exports' share of overall output in Northeast Ohio metros is smaller than the large metro average, and growth in service exports is slower.

Most troubling, Cleveland and its neighbors are underperforming when it comes to innovation, which is a critical ingredient for future international success. Metros that are manufacturing-oriented or export-intensive (or both) tend to create patents at a rate of just over five patents per 1,000 workers. But Cleveland, Akron and Youngstown fall short, with 2.8, 4.5, and 1 patent per 1,000 workers, respectively.

Northeast Ohio must accelerate its efforts to increase the region's innovation and export capacity, through regional organizations such as NorTech and JumpStart. Just as the president set an export goal for the nation, Northeast Ohio should embrace the opportunity to set its own aggressive export goals. Business groups, the Fund for Our Economic Future, universities and regional economic development organizations have made a start but need to devote more resources and collaborate to achieve those goals.

The region can make this happen. Organizations like the Manufacturing and Advocacy and Growth Network (MAGNET) and its partners, with support from the Fund and chambers, are working directly with companies to increase manufacturing innovation in Northeast Ohio, with increasing exports one of their major emphases.

The eighth and final Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) of the Obama administration will take place in Beijing next week. On the economic side, it will be difficult this year to make progress on specific outcomes; but it’s an important year for having a frank conversation about macroeconomic and financial policies.

One reason that it will be hard to get specific outcomes is that the Chinese leadership has shown that economic reform doesn’t rank very high on its list of priorities. After laying out an ambitious reform agenda in its Third Plenum resolution in 2013, implementation of reform has been slow, except in some aspects of financial reform. Recent speeches have emphasized the need to close zombie firms and clean up non-performing loans in the banking system, but specific plans have been modest. 

In terms of the agenda between China and the United States, the most important issue is negotiating a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Many important sectors are still closed to inward direct investment in China. It would help China’s transition to a new growth model to open up these sectors to competition and to private investment, and a BIT is a smart way to commit to these reforms. However, China has been slow to produce a credible offer on the BIT because enterprises and ministries with vested interests have opposed opening up and the leadership is apparently not willing to take them on.

Another factor affecting this S&ED is that it is the last for the Obama administration. I would argue that this is a good time for China and the United States to demonstrate that regular, high-level exchange produces results, increasing the likelihood that whatever administration comes next will want to maintain something similar. However, it is more likely that Chinese leaders will want to wait and see what administration they will be dealing with and to save deliverables for those future negotiations.

S&ED is an opportunity for the top economic officials in the two countries to frankly discuss their policy choices and to avoid mistakes that can come from miscommunication.

My experience with the first four S&EDs was that the conversation was more important than the deliverables, which have often been modest, incremental steps. This year, China will be very interested in hearing what the Federal Reserve thinks. May labor market data will be published on June 3, just in advance of the S&ED, so there may be more clarity about when the Fed is likely to raise interest rates. Regardless of when the Fed moves, both China and the United States have an interest in seeing a relatively stable exchange rate for the yuan. China’s central bank officials have emphasized that the country still has a large current account surplus, so depreciation of the trade-weighted exchange rate is not warranted. Depreciation would exacerbate imbalances and would work against the transformation of China’s growth model because it favors industry at the expense of services. 

But if the Fed continues to normalize interest rates and the dollar rises against other major currencies, China does not want to follow the dollar up. Hence, its emphasis on stable value of the currency relative to a basket. S&ED is an opportunity for the top economic officials in the two countries to frankly discuss their policy choices and to avoid mistakes that can come from miscommunication. The most important outcome of the S&ED may well be avoidance of policy mistakes, a subtle outcome that will not be reflected in headlines. 

Editors’ Note: Outgoing British Prime Minister David Cameron once proudly stated that "there is no country in the Western world more open to Chinese investment than Britain." What will happen to the Sino-British relationship now that the U.K. will almost certainly leave the EU? This post originally appeared in the Nikkei Asia Review.

One of the many side effects of the June 23 British referendum on the European Union is that it will put an end to a honeymoon that had barely started less than a year ago, when George Osborne, the U.K.'s chancellor of the exchequer, declared on the eve of Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Britain: "Let's stick together and make a golden decade for both our countries." Much has happened since the visit, during which Xi was feted as a guest of honor by Queen Elizabeth II at Buckingham Palace and at the British Parliament.

