Policy Brief #179

During an "exit interview" with the Wall Street Journal, departing National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers argued that history would judge the United States based on how well we adjust to China’s emergence as a great power, economically and politically. In the face of China’s progress, America’s manufacturing sector faces major challenges in becoming and remaining competitive and our choice of national economic policies will affect how well we meet those challenges. It is essential that the U.S. trade deficit not balloon as the economy recovers. There is scope to expand our exports in services and agriculture, but improving the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing is vital.

The U.S. Trade Deficit: Background

Components of the Trade Deficit. The U.S. trade deficit in goods and services was just under $700 billion in 2008—4.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the deficit in goods trade was nearly $835 billion, which was partially offset by a $136 billion surplus in services trade. The latter surplus has grown consistently over a range of service types and has important potential to expand. Going forward, we can assume this surplus will remain around one percent of GDP. But services trade surpluses alone cannot solve the U.S. trade deficit problem, because of persistent large deficits in goods trade.

Very important are deficits in the energy sector. In 2008, petroleum products accounted for $386 billion of the total trade deficit (2.7 percent of GDP). reducing energy imports (and consumption) is a significant challenge for the U.S. economy, and with global energy demand continuing to rise and supply constrained, oil prices are more likely to rise than fall. The U.S. bill for imported oil is unlikely to fall below 2.7 percent of GDP for years to come.

In future, for overall U.S. trade in goods and services to be balanced, non-energy products (that is, manufactured and agricultural products) would have to achieve a surplus of around 1.7 percent of GDP. Added to the one percent services surplus, the two would balance out the almost unavoidable petroleum deficit.

Obviously, elements in this rough calculation could shift, for better or worse, but if the U.S. economy is to achieve a more balanced growth path, the competitive position of U.S. manufacturing must improve sharply.

Growth of the U.S. Trade Deficit. In 1999, the U.S. economy was experiencing strong growth and low inflation, but the trade deficit in manufactured and agricultural products was high—$262.5 billion—and concentrated in four broad industry categories. The largest deficit was in plastic, wood and paper products ($62 billion). Transportation equipment—from autos to aerospace—was close behind ($61 billion), followed by textiles and apparel ($52 billion) and computers and electronics ($44 billion). Only two categories had trade surpluses: chemicals at more than $9 billion and agriculture at $4 billion.

By 2008, the trade deficit had risen to $400 billion, an increase of $138 billion or nearly 52 percent in nominal terms. The deficit in computers and electronics accounted for nearly half of the overall increase in the trade deficit (48 percent, a $66 billion increase). Two other industries had large deficit increases: plastic, wood and paper products; and textiles and apparel. By contrast, agricultural products contributed an additional $27 billion to a small 1999 surplus. And transportation equipment reduced its trade deficit by nearly $12 billion. Chart 1 illustrates how the increase in the U.S. goods trade deficit (excluding oil) was distributed by segment between 1999 and 2008.

Rising Imports from China

Simply put, the United States runs chronic trade deficits and China runs trade surpluses because we spend more than we produce, and they do the opposite. The U.S. trade deficit with China in manufactured and agricultural products was already large in 1999—$68.6 billion or 26 percent of the nation’s total trade deficit. By 2008, it had increased to nearly $268 billion. The story of the increasing U.S. trade deficit from 1999-2008—apart from oil—is the explosion in the deficit with China.

Computers and electronic products account for much of the increase in U.S. imports from China. In 2008, China exported $108 billion in these products to the United States, up from less than $19 billion in 1999. Beyond this sector, Chinese exports to the United States have grown strongly pretty much across the board. Although the United States exports agricultural products to China, there is a large return flow of processed and labor-intensive food products. And, while Chinese textile and apparel imports have risen, U.S. demand for Chinese goods in this category has grown only modestly as other emerging economies have become major clothing exporters.

The Nature of Chinese Exports. On a visit to China early in 2010, I heard a memorable speech declaring that the United States is exploiting China. The Chinese perception is based on where profits land. For example, a 2009 survey by Greg Linden, Kenneth Kraemer and Jason Dedrick of the University of California suggests that Apple, Inc. sells iPhones or iPods for several hundred dollars, most of them “made in China,” but the Chinese producer and Chinese workers receive just under four dollars apiece. The retail price of the 2005 video iPod was $299, the wholesale price $224 and the factory price $144.56. The largest part of the factory price ($101.40) came from Japanese components, with U.S. companies other than Apple supplying $14.14 in components and many different suppliers providing other small components. The final assembly and checking is done in China for $3.86, while Apple’s estimated gross margin is $80 per unit sold at wholesale, plus a portion of the retail margin through its Apple online and retail stores.

These same researchers deconstructed the value of a 2005 Hewlett-Packard Notebook PC, which sold at retail for $1,399 and had a factory cost of $856.33. Intel and Microsoft received a total of $305.43 for each computer sold, while the assembly and checking done in China netted $23.76— only 1.7 percent of the retail price. China’s massive export boom in computers and electronics derives from the fact that it is a very good place to assemble electronic products that clearly benefit U.S. companies’ profits. However, China’s policymakers want change; they are determined to attempt to obtain more of the value added of the goods their citizens assemble.

The place of China as a supplier to the United States is further illuminated in the forthcoming book Rising Tide: Is Growth in Emerging Economies Good for the United States? by Lawrence Edwards and Robert Lawrence, who have taken a detailed look at the “unit values” of traded products, particularly U.S. exports and imports. Detailed trade data identify specific classes of products and provide total dollar value and number of physical items sold in each class. For example, the data report the value of electric motors exported by China to the United States, along with the number of motors, which allows a calculation of the price per motor. If a country is selling motors for electric shavers or toys, the unit value will be small; if the motors are for large capital goods, the unit value will be high.

Edwards and Lawrence find a striking result for China, one that also applies to other emerging economies. It turns out that unit values in the same product categories are hugely different. China sells low unit value products to the United States, and the United States sells high unit value products around the world. These price differentials are so great, in fact, they suggest the United States and China are not really competing. They are making completely different things. Perhaps even more surprising, over the past several years, there appears to be no tendency for the unit values to converge. This contradicts the hypothesis that China is successfully moving up the technology or “value ladder.” Instead, U.S. competitors are Europe and Japan.

Although the volume of Chinese exports to the United States has soared, in high-tech, as we saw, it is assembling components originating elsewhere and, in other industries, it is making primarily low value products, such as toys and children’s clothing— market niches where the U.S. would not be expected to be competitive.

China and Multinational Companies

When China emerged from the Cultural Revolution and started on a path to become a productive and market-oriented economy, it faced massive educational, technological and business hurdles. Competent scientists, engineers and managers had been exiled and “re-educated.” Heroic efforts were needed to catch up to developed nations’ economies. Asian precursors such as Japan and Korea had faced their own catch-up challenges, taking advantage of the global market in capital goods to help them, and China followed their lead. Unlike the others, China encouraged direct foreign investments and required partnerships with domestic businesses. These relationships provided not only financing, but also the business and technology skills of global corporations and sped development of Chinese companies.

Germany provides a fascinating case study of the benefits and perils of a strong relationship with China. Spiegel Online notes that the most important driving force behind the current German economic upswing is its exports of sophisticated capital goods to China. German companies find, however, that the Chinese demand access to their industrial know-how. German businesses are reluctant to offend their Chinese customers, but deeply concerned about the loss of intellectual property. Beijing does not want merely to catch up to German companies—its goal is to surpass them. It has already done so in the manufacture of solar panels, by subsidizing research into solar technology. China exports perhaps 70 percent of its output of solar panels, about half of which goes to Germany, where demand is heavily subsidized by the German government. In electricity generation, Beijing invited Western companies to build power plants jointly with domestic Chinese partners. Now the Chinese are upgrading the plants with their own technology, based on what they learned through the German company Siemens and the French company Alstom.

A 2010 study by James McGregor of APCO sharply criticizing Chinese industrial and technology policies provides additional examples of China’s determination to leverage Western technology. Notably, China is expected to spend $730 billion on its rail network by 2020, with about half being used to expand high-speed passenger lines. This level of capital spending is irresistible for European producers. The China National Railway Corporation (CNR) invited Siemens to bid on a $919 million contract to build 60 passenger trains for service between Beijing and Tianjin. Siemens built the first three, but the remaining 57 were built in China by CNR, using 1,000 Chinese technicians Siemens had trained. In March 2009, Siemens announced an agreement for it to build 100 additional high-speed trains to serve Beijing-Shanghai, but China denied such an agreement ever existed. Siemens ultimately received a contract for $1 billion in components, but $5.7 billion went to CNR, which built the trains.

In the long run, China favors its own producers. It brings in foreign companies at the launching of an industry, then uses government procurement to advance the market share of Chinese companies and, eventually, to shut out competition. This strategy has allowed it to build on foreign companies’ expertise, develop domestic champions and raise the technological level of its economy and exports. Because of its large and rapidly growing market, China can pressure foreign companies to partner with Chinese companies, allowing their employees to learn managerial and technical skills. Over time, China has somewhat loosened formal requirements for foreign companies to accept partners, but the strategy of technology and skills transfer remains very much in force.

Developing countries naturally learn from best practices world-wide; indeed the 19th century economic history of the United States includes considerable technology transfer from Britain and the rest of Europe. Nevertheless, companies that have invested heavily to develop new technologies and efficient processes cannot afford to simply allow China to free-ride on their efforts. Yet many Chinese leaders make it clear they are on a mission to acquire the best technology, using their size and growth as a way to obtain it.

A December 23, 2010 New York Times editorial noted this strategy, saying, “[I]ntellectual property misappropriation cannot be a government policy goal, especially in a country the size of China, which can flood world markets with ill-begotten high tech products.” The editorial acknowledged some U.S. progress at the World Trade Organization, but urged our government to be “more vigilant and aggressive” against intellectual property losses.

Helping U.S. Manufacturers Adjust to China

1. Today’s trade deficit is not a technology problem. The U.S. economy simply must become a more attractive place to develop and manufacture new products. The best ways to do this are to balance the budget and lower the marginal tax rate on corporations. Our trade problem is that U.S. companies develop innovative products but choose not to manufacture much of their value here. One chronic reason is that the value of a dollar has been too high, making U.S. production too expensive. If the U.S. saved more and balanced the federal budget, that problem would take care of itself. This would require global exchange rate adjustments including an increase in the real exchange rate of the renminbi, although economic forces will force this to happen without the need for U.S. political action. In addition, the U.S. corporate tax rate is higher than that of other countries, encouraging overseas investments. Both of the recently announced deficit reduction plans provide blueprints for balancing the budget and lowering corporate tax rates.
    
2. Technology may become a problem in the future. The United States should work with the European Union, Japan and multinational companies to develop a uniform code of conduct to protect technology and patents when emerging market companies work with multinationals. Government sanctions that would draw the United States into direct conflict with China are inadvisable, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has limited effectiveness. Thus, multinational corporations should take the lead and refuse to work with foreign entities that demand access to and misuse proprietary technology. They should be fully informed of past unacceptable practices and the policies and behavior they should expect before entering new markets. If companies nevertheless reveal their technology as the price of market access, that is their choice.
    
3. Policymakers must work with the private sector to identify and reduce barriers to U.S. exports. The expansion of U.S. exports will be in industries such as advanced manufacturing, electronics, aerospace and medical devices. These industries will require new technologies, capital, R&D and skilled labor. There is a strong case for support of technology development through direct funding, improved tax treatment of R&D, increased access to capital and a reduced marginal corporate tax rate. Skill shortages appear to be another important barrier to expansion. Improving the U.S. education and training system in science, math, engineering and technology is a long-term national priority. Furthermore, as recommended by Brookings vice president Darrell West, easing restrictions on H-1B visas to prioritize high-value immigrants with technology expertise is an obvious policy fix with immediate benefits.
    
4. The policy debate must focus on the right issue, and not be drawn down blind alleys. Indicators that the U.S. economy is falling behind must be evaluated carefully. For example, A 2007 National Academy of Sciences study, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, reviewed a range of such indicators. It noted that China is building 50 chemical plants, whereas the United States is building one; and computer chip fabrication plants are being built in China (and elsewhere in Asia), but not in the United States. However, the lack of U.S. investment in these sectors may not be a reason for concern. It can be difficult to operate either bulk petrochemical or chip fabrication plants profitably over the long run, and they create few jobs.
    
5. Companies should focus on innovation and cost reduction and avoid dragging policymakers and themselves along time-wasting tangents. Endless discussions took place during the Clinton administration about how Fuji was competing unfairly with Kodak, whereas the real challenge to Kodak was not Fuji but digital technology. Currently, the World Trade Organization is assessing appeals from the European Union (EU) and the United States regarding its decision that the EU unfairly subsidized Airbus to the detriment of Boeing. Whatever the merits of the arguments in the parties’ six years of legal wrangling over this issue, Boeing’s future success may depend more on how well it solves problems with the new 787, now several years behind schedule, and whether it can make its factories leaner and more productive.

Conclusion

Expanding manufactured exports is a key to our nation’s global competitiveness and reduced trade deficits. Recovery in manufacturing will help employment and the revival of local economies. Competition from emerging economies, especially China, means that innovation in products and processes will be essential to maintaining U.S. leadership. While emerging economies are important markets for U.S. manufacturers, these exchanges should not become opportunities to misappropriate U.S. companies’ intellectual property. U.S. policymakers must create a climate that fosters growth in manufacturing while protecting U.S. innovation and technology.

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Situated in the heartland, Missouri reflects the full range of American reality.

The state is highly urban yet deeply rural. It contains two bustling metropolises, numerous fastgrowing suburbs, and dozens of typically American small towns. Elsewhere lie tranquil swaths of open country where farmers still rise before dawn and the view consists mainly of rich cropland, trees, and sky.

Missouri sums up the best of the nation, in short.

And yet, Missouri also mirrors the country’s experience in more problematic ways.

The spread of the national economic downturn to Missouri, most immediately, has depressed tax collections and increased the demand for social services, resulting in a troublesome state and local fiscal moment. This has highlighted pocketbook concerns and underscored that the state must make the most of limited resources.

At the same time, Missourians, like many Americans, have many opinions about how their local communities are changing. They are divided—and sometimes ambivalent—in their views of whether their towns and neighborhoods are developing in ways that maintain the quality of life and character they cherish.