Over the past three years, British Prime Minister David Cameron and Osborne, (the man in effect running the country's China policy), seem to have partly anticipated the referendum's outcome by partnering with a few Asian countries outside the European Union—China especially—that would help finance some of the major infrastructure projects needed by the U.K., including nuclear plants, high-speed railways and airport infrastructure.

Now, in the turmoil following the referendum, Cameron is on the way out and Osborne's future remains uncertain. What will happen to the Sino-British relationship now that the U.K. will almost certainly leave the EU? Initial signals from China have been subdued. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying recently said she believed that the impact of Brexit will be at all levels—not only in relations between China and Britain.

"China supports the European integration process and would like to see Europe playing a proactive role in international affairs. We have full confidence in the outlook for the development of China-EU ties," she said. This is a far cry from the enthusiastic comments in Chinese media on the Sino-British relationship in 2015, when Britain decided—much to the chagrin of Washington, Tokyo, Berlin and Paris—to be the first Western country to join the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and when it hosted Xi, hoping to attract massive Chinese foreign direct investment.

Cameron had proudly stated that "there is no country in the Western world more open to Chinese investment than Britain." The U.K. is currently Europe's top destination for Chinese FDI with a cumulative investment of $16.6 billion in the country since 2000 (including $3.3 billion in 2015 alone), and many memoranda of understanding signed during Xi's visit last fall. Will these be completed now that the British people have voted to leave the EU? A few months ago, Wang Jianlin, the head of China's Dalian Wanda Group—a commercial property and cinema chain operator—and a major investor in Europe warned: "Should Britain exit the EU, many Chinese companies would consider moving their European headquarters to other countries," adding that "Brexit would not be a smart choice for the U.K., as it would create more obstacles and challenges for investors and visa problems."

The Global Times, an English-language publication that is part of the Chinese Communist Party's People's Daily, was even less sympathetic to the British situation, writing in an editorial after the referendum, that the vote would "probably be a landmark event that proves Britain is heading in the direction of being a small country with few people, writing itself off as hopeless and acting recklessly."

The Beijing leadership—which uniquely went out of its way to support the Remain camp on several occasions—is puzzled by the referendum's result, which has not only created some disorder (an unbearable word in official party language) but also led to the resignation of the country's prime minister and the risk of further pro-autonomy referenda (namely, in Scotland). In the eyes of a communist party fully focused on retaining all its powers, Cameron made a serious mistake as the leader of a major country.

After all, China has no soft intentions toward the U.K. The two countries have had a complicated history. The Chinese still call the period starting in the mid-1800s— which included the British-led Opium Wars—the "century of humiliation." And it has only been 19 years since Hong Kong was returned to the motherland as a Chinese "special administrative region (SAR)." Not that the Cameron government has done very much to support its former territory: As the "golden decade" was unfolding, Hong Kong faced one of its most difficult times, with arrests of dissidents and the disappearance of some booksellers—including Lee Bo, who holds dual Sino-British citizenship and had published controversial books about Chinese leaders.

Now that British voters have spoken, chances of a backlash are running high. For a start, China is keen on keeping close involvement with the EU—its second-largest trading partner after the U.S., a source of technology transfers, and an ally in Beijing's "One Belt, One Road" projects in Europe and Asia, or in initiatives such as the AIIB and the country' Silk Road fund. In this respect China will almost certainly want to continue its close partnership with both EU institutions and individual countries, especially in Eastern and Central Europe where "One Belt, One Road" has been warmly welcomed. (Two countries recently visited by Xi, Poland and the Czech Republic, received substantial financial commitments from the Chinese president.)

London will, of course, continue to play a key role in finance as one of the world's top international trading platforms with Chinese treasury bonds issued in renminbi. Chinese visitors (including property buyers looking for fresh opportunities) will continue to flock to the city. But when it comes to being China's bridge to the EU, it is clear that Beijing will look for alternatives, particularly Germany, which is China's top economic partner in Europe. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently made her ninth visit to China and managed to address a long list of key issues, including trade, investment and reciprocity, as well as human rights, new laws regulating nongovernment organizations and territorial claims in the South China Sea. In a powerful speech to Nanjing University students in Beijing on June 12, she stressed that the trust of the citizens can only be achieved by the rule of law, "rather than rule by law." It has been many years since British leaders have used this language in China. Even though some British politicians are now calling for a reassessment of the country's China policy, it is unlikely that the U.K. will do anything but accommodate China in order to preserve trade and investment in the post-Brexit uncertainty.