All of which explains the double focus of the following report by the Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy. Intended to speak to the simultaneous concern of Missourians for fiscal efficiency and communities of quality, "Growth in the Heartland: Challenges and Opportunities for Missouri" brings together for the first time a large body of new information about both the nature and costs of development patterns in the Show-Me State.

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Event Information

As part of an ongoing cooperative agreement with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Engelberg Center for Health Care Reform at Brookings has formed the Brookings Council on Antibacterial Drug Development (BCADD) to identify steps to address the major technical, regulatory, and financial barriers impeding antibacterial drug development. At the first meeting of the BCADD, stakeholders emphasized the importance of concentrating on discrete policy and program areas to revitalize the antibacterial drug development enterprise.

BCADD convened a diverse group of stakeholders, including FDA officials, industry and biotech representatives, payers, providers, clinicians, and academic researchers Wednesday, February 27, 2013, to discuss two of the economic challenges facing antibacterial drug development:

• Better understanding the potential role of incentives in drug discovery and development; and
• Identifying potential reimbursement models that can support both stewardship and expanded investment for antibacterial drug products.

Event Materials

• meeting summary 20130925 FINAL
• Discussion Guide
• Participant List
• Presentation

Event Information

The Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) program has become an important tool of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in ensuring that the benefits of a given medical product outweigh the associated risks, and has enabled FDA to approve a number of products that might not otherwise have been made available for patient use. Since the implementation of the REMS program, however, concerns have been raised regarding its impact on patient access to products and the associated burden on providers and health care systems. In an effort to address these concerns—and as part of its commitments under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act reauthorization of 2012—FDA has undertaken efforts to standardize and improve the effectiveness of REMS, and to better integrate REMS programs into the health system. As part of this broader initiative, the Agency is currently assessing the feasibility of integrating accredited continuing education (CE) programs and activities into REMS programs that have been developed for a single drug.

Under a cooperative agreement with the FDA, the Center for Health Policy held an expert workshop on May 18, titled “Incorporating Continuing Education into Single-Drug REMS: Exploring the Challenges and Opportunities”. This workshop provided an opportunity for pharmaceutical manufacturers, regulators, CE providers, accreditors, and other stakeholders to explore the ways that CE can be a valuable addition to the REMS toolkit, discuss potential barriers to the development and implementation of REMS-related CE for single products, and identify strategies for addressing those barriers.

Event Materials

• Bio sheet
• REMS CE Meeting Agenda
• REMS_CE_Meeting_Discussion_Guide_Final
• REMS CE Meeting Summary

The Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) program has become an important tool of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in ensuring that the benefits of a given medical product outweigh the associated risks, and has enabled FDA to approve a number of products that might not otherwise have been made available for patient use. Since the implementation of the REMS program, however, concerns have been raised regarding its impact on patient access to products and the associated burden on providers and health care systems. In an effort to address these concerns—and as part of its commitments under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act reauthorization of 2012—FDA has undertaken efforts to standardize and improve the effectiveness of REMS, and to better integrate REMS programs into the health system. As part of this broader initiative, the Agency is currently assessing the feasibility of integrating accredited continuing education (CE) programs and activities into REMS programs that have been developed for a single drug.

Under a cooperative agreement with the FDA, the Center for Health Policy held an expert workshop on May 18 titled, “Incorporating Continuing Education into Single-Drug REMS: Exploring the Challenges and Opportunities”. This workshop provided an opportunity for pharmaceutical manufacturers, regulators, CE providers, accreditors, and other stakeholders to explore the ways that CE can be a valuable addition to the REMS toolkit, discuss potential barriers to the development and implementation of REMS-related CE for single products, and identify strategies for addressing those barriers.

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It has been hailed as the most significant discovery in biology since polymerase chain reaction allowed for the mass replication of DNA samples. CRISPR-Cas9 is an inexpensive and easy-to-use gene-editing method that promises applications ranging from medicine to industrial agriculture to biofuels. Currently, applications to treat leukemia, HIV, and cancer are under experimental development.¹ However, new technical solutions tend to be fraught with old problems, and in this case, ethical and legal questions loom large over the future.

Disagreements on ethics

The uptake of this method has been so fast that many scientists have started to worry about inadequate regulation of research and its unanticipated consequences.² Consider, for instance, the disagreement on research on human germ cells (eggs, sperm, or embryos) where an edited gene is passed onto offspring. Since the emergence of bioengineering applications in the 1970s, the scientific community has eschewed experiments to alter human germline and some governments have even banned them.³ The regulation regimes are expectedly not uniform: for instance, China bans the implantation of genetically modified embryos in women but not the research with embryos.

Last year, a group of Chinese researchers conducted gene-editing experiments on non-viable human zygotes (fertilized eggs) using CRISPR.⁴ News that these experiments were underway prompted a group of leading U.S. geneticists to meet in March 2015 in Napa, California, to begin a serious consideration of ethical and legal dimensions of CRISPR and called for a moratorium on research editing genes in human germline.⁵ Disregarding that call, the Chinese researchers published their results later in the year largely reporting a failure to precisely edit targeted genes without accidentally editing non-targets. CRISPR is not yet sufficiently precise.

CRISPR reignited an old debate on human germline research that is one of the central motivations (but surely not the only one) for an international summit on gene editing hosted by the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the U.K.'s Royal Society in December 2015. About 500 scientists as well as experts in the legal and ethical aspects of bioengineering attended.⁶ Rather than consensus, the meeting highlighted the significant contrasts among participants about the ethics of inquiry, and more generally, about the governance of science. Illustrative of these contrasts are the views of prominent geneticists Francis Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health, and George Church, professor of genetics at Harvard. Collins argues that the “balance of the debate leans overwhelmingly against human germline engineering.” In turn, Church, while a signatory of the moratorium called by the Napa group, has nevertheless suggested reasons why CRISPR is shifting the balance in favor of lifting the ban on human germline experiments.⁷

The desire to speed up discovery of cures for heritable diseases is laudable. But tinkering with human germline is truly a human concern and cannot be presumed to be the exclusive jurisdictions of scientists, clinicians, or patients. All members of society have a stake in the evolution of CRISPR and must be part of the conversation about what kind of research should be permitted, what should be discouraged, and what disallowed. To relegate lay citizens to react to CRISPR applications—i.e. to vote with their wallets once applications hit the market—is to reduce their citizenship to consumer rights, and public participation to purchasing power.⁸ Yet, neither the NAS summit nor the earlier Napa meeting sought to solicit the perspectives of citizens, groups, and associations other than those already tuned in the CRISPR debates.⁹

The scientific community has a bond to the larger society in which it operates that in its most basic form is the bond of the scientist to her national community, is the notion that the scientist is a citizen of society before she is a denizen of science. This bond entails liberties and responsibilities that transcend the ethos and telos of science and, consequently, subordinates science to the social compact. It is worth recalling this old lesson from the history of science as we continue the public debate on gene editing. Scientists are free to hold specific moral views and prescriptions about the proper conduct of research and the ethical limits of that conduct, but they are not free to exclude the rest of society from weighing in on the debate with their own values and moral imaginations about what should be permitted and what should be banned in research. The governance of CRISPR is a question of collective choice that must be answered by means of democratic deliberation and, when irreconcilable differences arise, by the due process of democratic institutions.