For all its openness, the "new U.K." will become less attractive market-wise. After Brexit, China will also lose a proponent of free trade within the EU—that is bad news as the 28-nation block is pondering the decision to grant market economy status to China, in accordance with an agreement under the World Trade Organization. Market economy status affects the way anti-dumping duties are used. Job-wise, the European steel industry is vulnerable. Since the adoption by the European Parliament of a nonbinding resolution against granting market economy status to China on May 12, many European politicians fear that more Chinese economic involvement in their home countries would lead to more cheap goods competing with European-made products and fewer jobs at home—hence a less favorable context for China. The chances of an EU-China free-trade agreement are becoming more remote now as the EU is more focused on finalizing a comprehensive agreement on investment with China. European companies have been lobbying for such a pact.

Although it will almost certainly make the most of an autonomous U.K. after conducting its own assessment, China does not like uncertainty—especially in turbulent times both at home and abroad. It worries about challenges against ruling parties, as well as an anti-globalization attitude that could affect its own image as a beneficiary of globalization. As for Europe, both Germany and France have strong relations with China. With their backing, the European Commission has just published an ambitious new strategy on China. It looks like the U.K. will not be part of it.

As expected, on August 10, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from the Justice and Development Party (AKP) decisively won Turkey’s first directly-elected presidential election. He received just about 52 percent of the votes, falling somewhat short of the 55 percent that the polls were predicting.

At a time when Turkey’s neighborhood is in a state of chaos and the country is deeply polarized, what will his next steps as president be? Will he transform Turkey’s political system from a parliamentary to a presidential one? Will he be able to simultaneously run his party, control the prime minister and be the president of Turkey? Will he be able to overcome the authoritarian and abrasive politics of the last two years and replace it with politics reminiscent of the mid-2000s characterized by consensus building and liberal reforms? Or will it be a case of more of the same?

Traditionally, presidents were elected by members of the Turkish Parliament, and had limited powers. However, Erdoğan has been aspiring for a strong presidency since AKP won close to half of the votes at the national elections in June 2011. While serving as prime minister, Erdoğan attempted to write a new constitution, but resistance from opposition parties together with the May 2013 Gezi Park protests and the December 2013 corruption scandal prevented him from achieving his goal. Consequently, his fallback plan has been to emerge triumphant from the 2014 presidential elections,use the presidential powers in the current constitution to its full extent and aim to get AKP to emerge from the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2015 with enough seats, enabling him to see to the adoption of a new constitution. This new constitution would transform Turkey’s parliamentary system into a presidential one and give Erdoğan the possibility to run the country until 2023, the Republic’s centenary.

Erdoğan’s Opponents: İhsanoğlu and Demirtaş

Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and Selahattin Demirtaş were Erdoğan’s main opponents. Although neither constituted major challenges for Erdoğan, each represent something significant for Turkey. The left-leaning secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP) and right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) joined forces to support İhsanoğlu’s candidacy. İhsanoğlu, born and raised in Cairo, a prominent religious scholar, and a secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation from 2004 to 2010, was seen as the best candidate to attract former AKP members, and votes from the wider conservative electorate. Though he lacked political experience and visibility in Turkey, he managed to receive more than 38 percent of the votes. This performance falls short of the 44 percent that CHP and MHP garnered at the local elections in March this year, but would still be considered as a respectable performance.

Demirtaş, a prominent figure amongst Turkey’s Kurdish minority population and a keen partner in government efforts to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, ran for presidency on a secular and somewhat leftist agenda, sensitive to the interests of especially minorities and women. He received almost 10 percent of the votes, one point short of most poll predictions, but almost twice the amount that his party, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), received in March local elections. This suggests that Demirtaş received support not just from Kurdish, but also Turkish voters, a very significant development in terms of politics in Turkey.

How Has the Turkish Political System Worked in the Past?