Patent disputes

More heated than the ethical debate is the legal battle for key CRISPR patents that has embroiled prominent scientists involved in perfecting this method. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office initiated a formal contestation process, called interference, in March 2016 to adjudicate the dispute. The process is likely to take years and appeals are expected to extend further in time. Challenges are also expected to patents filed internationally, including those filed with the European Patent Office.

To put this dispute in perspective, it is instructive to consider the history of CRISPR authored by one of the celebrities in gene science, Eric Lander.¹⁰ This article ignited a controversy because it understated the role of one of the parties to the patent dispute (Jennifer Doudna and Emmanuelle Charpentier), while casting the other party as truly culminating the development of this technology (Feng Zhang, who is affiliated to Lander’s Broad Institute). Some gene scientists accused Lander of tendentious inaccuracies and of trying to spin a story in a manner that favors the legal argument (and economic interest) of Zhang.

Ironically, the contentious article could be read as an argument against any particular claim to the CRISPR patents as it implicitly questions the fairness of granting exclusive rights to an invention. Lander tells the genesis of CRISPR that extends through a period of two decades and over various countries, where the protagonists are the many researchers who contributed to the cumulative knowledge in the ongoing development of the method. The very title of Lander’s piece, “The Heroes of CRISPR” highlights that the technology has not one but a plurality of authors.

A patent is a legal instrument that recognizes certain rights of the patent holder (individual, group, or organization) and at the same time denies those rights to everyone else, including those other contributors to the invention. Patent rights are thus arbitrary under the candle of history. I am not suggesting that the bureaucratic rules to grant a patent or to determine its validity are arbitrary; they have logical rationales anchored in practice and precedent. I am suggesting that in principle any exclusive assignation of rights that does not include the entire community responsible for the invention is arbitrary and thus unfair. The history of CRISPR highlights this old lesson from the history of technology: an invention does not belong to its patent holder, except in a court of law.

Some scientists may be willing to accept with resignation the unfair distribution of recognition granted by patents (or prizes like the Nobel) and find consolation in the fact that their contribution to science has real effects on people’s lives as it materializes in things like new therapies and drugs. Yet patents are also instrumental in distributing those real effects quite unevenly. Patents create monopolies that, selling their innovation at high prices, benefit only those who can afford them. The regular refrain to this charge is that without the promise of high profits, there would be no investments in innovation and no advances in life-saving medicine. What’s more, the biotech industry reminds us that start-ups will secure capital injections only if they have exclusive rights to the technologies they are developing. Yet, Editas Medicine, a biotech start-up that seeks to exploit commercial applications of CRISPR (Zhang is a stakeholder), was able to raise $94 million in its February 2016 initial public offering. That some of Editas’ key patents are disputed and were entering interference at USPTO was patently not a deterrent for those investors.

Towards a CRISPR democratic debate

Neither the governance of gene-editing research nor the management of CRISPR patents should be the exclusive responsibility of scientists. Yet, they do enjoy an advantage in public deliberations on gene editing that is derived from their technical competence and from the authority ascribed to them by society. They can use this advantage to close the public debate and monopolize its terms, or they could turn it into stewardship of a truly democratic debate about CRISPR.

The latter choice can benefit from three steps. A first step would be openness: a public willingness to consider and internalize public values that are not easily reconciled with research values. A second step would be self-restraint: publicly affirming a self-imposed ban on research with human germline and discouraging research practices that are contrary to received norms of prudence. A third useful step would be a public service orientation in the use of patents: scientists should pressure their universities, who hold title to their inventions, to preserve some degree of influence over research commercialization so that the dissemination and access to innovations is consonant with the noble aspirations of science and the public service mission of the university. Openness, self-restraint, and an orientation to service from scientists will go a long way to make of CRISPR a true servant of society and an instrument of democracy.

Other reading: See media coverage compiled by the National Academies of Sciences.

¹Nature: an authoritative and accessible primer. A more technical description of applications in Hsu, P. D. et al. 2014. Cell, 157(6): 1262–1278.

³More about ethical concerns on gene editing here: http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=8711

⁴Liang, P. et al. 2015. Protein & Cell, 6, 363–372

⁵Science: A prudent path forward for genomic engineering and germline gene modification.

⁶Nature: NAS Gene Editing Summit.

⁷While Collins and Church participated in the summit, their views quoted here are from StatNews.com: A debate: Should we edit the human germline. See also Sciencenews.org: Editing human germline cells sparks ethics debate.

⁸Hurlbut, J. B. 2015. Limits of Responsibility, Hastings Center Report, 45(5): 11-14.

⁹This point is forcefully made by Sheila Jasanoff and colleagues: CRISPR Democracy, 2015 Issues in S&T, 22(1).

¹⁰Lander, E. 2016. The Heroes of CRISPR. Cell, 164(1-2): 18-28.

Despite the undeniable benefits of education to society, the educational needs, particularly in the world’s poorest countries, remain strikingly great. There are more than 67 million children not enrolled in primary school around the world, millions of children who are enrolled in school but not really learning, and too few young people are advancing to secondary school (van der Gaag and Adams 2010). Consider, for instance, the number of children unable to read a single word of connected text at the end of grade two: more than 90 percent in Mali, more than 50 percent in Uganda, and nearly 33 percent in Honduras (USAID n.d.).

With more young people of age 12 to 24 years today than ever before who are passing through the global education system and looking for opportunities for economic and civic participation, the education community is at a crossroads. Of the 1.5 billion young people in this age group, 1.3 billion live in developing countries (World Bank 2007). The global community set the goal of achieving universal primary education by 2015 and has failed to mobilize the resources necessary, as UNESCO estimates that $16.2 billion in external resources will be need to reach this goal.

Read the full report »

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Results from this report were presented at an April 6 Center on Universal Education event at the Brookings Institution.

Learn more about the launch event »

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INTRODUCTION

In August, 2010 the government of Kenya adopted a new constitution. This followed a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Kenyans voted for change. The decisive impetus for reform came from the widespread violence and political crisis that followed the 2007 election. While claims of electoral fraud provided the immediate catalyst for violence, the deeper causes were to be found in the interaction of a highly centralized ‘winner-take-all’ political system with deep social disparities based in part on group identity (Hanson 2008).

Provisions for equity figure prominently in the new constitution. Backed by a bill of rights that opens the door to legal enforcement, citizenship rights have been strengthened in many areas,including access to basic services. ‘Equitable sharing’ has been introduced as a guiding principle for public spending. National and devolved governments are now constitutionally required to redress social disparities, target disadvantaged areas and provide affirmative action for marginalized groups.

Translating these provisions into tangible outcomes will not be straightforward. Equity is a principle that would be readily endorsed by most policymakers in Kenya and Kenya’s citizens have provided their own endorsement through the referendum. However, there is an ongoing debate over what the commitment to equity means in practice, as well as over the pace and direction of reform. Much of that debate has centered on the constitutional injunction requiring ‘equitable sharing’ in public spending.

On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared.