With Erdoğan’s victory, Turkey is now at an important crossroad. Since World War II, Turkey has been a parliamentary system. The prime minister was the head of the executive branch of government and the president, elected by the parliament, held a ceremonial role. This changed after General Kenan Evren led the 1980 military coup d’état. In 1982, Evren introduced a new constitution that empowered the president with some executive powers intended to exert some control over civilian politicians. However, with the exception of Evren and his successor, Turgut Özal, subsequent presidents, Süleyman Demirel and Ahmet Necdet Sezer, refrained from using these constitutional powers in any conspicuous manner. So where did the notion of a directly-elected president come from?

The idea of a president elected directly by the electorate, rather than by the parliament, is an outcome of the military’s interference in politics in 2007. As the end of the staunchly secular and politically shy Sezer’s term approached, the military in a rather undemocratic manner, tried to prevent the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, from becoming president. The military and the judicial establishment deeply distrusted Gül’s, as well as the AKP’s, commitment to secularism. The government overcame the challenge by calling for an early snap election that AKP won handsomely, opening the way for Gül’s election as the new president. Furthermore, the electoral victory encouraged Erdoğan to hit back at the military by calling for a referendum on whether future presidents should be directly elected by the people or by the parliament. Erdoğan’s initiative received support from 58 percent of the electorate, thereby quite decisively demonstrating to his opponents the very extent of his popularity while allowing him to emphasize the “will of the people” as the basis of his understanding of democracy.

The Campaigns: Two Approaches to Turkey’s Future

The 2014 presidential campaign unfolded as a competition between two political approaches to the future of governance in Turkey. The first approach, represented by Erdoğan, calls for a narrow and majoritarian understanding of democracy based on the notion of the “will of the people” (milli irade) at the expense of constitutional checks and balances and separation of powers. In return for such an authoritarian form of governance, Erdoğan promises a prosperous Turkey that will grow to be the 10th largest economy by 2023 and become a major regional, if not global power. It is with this in mind that Erdoğan aspires for a powerful presidential system dominated by him alone. The second approach, especially pushed for by İhsanoğlu, advocates the maintenance of the existing parliamentary system and warns that a hybrid system where both the prime minister and the president is elected directly by the people, risks creating instability, tension and polarization within the country. He advocated for a president who would be above party politics and who would focus on protecting freedoms and the rule of law.

Does Erdoğan Have a Mandate?

What will Erdoğan do now? He is confident that he enjoys wide-spread popularity among the masses. However, it is difficult to conclude if the electorate went to the polls on Sunday with a referendum to change the political system in mind. If they did, then they did so with a rather slim margin. Nevertheless, it is likely that Erdoğan will interpret the results of the elections as an explicit approval of his political agenda, and will thus proceed to transform Turkey towards a presidential system. However, a number of challenges will be awaiting his project. The first and immediate challenge will emerge with respect to the next prime minister. As a prominent Turkish columnist put it, Erdoğan will want a prime minister who will always be “one step behind”. But will politics allow for this to occur? Can Erdoğan find a loyal and unquestioning prime minister? The current constitution requires the president to resign his/her political party affiliations. Once he takes up his position as president at the end of August, will he be able to continue to enjoy control over AKP from a distance? This is not a challenge to be taken lightly considering that there will be parliamentary elections in 2015 and the ranks of AKP will be quite restless both in terms of the selection of candidates, as well as the prospects of ensuring a victory at the polls. Lastly, with ISIS’s growing power, political instability in many neighboring countries, a troubled relationship with the European Union and the United States and continued bloodbath in Syria, keeping the Turkish economy on course may turn out to be Erdogan’s greatest challenge. The coming months are going to be critical in terms of whether Erdoğan will overcome these challenges and succeed in transforming Turkey’s political system. The outcome will illustrate if Erdoğan is actually bigger than Turkey or vice versa. However, whatever happens in the next few months, it will largely determine if in 2023, Turkey will celebrate its centenary as a liberal or illiberal democracy. In the meantime, the fact that Erdoğan plans to use a constitution that was drawn up under military tutelage to achieve his presidential ambitions is both ironic, but also not very promising in terms of Turkey’s democracy turning liberal.

Editor's Note: Ranu Nath, the Turkey Project intern in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings, contributed to this piece.

As much as the nostalgic might hate to admit it, a new year is coming up. And for climate change negotiators, 2015 is a big one: it’s the make-it-or-break it year for a serious, last-ditch effort at an international agreement to slow runaway climate change. 

A new year brings new, hopeful resolutions. Of course, just as ubiquitous are the pesky memories of past resolutions that one never quite accomplished.

Some resolutions fade, understandably. But failure is less forgivable when the repercussions include the increased exploration of fossil fuels at the expense of our warming world. To avoid the most destructive effects of climate change, we must keep two-thirds of existing fossil fuel reserves underground, instead of providing subsidies to dig them up.

One group not living up to its resolution: the G20 members —19 countries and the European Union that make up 85% of global GDP. At the 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh, the group agreed to “rationalize and phase out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption.” At the 2013 summit in St. Petersburg, they reaffirmed this resolution. Yet that same year, these countries funneled $88 billion into exploring new reserves of oil, gas, and coal.

Another resolution abandoned.

This year’s G20 summit will convene in Brisbane, Australia (November 15^th - 16^th) — a perfect opportunity to commiserate about the backsliding on the agreement and to develop a new approach that includes some means of holding each other accountable. So how can the G20 follow through on its laudable and necessary pledge?

1. Get help from the experts.

A new report by the Overseas Development Institute and Oil Change International criticizes the G20 for “marry[ing] bad economics with potentially disastrous consequences for climate change.” It points out that every dollar used to subsidize renewables generates twice as much investment as the dollar that subsidizes fossil fuels.

And the G20 can try harder to heed the doctor’s orders. This report outlines specific recommendations, including revamping tax codes to support low carbon development instead.

2. Set a timeline and stick to it.

National timelines for fossil fuel subsidy phase out would be different depending on the governmental structures and budgeting processes of individual countries. Also, countries can utilize the timeline of the incoming international climate treaty, by including a subsidy phase out as part of a mitigation plan to be measured and reported.

3. It’s easier with friends.

The G20 got it right that no one country should have to go it alone. Now it is time to strengthen its methodology for peer review of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, and agree upon a transparent and consistent system for tracking and reporting.

That said, it can also be easier to cheat with friends. The new report tracks where investments from G20 state-owned energy companies are directed. As it turns out, G20 countries continue to fund each other’s fossil fuel exploration. Instead of cheating together on their own resolution, G20 members should leverage these relationships to advance investments in clean energy.  

4. Hold each other accountable.

The G20 is not the only group that has committed to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. The issue has received support from advocacy groups, religious leaders, and business constituencies alike. The public will be able to better hold leaders accountable if the G20 declares its commitment and progress loud and proud.

Moreover, G20 members and advocacy organizations can make the facts very clear: fossil fuel subsidies do not support the world’s poor, and the public ends up paying for the externalities they cause in pollution and public health. This accountability to addressing concerns of the people can help the G20 stand up to the fossil fuel industry.

5. If at first you don’t succeed…

True, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies is no piece of cake. There is no G20 standard definition of “inefficient subsidies” or timeline for the phase out. It also hasn’t helped that countries report their own data. They can even opt out of this unenforced commitment altogether. Yet the pledge is there, as is the urgency of the issue. New Year’s resolutions take more than just commitments — they take work. This week’s G20 Leaders Summit is a wonderful place to commit to phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. Again.

Editor’s Note: In the report “Think Tank 20: Growth, Convergence and Income Distribution: The Road from the Brisbane G-20 Summit” experts from Brookings and around the world address interrelated debates about growth, convergence and income distribution, three key elements that are likely to shape policy debates beyond the ninth G-20 summit that was held on November 15-16 in Brisbane, Australia. The content of this blog is based on the chapter on Latin America. Read the full brief on Latin America's growth trends here.

A figure says a thousand words. And, looking at Figure 1, which shows the population-weighted average income per capita in emerging economies relative to the U.S., there could be no doubt in anybody’s mind that since the late 1990s something rather extraordinary happened—a phenomenon with no antecedents in the post-WWII period—that propelled emerging economies into an exponential process of convergence.

Needless to say, this phenomenon had enormous consequences for the welfare of millions of citizens in emerging economies. It lifted more than 500 million people out from poverty and extreme poverty, and gave rise to the so-called emerging middle class that grew at a rate of 150 million per year.

So, it seems that something rather extraordinary happened in emerging economies. Or did it? Let’s look again. When China and India are removed from the emerging markets sample, Figure 1 becomes Figure 2a.