There are compelling grounds for a strengthened focus on equity in Kenya. In recent years, the country has maintained a respectable, if less than spectacular, record on economic growth. Social indicators are also on an upward trend. On most measures of human development, Kenya registers average outcomes considerably above those for sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Yet the national average masks extreme disparities—and the benefits of increased prosperity have been unequally shared. Some regions and social groups face levels of deprivation that rank alongside the worst in Africa. Moreover, the deep fault lines running through society are widely perceived as a source of injustice and potential political instability.

High levels of inequality in Kenya raise wider concerns. There has been a tendency in domestic debates to see ‘equitable sharing’ as a guiding principle for social justice, rather than as a condition for accelerated growth and enhanced economic efficiency. Yet international evidence strongly suggests that extreme inequality—especially in opportunities for education— is profoundly damaging for economic growth. It follows that redistributive public spending has the potential to support growth.

The current paper focuses on a group of 12 counties located in Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs). They are among the most disadvantaged in the country. Most are characterized by high levels of income poverty, chronic food insecurity and acute deprivation across a wide range of social indicators.

Nowhere is the deprivation starker than in education. The ASAL counties account for a disproportionately large share of Kenya’s out-of-school children, pointing to problems in access and school retention. Gender disparities in education are among the widest in the country. Learning outcomes for the small number of children who get through primary school are for the most part abysmal, even by the generally low national average standards.

Unequal public spending patterns have played no small part in creating the disparities that separate the ASAL counties from the rest of Kenya—and ‘equitable sharing’ could play a role in closing the gap. But what would a more equitable approach to public spending look like in practice?

This paper addresses that question. It looks in some detail at education for two reasons. First, good quality education is itself a powerful motor of enhanced equity. It has the potential to equip children and youth with the skills and competencies that they need to break out of cycles of poverty and to participate more fully in national prosperity. If Kenya is to embark on a more equitable pattern of development, there are strong grounds for prioritizing the creation of more equal opportunities in education. Second, the education sector illustrates many of the wider challenges and debates that Kenya’s policymakers will have to address as they seek to translate constitutional provisions into public spending strategies. In particular, it highlights the importance of weighting for indicators that reflect need in designing formulae for budget allocations.

Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity.

The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 provides an overview of the approach to equity enshrined in the constitution. While the spirit of the constitution is unequivocal, the letter is open to a vast array of interpretations. We briefly explore the implications of a range of approaches. Our broad conclusion is that, while Kenya clearly needs to avoid public spending reforms that jeopardize service delivery in wealthier counties, redistributive measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Although this paper focuses principally on basic services, we caution against approaches that treat equity as a matter of social sector financing to the exclusion of growth-oriented productive investment.

Part 2 provides an analysis of some key indicators on poverty, health and nutrition. Drawing on household expenditure data, the report locates the 12 ASAL counties in the national league table for the incidence and depth of poverty. Data on health outcomes and access to basic services provide another indicator of the state of human development. While there are some marked variations across counties and indicators, most of the 12 counties register levels of deprivation in poverty and basic health far in excess of those found in other areas.

Part 3 shifts the focus to education. Over the past decade, Kenya has made considerable progress in improving access to basic education. Enrollment rates in primary education have increased sharply since the elimination of school fees in 2003. Transition rates to secondary school are also rising. The record on learning achievement is less impressive. While Kenya lacks a comprehensive national learning assessment, survey evidence points to systemic problems in education quality. In both access and learning, children in the ASAL counties—especially female children—are at a considerable disadvantage. After setting out the national picture, the paper explores the distinctive problems facing these counties.

In Part 4 we look beyond Kenya to wider international experience. Many countries have grappled with the challenge of reducing disparities between less-favored and more-favored regions. There are no blueprints on offer. However, there are some useful lessons and guidelines that may be of some relevance to the policy debate in Kenya. The experience of South Africa may be particularly instructive given the weight attached to equity in the post-apartheid constitution.

Part 5 of the paper explores a range of approaches to financial allocations. Converting constitutional principle into operational practice will require the development of formulae-based approaches. From an equitable financing perspective there is no perfect model. Any formula that is adopted will involve trade-offs between different goals. Policymakers have to determine what weight to attach to different dimensions of equity (for example, gender, income, education and health), the time frame for achieving stated policy goals, and whether to frame targets in terms of outcomes or inputs. These questions go beyond devolved financing. The Kenyan constitution is unequivocal in stipulating that the ‘equitable sharing’ provision applies to all public spending. We therefore undertake a series of formula-based exercises illustrating the allocation patterns that would emerge under different formulae, with specific reference to the 12 ASAL focus counties and to education.

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Ghana attained middle-income status after rebasing its National Accounts, pushing per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the country above $1,000 in 2007. After recovering from economic recession in 1984 on account of the Bretton Woods sponsored economic reform introduced at that time, Ghana’s growth has been remarkably strong, with its lowest economic growth of 3.3 percent recorded in 1994. The country’s growth rate reached its peak of 15 percent in 2011 on the back of the commencement of commercial production of oil, making it one of the fastest growing economies globally during that year. This has translated into increased per capita income, which reached a high of about $1,900 in 2013.

The concern, however, has been the ability of the country to sustain this growth momentum given the level and quality of education and skills, and, more importantly, the failure of this strong growth performance to be translated into the creation of productive and decent jobs, improved incomes and livelihoods. The structure of the economy remains highly informal, with a shift in the country’s national output composition from agriculture to low-value service activities in the informal sector. The commencement of commercial production of oil raised the share of the industrial sector in national output. However, the continuous decline in manufacturing value added undermines Ghana’s economic transformation effort to promote high and secure incomes and improve the livelihoods of the people.

Structural change towards higher value added sectors, and upgrading of technologies in existing sectors, is expected to allow for better conditions of work, better jobs, and higher wages. But the low level and quality of human resources not only diverts the economy from its structural transformation path of development but also makes it difficult for the benefits of growth to be spread through the creation of gainful and productive employment. Thus, productive structural economic transformation hinges on the level and quality of education and labor skills. A highly skilled, innovative and knowledgeable workforce constitutes a key ingredient in the process of structural economic transformation, and as productive sectors apply more complex production technologies and research and development activities increase the demand for education and skills. However, the observed weak human capital base does not provide a strong foundation for structural economic transformation of Ghana.

Ghana’s employment growth lags behind economic growth, with an estimated employment elasticity of output of 0.47, suggesting that every 1 percent of annual economic growth yields 0.47 percent growth of total employment.

There is also widespread concern about the quality of the country’s growth in terms of employment and inequality, as well as general improvement in the livelihood of the people (see Alagidede et al. 2013; Aryeetey et al. 2014; Baah-Boateng 2013). A key indicator for measuring the extent to which macroeconomic growth results in gains in the welfare of the citizenry is the quality of jobs that the economy generates. Ghana’s employment growth lags behind economic growth, with an estimated employment elasticity of output of 0.47 (see Baah-Boateng 2013), suggesting that every 1 percent of annual economic growth yields 0.47 percent growth of total employment. Besides the slow rate of job creation is the dominance of vulnerable employment and the working poverty rate in the labor market. In 2010, 7 out of 10 jobs were estimated to be vulnerable while only 1 out of 5 jobs could be considered as productive jobs that meet the standard of decent work (Baah-Boateng and Ewusi 2013). Workers in vulnerable employment tend to lack formal work arrangements as well as elements associated with decent employment such as adequate social security and recourse to effective social dialogue mechanisms (Sparreboom and Baah-Boateng 2011). The working poverty rate remains a challenge with one out of every five persons employed belonging to poor households.

The article seeks to provide an analytical assessment of Ghana’s economic growth as one of Africa’s growth giants over a period of more than two decades and the implication for labour market and livelihood outcomes. Growth of labor productivity at the national and sectoral level is examined, as well as the sectoral contribution to aggregate productivity growth. The article also analyses the effect of growth on employment and the employment-poverty linkage in terms of elasticity within the growth-employment-poverty nexus in Ghana. It also delves into a discussion of the constraints on growth and productive employment from both demand and supply perspectives, and identifies skills gaps and the opportunities offered in the country, which has experienced strong growth performance. The article has five sections, with an overview of Ghana’s economic growth performance in Section 2, after this introductory section. This is followed by an overview of the developments in the labor market, specifically in the area of employment, unemployment, poverty, and inequality in Ghana in Section 3. The growth-employment-poverty linkage analysis is carried out in Section 4 followed by a discussion of constraints to growth and employment generation in Section 5. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusion, with some policy suggestions for the future.

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In a recent analysis, I highlighted how employment and disconnection among young people vary by age, race, and place. In this podcast, I dig deeper into the data on the Washington, D.C. region. Although the area generally performs well on employment measures, not all young people are faring equally well.

Listen to the full podcast segment here: 

In the U.S., the older and younger generations look very different. While older Americans are predominantly white, young Americans, like millennials, have more varied racial backgrounds. These demographic chasms have political implications: white, older Americans tend to favor conservative politics and have overwhelmingly voted for Republican candidates in past elections; younger Americans, regardless of racial identity, tend to lean left and support broadening social support programs.

In a podcast segment, I explore how these racial and political divides between generations will, no doubt, impact this year’s presidential election and races in the future.

Listen to the full podcast here:

Editor's Note: This piece originally appeared in Foreign Policy.

The killing of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, reportedly via U.S. drone strike, is not just another notch in the belt of America’s long campaign against al-Qaida and its allies. Wuhayshi was one of al-Qaida’s top remaining leaders, and he is the highest-level death the organization has suffered since Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Wuhayshi headed al-Qaida’s most active affiliate, the Yemen-based al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and was the designated successor of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. His killing adds one more element of uncertainty to the turbulence in Yemen and may set AQAP on a new path. Which path, however, remains an open question.

Wuhayshi helped transform AQAP from a fractious organization on the edge of defeat to one that menaces both Yemen and the United States. A decade ago, Yemen’s jihadi movement seemed near defeat. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Yemeni government rounded up jihadis and imprisoned Wuhayshi, and it was Saudi Arabia, not Yemen, that was the focus of jihadis in the Arabian Peninsula. In 2003, al-Qaida sponsored the original AQAP’s uprising against the Saudi government. Several years later, most of AQAP’s Saudi members were dead or in jail, and its remnants had fled to Yemen. There, they mixed with Yemeni jihadis, including important figures like Wuhayshi, who had escaped from Yemen’s jails in 2006. In 2009, two regional Islamist groups merged and formally anointed themselves AQAP, basing their operations in Yemen and trying to unseat the government. As Osama bin Laden’s former secretary, Wuhayshi became the group’s leader and embraced al-Qaida’s emphasis on attacking Western targets.

The group made fitful progress, at times taking territory but often losing it quickly after alienating locals and proving vulnerable to government counterattacks. But when the government of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh fell in 2012 during the Arab Spring, AQAP tried to step into the void. Saleh’s successor, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, pursued AQAP vigorously, but his weak government was unable to score any lasting successes.

In addition to its prowess in Yemen, AQAP has long been al-Qaida’s most active affiliate when it comes to taking on the West. The organization was behind the 2009 Christmas Day attempt to down a U.S. airliner over Detroit, a near-miss only foiled by the bomber’s incompetence and the quick thinking of the plane’s passengers. AQAP tried again in 2010, this time attempting to down U.S. cargo planes. The organization also attacked Western targets in Yemen, and puts out Inspire, a stylish English-language online publication that is one of al-Qaida’s more effective attempts to influence Western jihadis.

These AQAP efforts to attack the United States and the West, in general, led to a greater U.S. focus on Yemen and more drone attacks there. In 2011, the United States killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and AQAP member who helped lead the terrorist group’s campaign against targets in the United States and Europe. Awlaki has continued to inspire terrorists after his death, with Boston Marathon plotters downloading his sermons before their attack. Awlaki also inspired the Fort Hood shooter in 2009 and the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo office in 2015.

Wuhayshi’s death, however, comes as Yemen is falling apart. Earlier this year, Hadi’s government fell to the Houthi rebels, Yemeni Shiites who oppose both Yemen’s traditional order and the Sunni fanatics of AQAP who see Shiites as apostates. Alarmed by Houthi ties to Iran, Saudi Arabia has led an intervention in Yemen on Hadi’s behalf, bombing the Houthis and trying to reverse their gains. AQAP seems to be flourishing amid the chaos, as its enemies turn on one another.

But with Wuhayshi’s death, AQAP may find it difficult to further exploit the Yemeni civil war. Personal connections, reputation, and charisma play a bigger role in leadership in the jihadi cause than do formal rank, and it is not clear if Qasim al-Raimi, the designated new leader, can retain the support of the AQAP rank and file. There is always a chance, of course, that Raimi proves an even more effective leader than Wuhayshi, and some observers see him as “more dangerous and aggressive.” (Lest we forget: In 1992, the Israelis killed Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, one of the group’s most competent leaders. Musawi was replaced by Hassan Nasrallah, who has proven one of the most effective terrorist and guerrilla leaders in modern times.)

The bad news is that Raimi and AQAP may seek revenge, both out of genuine anger and to score points within the jihadi community. Al-Qaida’s chief bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, may still be out there and has likely passed his sophisticated techniques on to others in Yemen.

The bad news is that Raimi and AQAP may seek revenge, both out of genuine anger and to score points within the jihadi community.

Over time, however, Wuhayshi’s death may push AQAP to focus even more on Yemen and less on the West. His close, personal ties to the al-Qaidacore may have been part of why AQAP was a steadfast ally of Zawahiri in his power struggle with the Islamic State. The opportunities and risks in the civil war are both tempting and frightening for AQAP. On the one hand, by taking up arms against the hated Shiites, AQAP can position itself as the defender of Yemen’s Sunnis, a strategy that has worked well for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. AQAP might gain more recruits and local support, while drawing foreign fighters and money from Sunnis eager to find yet another Shiite-Iran axis to oppose. Not surprisingly, AQAP has stepped up its operations against the Houthis in recent months.

AQAP also has an opportunity to govern. And the bad news for the West is that it has learned from its own many mistakes on this front. In the past when AQAP made gains, it tried to impose a strict version of Islamic law that alienated local communities. Now when its fighters seize territory, theywork with local tribal figures and other elites, avoiding the most controversial measures and trying to portray themselves as guardians, not overlords.