In Figure 2a, one can still discern a period of convergence starting in the late 1990s. But convergence here was not nearly as strong—relative income is still far below its previous heights—and it occurred after a period of divergence that started in the mid-1970s after the first oil shock, in the early 1980s with the debt crisis, and in the late 1980s with post-Berlin Wall meltdown in Eastern European economies.

This pattern is actually characteristic of every emerging region including Latin America (see Figure 2b). Only Asia differs markedly from this pattern—with China and India displaying exponential convergence since the late 1990s, while the rest of emerging Asia experienced a sustained but much slower convergence since the mid-1960s. 

From a Latin American perspective, the relevant question we need to ask is whether the recent bout of convergence that started in 2004 after a quarter of a century of relative income decline is a break with the past or just a short-lived phenomenon?

In order to address this question from a Latin American perspective, we study the arithmetic of convergence (i.e., whether mechanical projections are consistent with the convergence hypothesis) and the economics of convergence (i.e., whether income convergence was associated with a comparable convergence in the drivers of growth).

According to our definition of convergence,[1] since 1950, growth-convergence-development miracles represent a tiny fraction of emerging countries. Only five countries managed to achieve this: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. In other words, convergence towards income per capita levels of rich countries is an extremely rare event.

But where does Latin America stand? Based on growth projections for the period 2014-2018, not a single Latin American country will converge to two-thirds of U.S. income per capita in two generations. Unfortunately, the arithmetic does not seem to be on the side of the region.

What about the economics? To answer this question, we analyze whether Latin America’s process of income convergence in the last decade was also associated with a similar convergence in the key drivers of growth: trade integration, physical and technological infrastructure, human capital, innovation, and the quality of public services. Figure 3 illustrates the results.

In contrast to relative income, during the last decade, LAC-7 [2] countries failed to converge towards advanced country levels in every growth driver. The overall index of growth drivers—the simple average of the five sub-indexes—remained unchanged in the last decade relative to the equivalent index for advanced economies. By and large, the latter holds true for every LAC-7 country with exceptions like Colombia (the only country that improved in every single growth driver in the last decade) and Chile (the country in the region where the levels of growth drivers are closer to those of advanced economies). 

Latin America had a decade of uninterrupted high growth rates—with the sole exception of 2009 in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis—that put an end to a quarter of a century of relative decline in income per capita levels vis-à-vis advanced economies. However, high growth and income convergence were largely the result of an unusually favorable external environment, rather than the result of convergence to advanced-country levels in the key drivers of growth. Fundamentally, the last was a decade of “development-less growth” in Latin America.

With the extremely favorable external conditions already behind us, the region is expected to grow at mediocre rates of around 2 percent in per capita terms for the foreseeable future. With this level of growth, the dream of convergence and development is unlikely to be realized any time soon.

To avoid such a fate the region must make a renewed effort of economic transformation. Although the challenges ahead appear to be huge, there is plenty of room for optimism. First, Latin America has built a sound platform to launch a process of development. Democracy has by-and-large consolidated across the region, and an entire generation has now grown up to see an election as the only legitimate way to select national leaders. Moreover, it is for the most part a relatively stable region with no armed conflicts and few insurgency movements threatening the authority of the state. Second, a sizeable group of major countries in Latin America have a long track record of sound macroeconomic performance by now. Third, the region could be just steps away from major economic integration. Most Latin American countries in the Pacific Coast have bilateral free trade agreements with their North American neighbors (11 countries with the U.S. and seven countries with Canada). Were these countries to harmonize current bilateral trade agreements among themselves—in the way Pacific Alliance members have been doing—a huge economic space would be born: a Trans-American Partnership that would comprise 620 million consumers, and have a combined GDP of more than $22 trillion (larger than the EU’s, and more than double that of China). Were such a partnership on the Pacific side of the Americas to gain traction, it could eventually be extended to Atlantic partners, in particular Brazil and other Mercosur countries.

In the last quarter of a century democracy, sound macroeconomic management and an outward-looking development strategy made substantial strides in the region. If these conquests are consolidated and the same kind of progress is achieved in key development drivers in the next 25 years, many countries in the region could be on the road to convergence.

[1] We define convergence as a process whereby a country’s income per capita starts at or below one-third of U.S. income per capita at any point in time since 1950, and rises to or above two-thirds of U.S. income per capita.

[2] LAC-7 is the simple average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, which account for 93 percent of Latin America’s GDP.