Wuhayshi’s death also comes at a time when the broader jihadi movement is split between backers of al-Qaida and supporters of the Islamic State, a struggle in which AQAP has long played an important role. As al-Qaida’s most active anti-Western affiliate, AQAP was important to Zawahiri’s claim that he was leading the struggle against the United States. Its strength in Yemen, moreover, also expanded al-Qaida’s presence and prestige to an important part of the Arab world. Islamic State supporters have already conducted attacks in Yemen, and the death of Wuhayshi offers them a chance to expand their influence there. The core leadership of AQAP is not likely to join the Islamic State, but some of its cells and supporters could break off if Raimi proves a weak leader.

For now, Wuhayshi’s death means the United States has another point in the struggle against the jihadi movement. In the long term, successful disruption is more likely if the United States and its allies can keep the pressure on AQAP, forcing its leaders to go on the run and hindering their ability to communicate — particularly difficult challenges for a group in transition under new leadership. Wuhayshi’s death also comes on the heels of the deaths of several other AQAP members, including its top ideologue and spokesman. Having to hide also makes it difficult for the group to govern, as its exposed leaders run the risk of being killed. But AQAP has lost many leaders before, yet remains a force to be reckoned with. So at best, this should be seen as winning a battle, not the war.

On December 12, 2015, 195 countries adopted the Paris Agreement, the most ambitious climate change pact to date. The document lays out a plan to curb greenhouse gas emissions, among other climate-related initiatives. Participating countries must now find ways to translate those ambitions into policy, and answer important questions about financing, transparency and accountability, national implementation, and accelerated emissions reduction goals, to name but a few. But one issue looms large: coal.

Coal-fired electricity is responsible for producing 40 percent of the world’s power and about 70 percent of its steel. The coal industry employs millions worldwide and provides billions of people with electricity. Analysts estimate that the world has hundreds of years of coal reserves in the ground, at current consumption levels. Its abundance, low price, and global availability make it a difficult fuel source to give up. But despite coal’s advantages, it poses significant environmental and health risks. Ten percent of coal consists of ash, which contains radioactive and toxic elements. It is responsible for over $50 billion in medical costs annually in the European Union alone. The environmental consequences of coal use, such as water contamination and habitat destruction, are common. Burning coal adds millions of tons of dangerous particulates and greenhouse gases, including carbon, to the atmosphere.

States and societies around the world rely on coal, even though many of its dangers have been known for decades. If the Paris Agreement is to succeed, global leaders must address the reasons why many countries—particularly in the developing world—still rely on coal. Better yet, they must find new ways to provide coal-reliant countries with affordable, alternative energy, and invest in new technologies that could help mitigate coal’s negative consequences.

COAL ACROSS THE WORLD

Globally, coal production and consumption has risen almost continuously for more than 200 years. The International Energy Agency has estimated that the world burned approximately 7,876 million tons of coal in 2013, adding over 14.8 gigatons of carbon to the atmosphere. But global coal statistics do not tell us much about markets and trends. In fact, coal usage varies enormously around the world, with some regions transitioning away from the resource as others have increasingly embraced it.

For example, stringent environmental, health, and safety policies in the United States have put increasing pressure on the coal industry. Well-funded environmental groups have succeeded in closing coal-fired power plants, and many states on the country’s west coast and in its northeast have aimed to create a coal-free power grid. Yet market forces have turned out to be the nail in U.S. coal’s coffin. The rise of natural gas in the United States has gave the country’s electricity producers an incentive to shift away from coal. In fact, U.S. coal consumption declined from a billion tons in 2008, to roughly 850 million tons by 2013. This year, analysts suggest that coal will fuel only 32 percent of all U.S. electricity, and natural gas will become the country’s leading electricity source for the first time. As a result of low prices, low returns, and political controversy, investors have shied away from coal, which has caused major coal companies to struggle to stay afloat. Of all announced new electricity generation capacity in the United States, not a single megawatt is coal-fired. Although change is happening, it will likely be decades before coal is no longer an important fuel source in the U.S. economy. Canada’s coal sector faces similar pressures: weak demand from Asia, public opposition to the construction of new export facilities, domestic environmental legislation, and the shale boom have all taken their toll.

In Europe, stringent air quality controls and climate change regulations have cut the use of coal dramatically in Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. But the EU emissions trading scheme, which relies on carbon offsets and carbon dioxide caps, has proven disappointing. In fact, most European countries still lack an economically competitive and readily available alternative to coal. Plus, the coal industry still has political power in capitals like Berlin and Warsaw, which lowers the European common denominator for energy policy, as well as its policies that fight climate change.

Photo courtesy of REUTERS/James Regan/File Photo. Coal is stockpiled at the Blair Athol mine in the Bowen Basin coalfield near the town of Moranbah, Australia, June 1, 2012.

In Asia, both Japan and South Korea are set to expand their use of coal despite signing the Paris Agreement. After the Fukushima disaster, Japan has implemented ambitious renewables and energy efficiency policies, but those cannot take the place of its nuclear energy production on their own. These countries are entirely import dependent, which makes natural gas prices high. This, in turn, makes natural gas a less likely fuel source as the countries transition to greener electricity. In this context, high-efficiency coal plants appear to be a viable alternative, especially as nuclear power remains highly controversial.

And outside of advanced economies, coal often plays the role it once played in Europe and North America. For over a decade, China was the main engine of global coal consumption, driving booms in coal mining and shipping. China’s domestic coal production skyrocketed, and other countries, such as Australia, experienced coal booms to keep pace with Chinese demand. Although China produced and consumed almost as much coal as the rest of the world combined in 2014, it seems that the country’s consumption has peaked. But China will still rely heavily on coal-fired electricity for decades. The country remains a key player in steel production, and millions of its citizens continue to work in the mining industry, despite recent layoffs.

South Asian countries continue to invest heavily in new coal-fired electricity plants and industrial projects. India may appreciate the risks of climate change, but its chief concern is delivering low-cost power to 350 million of its citizens who lack electricity. Coal is set to play a prominent role in meeting such goals. Countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam have followed suit as they search for low-cost electricity to power their countries.

In short, coal remains a big player in the global fuel mix, even as it faces tough challenges from stringent environmental regulations, competition from other fuel sources, and a lack of new investments.

Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Sheng Li/Files. A labourer carries honeycomb briquettes at a coal processing factory in Shenyang, Liaoning province in this December 2, 2009 file photo.

WHITHER COAL?

Different strategies apply in different parts of the world when it comes to eradicating coal, despite the global agreement in Paris. Just as there is not a global energy grid, there is also no single, global transition to lower-carbon energy. Although some countries are transitioning away from coal, others continue to transition toward it.

Second, pragmatism and persistence—rather than ideological purity—remain key values as countries transition towards low-carbon economies. Natural gas provides North America with a backup fuel as it transitions to green energy. Without major bulk terminals on the west coast, western U.S. coal producers will not find new markets for their products overseas. And in Europe, policymakers will have to make good on long-promised and long-delayed changes to energy policy and infrastructure. If Germany and other EU states are to achieve promised clean energy transitions, coal production must be scaled back substantially across the continent. European leaders must also build an “Energy Union” that will accelerate the flow of cross-border electricity, if they are to achieve the Paris Accord’s climate change goals. Europe must also reform its existing carbon pricing mechanisms. And across China, Europe, and North America, workers will have to be re-educated for new job opportunities as the coal market dries up.

But for now, coal still keeps the light on around the world. It powers new, high-tech economies, as well as a huge share of traditional manufacturing. If hundreds of millions of Africans and Asians are to gain access to electricity, new coal-fired power plants will have to come online in the years ahead. As coal continues to play a prominent role in industrial processes like steel and cement making, technological investments are required to limit its consequences.

To tackle these challenges, coal advocates, as well as some climate experts, suggest that more countries must invest in carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) research. But such investments are lagging, and the world would require several dozen CCS projects in order to make the technology commercially viable in the long term.

If the Paris Accord is to succeed, the earth’s atmosphere cannot remain a free dump for billions of tons of pollution every year. In fact, virtually all greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced. Countries can impose taxes, cap-and-trade schemes, and regulation to make this happen. Governments will have to design unique strategies that are custom fit to their countries, and, in some cases, find opportunities with their neighbors as well. For example, some private and public institutions have chosen to stop financing coal-fired projects, and the Obama administration has indicated it will not give out new leases for coal mining on federal land. Others will choose to build more coal-fired plants until the alternatives are cheaper, or until someone pays them not to.

Globally, coal may indeed be at the beginning of the end. But the energy transition is not strictly global. It is also national, regional, and local. Coal remains economically competitive—attractive even—in many parts of the world. Some countries will wage wars on coal, which will be as much economic and financial as they are political. But some countries, like India, will host coal booms regardless of the consequences. After Paris, there is no point in ignoring coal. It will be powering the world—and the world’s debates—for decades to come.

This piece was originally published by Foreign Affairs.

In many African countries, women still cannot own land or resources, a significant barrier to their ability to start businesses and take advantage of the continent’s economic potential.  Fellow Anne Kamau explores their plight.

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Summary

At the Gleneagles Summit in 2005, leaders of the G8 group of nations committed to increase aid to poor nations by $50 billion per year. During the same year, in a meeting in Paris, donors promised to coordinate their interventions for more effective delivery. These commitments are now often referred to as the promise of donors to “scale up aid.” Increasing aid flows and improving coordination are indeed important goals and, in fact, goals that donors seem to have trouble meeting. The international donor community met this fall in Accra and will meet in Doha in November 2008 to review progress with this aspect of scaling up aid, and it is hoped that they will recommit to meet the ambitious targets set three years ago.

Scaling up aid is only one of the challenges that donors face. A more important challenge is to “scale up through aid,” meaning that aid flows should not merely support short-lived, one-time and partial development interventions—pilot projects, short-term technical assistance, programs that only address part of the problem, but leave major bottlenecks unaddressed—but should support projects, programs and policies that scale up successful interventions in a country, region or globally to reach the entire target population. Scaling up means that programs are long-term and sustained and that external support is aligned with country needs and deals comprehensively with the development challenges—often by working in partnership with other donors and pooling resources. This is the scaling up challenge that donors should address head-on, but so far have not.

This policy brief reports on the findings of an in-depth review of the literature and practice of scaling up development interventions and focuses on the role that aid donors can play in supporting scaling up for effective development. It stresses that successful scaling up with external assistance means that donor agencies need to: work with a vision and leadership; help create the political constituencies for large-scale implementation; create linkages among project, program and policy interventions; strengthen the institutional capacity of the implementing entities; provide for effective incentives and accountabilities of their own staff and management; work together with each other; monitor and evaluate the progress of programs with special attention to the scaling up dimension; and finally make sure they focus on effective preparation and flexible implementation of the scaling up process. While this is a long-term agenda, donors can take a few practical steps right away that will provide a basis for a more ambitious effort over time.

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By 2020, Millennials will comprise more than one of three adult Americans. It is estimated that by 2025 they will make up as much as 75 percent of the workforce.  Millennials’ desire for pragmatic action that drives results will overtake today’s emphasis on ideology and polarization as Boomers finally fade from the scene. Thus, understanding the generation’s values offers a window into the future of corporate America.

Morley Winograd and Michael Hais outline the cultural force of the Millennial generation on the economy as Millennials increasingly dominate the nation’s workplaces and permeate its corporate culture. Winograd and Hais argue that the current culture on Wall Street is becoming increasingly isolated from the beliefs and values of America’s largest adult generation. The authors also include data on Millennials’ ideal employers, their financial behaviors, and their levels of institutional trust in order to provide further insight into this important demographic.

Key Millennial values shaping the future of the American economy include:

• Interest in daily work being a reflection of and part of larger societal concerns.
• Emphasis on corporate social responsibility, ethical causes, and stronger brand loyalty for companies offering solutions to specific social problems.
• A greater reverence for the environment, even in the absence of major environmental disaster.
• Higher worth placed on experiences over acquisition of material things.
• Ability to build communities around shared interests rather than geographical proximity, bridging otherwise disparate groups.

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International jihad has undergone a wholesale internal revolution in recent years. The dramatic emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and its proclamation of a Caliphate means that the world no longer faces one Sunni jihadi threat, but two, as IS and al-Qaida compete on the global stage. What is the relationship between the groups and how do their models differ? Is IS’s rapid organizational expansion sustainable? Can al-Qaida adapt and respond?

Read "Jihadi Rivalry: The Islamic State Challenges al-Qaida"

In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Charles Lister explores al-Qaida and IS’s respective evolutions and strategies. He argues that al-Qaida and its affiliates are now playing a long game by seeking to build alliances and develop deep roots within unstable and repressed societies. IS, on the other hand, looks to destabilize local dynamics so it can quickly seize control over territory.

Lister finds that the competition between IS and al-Qaida for jihadi supremacy will continue, and will likely include more terrorist attacks on the West. Accordingly, he calls for the continued targeting of al-Qaida leaders, the disruption of jihadi financial activities, and greater domestic intelligence and counter-radicalization efforts. Lister concludes, however, that state instability across the Muslim world must be addressed or jihadis will continue to thrive.

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Millions of Egyptians took to the streets in January 2011 chanting “‘ish, hurriyya, ‘adalah ijtima‘iyya,” or bread, freedom, and social justice. This simple chant captured protestors’ desire for a new Egypt defined by economic, political, and social change. Five years later, however, the attainment of those demands seems more elusive than ever. In the economic sphere, Egypt still faces the major challenge of high unemployment, particularly among educated youth. Why do so many of Egypt’s young university graduates struggle to find employment?

Read "Educated but unemployed: The challenge facing Egypt’s youth"

In this policy briefing, Adel Abdel Ghafar analyzes the roots of Egypt’s youth unemployment crisis, starting with the structural issues plaguing the country’s educational system. He then examines other contributing factors including neoliberal economic reforms, gender inequality, and the lack of entrepreneurship. Abdel Ghafar warns that failing to address the unemployment issue will increase the likelihood of another uprising.

Abdel Ghafar thus argues that the Egyptian government must urgently undertake reforms and devote extensive resources to dealing with youth unemployment. Specifically, he recommends ways in which Egypt can revamp public university funding, promote vocational training, stimulate entrepreneurship, and increase the participation of women in the workforce.

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