"Out of ammo?" The Economist recently asked of monetary policymakers. Stephen Roach has called the move by major central banks – including the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Sweden – to negative real (and, in some cases, even nominal) interest rates a “futile” effort that merely sets “the stage for the next crisis.” And, at the February G-20 finance ministers meeting, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney reportedly called these policies “ultimately a zero-sum game.” Have the major advanced economies’ central banks – which have borne the burden of sustaining anemic post-2008 recoveries – really run out of options?

It certainly seems so. Central-bank balance sheets have swelled, and policy rates have reached their “near zero” lower bounds. There is plenty of cheap water, it seems, but the horse refuses to drink. With no signs of inflation, and growth still tepid and fragile, many anticipate chronic slow growth, with some even fearing another global recession.

But policymakers have one more option: a shift to “purer” fiscal policy, in which they directly finance government spending by printing money – a so-called “helicopter drop.” The new money would bypass the financial and corporate sectors and go straight to the thirstiest horses: middle- and lower-income consumers. The money could go to them directly, and through investment in job-creating, productivity-increasing infrastructure. By placing purchasing power in the hands of those who need it most, direct monetary financing of public spending would also help to improve inclusiveness in economies where inequality is rising fast.

Helicopter drops are currently proposed by both leftist and centrist economists. In a sense, even some “conservatives” – who support more public infrastructure spending, but also want tax cuts and oppose more borrowing – de facto support helicopter drops.

Recently, more radical proposals have surfaced, reflecting a sense of urgency and widespread disappointment with the impact of current monetary policy. Beyond advocating higher minimum wages, some are calling for “reverse income policies,” with governments imposing across-the-board wage increases on private employers – a move that would drive up prices and defeat deflationary expectations. The fact that economists whose views typically fall nowhere near those of the far left are even thinking about such interventionism shows just how extreme circumstances have become.

I favor all of these proposals, in some form. The details of their implementation would obviously have to vary, depending on each economy’s circumstances. Germany, for example, is in a strong position to implement a reverse income policy, given its huge current-account surplus, though there would undoubtedly be major political barriers. More spending on education, skills upgrading, and infrastructure, however, is a no-brainer almost everywhere, and is politically more feasible.

But there is another dimension of the challenge that has so far not been emphasized nearly enough, despite the warnings of Carney, Roach, and others. Zero or negative real interest rates, when they become quasi-permanent, undermine the efficient allocation of capital and set the stage for bubbles, busts, and crises. They also contribute to further income concentration at the top by hurting small savers, while creating opportunities for large financial players to benefit from access to savings at negative real cost. As unorthodox as it may sound, it is likely that the world economy would benefit from somewhat higher interest rates.

Raising interest rates cannot, however, be a stand-alone policy. Instead, small policy-rate increases must be incorporated into a broader fiscal and distributional strategy, implemented alongside more public spending on infrastructure and skills upgrading, as well as some gentle forms of income policies, employing, for example, “moral suasion.”

Even with such an approach, however, major central banks would have to coordinate their policies. If a single major central bank attempted to introduce higher interest rates, its economy would immediately be “punished” through currency appreciation, declining competitiveness, and falling exports, all of which would undermine aggregate demand and employment.

If the major central banks decided to increase their policy rates simultaneously, these spillover effects would cancel one another out. A coordinated move, perhaps raising rates in two modest 25 or 30 basis-point increments, would be neutral in terms of exchange rates and short-term competitiveness, even as it moved real interest rates back into positive territory. If successful, this effort could eventually be followed by further small increases, creating space for more traditional monetary-policy “ammunition” to be deployed in the future.

Success also hinges on the simultaneous pursuit of fiscal expansion worldwide, with each country’s efforts calibrated according to its fiscal space and current-account position. The expansion should finance a global program of investment in physical and human infrastructure, focusing on the two key challenges of our time: cleaner energy and skills for the digital age.

A coordinated and well-timed policy package could boost global growth, improve capital allocation, support a more equitable income distribution, and reduce the danger of speculative bubbles. The various meetings in the run-up to the G-20 summit in China, including the spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, would be ideal forums for designing such a package, and advancing its implementation.

Economic orthodoxy and independent actions have clearly failed. It is time for policymakers to recognize that innovative international policy cooperation is not a luxury; sometimes – like today – it is a necessity.